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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Adltya Prasad Mukhopadhyay
The Mltaksara Birthright: A Comparative Study In the Light 
of Anticipated Legislation In India.
This thesis Is primarily about the relevancy of the Mltaksara birthright, 
the pivot of the juridical Hindu joint family, In the context of codification of a 
uniform C iv il Code or Code of Family Law In India. It also represents an enquiry 
Into the origination of the concept and a study of It In Its historical and compara­
tive perspective. The comparative framework of the thesis shows that a Hindu 
legal Institution, which governs about one-sixth of the human race, may stand 
comparison with the Institutions of any system with which It Is likely to be com­
pared. In compliance with the progress of social science, the study of law Is 
heading towards an Inter-disciplinary approach, and In the present study atten­
tion Is also focussed on the operation and veritable social role of the juridical 
concept of joint fam ily. Contemporary attempts at creating a uniform world 
law have come Into the foreground, prompted basically by socio-economic 
changes throughout the world. In the context of this global unification move­
ment, the present study Indicates that any viable attempt to reform, modernise 
and unify the personal laws (e .g . Hindu law) In India deserves a comparative 
awareness of other legal systems of the world, past and present.
Chapter 1 deals, generally, with the justification of a comparative study of
Hindu law with other legal systems. The chapter also explains the scope, 
purpose and methods adopted In the present study.
Chapter 2 deals broadly with the proprietary concepts In Roman family law and 
examines particularly the hypothesis that the Institution of joint family 
existed In pre-classlcal Rome.
Chapter 3 deals with the proprietary relationship existing between male 
ascendants and descendants In ancient Greek, Albanian and South 
Slavonian laws.
Cbapter 4 Is a study of the ancient Celtic familial Institutions and an explora­
tion of the Identical Hindu and Celtic juridical concepts In respect of 
ownership of property.
Chapter 5 examines the soctal and juridical relationships In Germanic law, 
particularly a son's position In the Germanic scheme of Inheritance.
Chapter 6 Is a comparative appraisal of Babylonian, Assyrian, Elamite and 
H lttlte  laws relative to the son's right In family property.
Chapter 7 Is an attempt to focus attention on those aspects of Jewish law which 
clarify the son's position In relation to property In the hands of his father.
Chapter 8 Is a discussion of the points of similarity and difference between 
Sasanlan and Hindu familial Institutions.
Chapter 9 Is an attempt to make a rapid survey of the nature of ownership of 
family property In Farther India (part of South and South-East Asia) 
seeking out Its origins In the Hindu system.
Chapter 10 deals with the relevant comparable Institutions of the Chinese and 
Japanese systems In the context of our present study.
Chapter 11 discusses the corporate rights In ownership of property In African 
customary law, In comparison wlih the Mltaksara system.
Chapter 12 Is an attempt to explore the origin of the concept of birthright In 
the pre-dharmasastra and dharmasastra literature.
Chapter 13 Is an examination of the treatment and development of the concept 
of birthright In early mediaeval Hindu commentatorlal literature.
Chapter 14 examines the juridical attitude of the late mediaeval commentators 
and also of the 17th century logicians towards Vljncne^vara's theory of 
birthright.
Chapter 15 Is a critical assessment of the concept of co-ownership between 
father and son In Vlvadarnava-setu (The Code of Gentoo Laws) and 
Vlvada-bhangarnava (Colebrooke^ Digest).
Chapter 16 Is an exploration of the meaning of co-ownership of father and 
son In the vyavastha (opinions of court pandits) literature. In this 
respect, the Chapter also Includes the juridical vyavastha works.
Chapter 17 deals with the extent of a father's power of disposition of family 
property. Four main areas are discussed: right of preemption, testa­
mentary power, alienation of self-acquired Immovables and right of 
merger or blending.
Chapter 18 examines the rights of different kinds of sons relating to the concept 
of birthright. The rights of two types of son, namely, those of the I lle ­
gitimate son (Including sudra's daslputra) and the adopted son, are dis­
cussed In de ta il.
Chapter 19 deals with the extent of birthright In Anglo-Hlndu law In different 
types of property, namely, joint family property, self-acquired property 
and property Inherited from the maternal grandfather.
Chapter 20 deals with birthright and a son's right to demand partition of family 
property under various circumstances.
Chapter 21 examines the relevancy of birthright In the light of contemporary 
socio-economic developments. Although statistical material regarding 
the number of joint and nucbar families to be found In different regions 
In India has been quoted, the significance of this must not be overstressed; 
such figures were Intended to act as Indicators and not as absolute guides. 
The Chapter highlights the anomalies and uncertainties arising out of the 
relevant provisions of the Hindu Succession A ct, 1956. Also discussed 
are the advantages and disadvantages of the joint family system, and the 
findings Indicate that the sociological jo int family w ill not necessarily 
wither away with the abolition of the juridical joint fam ily. It Is pointed 
out that the shifting of values within the familial organisation depends on 
multiple factors, v iz .,  changes In social philosophy; profound transform­
ation In the economic status of the family through statutory enactments,
e .g . land reform, revenue laws, e tc .; modern scientific and medical 
developments which make birth control and family planning possible; 
and growing claims of the State on the family, without, of course, assum­
ing any visible or substantial responsibility towards the family.
Chapter 22 deals with the peculiarities and gradual disintegration of the Malabar 
joint fam ily. The Chapter also discusses the Kerala Joint Hindu Family 
System (Abolition) Act, 1975, Act 30 of 1976.
Chapter 23: The last Cfnpter reminds us of and attempts to answer the problem 
posed at the beginning of the Thesis. The Chapter concludes that the 
Mltaksara birthright should be abolished by Parliament and In that respect, 
and by way of recommendation, sets out a proposed b i l l .  Lastly, the 
Chapter goes Into the crux of the problem by pointing out the typical 
orthodox arguments of the religious groups against reform of personal 
laws, and emphasises the need for a rational and humane attitude towards 
reform of family laws for a modern nation committed to secularism and 
modernity.
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THE HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND
I . Introduction
The march of mankind through stages of clvlllzatlon(s) coincides (not 
necessarily Tn terms of evolution) with modes of legal thinking, and even the be­
havioural pattern of primitive man, Tn a sense, bears the ascription of a juridical 
no rm j The history of the early dwellers on this earth and, more so, their legal 
history, Is partly *hldden In an unrecorded past1, and that Is why to unravel the
1. P. Radln, The World of Primitive Man, (New York, 1953), 223. Jerome Hall 
Illustrates that a ll societies are legal orgamsations -  ubl socletas, ubl lus; on the 
other hand, legal norms are of primary significance Tn social action, J . H all, 
Comparative Law and Social Theory, (Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 112, 
117. E .A . Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man, (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 5. 
’'Law Is an Index of civilization which reflects the underlying value concepts In­
herent within that c iv iliza tion1, S .M . Paul, Studies In the Book of the Covenant 
Tn the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law, (Leiden, 1970), Introd., 1. Stanley 
Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom*, Tn D . Black and M . 
MlleskT, ed ., The Social Organization of Law, (New York/London, 1973), 318— 
341 at 323. * . . .  law Is directly linked to the analysis of the social situation to
which the law applies, . . . * ,  D .N . Schlff, *SocTo-Legal Theory: SocTal Structure 
and Law*, Modern Law Review, 39 (1976) 3: 287-310 at 287.
2 . A .S . Diamond, Primitive Law, Past and Present, (London, 1971), Introd., 3 . 
Also E.S. Hartland, Primitive Law, (London, 1924), Introd. 3 .
legal pattern of primitive society non-legal sciences such as ethnography, phllo-
2 3logy and anthropology are complimentary. Indeed, In this respect, non-
4 5legal works provide Information which Is Invaluable for the jurist studying the
Interaction between ‘quid fact!* and ‘quid juris*.^ This generalisation Is basically
1 • One of the most Important writings Tn this field Is by P. Koschaker, ‘Die Ehe- 
formen be! den Indogermanen*, lecture delivered In the section: Ethnologle ju rl- 
dlque, II International Congress for Comparative Law, The Hague, 1937. 
Koschaker*s theory Is summarised by J . Renger, *Who are A ll These People?*, 
Orlentalla, 42 (1973), 259-273 at 260-1. Equally Illuminating are the works 
of Mozzarella. On his theory, see Derrett, ‘Juridical Ethnology: The Life 
and Work of Giuseppe Mazzarella (1868 -  1958), ZVR 71 (1970), 1-44 at 14-28, 
especially at 23-4. On the method of studying jural ethnography, see P. 
Bohannan, *The Differing Realms of the Law*, In L. Nader, ed., The Ethnogtaphy 
of Law, American Anthropologist, 67 (1965) 6, pt.2: 33-42 at 41-2; also 
Ethnography and Comparison In Legal Anthropology*, In L. Nader, ed ., Law In 
Culture and Society, (Chicago, 1969), 401-418. Also J . KurczewskI, The 
Ethnographic Approach*, Tn A . Podgoreckl, ed ., Law and Society, (London/ 
Boston, 1974 ) ,  66-82 at 66. On jurlst*s function and Importance In Inter­
disciplinary study, see Derrett, *LuIz da Cunha Gonqalves (1875 -  1956):
Jurist, Comparative Lawyer and Orientalist*, ZVR 74 (1974), 137-162 at 139.
For an Interesting work In context of Hindu law, see S. Singh, Evolution o f the 
Smrtl Law: A  Study In the Factors Leading to the Origin and Development of 
Ancient Indian Legal Ideas, Bharatiya VIdya Prakasana, Varanasi, 1972), 125- 
196 et seqT
2. For a summary of the anthropological contribution to law, see L. Nader, The 
Anthropological Study of Law* , American Anthropologist, 67 (1965) 6, pt.2: 
3-32.
3. J . Renger, *Who are A ll These People?*, Orlentalla, 42 (1973), 259-273 at 
260-1. E. Cotran and N .N . Rubin, ed., Readings In African Law, (London, 
1970), Introd. x v ll.
4 . Hermann Kantorowlcz points out that there are many subjects Including some of
a non-legal nature which employ a concept o f law, H. Kantorowlcz, The Defini­
tion of Law, (Cambridge University Press, 1958), 29,
5. A .N . A llo tt, The Methods of Legal Research Into Customary Law*, Journal of 
African Administration, 5 (1953) 4: 172-77 at 172.
6. G . Gurvltch, Sociology of Law, (London, 1947, rpt. 1974), Preface, x .
true of juridical research Tnto the norms and customs  ^ o f any prellterate people,
2 3and the case of the Hindus, a branch of the proto-lndo-Europeans, Is no ex­
ception .
I I . Hindus and the Indo-Europeans
4 —There Is now *falrly general agreement*" that the Aryan peoples had
1. Bohannan explains that ‘norm Is a rule, more or less overt*, which expresses 
"ought" aspects of relationships between human beings. Custom Is a body of 
such norms -  Including regular deviations and compromises with norms -  that
Is actually followed In practice much of the time*, P, Bohannan, The Differ­
ing Realms of Law*, Tn D. Black and M . MlleskI, ed ., The Social Organization 
of Law, op. c lt . ,  306-317 at 308. Seagle, of course, does not consider cus­
tom and law as ‘Interchangeable phenomena*. He says, *lf custom Is In the 
truest sense of the terms of spontaneous and automatic, law Is the product of 
organized force. Reciprocity Is Tn force In civilized communities, toa# but 
at least nobody confuses social with formal legal relationships*, W. Seagle,
The History o f Law, (New York, 1946), 35. Seagle Is supported by S. Diamond, 
The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom*, Tn D. Black and M . MlleskI, ed., 
Ib id ., 318-341 at 321-2.
2. On the role of custom In Hindu law, see Derrett, Religion, Law and the State 
In India, (London, 1968), ch.6.
3. Infra
4 . J .G . Macqueen, The HIttltes and Their Contemporaries In Asia Minor (London,
1975) , 25. Earlier pointed out by W .K . Sullivan, Introduction to Eugene 
0*Curry*s On the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish, 3 vols. (London, 
1873), I, Iv -v . M . D illon, ‘Celt and Hindu*, VIshveshvaranand Indologlcal 
Journal, 1 (1963) 2 : 203-223 at 222.
a common root and common abode.^ Here linguistic evidences come to our a id ,
1. Scholars differ on the location of the original home (die Indogermanlsche Urhelmat) 
of the Aryans. Bal Gangadhar TTlak tried to establish that *the oldest home of the 
Aryan people was somewhere In regions round about the North Pole*, The Arctic 
Home In the Vedas; Being also a Key to the Interpretation of many Vedlc Texts 
and Legends, (Poona, 1956), 18, also 384. Some of the scholars opine that 
central Asia was the original abode of the Indo-Europeans. A .B . Keith pre­
ferred this view, see *The Early History of the lndo-Iran Tans*, In Commemorative 
Essays to R .G . Bhandarkar, (B .O .R .I., Poona, 1971), 81-92 at 91. T. Burrow 
supports the view that South Russia was the original home of the Indo-Europeans,
The Sanskrit Language, New and Revised, ed , (London, 1973) 1, II. Vlnogradoff 
doubted the Central Aslan hypothesis and held the view that the Aryans first Inhabit­
ed Northern Europe, particularly the shores of the Baltic, Outlines of Historical 
Jurisprudence, (O .U .P ., London, 1920), I, 216. P. Giles refutes Vlnogradoff*s 
supposition In E .J . Rapson, ed., Cambridge History o f India, (Cambridge, 1922 ),
I, 68-69. For an admirable exposition of a ll the views, see V .G . Chllde, The 
Aryans: A Study of Indo-European Origins, (London, 1926), ch .V -V Il, e t. seq. 
Also H. Bruce Hannah, ‘Aryan Origins*, In Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume, (Patna, 
1926-28), I, 104-119. Keith pointed out that without archaeological evidence, 
the common abode hypothesis based on linguistic evidence, ‘pure and simple* was 
open to gravest doubt. He examined the available linguistic and archaeological 
evidences but could not come tc/deflnlte conclusion In localising the Indo-Euro­
peans, A .B . Keith, The Home of the Indo-Europeans*, Tn J .D .C . Parvy, ed., 
Oriental Studies In Honour of Cursetjl Erachjl Parvy, (London, 1933), 189-199 
at 189, 191, 194-6, 199. The Importance of archaeological evidence was also 
emphasised by Professor Kellogg, see Proceedings of the Middle West Branch of 
the American Oriental Society, Urbana, Illinois, 1928, JAOS 48 (1928), 358.
D .S. Trlveda pointed out the fa llib ility  of phonetic laws but took the opportunity 
of claiming that the Aryans were first bom on the bank of river Devlka near 
Multan, The Original Home of the Aryans*, ABORI 20 (1938) 1: 49-68 at 52,68. 
Ganganatha Jha accepted the weakness of linguistic evidences. He also doubted 
the theory that the Aryans came to India from outside, but he Invited further re­
search on the problem. B .K . Ghosh, of course, did not give any weight to 
Jha*s suggestion of Indian origin of the Aryans, The Aryan Problem*, In R.C. 
Majumdar, ed ., The Bharatiya Itlhasa Samltl*s History and Culture of the Indian 
People, V o l.I, The Vedlc Age, (London, 1951)^ 201-217. P. Bosch-GImpera 
opines that the embryo of the Indo-Europeans lies Tn Mesolithic Europe but found 
that archaeological evidence was against the European theory of the Indo-Euro­
pean homeland, see review of Bosch-GImpera*s Les Indo-Europeens, problems 
archaeologlques, (Paris, 1961), M . GTmbutas, The Indo-Europeans: Archaeo- 
loglcaI Problems*, American Anthropologist, 65 (1963), 815-836 at 815, 833.
For recent doubts by jurists on the linguistic basis of the Indo-European concept, 
see, J .A . Crook, ‘Patrla Potestas*, Classical Quarterly, 17 (1967): 113-122 at 
115. A lsoD . Daube, Studies In B ib lica l Law, (Cambridge University Press,
1947, rp t., 1969), 201. GTmbutas consistently claims that Kurgan culture of 
the Eurasian steppe was the basis of Indo-European culture. M . GImbutas,
Cont*d . on next page :
and, Tn this respect A do lf KaegT states:
To comparative philology we owe the Indisputable 
proof of the fact that the ancestors of Indians and 
Iranians and Greeks, of Slavs and Lithuanians and 
Germans, of Italians and Celts, In far distant ages 
spoke one language, and as a single people held 
dwelling-places In common, wherever that home 
may have been situated; and further, that for a 
considerable period after their separation from 
their brothers living further to the west, the Indians 
and Iranians lived together, and distinguished them­
selves from other tribes by the common name of  ^
Aryan. After their separation from the Iranians,
Note 1; -  p.4 -  continued:
‘Proto-Indo-European Culture: The Kurgan Culture During the Fifth, Fourth 
and Third MUIenla B .C .*, In G . Cardona, H .M . Hoenlgswald, and A . Senn, 
ed ., Indo-European and Indo-Europeans, (Philadelphia, 1970), 155-197at 190; 
also her *The Beginning of the Bronze Age In Europe and the Indo-Europeans: 
3500-2500 B .C .*, Journal of Indo-European Studies, 1 (1973), 163-214. But 
Goodenough doubts the Kurgan theory of GImbutas. He opines that archaeo­
logical evidence Is entirely compatTblewith linguistic evidence In pointing to 
the North European plain as the most probable home of the Proto-Into-Europeans, 
W .H . Goodenough, *The Evolution of Pastorallsm and Indo-European Origins*,
In G . Cardonft, Ib id ., 253-265, at 257, 262. In effect, GImbutas Is supported 
by P. Friedrich, ‘Proto-Indo-European Kinship*, Ethnology, 5 (1966) 1: 1-36 at 
2-3 . Also P. Harblson, The Coming of the Indo-Europeans to Ireland: An 
Archaeological Viewpoint*, JIS 3 (1975) 2: 101-119 at 101. The controversy 
on thefonsetorlgo of the Indo-Europeans has also been opened by P.L.Bhargava, 
The Original Home of the Aryans and Indo-lranlan Migrations*, ABORI, 48-9 
(1968), Golden Jubilee Volume, 219-226. Some scholars doubt the hypothesis 
That, along with related languages the Indo-Europeans had a common origin . . . * ,  
see Rosane Rocher, ‘Review of Cardona, Hoenlgswald and Senn*, JAOS 93 (1973), 
615-617 at 616. But the hypotheses of an original homeland and original Indo- 
European speech community are too well accepted to be overlooked, see T.Burrow^ 
The Early Aryans*, In A .L . Basham, ed., ACuItural History of India , Oxford, 
(1975), 20-29 at 22.
1. See F.C. Davar, Iran and Its Culture, (Bombay, 1953), 151, B .K . Ghosh, 
‘ Indo-lranlan Relations*, In k.C . Majumdar, ed ., The Vedlc Age, o p .c lt., 
218-224 at 218.
the Eastern Aryans, the later Indians, wandered 
from the west Tnto the land afterwards called 
India, descending from the heights of Iran, pro-.j 
bably over the western passes of the HTndukush.
That the common habitation and migratory course of the Aryans are 
supported by comparative philology was specifically eirTphasTsed by Max MO Her 
Tn these words:
The evidence of language Is Irrefragable, and 
It Is the only evidence worth listening to with 
regard to ante-historical periods. It would 
have been next to Impossible to discover any 
traces of relationship between the swarthy 
natives of India and their conquerors whether 
Alexander or C live, but for the testimony borne 
by language. ^
Granted that the Romantic period fostered such views, and that 
language Is held In common by the conquered (for example) and their conquerors, 
the nature and extent of linguistic evidence points unmistakably to migrations and 
Is supported by ethnographic particulars -  and archaeological artifacts.
Small wonder that hypotheses of common language and common abode 
would naturally Inspire a legal comparatlst to probe Into the possibility of an
1. A . Kaegl, The Rlgveda, tr . R. Arrowsmlth, (New Delhi, 1972), Introd., 11. 
On the basis of linguistic evidence, Sir William Jones also put forward the same 
view In 1786 In his famous address to the Asiatic Society of Bengal, see H. 
Pedersen, Linguistic Science In the Nineteenth Century, tr. J . Spargo, 
(Bloomington, 1931), 18: R.C. Majumdar, ed ., The Vedlc Age, loc. c l t . ,  
201; a lsoE .J. Raps on, ed ., The Cambridge History of India, op. c l t . ,  65.
2. F. Max MiJlIer, The Vedas, (Delhi, 1961), 1. AIsoR. von Iherlng, Vorge- 
schlchte der lndo-Europder, tr. A . Drucker, sub. t i t .  The Evolution of the 
Aryans, (London, 18£7), x l.  On philological evidences, also see P. V lno­
gradoff, Outline of the History of Jurisprudence, o p .c lt., I, 215-231.
unilinear development of legal Institutions among the Indo-Europeans.^ How­
ever, to quite a number of Romanists the adjective ‘L^e-European* applied to law
2 3Is highly objectionable. Indeed, considering the ‘challenge* and ‘response*,
to each c iv ilization , ‘ law and Institutions cannot be affiliated to a common ancestor
4
with anything like the same certainty as languages . . . . * ,  nevertheless, despite
5
these limitations, Leopold Wenger opines:
Certain principles of law can be claimed as a 
common Indo-Germanlc Inheritance, which a ll 
or some Aryan daughter-peoples have retained 
from a common past In the course of their sepa­
rate historical development as nations. ^
I I I . Hindu Law: case for comparison
It Is Indeed correct to say that ‘no one now seriously believes that 
there Is a pattern of human social development through which every society must
1. The study was Initiated by Sir Henry Maine. On limitations of such studies, 
seeG . Gurvltch, Sociology of Law, (London, 1974), 79-80.
2. D .A . Blnchy, ‘Celtic Suretyship, A  Fossilized Indo-European Institution*, In 
G . Cardona, H .M . Hoenlgswald, and A . Senn, ed ., Indo-European and 
Indo-Europeans, Papers presented at the Third I ^ -European Conference at the 
Univarsity of Pennsylvania, 1966, (Philadelphia, 1970), 355-367 at 355.
3 . A .J . Toynbee, Change and Habit, (London, 1966), 7, 151.
4 . D .A . Blnchy, lo c .c lt ., 355.
5 . ‘Gewlsse Rechtssdtze lassen slch a Is Indogermanlsches gemelnsames Erbgut an- 
sprechen, das alle oder elnlge arlsche Tochtervdlker aus elner gemelnsamen 
Vorzelt In Tnhre natlonale geschlchtllche Sonderentwlcklung mltgebracht haben*r 
L. Wenger, Die Quellen des rdmlschen Rechts, (Wien, 1953), 11.
6 . Translated forme by Derrett.
pass^ We cannot expect that the Hindus who came to India Via Azerbaijan 
2and Western Persia* woujd retain and show exactly Identical patterns of jegal
3
development with their European counterparts, but this possible diversity of
social development does not Invalidate the case for comparison of Hindu law
with other systems; on the contrary, *the real Hindu law (let the courts do what
they liked with such fragments as they toyed with) deserved comparison with the
4
Roman and the Greek . .  .*
A Younger student of comparative ancient law has very recently 
committed himself to the thesis that family law In the ancient Mediterranean 
and Middle East has common, Identifiable, recognisable and predictable feat­
ures which, at a glance, distinguish the Greco-Roman cultural world at Its
widest (It bordered on Russia and Iran) from African and South-East Aslan customs,
5
with their very different ecology and therefore, ethno-characterology.
However, Gutterldge, the doyen of the discipline, seems to have 
believed that oriental and occidental family laws were barely capable of fru itfu l
1. Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973), 6. R.H.
Lowle, The History of Ethnological Theory, iN ew  York, 1937), 26-29.
2 . M . GImbutas, The Indo-Europeans: Archaeological Problems*, American 
Anthropologist, 65 (1963), 815-836 at 816.
3. See the warning of Vlnogradoff, Infra^l5.
4 . Derrett, ‘Review of Stembach: Juridical Studies In Ancient Indian Law, Pt. I*,
JAOS 87 (1967), 103-4 at 103.
5. Wolfgang Wodke (Akademlschef Rat, Marbarg), ‘rom ,,Ungesch^^eb^nen,, zum v J 
"Geschrlebenen" Recht-Eln Beltrag zur rechtsgeschlchtlTchen Entwlchlung*, 
(cyclostyled lecture, Gdansk, June 1976). The reference was supplied to 
me by Derrett.
comparison. His view was that ‘family law Is so largely moulded by racial or
religious and politica l considerations that comparison Is fraught with d ifficu lty
and apt to be Inconclusive . . . ‘  ^ Although Gutterldge *s scepticism was
understandable, the horizon o f a legal comparatlst could not Indefinitely be
2limited by racial, religious or ‘ political frontiers*.
Since Gutterldge‘s days, the parameters of legal learning have
1. H .C . Gutterldge, Comparative Law, An Introduction to the Comparative 
Method of Legal Study & Research, (Cambridge, 1946), 32. But he did not 
say Tt was futile or Impossible, Ib id ., 32. For an answer to Gutterldge one 
may quote, ‘May we not say that one who knows only the laws of his own 
jurisdiction knows not the law of that jurisdiction*, R. Pound, *What We May 
Expect from Comparative Law?*, ABAJ 22 (1936), 60. Jerome Hall also 
neutralises Gutterldge*s argument, Comparative Law and Social Theory, 
(Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 95-7.
2. H.E« Yntema, ‘Comparative Legal Research*, M ich. L.Rev. 54 (1956) 7: 
899-928 at 903. To Yntema the study of law Is sub specie unlversltatls,
I .e . law Is essentially a comparative science, Ib id ., 924. Zoltan Petri also 
opines that to perfect one‘s own system, even countries having Ideologically 
opposing politica l systems should have comparison of their laws, ‘Goals and 
Methods of Legal Comparison*, Tn The Comparison of Laws, Selected Essays
for the 9th International Congress of Comparative Law, (Budapest, 1974), 45-48 
at 46, 53. The same view was of Kazantsev, a Russian law teacher, "The 
Tasks of Scientific Research-work In the Field of Law*, Bulletin of the Academy 
of Sciences U.S.S.R., Section of Economics and Law, 38 (1950), No.1, cited 
byE.S . Rashba, 'Consecrated Ignorance of Foreign Law*, C a lif. L.Rev. 39 
(1951), 355-368 at 358, n .7 .
considerably changed,^ and even long before Gutterldge, Pierre Lepaulle
pointed out that comparative law was *a necessary step Tn a highly scientific 
2
study of law*. So, whether It Is In the East or the West, the legal experl-
3ence of a nation ‘flows across cultural boundaries1, and as a concrete example
of this we proffer Pound*s suggestion regarding the problem of modernising
Chinese law. He emphasised that Republican China would have to develop
skill In adapting alien Institutions and rules to local conditions and prevailing 
4
cultural values. In the context of Indian family law, Derrett's exhaustive
5 6and ‘synoptic* study of the law of succession shows that a comparative approach
1. O . Kahn-Freund, ‘Comparative Law as an Academic Subject*, L .Q . Rev. 82 
(1966), 40-61 at 59. A t Gutterldge‘s time, the comparative method was on 
‘tria l* and at an ‘experimental stage** H .C. Gutterldge, *The Province of 
Comparative Law*, In P. Sayre, ed ., Interpretations of Modem Legal Phllo- 
sophles, Essays Tn Honor of Roscoe Pound, (New York, 1947), 303-312 at 310. 
Writing Tn 1949, Gutterldge described comparative law as the Cinderella of 
the legal sciencest  Comparative Law, (2nded., Cambridge, 1949), 22.
L. Neville Brown sums up the present position by saying: Today Clnderella*s 
coach has become something of a bandwaggon on which academics and practi­
tioners scramble for seats, so much so that the older passengers may sometimes 
be surprised at the company In which they travel*, ‘Comparison, Inform, and 
the Family*, Annuarlo DT D lrltto Com para to E DT, Stud! Legislative 43 (1969), 
123-140 at 125:
2. P. Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological 
Jurisprudence*, Harv.L. Rev. 35 (1922), 838-858 at 855. The history of com­
parative law goes back to Aristotle*s Constitution of Athens, J. H all, Compara­
tive Law and Social Theory, o p .c lt., 15.
3. A .T . von Mehren, ‘Roscoe Pound and Comparative Law, Am.J.Com p.L. 13 
(1964), 507-517 at 511.
4 . R. Pound, ‘Comparative Law and History as Basis for Chinese Law*, Harv.L. 
Rev. 61 (1948), 749, 750.
5. When a comparative study Is directed to more than one law, the method Is 
called ‘synoptic* as opposed to ‘monographic* which Is focussed upon one parti­
cular foreign legal system, M . Rhelnsteln, Teaching Comparative Law*, U. of 
Ch.L.Rev. 5 (1938), 616.
6. TLL, 1953, unpublished.
to Hindu law can open a new vTsta of juristic interpretation, and his stud/ 
justifies Rabef*s general remark that ‘the deeper we push the inquiry, the 
more bridges are revealed, and the more common conceptions and analogous,
Tf not identical, solutions appear*. ^
2
Therefore, comparative study Is not merely the Vioblle offlclum1
3of the academic lawyer; It has practical u tility  for the practical lawyer as w e ll.
Judges such as Holloway of Madras and Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee In Calcutta did
not hesitate to consult Roman law whenever It might throw light on a disputed
4
and unclear passage of Indian law. Sir Gooroodas Banerjee, In his cele-
1. E. Rabel, *On Institutes for Comparative Law*, Col.L.Rev. 47 (1947), 227-37 
at 230.
2 . O . Kahn-Freund, ‘Comparative Law as an Academic Subject*, L.Q .Rev. 82 
(1966), 40-61 at 44.
3. J .H . Stevenson, ‘Comparative and Foreign Law In American Law Schools*,
Col.L.Rev. 50 (1950), 613-628 at 616. *A lawyer Is to learn more than his 
own system*, R. Pound, ‘ Introduction*, Am .J. of Comp.L. 1 (1952), 1-10 at 1. 
Also, B. Kozolchyk, Trends In Comparative Legal Research: Apropos Da!now*s 
The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine In C iv il Law and In Mixed Juris­
dictions*, Am. J.Comp.L. 34(1976) 1: 100-112 at 111.
4 . Derrett, ‘Justice, Equity and Good Conscience*, B .L.R .J. 64 (1962) 129-152 
at 130-1. For an example of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee*s survey of Roman law on 
the rights of posthumous son, see Kusum Kumarl Dasl v. Dasarathl Slnha, (1921) 
AIR Cal 487. For J . Ho!Ioway*s utilization of Roman law on problems of Hindu 
law, see Derrett, The Role of Roman Law and Continental Laws In India*, 
Zeltschrlft fBr ausltindlsches und Internationales Prlvatrecht, 24, Heft 4 (1959), 
657-685 at 670-682. For judicial comparison between Roman law and Hindu 
law, one may cite the celebrated case of Hunoomanpersaud Panday v . Mussumat 
Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1856) 6 MIA 393 PC; also recently, Jogendra Nath 
v . I.T . Commr., AIR 1969 SC 1089, 1092; see Derrett, Critique, A p p x .ll. In 
the same vein, see an American judge*s application of French principles In an 
American case, see Singer Manufacturing Co. v . June, 163 U.S. 169, 196.
On this and for other examples, see J. W olff, The U tility  of Foreign Law to the 
Practicing Lawyer*, ABAJ 27 (1941). The substantive comparison In judicial
/Cont*d. on next page:
brated and pioneering work on Marriage and Strldhana,^ found it quite natural 
to refer to Roman law by way of illustration and comparison. Reference to
2Roman law in the development of Hindu law In practice became so widespread
that when, In 1906, a Hindu Subordinate Judge (*.) used Roman law to solve a
point In adoption, Chandravarkar, J . ,  a known partisan of Hindu jurisprudence, 
3
was furious with him.
4
The worldwide proliferation of comparative law teaching, and the
5
comparative experiments for the universal unification of private laws prove
Note 4 -  p. 11 -  continued:
context could be extended to Judicial technique, R. Pound, *What May We 
Expect from Comparative Law?*, ABAJ 22 (1936), 56-60 at 60. For an 
earlier opinion on the practical u tility  of comparative law, see E. Lambert 
and J .H . Wlgmore, *An International Congress of Comparative Law In 1931*,
III. L.Rev. 24 (1930), 656-65 at 656.
1 . Gooroodas Banerjee, The Hindu Law of Marriage and Strldhana, 5th edn., 
(Calcutta, 1923), 72-731
2 . G angav. LekhraJ, (1886) 9 A ll 253, 298-9. Evt-o tT T J w . U
-f-'vCe-0* c<*no-w, U * -  977
3 . Kalgavda v . Somappa, (1909), 33 Bom 669.
4 . G . Wlnterton, ‘Comparative Law Teaching*, Am .J. of Comp.L. 23 (1975),
69-118 at 69. On Indian response In this context, see R. Khan and S. Kumar, 
ed ., An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Law, ILI, New Delhi (Bom­
ba y , iw !y r c h ^ 7 - v 7 r ;
5. For details of such experiments, see A . J . Levi, *What Are the Initiating 
Agencies and What Is their Mission In Each Unification Movement? (Sect.I.
c.3)*, In S .Z . Feller, ed. Israeli Reports to the Elghh International Congress 
of Comparative Law, (Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, 
Jerusalem, 1970), 54-64. K.H . Nadelmann, The Formal Valid ity o f Wills 
and the Washington Convention 1973 Providing the Form of an International 
W ill* , Am .J. of Comp.L. 22 (1974) 365-383; also J .J . Curtis, J r .,  The 
Convention on International W ills: A Reply to Kurt Nadelmann*, Am .J. of 
Comp.L. 23 (1975), 119-131. M . Lupol, ‘M .I .D .A .:  A Project for Compara­
tive Legal Information Storage and Retrieval*, Annuarlo D1 D lrltto  Comparato 
E D l, 44(1970), 38-44.
that there cannot be two opinions on the justification of the comparative study 
2
of Hindu family law.
IV. Our Theme: The Mltak%ara birthright
The central theme of our study Is the Mltaksara birthright which,
•   .
according to Vljnanesvara, conveys the Idea that In the property of his father
3
and grandfather, a son becomes owner from his birth (or rather, from his con- 
4
ceptlon). This birthright of a son correlates with his right to demand partition 
and to Impugn or prevent alienation by the father.
5Vljnanesvara wrote his commentary In the 12th century A .D .
1. On the general Importance of comparative study, see J . Mayda, *The Value of 
Studying Foreign Law*, W ls.L. Rev. (1953), 635-656 at 649-50. R.H. Graveson, 
‘Philosophy and Function In Comparative Law*, I.C .L .Q . 7 (1958), 649-658.
M . Rhelnsteln, ‘Comparative Law -  Its Functions, Methods and Usages*, Arkansas 
L.R. 22 (1968), 415-425 at 423. R. David and J.E .C . Brlerly, Major Legal 
Systems In the World Today, (London, 1968), 8.
2. However, R. Khan and S. Kumar In their discussion on tentative topics for com­
parison In Indian laws gave thought to every conceivable subject matter under 
the sun but, surprisingly, did not find any topic In Hindu law (unless Included 
In the ‘common C iv il Code*?) as appropriate for comparative study, An Intro- 
ductlon to the Study of Comparative Law, c lt .  sup., 48-53.
3 . M lta, 1.1.27, fo ra  fuller discussion, see Infra, 517- 5"/8.
4 . Smrtlcandrlka, 258.
' •  1
5. Vljnanesvara*s Mltaksara Is to be dated A .D . 1120-1125, Kane, HD, I, 70. 
K .V.R. Alyangar, ecT., Laksmldhara, Krtvakalpataru, Vyavaharo-kan4a,j397,_ 
n .,  Dana-kapda, Introd., 31. Derrett, wlne kelatlve Antiquity of fKe Mltaksara, 
and the Dayabtiaga*, MLJ 2 (1952), J m l., 9-14; *A New Light on the M ltak­
sara as a Legal Authority*, JIH, 30 (1952), 35-55 at 36; Dharmasastra and Juri­
dical Literature, In J. Gonda, ed ., A History of Indian Literature, IV, (Wles- 
baden, 1973), 50, n.322.
Basically, It was a South Indian work by a South Indian jurist. By the 12th 
century, the Aryan conversion of the Deccan was complete, but considering the 
solid foundation of the pre-Aryan Dravidian culture In the South, It Is highly 
likely that Dra vidian customs would have Influenced the juridical concepts In the 
Mltaksara. It Is also not unlikely that, In order to sanctify the customs, a 
shrewd jurist like Vljnanesvara would Interpret them In terms of the sastra.
To legal comparatlsts this Is the ‘social reality of law *^ but social
reality Is only one of the aspects of jurisprudence. Hindu law Is something more
than a social reality. Like the Qur'an and the Torah, the dharmasastras have a
2divine sanction behind them. Thus ‘custom may negate the appllcatloonof a
3
given dharmlc rule as lus posltlvum, but It does not alter Its moral authority'.
But one must not take the whole of Hindu jurisprudence as revelation and warrant-
ably Isolated from social action. The Aryans as their pre-mlgratory stage had
their own legal norms, and undoubtedly, these norms Influenced their settled
lives In the Indian sub-continent. On the other hand, the Aryan values were
bound to be tempered by the customs of the people they subjugated, and with
4
whom they Intermarried.
1. J . Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory, o p .c lt., 123.
2. Gautama dh. su,1:vedo*khIIo dharmamulam. MTmamsasutra, 1.1.2: 
codana|aksano*rtho dharmah.
3. B.S. Jackson, ‘From Dharma to Law' (a review of R. LIngat's The Classical 
Law of India, tr . Derrett), Am. J . of Comp.L. 23 (1975), 490-512. Also 
Derrett, RLSI, ch.3 and 6.
4 . On this see, J. Gonda, ‘ Introduction. Some Critical Remarks Apropos of 
Substratum Theories', In his Change and Continuity In Indian Religion, 
(Moulton, LondoiyThe Hague/Paris, 1965), 7-37 at 13, but also 25.
Thus, whether the concept of birthright was an Aryan or a Dra vid­
ian concept, or an amalgam of the two, (a question posited by the nature of the 
Mltaksara) can only be established I f  we approach the question In a comparative 
context.
Here we must heed the warning, as well as the encouraging note, that 
‘between the Indians, Teutons, Celts, e tc ., there are differences In climate, geo­
graphy, mixture of races, conquests and other conditions and, therefore, their 
development was bound to proceed on divergent lines. We cannot expect Iden­
tical results, and we must always take Into account the special conditions of econo­
mic, geographical and political development. The significant fact Is that, In 
spite of profound differences In results, we do observe -  especially In family law, 
and In that of Succession and Real Property -  principles and rules that are varieties 
of the same leading Ideas’.^
It Is worth adding here that the ecology of the Deccan to which 
VI|nanesvara belonged can be likened to that of northern India rather than the 
Tamil country or South-East Asia. Apart from the rather scanty provision of 
tanks,Irrigation was confined to Immediate proximity of the few great rivers.
Only one area (the North-West) was rich: most of the area was given over to a 
hard, unrewarding cultivation In which agricultural labour, and defence against 
brigands and marauders competed for men's time and energy. Scarcity and
2
petty or more serious warfare dominated the lives of the people for centuries.
1. P. VTnogradoff, OHJ, I, 228-9.
2. G . YazdanI, The Early History of the Deccan, 2 vols., Part I—X I, (O .U .P ., 
London, 1960), Part IV.
In the South-East of the Deccan there were large settlements of TamTl-speakTng 
peoples of Dra vidian race, relatively recent migrants from the plain country 
below the Deccan. But the principal peoples for whom Vljnanesvara wrote 
were Kannada, Telegu and Marathi speaking peoples In that order of Importance.
V . Method and Scope of our study
Although In legal research ‘the quest w ill be ever new and the perils
ever-changing*,^ the success of any study depends on following the right method;
2
the application of a particular method depends on the purpose; and the purpose,
In turn, relate partly to the further aim and partly to the nature of the subject 
matter to be compared.
A t this point we may, perhaps, recall that we have already defined
3our subject matter; and our purpose Is a ‘scientific recoupement* of the 
Mltaksara b irthright. Thus, our central overriding purpose vindicates the
1. F. Pollock, The History of Comparative Jurisprudence*, In his Essays In the 
Law, (London, 1922), 29.
2. H .C . Gutterldge, Comparative Law, o p .c lt., 5.
3 . Recoupement Is the method of verifying a hypothesis by successive observations 
of the same phenomenon from different angles, P. Lepaulle, The Function of 
Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence*, Harv.L. Rev. 
35 (1922), 838-858 at 842, n.17, 853. For elaboration, see H.E. Yntema, 
‘Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative Law*, In Law; A Century of Progress 
1835 -  1935, Contributions In Celebration of the 100th Anniversary of the 
Founding of the School of Law of the New York University, (New York, 1937), 
3 voIs., II, 346-403 at 361-2.
1 2 ‘synoptic* and ‘analytical* method which, to be precise, brings our study
3Into the category of Wlgmore‘s ‘comparative nomogenetlcs*, as well as to
4 5Gutterldge‘s ‘applied* comparison.
However, we should point out that a study of such a range and design
1. On synoptic method, see supra,10>'n* 6".
2 . On analytical method, see R. Pound, U. of Penn .L.Rev. 100(1951), 1-19 at 1.
3 . Wlgmore devised Greek terms and distinguished between ‘Comparative Nomo­
genetlcs*, I .e . the study of the development of the systems of law; ‘Compara­
tive Nomoscopy*, I .e . the description of other systems of law; and ‘Compara­
tive Nomothetlcs*, I .e . the assessments of the relative merits of the rules under 
comparison, J .H . Wlgmore, *A New Way of Teaching Comparative Law*,
Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law, (1926), 6. However, Wlg- 
more‘s classification was not adopted by comparatlsts, W .J . Wagner, ‘Research 
In Comparative Law: Some Theoretical Considerations*, In R .A. Newman, ed ., 
Essays In Jurisprudence In Honor of Roscoe Pound, (New York, 1962), 511-534
4 . By ‘Applied Comparative Law*, as opposed to ‘Descriptive Comparative Law*, 
Gutterldge means the use of the comparative method with a definite aim In 
view where the Investigator probes deeper Into the rules and examines their 
operation In the context of the social environment In which the legal system 
operates, H .C. Gutterldge, Comparative Law, o p .c lt., 7 and passim; also,
The Province of Comparative Law*, In P. Sayre, ed., Interpretations of Modern 
Legal Philosophies: Essays In Honor of Roscoe Pound, (New York, 1947), 303- 
3T2~at 307-9.---------------------------------------------------------
5. For a discussion on different methods of comparative research, see H .C . Gutter­
ldge, The Province of Comparative Law*, In P. Sayre, ed ., Interpretations of 
Modem Legal Philosophies: Essays In Honor of Roscoe Pound, (New York, 1947)f  
303-312 at 305-10. J. Hall, ‘Methods of Sociological Research In Comparative 
Law*, In Legal Thought In the United States of America Under Contemporary 
Pressures, Reports V III Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, 
ed ., J .N . Hazard and W .J. Wagner, (Brussels, 1970), 149-169 at 165-7.
18.
as ours Is d ifficu lt to confine within the narrow definitions of Gutterldge*s 
‘descriptive* and ‘analytical* methods or Wlgmore*s ‘comparative nomogenetlcs*. 
Hence, Wlnterton rightly points out that these functional distinctions are unneces­
sary, and It Is also ‘unnecessary to take sides In this terminological war . .  .* ^
In a comparative study, dogmatlzatlon Is perhaps risky and, Indeed, 
at the same time, comparison Is a polysemlc concept whose diverse cognitive 
aspects permit Its use as a labelling category In manifold ways. Thus, the 
heuristics of legal research demand selectivity and emphases as required by the 
purpose and aim of our Investigation. In order not to expand beyond a ll measure 
and to avoid confusion of Issues, we can pursue our enquiry In the following 
directions:
(1) First, since the Hindus are a branch of the proto-lndo-Europeans, 
we must enquire whether other Indo-Europeans peoples had a similar or at least, 
analogous concept In their family law. If the answer Is In the affirmative, we 
may be allowed to conclude that the concept of the Mltaksara birthright was an 
Aryan phenomenon. If, on the other hand, the answer Is negative or doubtful, 
we should look Into other cultures for a possible explanation. That means we 
must examine the juridical norms of preliterate societies other than that of the 
Aryans, In order to see If this concept Is part of the social structure of non-
1. G . Wlnterton, ‘Comparative Law Teaching*, Am.J. of Comp.L. 23 (1975), 
69-118 at 71. Wagner also pointed out: ‘And It hardly seems that any rigid 
categories of comparative law are either possible to be established, or that 
such efforts are needed*, W .J . Wagner, ‘Research In Comparative Law; Some 
Theoretical Considerations*, In R.A. Newman, ed., Essays In Jurisprudence 
In Honor of Roscoe Pound, o p .c tt., 533.
2. Supra, s-? -
Aryan people, which might lead us to surmise that son‘s birthright Ts an autoch­
thonous customary concept of the Deccan.
(TT) The second stage of our enquiry should be devoted to the explora­
tion of the pre-dharmasastra and dharmasastra literature, which should reveal 
whether the concept of birthright was ordained by the sastra.
(Til) Thirdly, the major commentaries and digests should be searched 
and revalued, which may reveal at what point of time the concept of birthright 
became prominent In the fabric of Hindu jurisprudence,
(Iv) Fourthly, we should survey judicial opinions In Anglo-Hlndu law 
and Modern Hindu law, and should critica lly  examine and evaluate the juridical 
Interpretation of the concept.
(v) Finally, our study also being anticipatory, we should examine the 
relevance of the Mltaksara birthright In the context of social, economic and legis­
lative developments In modem India; and especially, In the context of a Code of 
Family Law or ‘Uniform C iv il Code*, we should suggest viable and accommodating 
adaptations and/or transformations of the concept.
CHAPTER 2
ROMAN LAW
I. The Historical Setting
When we turn to the legal systemof the Indo-European peoples, we
naturally look to the Roman system in view of its jurisprudential development
and Intellectual legacy.^ Archaeologists generally agree that the Indo-Euro-
peans settled on hills adjoining the river Tiber In Central Italy during the second
mlllenlum B .C ., and superimposed themselves on a pre-Indo-European popula- 
2
tlon. Either In the 7th or 6th century B.C. the Tiber region fe ll under the
3
domination of the Etruscans, a civilised nation of non-Aryan origin. So In the
early period, there was an ebb and flow of Aryan and non^Aryan customs In the 
4region around Rome.
We do not know much of the pre-hlstorlc Roman legal system and,
5
apart from certain conjectures, for trustworthy basic materials we can only look
1. H .E. Yntema, ‘Roman Law as the Basis of Comparative Law*, In Law: A  
Century of Progress, 1835 -  1935, Contributions In Celebration of the 100th 
Anniversary of the Founding of the School of Law of New York University, 
(New York, 1937), 3 vols. II, 346-403 at 346.
2 . H .J . W olff, Roman Law: An Historical Introduction, (University of Oklahoma
Press, Norman, 1951), 7. VInogradoff, OHJ, I, 216.
3. M . Rostovtzeff, Rome, tr. J .D . Duff, (O .U .P ., London, 1960, rp t. 1970), 9.
4 . This does not conclusively prove that the Roman legal Institutions were Influ­
enced by the Etruscans, H.F. Jolowlcz, Historical Introduction to the Study 
of Roman Law, (Cambridge, 1952), 112. H .J . W olff, lo c .c lt . ,  49.
5. Derrett, TLL, 1953, 52 .
back as far as the Twelve Tables. However, ‘while it is true that the enact­
ment of the Twelve Tables marks the concrete existence of Roman law, Tt is 
also clear that, since the c ity  reputedly existed from 753 B .C ., there must have 
been law before this legislation*.^ During the pre-classlcal epoch Rome was
undoubtedly a monarchy, and excepting ‘ legendary reports of legal legislation,
2
the law of the period was certainly customary*. And for our present purpose, 
the customary law of this epoch Is particularly Important, because this was the 
period most likely to retain some of the customs of the ‘mother nation1 (proto- 
Indo-European) which migrated to Rome.
II. Reconstruction of the pre-Classlcal Roman Familial Institutions
From time to time, scholars have attempted to collect juridical data 
and reconstruct the legal Institutions of this period but, despite the availability 
of some valuable materials, ‘only extremely vague conjectures can be put for­
ward*.^
The conjecture that in pre-CIasslcal Roman law a son could possibly 
have co-ownership In family property with his father, has sprung from both non-
1. J .A .C . Thomas, ‘Roman Law‘ , In Derrett, ed ., An Introduction to Legal 
Systems, (London, 1968), 1-27 at 3.
2. Thomas, Ib id ., 3 . W. Seagle, The History o f Law, (New York, 1946), 160.
3. We are told that In the ‘mother nation1, the development of legal Institutions 
was low, ft. von Iherlng, Vorgeschlchte der Indo-Europaer, tr. A . Drucker, 
sub. t i t .  The Evolution of the Aryan, (London, 1897), 25.
4 . C .W . Westrup, Introduction to Early Roman Law, Comparative Sociological 
Studies^ The Patriarchal Joint Families, Ml, Patrla Potestas, (Copenhagen/ 
London, 1939), 238.
legal and legal materials, and the hypothesis has been strengthened by evidences
which throw light mainly on three Institutions, namely (I) evidences of joint
family life;  ^ (II) the nature of compulsory heirship (heres necessarlus) of 
2children (suus heres) and (III) the special rules on disinherison of a son by
. „ 3testamentary disposition.
a . Non-legal materials
4
Among the non-legal materials, Plutarch’s Lives of the Greeks and 
Romans Is Informative on the existence of joint family among the Romans In Republi­
can times. From Plutarch we get a pen-plcture of a joint household consisting of 
a father and his adult married sons In the Life of Marcus Crassus, which comes very 
close to Its Hindu counterpart. Plutarch records the virtue of joint living:
Marcus Crassus was the son of a man who had been 
censor and had enjoyed a triumph; but he was 
reared In a small house with two brothers. His 
brothers were married while their parents were 
s till a live , and a ll shared the same table . . .  
which seems to have been the chief reason why 
Crassus was temperate and moderate In his 
manner of life . 5
1. Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom, (London, 1883), 239.
2 . W.W. Buck land, Elementary Principles of Roman Private Law, (Cambridge, 
1912), 185. G . Dlosdl. Ownership In Ancient and Precbsslcal Roman Law, 
(Budaoest, 19701. 44J Of course, th is  is  to be understood tha t,
| i f  they were in s t i t u t e d  in  the w i l l .
3 . J. Mulrhead, Historical Introduction to the Private Lew of Rome, (Edinburgh, 
1886), 46.
4 . A .D . 46-120 (? ), Everyman’s Classical Dictionary, (London, 1965), 413.
5 . Life of Marcus Crassus, Plutarch’s Lives, tr. B. Perrin, Loeb edn. I l l ,  315. 
Amherst translates: HTiey kept but one table amongst them a ll*, Plutarch’s 
Lives (London, 1700)^ III, 242. Cp. Aristotle defines primitive family:
’the same Institution of common meal*, Politics, 11.6, The Politics of Aristotle, 
t r .  J.E .C . Welldon, (London, 1901), 56. Cp. Jewish law, Mlshnah *Eruvln
V I .7; 72, B. Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study, 2 vo ls.,
/C on t’d . on next page:
23.
In the same vein, Plutarch describes joint living In the house of
Aellus:
For there were sixteen members of the family, 
a ll A e lll; and they had a very little  house, and 
one little  farm sufficed for a ll,  where they main­
tained one home together with many wives and 
children. 1
Again, from Plutarch one can add a record of joint living among 
Roman brothers. This Is revealed In the life of Cato, the younger (c. 95 -  
46 B.C.) who maintained a joint household with Caeplo, his brother:
Indeed, when he was twenty years old, w ith­
out Caeplo, he would not take supper, or  ^
make a journey, or go out Into the forum.
Plutarch Indicates that the two brothers were living jo in tly  up to
the time of CaepIo*s death, and Cato gave him an expensive and honourable 
3
burial. Plutarch goes on:
Note 5 -  p .22 -  continued:
(New York, 1966) I, 222-3. Bfhaspatl also explains jointness assekapakena 
vasatam, Br . 25.6; SBE, 33 , 370-1; Alyangar^ ed ., 26.5, p .196.
1. The Life of AemllTus Paulus, Plutarch*s Lives, tr. B. Perrin, Loeb edn., 
(London, T9'l8), V I, 367.
2. The Life of Cato, Marcus Portlus, Plutarch *s Lives, Loeb edn., V III, 245.
3 . Ib id ., 259.
24.
Furthermore, when the Inheritance Fell to him 
and Caeplo's young daughter, nothing that he 
had expended for the funeral was asked bacl^ 
by him In the distribution of the property.
b. jurid ica l value of Plutarch*s evidences
For our purpose, Plutarch*s records do not seem to prove anything 
except that what he describes as the Republican norm could be the vestiges of 
a social ethos In an earlier epoch of ancient Rome.
However,jshould not lose sight of the point that, even In a joint / ( * * *  
family, a father's authority could be absolute and patrla potestas could be fu lly  
operative. On the other hand, as the Hindu Mltaksara experience Indicates, 
the Institution could be consonant with the existence of common property and 
joint ownership In the fam ily. If poetic utterance Is any evidence of legal 
norm, then the second possibility Is supported by Horace when he contrasts the 
extravagance of Individual wealth In his own time with what he discerns to have 
been the ancient Roman Idealj 'their private property was small: what was In 
common that was large*. ^
Horace's pointer coalesces with the juridical view that the pater 
famlllas In pre-classlcal Roman law was In fact, though not In form, no more
1. Ib id ., 259-261. To these could be added the tale *how Q . Fulvlus Flaccus,
the censor of 174, removed his own frater germanus et consors from the ro ll
o f the senate*, J .A . Crook, *Patr!a Potestas*, Classical Quarterly, 17 (1967)
1: 113-122 at 117. Appous Claudius Pulcher, Claadlus* brother was also 
left by the death of his father In 76 with two brothers and two sisters to look 
after, Crook, ibid, 117.
2. Prlvatus lllls  census erat brevis, commune magnum, Horace, Carm. 11,15,
quoted by C . Gore, Property Its Duties and Rights, (New York, 1922), Introd.,
xx l 11.
25.
than a manager of the family estate. The family had the right to use but
2could not alienate the property.
3
This conjecture, as Westrup warns, should be taken with caution; 
and great care, therefore, Is required In deducing from non-legal passages the 
existence of a provision In ancient Roman law of which there Is seemingly no 
abundantly conclusive sign In the legal sources.
4
Recently, John Crook has rejected these ‘well attested historical
5
cases* as conclusive evidences of ‘survival of a universal Institution of remote 
antiquity*,^ namely the joint family of the Indo-Europeans In pre-classlcal Rome. 
On the historical materials of joint living, as referred to above, Crook suggests 
that In three out of fourcases there was an emphasis on poverty and ‘there was
1. C .W . Westrup, Introduction to Early Roman Law, Comparative Sociological 
Studies, The Patriarchal Joint Family, II, Joint Family and Family Property, 
(Copenhagen/London, 1934), 27-29. A .S . Diamond, Primitive Law, (London, 
1935), 251. Jolowlcz, HISRL, 2nd ed., 123. R. Pound, Jurisprudence, (St. 
Paul, Minn. West Publishing C o., 1959), III, c h .14, 144. In this respect, 
Paton assumes that ‘within the group, save for articles of personal use, there 
was little  need to distinguish between meum and tuum -  both persons and 
chattels were considered as belonging In the group rather than to particular 
Individuals*. G .W . Paton, AText Book of Jurisprudence, (Oxford, 1951), 422.
2 . Noyes says: ‘there was little  notion of alienation. The Idea was of a politico-
economic organisation, not of a proprietary fund*, C.R. Noyes, The Institution
of Property, (New York, 1936), 127-9.
3. Westrup, III, 289.
4 . J .A . Crook, "Patrla Potestas*, Classical Quarterly, 17 (1967) 1: 113-122 at 
117-8.
5. Ib id ., 117.
6. Ib id ., 118.
just not enough property in the family for the members to risk splitting up 
until they had acquired more by some means1 J  In economic terms, Crooks* 
statement sounds convincing, but when we consider the crux of Crooks* conten­
tion that poverty was the reason for joint living, It falls short of social rea ll- 
2ties.
Poverty might exist, nevertheless some of the families were high In
social status. For Instance, In the family of A e lll the daughter of Aemlllus
was married. Aemlllus *had twice been consul and twice had celebrated a 
3
triumph*, and his daughter *was not ashamed of her husband*s poverty,, but
4
admired the virtue that kept him poor*. Crook does not prove by evidence 
that nucleated family life was the norm among the richer classes. On the con­
trary, Plutarch shows that Cato and Caeplo, who were living jo in tly , were
5
people of considerable means; a fact which Crook left unexplained. Thus, 
there Is no convincing reason to believe that only the poor resort to joint living; 
and the Chinese evidences, which Crook freely uses In his artic le , do not sup­
port his contention either.^ Moreover, the *haves* are a tiny minority any­
where, as In Rome, and , accepting Crook*s argument that the *have-nots* show 
a tendency towards joint living In Rome of the relevant period, Indeed, It Is 
they, being the majority, and not the *haves* who set up the general social
1. Ib id ., 117.
2 . See our discussion In context of Chinese law, Infra,
3 . The Life of Aemlllus Paulus, Plutarch *s Lives, Loeb edn., V I, 367.
4 . Ib id ., 367.
5. The Life of Cato, Plutarch*s Lives, Loeb edn., V III, 259.
6 . See our dlscusslon on Chinese law, ln fra ,2.£3" 2 #5 *
norm of the time.
c . Plutarch vis-a-vis the legal sources
When we turn to the legal sources, the reference to joTnt living of 
2
brothers In Plutarch Is corroborated by the existence of a consortium of brothers
recorded In the Digest. The discovery of the new papyrus fragment of GaTus 
In 1933 strengthens the argument that It was not uncommon In Rome for brothers
5
to remain In co-ownership of the family property after the death of their father.
The text of Galus ^ runs as follows:
But there Is another kind of partnership pecu­
liar to Roman citizens. For at one time, when 
a paterfamilias died, there was between his sul 
heredes a certain partnership at once of positive 
and natural law, which was called ercto non ^ 
c l to, meaning undivided ownership: . . .
1. This has been pointed out by David Daube In context of testamentary disposi­
tion In Roman law, Roman Law: Linguistic Social and Philosophical Aspects,
(Edinburgh University Press, 1969), 72.
2. Plutarch*s Lives, Loeb edn., V III, 245.
3. Digest, 10.2.39.3; 17.2.52.6-8; 26.7.47.6; 27.1.31.4; 29.2.78; 31.89.1.
4 . On this, see C.W . Westrup, Family Property and Patrla Potestas, (Copenhagen/ 
London, 1936), 46, n .2 .
5 . Westrup, Ib id ., 47.
6 . Est autem allud genus socletatls proprlum clulum Romanorum. ollm enlm, mortuo 
patre famlllas, Inter suos heredes quaedam erat legltlma slmul et naturalls socle- 
tas, quae apellabotur ercto non clto, Id est domlnlo non dlulso. G a l. III. 154a,
F. de Zulueta, The Institutes of Galusj( Oxford, 1946), I, 202.
7. tr . Zulueta, Ib id ., 203.
28.
The members of an ercto non cite had, as Tn the Germanic ‘ joint
hands1 (Gemelnschaften zur gesammten Hand) r  ^ no divided Independent shares
In the consortium as a whole, or tn the common rights, though subject to the
same right on the part of the others. Galus says that each member had the power
2
to dispose of the whole property without the consent of others. Thus, It appears
to be a partnership of Independent equals In Its widest sense. But the lack of
lus prohlbendl to control the act of Individual members Is the Achilles* heel of
3the Institution and arouses doubts about Its existence. Indeed, from a theo-
4
retlcal point of view, the scholars are likely to be baffled by the lack of Tus
prohlbendl, but I f  we correlate law with life * the right of alienation was not
likely to lead to abuses because the members lived In a community and could
5
easily control each other*s acts*. Moreover, alienation was an overt trans­
action and manclpatlo required the participation of eight men so It was Impossible 
to be performed In secrecy.^
1. C.W . Westrup, Family Property and Patrla Potestas, o p .c lt., 45. M . Kaser, 
Romlsches prlvatrecht, tr . R. Dannenbrlng, sub, t i t . ,  Roman Private Law, 
(London, 1968), 310. These ‘Communities of Common (jo int or collective) 
Hand* were voluntary associations and should be distinguished from larger 
(sib) family of the Germanic peoples, see S .J. Stoljar, ‘Children, Parents 
cin3 Guardians*, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,; IV, 7, 
20-1.
2. G a l. 154b., Kaser, Ib id ., 310. H.F. Jolowlcz and B. Nicholas, Historical 
Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3rd ed ., (Cambridge, 1972), 126.
G . Dlosdl, Ownership In Ancient and Preclasslcal Roman Law, o p .c lt . ,45. 
Butin the Germanic Gemelnschaften zur gesammten Hand alienation had to 
be made by a ll.
3. J .A . Crook, ‘Patrla Potestas*, o p .c lt., 116. Also see Dlosdl, Ib id ., 45.
4 . Dlosdl, Ib id ., 45.
5. Ib id ., 45.
6 . Ib id ., 45.
In a strict comparative context, the consortium  ^ of brothers
does not prove anything In respect of our study of the son's birthright, but In 
the community of property (quaedam soctetas) between the sul heredes, which
Galus called ercto non c lto , one can see much more than mere partnership of 
brothers. In this respect, Dlosdl observed:
The ercto non clto was no mere co-ownership 
but was also a family community. On the 
death of the father, his sons become sul lurls, 
and being themselves patresfamiIras, they were 
entitled to deal freely with the property In the 
same way that their father had been • A  co- 
ownership divided by Individual shares Is an 
Individualistic and highly developed solution, 
but at that time It was s till unknown. 2
In other words, when seen In the light of a son's Ipso jure Inheritance, to his
father's property, ercto non clto may be considered as a continuation of the
same 'family community* which existed between the father and the son before
3
the death of the paterfamilias.
d . Compulsory heirship (heredes necessarll)
The foregoing Interpretation of the Institution of ercto non clto as a 
family community leads us to examine the nature of acquisition of Inheritance by 
sul heredes.
1 . Crook thinks that the consortium may be a product of the Servian reform and 
may not be an ancient Institution as claimed by Galus, J .A . Crook, CQ 17 
(1967) 1: 117. But David Daube opined that the antiquity of consortium was 
undisputed, 'Socletas as Consensual Contract*, Cambridge Law JoumaJ, 6 
(1938) 3: 381-403 at 382.
2. Dlosdl, o p .c lt., 45. At that rate, a tenancy In common would be excluded.
3. WestrupJII , 288.
30.
GaTus says:
They are called suT heredes because they are 
household heirs and even In their fathers life ­
time are considered In a manner owners. 2
3
Paul also states on sul that 'even In the pater's lifetime, they are 
regarded as owners In some fashion . . .  and so, on his death, they do not appear
to take an Inheritance but rather do they acquire free administration of the
> 4estate .
Galus and Paulus both assert that sul heredes acquire the Inheritance
Ipso jure because they are regarded as 'a kind of owners ' during the lifetime of 
5
their father'. It Is also asserted that the succession of the sul heredes was not 
regarded as the 'taking* ^ of an Inheritance, because they did not acquire alien 
property; rather It was that their latent ownership oln the family property became 
an actual one on the death of their father. ^
1. G a l. II. 157: Sed sul quldem heredes Ideo appellantur, quia domestic! 
heredes sunt, et uluo quoque parente quodammodo domln! exlstlmantur.,
F. de Zulueta, The Institutes of Galus, o p .c lt., 110.
2. tr . Zulueta, Ib id ., 111.
3. D .2 8 .2 .1 1 : * . . .  etlam vivo patre quodammodo domlnl exlstlmantur . . .  
Itaque post mortem patrls non heredltatem perclpere vldentur sed magls 
llberam bonorum admlnlstratlonem consequuntur*, J .A .C . Thomas, The 
Institutes of Justinian: Text, Translation and Commentary, (Cape Town,
1975), 122.
4 . Thomas, Ib id ., 122.
5. G a l. II . 157. D .28.2.11.
6 . Dlosdl, o p .c lt., 44.
7. W. Markby, Elements of Law, (Oxford, 1885), 391. W .W . Buck land , 
Elementary Principles of the Roman Private Law, (Cambridge, 1912), 185. 
JolowTcz, H1SRL, 3rd ed ., 124-5.
It is perhaps not without significance that In developed Roman law, 
the sul heredes are s till termed as necessarll, because unlike other heirs en­
titled to Inherit, I .e . agnatus proxlmus and gentiles, they acquire the estate
(famllla) Independently of their own volition J  In the Institutes of Justinian
2
the Incidents of heres necessarll and suus heres are explained thus:
Heirs are said to be obligatory (necessarll), 
direct and obligatory (sul et necessarll) or 
outslde^extranel). 1 . An obligatory heir 
Is a slave who Is Instituted heir and he Is so 
called because, whether he like It or not, 
he forthwith becomes free and obliged to be 
heir on the testator*s death. . . .  2 . Direct 
and obligatory heirs are e .g . sons, daughters, 
grandchildren, e tc ., of either sex by a son 
who are In the power of the deceased. . . .
3. Other persons, who are not subject to 
the power of the testator, are called out­
side heirs. 3
Thus, sul heredes could not refuse succession and they did not need
4
to take possession of the estate by any special act, because they were domestic!
In contrast to extranel. The position of su! heredes In respect of Inheritance
1. slve ve lln t, slve nolint, G a l. II, 157.
2. Inst.II. X IX . 1-3. Heredes autem aut necessarll dlcuntur aut sul et neces­
sarll aut extranel. 1. Necessarlus heres est servus heres Instltutus: Tdeo 
sic appellatur, quia, slve ve llt slve no llt, omnlmodo post mortem testatorls 
protlnus liber et necessarlus heres f i t .  . . .  2 . Suit autem et necessarll 
heredes sunt velutl films, f l l la , nepos neptlsque ex f ll lo  et delnceps ceterl 
Ilberl, qul modo In potestate morlentls fuerlnt. . . .  3 . Ceterl, qul testa­
torls lurl sublectl non sunt, extranel heredes appellantur.
3. tr. J .A .C . Thomas, l ie  Institutes of Justinian, o p .c lt., 138.
4 . adltlo and cretlo, see Thomas, o p .c lt., 139.
explains the nature of the son's right Tn pre-classlcal Rome. Pound states the 
situation tn concrete expresston:
The word used for Inheritance Tn Roman law, 
namely, succession, expresses the original 
Idea much better. Originally one did not 
Inherit, he succeeded. He did not ac­
quire the rights tn which he already had a 
share, but which had previously been ad­
ministered for his benefit. 1
However, It Is conceded that Tn ancient Roman law, a son's co-
ownership with his father was only potentially present. It was not unamblgu-
-  2 ously present as the Mltaksara |anmasvatva (birthright), and that Is why the co-
ownershtp of Roman sons Is expressed by Paulus as quast-ownershtp (quodamodo
dominium). The position of quast-ownershlp of sons as opposed to fu ll ownership
Is also substantiated by the fact that although ancient Roman law envisaged
3sanction against dissipation of family property by a paterfamilias, there Is
nothing In the texts which suggests that sul heredes had any control over the
4
management of family property by their father. Nevertheless, the quasl- 
ownershlp of a Roman sul heredes and the birthright of his Mltak§ara counter­
part are manifestations of the Idea of agnatic group ownership of family property.
1. R. Pound, Jurisprudence, III, 14, 143-4.
2. tnfra,driT-5V.
3. Westrup, Family Property and Patrla Potestas, o p .c lt., 69.
4 . But the latent ownership of the housesons Indirectly curtailed the ownesshtp 
of the paterfamilias, Westrup, Ib id ., 72. S .J . SfoI|ar, 'Children, Parents 
and Guardians', In M . Rhelnsteln, ed., Persons and Family, International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, IV, 17.
III. DTsherlslon (exheredatlo) and w ill
In continuation of our foregoing discussion, we can say that the only 
prohibition on a fathers action that may be mentioned Is the restriction on dis­
herison o f sons by the father.
Romans are acclaimed as the Inventors  ^ of the w il l ,  but *ln Rome, as
2
everywhere else, wills developed only gradually and In stages . . . *  However, 
despite the development of the w ill,  It was Indeed an arduous process In Roman 
law to evolve a proper Instrument to disinherit a son. Before we take up the 
poln t of disherison as such, let us take a quick view of the evolution of the w ill 
In Roman jurisprudence.
a . Acts of Testament
3
O riginally, as we learn from Galus, testaments were made In public: 
(1) testamentum calatls comltlls and (11) testamentum In proclnctu.
(1) testamentum calatls comltlls
The testators came before the comltla, which sat twice a year for the
4
despatch of private business, to declare their testaments. But this type of 
testament did not Imply a freedom of testation; It was open only to childless
1. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 172. Jolowlcz, HISRL, 3 rded ., 126-7. 
The popularity of testamentary disposition In ancient Rome Is denied by David 
Daube, Roman Law, o p .c lt., 71-2.
2. M . Kaser, tr. Dannenbrlng, o p .c lt., 289. Also Thomas, o p .c lt., 122.
3 . G a l. II. 101-104. Inst. Justn. II .X .
4 . T.C. Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian, (London, 1956), 164. Nicholas 
warns us to use Sandars* views with caution because his notes are often out- 
of-date and unrealiable, B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law,
(Oxford, 1975), 272.
persons,  ^ which is very significant. Its purpose was not to replace an intest­
ate heir by a testamentary heir, A>ut rather to create an heir on intestacy by a
2
process Tn the family law.
(TT) testamentum Tn procTnctu
Members of the armed forces, while setting out to battle, could make 
3
a testament. This practice was restricted to the army and did not apply to the 
general population.
(Ill) testamentum per aes et llbram
A manclpatory w ill was of later development. The testator used to
sell by manclpatto his whole fortune at a nominal price to a friend (famllae emptor)
4
with Instructions as to Its disposal after his death. Testamentum per aes et llbram
gradually replaced the earlier forms and became the sole form of testamentary 
5
transaction. However, we should not overlook the point that It was a legal 
dodge ^ to w ill away one*s property by a fictitious sale. A  w ill generally means
1. Crook, o p .c lt., 118. Dlosdl, o p .c lt., 48.
2. M . Kaser, o p .c lt., 290. Jolowlcz agrees with Kaser on this point, but he 
Is not sure whether this sort of w ill was, In effect, an adrogation, Jolowlcz, 
o p .c lt., 131. Pound suggests that Hindu adoption and Roman testament 
served the same purpose, Jurisprudence, III, 14, 148-9.
3 . G a l. II. 101. Inst. Justn., II. X . Schulz, Classical Roman Law, (Oxford, 
1951), 240-1.
4 . Jolowlcz, o p .c lt., 127. Kaser, o p .c lt., 290.
5. Kaser, o p .c lt., 290.
6 . Crook, o p .c lt., 118. Cp, sale adoption at Nuzl, Infra, i £1-4 . For
comparable devices In Jewish law, Infra, 2.18-9 • Also see the develop-
mem of testament In Hindu law, Infra, ~7I3~ A 3 .
an Interference with the legal rights of natural heirs. If, In early Roman law, 
this Interference by means of testamentary disposition was freely allowed, 
there would have been no need of a fictitious sale, Inter vivos.
.b . Texts on the concept of 'W ill1 In the Twelve Tables
There are two texts In the Twelve Tables which are generally be­
lieved to contain the substantive authority for testamentary disposition.
1. One of these texts runs like this:  ^ *as a man shall have made
2legacy concerning money and guardianship of his own, so shall It be law*.
3
There are varying versions of this text, and David Daube opines
that despite this provision, the act of making a w ill was anything but ordinary.
5
Max Kaser considers the text refers to the manclpatory w ill which form, he 
thinks was known ^ during the time of the Twelve Tables. Kaser adds:
1. utl legasslt super pecunla suae rel lus esto, Tab. V .3 .
2. Crook, ‘Patrla Potestas*, o p .c lt., 118. Also, A . Kocourek and J .H . Wlgmore, 
Evolution of Law, (Boston, 1915), I, 466.
3. Jolowlcz, HISRL, (Cambridge, 1932), 141, n .4 .
4 . Roman Law, o p .c lt., 72.
5. Kaser, o p .c lt., 290.
6 . Doubted by Jolowlcz, HISRL, 3rd ed ., 127-8; but Kaser Is supported by Dlosdl, 
o p .c lt., 47.
36.
However, it Ts likely that this form of w ill at 
first, by the side of intestate succession, con­
tained merely particular dispositions (legacies, 
manumissions) and only gradually came to be 
extended to form a disposal of the whole pro­
perty (famllta), originally this extension was 
perhaps made In the case of the absence of 
sut 1 , and later for the express purpose of 
choosing the ablest among sul as the sole heir  ^
and to benefit him with the undivided property.
3
Dlosdl Is unhappy about Kaser- confining the purport of the text to
a situation where the paterfamilias had no sul. Dlosdl remarks that ‘It can be
seen that the paterfamilias could bestow legacies without any lim itation1 and
‘the clear and unambiguous wording of the statute excludes the possibility of 
4
legal limitations*, but according to Crook ‘the Romans are unlikely to have
5
advanced so far In Individualism by that date* and the positive tone of the 
text on the hypothesis of fu ll free testation Tn earlier epochs makes It a ll the 
more superfluous.^
2. The other text ^ which seemingly deals with Intestate 
succession runs as follows: ‘I f  a man dies Intestate without having a suus heres,
1. Pound, Jurisprudence, III, 14, 148.
2. Kaser, o p .c lt., 290-1.
3. Dlosdl, o p .c lt., 47.
4. Ib id ., 46-7.
5. Crook, o p .c lt., 118.
6. Ib id ., 118.
7. si Intestato morltur cul suus heres nec esclt, adgnatus proxlmus famlllam habeto, 
Tab. V .4 .
the nearest agnate Ts to takeO
This text also Ts capable of several translations with diverse Tnter-
2
pretatTons. On this, JoIowTcz remarks:
at first sight It would seem that the provision 
of the XII Tables, si Tntestato . . .  Implies that 
a man who had suT heredes might nevertheless 
appoint other heirs . . .  but It can equally well 
envisage merely the case of a man who, having 
no suT heredes, Is In a position to make a w ill 
and falls to do so. 3
4
Levy-Bruhl, following Bonfante, opines that the text si Tntestato . . .
means *Tf a man dies Intestate and therefore no suus becomes his heir* . .  .* He
He holds the view that the text has nothing to do with property or testament.
Levy-Bruhl suggests that testation, not Intesacy, was the primitive Roman custom.
to
However, the purpose of such testation was not/devise any property but to choose 
a heres among the adult sons to be the sacral and gubernatorial head of the joint
5
fam ily. In the sphere of property, there could be no question of testation be­
cause property devolved automatically In the joint family, ^ and continued as
1. JoIowTcz, HISRL, 3rd ed ., 131. Also, Kocourek and Wlgmore, The Evolution 
of Law, o p .c lt., I, 466.
2. JoIowTcz, Ib id ., 131. Crook, o p .c lt., 118.
3 . JoIowTcz, Ib id ., 131, n .4 .
4 . H. Levy-Bruhl, Nouvelles etudes sur le tres ancten droit romaln, (Pbtr’s, 1947), 
3 3 ff., cited by Jolowlcz, 3rd ed ., 131, n .8 . Le"vy-Bruhl was explained to me 
by Dr. H. Kanltkar, Department of Anthropology, S .O .A .S .
5. Jolowlcz, Ib id ., 132. Dlosdl, o p .c lt., 47, n.23. Crook, o p .c lt., 118.
6 . Crook, Ib id ., 116.
before the death of the proposTtus. Levy-Bruhl assumes that the text suggests 
that if  no appointment Ts made for the sacral purpose, even then the son would
acquire the property as the nearest agnate. ^
2B oth Bonfante and Levy-Bruhl Interpreted this text Tn the context 
of the Roman joint family, and though that the concept of w ill In Rome was Imme­
morial as an Instrument for appointing one of the sul as the head of the family.
to
This view Is obviously unacceptable to Crook because he Ts ou^/explode the 
communis oplnto that an agnatic Indo-European family lies behind the classical
3 4Roman fam ily. Dlosdl also joins Issue with Le'vy-Bruhl on the ground 
that his assumptions are far-fetched and wander away from the plain meaning 
of the text. Others thought that the text Implied an Institution analogous to 
primogeniture, of which there does not seem to have been any trace In classical 
Rome.^ Max Kaser conjectures a situation ^ similar to that envisaged by Levy- 
Bruhl. Although ‘without more evidence, the riddle must remain unsolved*, ^
‘It Is, Indeed, not Inconceivable that testation originated Tn the desire of the 
patres to be able to select, among other sul, the one to succeed them Tn the
g
care of the family sacra*.
1. Jolowtcz, Ib id ., 132.
2. P. Bonfante , Corso d l D lrltto Romano, (M ilan, 1963), Ch*6 ; also Scrlttl 
GTurldlcl V a rll, 3 vols. (Tunlri, 1926), I, 115-6. Bonfante*s views were
explained to me by Derrett.
3 . Crook, o p .c lt., 114, 118.
4. Dlosdl, o p .c lt., 47, n.23.
5. Jolowlcz, o p .c lt., 125.
6 . Kaser, o p .c lt., 291.
7. Jolowlcz, o p .c lt., 132.
8 . Thomas, o p .c lt., 122. The same view of Pound, Jurisprudence, III, 14, 148-9.
c . Disherison of sons
This chequered origin of the concept of w ill Tn Rome
points out the secured right of natural heirs to Inherit, but the unique position 
of the son Is highlighted only when we view the matter In the context of disheri­
son of heirs.
In the Roman law of Intestate succession, there was no preference 
for males over females. Daughters Inherited equally with their brothers In the 
class of sul heredes.  ^ But In testate succession, when a father wanted to dis­
inherit a son who was In his power, he had to be disinherited Individually and
2
by name (nomlnatlone exheredare). If this procedure was not followed, the 
3
entire w ill was void. Other sul, such as daughters or grandchildren, could
4
be disinherited together without being specifically mentioned. This requlre-
1. Jolowlcz, HISRL, 3 rded ., 125-6.
2. Kaser, o p .c lt., 300. Thomas, o p .c lt., 122.
3. Kaser, Ib id ., 300. This rule was extended to posthumous suus, son or not, Thomas
o p .c lt., 123. The Sablnlans held that even If the child en ventre sa mere at the 
time of the testator's death were subsequently born and died without uttering a cry,
the w ill would s till be Invalidated, P. Stein, The Schools of Jurists Tn the Early
Roman Prlnclpate', Cambridge Law Journal, 31 (1972) 1: 8-31 at 24.
4 . Kaser, Ib id ., 300. There were various provisions to protect the natural heirs:
(I) lex Furla; (II) lex Voconla; (III) lex Falcldla. The first two were Ineffectual 
because the number of legacies a testator could make was not restricted. But by 
the last one, a testator was restrained from bequeathing more than three-fourths 
of the Inheritance, G a l.I I .  227; T .C . Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian^ op. 
c l t . ,  Introd. Ilv^ 549-50. When children were completely disinherited they had o 
remedies like: fit) querela/Inofficios I testament! or (I!) de TnoffTcTosI testamento, 
Sandars, Ib id ., 209-10. W .W . Buckland, Elementary Principles of the Roman 
Private Law, (Cambridge, 1912), 139. Kaser, o p .c lt., 299.
ment of express disherison, though it does not directly envisage birthright of
Roman sons Tn the MItaksara sense, yet a fortiori Tt substantiates the purport of
the text of Galus  ^ that even In their father*s lifetime suus heres are considered
Tn a manner, owners. Thomas presents the most plausible Insight on this point
by saying that ‘testation Inevitably gave a pater, In due course, the power to
dispose of his estate as he chose; but the old concept survived to the extent that
2sul, I f  not Instituted as heirs, must be expressly disinherited*.
IV . Indo-European family and Roman family
a . The general pattern of Indo-European family
The general hypothesis Ts that among a ll Indo-European peoples, the
3
fundamental social unit In pre-hlstorlc times was the patriarchal joint family.
This family pattern was characterised by co-residence of several generations, 
together exploiting a single homestead. In the gubernatorial sphere, the head 
of the family Ts sovereign, but In affairs of property he was not so much the owner 
as the administrator. A t the death of the head, the joint family! can continue 
uninterrupted, but Tn a partition a ll the sons have a right to equal shares. Apart 
from functioning as a social unit, the joint family Ts an ascribed social grouping 
underpinned by the cult of the ancestors.
1. G a l. II . 157; supra,
2 . Thomas, o p .c lt., 122.
3 . Maine, Lectures on the Early History o f Institutions, (London, 1889), 133.
J. Kennedy, The Aryan Invasion of Northern India: an Essay In Ethnology 
and History1, JRAS (1919), 5-29; (1920), 31-48 at 47.
b . Contribution of Henry Maine
The most outstanding proponent of this pattern of the Indo-European
family was Sir Henry Sumner Maine, who opined that society In general, and
Aryan society Tn particular,  ^ originated as patriarchy. He based his theory
on his observations of Aryan India and Europe, and concluded that the structure
2
of the Indo-European family was patriarchal.
The nineteenth century was Influenced by Darwin's thecfy of evo-
3Iutlon, and social evolution was a major topic of anthropological speculation.
1. Maine, Ib id ., 133. C. K. Allen In Maine's Ancient Law, (O .U .P ., 1930), 
Introd., x x ll.  H .H . Melnhard, The Patrilineal Principle In Early Teutonic 
Kinship*, Tn J .H .M . Beattie and R .G . Llenhardt, ed ., Studies In Social Anthro­
pology: Essays In Memory of E.E. Evans-Prltchard by his Former Colleagues, 
(Oxford, 1975), 1-29 at 4 .
2. Unquestionably accepted by VTnogradoff, OHJ, I, 224. Also A .B . Keith,
The Home of the Indo-Europeans*, Oriental Studies Tn Honour t f  Cursetjl 
ErachjI Parvy, (London, 1933), 189-199 at 190. Endorsed by recent scholar- 
shlp, P. Friedrich, *Proto-Indo-European Kinship*, Ethnology, 5 (1966) 1: 1-36 
at 29.
3. C.R. Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, on the 
Preservation of Favoured Races In Struggle for Life, (London, 1859) . For an ex­
tensive recent discussion on the development and Interrelationships of biological 
and ©clo-cultural theories of evolution, see M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropologl- 
cal Theory: A History o f Theories of Culture, (New York, 1969), C h .6and7 , 
on Maine 189-92. Darwin's theory of evolution has been challenged by 
Immanuel Vellkovsky, an Interesting, though less known, author, Tn his works, 
Worlds In Collision, (Victor Gollancz, London, 1950); Earth In Upheaval, 
(London, 1956); Ages In Chaos, (SIdgwTck and Jackson, London, 1953). V e llk - 
ovsky*s thesis runs counter to DarwTn's evolutionary theory. He advocates the 
catastrophic theories which coalesce with the Hindu Idecsof  srstl and pralaya.
On Vellkovsky, see A . De Grazla, The Vellkovsky A ffa ir, (London, 1966).
Also, F. Warshofsky, *When the Sky^alned Fire: The Vellkovsky Phenomenon*, 
Reader's Digest, January, (1976), 144-157 at 144, 156.
Maine expressed this evolutionary process Tn terms of jurisprudence, and 
came out with hts other postulation that Individualism Is a product of social 
evolution. He believed that the evolutionary shift In society was from status 
to contract; which means that In primitive societies an Individual's social posi­
tion was determined almost exclusively by the kinship status Into which he 
was borh. Afterwards, as society progressed, a man's relations to others 
were determined primarily by the restricted voluntary agreement Into which he 
entered
c. Re-appralsal of Maine's views
Neither the Malnesque hypothesis of patriarchal origin of society 
4
nor the Malnlan shift from status to contract had universal acceptance. Maine
1. R. NIsbet, 'Kinship and Political Power Tn First Century Rome*, Tn D. Black
and M . MlleskI, ed ., The Social Organization of Law, o p .c lt., 262-277 at 263.
2. L. Nader, *The Anthropological Study of Law*, American Anthropologist, 67 
(1965), 6 pt.2: 3-32 at 9. Edwin Patterson opines that Maine derives his 
theory, 'partly from Hegel and partly from Darwin . . . * ,  E.W. Patterson, 
‘Historical and Evolutionary Theories o f Law*, In Essays on Jurisprudence from
the Columbia Law Review, (Columbia University Press, New Yorl</London, 1963),
281-309 at 290.
3. On Maine's theory, see R. Redfleld, 'Maine's Ancient Law In the Light of Primi­
tive Societies', Western Political Quarterly, 3 (1950), 574-589. J .L . Peacock 
and A . Thomas KIrsch, The Human Direction, (New York, 1970), 41.
4 . See E .A . Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man, (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 327.
1 2 3was assaTled by Johann J. Bachofen (1815-1827), Lewis Henry Morgan
/ 4
(1 818-1881), and John McLennan (1827-1881). Morgan and McLennan
shared the view of Bachofen that Tn the evolution of society ‘Matriarchy Is
5
followed by patriarchy and preceded by unregulated hetaerlsm*. That means 
patriarchy was not the pristine state of society; It was preceded by gynaecocracy , 
a society ruled by women.
In the same vein, Malinowski also thought that Maine *was handi­
capped by his narrow adhesion to the patriarchal scheme* ^ and Sawer found
1. See G .E . Howard, The Patriarchal Theory*, In A . Kocourek and J.H.Wlgmore, 
ed.,  Evolution of Law, (Boston, 1915), II, 196-214 at 204. W .A . Robson,
*S1r ^enry Maine To-day*, Tn W .l. Jennings ed ., Modern Theories of Law, 
(London, 1933), 170.
2. J .J . Bachofen, a German-Swlss legal scholar whose lecture series In Stuttgart 
was published as Das Mutterecht: Elne Untersuchung uber die Gynalkrokratie 
der alten welt nach Iher retlglosen und rechtllchen Natur, (Stuttgart, 1861, rpt. 
Basel, 1897); Mother Right: An Investigation of the Religions and Juridical 
Character of Matriarchy In the Ancient World.
3 . L .H . Morgan, Ancient Society or Researches In the Line of Human Progress 
from Savagery, through Barbarism and C ivilization, (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); 
Systems of Consanguinity and A ffin ity  o f the Human Family, (Columbia, 1871).
4 . J.F . McLennan, Primitive Marriage: An Inquiry Into the Origin of the Form 
of Capture In Marriage Ceremonies, (Edinburgh, 1865).
5. Bachofen*s ‘ Introduction* to Mother Right In R. Marx, ed ., Mutterrecht und 
UrrelTgTon, (Stuttgart, 1926), tr. R. ManheTm, sub. t i t .  Myth, Religion arid 
Mother Right, (London, 1967), 69-120 at 93. For summarisation of the views 
of Morgan and McLennan, see J .L . Peacock and A . Thomas Klrsch, The Human 
Direction, o p .c lt., 42. Morgan's scheme that society passed through prlml- 
tlve promiscuity and barbarism was Incorporated by Friedrich Engels, The Origins 
of the Family, Private Property and the State, (Chicago, 1902).
6 . B. Malinowski, Crime and Custom Tn Savage Society, 8 th ed ., (London, 1966), 3.
that Maine's generalisation on the family structure was weak because he Veiled
almost exclusively on early Roman law*.  ^ Sawer*s criticism seems to be a
little  unfair because Maine, In fact, examined a ll the European societies as well
2
as Hindu society In India.
3
Although Maine *was a whipping boy of anthropology1, the main
criticism against him, namely, that he did not have sufficient comparative ethno-
4 5
graphic data on non-European societies to postulate a general theory, could
also be levelled at the proponents of a matriarchal origin of mankind.^ Now no
7
one believes that there was one grand universal system by which mankind developed.
g
This Is a question on which dogmatlsatlon Is perhaps risky and now anthropologists
1. G . Sawer, Law In Society, (Oxford, 1965), 65-66. Also R. Pound, Inter- 
pretatlons of Legal History, (Cambridge, 1923), 55.
2. J .L . Peacock and A . Thomas Klrsch, Human Direction, o p .c lt., 41.
3. L. PoplslI, Anthropology of Law: A  Comparative Theory, (New Haven, 1974), 
150. Also L .L . Puller, Anatomy of the Law, (Pelican, 1^71), 72.
4 . J. Stone, Law and Social Sciences In the Second Half Century, (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1966), 4.
5 . On defence of Maine's method, see F. Pollock, *The History of Comparative 
Jurisprudence*, Essays In the Law, (London, 1922), 1-30.
6 . See Derrett, 'Succession In Nigeria, the Patchwork of the Present Scene and the 
Common Problems of the Future*, In Derrett, ed ., Studies In the Laws of Success­
ion In Nigeria, (London, 1965), 1-32 at 15.
7. Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973), 6 . P. 
Bohannan, ‘Ethnography and Comparison In Legal Anthropology*, In L . Nader, 
ed ., Law In Culture and Society, (Chicago, 1969), 401-418 at 408-9. G . 
Feaver, From Status to Contract: A Biography of Sir Henry Main, 1822-1888, 
(London, 1969), 169.
8 . Maine was not dogmatic; *he was ready to accept new evidence, not to distort 
It*, H. Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual In Tribal Society, (Oxford, 1965), 8 .
are saying that ‘the search for an archetypal form from which a ll subsequent 
society has sprung Is fruitless; we simply have no way of knowing precisely 
what happened when humanity began*.  ^ Even within the well-attested patri­
archal family of the Greeks, W ille tt found Tn the succession law of Crete, evi­
dence of ‘encroachment of males upon the old-established rights of tenure of
2 3females*, and traces of more ancient matriarchal traditions. But Wlllett*s
evidences are not substantiated by other Greek societies, and are, therefore,
4
too doubtful to be regarded as unassallably accurate. However, these could
5
be either remnants of pre-Aryan customs, or due to Babylonian Influences to 
which Crete was exposed
1« J .L . Peacock and A . Thomas KIrsch, The Human Direction, o p .c lt., 43.
2. R.F. Wlllett*s, The Law Code of Gortyn, (Kadmos, Supplement I, 1967), 21. 
Also Aristocratic Society In Ancient Crete, (London, 1955), 69-100.
3. W llle tt‘s, The Law Code of Gortyn, o p .c lt., 18. Earlier claimed by M .
M ille r that pre-Homerlc Greeks were matrlllneal, ‘Greek Kinship Terminology*, 
Journal of Hellenic Studies, 73 (1952-53), 46-52 at 50-1. But see P.Friedrich, 
‘Proto-Indo-European Kinship*, Ethnology, 5 (J966), 1: 1-36.
4 . D. Schaps, *Women In Greek Inheritance Law*, Classical Q jarterly, 25 (1975)
1: 53-7 at 57.
5. T.P. Howe, *The Primitive Presence In Pre-classlcal Greece*, In S. Diamond, 
ed ., Culture In History, Essays In Honor o f Paul Radln, (New York, 1960), 
745-739T
6 . On contact between Babylon and Greece, see E .A . Spelser, *Ear!y Law and 
C ivilization *, In J .J . FInkelsteIn and M . Greenberg, ed., Oriental and 
Biblical Studies: Collected Writings of E .A . Spelser, (Philadelphia, 1967), 
534-555. Archaeo logically and epigraph lea I ly Babllonlan activities are 
attested In Crete, C .H . Gordon, Before the Bible, (London, 1962), 57-8.
Although Maine's utterances on many points are to be taken with
caution,  ^ from the point of view of family law ‘his famous theory that there
 ^ 2
has been a movement from status to contract Is fu lly  borne out by Indlavdata*.
Maine ‘fu lly  concedes that patriarchy Is not applicable to a ll forms
3
of society; a ll he claims Is that It Is characteristically Aryan . . . "  , and despite 
4
McLennan *s attempt to discredit Maine In the context of Hindu law, his view
-  5of the patriarchal character of the Aryan family Is well established. Under
the shadow of formidable opposition, Maine's ‘basic Insights often survive or
revive* ^ . . .  and through evidence from ‘most societies commonly studied by
1. On the limitations of Malne‘s hypotheses In the Hindu context, see Derrett,
‘Sir Henry Maine and Law In India: 1858-1958*, Juridical Review, (1959), p t . l ;  
40-55.
2. Derrett, Ib id ., at 53. Gluckman points out the misunderstanding of Maine by 
anthropologists, M . Gluckman, ‘Concepts In the Comparative Study of Tribal 
Law*, In L. Nader, ed ., Law Tn Culture and Society, o p .c lt., 349-373 at 351. 
A llo tt, however*, opines that Maine's theory on this point Is not fu lly  borne out 
by African experiences, A .N . A llo tt, ‘African Law*, In Derrett, ed ., An Intro­
duction to Legal Systems, (London, 1968), 131-156 at 149-50. But see 
Gluckman's appreciative comments on Maine, The Ideas In Barotse Jurisprudence, 
(New Haven, 1965), Preface, xv l, and throughout. For support of Maine, 
also see M .J . Levy, J r ., ‘Notes on the Hsu Hypothesis*, In F.L.K.Hsu, ed ., 
Kinship and Culture, (University of Chicago Press, 1971), 34.
3. C .K . A lle n , In Maine's Ancient Law, (O .U .P ., 1930), Introd., x x ll.
4 . D. McLennan, ed ., The Patriarchal Theory, Based on the Papers of the Late 
John Ferguson McLennan, (London, 1885), Ch.V I, 51-70.
5. Derrett, RLSI, 207.
6 . J. Stone, Law and Social Sciences In the Second Half Century, o p .c lt., 4 .
anthropologists*  ^ he seems to have been rehabilitated.
The basic concept of joint property or family property Tn archaic 
societies Is Interlinked with Maine*s generalisation on the progress of human 
society from status to contract. As a social theory, jurisprudentially It forms 
the foothold of convergence of multiple rights over family property on the basis 
o f kinship; such as the birthright of sons, rights to Inherit, or, In appropriate 
cases, the right to be maintained. So the status relationship envisages a cellu­
lar regime of property In the household.
V . Pre-classlca! Roman family
a . The Indo-European hypothesis
The suggestion Is made that among the Romans, the Germans, the
Greeks, and the Hindus, as among other Indo-European peoples, family and
2ownership have passed from a Joint or communal to an Individual stage. But
recently, Crook has come out with a belligerent thesis that the agnatic joint
3
family may not be the basis of the classical Roman family. This doubt, If
substantiated, throws overboard many of the premises on Roman family law
4
which were hitherto accepted by a school of Jurists to be axiomatic In the
1 . Klaus-Frledrlch Koch, *Law and Anthropology*, In P.B. Hammond, ed .,
Cultural and Social Anthropology: Introductory Readings In Ethnology,
(New York/London, 1975), 240-249 at 241.
2 . See Westrup, II, 13.
3 . J .A . Crook, *Patr!a Potestas*, Classical Quarterly, 17 (1967) 1: 113-122 at 114.
4 . The point has been explained by D .A . Blnchy, ‘Celtic Suretyship, A  Fossilized 
Indo-European Institution*, In G . Cardona, ed ., Indo-European and Indo- 
Euopeans, o p .c lt., 355-367 at 355.
light of genetic comparison of legpl institutions Tn other Indo-European societies. 
Crook's article Is an outgrowth of the line of thinking prevalent among a number 
of Romanists who do not accept that there was such a concept as Indo-European 
law J
b. Crook's objections
Crook's main objections to the existence of jo int family among the 
pre-classlcal Romans may be enumerated as follows:
(I) that there are plenty of joint families In wholly non-Aryan communities.
(II) that striking analogies to early Greek Institutions are found In contem­
porary Near Eastern, wholly non-Aryan communities.
(III) that one can point to numerous cases of adjacent communities with
different family property, and descent patterns, and even to Instances 
of different patterns co-existing within the same community.
(Iv) that the Idea of an exclusive family pattern may be a chimera, as
suggested by the Chinese situation. Families may divide, re-unlte 
and divide again.
(v) that the Indo-European concept Is a linguistic one and only with
caution could It be transferred to other fields.
(vT) that patrla potestas Is a power over descendants and never over
collaterals. If no one has potestas over brothers, how Ts It conceiv­
able to have a joint family of brothers?
1. See Crook, lo c .c lt ., 115-6. The point has been recently pursued by Geoffry 
MacCormack, 'Hausgemelnschaft and Consortium', ZVR76(1977) 1: 1-17.
4 9 .
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c . A review of Crook *s objections
Let us take up Crook‘s objections one by one.
(T) No one disputes that there may exist plenty of examples of joint
families Tn other, non-Aryan communities, but their existence by Itself does 
not disprove the existence of an Indo-European type joint family among pre- 
c lass Tea I Romans.
(II) Crook found striking analogies between early Greeks and Near
Eastern non-Aryan Institutions. One cannot be very sure on the point that 
the non-Aryans of the Near East remained completely untouched by Aryan 
values. In fact, the Aryan cultural Impact Tn the ancient Near East Is well 
attested,  ^ and there are traces of contact between Greece and semlte Babylon. 
Moreover, one wonders how semblances of Greek Institutions In the Near East 
do affect the existence of the Indo-European joint family In Rome. In addi­
tion, It Is d o  less significant that although our study of the Near East does note 
patriarchal, nuclear, or conjugal households among the non-Aryans, Tn many 
fundamental aspects they differ from the accepted norms of the Indo-European
1. N . Na‘aman, ‘Syria at the Transition from the Old Babylonian Period to the 
Middle Babylonian Period*, Ugarlt-Forschungen Internationales Jahrbuch fur
die Altertumskunde Syrlen-PaTestlnas, Band 6 , (Neuklrchener Ver Lag, Germany, 
1975), 265-274 at 2Z3-4] On Indo-European Influence In the Near and Middle 
East, also see M . Stone, ‘When God was a Woman*, condensation of The Fara- 
dlse Papers, (1976), The Sunday Times Magazine, August 29, (1976), 30-35 at 32.
2. Supra,46,Ti. 6.
joint family and it Ts assumed by scholars that the patriarchy Tn the Near East
was preceded by fratrlarchy and matriarchy,  ^ which Tn the case of the Indo-
2
Europeans, has not been convincingly suggested from any quarter.
(Ill) O f course, as Crook noticed, there could exist adjacent communi­
ties with different family and property regimes, and even different patterns w ith­
in the same community. The Hindus are a classic exanple In South Asia, and
within the Hindu fold diverse systems of property ownership have existed side by 
3
side. Also, In the context of social organisation, the Vedlc period envisages
4
joint as well as nuclear households. These variations do not disprove the Indo- 
European hypothesis In the context of Hindu joint fam ily.
1. E .A . Spelcer, The Wife-Sister M otif In the Patriarchal Narratives*, Tn 
A . Alttaan, ed. T Biblical and Other Studies, (Cambridge, Mass., 1963),
15-28 at 18. A . Ska 1st, The Authority of the Brother at Arrapha and NuzT*, 
JAOS 89 (1969), 10-17 at 11. P. Koschaker, ‘Cuneiform Law*, Encyclo­
paedia of Social Sciences, IX, 216. Also M . Stone, loc. c l t . ,  32.
2. M ille r suggested that the pre-Homerlc Greeks were matrlllneal, ‘Greek Kinship 
Terminology*, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 73 (1952-53), 46-52 at 50-1. 
MtIIer*s contention Is refuted by Paul Friedrich, who opines that the Indo- 
European society was *typTca! of the patrlllneate In Its most highest form*, 
*Proto-Indo-European Kinship*, Ethnology, 5 (1966) 1: 1-36 at 29. H .J . Rose 
rejects the suggestion that the plebeians In Rome had matrlllneal organisation, 
‘Patricians and Plebeians at Rome*, Journal o f Roman Studies, 12 (1925), 106- 
133 at 113. From linguistic evidences, Goody was Inclined to suggest that 
the Indo-Europeans were matrlllneal but he concluded: *1 do not seriously 
suggest that this was the case*, J. Goody, ‘ Indo-European Society) Past and 
Present, 16 (1959), 88-92 at 91.
3 . Kane, HD, III, 557.
4 . Sonthelmer, EHJFI, 42-43.
(Tv) It Ts true that an excIusTve family pattern Ts not synonymous with
any particular culture, but here we are confronted with a primitive situation
and since the Roman family pattern would have to be judged In Its pre-c!assTcal
setting, reliance on the evidences of other Indo-European families Is less risky
than on a comparatively modern study of Chinese families by Olga Lang. ^
In respect o f Crook's contention that there Ts no static and set pattern of fam ily;
It Is always Tn a state of flux In the sense that families may divide, reunite and
divide again: This cycle of partition and reunion Is a well-attested phenomenon 
2Tn Hindu families, but that does not alter the original Indo-European hypothesis 
of Hindu familial Institutions.
(v) Fifthly, although the Indo-European concept Is In itia lly  a linguistic
3
one, arousing mistrust on the Inferences drawn from It, In many respects the
4
archaeological evidence Is entirely compatible with linguistic evidence.
5
There Is *a new sign of the renaissance of Indo-European studies . . . "  and 'law '
1. Considering the position of women, It seems that the Chinese social organisa­
tion was completely different from that of the Romans. The chla-chang's 
(paterfamilias) wife In practice shared his power, 'In fact she Is often the real 
head . . . *  K. BIggerstaff, The Peasant Family: The Chinese Large-Family,
Its Role and Recent Trends', In C .F. Ware, ed ., The Cultural Approach to 
History, (New York, 1940), 109-124.
2. Derrett, IMHL, 557-562. Critique, f f  190, 199.
3 . Rosane Rocher, 'Review of Cardona, Hoenlgswald and Senn', JAOS 93 (1973), 
615-617 at 616.
4 . W .H. Goodenough, The Evolution of Pastorallsm and Indo-European Origins', 
In Cardona and others, ed ., Indo-European and Indo-Europeans, o p .c lt., 253- 
265 at 262.
5. Rocher, lo c .c lt ., 616.
Ts like ly to provide ‘precisely solid and relatively unambiguous data that the 
comparative study of the Indo-European Institutions needs at this tlm eO
(vi) Sixthly, the argument that It Is paradoxical that a joint family of
brothers can exist without patrla potestas over collaterals Ts not borne out by
parallel experiences. The Greeks had no patrla potestas In the Roman sense,
2
s till they had joint families; the Chinese/on whose evidences Crook relies
3
with much elation, had a less stringent system of potestas (hlsao) than the
Romans, but had some joint families nevertheless. The Hindus had, and even
today, have joint families of collaterals without the Institution of patrla potestas
(or fratrla potestas); so to have a joint family patrla potestas Is not an Indlspen-
%
slble component. Again, I f  patrla potestas Is the most Important factor In the 
formation and continuation of joint families, Crook should have applied his mind 
to the possibility of the existence of joint families consisting of a Roman father 
and his grown-up married sons.
To attack the Indo-European concept has become fashionable, some­
times without having more convincing reasons than Its proponents4. In the same 
vein, Crook poses doubts but cannot proffer any solution. However, quite a few
1. Rocher, Ib id ., 617. On comparative linguistic approach to Indo-European
legal Institutions, see C . Watkins, ‘Studies In Indo-European Legal Language,
Institutions and Mythology*, Tn Cardona, lo c .c lt ., 321-354. Also D .A . 
Blnchy, ‘Celtic Suretyship, a Fossilized, Indo-European Institution*, Tn 
Cardona, Ib id ., 355-367.
2 . Westrup, II, 8 -9 . R.F. WHIett*s, The Law Code of Gortyn, (Berlin, 1967),
12. Also Germanic law, In fra ,123-5*
3. K. BIggerstaff, *The Peasant Family: the Chinese Large-Family, Its Role and
Recent Trends*, In C .F. Ware, ed ., The Cultural Approach to History, o p .c lt.,
115.
of the questions raised by him are thought-provoking, even though they do not 
neutralise many of the positive evidences for the possibility of a pre-classlcal 
joint family In Rome.
d . Continuation of Crook*s hypothesis
Crook‘s line of thinking has been pursued further by Geoffry MacCormack,
another disintegrator of the Hausgemelnschaft  ^ theory. As recently as 1977,
2
MacCormack raised hypotheses using as a basis the doubt that the texts of 
3
Galus do not suggest any ownership of the sul during the lifetime of the pater­
familias; nor do they suggest the existence In archaic Rome of the joint family
4
as a characteristic Institution.
MacCormack, however, has rightly understood that, to explore the 
nature of the Institutions of family In pre-classlcal Rome, law and anthropology 
should share the fie ld . His technique lay chiefly In comparing the familial 
Institutions In other cultures, especially those pre-literate cultures which present 
a societal stage such as may be conceived In archaic Rome.
e . MacCormack *s observations
MacCormack relied principally upon the following series of arguments:
1. On this, see supra, 2  8 .
2 . G . MacCormack, ‘Hausgemelnschaft and Consortium*, ZVR 76 1977 1: 1-17.
3. Galus, 3.154ab.
4 . MacCormack, lo c .c lt ., 11.
i .  One may be able to cite examples of joint 
agnatic families among a ll the Indo-European 
peoples . . .  Nor Ts the joint agnatic family an 
Institution peculiar to the Indo-Europeans.
In one form or another, It Is commonly found 
Tn A frica . Hence one may say that the joint 
agnatic family Is a widespread phenomena of 
human life not that It Is a specially Indo- 
European Institution. 1
IT. The Roman evidence does not allow one 
to suppose that either the family or the notion 
o f ownership can helpfully be discussed In 
terms of an evolution of society from one 
stage to another. 2
f . Review of the above two arguments
(I) The first argument, namely, that the agnatic joint family Is not
an Institution peculiar to the Indo-Europeans, In fact, places undue reliance
3 4upon Crook's argument which we have already neutralised.
(II) Although no one now seriously believes that there Is a pattern
5
of human social development through which every society must pass, 'I t  can 
be proved Tn the case of many societies that family groupings undergo a certain 
pattern of development, ^ and It would be natural to expect Roman law to conform
1. Ib id .,  2.
2 . MacCormack, o p .c lt., 3.
3 . Crook, 'Patrla Potestas', CQ 17 (1967), 115.
4 . Supra, 5 0 -5A.
5. Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973), 6 .
6 . MacCormack, o p .c lt., 3.
to developments seen Tn sastrlc and Jewish law. ^
g . MacCormack's study of Indo-European families
In a comparative context, MacCormack studied three Indo -European 
legal systems and observed the following proprietary relationship In the family:
(I) Among the South Slavs 'A ll members of the joint family might be
2
said to possess rights In the property . . . '
(II) In Albanian customary law'the male members of the family have 
joint rights In the property which are realised on partition or 
separation'. ^
(III) In the Hindu system, 'I t  seems that the Aryan patrilineal families
originally were not joint since the sons upon marriage generally 
4
left home'.
h. Review of MacConmack's study of Indo-European families
About (I) and (II) above we have nothing more to say. But 
MacCormack's remark on the Hindu system deserves our attention.
1. Derrett, lo c .c lt ., 6 .
2 . MacCormack, lo c .c lt ., 5.
3. Ibid., 5.
4 . Ib id ., 5 . Relied on Derrett,* The History of the Juridical Framewortk of the 
Joint Hindu Family*, Tn Contributions to Indian Sociology N o .6 (1962), 17-47. 
The same theme Ts presented In a revised form, RLSI, C h .l2 , *The more than 
Imaginary expectations of sons' In the Aryan texts contained the gems of birth­
right In the mediaeval sense, RLSI, 414-5.
Although the enormous 'house community* of the zadruga type has
not been the norm, the sacred literature shows evidence that jo int family life
was not merely 'an Ideal but a real expectat!on*  ^ In the Hindu tradition.
There Is no conclusive evidence In the sastra that a ll sons after marriage used
2
to set up separate households. A marriage hymn Tn the Rg-veda may be
3Interpreted as Indicating joint family liv ing. Moreover, srutl texts may be
Interpreted as meaning that co-ownership of daya existed between father and 
4son.
I .  A  general review of MacCormack's study
It Is a weakness In the study of MacCormack that he examined only
three Indo-European systems. He did not take any notice of C eltic , Germanic
or Greek law which could have thrown light on pre-classlcal Roman law and,
Instead, he relied greatly on familial Institutions In African society. His
analysis of African law Is not exhaustive, but he did not fa ll to notice that the
general characteristic of the property arrangements In African extended or joint
5
families Is the m ultip lic ity of rights over the same property.
1. H. Orensteln and Michael M lcklln , The Hindu Joint Family: the Norms 
and the Numbers', Pacific Affairs, 39 (1966-67), 314-325 at 315.
2 . Orensteln and M lcklln , o p .c lt., 317. Sonthelmer, EHJFI, 42-43.
3 . R.V._10._85.46.
samrajnl svasure bhava samrajh! svasfam bhava / 
nanadarl samrajnl bhava samrajnl adhldevrsu//
'Over thy husband's father and thy husband's mother bear fu ll sway. .
Over the sister of thy lord, over his brothers rule supreme*, tr. R.T.H. 
G riff ith , The Hymns of the Rlgveda, (Benares, 1897), II, 506.
4 . Tal. Sam. I l l . I .9 .4 .
5. MacCormack, o p .c lt., 7.
He also observes that junior members In African society have not 
only the right to Inherit; In many societies, they also have an expectancy 
amounting to a right that property w ill be made available to them In their 
father's lifetime. However, MacCormack adds:
When one speaks of a 'right* Tn this context 
one does not mean a right In the Hohfeldlan 
sense. It would be misleading to think of 
the father as under a duty to allocate land 
which might be enforced by the son. Rather 
It Is a question of behaviour which the father 
Is normally expected by the society to show. ^
To MacCormack, a father's behaviour may not sound like a "r ig h t11 for the sons 
in the Hohfeldian sense, but in a pre-literate society an accepted customary 
norm has a simitar effect to a 'right* Tn modern jurisprudence.
Against this ethno-jurldlcal background, MacCormack examines the
texts of Gaius and concludes that 'I t  Is a mistake to conceive the power of the
paterfamilias as merely a power to direct or control the family affairs*. We
have already refuted this sort of observation on the text of Galus, and It Ts
unnecessary to repeat ourselves. Since MacCormack used anthropology as a
juris t's  a id, let us see what the anthropologists have got to say on the role of
the paterfamilias In Rome which has been conveniently overlooked by MacCormack.
4
Radcllffe-Brown opines:
1. IbTH.
2. MacCormack, o p .c lt., 10- 11.
3 . Supra, 27-32.
4 . A.R. Radcllffe-Brown, 'Patrilineal and Matrlllneal Succession*^jn his Structure 
and Function In Primitive Society, (London, 1952, rp t. 1971), 32-48-a* 4 5 .
The rights of a Roman father over his children 
were nearly exclusive but even these, at cer­
tain period of history certainly, were subject 
to the rights, exercised jo in tly , of the gens or 
of the state; even the potestas of a pater' * 
famlllas was not absolute.
He adds:
. . .  the decay of the gens In Rome s til l,  left 
the patriarchal family as a corporation (as 
Maine long ago has pointed out) the basis of 
which, however, was not merely the exercise 
of rights In rem by the pater famlllas over his 
children but a Iso the exercise of joint rights 
over property and the maintenance of a re li­
gious cult of ancestor-worshlp. 1
Zimmerman and Unnlthan explain this point further and says:
Much of the patriarchal Idea prevalent In the 
Western world arose from a misinterpretation 
of patrla potestas, which Is a term In Roman 
law used to designate the power of the head 
of the household. The confusion of this word 
with "patriarch" and private control o f fcmlly 
funds was then quite general In Western w rit­
ings about the early times. But certainly the 
Greek family which was related, I f  not a pre­
cedent, to the Roman family was of the "trustee" 
type . . .  2
a nd
1. Ibid ,j 47.
2. Carle C. Zimmerman and T .K .N . Unnlthan, Family and C ivilization In the 
East and the West, (Bombay, 1975), 73. The trustee family Is so named be- 
cause the elders of the families are considered ‘trustee1 of the property, titles 
and honours of the family groups, Ib id ., 165. This ‘ trustee family* of Zimmer­
man Is synonymous with Frederic Le Play*s ‘patriarchal family*, Ib id ., 166.
Le Play also suggested that the traditional European family system had a ll the 
characteristics which are claimed as uniquely Indian, Ib id ., 3 . On Le Play, 
see M .Z . Brooke, Le Play, Engineer and Social Scientist, (London, 1970).
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. . .  the Greek family . . .  furnished the pattern 
of the Roman family . . .  1
From the above observations, it Ts needless to dwell upon the argu­
ments of MacCormack further, but Tt may be said that hTs predominant scepti­
cism prevented him from delving Into learned works of anthropologists which 
were not Infected with a ll the faults he had found In the HausgemTnschaft 
theory.
1. Gens
A t this point, the mention of an ancient Roman Institution called
2
gens would not be superfluous. Gens was supposed^to be a group of several 
3
agnatic families which had the same name and looked back to their descent
Note 2 -  p .59 -  continued:
In Hindu context, Derrett says: The head was trustee, Tn a non-technlcal 
sense, for a host of dependants of various qualities*, RLSI, 409.
1. Zimmerman, and Unnlthan, Ib id ., 73.
2. A .S . Diamond opines that gens were real entitles at Rome until the middle of 
of the 3rd century B .C ., Primitive Law, (London, 1935), 251. E . Poste holds 
the view that *no definite historical record exists* of the Institution, Institute 
of Roman Law by Galus, (Oxford, 1904), Introd., x l l .  B u tS .J. Stoljar 
opines that the development of political power of the state caused the deterior­
ation of the gens, ‘Children, Parents and Guardians*, International Encyclo- 
paedla of Comparative Law, IV, 17.
3. Agnatic families Tn Rome are well attested In Rome: *famlllum dlclmus omnium 
agnatorlum*, Ulplun, quoted by H.H. Melnhard, The Patrilineal Principle Tn 
Early Teutonic Kinship*, In J .H .M . Beattie and R.G. Llenhardt, ed ., Studies 
In Social Anthropology, o p .c lt., 5.
from an eponymous ancestor. Perhaps Tn ancient Rome, the gens represented
2
the original owner of the land, and the property of the gens was succeeded by 
3
family property. It was laid down In the Twelve Tables that In default of
4
nearest agnates, the Inheritance would pass to the members of the gens.
The Idea of common descent from an ancestor Is linked with the
practice of ancestor-worship, and Is a key to the law of Inheritance In many 
§
primitive societies. In Rome, the sacrifice to the dead In the form of sacra
1. Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom, (London, 1883), 238-9.
A . Watson, Roman Private Law Around 200 B .C ., (Edinburgh, 1971), 28-9.
2. Jolowlcz, 123. Dlosdl, Ownership In Ancient and Preclasslcal Roman Law, 
(Budapest, 1970), 46.
3 . Dlosdl, Ib id ., 46. K.S. Karlston, Law and Structure of Social Action, 
(London, 1956), 39-40.
4 . G .W . Paton, A  Text Book of Jurisprudence, 4th ed., (Oxford, 1972), 548.
$  . See our discussion at in fr * . ,  2.6T, '30'5-4.
fe ll on the heir as a burden on the Inheritance.  ^ Thus, a ll the natural heirs 
of every generation had a supersensortal link through the Inheritance of family 
property. This continuum of family sacra endows a supra generational and meta­
physical entity on property and provides a background to the compulsory heirship 
of children. To a modem mind this may sound Incongruous, but In a classical
setting the concept that the purpose of property Is to perform sacrifice Is as real
2and appealing as Its physical enjoyment.
V I . Patrla potestas
a . Nature of the Institution
In Roman law, the virtually unrestricted power (patrla potestas) of the
3
paterfamilias over his children and remoter descendants Is well known. The
1. nulla heredltas sine sacrls was a well-known maxim In the jus pontlflclum,
R.V. IherTng, VorgeschTchte der Indo-Europaer, tr . A . Drucker, sub. t i t .
The Evolution of the Aryan , (London, 1897), 42-3. Cicero, Pe Leglbus, II,
19, 20: *RelIgTon prescribes that property and the worship of a family shall be 
Inseparable, and that the care of the sacrifices shall always devolve upon one 
who receives the Inheritance*. Cp# In the sastra the Inheritance of the son be­
comes dependent on his offering plnda to the ancestor, Manu, IX. 136: . . .  
dadyat plndam hared dhanam /Yajn. 11.132: plndado *msaharas calsam . . . /
VIsnu, X V .40: yas*’ carthaharah sa p lndadayl/
2. Cp. Derrett, RLSI, Ch.5.
3. Tab.4. Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian, o p .c lt., Introd., xv, p .29. G a l. l.
55. A . Watson, Roman Private Law Around 200 B .C ., o p .c lt., 28. The pecu­
liarity of the Institution In Rome Is restated In the Institutes of Justinian, I . IX .2: 
lus autem potestatls, quod In llberos habemus proplum est clvlum Romanorum: 
null! enlm a li i  sunt homines qul talem In llberos habeant potestatem qualem nos 
hcbsmus; The power that we have In respect of our children Is particular to 
Roman citizens: for there are no other men who have such power over their Issue 
as we do*, tr . Thomas, o p .c lt., 26. Galus mentions that the Galatians had a 
similar Institution, Sandars, Ib id ., 30. Patrla potestas In the Roman sense was 
absent In Athens and Egypt, Harrison, Infra,Td. Also R. Taubenschlag,
The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt In the Light of the Papyri, 2nd ed., (Warsaw, 1955), 
130-1. The Idea of patrla potestas could be found In Vaslstha, X V .2; SBE, 14,75.
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adopted children and wife Tn manu were also under this power. Patna potestas 
lasted the entire lifetime of the paterfamilias unless he released the child by a 
special legal act  ^ (emanclpatlo).
2 * 3A father could sell Into slavery (lus vendendl), expose or put to 
4
death his children (lus vitae neclsque). The power also Included
Footnote 3 -  p .62 -  continued:
Also litera lly In Manu, V III •416; but see, In fra ,427-3 p. the puissance
patemelle (puissance came from the Roman potestas) of the French C iv il Code, 
1896, gave a father unchecked authority over a child ‘s person and property for 
the first 21 years of his life . To a certain extent, fathers dominance In France 
Is retained even under the new law of 4th June, 1970, M .A . Glendon, ‘Power 
and Authority In the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections of Changing Ideo­
logies*, Am. J. Comp.L. 23 (1975) 1: 1-33 at 14-6. AJsoCp. Germanic 
mundlum, Infra, 4 - 6 *
1. F. Schulz, Classical Roman Law, (Oxford, 1951, rpt. 1969), 150.
2. Cp. the story of Sunahsepa. King Harlscandra proposed to sacrifice his son 
Rohlta to the god Varuna, but as Rohlta did not submlt/i brahmin named A jl-  
garta was persuaded to sell his son Sunahsepa to be sacrificed In place of Rohlta, 
A l.  Br. V II . 13-18, Keith, HOS, 25, 301-2. Im plicitly referred to In R .V .I.
24. Also The Ramayana, 1.62.3. On this legend, see A .P . Karmakar,‘Human 
Sacrifice In Proto-India*, ABORI 25 (1944), 109-115 at 115. K .M . KapadTa, 
Hindu Kinship, (Bombay, 1947), 83. Parallel tales are found In ancient Ireland 
of god Dlan Cecht and also of ‘Conn of the Hundred Battles*, M . D illon, ‘Celt 
and Hindu1, VIJ 1 (1963) 2: 203-223 at 212.
3. According to Manu, It was a crime to cast off one*s son, Manu, V I I I . 389.
Also Yajn. 11.237.
4 . This was absent Tn the law of Athens, see Infra,72 . In Rome, however, a father 
could use this power arbitrarily. He had to put his case before a consilium, 
Jolowlcz, HISRL, 3rd ed ., 119. Cp. Jewish law, Infra,2-Q'3 . In Vedlc India, 
similar power of a father was not altogether unknown. We learn from the ftgveda 
that RTjrasva was robbed of his eyesight by his father, R.V. I. 116. 16, alsoR.V.I. 
100.17. However, his eyesight was ultimately restored by the AsVlns, Wilson, It . 
Rgveda, (London, 1850), I, 311, n .c . Macdonell and Keith consider It to be *a 
legend of quite obscure meaning*, Vedlc Index of Names and Subjects, (Londan, 
1912), I, 108-9. NacTketas was offered by his father to death (mrtyaye), Tal.
B r . I l l• 11 .8 ; Katha.Upa.l .1 . The historical reality of Naclketas Is extremely 
doubtful. The philosophical significance of the story Is pointed out by
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1 2chastisement, noxa! surrender (Tus noxae dandT) and the right to force married 
3
children to divorce.
Maine chose to regard patrla potestas as a power much like soverlegnty
4
of a state -  abstract, Impersonal and remote. Malne*s analogy between sover­
eignty and patrla potestas emphasises the power aspect of the Institution, considering
5
family an Imperlum In tmperlo, a community within a commonwealth. O f Roman 
patrla potestas, Roscoe Pound says that It Is legally quite one-sided. The pater­
familias has rights, but whatever duties he may owe are owed without the household, 
not w ith in. ^ The Institution of patrla potestas, as understood by Kagan, ^  stems 
from the Idea of dominium on the principle that everyone who was under the power 
of the paterfamilias was considered as property.
Note 4 -  p .63 -  continued:
S. Radhakrlsh nan, The Principal Upanlsads, (London, 1953), 596.
1. Manu ordains that a father could beat his son with a rope or split bamboo Taut 
on the back part of the body (only)1, Manu, V III. 299-300.
2. Jolowlcz, lo c .c lt ., 119.
3. Maine, Ancient Law, N ew ed., 153.
4 . R. NIsbet, ‘Kinship and Political Power In First Century Rome*, In D. Black 
and M. MlleskI, ed ., The Social Organization of Law, o p .c lt., 262-277at 
263.
5. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1885), 150.
6 . R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (Boston, 1921), 27.
7. K .K . Kagan, Three Great Systems of Jurisprudence, (London, 1955), 61.
We are bound to be misled if  we try to understand the legal majesty 
of the patria potestas isolated from Its historical and sociological perspective. 
Stoljar points out: To begin w ith, nothing In our anthropological experience 
suggests that the Roman patrla potestas simply reflected an earlier or continuing 
order of an absolute parental tyranny*. ^
Although the patrla potestas connotes unrestricted power of the pa ter-
famlllas, and thereby upholds him as an Independent Individual, In essence, It Is a
2negation of Individualism; and In this respect, quite In tune with the mores of
archaic societies. The significance of patrla potestas does not lie Tn Its being
exclusively a power -  It rather springs from Its function as an essential cohesive
element Tn a household. Indeed, It stood for the unity of the fan lly , Its continuity
3
Tn time, and as the Trreducable atom of society as a whole. But, a t the same
time, It should be borne Tn mind that the word pater did not originally refer to
4
the biological father or genltor; It did not connote generation, but authority,
5
responsibility and protection. Thbs>, this abstract and Impersonal element of 
family continuity, like the concrete element of family property, was not attached 
to any particular Individual as such, but served as a weapon Tn the hands of the 
head of a family to hold together the Individual members through generations In
1. S. J. Stoljar, International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, IV, 16.
2. P. Stein and J. Shand, Legal Values In Western Society, (Edinburgh Univer­
sity Press, 1974), 116.
3. R. NIsbet, ‘Kinship and Political Power In First Century Rome*, In D. Black 
and M. MlleskI, ed., The Social Organization of Law, o p .c lt., 262-277*
4 . S .J. Stoljar, Intl.En.Comp.L., IV, 17.
5. NIsbet, lo c .c lt.
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Tn the fabric of a ‘community within a commonwealth*.
In most ancient societies In their grand designs of familial Institu­
tions, the potestas element was present Tn different forms and different degrees  ^ -  
defining the status aspect of the Individual within the group. Maybe Tn Roman 
society, the manifestation of this power was rigorous but In essence, It had no
r -
conflict with the values of archaic klnshlp-based groups In general, ard In that 
sense with those of the Indo-European joint fcmllles In particular.
The Roman family constituted, In a leading aspect, a sort o f private
religious society devoted to the worship of ancestors. The paterfamilias was In
2
charge of the sacra private. Ancestor-worshlp entails the necessity of o ff­
spring to perpetuate the family. A society, thus geared to preservation of fan lly , 
cannot have been Insensitive to the maltreatment of Its children. That Is why, any
act of cruelty towards children done by the father wTthoiit discernible justification
3
exposed him as a sacer -  virtually an outlaw. Also, to a certain extent, a
4
father was liable to public scrutiny of the lus sacrum for his domestic actions.
This shows that *the total picture, then, we have been presenting, emphasises the 
limitations rather than the formal scope o f the father*s rights. In this light, It 
Is simply not true, though this Is what Is commonly asserted, that a father could
c
freely or quite arbitrarily k i l l ,  malm, abandon or expel a chlld*y jonco he has accepted  
‘ the c h ild  in to  the fa m ily .
1. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1930), 151.
2. S .J. Stoljar, Inti.En.Comp.L., IV, 17.
3 . Stoljar, Ib id ., 17.
4 . Ib id ., 17.
5 . Ib id ., 17.
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b. Patrla potestas and famTly property
In the sphere of property ownerships the institution of patrla potestas
entails that no one under potestas could own property.  ^ A  son under power,
2
however Important he might be In m ilitary and public affairs, could not legally 
own property. Any acquisition made by the flllus famlllas was an acquisition 
for the pater
We are Informed that *at the basis of the patrla potestas was Its econo­
mic solidarity, the corporate possession of property by the family alone, not Its 
4
Individual members*. Therefore, although a son In potestate was not allowed
to own property, the character of the property In the hands of the paterfamilias
was virtually corporate; and It was for the continuation and sustenance of the
family. This Is Implied from the fact that In the Republic, property could not
5
easily be alienated from the agnatic fam ily.
6 7We also know from Galus and Paulus that a suus was a sort of
1. Jolowfaz, HISRL, 3rd e d ., 119. D. Daube, Roman Law, o p .c lt., 75.
2. Thomas, o p .c lt., 28.
3. G a l. I I .8 6 . Just. Inst. II . IX . SeeG .W . Keeton, The Elerre ntary Principles
of Jurisprudence , (London, 1949), 353. Cp. Manu, V III, 416; but see the 
comment of BharucT, Derrett, Bharucl*s Commentary on the ManusmrtI, (Wies­
baden, 1975), II, 209-10. The exegetlcaI,Interpretation also neutralises the 
literal purport of the text. A .S . Nataraja Ayyar, MI mamsa Jurisprudence,
(Allahabad, 1952), 36-8. For the text, see Infra, 42/^ ti.1.
4 . R. NIsbet, o p .c lt., 272. Also J . Declareull, Rome the Law G iver, (Loncbn,
1927), 156ff.
5. NIsbet, Ib id ., 267.
6 . G a l. II. 157.
7. D .28.2.11.
However, the most p lausable  exp lan atio n  could be th is ,  th a t,  
as commerce f lo u r is h e d , the  s h i f t  from an a g r ic u ltu ra l  to  a commercial 
economy demanded exc lus ive  ownership o f the p a te r fa m ilia s  to f a c i l i t a t e  
tra n s a c tio n  o f p ro p erty  in  a predom inantly commercial community.
owner of the family property during the lifetime of the pater.
Now, It remains Inexplicable how I f  Tn a preceding epoch, a father
was nothing more than an administrator  ^ of family property, In later periods, a
father In the household concentrates so much power Tn hts hands, * . . .  beholden
2
to no one for his actions and performances*.
Wd are not certain when *the original vague administrative supremacy
of the head of the family . . .  crystallised Into ownership of property as It had
3
crystallised Into potestas, manus and manclplum over persons*. The answer to 
this query perhaps may be supplied by the study of the historical forces behind the 
growth of Roman legal Institutions, rather than by concentrating on a particular 
epoch
In the Byzantine era, a trend Is noticeable toward the assimilation of
patrla potestas with the Institution of guardianship and toward Its termination when
majority Is reached. This profound change In substance was not abrupt; the pro-
4
cess of transformation began from the Republican era. Similarly, It would be
fallacious to assume that the nature of the Institution during Its preclasslcal stage
5
was the same as Is presented Tn the Republican era. The historical and economic 
reasonings behind the concentration of ownership Tn the hands of the pater Is
1. G .W . Paton, A  Text Book of Jurisprudence, 4th ed ., (Oxford, 1972), 519.
2. J .L . Stra chan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law, (London/New
York, 1926), 28-9. ~ ~
3 . Jolowlcz, HISRL, o p .c lt., 123.
4 . Thomas, o p .c lt., 27.
5 . Thomas, o p .c lt., 27.
explained by Gyorgy DTosdT thus:
The peculiarity of the Roman development con­
sists In the fact that, unlike other people, the 
development did not veer towards the economic 
Independence of the members of the family, on 
the contrary, It tended towards a concentration 
of the family property, which meant the exclu­
sive ownership of the paterfamilias. . . .  What 
can account for the fact that the exclusive owner­
ship of the paterfamilias succeeded family property 
so early? I think that the decisive ground for It 
was the peasant character of the ancient Roman 
society. A developed commodity turnover, and 
a lively commerce require the economic Independ­
ence of Individual, while the basically archaic 
peasant economy necessitates on the contrary the 
concentration of property. So the paterfamilias 
had to become very soon the sole owner of the 
family property. 1
We must remind ourselves that DTosdT*s attempted explanation Is 
based mainly on supposition and should not be allowed to grow Into a juridical 
conviction.
Another contradiction Tn the position of the son In Roman law baffles 
the jurists. The economic dependence of a son under potestas conflicts with his 
m ilitary and constitutional Independence. In the language of Maine:
In every relation of life  In which the collective 
community might have occasion to avail Itself 
of his wisdom and strength, for a ll purpose of 
counsel or of war, the FT Hus Famlllas, the Son 
under Power, was as free as his father. It was 
a maximum of Roman jurisprudence that the 
Patrla Potestas did not extend to the Jus Publi­
cum. Father and son voted together In the 
c ity , and fought side by side In the fie ld;
1. DIosdl, o p .c lt., 49.
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indeed, the son, as general, might happen to 
command the father, or, as magistrate, decide  ^
on his contracts and punish his delinquencies.
The exalted position of the son Tn civic and m ilitary life makes his 
2life under potestas unbelievable, nevertheless It Is not Impossible. As a
2parallel, a Hindu son belonging to the Dayabhaga school Is Tn a position no 
different from his Roman counterpart. C ivic Independence from and proprie­
tary dependence on the father may sound paradoxical but traditional family law 
Is not a Iways logic ; It Is a Iso experience.
1. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1905, 121.
2. A .A . Schiller Informs us that during the classical period, The Roman pater
fam litas, socially and often legally prevented from engaging Tn commerclaI 
enterprises, placed his sons Tn control of trading companies . .  . * , The Busi­
ness Relations of Patron and Freedman Tn Classical Roman Law1, In M . Radln 
and A .M . Kidd, ed ., Legal Essays In Tribute to OrirTn Kip McMurray, (Uni­
versity of California Press, Berkeley, 1935), 623-639. The position of these
sons may be explained Tn terms of Hindu law. Although at Mltdksara law a
son has birthright (janmasvatva) and he Is entitled to partition of the joint family 
property, he has no Independence (svatantrya) Tn respect of the management of 
the family and the disposition of certain acquisitions of the father. Svatantrya 
Is acquired by relatively few. Svatantrya comes with age, seniority, and the 
death of ancestors. A  son Is an example of paratantrya (dependence) and he 
Is not svatantra (Independent) while his father Is a live . To create fu ll owner­
ship In the western sense svatva and svatantrya must be combined, but In the 
MItaksara sense, property Is by no means dependent upon Independence. A 
Roman son also was paratantra but achieved a limited svatantrya due to the 
social or legal Incapacity of his father. However, unlike the Hindus, the 
Romans were not smart enough to distinguish svatva from svatantrya. For a 
discussion on these concepts, see Derrett, The Development of the Concept 
of Property In India1, ZVR 64 (1962), 15-130 at 96-101.
3. Infra,532*
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c . PeculTum
We have already pointed out that only persons suT TurTs could own 
property and whatever the son Tn potestas acquired was acquired for the father.
However, usually a father used to allow a son to achlnlster a fund 
called the pecullum.^ Technically, a lather remained the owner of the pecullum 
but the son could manage It as I f  It was his own. It should be borne In mind that
2
the paterfamilias could reduce the pecullum or completely recall It at any moment.
It Is also worth noting that *the fllTusfamllTas was not normally entitled to use It 
3
for any liberality. . . .  Even with respect to the pecullum . . .  he lacked true 
Independence' . 4
Considering the general rule that a son under potestas could own no 
property, the semblance of Independence implied In the Institution of pecullum 
aroused juristic speculations. David Daube satisfied himself by stating that
5
pecullum as a custom was manifestly confined to the ‘haves*. John Crook, on 
the other hand, did not hedge behind a Marxist Interpretation; he temporarily
1. F. Schulz, Classical Roman Law, o p .c lt., 154. The term pecullum Is derived 
from pecus = cattle, as In early times property primarily consisted of livestock. 
Cp. *fee* In English feudal law: old High German fehu, signifying property In 
the shape of animals: modern German Vleh. Corresponding term Tn Jewish 
law Is segullah. B. Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law . . . ,  o p .c lt., I, 181.
Cp. the Hindu expression godhanam.
2. A .J . Crook, Law and Life of Rome, (London, 1967), 110. Daube, Roman Law, 
o p .c lt., 83.
3. Liberality Is liber, which Is the test of power over property. Cp. Aristotle, 
Rhetoric, 1.5 .7 . See J.W . Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks, 
(Oxford), 1956, 197.
4 . Daube, Roman Law, o p .c lt., 83.
5. D. Daube, Roman Law, o p .c lt., 83.
paused to doubt the very existence of the Institution. ^  However, despite the 
lack of Information on Its actual administration, later legislation on Its modifi­
cation corroborates Its existence.
In the reign of Augustus, pecullum castrense was developed. It per­
mitted the sons under power to retain a ll booty, income and property they had
2
acquired during m ilitary service. A flllus farm lias could freely dispose of such 
property without his father's approval, although the pecullum s till remained techni­
cally his father's property and should he die Intestate, the pecullum went to his
3pater, lure peculTT. In the later Empire, an analogous institution, the pecullum
4
quast-castrense was developed for sons In the c iv il service.
However, the reason for this limited recognition of property rights o f 
sons In two particular careers was more m ilitary and administrative than any general 
recognition of the legal equality of ascendants and descendants. Although 
Robert NIsbet finds In the decree of pecullum castrense 'the beginnings of econo­
mic Individualism',^ Marcia Collsh remarks on Its contemporary rationale that
1 . Crook^ o p .c lt., 119-120.
2 . Cp. saurya-dhana as Impartible In the sastra.
3 . Thomas, o p .c lt., 28.
4 . Ib id . ,  28.
5. M .L . Collsh, 'The Roman Law of Persons and Roman History: A  Case for an 
Interdisciplinary Approach*, American Journal of Jurisprudence, 19 (1974), 
112-127 at 123.
6 . R. NIsbet, o p .c lt., 272.
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rather than being a recognition of the fu ll 
personhood of sons under patrla potestas, the 
Institution of the pecullum castrense and 
quasl-castrense was a perfectly transparent 
effort on the part of the emperors to encour­
age members of the propertied classes to 
enter and to remain In the service of the 
state as m ilitary and c iv il officials. 1
Such recognition re-emphaslsed the v ita lity  of potestas.
V II. Conclusion
Lastly, the two points which bring the position of the Roman son 
closer to his Mltaksara counterpart deserve a restatement.
The restriction on disherison of a son In Roman law Is not an absolute 
restriction. A ll a testator needs Is to be careful to exheredate the son In due 
form. Nevertheless, It signifies that a son Is the most formidable of the natural 
heirs and disherison was an act which Interfered with his prospective rights to the 
family property acquired at his birth.
Again, according to the Mltaksara, only sons are co-helrs with their
father , and they Inherit excluding a ll other relatives; but In Roman lav^ granted
2
that they are quodammodo domlnl, sul heredes Include daughters and they Inherit
3 4with their brothers. So, even If the texts of Galus and Paulus Imply a co-
ownership of ascendants and descendants, It Is not exclusively restricted to the son.
1. M .L . Collsh, Io c .c lt . ,  124.
2. G a l.I I .  157.
3. Jolowlcz, HISRL, 3 rded ., 125-6.
4 . G a l. I I .  157. D .28.2.11.
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Nonetheless, even though this last argument may diminish the 
possibility of son's birthright Tn the Mltaksara sense, we can say that the 
various points brought together Tn this discussion, even though the text of 
Galus Is salvaged from scraps of papyrus material, w ill add up to something 
more than a mere mirage of the son's co-ownership with the father Tn pre- 
classlcal Rome.
CHAPTER 3
GREEK, ALBANIAN AND SOUTH SLAVONIAN LAW
(1) Greek Law
I . Introductory Remark
The majority o f scholars agree that the Indo-Europeans arrived In
Greece c . 1900 B.C.  ^ Inioftir as It Is a branch of the Indo-European legal
system, ancient Greek family law stands theoretically, as Greece does geographj-
2
cally, In a curiously midway position between Roman and Hindu jurisprudence. 
Although there woe variations among the laws of more than a hundred title s , *the
similarity of Doric and Ionian Institutions allows us to speak of "Greek law" as
^  »3 a unity.*
1. 'R.A. CrosS^f1^ * ‘ Indo-European Origins: The Linguistic Evidence*, Past and 
Present, 12 (1957), 16-46 at 38. Wyatt did not find any evidence of Indo- 
European speech In Greece prior to c . 1600 B .C ., W .F. Wyatt, J r., *The Indo- 
European Tzat ion of Greece*, In G . Cardona and others, ed., Indo-European and 
Indo-Europeans, o p .c lt., 89-111 at 107. The following articles In Acta of the 
2nd International Colloquium on Aegean Prehistory, (Athens, 1972) throw light
on this controversy: W.F. Wyatt, J r., *Greek Dialectology and Greek Prehistory*, 
18r22 at 18; R.A. Crossland, *Recent Re-Appralsal of Evidence for the Chrono­
logy of the Differentiation of Indo-European*, 46-55; J .G . Macqueen, *The 
First Arrival of Indo-European Elements In Greece. Some Observation from 
Anatolia*, 142-5.
2. Derrett, TLL, 1953, 54.
3. F. Prlngshelm, The Greek Law of Sale, (Weimar , 1950), 5.
11. The Law of Athens
a. Father and son relationship
The Greek world Tn general shows that the relationship of a father to
his household differed from that which we find Tn developed Roman Law. ^
2
Galus had very much Tn mind the law of Athens when he said that Tn no other
3
system did a father have so much power over his children as the Romans.
In this respect, Aristotle points out that a Greek father was not an 
autocrat at his house, rather the father and son relationship was fu ll of f i l ia l 
love:
A husband and father rules over his wife and 
children, both free, but the rule differs, the 
rule over his children being a royal, over his 
wife a constitutional rule. . . .  The rule of 
a father over his children Is royal, for he re­
ceives both love and the respect due to age, 
exercising a kind of royal power. . . .  For 
a king Is the natural superior of his subjects, 
but he should be of the same kin or kind with 
them, and such Is the relation of elder and 
younger, of father and son. 4
1. VInogradoff, OHJ, I. C h.V . R. Taubenschlag, The Law o f Greco-Roman 
Egypt In the Light o f the Papyri, 332 B .C . -  640 A .D ., o p .c lt., 130.
2. G a l. 1.55.
3. A.R .W . Harrison, The Law of Athens, I, The Family and Property, (Oxford, 
1968), 70, n .3 .
4 . The Politics of Aristotle, 1.12, tr. B. Jowett, (Oxford, 1885), I, 22-3. On 
relationship between parents and children, also see D .A . Rees, ed ., Aristotle 
The Nlchomachean Ethics, (Oxford, 1951), 251-2.
The Greek attitude to sonshTp Is permeated by their attitude to the 
Institution of family. *Every Greek family*, as Lacey puts It,
looked backwards and forwards a ll the time.
It looked backwards to Its supposed first 
founder, and shared a religious worship with 
others with a similar belief; It also looked 
forward to Its own continuance, and to the 
preservation for as many future generations 
as possible of the cult of the family which 
the living members practised In the Interest 
of the dead. 1
2The Hellenic9 enos corresponds closely to the Hindu joint fam ily, and the son
of the house (olkos), Tn order to continue the family both Tn Its sacerdotal and
3
secular aspects, was under a strong obligation to marry and procreate a son.
However, the crucial moment In a child's juridical life Tn Athenian
law was Its admission Into the family by the father. A child had no right Ipso
4
jure on birth to be nurtured by Its father. One might argue that unlike his
1. W .K . Lacey, The Family In Classical Geece, (London, 1968), 15. On 
ancestor worship In Greece, see E.R. Leach, Rethinking Anthropology, 
(London, Athlone, 1961), 127.
2. Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom, (London, 1883), 239.
3. Lacey, o p .c lt., 16. Homer speaks of the 'Incomplete household* of 
Protesllaus who died without a son, Iliad, II, 701. Cp. \6cflc hankering 
after son, R.V. V II.4 .7 -8 , Kane, HD, III, 656-7. AIsoCp. Hindu Idea 
that man Is born with four debts: to the gods, to the rsls, to the fathers, to 
the human beings; rnam ha val jayate yo'stl, sa jayam3na eva devebhyah 
rslbhyah pltrbhyo manusyebhyah . . .  , Sat. Br. 1 .7 .2 .1 . ^The obligation to 
the parents Is discharged through procreation of progeny, Sat. Br. 1 .7 .2 .4 . 
On this, see H. Chatterjee, The Law of Debt In Ancient India, (Calcutta, 
1971), 84. Also other texts, Infra,A10-1
4 . In Sparta also, the elders of the tribes examined every newborn Infant and If
they found It to be w e ll-bu ilt and sturdy, they ordered the father to reafr I t , 
D. Asherl, *The Laws of Inheritance, Distribution of Land and Political Inst! 
tutlons In Ancient Greece*, HIstorla. Z e lt. fUralte Geschlchte, 12 (1963), 
1-21 at 5.
Mltaksara counterpart, a son in Athenian law had no right from his b irth . Never- 
theless, It Is a valid argument, though subject to the factor of admission, that It 
Is birth which was the determining factor In establishing the relationship between 
father and son. Once the child Is admitted to the family, It acquires Its rights.^
2
In Athens, as In Rome, a father could expose a child, but the act of 
exposure was legally negative Tn character and the legal tie between the father 
and the exposed child could be revived I f  the child later reappeared.
Up to the time of Solon, an Athenian father also enjoyed the right to
sell his children, and perhaps also to pledge them against a debt. But we should
not suppose that In historical times an Athenian father ever enjoyed the Roman
father*s right to put his son to death (Tus vitae ac necls). A  son In Roman law,
unless emancipated by his father, had to remain under potestas as long as the latter
lived. There Is no trace of anything comparable Tn the laws of Athens. A male
child In Athens seems to have been almost wholly free from paternal power as soon
4
as he reached the end of his seventeenth (conceivably eighteenth) year.
I l l . Ownership of family property
In the embryonic epoch of Greek legal history corporate ownership
1. Harrison, o p .c lt., 78.
2. Lacey, o p .c lt., 164-5. Aristotle was In favour of legislation to prevent 
exposure of children: E. Baker, The Politics of Aristotle, (Oxford, 1946), 
XV I. 15, p.327.
3. Harrison, o p .c lt., 73.
4 . Harrison, o p .c lt., 74.
of family land and chattels must have been the rule,^ and *even Tn the fourth
century It was common enough for sons to remain joint owners of the family
2 3property on their father's death . . . 1 The discourses of Dio Chrysostom
reveal that Tn ancient Greece joint family estate was the general norm of owner­
ship. In a series of speeches, Chrysostom tried to arouse the national feelings
4
of the Greeks by reminding them of their carious past. Once he dealt with 
the affairs of his native BTthynTa. He spoke against envy and rivalry and praised 
co-operation and jointness In these words:
Or, since we admire those brothers who share 
completely a common estate and have not be­
cause of stinginess divided their patrimony, 
whose wealth moreover, Is even more admired 
since It Is great er for the very reason tha t 
It has not been divided and half of everything 
made the property of each, but Instead the ^ ,
whole Is thought to belong to the1 both . . .  /  *
1. Harrison, Ib id ., 239. J.W . Jones, The Law and Legal Theory of the Greeks, 
(Oxford, 1956), 200. D. Asher!, ‘Laws of Inheritance, Distribution of Land 
and Political Constitutions Tn Ancient Greece*, HTstorla, 12 (1963), 1-21 at 7.
2. Harrison, Ib id ., 239. !R.F. W illetts, The Law Code of Gortyn, (Berlin, 1967), 12.
3 . A .D . 40-120.
4 . Dio Chrysostom, (London/New York, 1932), I, Tntrod., Ix .
5. Dio ChrysostQm, 38.45, tr. H .L . Crosby, (London/Cambridge, Mass., 1946),
IV, 89. Other examples of joint living: Euthymachos* two sons Meldylldes and 
Archlades remained joint after the death of their father, Dem. Leoch. 10, firvL 
18, cited by Harrison, o p .c lt., 239. Apollodoros was living joint with his
minor brother, PasTkles, Harrison, Ib id ., 240. Menecles and his brother were 
In joint ownership of land, Isaeus, II, 28, cited by Lacey, The Family In ClassT- 
caI Greece, o p .c lt., 126, n .9 a t2 9 2 . For other Instances, see Lacey, Ib id .,
126-7. TFe joint living Is also Indirectly proved by the detailed rules of parti­
tion (dlalresls) of joint property, see R. Taubenschlag, ‘Survey of Papyri Published
1939-45*, The Excavations at Dura Europos, Journal of Juristic Papyrology, 1
(1946) 1:98-118 at 117.
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The corporate family ownership of property Is also substantiated
from the fact that land, at least theoretically,  ^ was InalTencble Tn ancient 
2
Greek law. Even when It became legal to dispose of ancestral land, It
3
was deemed disgraceful to do so.
Commenting on the general Inalienability of land Tn ancient Greece,
Lacey says:
f t  Is also a reminder that modern notions of 
ownership may be misleading, and suggests 
that we should not look on the kyrlos of an 
olkos as an Individual owner, but as the pre­
sent custodian of what belongs to his family, 
past, present and, If he Is successful In pro­
creating a son, future. 4
In this sense, the succession of sons on the death of their father was In principle,
not succession at a ll,  but simply the continuation of joint ownership, a son thus
stepping Into the shoes of his father to play the same role In respect o f the olkos
1. Lacey, Ib id ., 23.
2. N.Dfustel de Coulanges, The Origin of Property Tn Land, t r . ,  M . Ashley, 
(London, 1927), 90. D . Asherl, *Laws of Inheritance , Distribution of Land 
and Political Constitutions Tn Ancient Greece*, HIstorla, 12 (1963) 1-21 at 
1-3. Cp. the sastrlc text: sthavare vlkrayo nastl . . . ,  Dh.K. 1589b, Infra,
3 . Plato, Laws, 923A. Also, Lacey,Ioo.c lt., 23.
4 . Lacey, o p .c lt., 23. Cp. the position of the manager of joint Hindu families, 
Derrett, IMHL,$f426, 427.
5. For survival of this custom In modern Greece, see E. FrTedl, *Dowry and 
Inheritance In Modern Greece*, In J .M . Potter, M .N . Diaz and G .M .
Foster , ed ., Peasant Societyj[ Boston, 1967), 57-62 at 57.
6. D. Asherl, o p .c lt., 7.
IV. Testamentary power of the father
In pre-c!assTcaI Greece, testate succession was unknown.^ In
2
Homeric society we do not come across the concept of w il l .  Plato also dls-
3
approved of testamentary disposition. The general rule was that a man could
4
not dispose of his property by w ill I f  he had legitimate sons. Plutarch speaks
of Solon that :
before his time, no w ill could be made, but the 
eratlre estate of the deceased must remain In his 
family. Whereas he, by permitting a man who 
had no children to give his property to whom he 
wished, ranked friendship above kinship, and 
favour above necessity, and make a man's 
possession his own. 5
Although Plutarch's record gives the Impression that the reform of 
Solon granted general power ^ o f making a w ill,  Tn fact It only Introduced a 
a testamentary adoption. ^  The law granted the power of making a w ill only 
In the case of fa Ilure of natural heirs. David Asherl opines that a
1. Asherl, Ib id ., 6 .
2. Lacey, o p .c lt., 131.
3. Law, 922A.
4 . Lacey, o p .c lt., 131, n .35a t294 . Asherl, o p .c lt., 6 .
5. Plutarch's Lives, Life of Solon, tr. B. Perrin, (London, 1914), I, 461-463.
6 . Asherl thinks that Plutarch's report was Inaccurate and erroneous, D. Asherl, 
o p .c lt., 7, 12.
7. Asherl, Ib id ., 8 .
So Ionian testament was identical with the insti­
tution of an heir by means of adoption by a 
childless head of household. The adopted son, 
at the death of the testator, was Introduced In­
to his adoptive father's household to Inherit  ^
and perpetuate It and to keep Its sacra a live .
However, the passage from Plutarch undoubtedly suggests that prior 
to the legislation of Solon, property belonged to the family and a father did not 
have the power to deprive the natural heirs by testamentary disposition.
It Is Interesting to note that Tn Sparta, a father could not dispose of 
family property with the object of depriving his son either Inter vivos or by a w il l .  
Plutarch Informs us that the Spartan families who were Instituted by Lycurgus re­
tained their old system In the Lacedaemonian state until It was changed by EpTta- 
deus, who had a quarrel with his son. As a result of this personal aggrandise­
ment he 'Introduced a law permitting a man during his lifetime to give his estate
2and allotment to any one he wished, or In his w ill and testament so to leave It*.
3
Thus, Plutarch comments, 'the most excellent of Institutions' was destroyed.
1 . Asherl, Ibid, 8 .
2 . Plutarch's Lives, Life of Agts, V , 2, tr. B. Perrin, (London, 1921), X , 13-15. 
Also see the Life of Lycurgus, V III, 3. Asherl tells us that unlike the So Ionian 
testamentary adoption, the rhetra of EpTtadeus was a proper testamentary Instru­
ment: *Land became absolute private property and Its owner was now free to 
dispose of his substance without limitations . . . * ,  D . Asherl, HIstorla, 12 (1963)
13. Alluded to by Aristotle, Pol. 1270 A 2 l.
3 . Plutarch, A g ., Ib id ., X , 13.
V . Son's position among the natural heirs
In Athenian law, the most Important of the heirs of the de cuius are
his legitimate sons.  ^ It Is perhaps not Insignificant to note In a context com-
2
parable with Hindu law that throughout Greece (excepting a variation In 
3
Gortyn) sons exclude a ll other heirs Tn respect of Inheritance.
However, even during Kb lifetime, a father could distribute the family
4 _ 5property among his sons. Like a Hindu vanaprastha, In ancient Greece
1. Adopted sons also are equally Important, Harrison, o p .c lt., 130. Also see,
D. Schaps, *Women Tn Greek Inheritance Law*, Classical Quarterly, 25 (1975)
1: 53-7 at 54. Illegitimate children were excluded from Inheritance of their 
father's estate. D .M . Macdowell, 'Bastards as Athenian Citizens', Classical 
Quarterly, 26 (1976), 1: 88;9l at 8 8 . Cp. Hindu Law, I n f r a , "761- 4.
2. Asherl, lo c .c lt ., 20. InscrlptlonaI materials also supports this contention.
An Inscription of Naupactus prescribes the order of succession: (a) sons, (b) 
daughters, (c) brothers; and exp lic itly  excludes the daughters In presence of 
sons. The order of succession In an Inscription from Thermus In Aetolla, around 
c. 223 B.C. (a) sons, (b) daughters, (c) brothers or sisters, (d) at least any other 
category. The same order In an Inscription from Tegeaf  on these, see D. Schaps, 
lo c .c lt ., 55-57. The same preference for sons In Plato, Laws, X I, 924. In 
A ttic  law, In order of preference of heirs, the anchlstels were'the first; then the 
sungenels. The anchlstels were members of the anchlstela. In Its concrete 
sense anchlstela means those who stand very near to the deceased; In Its abstract 
sense It means proximity, which Is exactly synonymous with the Sanskrit word, 
pratyasattl, Derrett, TLL, 1953 , 57, n.15. With the Greek rules, cp. Manu, IX, 
185:
3. Tnfra^88-90 '
4 . Bouselus had five sons; 'their father divided their property for them*. They got 
married and set up five olkol, Lacey, o p .c lt., 127, n.13 at 292. Euctemon, 
during his lifetime, settled property to his son Phlloctemon. In a proprietary 
sense this property belonged to Phlloctemon since he bequeathed It to one of 
his sister's two sons during the lifetime of Euctemon, Lacey, Ib id ., 127. Cp. 
Tal.Sam . III. 1.9.4; 11.5.2.7; also MTta on Yajn. II. 114, Kane, HD, 111, 
565-569. Also see, Infra, 3 7 0  - 8 5 .
5. On vanaprastha, see Infra, 3 8 5 -4 0 2 .
'fathers of adult sons often handed over the management of their oik os to their
sons, and virtually stepped down from the management of the houses . . To
safeguard the Interest of the aged, Athenian law provided that a father, In
common with other ascendants both male and female, had a right Tn his old age
2to be maintained by his son; to which Solon added a proviso that a father who
failed to educate his son In a trade could not claim maintenance from him In old
3age.
It Is worth discussing the fact that a son of any age could be removed 
from the house by his father, and possibly this was a means to exclude a son from 
his share In the Inheritance, an exclusion which the father could not bring about
by testamentary disposition. Actual Instances of casting out sons were extremely
4 5 rare, and possibly, like formal disherison, weiecontra bonos mores.
Apart from discountenancing disherison, Athenian law took care to 
protect the Interest of children and remoter heirs In family property against dis­
sipation by the father due to his Idleness or mental Incapacity.^ These safeguards 
Indicate that the latent right of the heirs In the family property which was In the
1 . Lacey, o p .c lt., 117. Also G .S . Kirk, 'O ld Age and Maturity In Ancient
Greece', In A . Portmann and R. RItsema, ed., The Stages of Life In Creative 
Process, (Leiden, 1973), Eranos^40 (1971), 123-158 at 131.
2 . Harrison, o p .c lt., 77. Cp. Sat. br.
3 . Harrison, Ibid, 78.
4 . HarlTson, Ib id ., 75-6. Cp. Manu, V II I. 389. Yajn. II. 237.
5. Plato, Laws, 928, D?E. Lacey^ o p .c lt., 126, n .7 a t2 9 2 .
6 . Harrison, o p .c lt., 79.
hands of the father was not a myth but a jurT dTca! reality.
V I . Conclusion
Thus, the preferential position of a son as first among the heirs, the 
checks and balances In the power of the father to deal with family property, and 
the absence of the power of testamentary disposition, Indirectly Imply a quasi- 
ownership of the son In the family property along with his father. It may not be 
as concrete as the Mltaksara birthright, nevertheless, It makes meaningful the 
assertion of Plato that ‘neither your own persons nor the estate are your own; 
both belong to your whole line, past and future . .  .* ^
V II . The Gortyn Code
The Greeks were not confined to the mainland of Greece. Commerce 
and conquest carried the Greek civilization quite far afie ld, and In some of the 
Greek colonies valuable traces of the Greek legal system have been found.
One of the outstanding discoveries In the field of Greek legal history
2
Is the finding of the Great Code of Gortyn. Scholars agree that the Code Is not
3
older than c . 450 B .C ., and It Is generally accepted that the Code contains many
1. The Laws of Plato, X . 924, tr. A .E. Taylor, (London, 1934), 316. Cp. 
Vyasa's text: ye jata ye^pyajatas'ca . . . ,  Dh.K. 1587.
2. On the Importance and nature of the Code, see R.F. W illetts, Ancient Crete: 
A  Social History, (London, 1965), 82-4.
3. A .C . Merrlam, Law Code of Gortyna In Krete, (Baltimore, 1886), 6 . R.F. 
W illetts, The Law Code of Gortyn, (Berlin, 1967), 8 .
traces of older usages than its actual date of formulation.^
a . FamT ly organisation
2
The Code gtves the Impression that, so far as the Dorian citizens
3
were concerned, the social system was essentially patriarchal. The family
4
was centred within the wider circle of the clan and the household (oTkos) was
closely related to the tenure of the kleros, I .e . the ancestral estate consisting
5
of the land and the attached peasants.
b. Proprietary relationship between father and son
The Gortyn system reveals that a father*s power was not as absolute 
as In developed Roman law. The sons could deal with their self-acqulsltlons 
In any way they liked. The passage which deals with the respective proprietary
1. W illetts, Ib id ., 8 . Also Vlnogradoff, OHJ, II, The Jurisprudence of the 
Greek C ity, (London, 1922), 207. Cp. the remark of Benvenlste, Ml n*ya 
pas Imprudence a supposer d&s malntenant que les Aryens dolvent autant a la 
culture de l*lndus,que les Hellenes au monde creto-mycenlen*, E. Benvenlste, 
Vrtrqlet Vragna, Etude de mythologle Indo-lranlenne, E. Benvenlste and L._ 
Renou, (Paris, 1934), 199; Mt Is not rash to suppose from now on that the Aryans 
owe as much to the Indus culture as did the Hellenes to the Creto-Mycenaean 
world*, tr. H. Kanltkar, Department of Anthropology, S .O .A .S .
2. On the origin of the Dorians, see W. Ridgeway, *Who Were the Dorians?*, 
Anthropological Essays, Edward Burnett Taylor Felicitation Volume, (Oxford, 
1907), 295-308 at 308. Also, W illetts, Ancient Crete, lo c .c lt . ,  C h .II.
3 . W illetts, The Law Code of Gortyn, lo c .c lt ., 10-17.
4 . Cp. gens among the Romans, supra, 6 0 - 6 2 -.
5. W illetts, lo c .c lt ., 11-12.
rights of father and son In family property unambiguously upholds a son*s Inde­
pendence and ownership of his self-acquisitions:
As long as a father lives, no one shall purchase 
any of his property from a son, or take It on 
mortgage; but, whatever the son himself may 
have acquired or obtained by Inheritance, 1 
he may sell If  he w ill: nor shall the father 
sell or promise the property of his children
whatever they have themselves acquired or 
succeeded to . . .  2
An Ingenious variety of checks existed to prevent possible Infringement
of these rules, and the Code laid down a fine In relevant cases. The Intention of
Imposing these penalties was *to try to lim it the extent of encroachment upon 
collective rights, particularly by limiting the powers of Individual action by the 
males*.^
Although the father was given control of the children and division of
4
property, he had no power of testamentary disposition. We have Just seen that 
a father had no right over the self-acquired property of his sons and this shows 
that a father had effective control only over his own self-acquisitions and the 
ancestral property In his hands. However, I t  Is Indeed worth noting that even 
In respect of these properties, a father could not Interfere with the normal course
1 . When the wife died leaving children, her property passed to the children and 
not to her husband. The father had the right to administer such property, but, 
unless the children consented, he could not sell or mortgage such property, 
W illetts, The Law Code of Gortyn, o p .c lt., 20, n.38, n.35; 44, Cols. V I, 
31-46.
2. W illetts, Ib id ., 20.
3. W illetts, Ib id ., 21.
4 . W illetts, Ib id*, 12, 20.
of inheritance by testamentary means.
The Gortyn Code gives the impression that so long as the parents were 
a live, the property remained joint and there seems to be no general right of the
2
sons to demand a share of the family property during the lifetime of the father.
But there Is a curious provision In the Code which Implies son's ownership even
during the lifetime of the father. The provision was that I f  a son was condemned
3
to pay a fine, his due portion of the family property had to be given to him.
This entitlement to his share of the family property In his father's lifetime denotes
a birthright of the son which, although It may not be exactly like the MItaksara
birthright In connotation, nevertheless, Is the manifestation of a right which a
4
Dorian son acquired from his birth. The only limitation was that It was con­
ditional on committing an offence, resulting In the necessity of paying a fine by 
the son.
c . Position of the daughter
From the Indo-European point of view where agnatic succession Is the
1. W illetts, The Law Code of Gortyn, o p .c lt., 20. O .K . McMurray, *LTberty 
of Testation and Some Modem Limitations Thereon*, In Celebration Legal 
Essays to mark the twenty-fifth year of service of John H . Wlgmore as Professor 
of Law In Northwestern University, (Chicago, 1919), 536-563 at 539.
2. Cp. the MItaksara position, Kane, HD, III, 564-570. Also Infra,5 l£ -9 .
3. It was a portion, not a payment like the paterfamilias paying for the delict of 
flllasfamlllas In Roman Law, W illetts, lo c .c lt ., 64, cols. 23-31.
4 . In a personal discussion, Willetts agreed on this point with the present writer.
norm, the Gortyn Code has a discordant provision which, in respect of certain
1 2 movable property, provides that half a son's portion goes to the daughter.
Thetext on this rule runs as follows:
But, If a (father) die, the houses In the c ity 
and whatever there Is In the houses In which 
a serf residing In the country does not live, 
and the sheep and larger animals which do 
not belong to the serf , shall belong to the 
sons, but a ll the rest of the property shall 
be divided fa irly , and the sons, how many 
soever there be, shall receive two parts each, 
and the daughters, how many soever there be, 
one part each daughter. 3
A  father could make a g ift of property to his daughter on her marriage, 
but this should not exceed the daughter's entitlement of Inheritance at his death. 
The texts run as follows:
If the father while a live , wished to make a 
g ift to his daughter on her marriage, he 
could do so, but only within the prescribed 
limits, that Is to say, the prescribed lim it 
of her share of the hherltance, which was 
half as much as the sons. 4
Any (daughter) to whom he gave or pledged 
before shall have these things, but shall ob­
tain nothing besides from the paternal pro­
perty. 5
1. D . Asherl, 'Laws of Inheritance, Distribution of Land and Political Constitu­
tions In Ancient Greece*, HlstorIa# 12 (1963), 1-21 at 17.
2. D. Schaps, *Women In Greek Inheritance Law*, Classical Quarterly, 25 (1975) 
1: 53-57 at 55.
3 . A .C . Merrlam, Law Code ofGortynaln Krete, o p .c lt., 15.
4 . W illetts, The Law Code of Gortyn, o p .c lt., 20.
5. W illetts, Ib id ., 42, c o l. lv .
In fact, Tt is an advancement, and the rule restricts a father's power of g ift to 
fits daughters in order to protect the rights of the sons. ^
V III. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion shows that among the Dorian Greeks, a 
father Is dominant In the gubernatorial sphere but In the sphere of property, he 
appears to be no more than an administrator of the common goods. And, Indeed, 
In this respect, like the Athenian system, the Dorian stands half-way between 
the absolute paternal ownership characteristic of developed Roman law and the 
corporate property regime of the MItaksara.
1 . Daughter as co-heir with her brother Is mentioned In the Hindu texts. 
Yajnavalkya ordained her a share with her brother which was to be one- 
fourth of what she would have *)Ot had shtbeen born as a son. Y a jn .ll .124.
Mlta on Yajn. II. 124: anena duhltaro^pl pltur urdhvam amsa bhaglnya I t l 
gamyate . . .  tasmat pltur urdhvam kanyapl amsa bhaglnl / Balambhatta Is 
more emphatic and says that a sister Is entitled to a share as of right of the 
paternal property: vlbhage satyasatl ca duhlta taccaturtham^a bhaglnl tad 
anantaram It! slddham /  ata evalka putrasthalepy upapadanam krtam It! 
bodhyam /  BalarribhattI, on Yajn. II. 124, Gharpure, ed. 159; also, putrls- 
vatve (putrltve) tu svajatlnlbandhanadath^ac caturtharpsa bhagltvam vaksyama -  
nam bodhyam/ BalambhattI, on M lta, Yajn. II. 124; Gharpure, ed ., 154-5. 
Cp. Manu, IX. 185, The Nagpur High Court (defunct In 1956) held that un­
married daughters may, I f  they choose, demand each a quarter of any brother's 
share according to the text of the MItaksara, M t. Lochan v. Babal (1909) 5 
Nag. L.R. 161, 170-1 - 4  I.C . 786 (referred to In Shamrao v. Munnabal 
(1945) 1948 Nag. 678, 687. The Nagpur decision was Ignored by the Supreme 
Court In Guramma v . Mai lappa, AIR, 1964 SC 510; and In the light o f the S.C. 
decision, a daughter's right to a share In presence of son should be considered 
as obsolete. Fora juridical discussion on this point, see Derrett, Critique,
91, n .7 .
91 .
(2) The Customary Law of the Albanian Highlands
I . Background
The Albanian highlands, I .e . the country lying to the north of the 
river Shukumbln, stretches from the Adriatic sea on the west to the Yugoslav
frontier In the east. The Inhabitants of this region are the direct descendants
of the Illyrians,  ^ and *untll recent decades, this tribal region probably repre-
2
sented the most ancient social system s till extant In Europe*. Thus, the 
Albanian customs are of special significance In the study of the ancient family 
law In a comparative context among the Indo-Europeans.
II. Soclometrlc and proprietary relationship
3
Albanian society was patrilineal and property rights were vested 
4
In the men. Joint families of four or five generations, numbering twenty
1. En. Br. (1970) I, 507. The Illyrians were an Indo-European people who 
settled In the western half of the Balkan peninsula at about c . 1000 B .C ., 
Ib id ., 1101. Also, see N .G .L . Hammond, The Coming of the Indo- 
Europeans to the southwestern Balkans*, In Acta of the 2nd International 
Colloquium on Aegean Prehistory, (Athens, 1972), 104-112.
2 . P.E. Mosely, The Distribution of the Zadruga within Southeastern Europe*, 
In The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume, (New York, 1953), 219-230 at 221. 
Mosely opines that Albania also passed through the familial Institution of 
zadruga. Eventually the zadrugas declined but the Indo-European tribal 
social organisation remained, Ib id ., 223.
3 . M . Hasluck, The Unwritten Law In Albania, ed ., J .H . Hutton, (Cambridge, 
1954), 25.
4 . Hasluck, Ib id ., 25.
members or more, used to live under one roofO These families were
2
governed according to the patriarchal system under the absolute manage­
ment of a head who used to be elected from among the male members.
Normally, the dying father's mantle used to fa ll on the son and even a younger
brother, having better administrative qualities than his elders, could become
3
the manager of a household.
However, It Is assumed that the head of the family was supreme In
the administrative sphere. In the affairs of property, he was no more than a
manager of the common goods. Like the MItaksara coparcenary, the family
farm was jo in tly owned by a ll the men 'and the rraster did not own a blade of
4
grass more than the others did*. The earnings of any member of the famf Iy
had to be handed over to the house master who would save or spend them for
5
the benefit of the family. The Albanian custom has a saying that 'the
earnings of a son are shared by his father and brothers*.^ The customary law
did not give any scope to the master of the household to act as an autocrat.
1. Ib id ., 25.
2. Ib id ., 34.
3. M . Hasluck, The Unwritten Law In Albania, o p .c lt., 35.
4 . Ib id ., 36.
5. Ib id ., 36.
6 . Ib id ., 36. In this connection, the words such as 'father', 'son*, and *brotheri 
apart from their literal and narrow connotations should be taken In the wider 
Albanian sense of relatives In the older and younger generations, Ib id ., 30, 36.
It was his duty to consult other male members whenever he had to buy or sell 
any family possessions.^ He had to give everybody the Impression that the 
family property belonged to a ll the members, and the welfare of each member 
concerned the whole family.
Although the overall power to direct the lives and work of a ll mem­
bers remained In the hands of the master of the joint family, an adult married 
member of the joint household was supreme over his own conjugal unit.
III. Relationship of father and son
In a household comprising a father and his sons, naturally the
father was the master of the house. A son and his conjugal family had the
right to be maintained by the joint family, even though the son was a wastrel
and did not earn anything to contribute to the family. The customary law dls-
2
approved of expulsion of such a son by the father; *It was the offenders
3
"birthright” to remain In the house, to eat at the common table, and to have
4
his wife and children maintained out of the family purse1. Only for gross
5
misdemeanour, like murder, could a father expel a son from the house.
1. Ib id ., 40.
2. Cp. Manu, V II I .  389; Y^jn . II. 237.
3 . Cp. Br. 25.6. SBE, 33, 370-1; Alyangar, ed ., 26.5, p .196; ekapakena vasa- 
tam. Aristotle, Politics, 11.6. Plutarch's Lives, Life of Marcus Crassus, Loeb 
ed ., I l l ,  315.
4 . M . Hasluck, The Unwritten Law in Albania, o p .c lt., 39. As an Illustration, 
see the case of Pal, the eldest son of MIrash Nue In Shalfi , Ib id ., 39.
5. Hasluck was present when a father expelled one of his sons for k illing  the other 
In KrujS, Ib id ., 38.
Although a son*s joint living with hTs father was socially pratsed
and economically Favoured, occasionally sons used to separate while their
father was stTlI a live . But, it is Indeed, significant In a comparative context
with classical Hindu law that the sons who took the Initiative In a separation
2
were publicly mocked as Mow class fellows*. This social disapproval, as 
3In sastrlc law, only proves that the legal right of a son to demand partition
of family property against the w ill of his lather was well known In the customary
4 5law of Albania. However, as Is found In Greek and Hindu law, there were 
occasions when the father might partition the family property amongst his sons.^
In Albanian customary law, property was not distinctly labelled as 
movables and Immovables. Property was categorised as ‘food* or ‘other than 
food*, and the latter category Included both movables and Immovables. In a 
division during the lifetime of the father, one-eighth of the land and a room 
were set aside for the father and the rest of the family property used to be distri­
buted among the sons. However, the father would retain a ll the title-deeds 
of land which would pass to the sons after his death. Property In the Albanian
1. Ib id ., 51.
2. Ib id ., 52. Cp. Gautama states that the brahmanas who had separated from 
their father against the latter*s w ill,  were not f i t  to be Invited for dinner at 
a sraddha feast, Gautama, 15. 15 and 19, Kane, HD, II I, 566-7.
3. Kane, HD, III, 567.
4 . Supra,
5. Kane, HD, III, 568.
6 . Hasluck,Ioc. c l t . ,  63-4.
mountains was categorised Into ancestral and self-acquired, and this categorisa­
tion had Importance regarding the rules of partition. The customary law pro­
vided that lands Inherited and bought by the father had to be divided amongst 
the brothers per stirpes, and a predeceased son's son would represent his father.^
But any land bought after the death of the father had to be divided per capita^;
2
I .e . according to the number of adult men .
We have mentioned earlier that, according to Albanian custom, for
extreme misdemeanour a father could banish a son from his house, and while
partitioning the property among his sons, he was not obliged to give any portion
to the banished son. Despite this power, the banishment and the consequent
exclusion from the partition by the father did not entail disherison, and could
not affect the Inherent right of the son In the property of his father. It seems
that a son's right In the family property was latent from his birth because, even
though an expelled son could be excluded from his share In a partition by his
father, he could take his share back proportionately from his brothers after the
3
decease of their father.
1. Hasluck, o p .c lt., 61. About a house there were different rules. If the 
house was Inherited or bu ilt by the father, It would go to the youngest son. 
If It was bu ilt after the father's death, the eldest used to retain It but he 
had to pay to the other brothers their proportionate shares of assessed 
value, Ib id ., 61.
2. Ib id ., 61.
3. Hasluck, o p .c lt., 65.
IV . Conclusion
In many of the provisions discussed above, Albanian customary law 
presents a clarifying Insight Into the proprietary relationship between father and 
sons and, In a comparative context, Illuminates our study o f the MItaksara blrth- 
rlght. Although the head of a family among the Albanians might buy and sell 
property without obtaining the approval of other members, In practice he was not 
like ly to undertake Important transactions without consultations with the male 
members. Thus, Margaret Hasluck states that In Albanian customary law, the 
male members of the family have joint rights In the property which are realised 
on partition or separation.^ It needs no elaboration that similar rights of the 
male members In Hindu joint family are quite well-known.
1. Hasluck, o p .c lt., C h .lV -V I.
(3) The Zadruga (communal joTnt family) of the South Slavs
I. Introductory Remarks
The opTnTon that *South Russia*, more than any other region, can 
claim to be regarded as the cradle-Iand of the Aryans (=? Indo-Europeans)*^, 
must draw our attention to the ancient fam ilial Institutions around the region.
II. Zadruga: Definition and structure
2
Until recently, the zadruga or communal joint family, was
1. B .K . Ghosh, *The Aryan Problem*, In IR.C. Majumdar, ed ., The BharatTya 
Itlhasa SamltT*s History and Culture of the Indian People, I, The Vedlc Age, 
(London, 1951), 2 l2 . Also supra,4,n .i.
2 . As recently as 1936, Philip Mosely made case-studles of the zadruga In some 
forty-five localities within Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, P.E. Mosely,
The Peasant Family: the zadruga or Communal Joint-Family In the Balkans, 
and Its Recent Evolution*, In C .F . Ware, ed ., The Cultural Approach to 
History, (New York, 1940), 95-108; also The Distribution of the Zadruga 
within Southeastern Europe*, In The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume, (New York, 
1953), 219-230. The zadrugas could be found In Montenegro, Northern and 
Central Albania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Western Croatia, Northern, Central 
and Southern Macedonia and Dalmatia, Ib id ., 221-2. Vlnogradoff, OHJ, I, 
268, Slavonic Encyclopaedia, (New York, 1969), IV, 1393-4. The Southern 
Slavs were not the only people of eastern Europe with a joint family life .
Both In the Northern forests and In the Southern Steppes, the Russians had a simi­
lar kind of family structure and property ownership among kinsmen, Vlnogradoff, 
OHJ, I, 271. These Russian joint families were called derevnla, and usually 
extended to second cousin and sometimes to their children"! The power of the 
father was stronger among the Russians than among the South Slavs. Among the 
native tribes, belonging to the different ethnic groups: Turk!, Mongol, Tungus 
and Urgo-Flnlsh, of Western and Eastern Siberia, the power of the lord of the 
household Is very great. The family relations are bu ilt on patriarchal basis and 
among some tribes, there are marked weakening of parental authority In respect 
of grown-up children. V .A . Rlasanovsky, Customary Law of the Nomadic Tribes 
of Siberia, (Indiana University, Bloomington, 1965), 29, 33 , 59. Cp. the dvor 
In pre-revolutlonary Russia which was part and parcel of the 19th century Great 
Russian mlr system. The peasant dvor was actually a farming unit. A  family
/Continued on next page:
characteristic of the Southern Slavs. No single definition embraces a ll 
varieties of zadruga,  ^ but It can best be defined as an extended family asso­
ciation of 50 to 80 members related patrilineal ly by blood to one another up
to second and third degree. They live In the same farm for several generations
2 _
without dividing the property or the household. Very much like a MItaksara
coparcener, each male member of a zadruga 'possesses a recognised , I f  latent,
right to a share of the communal property and Is firee, I f  he chooses, to leave
the zadruga to take his share of Its property, as defined by customary or written 
3
law . . . *  However, besides the common property (skupclna), an Individual
4
could also own separate property (osebunjak).
Note 2 -  p. 97 -  continued:
could be a dvor unit, but It Is more a tenure than a kinship-based complex.
The corporate personality of the dvor has been left Intact In modem collective 
farms (kolkhoz), S. Osofsky, The Legal Status of the Russian Collective Farm 
Household', Am. J. Comp.L., 22 (1974), 541-562.
1. P.E. Mosely, 'Adaptation for Survival: the Varzlc Zadruga*, Slavonic and 
East European IRevIew, 31, p t . l  (American Series, vo l.II) , March, (1943), 
147-173 at 147. On varieties of zadruga, see Mosely, The Peasant Family; 
the zadruga, or Communal Joint-Family In the Balkans', In C .F . Ware, ed ., 
The Cultural Approach to History, o p .c lt . ,  95-108 at 97. Outside Croatia, 
the zadruga Is more commonly referred to as 'a large house' or'a large house­
hold*, *a lot of people*, sometimes as 'an undivided house'. In Serbia, to 
live In zadruga means 'to live In concord* or 'In harmony', Ib id ., 99.
2 . K.P. Chattopadhyaya, 'Ancient Indian Culture: Contacts and Migrants',
Our Heritage, 8 (1960) 1: 1-36; 2: 37-73 at 5, quoting O . Schrader, 
Real-texTcon der Indogermanlschen Altertumskunde (Strassburg, 1901).
3 . Mosely, The Distribution of the Zadruga within Southeastern Europe*, o p .c lt., 
220.
4 . Slavonic Encyclopaedia, IV, 1393.
III. Head of the family community
At the head of the zadruga household Is the house manager. Beyond 
his own share, he does not own anything of the family property; he administers 
It on behalf of Its members.^ Zadrugal custom rests on the equality o f Its male 
members and, therefore, the house manager makes the basic decisions jo in tly 
with other members. The administrator Is almost always the father of the family 
and usually, he Is succeeded by his son or brother. Election to headship, a l­
though rare, Is not unknown.
IV. Narrower family units (Inokostlna)
We have stated earlier that an Individual member had the right to
demand a partition of the zadruga property and he could set up hns own conjugal
family; but each small family, because of the uniformity of social configuration
2
In the area was, potentially, a zadruga. Thus, In many cases, zadrugas
3
were larger groups which grew out of the narrower conjugal units (Inokostlna).
However, It w ill be wrong to assume that these two Institutions are separate.
They may differ In size, but the same customs apply to both In respect of owner-
4
ship, Inheritance and dowry.
1. Vlnogradoff, OHJ, I, 269. Cp. the position of the manager of a joint Hindu 
family, Derrett, 1MHL, 259 f f .
2. Mosely, The Distribution of the Zadruga within Southeastern Europe, o p .c lt., 
220.
3. Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom, (London, 1883), 241-2.
4 . Mosely, lo c .c lt ., 226.
V . Respective proprietary rights of ascendants and descendants
In the context of our present study, It Is significant that 'one of the 
customary rules on which the zadruga I way of life rests Is that, as long as there 
are male heirs to carry on the communal family, women Inherit no share In the
zadrugal land 'J  Thus, basically, like the MItaksara coparcenary, zadrugal
ownership also Implies a male property complex. The striking resemblance be­
tween the two Institutions Is further revealed by the co-ownership of ascendants
and descendants In zadrugal property. The customs of family ownership have
been presented by Professor Bog Isle as follows:
1. The father, while living In the same house­
hold as his grown-up sons, has not the right to 
dispose of the family property.
2. He has not the right to dispose of It mortis 
causa without the consent of his sons.
3 . The father Is the head of the administration, 
but on Important occasions he acts i*n concert
with his sons. If, for any reason, he Is not
equal to the task of administering the affairs
of the community, one of his sons may be put 
In his place.
4 . Sons who are of fu ll age, especially I f  
they are married, may demand partition 
during the life of their father. 2
1. Mosely, The Peasant Family: the zadruga, or Communal Joint-Family In the 
Balkans', o p .c lt., 100.
2. tr. Vlnogradoff, OHJ, I, 271 from an article by Valtazar Boglslc In the Russian 
Journal of the Ministry of Public Administration, Vlnogradoff, Ib id ., 270, n . l . 
On this topic, the other Important works of BoglSic are: ,PravnI obl&ija u slovena; 
prlvatno pravo, (Zagreb, 1867); Zbornlk sadasnjlh pravnlh obI£aja u juznlh slo- 
vena; gragja u odgovorlma Iz razll6nlh krajeva slovenskoga Juga, see Mosely, 
lo c .c lt ., 96, n . l . It Is regretted that the original sources could not be con­
sulted. On the life and works of Boglslc, see Maine, Early Law and Custom, 
241-2; 244, n .2 . Also Slavonic Encyclopaedia, I, 10.4.
V I.  Conclusion
Considering the above rules, It Is needless to say that nothing could 
more proximate  ^ the concept of the MItaksara co-ownership of father and son, 
and one can hardly be satisfied with any suggestion that the two proprietary 
systems represent mere agro-economlc coincidence without any ethnological 
significance.
1 . Derrett, TLL, 1953 , 56.
CHAPTER 4
CELTIC LAW
I . Introductory Remarks
In addition to linguistic and mythological affin ities,^ the social
2organisation and familial Institutions of the Vedlc Indians and the Celts
3
show striking resemblances In their |urldlcal context.
The continental Celts of Gaul were conquered by the Romans and,
excepting some Insights Into their general social organisation, very little  Is
4
known of their family law. For a study of Celtic law, one has to depend
5
mainly on the ancient laws of Ireland and Wales.
1. A . Macbaln, Celtic Mythology and Religion, (Stirling, 1917), 44. On 
linguistic a ffin ity , see P. Rotland, *A Few Vedlco-Celtlc Concordances1, 
Vlshveshvaranand Indologlcal Journal, 12 (1974) 1 and 2; 311-318.
2. On the Celts, see J. Cameron, Celtic Law, (London/Edinburgh, 1937) 3 -4 .
3. M . D illon, ‘Celt and HIndu‘ , V IJ, 1 (1963) 2 : 203-223 at 220-3. Also, 
D .A . Blnchy, ‘Preface*, toR . Thumeysen, Studies In Early Irish Law, 
(Royal Irish Academy, Dubllrv/London, 1936), v l.
4 . E. M acN elll, ‘Celtic*, sub. *Law‘ , En.So.Sc., IX, 246.
5. M acN elll, Ib id ., 246,
I I. The ancient laws of Ireland
The ‘Beaker Invasion* of the later third millennium B.C. In Ireland 
marks the major Indo-European Infiltration,^ and the formation of a juridical
tradition In Ireland has been a process of development from Its Indo-European
2 3orig in. The Irish law tracts go back In written form to the seventh century,
but the oldest writings on Irish law point clearly to an older oral tradition which,
perhaps, remained undisturbed by the subsequent Invasion of Christianity.
4
Thus, these laws are mostly pure Celtic tradition, and thereby , are an *authen-
5
tic monument of a very ancient group of Aryan Institutions . .  .* , though the
1 . P. Harblson, *The Coming of the Indo-Europeans to Ireland: an Archaeo­
logical Viewpoint*, Journal of Indo-European Studies, 3 (1975), 2: 101-119.
2. The two largest of these tracts are: (I) Senchus Mor or Great Book of the 
Ancient Law; (IT) Book of A lcTll. Senchus Mor Is one of the oldest portions of 
the Ancient Laws of Ireland, W .K . Sullivan, Introduction to E. 0*Curry*s 
Lectures on the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish, (London, 1873), I,
X I I Ij), xv.
3. Even In A .D . 1509 these laws were In force In the County of Clare, Sullivan, 
Ib id ., xITI-xv.
4 . E. M acN elll, *CeltIc*, sub. *Law*, En.So.Sc. IX, 246-7.
5. Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, (London, 1897), 11. 
Maine*s supposition that the Irish law tracts were a kind of phonographic record 
of primitive customary law Is not shared by M acN e lll. He points out that Irish 
law came forth not from the customs of the countryside but from a school of law 
and from a long tradition of teaching under a class of men who claimed to be, 
and recognised to be authentic expositors of a ll high knowledge, Early Irish 
Laws and Institutions, (Dublin, 1935), 83.
original texts need to be distinguished from a subsequent gloss.^
a . The Social Organisation
The structural Institutions of ancient Irish society were closely
linked with their rural setting and the whole community was dependant on the
2
use and cultivation of land. Within a limited zone of kinship, the whole
3
society was divided Into tribes and sub-tribes named after an eponymous an­
cestor. The smaller unit of these two groupings, the Sept, shows the character­
istics of the joint family of the Hindus.
b. Ownership of family property
In the context of ownership, the sons, grandsons and great-grandsons 
of a male ancestor, like the Hindu coparcenary, constitute the derbflne or the
4true family. The juridical and comparative significance of the Institution
1. D .A . BTnchy, The Linguistic and Historical Value of the Irish Law Tracts*,
In Proceedings of the British Academy, 29 (1943), 195-227. The juristic value 
of the 1852 edition of the Ancient Laws of Ireland has been doubted by scholars 
for faulty rendering, E. M acN elll, Ib id ., 88-9. The law s till has to be de­
duced from e llip tica l, Incomplete and often corrupt texts, which appear to be 
copies of copies of archaic manuscripts . . . * ,  Gavan Duffy P. In Foyle and 
Bann Fisheries Ltd. v . Attorney-General, (1949 ) , 83 1LTR 29, But BTnchy 
opines that the 'sacred* texts were preserved with touching fide lity  by 16th cen­
tury scribes, D .A . Blnchy, 'Ancient Irish Law*, Irish Jurist (n.s.) 1 (1966), 84- 
92 at 90.
2. E. M acNelll, Early Irish Laws and Institutions, o p .c lt., 42.
3 . T .D . Sullivan's ballad: 'Chiefs and clans In a ll directions,
With their far and near connections.* 
quoted by M acNelll, Ib id ., 5.
4 . M acN elll, 'Celtic*, sub. *Law', En.So.Sc., IX, 248. Myles D illon, Celts 
and Aryans: Survivals of Indo-European Speech and Society, (Indian Institute 
of Advanced Study, Simla, 1975), 95.
is brought out by Myles DTllon Tn these words:
The important unit Tn Ireland was the family 
of four generations, descendants of a common  ^
great-grandfather, and known as the derbfTne 
("true kindred"). This was the normal pro- 
perty-ownlng unit -  land belonged to the derb- 
flne -  and It was also the unit for the purpose 
of dynastic succession. . . .  In Hindu society 
we find the same family group, there called 
the saplnda; but It Is found elsewhere In 
ancient legal systems, so that no Importance 
attaches to It, beyond the common survival, 
east and west, of old IE tradition. 2
A ll recognised members of a fine, In the sense of a particular family, 
constituted the fine duthalg or hereditary family, embracing a ll within the de­
grees of consanguinity entitled to Inherit property; and In the order of degree, the
3sons (clndflne = children) had the forerlght. The fine duthalg, like the joint
1 . The word fine or flnead litera lly means family or house, W .K . Sullivan,
Introd. to Q*Curry*s Lectures on the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish, 
o p .c lt., I, c lx ll- c lx ll l .  fine was a miniature clan and It was considerably 
more comprehensive than the word family. Each clan was composed of a num­
ber of fines, see L. G Innell, The Brehon Laws: A Legal Handbook, (London, 
1894), 100-111. Also J* Gimeron, Celtic Law, o p .c lt., 101-20.
2. M . D illon, ‘Celt and Hindu*, V IJ , 1 (1963) 2: 203-223 at 220-1. Also 
D illon, Celts and Aryans, lo c .c lt . ,  95. M acN elll, Celtic Ireland, (Dublin, 
1921), 118; Early Irish Laws and Institutions, o p .c lt., 16-17. J. Cameron, 
Celtic Law, o p .c lt., 112. Malne^ EHI, 89.
3. *lf there Is a male heir, a daughter receives nothing of her father*s Inheritance 
of movables or Immovables, save lanna, ranna and bregdha*, H .3 .18. 22la 3 
(C.395) quoted by M . D illon, The Relationship of Mother and Son, of Father 
and Daughter, and the Law of Inheritance with Regard to Women*, In 'D .A . 
BTnchy, e d .Studies In Early Irish Law, (Royal Irish Academy, DublTry^London, 
1936), 129-179 at 133. It Is clear from the texts that a daughter never In­
herited ancestral land In presence of sons, Ib id ., 133. DTllon also Informs
us that jurid ica lly, *A son was closely bound to his father*, Ib id ., 129. Cp. 
Manu, IX, 185. According to text (AL Iv.240) *a father must answer for the 
liabilities of his son If  the latter has no assets, . .  .* and a son was bound to 
support his aged parents, Ib id ., 129-30.
Hindu family, was a corporate, organic and self-sufficient social unit and Its 
continuation depended both In Its origin from a common ancestor, and on the 
land It continued to occupy.^
Since the ownership of family land belonged to the group (fine
2
duthalg), the right to alienate such land was denied to the Individual.
In this respect, the text of Senchus Mor Is unambiguous: *every tribesman Is
able to keep his trlbe-Iand: he Is not to sell It or alienate or conceal It ,  or
3
give It to pay for crimes or contracts*. The archaic law conceals the prohibi­
tion against alienation under the guise of the Individuals duty to the tribe:
The propei/y duties of one towards the tribe are that when he has not bought
if 4
he should not sell . .  .*
These rules show that the rights of an Individual member of the fine
were limited to cultivation and, In case of family necessity, to raise a loan on
a very limited scale. An Individual member could alienate If , and only If,
5
he could get the consent of a ll the members of the property complex, or I f
1. Maine, ELC, 107. Laurence G lnnell explains this point by saying that 
The fine or sept occupied the position of principal and cestui que trust,
The Brehon Laws, o p .c lt., 114.
2. G lnnell, Ib id ., 114-5.
3. W .N . Hancock and T.0*Mahoney, ed ., Ancient Laws of Ireland, II, Senchus 
Mor, (DublIr\/London, 1869), 283. Maine, The Early History of Institutions, 
(London, 1897), 108.
4 . T. 0*Mahoney and & .G . Richey, ed ., Ancient Laws of Ireland, (Dubllry^ 
London, 1873), III, 55. G lnnell, lo c .c lt ., 115.
5. Cp. Hindu law, Derrett, IMHL,f461^
he was under pressure of strong necessity:^ *No person should grant land
except such as he has purchased himself, unless by the common consent of
the tribe, and that he leaves his share of the land to revert to the common
2possession of the tribe after him*. And, *he who neither sells nor purchases
may give as far as the third of tribe share, Tn case of little  necessity, and the
3
one-half In case of great necessity*,
c . Self-acquired property
As In the smrtls, the concept of self-acquired property Is well attested
In the Brehon tracts and the Instances of self-acquisitions differ from those of the
4
common property of the ‘ tribe*. A tribesman had more power over and Inde­
pendence regarding property acquired by his own Industry, unaided by the nucleus 
of property of the tribe, than over acquisitions made through profits arising from
5
the cultivation of tribal land. The crisis of defining self-acquired property 
and Its overlapping with joint family property are burning problems of Hindu law.^ 
Considering the antiquity of Brehon laws, the ancient Irish system deserves commend­
ation In Its practical and well-defined approach to this senstltlve topic which
1 . Cp. apatkale kutumbarthe . . . ,  B r., cited M lta, 1.1. 28; Dh.K . 1588b.
2. G lnnell, o p .c lt., 115. ALI, III, 53.
3. Ancient Laws of Ireland, III, 47.
4 . G lnnell, lo c .c lt . ,  115.
5. ALI, III, 53.
6 . Derrett, Critique, 61 ff .
puzzles the judiciary even today. ^
In respect of self-acquired land, the power of bequest by the
acquirer has been detailed In the following rules: *If It be land that acquires
It, It Is one-half, I f  It  be land that grows It; I f  It be not he that acquires It ,
2
It Is one-third; I f  It be a professional man, It Is two-thirds of his contracts*.
Then the law makes a distinction, and quite equitably, between the power of a 
professional man who acquires his skill by the aid of tribal property and such a 
man who acquires his skill without such aid:
If he be a professional man, I.e . I f  It be land 
that he has obtained for (by the exercise of) 
his profession, I .e . I f  It be property acquired 
by judicature or poetry, or for any other pro­
fession whatsoever, he Is capable of giving 
two-thirds of It to the Church . . .  (but) I f  It  
was the lawful profession of the tribe, he 
shall not give of It (the emolument of that 
profession) but just as he would give of the 
lawful land of the tribe. 3
It seems that In the case of acquisition through the ‘ lawful profession 
of the tribe* the presumption was that the Individual was acquiring for the group; 
the earning being the result of a skill which he was like ly to learn simply by being 
born In that tribe; and thereby, the law restricted the Individuals right to make 
a gift of his earnings as strictly as It did tribal land. On the other hand, I f  the 
Individual was engaged In a profession which was not pursued by his tribe, his
1 . Ibid.
2. ALI, III, 49.
3. Comment on the text cited at III, 49, n.2 above. ALI, III, 51. Also Maine, 
EHI, 111.
skill was presumed to be hTs personal attainment and he could give away up to 
two-thirds of his earnings.^ However, the general presumption of the corpor­
ate character of property Is s till emphasised by the remaining one-third. The 
experiences of Irish and Hindu societies conform to the norm that In archaic 
societies, the claim of the group prevailed over the claim of the Individual.
Thus, In terms of Hindu law It could be said that the Interaction between the 
claim of the group and claim of the I ndlvldual over self-acquisition Is deter­
mined by how far the birthright of other members of the group could be extended 
to the Individuals acquisition. Thus, In both the Hlndyand Irish systems, ac­
quisition by any member was prlma facie acquisition for the family (fine), and 
to negate the corporate Image of property It had to be established that the 
earning of the Individual concerned was unaided by the common property of 
the group.
d. Conclusion
In the context of our present study, part of the Irish system of land 
tenure Is significant. Before the establishment of Common law, a ll landed pro­
perty In Ireland came under either the descent system of Tanlstry or tha t of Gavel­
kind. Tanlstry was an estate of Impartible character, attached to the Slgnory
2
or Chieftaincy, and used to pass to the Tanlst by election or by force o f arms.
1 . Cp. The Hindu Gains of Learning Act (1930). Derrett, IMHL, 625-6:
Critique, 60.
2 . Abolished In the Case of Tanlstry (K .B . 1607) Dav. !Rep. 28, 80 Eng. Rep. 
516, cited by A .G . Donaldson, Some Comparative Aspects of Irish Law, 
(Durharr/London, 1957), 230. On the characteristics and antiquity of the 
Institution, see G . Mac N loca lll, The *HeIr Designate* Tn Early Medieval 
Ireland*, Irish Jurist, (n.s.) 3 (1968), 326-335 at 326, 329.
But the majority, that is, a ll inferior tenancies, were divisible among the males
of the Sept (clan) |n  Gavelkind.^ Sir John Davis observed: that: * . . .  after
partition made, I f  any one of the Sept had died, his portion was not divided among
his sonnes, but the Chief of the Sept made a new partition of a ll the lands belong-
2
Ing to that Sept, and gave everyone his part according to his antiquity*.
Cameron explains that In connection with the *derbflne*, It was only on the
dfcathof any one of the adult male members the property was divided among the
3 4remaining members of the *derbflne*. We have already noticed that accord-
5
Ing to Irish custom, property descended at first only to the male heirs, each son 
receiving an equal share. It was also not uncommon for the brothers to remain 
joint after the death of their father as comorbs ^ or co-heirs. The custom of re­
distribution of a deceased member*s property among the surviving males comes 
very near to the Institution of survivorship In the MItaksara system. Maine 
observed that survivorship Tn a Hindu joint family and the kind of survivorship
1. The term used In Irish for this kind of succession was Gabal clned which origi­
nally meant the liabilities and rights of the whole fine, Sullivan, Trlntrod, to 
0*Curry*s Lectures on the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish, o p .c lt.,
c Ix lx .
2 . The Case of Gavelkind, (K.B. 1605) Dav. Rep. 49, 80 . Eng. !Rep. 535; 
quoted by Maine, EH I, 186. Maine thought that by ‘according to antiquity*, 
Sir Davis meant that the distribution of the effects were made not per capita 
but per stirpes, EHI, 188.
3 . J. Cameron, Celtic Law, o p .c lt., 114.
4 . Supra, 105.
5 . G lnnell, The Brehon Laws, o p .c lt., 130-1.
6 . Sullivan, lo c .c lt ., c lxxx ll. orba = property; com-orb -  co-heir. Identical 
Is German Erbe = heir, Sullivan, Ib id ., c lxxx ll, n.332.
we have just discussed in a Sept were Identical. He remarks: ‘A ll the pro­
perty being held In common, and a ll earnings being brought Into the ‘common 
chest or purse*, the lapse of any one life would have the effect, potentially I f  
not actually, of distributing the dead man*s share among a ll the kindred united 
In the family group*. ^  Thus, the Irish Gavelkind with Its Institution of sur­
vivorship presupposes a birthright of sons In the family property a t the hands 
2
of their father.
1. Maine, EHI, 187. Cp. Katama Natchlar v . ’Rajah of Shlvagunga, (1863) 9 
MIA 539, 543, 611. Also Appovler v . IRama Subba, (1886) 11 MIA 75, 89-90.
2 . From the contents of 1911 census schedules, David Symes Informs us that In 
the electoral divisions of Dunurlln and Marhln In the parish of Ballyferrlter, 
married sons assumed de facto authority and responsibility concerning the 
family farm during the lifetime of their parents. Although It Is ihought tbat 
marriage and Inheritance are synchronous events In some parts of Ireland,
Symes found that even the unmarried sons had a ‘subordinate economic status* 
during the lifetime of their father, D .G . Symes, ‘Farm Household and Farm 
Performance: A Study of Twentieth Century Changes In Ballyferrlter, South­
west Ireland*, Ethnology, 11(1972), 25-38 at 30. Normally, after the 
marriage of their son, the aged parents relinquish the farm and ‘enter the 
age grade of the dying*, C .M . Arensberg and S.T. Kimball, Family and 
Community In Ireland, (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 118. But In some cases, 
a son*s marriage and Inheritance were delayed until after the death of his 
parents, K .H . Connell, ‘Peasant Marriage In Ireland: Its Structure and 
Development Since the Famine*, Economic History Review, ser.2, 14 (1961- 
62), 502-523 at 510; also P. McNabb, ‘Demography* (Pt.3); ‘Social Struct­
ure* (Pt.4), In J . Newman, ed ., The Limerick Survey, 1958-64, (Tipperary,
1964), 158-247 at 226.
I II .  The Law of Wa les
a. The background
Although the Welsh Code was drawn up in the tenth century under
1 2 Howe! the Good, the rules existed as custom before that period. However,
we should not miss the point that owing to subsequent additions, In their existing
form the Laws of Howel the Good exhibit Influences of feudalism as established
3
In parts of Wales by the Norman Invasion.
b. The family organisation and ownership
Like other Indo-European peoples, the family group of the Cymric
4
tribal society was essentially a patriarchal unit. Both the Denbigh Extent
5
and the Welsh Extent point to the fact that the family unit (gwely or wele) 
was limited to the fourth degree of descent.^ The wele occupied the home­
steads with land around them In quasl-ownershlp In severalty. The eldest male 
member, along with his descendants, held In common the family share In tribal
1. Hi*we I the Good died In c . 948 A .D .
2. A . Owen, Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales, (1841), I, Preface, v l l.
3 . E. M acN elll, ‘Celtic*, sub. *Law*, En.So.Sc., IX, 246.
4 . F. Seebobm, The Tribal System In Wales, (London, 1904), 99.
5. The clans were divided Into groups of cousins (gwelys or wele = beds)(^  V lno- 
gradoff, OHJ, I, 278. The families of a group either shared common dwelllrg s 
or lived closely together In little  hamlets, The Cambridge Economic History of 
Europe, (Cambridge, 1966), I, 53.
6 . F. Seebohm, lo c .c lt ., Introd., v ll,  also p .73.
rights and occupation Tn landJ Sometimes, even after the death of the
great-grandfather, the surviving members used to manage the property under 
his name. This system of corporate ownership of family property Is very close 
to the Mltaksara coparcenary. In itia lly , after the death of the head of the
2household, property used to be divided among the male members per capita,
but gradually represehtatlon by male heirs crept In and by the time of Howel
3
the Good, It was well-established.
c . Proprietary relation of father and son
Co-ownership of father and son In family property Is Implied In the 
Venedotlan Code:
The father Is not to deteriorate nor dispose of 
the rights of hlsston for land and soli, except 
during his own life; neither Is the som to de­
prive his father, during his life , of land and 
soli; In like manner, the father Is not to de­
prive the son of land; and though he may de­
prive him, It w ill be recoverable, except In 
one case: where there shall be an agreement 
between father, brothers, cousins, second 
cousins and the lord, to yield the land as 
blood land; and that the son cannot recover; 
for peace was bought to the son by that as 
well as to the father: for those persons are 
the grades, without whose consent land can­
not be assigned. 4
1. Seebohm, Ib id ., Introd., v l l.
2. F. Seebohm, The Tribal System In Wales, o p .c lt., Introd., v l l l .
3 . Seebohm, Ib id ., xv l.
4 . The Venedotlan Code, II . X IV .3; A . Owen, Ancient Laws and Institutes of 
Wales, o p .c lt., I, 177.
As Tn most mediaeval literature, the language of the passage
leaves scope for ambiguity, > but one thing Is clear from the rule, namely, 
that the father was not the absolute master of the family land. Even though 
the father could dispose of the land, normally, a son*s right o f preemption Is 
confirmed by the rule.^
The DImetlan Code Implies that the sons share the patrimony after
the death of their father but the Code, In certain specific properties, Implies
2a combination of ultimogeniture and birthright of the youngest son:
When brothers share their patrimony between 
them, the youngest son Is to have the princi­
pal tyddyn, and a ll the buildings of his 
father, and eight erws of land, his boiler, 
his fuel hatchet, and his coulter; because 
a father cannot give those three to any one 
but to the youngest son; and though they 
should be pledged, they never become for­
feited. Then let every brother take a home­
stead with eight erws of land and the young­
est son Is to share; and they are to choose ^
In succession, from the eldest to the youngest.
1. Cp. that an heir even In the ninth descent could redeem at a valuation by 
jury any portion of an estate with which his forefathers had been compelled 
to part, Richard of Cirencester, B k .l, C h .Ill, cited by I.H . Elder, Celt, 
Druid and Culdee, (London, 1962), 45, n ,1 3 a t5 0 . Cp. Yajn*. II. 119.
2. GInnell Is Inclined to believe that In early Irish law the youngest son was 
In a similar favoured position, The Brehon Laws, o p .c lt., 132. Cp. the 
additional share of the youngest son Tn Gautama, xxvTIT, 7, SBE, 2, 300.
3. The DImetlan Code, II. X X II I .1; ALIW, I, 543, 545. A  slight variation 
In the Venedotlan Zlode, II, X II .3, ALIW, 81 (Institute of Historical Re­
search Library, Volume, BWW3, 3940.
The youngest son*s Innate right to certain properties seems to be
equitable because the youngest Is generally the weakest.and thusy the law
simply takes care to protect him. It Is not a denial of the rights of ihe other 
1sons.
The Gwentlan Code also reveals that jo int ownership of land was 
the norm among brothers and cousins:
Every jo int land Is to be maintained with 
oath 2 and with goods; and he who does 
not maintain It , let him lose his share, 
after the sharing shall have taken place, 
however, no one Is to pay for the land of 
another; each, however, Is to maintain 
It one for another, upon his oath, of the 
brothers, the cousins, and the second 
cousins . . .  3
The above passage Implies a joint management of common landed pro­
perty In a joint family up to the second cousins.
d . Concluding comment
Although the original Celtic customs underwent later redaction, It 
Is, Indeed, least to be expected that fam ilial customs In a settled agrarian 
society would suffer drastic transformation. Therefore, the rules of the Welsh 
Codes discussed above may not be the customs of the pristine state of C e ltic
1. We should note that a text allows daughters ha lf the share of a brother:
*A daughter Is to have, of her father's property, only half the share a 
brother shall have The Venedotlan Code, Laws of Howel Dha, rpt.
from ALIW, In A . Kocourek and J .H . Wlgmore, ed ., Evolution of Law, 
(Boston, 1915), I, 524.
2. Oath means goods and with strength, ALIW, I, 761, n .a .
3 . The Gwentlan Code, II .  X X I.2; ALIW, I, 761.
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society; nevertheless, In their general purport, they point to the corporate, 
patriarchal household of other Indo-European peoples.
IV. Celts of Scotland
a. General features
The heterogeneous  ^ origin of the population of Scotland does not 
connote any uniformity of custom, but the Highlands of Scotland where Celtic 
custom Is best able to holds Its own Is probably discernible as an area fu ll of a 
mixture of Cymric and Gaelic elements.
Clanship Tn the Highlands Is well known. The ch ie f of the clan Is
representative of the common ancestor of the whole clan. Unlike Ireland, there
2
Is no early Code of Gaelic law In Scotland, but *the system in Ireland, Scotland
3
arid Wales was practically Identical*.
In Scotland, like Wales and Ireland, the land was divided among
clans and Septs, each under the strict patriarchal rule of Its chieftain. The
4
land of each clan Is, In principle, the common property of Its members* By 
the law of the Gavel the property of the clan was divided In certain proportions
1. J . Cameron, Celtic Law, o p .c lt., 165-66. A . Robertson, A Course of 
Lecture on the Government, Constitution and the Laws of Scotland, from 
the Earliest to the Present Time, (London, 1878), 3.
2. Cameron, Ib id ., 141.
3. Cameron, Ib id ., 178.
4. M .M . Postan, ed ., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, (Cambridge, 
1966), I, 53 .
among the whole of the male branches of the fam ily.^ Females could not
2succeed. The Highlanders adhered strictly to succession in the male line,
and there are evidences that early Scottish society, like the Welsh and Irish,
3
recognised kindred up to the fourth degree. This shows that the Celts had a 
distinct law of succession, common for the most part of Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. ^
b . Conclusion
One must not seek In the Celtic legal systems a purely primitive 
5
customary law, but the social system reflected In them In general *are likely 
to have their roots In a prehistoric order common to the ancestral Indo-EuDpean 
stock before the era of Its expansion . . .  had begun
1. W .F. Skene, The Highlanders of Scotland, (Stirling, 1902), 106.
2. Skene, Ib id ., 106. We should note that the PIcts had a matrlllneal system,
J. Cameron, Celtic Law, 179. On the controversey over the origin of Hie 
PIcts, see Cameron, Ib id ., 180-186.
3 . Kindred up to 4th degree Is referred to In Quonlan attachlamentla, I, 365, 
clause De brevl de natlvls, cited by F. Seebohm, Tribal Custom In Anglo- 
Saxon Taw~7London7~1902), 319-20. Sometimes kindred Is referred to up 
to 9th degree: St. Margaret seems to renounce her kindred up to 9th degree 
by these words: *al my kun I forsake to the nlnthe kune*, Seebohm, Ib id ., 318
4 . J . Cameron, Celtic Law, o p .c lt., 120.
5. As claimed by Maine, Early History of Institutions, (London, 1897), 11 . 
Denied by M acNelll, En.So.Sc., IX, 247.
6 . M acN elll, Ib id ., 247.
CHAPTER 5
GERMANIC LAW
I • Introductory remarks
Germanic law Is the law of the Germanic peoples, that Is, the law of
the tribes called Germans or Teutons.^ The Saxons, Danes and Normans, who
came to Britain, were but extensions of the same Germanic warp and woof that
was shaping the law In France, Germany, Saandlnavla, Netherlands, Austria,
2
Switzerland, Northern Italy and Spain.
The Romans spread over the whole land-mass of South-Western Europe
and the Roman Empire extended Its frontier to Britain, the Rhine and the Danube.
But during the last centuries of the Western Empire, powerful groups o f Germans
mingled with the Romans, and this was followed by a conquering movement,
(VBIkerwanderung), In consequence of which, German settlement spread Into the
3
Afclne lands and Gaul (France). The Germans came Into contact with Roman 
jurisprudence and the decisive fact In Germanic legal history was this ^Reception*
1. Principal Germanic tribes were the North Germans or Scandinavians (Norweg­
ians, Swedes and Danes); the East Germans (Goths and Burgandlans) and the 
West Germans (Germans, Frisians, Lombards, Angles and Saxons), E. von 
KBnssberg, ‘Germanic*, sub. *Law*, En.So. Sc., IX, 235.
2. Comment of the Editoria l Committee, In R. Huebner, GrundzOge des deutschen 
Prlvatrechts, tr. F.S. Phllbrlck, sub .tit., A  History of Germanic Private Law, 
(London, 1918), Ix . Also, F. Pollock and F.W. Maitland, T he History of ~ 
English Law, 2nded., (Cambridge, 1911), I, Introd., xxx-xxxl.
3 . M .M . Postan, ed ., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 2nd ed.,
(Cambridge, 1966), I, 1-2.
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o f the Roman law .
But Tn their general effect, the German customs ‘were to survive the
later Reception of Roman law, something perhaps less d ifficu lt to explain when one
remembers that Indigenous custom, peculiarly custom relating to family status, Is
vigorously resistant to external change . .  . *  ^ Also, Huebner opines that I f  we
look at German private law before the Reception, a whole sequence of social
characteristics can be pointed out which essentially distinguish It Tn form and
2content from Its later appearance. In the same vein, Ernest Young observes 
that ‘ the old German law of the household Is not merely Interesting and Important 
as showing the modern laws and customs: It Is even more Important, for the student 
of comparative history, as furnishing a type -  perhaps the most archaic type of
3which we have any knowledge -  of a primitive Aryan Institution*. Thus, In
jurisprudential context *the law of the Germanic peoples Is as fundamental to
4
comparative law as Is Sanskrit to comparative philology*.
It Is Indeed d ifficu lt, I f  not Impossible, to reconstruct the primal
5Aryan legal Institutions among the early G ermans from medieval law Codes; 
and the d iff ic u lty , In this respect, Is also enhanced because of the lack of unity
1. Stoljar, International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, IV, 7, 20.
2. Huebner, o p .c lt., 1-2.
3. E. Young, *The Anglo-Saxon Family Law*, In Essays In Anglo-Saxon Law, 
(Boston, 1905, rp t., Southnackensack, New Jersey, 1972), 121-182 at 148.
4 . KOnssberg, o p .c lt., 235. Also see Pollock and Maitland, o p .c lt., 1, Introd., 
xx lx .
5 . KOnssberg, o p .c lt., 235.
among Germanic laws from the very begTnnTng.  ^ However, it is not our pur­
pose to reconstruct the family organisation of the primitive Germans. Geoffrey 
MacCormack scorns such attempts at reconstruction and observes:
The reconstruction of society which Is offered 
appears either to be based upon arbitrary and 
Improvable assumptions or to Involve an I l l ic it  
argument. Where the available evidence Is 
some centuries later, one may find an argument 
which suggests that certain Items of the evidence 
(for example, such Institutions as appear to be 
common to a number of tribes or peoples) may 
be taken as a survival from a more distant age.
Such arguments are I l l ic i t .  It does not follow 
that, because tribe A , B, C have X Institution 
In common (even If this could be shown), the 
tribes at an earlier age formed one people whose 
dominant Institution was X . 2
Despite the force In his argument, MacCormack does not te ll us as
to why the common dominant Institution Is always, or overwhelmingly, X ; and
not In some cases Y, or, Indeed, Z . He suggests: *what It Is possible to do Is
to examine the law Codes of the separate Germanic peoples In order to extract
3
Information on a particular topic*. And that Is our primary Intention -  a com­
parative appraisal of the MItaksara birthright In the context of early Germanic law, 
In our enquiry the Germanic Codbs w ill be our primary guidance, but at the same 
time, we cannot altogether Ignore the learned juridical opinions on earlier epochs
1. Huebner, o p .c lt., 2.
2. G . MacCormack, ‘ Inheritance and Wergild Tn Early Germanic Law -  1*, 
Irish Jurist, (n.s.) 8 (1973), 143-163; 11, 9(1974) 1; 166-183 at 143. 
Echoes Pot lock and Maitland, o p .c lt., I, Introd., xxx l.
3 . MacCormack, Ib id ., 144.
of GermanTc legal history.
I I . Social Organisation
a. SYppe (sib).
Rubrics of family law are interrelated with the type and structure of
the family Tn a social organisation. Therefore, a brief over-view of the familial
organisation of the Germanic peoples must claim our attention and In this respect,
we come to know from Juridical literature that ‘ the oldest type of association,
existing already In the primitive Germanic period, Is the union of the blood-
group ("Geschlechtsverband”), the slb*,^ Most of the Germanists seem to
assume that the term Slppe was originally applied to an agnatic descent group
2
descended from a common male ancestor. In historical times, It changed Its
meaning to Imply an Impermanent cognatlc body of kinsfolk, the type of grouping
3
which Is usually styled 'kindred*. It was also an agrarian union of equal adult
1. Huebner, o p .c lt., 114.
2. VInogradoff, OHJ, I, 303. Huebner, Ib id ., 114. H .H . Melnhard, The 
Patrilineal Principle In Early Teutonic Kinship*, In J .H .M . Beattie and !R.G. 
Llenhardt, ed ., Studies In Social Anthropology: Essays In Memory of E.E. 
Evans-Prltchard by his former Oxford Colleagues, (Oxford, 1975), 1-29 at 7,
10. This blood-group among the Anglo-Saxons was called as the maegth or 
maegburh, E. Young, o p .c lt., 123.
3. Melnhard, Ib id ., 7 . Tacitus noticed among the Germans a larger group than 
the family* In Germania, C h.7, he mentions that German tribal army Is com­
posed of 'famlllae et proplnqultates*; and at C h ,2 l, speaking of corrpensatTon 
for homicide he says: 'reclp lt satlsfactlonem unlversa domus* , cited by Melnhard 
Ib id ., 5 . The 'proplnquus*, was probably larger than the Immediate family and 
Germanists Identify 'unlversa domus* as Slppe. Melnhard points out that Tn the 
light of the authentic old sources, the word Slppe does not unambiguously and 
exclusively apply to an 'agnatic descent group*, Ib id ., 6 . A .1R. IRadcIIffe- 
Brown explains a man's sib: This included a ll his relatives through his father
/Continued on next page:
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male members and, like land, even movables seem to have been the object of 
collective ownership In the slb.^
a. Household
The sib as an assocTatlonal group gradually disintegrated and was re­
placed by the house community, the Institution which Is particularly Important Tn 
studying the family law of the early Germanic peoples. On the structure of fami­
lia l organisation among the primitive Germans, Huebner remarks:
In view of the present result of historical 
research It may be asserted with good reason 
that the primitive Indo-Germanlc folk already 
lived under patriarchal conditions; and at 
any rate, as regards the general Germanic 
and German family law, there can scarcely 
remain any doubt that their historical point 
o f departure was the patriarchal family organi­
zation. It prevailed among the primitive 
Germans ("Germanen” ) In a pure and abso­
lute form, so far as their conditions can be  ^
traced In the obscure origins of history.
Note 3 -  p . l2 l -  continued:
and through his mother, counting either through males or through females, 
within a certain range1, ‘Patrilineal and Matrlllneal Succession1, Tn his 
Structure and Function In Primitive Society, (London, 1952, rp t., 1971), 
32-48 at 39. Melnhard has presented the conflicting views on the connota­
tion of the term but the controversy s till retains unabated, Ib id ., 10.
1. Huebner, o p .c lt., 115. But the case Is not so In respect of maegth In English 
law, Pollock and Maitland, II, 251.
2. Huebner, o p .c lt., 584-585. Huebner‘s view represents the opinions of a con­
siderable number of nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars. For the 
views supporting the priority of mother right In Teutonic prehistory, see Meln­
hard, o p .c lt., 14. Young opines: There Is quite as much evidence In early 
Germanic law to support the theory that the primitive German kinship was 
limited to those descended from a common ancestor through females as that It 
was a system of agnation1, Young, o p .c lt., 150-1. Strict Adherence, either 
to the patriarchal or matriarchal life of the early Germans, has been disap­
proved by MacCormack, o p .c lt., 143, but, as he concedes, much of the
/Continued on next page:
In Germany, the original family consisted of the ‘greater family*
presided over by a truncal father (Stammvater) uniting a ll male descendants
and their wives.^ This greater family developed Into a looser form of the
2
sib. These families remained conscious of their origin through common descent, 
but were Independent In their own sphere. When the son got married he ordlna- 
r lly  lit  his own hearth fire and set up his own household. Thus, Tn these cases, 
with the departure of the son with his Immediate family, a narrower separate 
(Sonder) or ‘ lesser* family came Into being.
Among the primitive and later Germans, we find a preponderance of
this Messer* family but, even during the Middle Ages, In some localities remln-
4
Iscences of the original greater family were preserved. From the law of 
OstergBtland and also with reference to some Danish laws, Bergman concludes
Note 2 -  p«l22 -  continued:
literature from the late nineteenth century was unavailable to him, Ib id ., 143, 
n . l . Juridically, the patriarchal character of Germanic family seems to be 
well-established, Stoljar, Int. En. Comp.L., IV, 20.
1. Stoljar, Ib id ., IV, 20.
2. These two distinct groups, namely maegth (Slppe) and the household were ju ri­
d ically distinct among the Anglo-Saxons, Young, o p .c lt., 125.
3. Huebner, 587. Cp. the same custom among the Vedlc Indians.
4 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 588. These early Germanic families had a close resem­
blance to the early Russian great family communes, J . Blum, Lord and Peasant 
In Russia, (Princeton, 1961), 25. Bede described this Germanic familial Instl- 
tutlon as Terra unlus famlllae* -  *a patriarchal Institution of several generations 
and several collateral households living around a common hearth*. Bede trans­
lated the English word hide as Terra unlus famlllae*, M . Bloch, In M.M.Postan, 
ed., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, o p .c lt . ,  1, 279-80.
that the Joint family in Sweden was comparatively small In size and embraced
only four generations.^ He noticed another, older, type of Joint family In
the laws of Gtttland (South Sweden) which was characterised on the one hand by
submission of the sons to their father and, on the other, allowed a certain amount
2
of equality of ownership to the son. The learned professor Informs us that 
submission of a son to his father co-existed In certain cases with his equality 
of ownership with the latter.
c . Mundlum
Families were under the headship of the house-father and the members 
3
were under his mundlum. The original character of the Institution of mundlum 
was preserved In Its purest form In the relation of a father to his children. A l­
though Huebner points out that ‘ Its original character was that of an unlimited 
cuthorlty of the mundlum-holder (” MuntherTM) over the persons subjected to hjs
4power*, there Is no convincing reason to believe that Germanic mundlum In Its
1. Gleaning of C .G . Bergman*s The Joint Family In Ancient Swedish Law*, In 
Essays of the IVth International Congress of Historical Studies, (London, 1914, 
rp t., Nendeln/Llechtensteln, 1972), 245.
2. Bergman, Ib id ., 245.
3 . mundlum Is the Latinised version of mund (North Germanic and Old Norse), 
derived from Old High German munt, meaning hand, the symbol of power. 
Munt corresponds etymologically and In meaning to the manus of Roman family 
law, Huebner, o p .c lt., 585-6. Mund Is close enough to be Interchangeable 
with Anglo-Saxon, *borg*, meaning ‘surety*, see Stoljar, o p .c lt., 20.
4 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 586.
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juridical form exactly coalesced with the absolute regime of the patria potestas.^ 
LTke the Roman patria potestas/ Germanic mundlum was not 'one-
2
sided1; It recognized a duty, In addition to the rights of the master. Mun-
dlum as an Institution Implies a relationship of protection and subjection, duties
as well as rights. A father has rights but, at the same time, he has specific
3
duties, and the children may have legal rights too. Moreover, the wider 
family or the kindred had a significant role In the protection of the child . Thus, 
the mund of the father was not absolute, It was subject to the Intervention of the 
kindred
This limitation on the father's power becomes apparent when we ana­
lyse the specific powers of the father. For example, the power to chastise the
5
children Is a natural power, Inherent In a ll parental authority; but In early 
Germanic law, a father was not even supposed to perform any severe chastise­
ment ^ without the co-operation of the family or the sib.^ Nevertheless,
1 . Stoljar, o p .c lt., 20. Huebner points out that upon the original concept of 
almost unlimited authority, moral and, then, legal restrictions were grafted, 
o p .c lt., 586. Maine also considered mundlum as 'relics of a decayed Patria 
Potestas', Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 127. Young disagrees with Maine, 
Young, o p .c lt., 150-1 .
2. R. Pound, The Spirit o f the Common Law, (Boston, 1921), 27.
3. Stoljar, o p .c lt., 20.
4 . Young, o p .c lt., 153.
5. Among the Anglo-Saxons, It was specifically ascribed to the father, Young, 
o p .c lt., 153, n .5 .
6 . Cp. Manu, V III, 299-300.
7. Huebner, o p .c lt., 657-8; Stoljar, o p .c lt., IV, 21.
sometimes a father could urn laterally enforce very harsh rights.^
Theoretically, Tt appears that a father could k i l l ,  abandon or sell
2
a child for a price. But a ll these rights were qualified when put Into practice.
3It Is true that a father could reject a child at b irth, I f  he had reason to doubt
his paternity. A father also could abandon crippled or deformed children but
these exceptional cases do not prove his general power of exposing or k illing  ^
5
children at his w il l .  Again, once the father had accepted the child, his 
right to k i l l  was completely gone.^
Selling of children was also not an unlimited right. It existed mainly 
to allow the parents to deal with situations of extreme necessity. ^ We should 
not lose sight of the fact that the mundlum was a sort of general guideline, em­
bedded In custom; but, to a great extent, Its administration remained a matter 
for the kindred.
1. Stoljar, o p .c lt., 21.
2. Young, o p .c lt., 153.
3. Cp. Greek law, s u p ^ 7 7 .
4 . Stoljar, o p .c lt., 21.
5. Young Informs us that a father had a general right of k illing  children* who had 
not tasted food*, o p .c lt., 153, n .2 . In the oldest of the Norse laws, we 
find that In case of extreme necessity, a father could k ill his children. 
Gulathlngslog, c . 63 provides that I f  parents come to extreme want, they are
graftgangsmenn. They would dig a grave and leave a ll the children to die
there. The father shall take out the one who lives the longest, and feed him 
thereafter, F. Seebohm, Tribal Gstom In Anglo-Saxon Law, (London, 1902), 265
6 . Stoljar, o p .c lt., 21.
7. Stoljar, o p .c lt., 22. fdfcfum Plstense of the Emperor Charles II of A .D . 864
provided that a father might sell his children Into slavery In case of his own 
actual necessity. A  similar rule was adopted In the SchwabensplegeI but It
Is doubted by Huebner, o p .c lt., 658, and also by Stoljar, o p .c lt., IV, 7, 22.
I l l . Father's power in the context of ownership o f property by children
Unlike developed Roman law, children Tn Germanic law were always 
regarded as capable of holding property.^ Theoretically, as the child came 
under the father's mundlum, so did his property; but 'the power of the father
was not of the nature of property, but of guardianship; It was not gewere, but
2 3
mund'. A  child could acquire separate property by Inheritance or by g ift.
4
The father, however, by virtue of his mundlum obtained a 'seisin In mundlum*
which did not give him ownership but only a right to enjoy It and Its profits
or Income. In other words, 'the father had the gewere, the legal possession,
5
of his son's property and, as a consequence of this, the usufruct*. It remained 
throughout the property of the son and, at the close of parental authority, the 
father was bound to deliver the property of the child with Indemnity for any 
diminution of value resulting from excessive damage or waste.
Germans, like the Hindus, have treated movables differently from 
Immovables.^ A father could deal Independently with the child's movables;
1. Huebner, o p .c lt., 665. Stoljar, o p .c lt., 23.
2. Young, o p .c lt., 153.
3. Huebner, o p .c lt., 665. Stoljar, o p .c lt., 23.
4 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 666 .
5. Young, o p .c lt., 154. It resolves an apparent contradiction In father's gwere.
6 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 694-98. On the Hindu law texts, see Infra, *33£-46.
Gluckman points out that In a ll tribal societies, the movables and Immovables
acquire different symbolic values In the law and ritua l, M . Gluckman, T he
Ideas Tn Barotse Jurisprudence, (New Haven, 1965), 116 -7.
but Tn respect of immovables, the latter's consent was necessary for similar ju ri­
stic acts. If, during the child's minority, a father disposed of Immovable pro­
perty, the former could revoke the agreement within a year of attaining majority. 
Generally, even after the son'$ attainment of majority, the father continued to 
administer the son's separate property; but, according to WestgothTc law, the
father was bound to restore a portion of such property to the son when he came
2of age; and this did not depend on whether he was married or not.
| V .  Son's Interest In family property
Apart from having separate property^. In Germanic law, a son had an 
Interest In family property co-ordinate with that of the father. Huebner states:
The house-lord and the heirs united within his 
household and under his household authority -  
that Is, his sons, -  constituted as respects the 
household estate a property community, In 
which the father as the representative of this 
community was Indeed accorded a primary 
right, above a ll the usufruct of the household 
property, but the sons were also recognized 
as co-holders of rights with him, and were ^ 
conceded an Irrevocable right of succession.
1 . Huebner, o p .c lt,, 666 . Stoljar, o p .c lt., 24.
2. Young, o p .c lt., 159, n .2 .
3 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 695. Also Maine, The ancient German law, like the 
Hindu jurisprudence, makes the male children co-proprietors with their 
father, and the endowment of the family cannot be parted with except by 
consent of a ll Its members', Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 176.
Although a father had a right to the usufruct of the entire household
property, the idea of considering his sons as ‘co-holders* of rights with him Is a 
convincing parallel In a Germanic setting to the MItaksara birthright.^ The 
closeness between the two systems becomes clear when we add the subsequent 
statement of Huebner:
Within the family, therefore, there were In 
fact, originally Involved no rights of Inheri­
tance whatever but merely a ’'communitysuc­
cession” In the collective property; or as the 
case might be, I f  one of the sons died during 
the lifetime of the father or after his death 
but during a continued community, a question 
of benefit of survivorship (Anwachsung). 2
V . Alienation
The restriction on alienation by the unilateral act of the head of the
3  _
family connotes multiple ownership over the same property. Like the MItaksara 
system, the early Germanic law also manifests this lack of power of the father 
(househead) to dispose of the family property at his own w il l .  Rights of other 
members, especially of the (adult) son, prevented him from making an alienation 
of family property Inter vivos. Ernest Young Informs us:
1. See Pollock and Maitland, II, o p .c lt., 248.
2. Huebner, o p .c lt., 695. Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, 
2nd ed ., II ,  248. Cp. the Incidents of coparcenary property In Hindu law, 
Katama Natchlar v . Rajah of ShTvaganga, (1863) 9 MIA 539 at 611. Also 
Raghavacharlar, Hindu Law, 4th ed ., 243.
3 . The ‘true notion* of Hindu law Is laid down In Appovler v . Rama Subba Alyan, 
(1866) 11 MIA 75, 89.
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that even, as regards the fathers property, the 
attainment of majority had an Important effect 
Is admitted by Stobbe. Before majority, the 
son had no right of veto In alienations by the 
father; after majority, he acquired this right.
In some laws also the son, after majority, had 
the right to demand a division of property. 1
A father, however, could dispose of his own ‘free portion* (Freltell;
2Freltellsrechte) but before doing so he had to partition the property amongst
his sons. In order to avoid confusion over the extent of this *free portion*
some of the laws fixed It by *head-rights*, according to the number of heirs
entitled to rights In expectancy; for example, *the father who had only one
son could dispose of one-half. If he had two sons of one-third, and If  nine
3
sons of one-tenth, of his property*. This *per capita* system (Kopftellsrechte)
regarding alienation does Imply a definite right In expectancy (Wartrecht) of the
son and, since he can prevent his father from alienating his expected portion
he undoubtedly acquires this right from his adulthood whlch;^ In effect, may be
4
said to stem from his birth, as w ill become clear later.
1. Young, o p .c lt., 159. Young Is referring to Stobbe*s Beltrdge zur Geschlchte 
des deutschen Rechts, .21, 11. This was peculiar to the South German 
(Alaman and Bavarian) nations. Pollock and Maitland, The History of English 
Law, 2nd ed.^ (Cambridge, 1923), II, 248, n .2 .
2 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 305. It was abolished by a Capitulary of Louis the Pious 
for a ll folk-laws of the Frankish Empire, Ib id ., 304, n .2 .
3 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 305, n .3 ., quoting Brunner, *BeItrdge zur Geschlchte des 
germanIschen Wartrechts* In Berliner Festgabe fflr Durnburg, (1900), 5. 
Huebner points out that this was also the rule Ip Lombard, Bavarian, Alamnlc, 
Turlnglan and In many Swedish and Danish systems, Ib id ., 305-6. The Salic 
Franks, Frisians, the West Gauls and the Burgundians, Irrespective of the num­
ber of sons, made the free portion a fixed portion, like a half, a third, a fifth 
or a tenth, Ib id ., 306; th!s{could be a secondary development.
4 . Infra, 132.
The modern tendency is to liberate the individual from the fetters 
of group ownership of property. In this respect, when substantive law was In 
favour o f the group, various procedural and fictional devices were adopted to 
promote the tendency toward Individualism. In Germanic law, one such device 
Is the so-called *RIghts of Co-alienation* (Belspruchsrechte).^ In dispositive 
acts, It was a formal right o f co-operation. It Is significant that this right 
existed only In favour of the next heir, and the next heir to the father was a l­
most always the son. The next heir enjoyed this right whether or not he suffered 
any loss by the disposition In question. It applied only to alienation Inter vivos
and the va lid ity of a conveyance was dependent upon the consent of the next 
2
heir. Unless this consent was obtained, an alienation was not treated as 
3
unimpeachable. When an alienation was made without the consent of the
next heir, he could, within a year and a day, sue to set aside the alienation 
4
as Void*. The rule was so strict, and the right of the next heir so Inviolable,
that on the Instant of an Invalid alienation, the land became his property. The
law viewed the situation as If  the alienor had died and, therefore, the next heir
5
could demand redellvery of the property from the third parties.
In describing the nature of this right of the next heir, Huebner comments
1. Huebner, o p .c lt., 306. It was particularly developed In Saxon Law;
Lex Saxon urn, cc 62-64, Huebner, Ib id ., 306, n .2 .
2 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 306.
3 . Ib id ., 306.
4 . Ib id ., 306-7. Cp. the Hindu law position, Derrett, IMHL, ^£465, 476; 
Critique, f  129.
5 . Ib id ., 307.
132.
that *he possessed a real right Tn expectancy ("dlngllches Anwartschaftsrecht” ) 
which was transformed by the unlawful alienation into ownership . .  . *^  But 
In terms of the MItaksara, this Veal right*, since It Is effective during the life ­
time of the father, Is a form of birthright which merely manifests Itself as soon 
as the father alienates the family property without the consent of his son (the 
next heir).
V I. Entailed estates
With the growth of the rising commercial value of land, restrictions
on free alienation were gradually eroded; but In the systems of ‘ town law1,
2
they s till persisted In the case of ancestral lands (Erbgut) * From A .D . 1200
onward, the nobility maintained their family lands In the form of entailed estates
3
(Stammguter) which were Inherited from ancient times. The entailed estates
were Inalienable and were Inherited agnatlcally. Although In the matter of
Inheritance, the entailed estates devolved In accordance with the system of
primogeniture, the majority of the Germanists opine that a ll the agnates as
4
members of the Kflrperschaft had Veal rights In expectancy*.
The lower nobility was unable to secure for Itself the power of private 
enactment which enabled the higher aristocracy to preserve agnatic family owner-
1. Ib id ., 307.
2. Huebner, o p .c lt., 308-9.
3. Ib id ., 309.
4 . Ib id ., 309-10.
ship Tn the form of entailed estates. The lower nobility, however, chose to
accomplish the same ends by means of consensual agreements and entails
(Stammgutsstlftungen) . ^  Such entails come to our notice sporadically from
A .D . 1000 onwards and became very popular In the sixteenth century. The
purpose of this Institution was to keep lands Inalienable and heritable In the
male line of the first acc^Irer, and It became the most effective means of
guarding the ‘splendor famlllae* against the Individualistic principles of the
2
Roman law of Inheritance.
In English legal history also, we find that the rlghte of the heir 
combined with the tendency to keep the property within the family assert 
themselves through the system of feudal tenures. In Norman England ‘ lands 
acquired by Inheritance as family domain were considered more or less like en­
tailed property, that Is, property Tn which the "heir” had a legal Interest In the
lifetime of the tenant, so that the helr*s consent wasi necessary to any transfer
* * • » 3even inter vivos .
The G lanvlll exegesis seems to suggest that at that time the fee, ^
1. Ib id ., 311. Stlftungen of this type are well-known In Switzerland to this day.
2. Ib id ., 311.
3. M .M . Bigelow, The Rise of the English W ill* , In E. Freund, W.E. MTkell 
and J .H . Wlgmore, ed ., Select Essays In Anglo-American Legal History,
3 vols• , (Boston, 1909), HI, 770-781 at 778.
4 . Fee had grown Into heritable estate from a succession of life estates granted by 
the lord and his heir to the vassal and his successors. Enfeoffment In fee took 
the form of a grant *to A  and his heirs*, (et suls haeredlbus); first brought Into 
England In late eleventh century or twelfth century, Bigelow, Ib id ., 778.
On this, also see, C .H .S . FIfoot, English Law and Its Background, (London, 
1932), 46.
at least Tn theory, had grown into an hereditary estate.^ Within certain limits 
a fee was subject to alienation barring the succession of the heirs. But the rules 
governing succession and determining the scope of alienability were s till un­
settled. The traditional tendency to keep the family property Intact and to 
pass It through a particular line of descent^ conflicted with the forces In favour 
of free a lienability . Stefan RIesenfeld observes: The land hunger of the
church likewise worked toward alienability, and last, not least, the acceptance
of a moral duty to provide for a daughter or sister on the occasion of her marriage
2
added to the existing forces*.
It appears from G lanv lll that he supported the Inalienability of 
3
Inherited lands, but he also wrote that a man could convey a reasonable part 
of purchased property without consent of his bodily heirs: *lf he has only ac­
quired land, and wishes to give part of this land, then he can do so; but he
4cannot give a ll his acquired land, because he must not disinherit his son*.
1. S .A . RIesenfeld, ‘ Individual and Family Rights In Land During the Formative 
Period of the Common Law*, In A . Newman, ed.g Essays In Jurisprudence In 
Honor of Roscoe Pound, (New York, 1962), 439-462 at 454-5. For an assert- 
lon to the contrary, see S.E. Thorne, *EngIIsh Feudalism and Estates In Land*, 
Camb. L .J . , (1959), 193-209.
2. RIesenfeld, Ib id ., 455. Cp. the Hindu law position In Guramma v . Mallappa,
AIR 1964 S.C. 510. Derrett, Critique, f  124.
3. W.S. Holdsworth, A  History o f English Law, 7 vols., (3rd ed ., London, 1923),
III, 74.
4 . G lanv lll, V ll,  1: Si uero questum tantum habuerlt Is qul partem terre sue donare 
uoluerlt, tunc quldem hoc el licet; sed non totum questum, quia non potest flllum 
suum exheredare, Tractatus De Leglbus Et Consuetudlnlbus RegnI Anglle Qul G lan- 
vl I la Vocatur, ed. tr. G .D .C . Hall, sub, t i t .  The Treatise on the Laws and Customs 
of the Realm of England Commonly called G lanv lll, (Nelson, Londor/Edmburgfi,
1965), 71a; tr. Ib id ., 71b.
However, the author o f the G lanvlll  ^ was conscious that he was 
writing Tn an age of transition and conflict between corporate family ownership 
and the emerging notion of uubrldled a lienability . That Is why he devoted 
some space to this, as yet unsettled, problem. Until the end of the twelfth 
century, the effects of herltablllty on the power of alienation remained In a 
flu id state, though one might say that the controversy mostly remained a matter 
of doctrinal neatness.
The lingering doubts on the point were judicia lly settled In 1225
Tn respect of the position of a tenant In fee held In knight service. According
2
to the facts of this case, S, the son of F, the alienor, bought a suit against one
AS, the son of A , the alienee, In order to recover certain lands. The defendant
pleaded that F had conveyed the lands to A by *qult-clalmlng the same for hlm-
3
self and his heirs to A , and his heirs In perpetuity* In a settlement concluded 
In the Royal Court. S, the p la in tiff, admitted the authenticity of this trans­
action but asked for judgment *s! pater suus potult dare totam terram quam tenult
4
per servltlum mllltare nullo retento servlcTo slbl vel heredlbus suit*.
1. On G lan v lll, see Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, o p .c lt., 
I, 162 ff .
2 . 12 Curia Regis Rolls, 47 (HU. Term, 9 Henry III), cited In F.W. Maitland, 
ed ., Bracton*s Note Book: A Collection of Cases Decided In the K!ng*s 
Courts During the Reign of Henry the Third, (London, 1887), III, case 1054
at 84.
3 . See RlesenfeId, o p .c lt., 460.
4 . Bracton*s Note Book, III, o p .c lt., 84.
The court held that such alienation without reservation of any ser-
1 2vice was binding on the heir and decided against the p la in tiff. Bracton noted 
the case and, on the historic family restraints on free alienability, jurid ically 
gave the coup de grace by saying: Mf the ancestor disposed of the entire Inheri­
tance without retaining anything In demesne or selgnory for the benefit of the
2(potential) heir, the latter ceased to be such*.
But the victory of free alienation was short-lived and, significantly, 
the traditional attachment of the family to Its property re-emerged almost Instantly 
In another form. A  grantor who wished to deviate from the rules governing suc­
cession and alienation started to modify the magic words *et heredlbus suls* by
adding restrictions and conditions, and the most common restriction was a grant
4
to A *et heredlbus suls quos habuerlt de corpore suo*. These words were con-
1. We notice that In the reign of Henry I (1100-1135) *a son confirms or rather
makes anew, a g ift of land by his father to the church, which had been ad­
judged good against the son*, Placlta Anglo-Normanlca, 128-9, cited by 
Bigelow, o p .c lt., 779, n . l .
2 i  Bracton*s Note Book, III, case 1054 at 84.
3. Eodem modo deslnere posslt, (potent) esse films &  heres, ut si pater & mater,
vel eorum alter totam dederlnt heredltatem, n lh li rellnquentes heredl nec In
domlnlo nec In servltlo, cum Id quasi (quare) sine causa heres dlcebatur cum 
lam non subslstat, De Leglbus et Consuetudlnlbus Regnl Angllae, (London, 
1649), 265a, b. Summary of the text In English, Rlesenfeld, o p .c lt., 460.
4 . IRTesenfeld, o p .c lt., 462.
strued as limiting the succession to lineal descendants of the grantee, leaving a 
right of reversion to the grantor and his heirs In cases where a direct line of 
descent from the grantee was lacking or became extinct. Thus, a new form 
of family ownership gradually emerged, known as the feodum arctatum or fee 
ta ll.^
VIL. Testamentary power of the father
The absence of testamentary disposition In early Germanic law Is
2
another proof that the right enjoyed by natural heirs was Irrevocable. This
Is contained In the proverb: *he who would die well and blessed should leave
3
his property to the legal heir1. Society disapproved any arbitrary Interference
by man with the law of succession: *Whatever the dying man lets fa ll must fa ll
4
Into the hand of the heir appointed by nature*. And In this respect, *the strict
1. Ib id ., 462. The Statute De Donls, the first chapter of the Statute of West­
minster II (1285) sanctioned and strengthened the new Institution. On Its 
further Implications and developments, see F.T. Plucknett, A  Concise History 
of Common Law, 5th ed ., (London, 1956), 546-557. A lsoC .H .S . Flfoot, 
English Law and Its Background, o p .c lt., 46-47.
2. M .M . Bigelow, o p .c lt., 776. Huebner, o p .c lt., 740.
3. *wer w ill wohl und seellg sterben,der lasse seln Gut den rechten Erben*, 
Huebner, o p .c lt., 697.
4 . *solus deus heredem facere potest, non homo*r  Huebner, o p .c lt., 696. Cp. 
G lanv lll, Lib. V I I . c . l :  *qu!a solus Deus heredem facere potest, non homo*; 
*for only God, not man, can make an heir1, tr. G .D .G . Hall, o p .c lt . ,  71b; 
qualified by Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd ed ., II, 
254.
Germanic order of succession was In entire agreement with the general conditions 
and views of a primitive and unlndlvlduallstlc society. Moreover, It was Identi­
cal with the original Institutions of other Indo-Germanlc races*.^
This points to the fact that the son who was first In order of priority 
among the natural heirs had an unassailable right of expectancy In family pro­
perty at the hands of his father. The appearance of wills In the Germanic codes 
(Leges Barbarorum) of a later time was due to the Influence of Roman jurisprudence.
In conformity with the law of their Germanic ancestors, the early 
settlers In England, who later became the English, had no testaments In their 
laws of succession
GlanvIII says that a man may make a w ill In his last sickness: ‘How­
ever, a g ift of this kind made to another In a last w ill can hold good If  made and
4
confirmed with the helr*s consent*. G lanvIII adds that a man cannot disinherit
1. Huebner, o p .c lt., 697. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 174.
2. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 174. Bigelow, lo c .c lt . ,  777. But 
Huebner opines that Germanic law Itself, In time, came to recognise a volun­
tary testamentary order of succession, o p .c lt., 697. To this should be added 
the Influence of the church. The priest before granting absolution used to per­
suade the dying msn to make a w ill by which he would bestow a part of his mov­
ables on the church and the poor for the repose of his soul, C . Gross, The Medi­
aeval Law of Intestacy*, In E. Freund and others ed ., Select Essays In Anglo- 
Amerlcan Legal History, (Boston, 1909), 111, 723-736 at 723.
3. Bigelow, o p .c lt., 777. On the various stages of English w ill,  see Pollock and 
Maitland, History of the English Law, 2nd ed ., (Cambridge, 1923), II, 314—
356. Alsto T .F .T . Plucknett, A Concise History o f Common Law, 5th ed ., 
(London# 1956), 732-746.
4 . G lanvIII, L lb .V II. c . l ;  H all, o p .c lt., 70.
*hls son and heir* even as to land which the father has bought himself. However,
if  he has no heir of his body, he may do as he w ill with such land. Also, he
could convey a reasonable part of his self-acquired property without consent of
his natural helr.^ We may say that the right of making a testament in England
2
arose from the power to w ill away chattels and self-acquired land^
V II I . Debts of the father
The primary rights of the natural heirs In family property are also re­
flected In the attitude toward the debts and obligations of the propositus. In
Germanic law, it was unknown that the legal personality of the deceased was
3
continued In the heir. Despite this rule, the heir was liable to some extent
1. G lanvIII, Lib. V II . c . l ;  Hall, ib id .,  71.
2 . G lanv ill says that chattels of a deceased should be divided into three portions: 
one-third went to the legacies of the deceased or, i f  he had none, were de­
voted to his executor In pTos usus; one-third went to the w ife; and the rest
was distributed among the childrenT Lib. V II. c .5 . This Independence over 
the third to dispose of by legacy might have developed from the ‘dead man*s 
portion*, the part of the movable estate laid with the dead man in his grave
or burned with him; .this sometimes included the widow as w ell, Huebner, 
o p .c lt., 611, 742. The practice was noted by Herodotus (V, 5), among the 
Thracians of the Danube, and was also prevalent among Slavonic tribes, 
Vlnogradoff, OHJ, I, 236, n . l ,  2. *lt was a widespread custom*, says 
Huebner, *to set apart a third of the movable estate as the death-portion, 
from the part belonging to the heirs*, lo c .c lt ., 743.
3 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 705. Cp. Roman law: Heredltas est successlo in unlver-
sum jus quod defunctus habuTt: an inheritance is a succession to the entire 
legal position of a deceased man, see Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 
161.
for the obligations of the deceased. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the
heir was bound to honour every conceivable obligation; even a mediaeval work
like the Sachsenplegel  ^ provides that certain obligations did not belong to the
heritage, and they were presumed, therefore, to lapse on the death of the propo- 
2
situs. The crucial test was whether a particular obligation ‘enabled the de-
3
ceased to leave the heritage and the heirs to receive It In Its existing form1.
Thus, the father was restrained from entering Into obligations which might jeop­
ardise the Interest of the heir. That Is why the Sachsesplegel provided that
among the contractual obligations of the propositus, the heirs were obliged to
4
honour those which had left In the heritage a *wederstadlnge‘ , that Is, a value
In exchange. This value In exchange need not be an actual or demonstrable
Increase of the Inheritance, but It should help to bring the heritage to the heirs
5
In Its undiminished form. Following this principle, promises of gifts, promises 
of alienations and also gaming debts ^ were non-her!table, but debts due for loans
1 . Written by the East-Saxon knight, Elke von Repgow, about A .D . 1225, 
Melnhard, o p .c lt., 2.
2. Huebner, o p .c lt.^  706.
3. Ib id ., 706.
4 . Ib id ., 706.
5 . Ib id ., 706.
6 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 706. Cp. In Hindu law father's debts tainted by Illegality
as wagering contracts are avyavaharlka, that Is, ‘unenforceable by process'^' 
Derrett, IMHL, f509 .
141.
were. This is a sequel to the rule that the father did not have the unilateral
right to alienate the property Inter vivos; and particularly, It emphasises that
the father did not have the right to bind the heirs with a promise of alienation,
far less to squander away the property by entering Into wagering contracts.
Moreover, under the older law any obligation of the deceased could be en-
2
forced only against the chattels which the heirs Inherited. That lands should 
rest free from I lab ility  for debts In the herltal system was a rubric of old Ger­
manic law. Thus, the law gave some freedom to the father only In dealing
3
with chattels within the Indestructible herltal rights (Erbgut) of the son; and, 
had the father been allowed to contract debts without restriction, his sons could
have been forced to make them good out of the estate and, as a result, owner-
4 5ship In ‘collective hand* by father and sons would be meaningless. In other
words, the co-ordinate right of the son with the father In family property stood
In the way of a father's contracting debts and entering Into obligations at his
own volition; and the attitude taken by Germanic law might form a key, In the
1. Huebner, o p .c lt., 706. Magdeburg town-law; the Schwabensplegel; and 
the town-Jaws of South Germany did not follow the requisites of wederstand- 
Inge. They treated a ll contractual obligations of the father as heritable^ 
but; debts violating the prohibition of usury by containing a promise of Inter­
est and obligations of suretyship were non-her!table* Huebner, Ib id ., 706.
In Hindu law, debts for being surety for the appearance or for the honesty
of another are avyavaharlka (unenforceable) debts, Mulla, Principles of Hindu 
Law, 13th ed ., f  298. For a fu ller discussion on avyavaharlka, see Derrett, 
Critique, 134-139.
2 . Huebner, o p .c lt.£  706-7,
3. Ib id ., 707.
4 . On this, see Infra,14 ^"4  •
5. Ib id ., 707.
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proprietary sense, to the so-called pTous obligation  ^ of a Hindu son, and also 
to his exemption from honouring illegal and immoral debts (avyavaharlka).
IX. Ownership In Collective Hand (Elgentum zu gesamter Hand)
Another feature of the Germanic concept of ownership Is manifested
In the Institution of ^Collective Hand*. The members of this joint community
were co-owners of property, but no Individual member had the dispositive power
2
unilaterally. Unlike the Roman ercto non c lto , a ll the co-owners, acting to­
gether *as with one Hand* (mlt gesamter Hand), could dispose of either a part or
3
the whole of the property. The shares of Individual members remained In an
4
Ideal sense and undifferentiated, until the dissolution of the community by 
partition.
The communities of collective Hand had their origin In the Indo-
5
Germanic Institution of the household community. Among the primitive 
Germans, It was common practice that the sons, after the death of their 
father, used to live jo in tly  holding the estate In collective hand. It Is w e ll-
1 . For Its origins, see Kage, HD, III, 442 f f .  Derrett, Mndlca Pletas: a 
Current Rule Derived from Remote Antiquity*, Zeltschrlft der Savlgny- 
Stlftung fuerRechtsgeschlchte, Rom. A b t., vo l.86 (1969), 37-66.
2 .  S u p ra ,2 7 - 9 .
3. Huebner, o p .c lt., 235.
4 . Ib id ., 142.
5. Ibid •, 140.
attested from the folk-laws of the Lombards, AlamanTans, Bavarians and Franks ^
that these ‘house associations* (Hausgenossenschaften) or ‘associations of common-
2
ers* (GerneYnderschaften) among peasants Included grandchildren or even remoter 
3
descendants. These communities of collective hands survived down to the end
4 5of the Middle Ages and continued, sporadically, even to the present time.
These communities were mostly consortiums of brothers and sisters 
and their descendants.^ Exceptionally, and significantly In some cases, there 
existed a community of collective hand among parents and children; but the legal
1. Ib id ., 141. Huebner points out that joint living of brothers was also known 
among the Saxons, Frisians, Anglo-Saxons, East Germans (Burgundians) and 
Scandinavians, Ib id ., 141. Among the Lombards, we notice that acquisition 
by Individual brother was considered as acquisition for the common pool.
The Edict of Rothar, c.167; Title De fratres qul In casam communem reman -  
serunt, allowed a brother In the service of the king or judge to keep his acqul- 
sTtTons for himself, Seebbhm, o p .c lt., 293. Joint pool or Communis Sub- 
stantla Is also well-attested from the Lex Scania Antigua, (A .D . 1206-1215) 
among the Danes, Seebohm, Ib id ., S&2. Capltula Generalla of A .D . 825 
shows that Frankish brothers were living jo in tly , Seebohm, Ib id ., 183.
2. Huebner, Ib id ., 141.
3. Ib id ., 141.
4 . Throughout the Middle Ages, they were widely noticed In South and West 
Germany, Huebner, Ib id ., 141.
5. Ib id ., 141. These communities played a great role In the A .D . 1506s and 
1600s In Switzerland. In the Zurich Code of 1853-55, they were capitally 
regulated, Ib id ., 141. In the 1500s and 1600s the communities existed In 
the Burgundian and Alamanlan districts as w ell, ib id ., 141.
6 . The eldest brother acted as the manager and representative of the community, 
Huebner, Ib id ., 142.
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systems of many regions excluded these exp lic itly  because of their inconsistency 
with parental powers,  ^ a fact which does not disprove the possibility of holding 
property by father and son as co-owners. It should be mentioned that, although 
these communities might come Into existence as a result of contract among mem­
bers, they were marked throughout by the old characteristics of familial Institu­
tions, and thereby, fe ll within the family law.
X . Preemption (Ndherrechte)
Corporate rights In family property, as opposed to exclusive Individual
ownership, are also noticed In early Germanic law from the next helr*s right of
2
preemption (Ndherrechte). The next helr*s right of retractive purchase 
(Zugrecht) Is *one of the restrictions upon ownership based upon a one-tlmei
3existence of collective family property1. The right of preemption Is of later
4
growth than the right of co-allenatlon, which Itself stemmed from the co-ordl-
5
nate right (of expectancy) of the heir. As we have noticed earlie r, by refusing 
consent, the heir could prevent any g ift (Vergabung), even though gratuitous, as 
well as any sale of land, outside the fam ily.^ Also, through his formal right
1 . Ib id ., 141.
2. Huebner, Ib id ., 395.
3. Ib id ., 395.
4. Supra, 131
5. Supra, |3 |.
6 . Huebner, o p .c lt., 395.
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of co-allenatlon, he could bring a real action and rescind a sale already made
without hTs consent. The rigour of these rules against the landowner paved
the way for a less restrictive institution In the form of a mere prior or preferen- 
”  1tla l (Naher) right of the heir to purchase the property# For some tjme the 
right o f co-allenatlon and the right of preemption existed side by side. A l­
though It may appear that the Introduction of the right of preemption and the 
abolition of the right of co-allenatlon gave reasonable freedom to the father
In dealing with family property, ‘ the Interest of the heirs In the preservation
2
of the family estate was also completely protected * by the former right.
It became well-accepted practice In Germanic law that whoever wished to
3
sell his land must offer It first to his heirs.
In old Norse law, we notice that the vendor Intending to sell land,
4
first of a ll had to offer It publicly to his odal- fellows who had the first option 
5
to buy. If the vendor sold the land ‘unoffered* the odal men could redeem
1. Ib id ., 396.
2. Huebner, o p .c lt., 396.
3. The other preemptors were: part-owners (Gelellen); fellow-occupants of 
an estate (Hofgenossen); the members of the commune, e tc ., Huebner,
Ib id ., 396. Cp. Hindu law, Infra, 7 H -Z .
4 . odal Is terra hereditaria; genuine odal Is the odal Inherited from lineal 
ancestors, not from collaterals, A . Taranger, The Meaning of the Words, 
Odal and Skeytlng In the Old Laws of Norway*, In Essays of the IVth Inter­
national Congress of Historical Studies, o p .c lt., 159-173 at 167. The word 
edal generally signifies family ownership but there are opinions that the orlg l- 
aI meaning of the word was simple ownership, see Taranger, Ib id ., 160, 168.
5. Vlnogradoff, OHJ, 1, 277-8.
It within twelve months. ^
In this respect, which is important for our purpose, Taranger puts 
forward the controversy as to whether Tn Norse law a son had any right of re­
demption In the case of sale of odal property by his father. He says: ‘ None 
of the seller‘s offspring had any right of redeeming sold odal-land, If It had
been lawfully "offered". On the contrary, he had to "offer" It even to his 
2
own son*. This shows that although there could be doubts about a son*s 
right of redemption after a sale has been made properly following the rules 
of preemption, the son*s position as a preemptor and, Indeed, the first among 
the preemptors, In a sale by his father, Is unquestionable.
If we look at old Norse law from another angle, It strengthens the 
son*s position as a possible primary preemptor. The Gutha lings law provides 
that when land falls to a woman, the men of the kindred have a right to redeem 
It from the kinswoman at one-fifth less than Its value. The preference for male
kindred Is further emphasised by the rule that even If odal has passed ‘ three
3 4times under the spindle*, It comes bask at least to the male kinsmen. So
1. Gu la things law, s.278; F. Seebohm, Tribal Custom In Anglo-Saxon Law, 
o p .c lt., 273. Also Taranger, Io c .c lt., 168.
2. Taranger, Ib id ., 169.
3. The spindle represents the female kind. Splndelmagen Include a ll female 
kin, as well as male kin connected with by a female link . As a contrast 
the sword Is the symbol of the male sex. German Schwertmagen Is defined 
as male kin connected exclusively through the male link . They are not only 
agnatl but agnatl mascull as opposed to Splndelmagen or nonagnates, Meln- 
hard, o p .c lt., 16. The juridical significance of these two are pointed out 
by Vlnogradoff: ‘ In the case of the Teutons the sword side has a natural and 
marked precedence over the spindle side In a ll matters concerning defence and 
ownership of land*, OHJ, 302, 286 ff .
4 . Gutha lings law, s.275, cited by Seebohm, o p .c lt., 275.
a son, being the nearest of the male kindred of his father, and also being the 
first to Inherit the patrimony, would naturally have the right to preempt family 
land If  sold by his father.
The right of preemption does Imply an original situation In which the 
ownership of property was corporate as opposed to Individualistic, though It does 
not directly prove any exact synonymity with the Mltaksara birthright of a son.
X I . A son's position In the Germanic scheme of Inheritance
Strictly speaking, the study of the Mltaksara birthright should be con­
fined to the analysis of a son's rights during the lifetime of his father. Never­
theless, the concept has direct bearings on the heritable position of a son In re­
spect of the paternal estate after the death of his father. That Is why, before 
we come to a final conclusion In the comparative context, a short survey of the 
son's position In early Germanic systems of Inheritance seems to be relevant to 
our purpose.
a. Germania of Tacitus
The earliest record regarding rules of Inheritance among the Germans 
Is by Tacitus. He states:  ^ The son Is always heir to his father. Last w ills 
and testaments are not In use. In case of failure of Issue, the brothers of the
1. Tac. Ger. 20: heredes tamen successoresque sul culque llberl, et nullum 
testamentum. si llberl non sunt, proxlmus gradus In possesslone, fratres, 
patrul, avuncull, quoted by Pollock and Maitland, The History of English 
Law, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 1923), II, 250, n .2 .
deceased are next in succession, or else the paternal or maternal uncles* J  
We have no way of knowing from Tacitus which particular Germanic tribe, 
or how many of them, followed this rule and therefore, *the evidence of Tacitus
1. tr. A . Murphy, Tacitus* Germania: A  Treatise on the Si tuatlon, Manners, 
and People of Germany, In A . Kocourek and J .H . Wlgmore, ed ., Evolution 
of Law, I, Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law, (Boston, 1915), 106. We 
note that the maternal uncle (avuncull) Is one of the heirs In order of success­
ion and the text Is preceded by a general statement concerning the 'fionor* 
accorded to a sister's son by his mother's brother: Sororum flIlls  Idem apud 
avunculum qul apud patrem honor, Pollock and Maitland, II, Ib id ., 241, 
n . l . The uncle by the mother's side regards his nephews with an affection 
nothing Inferior to that of their father*, tr. Murphy, Ib id ., 105-6. The 
German legal historians often Interpret the text as the oldest literary record 
of an agnatic society gradually admitting the principle of cognation, Huebner, 
o p .c lt., 590. Lowle disagrees with this Interpretation and adds: ' . . .  
matronymy Is perfectly consistent with the assignment of definite functions 
to the father's group and patronymy Is equally consistent with the avunculate', 
University of California Publications In American Archaeology and Ethnology,
16 (1919), 42. Also, R.H. * Lowle, Social Organization, (London, 1950), 
76. Primitive Society, (London, 1929), 78, 181. The champions of 'mother 
right' opine that at a remote epoch the Teutonic peoples passed the matriar­
chal stage, Melnhard, op .c lt. ,1 4 .  In the African context^ see the same 
view of H .A . Junod^ The Life of a South African Tribe, 2 vols. (New York, 
1966), I, 234. Junod's orthodox view Is contested by A.R . Radcllffe-Brown, 
The Mother's Brother In South Africa*, In his Structure and Function In Primi­
tive Society, (London, 1971), 15-31. He says: *Even in the most strongly 
patriarchal society some social Importance Is attached to kinship through the 
mother . .  .*, Ib id ., 23. Elsewhere Radcllffe-Brown does not attach any 
legal significance to the Tacltean passage, In A.R. Radcllffe-Brown and
D. Forde, ed ., African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, (London, 1950), 
In irod., 18. Cp. the marumakkattayls In the Malabar Joint Family customs. 
Among the Nayars of South India, the descent Is matrlllneal and the son be­
longs to the family of his mother. *When his father dies, he does not wear 
mourning nor take part In the funeral, but I f  his mother or the brother of his 
mother dies, he Is bound to wear the deepest mourning and to sit In ashes for 
weeks', Vlnogradoff, OHJ, I, 191. A man's attachment to his sister's 
children more than his own Is also found among the matrlllneal Khasls, V lno­
gradoff, Ib id ., 192-3. The same custom Is also found among some of the 
North Indian tribes, Ib id ., 193.
Ts . . .  of limited help In  the reconstruction of the rules on Inheritance . . .  among 
the Germanic tribes of the first century A .D . * ^
b. Lex Sallca
Although the different Germanic codes were not contemporaneous with
2
early Germanic society, It Is supposed that the ancient Teutonic rules were re­
tained In the Frankish laws (Lex Sallca; Lex Rlbuarla) and In that of the Thurln- 
glans (Lex Ang llorum).
The Lex Sallca (Title 59; de alodls: Concerning Private Property)
3
speaks of a propositus dying without leaving any sons (f lI I I) : Mf a man die and
leave no sons, If the father and mother survive, they shall Inherit1. Melnhard
opines that, since the mother Is mentioned, the first paragraph refers only to the
4
Inheritance of movable property. Even If  we accept MacCormack *s rendering 
of the term f l l l l  as 'children* and not as 'sons* the purport of the rules entitles the 
daughters only to the Inheritance of movable property, because the last paragraph 
lays down: 'But of Salic land no portion of the Inheritance shall come to a woman;
5
but the whole Inheritance of the land shall come to the male sex*.
1. MacCormack, o p .c lt., 147.
2. Melnhard, o p .c lt., 18.
3. The Lex Sallca, 59.1, In Evolution of Law I , o p .c lt.,
4 . Melnhard, o p .c lt., 18. Pollock and Maitland, o p .c lt., II, 251.
5. MacCormack, o p .c lt., 166. Pollock and Maitland, Ib id ., 251, 261.
The Lex Sallca, 59.6. De terra vero nulla In mullere heredltas non pertlneblt, 
sed ad vlrllem sexum qul fratres fuerlnt tota terra perteneat. The text Ts quoted 
by Vlnogodrafoff, OHJ, I, 302, n .3 . Melnhard points out that the passage Is 
not too clear but *qul fratres fuerlnt* Is probably to be understood as meaning 'of
/Continued on next page:
c . Lex RTbuarTa
The exclusion of females from the inheritance of land Ts also found
Tn the Lex RTbuarTa,  ^ the law of the Franks of the MTddle RhTne. TTtle 56 of
the Lex RTbuarTa provTdes that amongst the heTrs fTrst Tn the order of successTon 
2
are the chTtdren. A proviso at the end of the TTtle excludes females from the
Inheritance transmitted from the grandfather, or ‘patrlmonalal Inheritance*
3
(heredltas avlatlca). Thus, I f  there are both sons and daughters among the 
children of the deceased, the former undoubtedly would Inherit the heredltas 
avlatlca
Note -  p. 149 -  continued:
the male line*, o p .c lt., 18. Note the changes In different recensions of 
the Lex Sallca, see MacCormack, o p .c lt., 166. In some manuscripts In­
stead of *de terra* there Is *de terra sallca*, which could Imply as law appli­
cable to the Sallan Franks or the adjective sallca could be derived from the 
Frankish word $a|a, meaning ‘house*, homestead. Thus terra sallca would 
mean *the land belonging to the homestead*, Melnhard, o p .c lt., 18.
1. The laws of Inheritance In the Lex Rlbuarla, ss .32-64, were supposed to be 
Influenced by the Lex Sallca. The Lex RTbuarTa Is thought to be completed 
In the latter part of the sixth century and to have been revised In the Carol- 
TngTan period, MacCormack, o p .c lt., 169, n .4 l.
2# MacCormack, Ib id ., 169.
3. sed cum vlrllls  sexus exstlterlt, femlna In heredltatem avtatlcam non 
succedat, Melnhard, o p .c lt., 18.
4. Melnhard opines that heredltas avlatlca Is *the Inheritance transmitted from 
the grandfather*. He does not make any distinction between movables and 
land, Ib id ., 18. MacCormack holds the view that *thls phrase seems to 
denote the land belonging to the Inheritance1, o p .c lt., 169, n.42.
d. Lex AnglTorum et Werlnorm hoc est ThurTngorum
Thuringorum  ^ (ss.26-34, de alodlbus) states that Tn the Inheritance
2
of a deceased's heredltas (land and movables), sons exclude daughters. When
there are no sons of the deceased, the daughters Inherit only movables (pecunla
3
et manclpltla); the land goes to the nearest kinsman of the male line. The
male line succeeds, to the exclusion of the females, up to the fifth  generation
and, after the fifth , the daughter may, however, succeed to the whole of the 
4
Inheritance. When the mother dies, the son, In respect of terra, manclpla 
and pecunla, excludes the daughter; only the mother's jewellery and clothing 
go to her.**
e. Lex Burgundlorum etc.
In the Lex Burgundlorum also the sons took the Inheritance to the ex­
clusion of the daughters.^ But the significant position of the son among the
1. As late as the early 9th century, Melnhard, o p .c lt., 18.
2. Melnhard, Ib id ., 19. MacCormack, Ib id ., 179. Vlnogradoff, OHJ, I,
302, n .3 .
3. s.27: ad proxlmum paternae generatlonls consengulneum, quoted by Melnhard, 
Ib id ., 19. Also MacCormack, Ib id ., 179-80.
4 . Melnhard, o p .c lt., 19.
5. MacCormack, o p .c lt., 180. Cp» strldhanarp among the Hindus, Kane, H.D. 
I l l,  Ch.30. The provisions on the laws of Inheritance followed among the 
Burgundians are contained In the Lex Gundobada, named after the king Gund- 
obad^l (A .D . 474-516). The collection Ts dated to the last quarter of the 5th 
century A .D .,  MacCormack, Ib id ., 171, n.47.
6 . MacCormack, Ib id ., 171. But there was a stipulation that a daughter who 
entered church was to receive the same share of Inheritance as a son, Meln­
hard, o p .c lt., 17-18.
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Burgundians Ts this, that the land was normally divided among the sons Tn the 
father*s lifetime,^ the latter keeping a portion for himself.
2
The other Germanic laws also state that the sons exclude daughters
In matters of Inheritance. The only exception we notice Ts located among the
3Frisians. The Lex Frlslorum (s. 19.2, de parrlcldlls), Indirectly Implies the 
order of succession as: children, parents, brothers and sisters. MacCormack 
Ts Inclined to believe that the children, both male and female, used to share;
4
equally. But there Is a suggestion Tn a phrase -  vel fratrl vel etlam sororTs suae, 
that In the matter of Inheritance men might bepreferred to women. The phrase 
does not Isolate the Frisian law from the general mould found Tn the Germanic 
pattern of Inheritance.
f .  Anglo-Saxon law
The Anglo-Saxon laws fa ll Into two groups. First, there are the dooms 
Issued by the earlier Anglo-Saxon kings; and, secondly, there are the late collect­
ions of laws from the time of Canute, William and Henry I.
The dooms do not contain any comprehensive account of the law of 
Inheritance, but Indirectly they do supply Information on the position of sons
1. The same rule among the AlamannI, Lex Alamannorum, paras. 2, 35; and 
especially, 91. The code Is dated between A .D . 709 and 730.
2. Lex Baluwarlorum, 1.1; 11.9; X V .9. The law was applicable to the Bavarians 
and Ts dated to the middle of the 8 th century, MacCormack, Ib id ., 175.
Edlctus Longobardorum (Ed. !Roth, 167), MacCormack, Ib id ., 175. Lex 
Saxonum, c l.41, MacCormack, Ib id ., 178. Lex Francorum Chamovorum, 
MacCormack, Ib id ., 180.
3. A compilation put together from various sources In the time of Charlemagne, 
MacCormack, Ib id ., 177, n.61.
4 . MacCormack, o p .c lt., 177.
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(children) among the heirs.
The Laws of Aethelberht  ^ (ss. 78-81) provide that if a woman who
has borne a child chooses to leave her husband, she Is entitled to take with her
property equivalent In amount to a child's share: (78) Mf she bears a living child,
she shall have half the goods left by her husband, I f  he dies first*. (79) Mf
2
she wishes to depart with her children, she shall have half the goods*.
(80) *lf the husband wishes to keep (the children)* she shall have a share of
the goods equal to a Child*s*. (81) Mf she does not bear a child, (her) father's
3
relatives shall have her goods, and the '‘morning g ift” *.
From the above provisions, It Is apparent that the birth of a child Is 
significant In the sense that as soon as a child Is bom the question of a share In 
the father's property arises.
The Laws of Hlothhere and Edrlc provide: Mf a man dies leaving a
wife and child, It Is right, that the child should accompany the mother and one
of his father's relatives who Is w illing to act, shall be given him as his guardian
4
to take care of his property, until he Is ten years old*.
1. King of Kent, A .D . 560-616.
2. 78: G if hlo cwlc beam gybyrep, healfne scaet age, g if ceorl aer swyltep*, 
F.L. Attenborough* The Laws of the Earliest English Kings, (Cambridge, 1922), 
14-15.
3. Attenborough, o p .c lt., 15. 'Morning gift* Is the present which the bridegroom 
gives to the bride on the morning after the marriage 'for granting his desire*, 
Vlnogradoff, OHJ, I, 255. Like Germanic law, a similar custom Is found
In Russian law, Ib id ., 255.
4 . Attenborough, o p .c lt., 19.
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The law of Alfred  ^ states that i f  a nun is abducted, neither she nor
any child she may bear would Inherit any property. The rule Implies that a
2
legitimate child would ordinarily Inherit the property of his father.
Canute*s doom seems to Imply that when a person died Intestate, his
son had to share the Inheritance with other heirs:
And If anyone departs this Ilf© Intestate, be It 
through his neglect, be It through sudden death; 
then let not the lord draw more from his property 
than his lawful herlot. And, according to his 
direction, let the property be distributed very 
justly to the w ife, and children, and relations;- 
to every one according to the degree that be­
longs to him. 3
The Lels Wlllhelme, 1.34 provides that the sons of an Intestate shall
4
divide the Inheritance among them equally.
The Leges HenrlcI Prim! contains an elaborate exposition of the rules
of Inheritance. The general rule Is laid down^* While the male line subsists,
5
and the Inheritance descends from that side, a woman shall not succeed*.
1. King of Wessex, A .D . 871-900.
2. A lfred, 8.1-2; Attenborough, o p .c lt., 68-9.
2. The Laws of King Cnut, 71, B. Thorpe, Ancient Laws and Institutes of
England, 2 vols., The Commissioners of the Public Records of the Kingdom, 
(1840), lp 413, 415.
4. Young, o p .c lt., 133. Also C . Gross, The Mediaeval Law of Intestacy*, 
Tn Select Essays In Anglo-American Legal History, o p .c lt., I l l ,  727. si 
quls paterfamilias casu aIIquo sine testamento oberlt, puerl Inter se heredlt- 
atem patemam equaliter dlvldant, the text Is quoted by MacCormack, op. 
c l t „  147.
5. 70, 18-23; L .J . Downer, Leges HenrlcI Prlml, (Oxford, 1972), 224-5,
The rule confirms that if  a man dies leaving a son and a daughter, the latter Ts 
postponed by the former.
Seemtngly there appears a discrepancy Tn the law when we view to­
gether the rules Tn the Canute, LeTs WTllhelme and the LegTs HenrTcT Prlml.
The last two, conforming with the Germanic laws,  ^ contemplate succession 
to the father's property, by sons alone and not by a ll children. Although the 
laws of Canute Imply a claim of the relatives and the wife along with the child­
ren, there Ts juridical suggestion that they have no precise significance In the 
2
law of Inheritance. There Is disagreement among scholars on this point,
and MacCormack would have us believe that 'the wife took a share of the
3
Inheritance together with the children or other hefrs', -  a view which runs
4
counter to the observation of Young.
The Lex Rlbuarla, 56,4 Ts supposed to be the source of  Leges
HenrlcI PrTmT, 70, 20b, and Downer opines that the author of the latter de-
5
parted from Its source. However, despite slight deviance from the Lex, the 
Laws of Henry I keep the preference of the male Issues In matters of Inheritance.
1 . 70, 20b: Et dum ulrllls sexus extlterlt et heredltas ablnde sit, femlna non 
heredltetur, Downer, Ib id ., 224; tr. 225.
2. E. Young, o p .c lt., 133. Young says: *The allusion here to the partition 
of the Inheritance Is only casual, and, . . .  cannot be accepted lite ra lly .
A partition by which the near kin shared with wife and children Is, for the 
period o fC n u ta t least, Inconceivable . . . * ,  Ib id ., 133, n .2 .
3. MacCormack, o p .c lt.,
4 . See n.2 above.
5. Downer, o p .c lt., 386.
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The earlier dooms use the word *bearn* when signifying children.^
According to MacCormack, the word 'beam* could mean children In general,
both sons and daughters. He also emphasises that the same Inference could
2
be drawn from the Lets Wlllhelme. If he Ts correct, It may be said that
the equation of daughter with son Is a feature developed from social and re li­
gious forces.^
Ernest Young Informs us that In Germanic law, the widow was never 
4
an heir to her husband. Similarly, In a male-biased family law, daughters 
were postponed by sons In the Inheritance of their father's estate. But the church 
played an egalitarian and humanistic role to mould the law of property. Thus, we
5
find that In the seventh century, a Frankish monk Marculf complains that It Is an
old but heathenish custom to deny women their share Tn the Inheritance of land.^
Through the Influence of the church, the Lex Burgundlorum also Incorporated a
rule that daughters who entered the church would receive the same share of Tn- 
7
herltance as a son. The stipulation appears to show a trend towards equality
1 . See Aethelberht, 78; Attenborough, o p .c lt., 14. Hlothhere and Eadrlc, 6 ; 
Attenborough, Ib id ., 18-19. A lfred, 8.2, Ib id ., 68-69.
2. MacCormack, o p .c lt.,
3. See In fra ,15Z
4. Young, o p .c lt., 124, n .2 .
5. Author of Formulae Marculfl, a compilation of legal decisions, see Melnhard, 
o p .c lt., 17,
6 . Stiutuma sed Tmpla consuetudo tenetur ut de terra patema sorores portlonem 
non habeant, quoted by Melnhard, o p .c lt., 17.
7. Melnhard, o p .c lt., 17-18.
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of the sexes Tn the law of Inheritance; but Tn reality, one cannot fa ll to note 
that a daughter entering the church would have no Issue and therefore, the 
share would represent a kind of dowr y  which would ultimately go to the 
church. Hence, It Is clear that the rule has no contrary bearing on the 
preferential position of the son.
Although the feudal principle of primogeniture changed the rules
of succession held by military tenure, the rules Tn respect of socage  ^ tenure
still reflected the ancient Anglo-Saxon custom by which the sons shared the 
2
estate equally, excluding the daughters. On socage land, G lanvIII says:
It shoujd, however, be known that I f  anyone 
holds free socage land and has several sons 
who must a ll be admitted equally to equal 
shares In the Inheritance, then It Is beyond 
question that the father cannot give to any 
one of them any land, whether Inherited or 
acquired I f  he has no Inherited land, beyond 
the reasonable share that would fa ll to him 
from the paternal Inheritance; but the 
father can In his lifetime give to any one 
of his sons so much of his Inherited land 
held Tn free socage as that son would take 
from the Inheritance by way of succession 
after the death of his father. 3
The survival of the old custom could be witnessed Tn the Gavelkind 
lands of Kent. The chief feature of the custom was that on Intestacy the land
1. On socage, see Megarry and Wade, o p .c lt., 19-22.
2. Young, o p .c lt., 134. A lsoT.F .T . Plucknett, Legislation of Edward I: 
The Ford Lectures Delivered In the University of Oxford Tn Hilary Term, 
1947, (Oxford, 1949), 111.
3 . L ib . V I I . 1; Hall, o p .c lt., 71b. Also Lib. V II. c .3; Hall, Ibid. 75b.
descended  ^ to a ll males of the same degree equally, Instead of to the eldest 
male. The rule Ts stated as follows In the Statute De PraerogatTva Regis, 
17Edw. 2, c.16: Mn Kent, In gavelkind a ll the heirs male shall divide the
Inheritance, and women In the same way: but women shall not share with the
* 2men .
X II. Conclusion
The preference for male heirs and the devolution of the estate equally
among them may be considered to be remnants of a system In which the male
ascendants and descendants had co-eval rights In fie family property and especl- 
3
a lly  In lands.
1. C . l.  Elton and H. J.H . Mackay, Robinson on Gavelkind: The Common Law 
of Kent, or The Customs of Gavelkind, with Additions Relating to Borough- 
English and Similar Customs, 5th ed ., (London, 1897), 89.
2. Ibidem omnes heredes mascull partlclpabunt heredltatem eorum, et similiter 
femlnae: sed femlnae non partlclpabunt cum masculls, Ib id ., 89. Plucknett 
opines that the Gavelkind was the relics of pre-Conquest England, o p .c lt., 
111. The Kentish custom Is contained In the maxim: ‘father to the bough, 
son to the plough*, Plucknett, Ib id ., I l l ;  also A Concise History of the 
Common Law, o p .c lt., 713. The maxim Ts explained: * . . .  It was part of 
the customs of Kent that I f  a tenant In fee-simple of gavelkind lands com­
mitted felony, and suffered judgment of death, he would Incur a forfeiture 
of his goods, but his gavelkind lands would not be forfeited or escheat to 
the king, or other lord of whom they were held; but the heir, notwithstand­
ing the offence of his ancestor, might enter Immediately, and enjoy the land 
by descent under the same customs and services as those by which they were 
held before . . . * ,  Elton and Mackay, Robinson on Gavelkind, lo c .c lt . ,  176*
3. Strongly suggested from the rules regarding socage land, G lanvIII, V I I . c . l ,  
supra, 157" . Also from Gavelkind, supra, 167 . In context of early
English law accepted as well as doubted by Pollock and Maitland, The History 
of English Law, 2nd ed ., II, 248, 255.
159.
In pre-Norman times land belonged to the 
family, which s till remembered and to a 
certain extent practised joint family law, 
and was either spilt up at once on the 
death of the owner among his children, 
or was allowed to remain joint In the 
hands of the senior members of the family, 
often called collaterals. 1
The discussion should be allowed to rest here and we may conclude
that early Germanic family ownership of property bears a close resemblance to
the Hindu co-ownership of father and son. Maybe, through the epochs, and
through migration, the Idea of a son's co-ordinate rights with his father In the
family property passed through different variations and mbdlflcatlons; never-
2 3theless, a German son's right of co-allenatlon, preemption, and, In re le-
4
vant cases, his right to demand a partition, as well as the Germanic limitation
5 6of a father's power In contracting debts, and their rules of testamentary and
Intestate ^ succession, are evidences enough to visualise that both the Germanic
and the Hindu systems point to a common juridical root In which the rights of a
son In his father's property were not a mere right of expectancy but much more
1 . Derrett, TLL, 193, n ,10a t239 .
2. Supra, 131.
3. Supra, 144-7.
4 . Supra, 130, t m .
5. Supra, 1*39-42..
6 . Supra, 137- 3 9 .
7. Supra, 14 7 ^ *
real right during the survival of the father J
However, when In a comparative context we use the phrase 'b irth­
right*, one fundamental difference between the two systems should not go un- 
mentloned. In the Mltaksara system, a son's right Is co-ordinate with his 
birth or, to be precise, with his conception. In the Germanic system, a 
father's admittance of the son was a v ita l factor In the emergence of the rights 
of the latter. Although In Germanic law, a father's action was subject to the 
scrutiny of the kindred, s till a father could k ill a disqualified son or repudiate 
one about whose legitimacy he was not certain. Despite these apparent dis­
similarities, In both systems the rights of adult sons In family property vls-b-vls 
their father meet on a converging plane.
1. It needs to be mentioned that our concluding observations are mainly based 
on Huebner's Grundzuge des deufschen Prlvatrechts, o p .c lt., and his obser­
vations coalesce with those of Maine In Ancient Law, but there Is no certain 
way of knowing how much Huebner was Influenced by Maine and his school. 
We should note the remark of Flcker, The suggestion therefore may be admis­
sible that at least In some cases "family ownership*, or the semblance of It , 
may really be, not the origin, but the outcome of Intestate succession*, 
Untersuchungen zur Erbenfolge, 1, 299, quoted by F. Pollock and F.W. 
Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 1968), II, 249, 
n .2 . On Flcker's opinion, Huebner shrewdly comments" 'Flcker regards 
the right In expectancy ("Wartrecht") as having been Introduced only later 
In place of an original freedom In dispositive powers, because It Is Impossible, 
In view of the great diversity of Its later development, to ascribe to the right 
In expectancy a common or primitive Germanic character; but this conclusion 
must be a "petltlo prlnclp ll" for any one who does not accept his highly a r t if i­
cial theory -  which Is certainly wholly devoid of convincing proof -  of the 
Interrelations and derivations of the various Germanic legal systems', Huebner, 
Tbld.,  305, n . 1.
CHAPTER 6 
BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS
I . Introduction
Being a link between India and Europe, topograph tea I ly and cultur­
a lly , the Near and Middle East Is one of the most interesting and noteworthy 
regions on the face of the globe. Hence, the laws of the ancient c lv lllza -
tlons which flourished In Anatolia and Mesopotamia deserve a fu ll share of
1 2 attention, not only because of their antiquity, but also because of their
contact with the Indo-Europeans who apparently entered Babylonia and
3
Assyria and established themselves as the ruling class of the HIttlte Empire.
1 . Derrett, TLL, 254. Also S .M . Paul,Studies In the Book of the Covenant 
In the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law, (Leiden, 1970), 4 .
2. E .A . Spelser points out that Mesopotamia experienced more than two millen­
nia o f legal progress before the classical civilization began, *Early Law and 
C iv iliza tion1, 31 Canadian Bar Review (1953), 863-877 at 877.
3. On the Indo-European penetration Into Hither Asia, see A .H . Sayce, The 
Early Home of Sanskrit*, Modi Memorial Volume, (Bombay, 1930), 68-72 
at 72; also ‘ Indians In Western Asia In the Fifteenth Century B .C .*, Orlen- 
ta l Studies In Honour of C.E. Parvey, (London, 1933), 399-402 at 40?I 
E .A . Spelser, *EthnIc Movements In the Near East In the Second Millennium 
B .C .*, AASOR 13 (1931-32), 13-54 at 51-2. M . GImbutas, The Indo- 
Europeans: Archaeological Problems*, Am. Anthropologist 65 (1963), 815- 
836 at 816. N . Na*aman, ‘Syria at the Transition from the Old Babylonian 
Period to the Middle Babylonian Period*, Ugarlt-Forschungen, Internationales 
Jahrbuch fOr die Altertumskunde Syrlen-Pdlestlnas, Band 6 , (Neuklrchener 
Ver Lag, Germany, 1975), 265-274, 273-4. T. Burrow^ The Early Aryans*, 
In A .L . Basham, ed ., A Cultural History of India, (Oxford, 1975), 20-29 at 
23-4 .
The resurrection of Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian and HTttlte 
civilizations is a magnificent achievement of nineteenth and twentieth cen­
tury archaeological scholarship. Like much other human knowledge, many 
aspects of ancient laws were hidden under these ruins. Therefore, It Is not 
an exaggeration to say that ‘the cradle of law Is today no longer sought In 
Rome but rather In Mesopotamia1.^
It deserves to be emphasised at the outset that the family organization
2
of the leading people of the Near East was patriarchal, and the final jural 
authority over members of the fam ily was vested only In the father. But ‘It 
differed from the Roman patrla potestas In that It did not necessarily last 
throughout his life; nor did It exclude the personal property of the members
1. S.M . Paul, Studies In the Book of the Covenant . . . , lo c .c lt ., 3 . Also, 
Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, 2nd ed+, I, I .
2. A . Skalst, The authority of the Brother at Arrapha and Nuzl*, JAOS 89 
(1969), 10-17 at 11. But note the existence of fratrla potestas at Nuzl,
Skalst, Ib id . ,  11. On this trace of NuzTan fratrlarchy, E .A . Spelser says 
that the encroachment of patriarchy managed to restrict the underlying fra trl- 
archal system *but could not entirely obliterate It*, The Wife-Sister M otif
In the Patriarchal Narratives1, In A . Altmann, ed ., Biblical and Other Studies, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 15-28 at 18. Fora criticism o f Spelser's drawing 
of parallel between Nuzl evidences and the betrothal of Rebecca In Genesis,
24, see D. Freedman, ‘A New Approach to the Nuzl Sistershlp Contract1, 
JANES 2 (1970) 2: 77-85. It Is worth mentioning that the f i l ia l relationship 
between father and son was Important and popular throughout the Near East, 
for a study In a different context, see F. Charles Fensham, ‘Father and Son 
as Terminology for Treaty and Covenant1, Near Eastern Studies In Honour of 
William Foxwell Albright, (Baltimore/London, 1971), 121-135.
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of the fam ily, especially o f the w lfe*.^
II. Babylonian Law
2
Knowledge of Babylonian laws Is derived from the so-called Maw
3
codes* of lower Mesopotamia and also from various tablets unearthed from the
1. P. Koschaker, Cuneiform Law*, Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,
(New York, 1949), IX, 215.
2. The lower part of classical Mesopotamia was known as Babylonia. Baby­
lonia was again divided Into Accad, the north and Sumer, the south, see 
Driver and Miles, The Babylonian Laws, (Oxford, 1952, rpt. 1968), I, 1. 
Babylonia Is roughly Identical with modem Iraq, see S .N . Kramer, The 
Sumerlans: Their History, Culture and Character, (Chicago, 1964), 63.
The laws of this region are generally designated as Babylonian laws, see 
Driver and Miles, BL, (1952) I, 54. Also S. Greengus, The Old Baby­
lonian Marriage Contract*, JAOS 89 (1969), 505-532 at 505. The common 
bond of these laws Is the cuneiform script and some jurists In a wider context 
like to call these as ‘Cuneiform Law*, see E .A . Spelser, ‘Cuneiform Law and 
the History of C ivilization*, Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, V o l. 107 (1963) 6 : 536-541 at 536.
3. On the typology and genre of these Codes, see Derrett, TLL, 255-6.
J. J. Flnkelsteln, *AmmIsaduqa*s Edict and the Babylonian Law Codes*, 
Journal of Cuneiform Studies, 15 (1961), 91-104 at 103-4. Also Driver 
and Miles, BL, I, 8-9. The actual and substantive application of the pro­
visions of the Codes has recently been doubted, see B.S. Jackson, ‘From 
Dharma to Law*, 23 Am.J.Comp.L. (1975), 490-511 at 493. D .J . Wiseman 
In effect has given much weight to these doubts but until further research, he 
prefers to keep the question open. The Laws of Hammurabi Again*, JSS 7
(1962), 161-172. But Rlvkah Harris In the context of the right of Inheri­
tance of the nadltu daughters In the Code of Hammurabi opines that the rules 
were actually applied In practice, The nadl tu Laws of the Code of Hammu- 
rapl In Praxis*, Orlentalla, 30 (1961), 163-9 at 168.
private archleves of that region. The most famous, although not the oldest,
3
of these Codes is the Code of Hammurabi, to which we shall turn in due course.
4
The earliest collection of laws so far discovered Is the Code of Eshnunna, bear-
5
Tng the name of King Bi la lama (c. 2268-2259 B .C .); this is at least two
1. On these private documents, see Driver and Miles, BL, I, 24. Also, R.
Harris, Ancient Slppar: A Demographic Study of an Old Babylonian C ity 
(1894-1595 B .C .), (Nederlands Hlstorlsch-Archaeologlsch lnstttuufTe 
Istanbul, 1975), Preface, x l- x l l .
2. Before sufficient archaeological discoveries, the Code of Hammurabi used to 
be considered by some scholars as the oldest body of law In the world, see
E. Lansing, The Sumerlans, (London, 1974), 115.
3. The highest chronology of Hammurabi's reign Is of Fotherlngham and langdon,
c. 2067-2025 B.C. , see Driver and Miles, BL, I, xx lv . But Smith's chrono­
logy of c . 1792-1750 Is now generally accepted, see M .B. Rowton, *The Date 
of Hammurabi*, JNES 17 (1958), 97—111 at 111; also A . Leo Oppenhelm, 
Ancient Mesopotamia, (Londor/Toronto, 1964), 154; L .L . O rlln, Assyrian 
Colonies In Cappadocla, (The Hague/Paris, 1970), 222; R. HarrlsT^n c le n t 
Slppar, lo c .c lt ., 1. For other lower chronologies, see Driver and Miles, BL, 
I, xxv ll. The King's 40th year of reign Is supposed to be the period of pro­
mulgation of the Code, see Driver and Miles, BL, I, 36.
4 . This Is a collection of Old-Accadlan Laws. The clay tablets containing the 
laws were found In a place called Tar Harmall, a small mound on the southern 
outskirts of Baghdad. Eshnunna was the capital c ity  of the district between 
Accad and Elam, see A . Goetze, The Laws of Eshnunna, AASOR 31 for 1951- 
52 (New Haven, 1956), 16. E .A . Spelser, 'Cuneiform Law and the History 
of C ivilization*, vol. 107, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,
(1963) 6 : 536-541 at 538, n .8 . Also Driver and Miles, BL, I, 6 . Archaeo- 
loglcal evidence shows that the Accadlan city of Eshnunna was In communica­
tion with the Indus Va 11 ey just before the middle of the third mlllenlum B .C ., 
P.J. Ginmulgund andV .V . Mlrashl, ed., M .M . Chltraoshastrl Felicitation 
Volume: Review of Indologlcal Research In Last 75 Years , (Poona, 1967), 297.
5. Driver and Miles, BL, I. 6 .
centuries older  ^ than the Code of Hammurabi and most likely a source of
Inspiration for the latter, into which much of It might have been Incorpor- 
2
ated.
a . The Code of Eshnunna
The Code of Eshnunna deals with sixty subjects which do not contain
anything about Inheritance or respective proprietary rights of father and son.
However, there Is one text which Is seemingly suggestive of the existence of
joint ownership of property amongst brothers. The text comes under the topic
of 'Special Rules Limiting Sales and Purchases* and runs as follows: 'I f  one
of (several) partners wishes to sell his share (In property owned by them jointly)
and his associate wants to buy It , he shall (also) pay the price for the half of
3
the other, I .e . the (third) associate'.
Two Interpretations of the text are possible: Either It deals with the 
dissolution of a company (partnership) or It Is laying down rules for alienation 
of a share of joint property. Regarding these two suppositions, although, con­
sidering the antiquity of the Code, the latter Is more probable than the former,
1. Driver and Miles, BL, I, 6 . But!R. Yaron points out that ancient Babylonian 
chronology Is not yet agreed upon by Scholars. He, however, agrees that 
the Code of Eshnunna Is older than the Code of Hammurabi, but the actual 
dates are In dispute, The Goring Ox In Near Eastern Laws', In H .H. Cohn, 
ed ., Jewish Law In Ancient and Modern Israel, (Ktav Publishing House,
New York, 1971), 50-60 at 51.
2. On specific borrowing, see J/rgen Laes^de, 'On the Fragments of the Hammu­
rabi Code*, JCS 4 (1950), 173-187 at 187. Also, see Driver and Miles, BL, 
1/ 9.
3. A . Goetze, The Laws of Eshnunna, AASQR 31 (1951-2), 105; Text, 38. 
A 111, 23-5; B 111, 7-9.
we have in fact, evidences of the existence of partnership In Babylonian law.^
2
Goetze Informs us that the expression *qabllt santm mullum* l i t .  *to f i l l  ( I.e .
3
pay In fu ll for) the middle (part) of the other one* creates d ifficu lty  In e lic it­
ing Its technical legal meaning. The three persons who could be seemingly
Involved In such a transaction /are called atjju . The noun athu litera lly means
4
*persons who are mutual brothers*, which could be a clue to the Interpretation
of the text* In fact, Yaron opines that the text stands for a rule denoting the
5
right of preemption of the brother. He renders the text as follows: ‘ If one 
of the brothers w ill sell his share, and his brother wants to buy, he shall pay 
In fu ll the average (price) o f another*.^
However, even If  It Is accepted that there was In  Eshnunna , an 
Institution like the consortium ^ of Roman brothers, that could have no direct
1. Note the difference between Babylonian partnership, (socletas unlus re!) 
and partnership In English Law, Gftver and Miles, BL, I, 187. In Assyrian 
documents, there are mentions of sellers In the plural. This common owner­
ship of property may be held to fa ll under partnership, see C .H .W . Johns, 
Assyrian Deeds and Documents, (Cambridge, 1901), III, 318. Joint owner- 
shlp or partnership was also found at Slppar, see R. Harris, Ancient Slppar, 
o p .c lt., 364.
2. Goetze, loc^c lt., 107.
3. Goetze, Ib id ., 107.
4. Goetze, Ib id ., 107, n . l .
5. R. Yaron, The Laws of Eshnunna, (Jerusalem, 1969), 152.
6 . R. Yaron, Ib id ., 41. For a discussion of the text, see Ib id ., 149-152.
7. G a l.I I I .  154a. On this see, G . DIosdl, Ownership In Ancient and Pre-
classlcal Roman Law, (Budapest, 1970), 44.
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bearing on our present study except by proving that multiple ownership of pro­
perty was not unknown to the area for which the law was applicable.
b. The Sumerian Codes
The excavations In the sands of Sumer have unearthed Codes far older
1 2 than the Code of Hammurabi, and there are opinions that promulgation of
laws by Sumerian kings became a common phenomenon by c.2400 B.C. and,
3
probably, even considerably earlier.
The first Sumerian legal compilation worth mentioning Is that of
4
Ur-Nammu whose reign began about c . 2050 B.C. The fragments of the
5
Laws of Ur-Nammu, as available to us, keep us In the dark regarding the 
respective rights of father and son In the Sumerian fam ily. But two hundred 
years later, another king of Ism, Llplt-lshtar (c. 2217-2207 B .C .), ^
1. E. Lansing, The Sumerlans, (London, 1974), 115. Driver and Miles, BL, 
I, 12. On possible contact between the Sumerlans and the Indus Valley 
c iv ilization, see P.J. Chlnmulgund and V .V . Mlrashl, ed ., M .M . 
Chltraoshastrl Felicitation Volume, o p .c lt., 298,
2. SeeS.N . Kramer, The Sumerlans: Their History, Culture and Character, 
(Chicago, 1964), 83T
3. Kramer, Ib id ., 83. Driver and Miles, BL, I, 5.
4 . The third dynasty of Ur reigned between c. 2465 -  2347. C. Edwards, 
The Hammurabi Code and the Slnaltlc Legislation, (London, 1921), 129. 
The lower chronology Is c . 2408-2301 or c. 2298-2180 B .C . Driver and 
Miles, BL, I, 12.
5. For text, translation and comments, see S .N . Kramer, ‘Ur-Nammu Law 
Code1, Orlentalla, 23 (1954) 40-48. J .J . Flnkelstetn, The Laws of Ur- 
Nammu *7 JC^S_22"XT968-9), 68-82.
6 . Driver and Miles, BL, I, 12.
promulgated a more formal Code  ^ which contained some provisions apparently 
Important to our purpose.
The king claims In the prologue:
I, L lp lt- Ishtar . .  .procured . . .  the freedom 
of the sons and daughters of Nippur, the 
sons and daughters of Ur, the sons and 
daughters of Ism, the sons and daughters 
of Sumer and Akkad upon whom . . .  slave- 
ship . . .  had been Imposed. Verily , In 
accordance with . . . ,  I made the father 
support his children, (and) I made the 
children support the father . . .  2
The prologue Implies (notwithstanding the hyperbole of freeing from slavery)
that the pre-Code state of Sumerian society was remarkable for Its lack of
recognised fil ia l duties, since the father was not obliged to maintain his
3
children nor the children their aged parents. In such a system, the search 
for the existence of a son's Innate right In the property of the father Is fu tile .
However, the Code Indicates that, unless not Intended by the father,
1. The Laws of L lp lt Ishtar are set out In translation by Kramer, The Sumerlans, 
lo c .c lt ., Appx.8 , pp.336-340. Also succinctly by Driver and Miles, BL, 
1|, 306-7. Also see F.R. Steele, The Llplt-lshtar Law Code*, Am .J.Arch. 
51 (1947) 158-164.
2. Kramer, Ib id ., 336-7. Although considerable part of the prologue In L lp lt— 
lshtar*s Code Is Identical with the prologue In the Code of Hammurabi, this 
part of Llplt-lshtar*s prologue Is not seen In the latter, see Driver and Miles, 
BL, II, 7-13.
3. Cp. Hindu view, Sat. Br. 12 .2 .3 .4 ; Dh.K.1163a: tasmat purtora vayase . . .  
Infra,401^4. In Athens before a son acquired the right to be maintained, 
he had to be admitted to the family by his father. The acceptance of the 
child to the family depended on the absolute discretion of the father,
A.IR.W. Harrison, The Law of Athens, o p .c lt., 70-1.
169.
the legitimate sons were the primary heirs of their father's property.^ A son
procreated through a slave girl could also claim a share In the estate I f  his
2
putative father took the slave as a titu lar wife while his wife was dying.
But ownership of property In Sumerian law was not confined only to males;
the law also allowed women to own property. In this respect, a partial trans-
3
latlon of a Sumerian d ltllla  as presented by Elizabeth Lancing runs like this:
Innashagga, wife of Dudu . . .  bought a . . .  
house . . .  with her own money. As long as 
Dudu lived, Ur-Enlnnu, the son of Dudu, 
had possession of his house. Since Inna­
shagga had bought the house, he (Ur-Enlnnu) 
had the tablet recording the purchase of the 
house, made over to him by Innashagga.
Innashagga took the oath that she bought 
the house with her own money and not 
with (that) of Dudu . . .  Therefore . . .  
the house (was) confirmed as belonging 
to Innashagga, the wife of Dudu . . .  The 
heirs swore by the name of their king that ^ 
they would not change their mother's word.
1. Laws of Llplt-lshtar, N o.31, Kramer, The Sumerlans, o p .c lt., 339. This
was the general purport of Sumerian laws, see S. Langdon, The Sumerian
Law Code compared with the Code of Hammurabi*, JRAS (1920) 489-515 
at 504-6. A IsoC . Edwards, The Hammurabi Code . . . ,  (London, 1921), 
129-132.
2. F.R. Steele, The Llplt-lshtar Law Code', Am .J. Arch. 51 (1947) 158-164.
3. Over three hundred court records and court notarizations of agreements or 
contracts have been excavated, mostly at Lagash (now called Telloh).
The general term for these court records as designated by ancient scribes Is 
d ltllla  (completed judgement), see Kramer, Ib id ., 85. Driver and Miles, 
B U 7  23. This could be regarded as the beginning of the history of law 
reporting.
4 . E. Lancing, The Sumerlans, o p .c lt., 125. The document was signed by the
mashklm (a kind of court clerk or ba iliff) and three judges, Ib id ., 124-5.
This shows that the Sumerian system allowed property ownership to 
both male and female; and, Indeed^ there is no reason for us to expect a legal 
norm identical to that of the Romans, Greeks, Celts or Hindus from people who 
were speakers of an agglutinative language unrelated to the Inflected Indo- 
European tongue.^
c. The Code of Hammurabi
There were no natural boundaries between Accad and Sumer, and the
Sumerlans at the zenith of their power seem to have overrun the greater part of
Accad, and many Sumerlans must have settled In Accad, just as many Semites
2
from the earliest times were settled In Sumer. Thus, the two races came Into 
close contact and each was bound to leave Its mark on the culture and legal
3 Tv
system of the other. Politica lly, towards the end of the third mlllenJTum
B.C. the centre of Importance continually shifted from one to another city
state In the region; but a ll,  whether Sumerian or Semite, ultimately accepted
4
the supremacy of Babylon when the First Dynasty (c. 2169-1870 B.C.) of 
Babylon was established.
1. In this respect, the Sumerian language differed from the Semitic family of 
languages as w ell, see Kramer, the Sumerlans, o p .c lt., 298. Fora recent 
study on this question, see Istvan Fodor, ‘Are the Sumerlans and the Hungar­
ians or the Urallc Peoples Related?1, Current Anthropology, 17 (1976) 1: 
115-118.
2. See G . Roux, ‘Ancient Iraq*, In T. Jones, ed ., The Sumerian Problem, 
(London, 1969), 135.
3. Driver and Miles, BL, 1, 2.
4 . Driver and Miles, BL, I, 3 .
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Hammurabi, one of the seven kings of this dynasty, who brought 
the whole of Babylonia under his rule In the th irty-first year of his reign, 
promulgated his famous Code most probably In his 40th regnal year, as we 
have stated earlier.^
Since Its discovery the Code has engaged the minds of scholars,
who have studied It from different angles and have found parallels, real or
simulated, between most of the ancient Codes and that of Hammurabi. Such
2
parallels between Manu and Hammurabi have been noted by Saletore, and 
3
MotwanI has enthusiastically put forward the suggestion that Hammurabi
4
drew upon the dharmasastra In preparing his Code.
Whatever might be the claims of these scholars there Is no ground to 
suppose that In Babylonian law a son had a birthright, as the term Is used In the 
Mltaksara sense, In the property of his father; and, In the course of their sur­
vey. of co-ownership of father and son In the Hindu (Mltaksara) system, Driver
1. Supra, \(o 4,
2. B .A . Saletore, Ancient Indian Political Thoughts and Institutions (London, 
1963), 151-175. Excepting a passing reference of domestic relations at 161 
the work has no relevance to our present purpose. An earlier unsatisfactory
attempt, !R.S. Valdyanatha Ayyar, Manu*s Land and Trade laws (Their Sumerian 
Origin and Evolution up to the Beginning of the Christian Era), (Madras, 1927), 
3 H 6 ;
3. K. MotwanI, Manu Pharma Sastra, (Madras, 1958), 283.
4 . The views of Saletore and MotwanI have recently been evaluated and by 
examining the theory of kingship In the two Codes, the claims of both have 
been eroded by E . Burke In low, *Manu and Hammurabi -  A Study In Legal 
Theory*, Journal of Indian History, Golden Jubilee Volume, (University of 
Kerala, Trivandrum, 1973), 97-107.
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and Miles correctly say that ‘ l it t le , however, is known of Babylonian law on 
this subject*.  ^ Nevertheless, they put forward the view that ‘probably the 
sons succeeded originally by survivorship as being co-owners with the head of 
the family but, when Individual ownership became the rule and the head of the 
family had acquired some of the rights of an owner, they succeeded as his heirs*. 
If this were not based on supposition, It would have been a happy parallel with 
the Mltaksara system; but no document discovered so far directly supports Its 
substance.
In the earlier epoch In Babylonia sons, unless formally disinherited, 
succeeded to their father*s property and a predeceased son*s male Issue repre­
sented their father and shared the property per stirpes with their surviving 
3
uncles. It was a peculiarity of Southern Babylonia that the eldest son .
4
was entitled to an additional share but the Code of Hammurabi does not have 
any such provision.
5
We notice In the Code of Hammurabi, that daughters who were
1 . Driver and Miles, BL, 1,328.
2. Driver and Miles, BL, I, 331.
3. Driver and Miles, BL, I, 331.
4 . This was also the rule In Middle Assyrian and Subarean law, P. Koschaker, 
•Cuneiform Law*, En.Soc.Sc., IX, 216. There are references In the smrtls 
fo this effect, Gautama, 28, 6 , 9; but It was not approved by the sastra,
Apastamba, 2, 14, 10-11, Dh.K . 1166a; for a fu ller discussion, see Infra, 
380-^-^-P* Jewish Law, Deut. 21: 15-17.
5. CH, f l8 0 , t l8 1 , Driver and Miles, BL, II, 73.
priestesses received a fu ll share or In some cases, a third share of the paternal
estate which reverted to their brothers on their death. Certain documents from
the first dynasty of Babylon allow daughters In general to share In the Inheritance 
2with sons, but Driver and Miles think that such daughters (neither married nor
3
priestesses) probably used to get only a life interest. So the general rule was
4
that daughters Inherited In default of sons; but again, a son was easily ava il-
5
able by means of slave wives or by adoption.
According to the Laws of Hammurabi, a widow also got a share in the 
Inheritance i f  her husband did not make her a settlement,^ but at her death or 
remarriage, the property reverted to her sons.
So the general impression of the Code is this, that although the widow 
or daughters, in certain circumstances, could have a share of the inheritance 
with life interest in i t ,  the estate was actually vested ^  in the sons. With this 
formidable position of the son in respect of his father's property, we can link the
A
1. Rivkah Harris disapproves the ude of the term 'priestess* fn this context. She
thinks the term 'priestess* Is a fallacious description of the naditu, The naditu
laws of the Code of Hammurabi in praxis', O r. 30 (1961) 163, n .3 . On these 
*women of religion*, see Driver and Miles, BL, I, 358-383; IR. Harris, Ancient 
Slppar, o p .c lt., 302-332. Cp. devadasis in South India, Derrett, IMHL,
163, 200. Also vestal virgins in Rome; on vestal virgins, see W.R. Halliday, 
Lectures on the History of Roman Religion: from Numa to Augustus, (L iverpool 
London, 1922), 54.
2. Driver and Miles, BL, I, 337.
3. Driver and Miles, ib id ., 338.
4 . Driver and Miles, ib id ., 341.
5. Driver and Miles, ib id ., 341.
6 . CH, 172; Driver and Miles, BL, I, 334; Bt, II, 67.
7. Driver and Miles, BL, II, 334.
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1
rules as to the disherison of a son by his father. The Code Implies that disheri­
son of a son was a matter not exclusively dependent on the w ill of the father.
To disinherit bis son, a father had to go before a court and announce his Inten­
tion and I f  the judges found that the son had not committed an offence entailing
2disherison, the father could not disinherit him. Indeed, It seems that the law
3
discountenanced disherison, a fact which was established from the provision 
that >even though a son deserved the heavy penalty of disherison, for a first 
offence, the judges *sha 11 pardon hlm*.^
However, I f  the committing of a second offence Is established, only
then could the son be disinherited. The foregoing provisions only Imply that
In Babylonia sons had a definite contingent right In the property of their father,
though not necessarily co-ordinate with b irth , and probably this provision, above
a ll,  Indirectly led Driver and Miles to put forward the suggestion that In Babylonia
5
originally sons succeeded by survivorship as being co-owners with their father.
1 . CH * 168, BL, II, 65; BL, I, 348.
2. CH $ 168. In Aliens a father could expel a son from the house and this
possibly meant a disherison of the son, A .R .W . Harrison, The Law of Athens, 
(Oxford, 1968), 74. But Plato required the charge to be brought before a 
family council, Laws, X I, 929b. In Roman law, a testator was obliged to 
disinherit each heir (suus heres) by name, see T .C . SandaPs, The Institutes
of Justinian, (London, 1956), In trod., llv ; for a discussion, see supra, ‘5$-40. 
Cp. Hindu law, Jagannatha's view on Gautama, M lta , I, 1, 23. Jagannatha 
states that I f  a father Intends to exclude a son from his share on the ground of
f i l ia l love or animosity, a father's decision Is not fina l unless he proves the
grounds for such exclusion In the presence of the king or a public assembly,
H.T. Colebrooke, A  Digest of Hindu Law, (London, 1801), III, 2.
3 . CH £169, Driver and Miles, BL, II, 65; BL, I, 348.
4 . CH f  169, Driver and Miles, BL, II, 65.
5. Driver and Miles, BL, I, 331.
d. Tablet's from STppar
The laws of the First Dynasty of Babylon and particularly, the Code 
of Hammurabi, could be taken as an Integrated and unified legal system operat­
ing throughout the territories under the sway of the kings of Babylon. But amidst 
this apparent unity, recently deciphered texts, to which Driver and Miles have 
referred In passing,  ^ are bringing to light diversities which are In no way less 
Important than the Code of Hammurabi In understanding the ancient Babylonian 
lega I system.
One such Important study, of ancient Slppar, Is by Rlvkah Harris, In
2
which she delineates the legal system of Slppar for three hundred years (c.1894-
3
1595 B .C .), which coincide with the reign of the First Dynasty of Babylon.
Although a short-lived and ephemeral control over Slppar can be
k traaed back to the reign of Sammuabum (c. 1894 -  1881 B .C .), the first ruler
4
of the First Dynasty of Babylon, effective Babylonian domination over the city
1. See Driver and Miles, BL, I, 359.
2. R. Harris, Ancient Slppar: A Demographic Study of an Old Babylonian City
(1894 -  1595 B .C .), (Nederlands Hlstorlsch-Archaeologlsch InstltuutTe 
Istanbul, 1975 ) . The study Is based on the tablets found In the ruins of an 
Institution called the walled ‘Close*, connected with the famous *Whlte 
Temple* of the city god, Samas. The daughters of wealthy families and evei 
the daughters of the kings of Babylon passed their lives Inside the ‘Close*.
Because of their wealth and business Investment, they had considerable In flu ­
ence over the economy of Babylon. The women were called nadlturn Accadlan =
*one who Is left fallow*, Harris, Ib id ., Preface, X II; 302-33?! Also Driver 
and Miles, BL, I, 358-383.
3 . See the chronology of Smith, Driver and Miles, BI„ I, xx lv -v .
4 . Harris, Ib id ., 1.
started only in c . 1838 B .C ., and reached its highest point under Hammurabi, 
the “organizer of Slppar*.^
In line with the Code of Hammurabi, the family In Old Babylonian
2
Slppar was a nucleated unit consisting of husband, wife and their children.
The kinship terms used In Slppar tablets Imply that In certain cases brothers
used to live jo in tly , but there Is no evidence of |olnt living beyond two gener-
3
atlons. It Is significant to note that only on rare occasions Is the name of
4
the grandfather Included In legal texts.
Some texts reveal that children were to revere their parents and
5
normally a man“s primary heirs were his sons. Before dividing the patrimony, 
the heirs were obliged to pay their fathers debt,^ and they were also respon­
sible for performing the feudal duties (watch and corvee) attached to the pater-
7 8nal estate. So It was a universal succession to a ll the assets and liabilities
1. Harris, Ib id ., 7.
2 . Harris, Ib id ., 352.
3 . So far there Is trace of only one family of three generations In Slppar, see
the genealogy of the family of Aksaja, R. Harris, “Notes on the Babylonian
Cloister and Hearth*, O r. 38 (1969) 133-145 at 138.
4 . Harris, Ancient Slppar, o p .c lt., 351.
5 . Ib id ., 361. See another text to this effect, R. Harris, “Biographical Notes 
on the Naditu Women of Slppar*, 16 JCS (1962), 1-12 at 2.
6 . Harris, Ancient Slppar, o p .c lt., 361.
7 . Harris, ib id ., 361.
8 . Cp. Roman Law, Haeredltas est successlo In unlversum |us quod defunctus 
habult, Maine, Ancient Law, (1930), 203.
of the deceased.
The law probably did not need any conceptualisation of property
as between movable and Immovable,^ but the Inheritance used to be divided 
2
“from chaff to gold*, or from the least to the most valuable.
i
■ Unlike the practice In South Mesopotamia, as In Nippur and Ur where
| 3
! the eldest son was entitled to a preferential share, the Slppar texts Indicate
i
and support the Implication of the Code of Hammurabi, that the estate Is shared 
equally by the brothers.
In this connection, I t  Is Indeed worth mentioning that nadltu daughters
used to receive a share along with their brothers, which coincides with the pro'
5visions In Hammurabl“s Code. On the entitlement to a share by daughters
1. This contradicts the universal legal distinction of property made by Gluckman.
He states that “both developed and under-developed legal systems distinguish 
sharply between Immovable and movable property*, M* Gluckman, The Ideas 
In Barotse Jurisprudence, (New Haven/London, 1965), 113. Gluckman“s 
categorisation Is also weakened by Kapauku Papuan laws where a deceased 
person“s property Is Itemised rather than strictly categorised Into two broad 
types, see L. PosplslI, “A Formal Analysis of Substantive Law: Kapauku Papuan 
Laws of Inheritance*, Am .An., V o l.67, N o .6 (1965)^ Pt .2, 166-185 at 169- 
73. In Hindu law the distinction between movable and Immovable was Import­
ant, see M lta , 1.1.27 but sometimes slaves were as Important as Immovables, 
(which they worked), Vyasa, Dh.K.1587, tnfira,340/».'3* In Roman law, res
manclpl Included oxen, horses, and slaves, besides land. These overlappings
were, however, noticed by Gluckman, Ib id», 113.
2. This description Is used In a division of estate of a kulmasltum, a well-known 
type of priestess, between her brothers, see A . Goetze, “Old Babylonian Docu­
ments from Slppar In the Collection of the Catholic University of America*,
JCS 11 (1957) 15-40, contract N o .1:5 at 15.
3. See supra, 172 ,
4 . Harris, Ib id ., 368.
5. CH *$180-2.
who are not nadttus, the texts are not unanimous, but these leave the general 
Impression that daughters who did not belong to a special class, apparently 
Inherited only a small portion of the estate.^
However, there Is no reason to believe that ownership of property In
Slppar was restricted only to males. Besides the nadltus, women could possess
extensive property rights and a married woman might own property to which her
husband had no claim, and which she could dispose of at her w il l .  It was not
even uncommon for husband or wife to buy or sell, make or receive, a g ift of
2
property from each other.
Parallel to Individual ownership, property was not Infrequently owned 
jo in tly  by any combination of members of the family, as exemplified In the con­
tracts of sale where a specific property could be jo in tly sold by brother, sisters; 
sisters (usually nadltus) and brothers; mothers, sons and daughters; nadltus and
o
their fathers; and, significantly, father and sons.
The Slppar tablets also reveal that a paternal estate (bft ablm) could
4
be redeemed by a member of the family at a later date.
In the light of the Code of Hammurabi, Driver and Miles opine that
1. Harris, Ib id ., 369.
2. R. Harris, Ancient Slppar, o p .c lt., 367, 369.
3 . Harris, Ib id ., 364. For property sold jo in tly  by father and son, see Cunei­
form texts from Babylonian tablets In the British Museum, 8 31c cited by
Harris, Ib id ., 364, n.94.
4 . Harris, Ib id ., 366. Also cp. the discussion on preemption, In fra ,689-713*
*the Babylonians did not recognize the "dead hand" of a testator . . . * ,   ^ but
the Slppar tablets qualify the general purport of this statement. It Ts Indeed
correct to say that the Babylonians manipulated the Institution of adoption for
a variety of purposes, and particularly, as a means of testamentary disposition,
but the purport of the Slppar tablets Indicates that a bequest, although rare,
was not altogether unknown. There Is evidence that a wife was allowed to
2
bequeath three slaves which she received as a g ift from her husband. Also, 
from an extant law suit, It Is apparent that a brother and two sisters of a pro­
positus unsuccessfully claimed the property which s he had bequeathed (ezebu) 
to his wife
e. Conclusion
The above discussion shows that the property rdglme In Babylonia was 
not based exclusively on a collective family entity, nor was It purely Individual 
Istlc either; rather It was a conglomeration of the two, possibly reflecting a 
transitional stage from the former to the latter.
1. Driver and Miles, BL, I, 270.
2. Harris, Ancient Slppar, o p .c lt., 370. This could be an analogous Instru­
ment as In the Code of Hammurabi, f  150. But In the CH there Is a re­
striction on the power of the wife that she should leave the property to one 
of her favourite children. This Is seemingly the underlying purport of the 
Slppar tablet, but It Is not expressly stated, see Harris, Ib id ., 370. How­
ever, there was a tablet In Slppar Identical with CH f  150. Harris, Ibid 
370. Similar Instruments were also found In Elam, Infra,(84-
3. Harris, Ib id ., 370.
I l l . Laws of the Amorltes of Old Babylonian Mari
The legal system of the Amorttes  ^ of Old Babylonian Mart deserves
a quick glance. Marl was one of the principal centres of Mesopotamia during
2
the third and the early second mlllenlum B.C.
The Marl archives reflect the customs and Institutions of a ‘dimorphic
3
society*, based on the nomadic and sedentary social morphemes of the West
Semitic tribes, and help In our understanding of the gradual process of Israelite
4
settlement In Canaan.
The social system of the West Semi tics at Marl was patriarchal and
the family was the basic unit of tribal organisation. The head of the family
5
was called *the father of the household* (abu bltlm ). Individual ownership
1 . The Amorltes (West Semitic) belonged to the same stock as the Hebrews, see
A . Malamat, *Mar!*, Encyclopaedia Judalca, 1971, VoI.11, C o l.972-989; 
rpt. In A . Malamat ed ., Marl and the Bible, (Jerusalem, 1973), 1-11 at 4 .
2. The archaeological evidences show that Marl was founded at the end of the 
fourth millennium B.C. It was situated at Tell Hariri at present some 1.5 
miles (2.5 km.) west of the Euphrates near Abu Kemal, around 15 miles 
(25 km.) north of the modern Syrlan-lraql border, A . Malamat, ib id ., 1.
For more Information on this see, I .J .  Gelb, The Early History of the West 
Semitic Peoples*, JCS 15 (1961), 27-47.
3. M . Rowton, The Physical Environment and the Problem of the Nomads*, XV 
Recontre Assyrlologlque Internationale, Liege, 1966, La Civilisation de Marl, 
ed ., J.R. Kupper, (Paris, 1967), 109-121 at 114; also Rowton, 'Autonomy 
and Nomadism In Western Asia*, Orlentalla 42 (1973), 247-258 at 254-5 .
4 . A . Malamat, lo c .c lt . ,  5-6.
5. A . Malamat, Ib id ., 6 . Cp. Bible, *By their families by their father*s houses*, 
N u .1 .2 . Babyl. Talmud, Bava Batra, 109b, cited by Horowitz, The Spirit of 
Jewish Law, (New York, 1953), 260.
of land was unknown. Land was always considered as ‘patrimony* (nthlatum
at Mari = Hebrew nahala)  ^ which was theoretically inalienable and could pass
2
only by inheritance, thus implying secured and transmissible rights of the
3
heirs over It . However, like the Hurrlans of Nuzl, the West Semltlcs of
Marl Invented a fiction for circumventing the rule against alienation of land.
The legal documents from Marl show that Instead of using the term sale, the
Amorltes of Marl used the term nahalum = *to Inherit or apportion* to effect
4
transfer of land within the framework of quasi-familial Inheritance.
Thus, the Inalienability o f land (patrimony), although seemingly 
theoretical at M arl, was Indeed a socially viable rubric denoting definite 
expectancy of a son In the property of his male ancestors.
IV . E lam
a. Historical background
5
At the beginning of History, Sumer was dominated by the Elamites 
and Sumerlans, but eventually the Elamites were driven out of Sumer and they
1. A . Malamat, Ib id ., 7.
2. Cp. similar suggestions of Inalienability o f land, Nu.36.7; Lev.25.13, 
25.28. Hindu, sthavare vlkrayo nastl . . . , D h.K . 1589by rn fr*-, '34'5, n*3.
3 . See the device of *sale adoption at N uzl.
4 . A . Malamat, lo c .c lt . ,  7.
5. The Elamites were a non-Semltlc people who used to speak an agglutlmatlve 
tongue having no known ancient relative and assuredly no modern descend­
ants, En. Br. (1970), V III, 107.
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ceased to play any part in the Babylonian c iv iliza tion .  ^ The eventual grand­
eur of Babylon completely overshadowed the Elamites who carried on living on
2
the eastern flank of the Mesopotamian plain, but they maintained an outstand-
3
Ing culture and history spanning two thousand years. Despite Its propinquity
4
to Babylonia and Its ‘Mesopotamlzation*, Elam can claim some Independent
5
contribution In the field of ancient legal systems of the Middle East,
b . The Elamlte law of succession
In Elamite law, inheritance was not agnatic. Sons had no special 
preference over daughters; rather, the latter were in a better position than the 
sons. Hlnz suggests ^ that during the third and fourth millennia, brothers were 
preferred at the expense of their sisters, but gradually this gave way to confine
1 . Driver and Miles, BL, 1 ,1 .
2. Elam corresponds to modern Iranian province of Khuzistan in South-western 
Persia. The capital of Elam was Susa. Biblical references of Elam could 
be found in Gen. 10: 21-2; 14:1; Daniel, 8:2; Acts of the Apostles, 2:9.
3 . During 2 lst century B.C. Ur controlled much of Elam, but Elam became inde­
pendent In c . 2030 B.C. Ashurbanlpal invaded Elam and sacked Susa in c. 
640 B.C. From the rise of the Persian Empire in c . 550 B .C ., Elam was 
merely a satrappy, En. Br. (1970) V III, 106-7.
4 . A . Leo Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia, (Chicago/London, 1964), 69.
5. On the archaeological expeditions to Susa, see Walther Hinz, The Lost World 
o f Elam: Recreation of a Vanished C iv iliza tion, (Verlag W. Kohl hammer 
GmbH, West Germany, 1964), tr . Jennifer Barnes, (London, 1972), in trod., 
14-5.
6 . HTnz, Jhe Lost World of Elam, o p .c lt., 108.
rights of Inheritance within the Immediate family of the propositus and, from 
then on, sons and daughters had equal rights of Inheritance.^ But even this 
rule could be varied by the owner by a deed of apportionment or a w il l .
A father's power to distribute the Inheritance according to his w ill
was well-accepted. One of the contract tablets records a dying father's
apportionment of property to his son and daughter In equal shares, and It Is
2
significant to note that he names his daughter before his son, (perhaps that
was the point of such testament-contracts). Another tablet reveals that an
Elamite left a ll his property to awlfe with a life Interest, with the stipulation
that on her death 'only those sons may Inherit who have treated their mother
3
with love and consideration*.
1. H lnz., Ib id ., 108.
2. Hlnz, Ib id ., 109.
3. Hlnz, Ib id ., 109. The purport of another Instrument from the time of the 
Grand Regent Atta-Merra-halkl (c. 1580-1570 B.C.) was also the same,
Hlnz, Ib id ., 110. The Instruments are Identical with CH 150. Similar 
documents were found In Egypt (c. 1800 B .C .), see J .J . Rablnowltz,
Jewish Law: Its Influence on the Development of Legal Institutions, (New 
York, 1956), 18. The common factor In a ll these documents Is that the wife 
Is to have a life estate In the property together with a limited power of ap­
pointment of the remainder after her death to the one of her sons whom she 
loves best. This restrictive clause of giving the property only to a son Is 
called as the asar taramu clause. The clause originally used to be Inserted 
only In a g ift of property by husband to w ife , ramu = 'to love*, but In course 
of time, ramu acquired the meaning 'to desire* and the clause came to be used 
generally In deeds of conveyance of property, and to mean an unlimited power 
to dispose of the property. In a Susa document, the donee Is given the general 
power to dispose of, see Rablnowltz, Ib id ., 19, n .5 . Another document to 
the same effect Is found In the Aramaic papyri, Rablnowltz, Ib id ., 19, n .6 . 
Also see a Slppar document to this effect, supra y|7 9  . This shows a gradual
development towards Individual's Independence In dealing with property.
Cp. Aristotelian definition of ownership: To have ownership of a thing Is to 
be able to alienate It or not; by alienation I mean g ift or sale', Rhet.l .5 .7 . 
Rablnowltz claims that Aristotle's definition was anticipated by the scribes of
/Continued on next page:
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A tablet shows that In a w il l ,  a testator left his property to his
daughter although he had two wives and several sons.^ .The text of the w ill
reads as follows: 'As long as I am s till a live , she (the daughter) w ill care for
2
me, and, when I die, she shall bring sacrifices for the dead1. The w ill Ts 
signed In the presence of sixteen witnesses and the punishment to befa ll, for 
those relatives who might dare to defy the provisions of the Instrument, Is both 
human and divine. The testament shows that ancestral worship was practised In 
Elam but, as Is evident, the son had no preferential position, as among the 
Greeks, Romans and Hindus, to offer sacral rites to the ancestors. The ev i­
dence of ownership of property by women and their Independence In dealing 
with property are also vindicated by a tablet which records a father's g ift of
a field to his daughter. Subsequently, the daughter made a bequest of the
3
field to her daughter, and she to hers, who then sold I t .
Note 3 -  p. 183 -  continued:
Yeb; a deed of conveyance, c.402 B.C. corresponds to the Aristotelian defi­
nition o f ownership, Brooklyn 12, E .G . Kraellng, The Brooklyn Museum Ara­
maic Papyri, (Yale University Press, 1953), cited by Rablnowltz, Ib id ., 2 l .
Cp. Danlelr  4.14; 'and glveth It to whomsoever he w i l l ' .  Rablnowltz tries
to establish the peregrination of a legal formula 'from the Susa documents, 
through the Aramaic papyri, to Aristotle and the Book of Daniel*, Ib id ., 23. 
In the light of the Aristotelian definition of ownership, Cp. a Hindu father's 
ownership and pover of alienation, M lta, 1.1.21; 1.1.27 and 1.5.10, see 
In fra ,5 (7 -29  . Also cp. Yathesta-vlnTyogarhatva lakganasya svatvasya,
Da.bha, 2 .27. For a discusslont  Infra, 5*4 8 -
1. Hlnz, Ib id ., 110.
2. Hlnz, Ib id ., 110.
3 . ihtilv 109*
Elamite history was unique in the area Tn the sense that matriarchal
succession was the rule for the throne. A new ruler was always 'son of a
sister*,^ which means that the ruling house of Elam propagated itself through 
2
the distaff side. This royal practice might have been a contributory Influ­
ence to the Elamite law of succession, which obviously betrays a female bias 
showing a contrast to the devolution of property under the Mltaksara system.
V . The HTttTte Law
In 1902, the Norwegian scholar, J .A . Knudtzon's claim to the dis­
covery of a new Indo-European language Tn Central Anatolia aroused nothing
3
but In itia l scepticism among scholars, but the subsequent discoveries confirmed 
4
his findings, and It became generally accepted that the HTttites were a sepa-
5
rate Indo-European group; thereby, their family law Is bound to be of interest 
to our present study.
1. En. Br. (1970), V III, 106.
2. Hlnz, Ib id ., 109.
3. J .G . Macqueen, T he HittTtes and Their Contemporaries in Asia Minor, 
(London^ 1975), TT.
4. Macqueen, ib id ., 23.
5. A .H . Sayce, The H ittlte Language of Boghaz Keui', JRAS (1920) 49-83;
The Early Home of Sanskrit', Modi Memorial Volume^ (Bombay, 1930), 68-  
72 at 72; also for the existence of close relationship between the HTttTte 
Empire and the proto-Indian people, see 'Indians Tn West Asia Tn the Fif­
teenth Century B .C .*, Oriental Studies In Honour of C.E. Ftarvey, (London, 
1933), 399-402 at 402. M . Gimbutas, The Indo-Europeans: Archaeological 
Problems', Am .A n .65 (1963), 815-836 at 816. On HTttTte relation with the 
West, see E .A . Spelser, 'Cuneiform Law and the History of C ivilization*,
/Continued on next page:
The old H lttlte kingdom was founded In c . 1750 B .C .,  ^ but the
2
Code belongs to the period before the great conquests (the battle of Kades
3
c . 1290 B.C .) when the kingdom was confined to Asia Minor. It Is worth
mentioning here that there were some non-lndo-European elements In the
H lttlte  language, and It Is possible that the Hlttltes formed an ethnic stratum
4 5superimposed on a Hurrlan substratum. The strong Hurrlan Influence marked 
In the historical texts from the royal archives at Huttusha betrays a Hurro-
Note 5 -  p. 185 -  continued:
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, V o l.107, N o .6
(1963), 536-541 a t5 4 l,  n .2 1 .
1. L .L . O rlln , Assyrian Colonies In Cappadocta, (The Hague/Paris, 1970), 233.
2. The Code was found In the excavation at Boghazkdy In Central Anatolia, 
ninety miles east of Ankara In 1906 and 1907, J .M . Powls Smith, The Origin 
and History o f Hebrew Law, (Chicago, 1960) ,^' 246-7. For details of Bogh- 
zkdy excavations, see L .L . O rlln , Assyrian Colonies In Cappadocla, op. 
c l t . ,  217-220; also U.B. A lklm , Anatolia, I, tr. J. Hogarth, (Geneva/ 
Paris/Munich, 1968), 182-184.
3 . K. Fabrlclus, ‘Landed Property of the Hlttltes In the 2nd M illenary B.C. 
(Jjdihan and Iuzzl)1, In Resumes Des Communications presentees a ll congres 
VI Internationale des sciences Hlstorlques (Oslo, 1928), 78-80 at 78.
The Code Is supposed to belong to the 14th century B .C ., Smith, lo c .c lt ., 
246-7.
4 . Hurrlans were a non-Semltlc race occupying In the 2nd millennium B ,C .
a considerable portion of the Near East. E .A . Spelser, *Ethn1c Movements 
In the Near East*, AASOR 13 (1931-32), 13-54 at 45.
5 . I .J .  Gelb, Hurrlans and Subarlans, (Chicago/London, 1973), 4 .
HTttTte symbiosis in Anatolia.^ In consequence, we cannot expect purely
2
Indo-European characteristics Tn the Hlttlte Code.
The Code seems to portray two periods of juridical epochs, distin­
guished by the words ‘formerly* and *now*, which suggests that the purpose
of the Code was to organise and revise the old customary law by statutory 
3means.
4
The H lttlte  households were patently patriarchal and the normal
marriage arrangement was that a man ‘took* a wife and ‘made a house and 
5
children*. The phraseology Implies that nuclear rather than extended 
families were recognised as primary social units among the H lttltes.^
1 . W .W . Hallo and W. K. Simpson, The Ancient Near East; A History,
(New York, 1971), 110. A language called (ja ttlll In the H lttlte  texts 
was spoken by the population of the northern part of central Anatolia be­
fore the Indo-Europeans conquered the country. This language Is s till 
poorly understood, S.R. Bln-Nun, *The Anatolian Background of the 
Tawananna‘s position In the H lttlte  Kingdom*, Revue H lttlte Et Aslanlque 
30 (1972) (Paris, 1973), 54-80 at 56.
2. Traces of pre-Indo-European matriarchy may be seen In the provisions of the 
Code dealing with a mother*s right to disown her son, The Hlttltes*, sub. 
*Law», En. Br. (1967) 11, 556.
3. H .G . Guterbock, ‘Authority and Law In the H lttlte  Kingdom*, JAOS 17 
Suppl. (1954), 16-24 at 21.
4 . Macqueen, The Hlttltes and Their Contemporaries In Asia Minor, o p .c lt., 
113. O .R. Gurney, The Hlttltes, (London, 1975), 99.
5. Macqueen, Ib id ., 113.
6 . Macqueen, Ib id ., 113. Cp. suggestion of nuclear family In TaltJirTya 
Samhlta, II. 5 .2 .7 ., Kane, HD, 111, 565-6. G .D . SontheImer, EHJFI,
41 .* Fora fu ller discussion, Derrett, RLSI, 408-9.
The Code in its present form, hardly throws any light on the relation
ship and respective rights of father and son, but Tt is indirectly suggested that
the father exercised a great deal o f authority in the family.^ He could
2
‘give* a son to another household whose son he had k illed . It also appears
from the law applicable to a captive that a free citizen had the power to sell 
3
his son. The provision on the captive runs as follows: * . . .  with the captive
nobody dare do business; nobody dare buy his son, his fie ld , his vineyards.
He who does business with the captive shall forego the business; (var. adds,
4
but) the captive shall take back what he has disposed of*.
The Code as it  stands, in its present form, deals mainly with land 
tenure, and from such meagre materials we should not draw any definite con­
clusion except for noting the existence of the patriarchal power of the father 
in a patrilineal fam ily. Despite the paucity of legal materials, i t  must be 
taken into account that *the Hittites carried their composite culture (partly
through their conquests that extended in every direction) from the Aegean to
5
Babylon, from the Black Sea to Canaan*.
1 . A father might sell his children and k il l  an adulterous w ife, EnBr. (1967) 
11, 556.
2. Macqueen, The Hittites and Their Contemporaries in Asia Minor, o p .c it., 
113. O .R. Gurney, The Hittites, o p .c it . ,  99.
3. Macqueen, ib id ., 113.
4 . The H ittite Code, s.48, tr. A . Walther, in J .M . Powis Smith, The Origin
and History o f Hebrew Law, (Chicago, 1931, rpt. I960), 256.
5. C .H . Gordon, Before the Bible: The Common Background of Greek and
Hebrew C iv iliza tion , (London, 1962), 93.
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V I . Assyrian Law
(1) The Old Assyrian Documents from NuzT: the historical setting
a. The historical setting
We have already pointed out  ^ that during the middle of the second
millennium B.C. the Hurrlans could be found In the area extending from the
mountains of Northern Iran across upper Mesopotamia and Armenia Into Syria,
2
and up to the Mediterranean sea. During the 17th or 16th century B .C .,
a branch of the Indo-Aryan people penetrated Into Hither Asia and dominated
the local Hurrlans. A group then settled In parts of present-day Iravyand Syria
3
and founded the kingdom of Mltannl In Northern Mesopotamia. They u lt i­
mately extended their overlordship even to remote territories like N uzl.
Although scholars have suggested that the Indo-Europeans formed
4
'a thin layer of ruling aristocracy* at Mltannl, It cannot be denied that they
1. Supra, l8bT" 4-
2. A . Skalst, The Authority of the Brother at Arrapha and Nuzl*^ JAOS 
89(1969), 10-17 at 10-11, n .1 .
3. G . Herm, The Phoenicians: The Purple Empire of the Ancient World, t r .
C. H lllle r, (Dusseldorf, 1973; London, 1975), 4 l .
4 . E .A . SpeTser, ’Ethnic Movements In the Near East In the Sdcond M illen­
nium B .C .*, AASOR 13 (1931-32), 13-54at52 . G .W . Brown, The 
Possibility of a Connection Between Mltannl and the Dravldlan Languages*, 
JAOS 50 (1930), 273-305 at 274. W.F. Albright, ‘Publications Recently 
Received by the Editor*, BASOR 91 (1943), 46.
1
contributed considerably toward the demographic, political and social changes
2
which came about In the Tigris-Euphrates p la in .
3
The Aryan hegemony over Nuzl was only ephemera\, but It cannot be 
said that the Nuzlart remained completely untouched by the Aryan values. Thus, 
the antiquity of Hurrlan c ivilization and the Aryan suzerainty over Nuzl contri­
bute to an arousal of our Interest In the tablets found In the course of the Nuzl 
excavations
1. G . Herm, The Phoenicians, o p .c it., 41.
2. N . Na*aman, ‘Syria at the Transition from the Old Babylonian Period to the 
Middle Babylonian Period1, Ugarlt Forschungen, Internationales Jahrbuch 
fUr d le Altertumskunde Syrlen-Palestlnas, Band 6 , (Neuklrchener Verlag, 
Germany, 1975), 265-274 at 265, 272.
3. W.F. A lbright, ‘Publications Recently Received by the Editor*, BASOR 91 
(1943), 46.
4 . The texts are supposed to belong to the middle of the second millennium B .C ., 
E .A . Spelser, *A letter of Saushshatar and the date of the Kirkuk tablets*,
JAOS 49 (1929), 269-275 at 269. The tablets belong to Arrapha and Nuzl. 
Arrapha Is to be found under the modem c ity  of Kirkuk and Nuzl was nearby 
Yorghan Tepe, A . Ska 1st, The Authority of the Brother at Arrapha and Nuzl*, 
JAOS 89 (1969), 10-11, n . l . On Yorghan Tepe (Nuzl) excavations, also 
see, L .L . O rlln , Assyrian Colonies In Cappadocla, (The Hague/Paris, 1970)^ 
220-1. The excavations provided about 4,000 Cuneiform tablets. Some of 
these were Sumerian and the rest were Nuzl (Assyrian), E.R. Lacheman, 
*EpIgraphIc Evidences of the Material Culture of the Nuzlans*, In R.F.S. Starr, 
Nuzl I, (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), 528. The language of the texts were 
Hurrlanlsed Accadlan, R.H. Prelffer and E .A . Spelser, ‘One Hundred New 
Selected Nuzl Texts*, AASOR 14 (1935-6), Introd., 11 . Also on these 
texts, see T .J . Meek, ‘Some Gleanings from the Last Excavations at Nuzl*, 
AASOR 13 (1931-2), 1-11; The Akkadian and Cappadoclan Texts from Nuzl*, 
BASOR 48 (1932), 2-5.
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b. A son's position in the system of inheritance
Excepting certain peculiarities,^ on the whole the evidence for
2Nuzlan society being patriarchal Is overwhelming. We can say that Nuzlan
3
society was patronymic and that Inheritance was patrilineal. Unlike Elam,
4
or, as vaguely Implied, Babylon, daughters at Nuzl Inherited only In the ab-
, 5sence ot sons.
c . Sale adoption
A son's definite and, at some stage In the past, possibly Innate 
expectation to Inherit the property of his father Is Indirectly established from 
a legal dodge called 'sale adoption'.^ Executed In the name of adoption, It
was'a disguised business transaction'.^ It Is Interesting to note that at Nuzl
T. There are evidences that the Nuzlans recognised the existence of an fratrla 
potestas In the family. A . Ska 1st, The Authority of the Brother at Arrapha 
and Nuzl*, JAOS 89 (1969), 10-17 at 11.
2. P. Koschaker, 'Cuneiform', sub. *Law', Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, 
ed., R.A. Sellgman, (New York, 1933), IX, 215. A . Ska 1st suggests that 
the Hurrlan society preserved certain fratrlarchal customs when It switched to 
patriarchal system, JAOS 89 (1969), 13.
3. Supra, 182.
4 . Supra, 173.
5. Cp. Manu, IX. 185.
6 . The phrase adopted by E . Chlera and E .A . Spelser, 'Selected Kirkuk Docu­
ments', JAOS 47 (1927), 36-60 at 36.
7. C .H . Gordon, The Status of Women Reflected In the Nuzl Tablets', Z e lt- 
schrlft fur Assyrlologle, 43 (1935), 151.
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Veal estate* was Inalienable,^ and such property could pass only by Inheritance
2 3from the owner to his legal heirs. So one of the functions, perhaps the main
function, of *sale adoption* was *to provide a legally unimpeachable by-path for
transferred ownership of property . . .  * ^
We have already noticed that, In Nuzl, a father*s property used to 
pass to the sons In preference to other heirs; so the rationale behind the Inalien­
ab ility  o f real estate was to keep the family lands within the family, passing
from generation to generation through the male heirs. This archaic rule of 
5
Inalienability of land Is an economic hindrance; and therefore, to cope with
f . Cp. The anonymous' text In the smrtl, sthavare vlkrayo nastt Icuryad adhlm 
anujnaya /  Dh.K . 1 5 8 9 b ^ .
2 . E .A . Spelser, *New Kirkuk Documents Relating to Family Laws*, AASOR 10 
(1928-9), 1-74 at 13.
3 . P.M . Purves, *Commentary on Nuzl Real Property In the Light of the Recent 
Studies*, JNES 4 (1945), 68-86  at 8 6 .
4 . E .A . Spelser, lo c .c lt . ,  13. HI ldegard Lewy thought that land was freely 
alienable at Nuzl and *sale adoption* was not an Indirect means for alienation 
of land. To support her argument, she cites a text (N V 552) where B pur­
chases land from S and conveys It to his Infant son, I, H. Lewy, *Revlew of 
Cassln*s L ‘adoption a Nuzl*, JAOS 59 (1939), 118-9 at 119. But Purves 
refutes Lewy*s Interpretation and says that NV 552 (or JEN 552) was perhaps 
the oldest text of a ll the Nuzl tablets. Conveying to the minor was probably 
a formula to evade the law of inalienability of land before the sale adoption 
was devised; *for minors at Nuzl as elsewhere, presumably had certain pro­
tection from legal action*. He concludes that there was no outright sale of 
real estate In Nuzl, P .N . Purves, lo c .c lt . ,  83.
5. Archaic society envisages a multiple and multlgeneratlonal ownership, and 
therefore, puts fetters on alienation; for example, see the smrtl texts} infra,347 - 6 4 . 
Modern tendency emphasises on maximum alienability and Identification of 
property with the Individual, what the German l egalists have called Freles 
Elgentum or as the C iv il Code of the French Third Republic stated: * . . .  le
droit de joulr et de disposer des choses de la manlere la plus abolue . .  .*, for 
a discussion on this see, H.F. Schurmann, Traditional Property Concepts In 
China*, Far Eastern Quarterly, 15 (1956), 507-516 at 507-8. Both the German
/Continued on next page:
economic realities, law needs to be pfastTc. So an Ingenious legal fiction ^
In the form of ‘sale adoption* for legalised sales of land was looked for and found 
within the socially recognised Institution of sonshlp.
Thus, the evasion of the rule of Inalienability of land was performed 
by establishing a relationship of sonshlp with the buyer through a quasi-adoption. 
The vendor of a house or land had to adopt the prospective buyer, and thus, the 
seller became the adoptive parent and the buyer became the adopted son; and 
the relevant portion became the share (zlttu) of the Inheritance. To keep the 
appearance of adoption, the consideration, of course, could not be called pur­
chase price Q>imu); but since the law could not prevent the adopted son from
2
presenting an honorarium to his adoptive father, the stipulated purchase price
3
would enter the record as such a grant (qlStu). In a real adoption , an adoptee
4
enters the new family for good; In a sale adoption^, however, there need be
5
no subsequent family relationship between the contracting parties.
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and the French view were anticipated by Aristotle, Rhet.l .5 .7 . Cp. Dayab- 
haga, 2.27; yathesla-vlnlyogarhatvalaksanasya svatvasya; on this see,
Derrett, ‘An Indian Contribution to the Study of Property*, BSOAS 18 (1956) 3: 
475-497 at 481.
1. Cp. the fiction of the doctrine of relation back In Hindu law of adoption, but 
note the difference of purpose between the two, Derrett, IMHL, 187-190.
2. E .A . Spelser, AASOR 10 (1928-9), 14.
3 # E . Chlera and E .A . Spelser, *A New Factor In the History of the Ancient East*,
AASOR 6 (1924-5), 75-92 at 8 6 .
4 . See Hindu law, Derrett, IMHL,3fl70, 175.
5. A .P . Morgan, Marriage, Birthright and Adoption In the Patriarchal Narratives 
In the Light of The Nuzl Documents, M .A . dissertation, University of Wales,
1972, unpublished, 75.
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At N u tt, and also in Human society in general, sonshlp could legally
be determined by adoption (fla t), as much as by birth. ^  A t Nuzl an adopted son
2 3used to take an equal share with a subsequent natural-born son.
d # Disinherison
However, a Nuzlan father could disinherit a son at his w ill.  A dls-
4
Inherited son was withheld from possession of family gods (llanl) and a father
5
symbolically terminated the relationship with his son by smashing a lump of clay.
1. E .A . Spelser, *1 Know Not the Day of My Death1, In J .J . Flnkelsteln and
M . Greensburg, ed ., Oriental and Biblical Studies, (Philadelphia, 1967)
91. For establishment of brothershlp by adoption, see A .D . Kilmer, ‘Sym­
bolic Gestures In Akkadian Contracts from Alalakh and LJgarlt*, JAOS 94
(1974), 177-183. Adoption of brother was also known at Elam.
2. In the laws of Hammurabi, I f  a father having subsequently a natural son, 
wanted to cut o ff the adopted son, he was obliged to give him of his goods
one one-third of the portion of a son, but not of fields, garden or house, CH
191. Cp. Hindu law, Derrett, IMHL, f  186.
3. Fora typical adoption tablet, see C .H . Gordon, ‘Biblical Customs and the 
Nuzl Tablets1, Biblical Archaeologist, 3 (1940), 5. The adoption document 
stipulates that I f  a natural son Is born subsequent to the adoption, the natural- 
born son would take the gods (llanl) of the father and not the adopted son.
The right of possession of the gods has been thought as the actual right of In­
heritance. At Nuzl, sons required new llan l to set up a separate household.
Cp. the Aryan custom of setting up house fire while sons set up a separate 
household, Sonthe!mer,EHJFI,42. Also compare Rachel's stealing of the gods 
from her father, Gen. 31.20. S. Smith suggests that the possession of the
gods was a symbol of possessing the Inheritance. By stealing the gods, Rachel
was ensuring that she was not deprived of her right as the presumptive heir,
*What were the Teraphlro?} Journal o f Theological Studies, 33 (1932.),
But the llan l clause was absent In many adoption documents from Nuzl, E .A . 
Spelser, ‘ New Kirkuk Documents Relating to Family Laws*, AASOR 10 (1928—
29), 1-73 at 7-8 .
4 . On lla n l, see n .3 above.
5. See A .P . Morgan, Marriage, Birthright and Adoption In the Patriarchal Narra­
tives In the Light of the Nuzl Documents, o p .c it., 57, n .8 . Like other primi­
tive societies, symbolic acts were part of legal transactions at Nuzl, A .D .K ilm er,
f ^ sifi5§S ‘n Akkadian Contracts from Alalakh to Ugarlt*, JAOS 94
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e. ‘Birthright*
The Nuzl tablets contain two texts on sale of *blrthrlght* by one
brother to another, which Is termlnologlcally tempting, and thereby needs an
Investigation as to whether the concept Is In any way substantially akin to the
Mltaksara birthright. The two texts,  ^ tuppl tamgurtl and tuppl ahhutl, record
2
two transactions similar to the selling o f birthright by Esau to his brother Jacob 
In the Old Testament. In the Nuzl documents, the sale of part of their birth­
right took place between adopted sons and natural sons. We may recall that 
the Mltaksara birthright Is an Innate right of the son where co-ownership of 
father and son Is a reality. In Hebrew law where ‘family was based on the
3 4principle of patrla potestas*, b irthright In the Mltaksara sense was Impossible. 
Esau‘s birthright denotes nothing but the right of the eldest brother In Jewish law
5
to have an extra share of his father‘s estate. S im ilarly, considering a father's 
undisputed power of disherison, and also his power of Indirect alienation through 
‘sale adoption*, the Idea of birthright at Nuzl should be Interpreted In the light 
of Jewish law and no a ffin ity  with the Mltaksara birthright should be attached to
1. N.204; HSS 5^99 also N 87. On these texts, see E .A . Spelser, ‘New 
Kirkuk Documents Relating to Family Laws, AASOR 10 (1928-9), 18; *Ethnlc 
Movements In the Near East In the Second Millennium B .C .*, AASOR 13 
(1931-32), 44. C .H . Gordon, *Blbllcal Customs and Nuzl Tablets, B lb ll- 
cal Archaeologist 3 (1940), 5 .
2. Gen. 25.29-34; Esau ‘sold his birthright unto Jacob*, Gen. 25.29-31.
3 . G . Horowitz, The Spirit o f Jewish Law, (New York, 1953), 260.
4 . See Derrett, Law In the New Testament, (London, 1974), 104; for a fuller 
discussion, see Ib id ., 104-111.
5. See our discussion on Jewish law, m f ra-,
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i t .  Therefore, any analogous idea of Mltaksara b irthright was as foreign to the 
Hebrews as it was to the Hurrlans.
(2) The Middle Assyrian Laws
Apart from the NuzT documents, the Old Assyrian Laws (c.2350 -  2100
B.C.)  ^ o f an Assyrian trading colony In Asia Minor do not seem to be Important
2
for our purpose, but the Middle Assyrian Laws (c. 1133 -  1107B.C.) of the city 
of ancient Assur deserve our attention.
a . General feature of family property
3In Middle Assyrian Law, as In the sastrlc provisions of the Hindus,
4
land was categorised Into ancestral and self-acquired. The ancestral land 
belonged to the family; therefore, a member ,of the family could acquire his 
share on partition. A man*s own *ppr chases* (Ass. Ilmatu) were considered as 
his self-acquisitions.^ When the self-acquired land descended to the owner*s 
sons, It was considered as ancestral In their hands. Although we are not told 
whether the sons had a right to demand partition for a share In the ancestral
1 . Driver and Miles, The Assyrian Laws, (Oxford, 1935), 1-2.
2. Driver and Miles previously dated these laws between c. 1450-1250 B .C ., see
Ib id ., 4; but now these are known to have been written down In the reign of 
Tig lath-pllesar (c. 1133-1107 B .C .), see Driver and Miles, The Babylonian 
Laws, (Oxford, 1952, rp t. 1968), 4 , n .4 .
3 . pltamahopatta, Y a jn .ll.  121, Dh.K.1175b. V i s q u . 17.2 T Dh.K.1175a. 
kramagate, Br .26.10, D h.K . 1180b. svayam uparjlta, Katy, 839, Dh.K.1173b.
4 . Driver and Miles, AL, 293.
5. Ib id ., 293.
6 . Ib id ., 293.
property during the lifetime of their father, we can generally Infer that this 
right was available only to the brothers who were living jo in tly after the death 
of their father.^
2
Male inheritance was the rule in Assyria and, to the exclusion of
3
a ll other males, sons used to Inherit the property of their father,
b. Conclusion
However, despite considerable similarities between the Assyrian and 
Hindu laws of property, we cannot find any vestige of son's birthright In the 
Assyrian system.
1. Cp. traces of jo int living of brothers among the Romans, Greeks, Hebrews, 
Deut. 25.6, Hindus.
2. Driver and Miles, Assyrian Laws, o p .c it., 295.
3 . Driver and Miles, Ib id ., 1920, 295. Cp. Manu. IX, 185.
CHAPTER 7
JEWISH LAW
I. Introductory Remarks
The origin of Israel stemmed from a group of West Semitic nomads of 
Mesopotamia. A t some point in the Old-BabylonTan period, this group migra­
ted from Mesopotamia to Palestine.^ Israel was subsequently conquered by 
the Assyrians (c. 721 B.C.) and the Babylonians (c. 586 B .C .). Following 
the Babylonian exile (c. 586-537 B.C.) up to the destruction of the Second 
Temple (70 A .D .) , the Israelites were ruled by the Persians (c. 538 -  333 B .C .), 
Greeks (c. 333 -  166 B.C .) and the Romans (c. 37 -  66 A .D .) . It Is not within 
our scope to record the whole political history of Israel, nevertheless for an
understanding of their legal philosophy, It Is worth noting that the Jewish people
2
came Into cultural contact with most civilized nations of the ancient world.
1. J .C .L . Gibson, *Llght from Marl on the Patriarchs1, Journal o f Semitic 
Studies, 7 (1962) 1: 44-62 at 62. Gibson finds striking resemblances be­
tween the nomads of Marl area and the people of the early books of the Old 
Testament, Ib id ., 45. On the Mesopotamian origin of the Hebrew people, 
also see H. Rlnggren, ‘ Israel's Place Among the Religions o f the Ancient 
Near East1, In G .W . Anderson, ed ., Studies In the Religion of Ancient 
Israel, (Leiden, 1972), 1-8 at 7.
2. There are stories that the Jews had commercial contact with the Malabar 
coast since the time of King Solomon, G . Kushner, Immigrants From India 
In Israel; Planned Change in an Administered Community, (The University
of Arizona Press, Tucson, Arizona, 1973), 12. Inscrlptlonal evidences point 
to Jewish settlement In India as early as c . 139 B .C ., A .C . Burnell, The 
Original Settlement Deed of the Jewish Colony at Cochin', The Indian A n tl- 
quary, 3 (1874), 333-4. K .N . Daniel, The Anchuvannam and the Manlgra- 
mam of the Kottayam Plates of Tanu travl or the Jews and the Christians of
/Continued on next page:
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During the post-exTllc period, Israel did not renounce everything
that bore the Mesopotamian Imprint;^ rather it drew heavily from the parent; 
2
c iv iliza tio n .
So, considering the link with Mesopotamian tradition; the possible
Note 2 -  p . 198 -  continued:
Malabar1, The Indian Antiquary, 53 (1924), 257-61. For a discussion on 
the early Jewish settlement In Cochin, also see D .G . Mandelbaum, ‘Social 
Stratification Among the Jews of Cochin In India and In Israel, The Jewish 
Journal of Sociology, 12 (1975) 2: 165-210 at 166-70.
1. On striking parallels between Cuneiform documents from north of Babylonia 
and the patriarchal narratives, see C .H . Gordon, ‘Hebrew Origins In the 
Light of Recent Discovery*, In A . Altman, ed ., Biblical and Other Studies, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 3-14. Specific parallel to the Idea In Gen. 
3.19: *You are earth, and to earth you shall return* Is found In the A tra- 
hasls, the Sumero-Babylonlan epic, W .G . Lambert and A.R. M illard, 
Atra-hasls: The Babylonian Story of the Flood, (Oxford, 1969), Introd.,
2 . S .M . Paul, Studies In the Book of the Covenant In the Light of Cuneiform 
and Biblical Law, (Leiden, 1970), 42. But note the opinion of I. Rappo­
port who thought that the Book of the Covenant was entirely of Israelite 
origin, The Origins of Hebrew Law*, Palestine Exploration Quarterly, 73 
(1941), 158-167 at 166. A . Goetze did not find any parallel between the 
Code of Hammurabi and the Book of the Covenant, but he thought that the 
latter might have Inspiration from Old Babylonian Marl, ‘Mesopotamian 
Laws and the Historian*, JAOS 69 (1949), 115-120 at 120. However, 
parallels have been shown to exist between Biblical and Cuneiform law by
S .M . Paul, Ib id ., 43-98, 105. , The Mesopotamian tradition also ‘ sur­
vived In the Babylonian Talmud*, E .A . Spelser, ‘Authority and Law In Meso­
potamia*, JAOS 17, suppl. (1954-), 15.
1 2  3Influences of the Persians, Greeks and Romans; and, above a ll,  the sur­
vival of the peculiarities of Jewish law through moulding and development ^
for three millennia In the four corners of the world, a study such as ours would
5Indeed be Incomplete without a comparison with the Jewish legal system.
1. The Jews of Babylon came In contact with Sasanlans and the rabbis uncon­
sciously Included many Iranian words and motifs. The rabbis also betray 
their direct knowledge of Sasanlan rules on taxes and real estate transact­
ions, J . Neusner, ‘How much Iranian In Jewish Babylonia?* JAOS 95,
(1975), 184-190 at 184, 190.
2. The Talmud In a number of passages (e .g . B .K. 82a) prohibits the teaching 
of *Greek wisdom*. But this was not a fact; Malmonldes did study 
Aristotle, see Isaac bar Sheshet*s responsum, ‘Aristotle or the Talmud*,
S.B. Freehof, A  Treasury of Responsa, (Philadelphia, 1963), 72-7. For 
an assessment of Hellenic Influences, see S. Llberman, ‘How much Greek
In Palestine?*, In A . Altmann, ed ., Biblical and Other Studies, (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1963), 123-141 at 123; also Llebermann, Hellenism In Jewish Pale­
stine, (New York, 1950). On the Greek Influences In the writings of Philo 
Judaeus Alexandrlnus, see E.R. Goodenough, The Jurisprudence of the Jewish 
Courts In Egypt: Legal Administration by the Jews Under the Early Roman Em­
pire as described by Philo Judaeus, (Amsterdam, 1968), 58.
3. Successful comparison between Roman law and Jewish law could be seen In
B. Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law, (New York, 1966), 2 vols., e tseq.
4 . Z .W . Falk, ‘Jewish Law*, In Derrett, ed ., An .Introduction to Legal Systems, 
(London, 1968), 28-53 at 42 . Hindu law also was never fixed. It passed 
through Interpretative change and modification, Derrett, ‘Sir Henry Maine and 
Law In India*, 61 The Juridical Review, (1959), 40 -55a t46-7 ; ‘Sanskrit 
Legal Treatises Compiled at the Insistence of the British*, 63 ZVR (1961), 72- 
117; ‘ Illegitimates: a test for modern Hindu Family Law*, JAOS 81 (1961), 
251-261; *The History of the Juridical Framework of the Joint Hindu Family*, 
Contributions to Indian Sociology, 6 (1962), 17-47 at 19; RLSl,_Ch. 3, 4 
and 12. K . Upsteln, *The Reception of Western Law In India*, International 
Social Science Bulletin, 9 (1957), 85-95 at 87-8. Derrett*s view has been 
weighed and endorsed In context of the effects of law on society by B.S. Cohn, 
‘Anthropological Notes on Disputes and Law In India*, American Anthropologist, 
V o l.67, N o .6 , P t.ll, (1965), 82-122 at 114.
5. David Daube emphasises that Jewish law deserves to be compared with any 
legal system In the world, Studies In Biblical Law, (New York, 1969), 2.
Apart from their metadmne orTgTn and similarities In exegetlcal 
2and Interpretative techniques, both Jewish and Hindu legal systems today
stand In a world where maintaining the equilibrium between religious law
(Huklm: dharma) and secular law (mlshpatlm: vyavahara) Is a besetting problem.
In this respect, It Is Indeed Interesting to note that, under British rule while the
4
Hindus and the Muslims were allowed to follow their own personal laws, the
5
Jewish population of India was governed by the English law of Inheritance. 
However/when the Indian C iv il Code ^ comes to be drafted, Jewish law w ill 
have to be taken Into account’.^
1. For a comparative similarity on this point between Hindu law and Jewish 
law, see H .H . Cohn, ‘Secularization of Divine Law*, In H .H . Cohn, ed ., 
Jewish Law In Ancient and Modem Israel, (Ktav Publishing House, New 
York, 1971), 1-49 at 7 . For further Information on this point In context 
of Hindu law, see RLSI, Ch.3 and 4.
2. Cp . mldoth and mldrash In the Jewish system with mlmamsa and commen- 
tatorlal literature In Hindu law.
3 . See RLSI, C h .13. From the point of view of Jewish law, see I. England, 
The Relationship Between Religion and State In Israel*, In H .H . Cohn, ed., 
Jewish Law In Ancient and Modern Israel, lo c .c lt ., 168-189. Also, A . 
Rubinstein, *Law and Religion In Israel*, In H .H , Cohn, Ib id ., 190-224. 
Cp. Roman fas and the jus.
4. RLSI, 289.
5. Derrett, ‘Jewish Law In Southern Asia*, ICLQ 13 (1964), 288-301.
6 . Article 44 of the Constitution of India.
7. Derrett, ICLQ 13 (1964), 288.
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I I • Social Organisation and a father‘s power over his children
The social organisation of the ancient Israelites was dominated by the
tribal community composed of families and kinship groups.^ The head of the
kinship group held enormous power even to the extent of passing sentence of
death. This patriarchal authority exercised by the head of the kin group was
X
reflected In the sphere of family life . The Covenant Code, like the Roman
3
system, decrees death for the son who strikes his parents or reviles them.
Here we should remind ourselves that Hebrew law consists of two
layers: one, customary law as depicted In the patriarchal narratives, derived
chiefly from the experiences of the nomad people; the other, the codified law
A
of the Pentateuch, which Is the product of the later period. In the laws of
1. A . Gulak, ‘Jewish1, sub. ‘Law*, En.So.Sc!., IX , 219#
2 • A law of Servlus Tullius: si parentem puer uerberltast olle plorasslt, puer 
dluls parentum sacer esto, Festus, ed ., Lindsay, quoted by J.C . Stobart, 
The Grandeur that was Rome, (London, 1971), 23. ‘ If a boy beats his 
father and the father complains, let the boy be devoted to the gods of 
parents, ( I.e . slain as a sacrifice)*, tr. Stobart, Ib id ., 23. The authori­
ties are divided on the nationality of Servlus Tullius (c. 578 -  534 B .C .). 
Although there Is strong evidence to suggest that he was Latin, according to 
one tradition he Is Etruscan, see En.Br. (1970), XX, 259. In Chinese law, 
scolding or beating a parent carried the death sentence, T*ung-Tsu Ch*u, 
Law and Society In Traditional China, (Paris, 1961), 28. For an anecdote 
to the same effect from South India In c . 1773, see J. Malssln, Rechercbe 
de la Verlte . . . , ed. R.H. Regnler (Paris, 1975), 293.
3 . Ex. 2L J5 and 17.
A . Gulak, lo c .c lt . ,  219.
the Pentateuch, we fTnd that the father's power was comparatively diminished. ^
The DeuteronomTc Code does not consider cases like the one we just referred to,
but deals only with the stubborn and rebellious son who could not be disciplined
3
even when chastised with the rod. We notice, that unlike the Covenant
Code (Ex. 2.15 and 17), In such a case the father could not judge and pass
the death sentence on his rebellious son. The parents must take him before
the elders and make an affidavit that he Is disobedient. Then the citizens
4
of the town would stone him to death. The provision seems to be more a
deterrent towards disrespect and disobedience to parents than a rule to be
5
applied frequently In Jewish society.
The power of pledging one's children Is evidenced In Judaea ^ and 
there are also evidences In the legal documents In Aramaic and Neo-Baby- 
lonlan deeds of loan that the father had the power to pledge his children.^
1 . R. de Vaux, Les Institutions de I'AncIen Testament, tr. J. McHugh, sub. 
t i t .  Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institution, (London, 1962), 23.
2. Ex. 15 a-nd 17.
3. Cp. Manu, V III, 299 and 300; on this, see BharucT, Derrett, ed ., II, 
180-1.
4 . Deut. 21.18-21.
5. J .M . Powls-Smlth, The Origin and History of Hebrew Law, (The University 
of Chicago Press, 1960), 50.
6 . Nehemlah, 5.1 .f f .
7. R. Yaron, Introduction to the Law of the Aramaic Papyri, (Oxford, 1961), 
42. However, the Aramaic Papyri should be treated with reserve as evi­
dence for Jewish law, Yaron, Ib id ., 115; also, G ifts In Contemplation 
of Death, (Oxford, i960), 12.
But we should not form the opinion that there was an absence of f i l ia l love In
Jewish society. In ancient Israel, to have many children was a coveted
honour,  ^ and lack of children was sometimes rdgarded as a ‘chastisement of
2
love* as was suffering from leprosy.
I l l . Family ownership of land
It seems that In the beginning alienation of land was not permissible 
In Jewish law. Selling of an ancestral estate, like entering upon an Improper
3marriage, was disgraceful and would Incur the disapproval of kinsmen. How­
ever, as the authority of the tribe and family gradually waned, land became
alienable, but the original attachment of the land to the family shows through
4
the rule that the relatives were entitled to repurchase It from the buyer.
1. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, (London, 1962), 41.
2. J . Newman, Halachlc Sources, Leiden, 1969), 169-70.
3. KIddushm, 1.5, cited by R. Yaron, G ifts In Contemplation of Death, 
o p .c it., 33.
4. Jer. 32.8. Ruth, 2.20; 3.12; 4 .4 . The Institution was known as go*el. 
The word, go*el comes from a root which means *to buy back or to redeem* , 
but fundamentally Its meaning Is *to protect*. If an Israelite had to sell 
his patrimony, the go*el (redeemer or protector) had priority over a ll other 
purchasers. The law Is set out In Lev.25.25. On this, see R. de Vaux, 
lo c .c lt ., 21. Also Malm on Ides, XII .III .X II .4 -5 , (New Haven, 1951), 
198. Developments are discussed by S.W. Baron, *The Economic Views
of MalmonTdes*, In S.W. Baron, ed ., Essays on Malmonldes, An Octocen- 
tennlal Volume, (New York, 1966), 127-264 at 158, 168. Also see our 
discussion on preemption, Infra, 6 8 ^ -7 13 .
IV . Traces of joTnt family
In early Jewish society, jo in t liv ing of father and married sons, and
1 2especially o f brothers, was not uncommon. The Sabbath travel regulations
1 . Malmonldes, X I I . IV .VI11.7: ^ |f brothers or other heirs do not divide their 
Inheritance but continue to use It together, they have the status o f partners 
In a ll respects*, The Code of Malmonldes, X II, The Book of Acquisition, 
tr .  I .  Klein, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951), 237. Also Mal­
monldes, X I I . I I I .X I I .4: *lf one of the brothers or the jo in t owners . .  .*,
K lein, Ib id ., 198. Traces of jo in t liv ing o f brothers In testimonies deposited 
In the rabbinical court of Damascus, Genlzah fragments: TS 20.92 and TS 8 
J 4 , f . 13, 1094-1095 A .D .;  also a court record, reconstructed from three 
Genlzah fragments: TS NS J 382^; TS NS J 338, and TS 12.177, (Tyre, 
around 1194 A .D .) , S.D. G o lte ln , ‘Documents from Damascus and Tyre Con­
cerning Buildings belonging to Jews*, Eretz-lsrael, E .L . Sukenlk Memorial 
Volume, Jerusalem, Israel Exploration Society, 8 (1967), 288-297 (In Hebrew), 
summarised In English a t 78. The rules on levlrate marriage also signifies 
jo in t liv ing o f brothers: *lf brethren dwell together . . . * ,  Efeut. 25.5; also 
see The Book o f Women, The Code of Malmonldes, Book IV , tr .  I .  Klein,
(New Haver/London, 1972), 265. Levlrate marriage Is attested among the 
Indo-Europeans, such as the Hindus, H lttltes, Greeks and Romans. C .H . 
Gordon suggests that the Institution might have found Its way Into the Semitic 
world through the Indo-European Invasions that took place during the second 
millennium B .C ., Before the Bible: The Common Background o f Greek and 
Hebrew C ivilizations, (London, 1962), 94-5.
2. Among the Jews In Kerala jo int family o f father and married son Is s till the 
usual social unit, and father as the senior male member Is the manager of the 
fam ily, G . Kushner, Immigrants from India In Israel, (Arizona, 1973), 12, 18.
3. S . Langdon thought that the Pharlslc strictures against travelling on Sabbath 
were post-exilic and originated from Babylonian Influences, Babylonian Mono- 
logles and Semitic Calendars, (London, 1935), 85. But M.Gnjber disagrees 
with Langdon and opines that weekly Sabbath was Jewish In origin, JANES 1
(1969) 2: 14-20 at 20. For a fu lle r discussion on the origin and significance 
of Sabbath, see R. de Vaux, lo o .c lt . ,  475-483.
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throw light on this Joint ItvTng of father and son. The regulations stem from a
verse Tn Exodus (16.29): * . . .  let no man go out of hTs place on the seventh
day1. The Torah was interpreted to mean that no one could travel on the
Sabbath more than two thousand cubits from his residence.  ^ Much rabbinic
2disagreement sprung from this Interpretation, but a fiction was Invented to
avoid the prohibition: the restriction on walking farther than two thousand
3
cubits on the Sabbath could be overcome through the Institution of *eruv.
Thus, the person who wanted to take a longer walk on the Sabbath used to
place a bundle or basket of food at the proper distance from his residence or
on a Jointly-owned spot on Friday. The ritual o f depositing the food made
the place an extension of the personas domain and, thus, another two thousand
4
cubits Sabbath walk then became possible.
A  jo in t family of father and sons needed to place only a single
bundle of food (single 'eruv) on Friday. This Is Implied by the Mlshnah.
Mlshnah TEruvln states that brothers who eat at their father's table but sleep
5In their own houses must prepare a separate 'eruv*. The Mlshnah and the
1. E .J. Llpman, The Mlshnah: Oral Teachings of Judaism, (New York, 1970), 92.
2. See Halachoth Pesukoth, Hllkoth Erubln, discussed by J. Newman, Halachlc
Sources, (Leiden, 1969), 215-6.
3. 'eruv means 'mixture, combination, fusion*, Llpman, lo c .c lt . ,  92.
4 . Llpman, Ib id ., 92.
5. Babyl. Talmud, Er 72b., G .G . Porton, 'Hanokh Albeck on the Talmudlc
Sugya', In J. Neusner, ed ., The Formation of the Babylonian Talmud,
(Leiden, 1970), 127-133 at 128-9. The Gemgra anonymously states:
Then where one sleeps Is decisive. Rav Judah quoted Rav: The Mlshnah 
refers to people who receive their food from their father's house, but eat 
at their own houses . . . * ,  Porton, Ib id ., 129. Cp. Plutarch's mention of
/Continued on next page:
207.
1 2 gemara were cited by Albeck, in order to show that the gemara was in a fluTd
state during the Amoralc period but, for our purpose, the whole tenor of the
3
Mlshnah (at TEpivln 72b) with the anonymous sugya establishes that sons could
live jo intly with their father; but the test of jointness was whether they dined
4
and lived In the same house with him. There are evidences In the procedural
law as well that co-helrs used to live jo in tly . This Is apparent from the rule
that a managing co-heTr could clear himself by oath from any suspicion of mls-
5
management of the joint property.
Note 5 -  p .206 -  continued:
jo int living among the Romans; Marcus Crassus and his brothers shared the 
same table with their parents, Life of Marcus Crassus, Plutarch's Lives, 
tr .  B. Perrin, (London/New York, 1916), 315.
1. See n .5, p .206.
2. Porton, lo c .c lt . ,  129.
3 . See supra, 206 n .5 .
4 . Joint living Is also evident from Tnterpreatlon of the scriptural text: 'A  Iamb
fo ra  household*, Pesahlm, 89a. Even *ten families belonging to one father's
house' was supposed to sacrifice only one Iamb, see the Mekllta on Ex. 12.3.
J. Newman, Halachlc Sources, (Leiden, 1969), 93. The term father's house
means family, Numbers, 1.2. Cp. the criteria of jointness In Hindu law: 
'Mere cesser of commensallty or separation In residence, food and worship
do not by themselves constitute severance In status. On the other hand, 
coparceners who live together may very well be separated and unreunlted 
. . . * ,  Derrett, IMHL,^515.
5. Mlshnah, Shebu'oth, V I I .8 , see Z .W . Falk, Introduction to Jewish law of 
the Second Commonwealth, (Leiden, 1972), I, 130.
V . Joint property
In Jewish law, the ju rld lc  concept o f jo in t property could arise either
through persons who would acquire property jo in tly or through helr^ who jo in tly
Inherited the deceased‘s estate.^ But Jewish law does not seem to know any-
2
thing of joint ownership with the rule of survivorship (jus accrescendl).
3
In a ll probability, the Jewish concept of shuttafuth (joint property) stands for
4
a concept analogous to tenancy In common, and It does not convey any Idea 
such as co-ownership of father and son.
However, parallels could be drawn between the Biblical passage:
5
‘Abraham gave a ll that he had unto Isaac1 and the srutl text ‘Manu divided 
his daya among (for) his sons* ^ but the Biblical text ‘need not be taken liter­
a lly  as meaning that Abraham actually transferred his property to Isaac*.^
1 . Rabbi I ,  Herzog, The Main Institutions of Jewish Law, (london/New York, 
1965), I, 213. G . Horowitz, The Spirit of Jewish Law, (New York, 1953), 
322.
2. Herzog, Ib id ., 213. On jus accrescendl see J. Salmond, Jurisprudence, 
(London, 1924), 474-5.
3. Fora discussion on the concept, see Herzog, lo c .c lt ., 213-223. The term 
Is used for commercial partnership as w ell, Herzog, Tb^ ld.,  V o l.I I ,  155-166.
4 . Horowitz, lo c .c lt . ,  324.
5. Gen. 25.5, also see Gen. 24.36.
6 . Tal. Sam. I I I . 1.9.4; Kane, HD, III, 542.
7. R. Yaron, Gifts In Contemplation of Death, In Jewish and Roman Law, 
(Oxford, 1960), 6 . A  Iso the same purport of E zek. 46.16-1 $: * . . .  he 
shall give his sons Inheritance out of his own possession*, Yaron, Ib id ., 6 .
The law of the Pentateuch, whjch was followed by the post-exilic 
Jewry, does not give any indication of the existence of son*s co-ownership 
during the lifetime of the father. A  passage In the Book of Numbers, 27.8-11,
fixes the order of succession, and ordains that, I f  sons exlsjf, no other heirs
1 2 should Inherit. Both In written and unwritten law, sons were the primary
heirs of the property and continuers of the ancestral traditions. Thus, Philo 
writes: ‘Children ought to Inherit from their parents, besides property, ancest­
ral customs ( . . . )  whlgh they were reared In and have lived with even from the 
cradle, and not despite them because they have been handed down without 
written record*. ^
1. Cp. Manu, IX . 185.
2. The Sadducees rejected the oral law, Babylonian Talmud, Qlddushln,
66a . Josephus put forward this opinion: ‘only written laws should be 
considered as such, whereas those from the ancestral tradition need not 
be kept*, Antlqultates Judalcae, X III. 1, 6 , 298, quoted by Z .W . Falk, 
Introduction to Jewish Law of the Second Commonwealth, (Leiden, 1972), 
I, 39. However, there are doubts as to whether the views of the Sadduc- 
cees were ever put Into practice even when they dominated the Sanhedrln, 
Falk, Ib id ., 40. On Sanhedrln, see H. Mantel, Studies In the History 
of the Sanhedrln, (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), Introd. x l-x v , also 54; also 
see S. Z e ltlin , Studies In the Early History of Judaism, (New York, 1973), 
I, 275-315.
3. Philo on Deut. 19.14: *Thy shalt not remove thy neighbours landmarks 
which thy forerunners have set up*, The Special Laws, IV, 28, 149-50, 
tr. F.H. Colson, V III, 101, quoted by J .M . Baumgarten, The Un­
written Law In the Pre-Rabblnlc Period*, Journal for the Study of Judaism, 
1970-72 (Leiden, 1972), 7-29 at 14.
V I . Respective positions o f sons and daughters Tn the heritable system
A t this stage of our discussion, one point needs to be clarified, 
namely the position of daughters as heirs In the presence of sons.
We notice that Job's three daughters received a share of the Inheri­
tance along with their seven brothers,^ which Is obviously marked as a dlgres-
2 3slon from the ‘statute of judgment1 (hukkat mlshpat) laid down In Numbers,
27.8-11, under which daughters Inherit only In the absence of sons. We also
know that Moses at first did not consider the daughters of Zelophehad as heirs
to the estate of their father, even though he died without leaving any sons.
The five daughters of Zelophehad approached Moses who, after deliberation,
4
established the rule that daughters would,Inherit only In the absence of sons.
In patrilineal families the objection to Inheritance by a daughter 
springs from the consideration that I f  she marries and has male Issue, her portion
5of the family property passes to another family. This explains why Moses
1. Job, 42.13-15.
2. Job's action probably represents an Ideal situation rather than an actual 
case, R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, o p .c it., 54. Also, R. Yaron, Gifts 
In Contemplation of Death, o p .c it., 5.
3 . N . Llpschutz, *WlIIs In the C iv il Law of Israel and In the Jewish Law', Ip 
International Lawyers Convention In Israel, 1958, (Jerusalem, 1959), 257- 
275 at 270.
4 . N u .36.1-13. Also Beta Batra, 8 .3 , cited by E .J. Llpman, The Mlshnah, 
(New York, 1970), 2T5-6.
5. Driver and Miles, BL, 1, 337. This also explains the existence of the rules 
of preemption, supra, 204 •
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instructed the Israelites that a daughters right of Inheritance was conditional
on her marrying within,her fathers tribe J  The rule slmp^ highlights the
predominant Interest of the agnates In family property, and particularly, that
2
of the sons. The Sadduccees, however, Indirectly upheld the right of a
1 . N u.36.1-9 . On this, see H .H . Cohn, 'Secularization of Divine Law', In
H .H . Cohn, ed ., Jewish Law In Ancient and Modern Israel, (New York, 
1971), 1-49 at 18. Notwithstanding the written provision of the Torah, 
this rule provoked controversies. The scribes and the sages considered It 
void on the ground that It existed only In the generation of wilderness, 
Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra, 120a. But the author of the Tobias 
held that the requirement of marrying a member of the father's tribe was 
s till In force and went as far as to say that the transgressor of the rule de­
served the death penalty. We are to note that this punishment was not 
B iblical, see Z .W . Falk, Introduction to Jewish Law of the Second Common­
wealth, (Leiden, 1972), I, 6 ,n .2 . Yaron points out that the authority of the 
Book of Toblt (perhaps, 3rd c . B.C.) as evidence for Old Testament law Is 
doubtful, Gifts In Contemplation of Death, o p .c l t . , 7 . .  Cp. In A ttic
law, the compulsory rule for marriage of the daughter with a near agnate 
when one died llvlqg no sons or grandsons, but only a daughter; the daugh­
ter became an eplkleros. The sons of the union, when they came of age, 
were the heirs of the property, D . Sc haps, *Women In Greek Inheritance 
Law', The Classical Quarterly, 25 (1975) 1: 53-57 at 54. Philo resorted 
to a compromise between the rights of a man's tribe and the claims of hls> 
daughters. He suggested that the daughters of Zelophehad did not have 
the Inheritance by right of kinship; they had It as an 'external ornament*, 
V ita Mosls, II, 243, cited by S. Belkin, Philo and the Oral Law: The Phllo- 
nlc Interpretation of Biblical Law In Relation to the Palestinian Halakah, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1940), 20, n.31. E.R. Goodenough thinks that Philo's 
Interpretation betrays Greek Influence. As we just pointed out, In Athens 
when a daughter Inherited her father's estate, that property did not, like the 
rest of her possesslpns, belong to her husband. He had only the use of It 
until their son became of age. By attaining majority, the daughter's son 
took the property, E.R. Goodenough, The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts 
In Egypt: Legal Administration by the Jews Under the Early Roman Empire as 
Described by Philo Judaeus, (Amsterdam, 1968), 58.
2. On Sadducees, see Z .W . Falk, Introduction to Jewish Law of the Second 
Commonwealth, o p .c lt., 39-40.
daughter to share the inheritance with sons.^ According to the Sadducees,
the daughter of the propositus takes only half the estate In competition with a
son's daughter; but the Pharisees advocated the doctrines of representation ,
2
and held that the whole estate should go to the son's daughter.
It appears we can conclude that, In the Biblical text as well as
In rabbinical literature, the son is the heir to the estate of his father In pre-
3
ference to a ll other heirs.
1. A . Gulak, 'Jewish', sub. *Law*, En.So.Sc. IX, 221. The Sadducees and 
Pharisees had great differences on this point. To the Pharisees, the equal­
ity  of rights of daughters with sons was nothing else than 'the robbing of 
orphans', whereas the Sadducees were no less justified, from their point
of view, In describing the disinheritance of daughters In the same language, 
see L . Glnzberg, An Unknown Jewish Sect (Revised and updated trans lat- 
lon of the author s Elne unbekannte jddlsche Sekte, (1922), (New York, 
1976), 157.
2. Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra, 115b; Tosefta Yadaylm, 11.20; Palestin­
ian Talmud, Baba Bathra, V III, 1, 16a. The doctrine of representation had 
no foundation Ig the Torah, but on a right Interpretation of the Pentateuch, 
the Pharisees could not hold otherwise.
3. Philo allowed unmarried daughters to Inherit with their brothers, De Speclal- 
Ib us Leg lb us, II, 125, cited by E.R. Goodenough, The Jurisprudence of the 
Jewish Courts In Egypt# (Amsterdam, 1968), 59. But Philo admitted that In 
a normal sort of Inheritance, son Is definitely the true heir of his father, 
Spec. Legg., II, 124, cited by Goodenough, Ib id ., 56, n.98.
213.
V II .  Conclusion
Before we close our dtscusstpn on Jewish law, we must clear up one
other point Tn order to avoid possible misunderstanding of our central theme,
namely, the concept of the Mltaksara birthright. It Is true that In Jewish
law, like Roman law,  ^ a son Inherits his father's estate whether he wants It  
2
or not, but that by Itself Is no proof of a son's birthright.
It Is well-known that Jewish law does not provide equal shares for a ll
3
sons; on the contrary, the eldest son gets a double share. The strong prefer-
4
ence shown to the first-born seems to have been an old custom In Israel, and
the Deuteronomic rule guarantees the double portion of the eldest son against
5
any arbitrary action by the father. The Code makes | t  an absolute rule that, 
although the eldest son Is born from a wife whom the father might disfavour,
1 . G a l.11. 156-8; The Institutes of Justinian, II. X IX .2.
2. N . Llpschutz, *WllIs In the C iv il Law of Israel and In the Jewish Law', In 
International Lawyers Convention In Israel, 1958, (Jerusalem, 1959), 257- 
275 at 271.
3. Deut. 21.15-17. The same provision could be found In the Assyrian laws, 
at Nuzl and at Marl, E .A . Spelser, 'New Kirkuk Documents Relating to 
Family Laws'AAS OR 10 (1928-9), 1-73 at 7 -8 . R. de Vaux, Ancient 
Israel, o p .c lt., 53.
4 . G en.27; also, 49.3 . The point has been discussed by G . von Rad,
Das fOnfte Buch Mose: Deuteronomlum, tr. D. Barton, sub. t i t . ,  Deutero- 
nomy: A Commentary, (London, 1974), 138.
5. Rad., Ib id ., 138.
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s ttll such a son is entitled to his double shared
This right of the eldest son to a double portion, a right which a father
cannot vary, has been designated as •birthright*, as In the case of Esau's sale
2
of his birthright to his brother.
3
Again Halhed In the Preface to A Code of Gentoo Laws, tried to
4 -Interpret the right of the Prodigal son In terms of the Mltaksara birthright.
1. Deut. 21.15-17* G . von Rad, ■Deuteronomy: A Commentary, (London, 
1974), 138. R. Yaron, Gifts In Contemplatlon of Death, o p .c lt., 9.
R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, o p .c lt., 53. The classical Greek law also 
provided double portion of the Inheritance to the eldest son, E.R. Goode­
nough, The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts In  Egypt, o p .c lt., 56-7, 
n.99. This custom was carried over Into Ptolemlc Egypt, Goodenough, 
ib id ., 57. Philo justifies the double share of the eldest son on the ground 
that he It Is who first makes the parents to be parents and It Is a manifesta­
tion of lust on the part of the father who takes a second wife when he a l­
ready has an heir, Spec. Legg. II, 135-9, Goodenough, Ib id ., 57. In 
Hindu law, a good number of texts prescribe unequal partition and some of 
them ordain two shares for the eldest, Gautama, 28.9-10, SBE, 2,300; 
Manu, 9.117; Vas. V jl .42. But double share to the eldest was not ap­
proved by the sastra, Apastamba, 2, 14, 10-11, Dh.K . 1166a. For a dis­
cussion on this., see Ludo Rocher, 'Hindu Law of Succession: From the 
Sastras to Modern Law*, Revue du sud-est aslatlque, 1967/1, 1-47 at 11-12. 
Also Radhabjnod Pal, The History of Primogeniture^with Special Reference to 
India, Ancient and Modern, TLL, 1925, (Calcutta, 1929).
2. Deut .21.17.
3 . Halhed, The Code of Gentoo Laws, (London, 1776), Preface, Iv l.
4 . Luke, 15.11-32.
According to DeutoronomTc rule, a father was bound to leave each
1 2 son his due, but on a close analysis neither the right of the eldest nor the
right o f the other sons to a share In the Inheritance resembles the Innate right
of a Mltaksara son. In Jewish law, like their Mltaksara counterparts, none
of these sons seems to have the right to demand a share from their father. In
this context, one cannot treat the subject better than Derrett, who states:
‘Neither at law nor by custom nor according to any sort of reasoning could
3this son demand anything like a share.1 To dissipate any possible miscon­
ception, Derrett continues and explains the situation In terms of agro-economics
4
and social morphology: * . . .  the Jews, like every other eastern agricultural
society, treated an ancestral farm as virtua lly common property In dally use.
Agriculturists live like co-owners, but when a domestic crisis arises, the speclal-
5
Itles of the private law reveal themselves.*
However, to forestall fraternal quarrel, a father could *set his house
1. R. Yaron, lo c .c lt . ,  10.
2. It Is Interesting to note that with each of the patriarchs, the first-born was 
deprived of his rank, Yaron, Ib id ., 9. Vaux, lo c .c lt ., 53. Cp. Apastamba, 
2, 14, 10-11.
3. Derrett, Law In the New Testament, (London, 1974), 104. The portion which 
the prodigal son received was probably a case of dismission (Abschlchtung). 
Dismission Is an arrangement under which a son receives a portion of the 
father*s property while the father Is s till a live , and thereby, loses a ll further 
claims to the Inheritance, Yaron, G ifts In Contemplation of Death, o p .c lt.,
2, 42-5.
4 . On social morphology, see D. Black and M . Mlleskl, The Social Organlza- 
tlon of Law, (New Yorl^^ondon, 1973), Introd., 8-9.
5. Derrett, lo c .c lt . ,  104-5.
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In order* by giving verbal instructions about the distribution of his property, 
although he had to conform to law and custom J
Although religion and law appear to be two different concepts, in
2
Hebrew society religion, law and morals were undifferentiated. This 
ethico-jucidic view has played a decisive role in the formations of the various
3 r*rules and, consequently, property in Jewish law was suwbject to moral respon- 
4
sibilities. According to Jewish legal philosophy, a man*s property is but a
kind of holding from the Lord. Society adopts this religious view that there
does not exist any fu ll ownership, and , moreover, rights of property are re-
5
strained in favour of persons in need of special care. Therefore, in a society 
where parents were honoured as God himself,^ a father would have moral claim,
1. R. de Vaux, Ancient Israel, o p .c it., 53. R. Yaron, lo c .c lt ., 10. This 
was the beginning of a g ift in contemplation of death to a favourite son, 
Derrett, ib id ., 105, n .2 .
2. B. Cohen, Law and Tradition in Judaism, (New York, 1969), 185.
3. Law of property merges with ethics: the particular formalities in a contract 
of sale and purchase involved no ethical considerations, yet the failure to 
keep one*s word in an oral contract was morally condemned, B. Cohen,
Law and Tradition in Judaism, (New York, 1969), 195. Cp. the Hindu 
view of property as kratvartha and purusartha, RLSI, Ch.5 .
4 . Derrett, Law in the New Testament, o p .c it., 111.
5. Z .W . Falk, ‘Jewish Law*, In Derrett, ed ., An Introduction to Legal Systems, 
(London, 1968), 28-53 at 42.
6. Lev. 19.3, to be read with Deut. 6.13; Ex.20.12; Prov.3.9. Fora dis­
cussion on this, see The Sifra on Lev. 19.3, J. Newman, Halachic Sources: 
From the Beginning to the Nineteenth Century, (Leiden, 1969), 99-100.
B. Cohen, Io c .c it., 185, 222. Derrett, lo c .c it . ,  109-10.
In case of necessity, on the earnings even of his separated sonsj
A t the same time, It Is worthwhile noting that In Jewish Iaw^ no one
2
was entitled to disinherit his heirs. But the Pentateuchal law was causing 
hardship by depriving the daughter of any share In the Inheritance, and by pre­
venting the father from making a bequest when he did not want the Inheritance
3
to fa ll to a son whose behaviour was not to his lik ing. So, lately, by circum­
venting the law of Inheritance, a father may deprive his sons by making a g ift
4
of his properties to strangers. The rabbis, however, made no secret of their
5
dislike of this power given to the father of the family. S till, to provide for 
the need of making testamentary disposition, technically keeping the Penta­
teuchal law Intact, recourse was had to the fiction of g ift Inter vivos. ^
1. Derrett, Ib id ., I l l . Note the view of R. Abln who opines: *A son who 
seems to live apart during the lifetime of his father, what he acquired he 
acquired for himself*, Methlboth, J . Newman, Halachlc Sources, (Leiden, 
1969), 237. Cp. Jesus enjoined, ‘parents must be supported from their 
children's possessions*, M . Hengel, Property and Riches In the Early Church, 
(London, 1974), 27.
2. H .H . Cohn, ed., Jewish Law In Ancient and Modem Israel, (New York, 
1971), Introd., xxx.
3 . R. Yaronf  Gifts In Contemplation of Death, o p .c lt., 33.
4 . On this mark the subtle terminological device, * . . .  whoever says, "Let X 
Inherit from me" had said nothing; ‘Give my goods to X ‘ , his words stand*, 
Tosephta Baba Bathra, 7.16, cited by R. Yaron^ G ifts In Contemplation of 
Death, o p .c lt., 30.
5. Yaron, Ib id ., 39.
6. An example of expediency v . authority; for a discussion on this In context 
of Hindu law, see RLSI, Ch.5. Cp. judicial evolution of w ill In Hindu law, 
I n f r a , 4*3 .
By this fictitious device, a man could give his property to another person *as 
from today until after death*, whereupon the g ift would take effect Immediately 
but the donee could claim delivery of the property only upon the donor*s death. ^
The development of testamentary disposition through fictitious de­
vices Is another aspect of Jewish law which highlights the nature of a son*s
2right In the property of his father. This ‘more or less Indefeasible* right 
of a Jewish son could be mistermed *blrthrlght* but, as the above discussion 
shows, ItTs fundamentally different from the Mltaksara birthright which is 
synonymous with the co-ownership of a son with his father. In this context, 
a comparison between Hindu law and Jewish law may not be rewarding to 
those who revel in parallel-hunting, but there Is no denying the fact that 
to a legal comparat!st,a contrast also provides a useful sidelight on his 
central theme.
1. Baba Bathra, 126a; 136a, cited by H .H . Cohn, Jewish Law In Ancient 
and Modem Israel, o p .c it., in trod., xxx. This fiction did not cover 
gifts in respect of after-acquired property which was dealt with by the 
fictitious acknowledgement of a debt for which the donee was entitled 
to satisfy himself from any after-acquired property left by the deceased 
donor, Baba Bathra, 149a; 157a, cited by Cohn, ib id ., xxx.
2 . The phrase was used by S .G . Vesey-Fitzgerald in context of mediaeval 
Roman law, ‘Family Property In Beaumanoir: A  Study in Comparative Law*, 
8 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, (1926) 1: 71- 
80 at 72. It is significant that uhtier Jewish law, no son could sell his 
prospective inheritance. The rabbis themselves had to grant dispensations 
in favour of the children of persons on their deathbeds when the children 
tried to obtain money for funeral expenses on the security of their prospect­
ive estates, Maimonides* Mishneh Torah, or Code of Laws, Meklrah 22, 1, 
5-6, based upon several rather controversial talmudic passages, cited by
S.W. Baron, *The Economic Views of Maimonides* in S.W. Baron, ed ., 
Essays on Maimonides, o p .c lt., 155, n.58.
CHAPTER 8
THE SASAN1AN LAW
I. Historical Background
Probably during the seventeenth century B.C.  ^ a group of Indo-
Aryans crossed the Oxus and moved Into the Iranian Plateau. They were
followed by successive Aryan waves, but up to c . 1200 B.C. their presence
remained Insignificant. However, before c . 900 B.C. they had crossed the
2
Zagros range and spread to the north and south.
Iran, being the geographical focal point between Asia Minor and
India, had contact throughout the ages with the great civilizations of East 
3
and West. The Achaemenld Empire (c. 559 -  330 B.C.) In Persia succeeded 
the last Babylonian Empire and continued until the defeat of Darius III by A lex­
ander. The Seleucld period was followed by Parthian domination until the
third century A .D . when the Sasanlan Empire was established (c. 224 A .D . -  
4
651).
1. En.Br. (1970), XVII, 653.
2. D .N . Wilber, Iran Past and Present, (Princeton, 1975), 25.
3. G . Morgenstlerne, *Early Iranlc Influence upon Indo-Aryan*, Acta Iranlca 
Actes Du Congres Dhe Shiraz 1971 et Autres Irtudes Redlgees A L‘ccasIon du 
2500 Annlversalre de la Fondatlon De L ‘empire Perse, (Teherar/liege, 1974), 
I, 271-279 at 279.
4 . For a short history of the early dynasties, see D .N . Wilber, lo c .c lt . ,  26-36.
During the early Sasantan period , part of Northern and Western
2India was conquered by the Iranians. Ultimately, the Sasanians came Into
3political contact with the Romans. Thus, the course of history during the 
Sasanlan perTod Implies an awareness on the part of the Iranians of the Babylon­
ian, Hellenic, Indian and Roman legal systems,
4
Zoroastrianism continued to flourish as the state religion under the 
Sasanians until the overthrow of the dynasty by the Arabs in 651 A .D . After 
three centuries , some Zoroastrlans who could manage It fled to the Western 
shores of India. It Is now generally accepted that the founders of the Pars!
1. We should note that Darius the Great (c. 522 -  486 B .C .) also conquered 
part of the North-West India, see Dastur Dr. F.A. Bode, ‘ Influence of 
Ancient Iran on India1, Journal of K.R. Cama Oriental Institute , 40 (1960), 
120-142 at 129-131. Also G ,W. Briggs, *Brlef Outline of the ndo-lrantan 
Contacts * In J .D .C . Parvey, ed., Oriental Studies In Honour of Cursetjl 
Erachjl Parvey, (London, 1933), 50-60 at 50.
2. J. Charpentler, The Sasanlan Conquest of the Indus Region*, S. Krlshnaswaml, 
Alyangar Commemoration Volume, (Madras, 1936), 11 -17 at 14, 17. Also 
J .M . Unvala, ‘Political and Cultural Relations between Iran and India*,
ABORI 28 (1947), 165-189 at 181.
3. EruBr. (1970) XV II, 670.
4. On Zoroastrlan fa ith , see K.F. Geldner, ‘Zoroastrlan Religion In the Avesta*, 
tr. J .C . Tavadla, JKRCOI 24 (1933), 1-80. J.C . Tavadla, The Life of 
Zarathustra as based on the Avesta*, JKRCOI 36 (1943)^ 47-101. Also more 
recent, Mary Boyce, *A History of Zoroastrianism*, B. Spuler, ed ., Handbuch 
der Orlentallstlk, (Leiden, 1975).
colony in G ujarat arrived there Tn 916 A .D .  ^ They were the ancestors of the
present Parsee community Tn India, and when they left theTr fatherland they,
2
as a community, were following the rules of Sasanlan family law.
3
However, In the laws of the Sasanlan period we are not expecting
4
an unbroken thread of legal traits stretching from Babylon to Bombay, never- 
-  5
the less, the AryanlzatTon of Iran and India, and their mutual experiences 
through the stages of history justify a juridical study Tn the comparative context.
1. S.H. Hodlvala, Studies In Pars! History, (Bombay, 1920), 67-91. The Im­
pression given by Inostranstev and Irani that the Parsees arrived In India In the 
7th century Is no longer tenable. On their hypotheses, see K. Inostranstev, 
tr. L. Bogdanov, The Emigration of the Pars Is to India and the Musulman 
World Tn the Middle of the V II Century*, JKRCOI 1 (1922), 33-74. P.K.
Irani, The Personal Law of the Parsls of India*, Tn J .N .D . Anderson, ed.,
Family Law In Asia and A frica, (London, 1968), 273-300 at 273.
2. Derrett, TLL, 253.
3. We call the Zoroastrlan traditional *SasanIan* because It survives (Insofar as 
It does) In records of that, the last Zoroastrlan Imperial epoch. R-esumably,
It was more or less the same under the Arsaclds and Aschaemeneans before them.
4. The Pars! law Tn India Is largely based on Hindu customary law and rules of 
English law. P.K. Irani, lo c .c lt . ,  273, 281. Derrett, RLSI, 40, n .1 ,7 ;
48-9. Presumably, before British rule, Pars! law was a mixture of their own 
traditional law with Hindu customary law. This Is the view of Mary Boyce.
5. The word Iran Itself has come from Artya; middle Persian: Eran. Eran Is 
from Eransahr: *Iand of the ^ Aryans*, Eran being an Old genltlv e plural.
Darius I called himself as Arlya, En.Br. (1970), XV II, 653. A tone time, 
the Iranians called themselves as *ArIan*, see D.P. Sanjana*s translation of 
Dr. Gelger*s German, The Ethnography of the Avesta People* In J .J .Z .
Madressa, ed ., The Collected Works of the Late Dastur Darab Peshotan Sanjana, 
(Bombay, 1932), 110. The present Shah has given himself the title  of Aryanmfhr, 
meaning *frlend to the Aryans*, I .e . to his own subjects; I am grateful to Mary 
Boyce for this Information.
II. Traces of joint family
The Zoroastrlan legal treatises were worked out partly before and
partly during the SasanTan perTod. The Sasanlan laws show unambiguous traces 
2of joint family life Tn the PahlavT treatises. Each joint family lived under the
domestic management of the Lord and Lady of the ^ouse. If either of them
died, the eldest son of the family or his w ife, living joint with the family, took 
4
his or her place. The Lord of the House was the manager of the joint family
5
property and, besides having their Interest In the joint family property, the
1. The Zoroastrlan legal treatises were examined In Palhavl original by Dr.
B .J. Daboo. The typescript of Daboos* Ph.D. thesis, University of Bombay, 
on Sasanlan Law was used by Derrett, TLL, 263-4. It Is to be noted that In­
formation on the legal system during the Achaemenld period Is very Insignifi­
cant and no collection of legal treatises, In fact, has survived, En.Br.,
(1970), XVII, 660.
2. Derrett, TLL, 263. S .J. Bulsara, The Laws of the Ancient Persians as Found 
In the *Matlkan e Hazar Datastan* or *The Digest of a Thousand Points of Law, 
(Bombay, 1937), 3 l2 , (hereinafter as MHD). This work seems to have been 
written In, or Immediately after the ninth century A .D . The author Is Fark- 
hanmard, the son of Vahram and the authorities quoted In the work are a ll of 
the Sasanlan period, see J .J . Modl*s Introduction, In E .T .D . Anklesarla,
The Social Code of the Parsees Tn Sasanlan Times or The Madlgan-1- Hazar
Dadlstan, (Bombay, 1912), 11.
3. See Bulsara, Ib id ., Introd., 50. Cp. Hindu, £rut! text; dharme ca arthe ca 
kame ca na atlcarltarya /  *In matters relating to Duty (religious acts) and to 
property and to pleasure the wife should not be Ignored*, A .S . Nataraja 
Ayyan, MTmamsa Jurisprudence, (Allahabad, 1952), 37.
4 . Bulsara, Ib id ., Introd., 50.
5. MHD, XXI 1.4; XXVI11.2. Also Bulsara, Introd., 51.
Individual members could have separate property of their own.
a. Proprietary relationship of lather and son
Although Bulsara would like to make us believe that *a son of the
family could demand his lawful share In the family property and establish a
2
separate home of his own*, the text on which he relied does not say anything
to that effect d irectly. However, It Is certainly correct to say that a son
could live separately from the family during the lifetime of the Lord of the 
3
House, and It Is clear from the texts that In the management of the {oTnt 
family property, the father-manager had no arbitrary power of disposition.
A text In the MadTgan-I-Hazar Dadlstan clearly states: "The wife and child­
ren cannot be disinherited, and the patrimony legally coming down to one*s
4
family cannot be alienated*.
b. Procedural law
But Bulsara*s conclusion In the light o f his Interpretation of the text 
Is buttressed to a certain extent by procedural law dealing with the rights of a 
minor son. In BarthoIomae*s ‘Notes on Sasanlan Law*,^ we come across two
1. MHD, XLII, 43; XLIII .20; XXIII .X+72.
2. MHD, XXIII.X+72.
3. MHD, XXIII.X+72.
4 . MHD, 1.20, 6-7, cited by M . ShakI, The Sassanlan Matrimonial Relations*, 
archIv orlenta ln l, 39 (1971), 322-345 at 341.
5. MHD, XXII.X+72. See n.2 above.
6. C . Bartholomae, *Zum Sasanldlschen Recht*, tr. L . Bogdanov, 18 JKRCOI 
(1931) 1 : 1-67; 21 JKRCOI (1932) I : 1-40; 26 JKRCOI (1934) II : 1-80, 
30 JKRCOI (1936) III : 1-103; 41 JKRCOI (1967) IV : 1-93.
cases on the question of burden of proof, which Imply the recognition of a son's 
birthright In joint family property. The cases are presented by way of Illustra­
tion to determine as to which of the parties In a litigation Is to be considered as
'nearer to proving by oa th 'J  As a general rule, the right of taking the oath
2
(var) In a tria l belonged to the defendant, but, In special cases, the p la in tiff 
could be considered as offering, through the var, the evidence for a better deci­
sion; and the protection of the right of a minor son fe ll Into such a special cate­
gory. The text to that effect runs as follows:
When the head of the family and the mistress 
of the house recognize the obligation of effect­
ing a payment from the family (estate) to a 
countryman and hand over the money for the 
payment, and (when) then In the family the 
son comes of age and contests the liab ility  
towards the one who has the money In his 
possession and Intends a lawsuit: then the 
son has the preference for the decision by 
the var. 2
The rule In the other case runs as follows:
When the chief of the family and the mis 
tress of the house recognize the payment 
(obligation) towards a (former) master of 
the house and disburse the money for the 
payment from the family estate, and 
(when then) a son In the family comes of 
age and registers a complaint against the
1. 26 JKRCOI (1934) II : 1-80 at 30.
x  . The case Is from MHD. MHD, 14.7-10, 26 JKRCOI (1934) II : 1-80 at 31-2.
one who has taken the money, the decision 
lies better with the plaintiff's party. 1
From the evidential point of view, the two cases are not dissimilar; 
but, In the context of a son's right In family property, they reflect two differ­
ent situations. If we set out the cases according to a different schema, the 
situations may be seen In their proper light: In the first case (MHD, 14.7-10), 
the situation may be expressed thus: A family consists of F, W and S , the 
minor. F and W paid a family debt during the minority of S. After attaining 
majority, S contested the liab ility  and sued C the creditor.
In the second case (MHD, 15.12-14) the facts appear to be as
1 1 2follows. A  Joint family consists of F, W, S , 5 W and S , a minor. F and 
W died, and after their death, and S^W became the Lord and Lady of the
House, respectively. and S^W made a payment to C regarding a debt
2 2 due from F. S , after attaining majority, contested the liab ility  and sued C.
In the former situation, the right o f S to contest the liab ility  emanates 
from his birthright; but, In the latter, as It appears from the text, It stems from 
his right to have a share In the estate of his deceased father. However, It Is not 
too far-fetched to conclude that the first case, by allowing the son to contest 
the liab ility , does uphold the Innate right of a son In the Joint family property#
1. MHD, 15.12-14; 26 JKRCOI (1934) II : 1-80 at 33.
2. The expression used In the text Is pus 1 andar dutak ('son of the house*) 
who Is normally the eldest son of the Father of the House If that Is 
meant In this text, then we should take S as the son of S and there 
would be no difference In the Implications of the two situations. 26 
JKRCOI (1934) II: 1-80 at 34.
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i
The payment made to the creditors in these casesiwere not made for the benefit
of the minor, but for the payment o f a family debt. Sasanlan law jealously
guarded the Interest of the minor and, like the sastrlc law of the Hindus, ^
was particular that the property of the minors should remain In the custody of
2
the manager (Father of the House).
III. Testamentary disposition
In Sasanlan law , a father could make a bequest of his self-acquired
3
property. In this also, a son*s position as ‘owner* has been significantly 
highlighted when his taking possession of a legacy Is distinguished from that 
of a stranger. In the ‘Remarks* to the two cases just discussed, the commen­
tator states:
the citizen, when a thing Is bestowed on him,
(Is considered), except when he (expressly) 
declares: "I do enter In possession of the 
thing" not as owner of the thing; the son 
(of the family Is considered) as owner of the 
thing, 4 except when he (expressly) declares:^
Ml do not enter (In possession of the thing)” .
1. Kane, HD , III, 165. Cp. Anglo-Hlndu law situation on this, Hunooman- 
persaud Pandey v . M t. Babooee Munral ( 1856) 6 MIA 393, 423. Also M lta, 
1,1.27-29. For a criticism and comparative background of the Hunooman- 
persaud rule, see Derrett, Critique, A ppx.II, 425-432.
2. MHD, XV. 14.
3. S e en .i below, 2 2 S.
4. Emphasis supplied.
5. MHD, 61.9-11. 26 JKRCOI (1934) II: 1-80 at 35.
Although it Ts accepted that the Sasanians were entitled to make a 
testamentary disposition of their separate property, they had to provide suffi­
cient for the maintenance of wife and children  ^ and to leave wllh the wife a
2
suitable amount for the marriage of the daughters. Again, If there was an
3
only son, ‘the father ought to assign the property to him* and, even though 
the son was guilty o f misbehaviour, the father could not disinherit the son;
4
he was required by law to put the property In trust for the benefit of his son. 
A ll through these rules we can clearly discern the cellular modality of the 
Sasanlan family, In which a fathers power over family property, whether 
joint family or separate, Is considerably restricted by the rights of other 
members, and particularly of his epigones.
1. Derrett, TLL, 263. Cp. svam kutumbavlrodhena deyam, Yajn. 11.175: 
‘Property other than what Is required for the maintenance of the family may 
be given*, Golap Candra Sarkar Sastrl, Hindu Law, 4th ed ., 379. Also 
Vyasa, Dh.K. 1587b: v rttl lopah vlgarhltah/
2. The Dadlstan-1-Dlnlk (hereinafter as Dd.), LIV.6 and 7; LIV.10, Pahlavl 
Texts, Part II, SBE, 18 (Oxford, 1882), 184, 186. The Dadlstan-i-DinTk 
( ‘Religious Opinions or Decisions*) Is a collection of answers to 92 questions 
on religious subjects put to the high priest Manus£!hr who lived c . 881 A .D ., 
see SBE, 18, Introd., x x ll.
3. MHD, XXVIII, 3.
4 . MHD, XLII, X+129.
IV . A  son's obligation to pay the debts of hTs father
From Daboo's treatment of the subject, as stated by Derrett,  ^ we
2
come to know that in SasanTan law, sons were obliged to pay the untainted
debts of their father. But this supposition of a parallel system of 'pious o b ll-
3 _ _ _ _ _ _
gatlon' Is not endorsed by the texts of the Matlkan 1 Hazar Datatltan.
4
A son's personal property could not be seized for payment of his father's debt, 
but the son might have to surrender his portion of property Inherited from his
5
father to meet the paternal debt.
1. Derrett, TLL, 264-270.
2. On this, see Derrett, Critique, $$128-139.
3. On Its origin In Hindu law, see Kane, HD, III, 442 f f .  Also Derrett,
'Indlca pletas: a current rule derived from remote antiquity ', Z e lt- 
schrlft der Savlgny-Stlftung fuer Rechtsgeschlchte, Rom.Abt., vol .86 
(1969) 37-66; Critique, 93, n . 10.
4 . MHD, XLII. 8. Also Bulsara, o p .c lt., 591, n.12.
5. MHD, XLII. 4 . We find In a text In the Zend-Avesta that breach of a
'word contract* by a man was considered as a great sin. For this breach, 
the next-of-kln of the man to the 9th degree (Nabanazadlstas) were answer 
able for three hundred years, Z .A . IV . 11c. 5 and 6 to be read with IV.
1 ld .1 1. But the commentators reduced these three hundred years and, 
curiously enough, prescribed that 'only the son bom after the breach Is 
liable for It, when the father dies, the son I f  righteous, has nothing to 
fear from I t ',  Zenda^Avesta, Part I, SBE, 4 , (Oxford, 1880), 36, n .3 .
V . Trust For ptous purposes
We shall presently see that even Tn making a g ift or setting up a 
trust for ptous purposes, a father's power Tn respect of joint family property was 
considerably restricted.
Like most ancient peoples of the world, the ancient Iranians had a 
strong sense of existence after death. In the remote past, the ritual after 
death was the responsibility o f the living,^ but eventually It became Incumbent 
on the Individual to make provision for himself for the essential rites to be per­
formed for him after his death. And, for this purpose, the Individual dould
2
endow property for the performance of such rites. Quite often the Zoro-
astrlans used to set up a Sacred Fire and put property Tn trust for the malnten- 
3
ance of that Fire. B ut Sasanlan law allowed a father to make a g ift of
1. Cp . Hindu son's obligation to perform the sraddha ceremonies of his parents, 
Br, 5.66; Alyangar, ed ., 335; Dh.K. 1349a. A trl, D h.K . 1352b, see Infra,
2. M . Boyce, The Pious Foundations of the Zoroastrlans', BSOAS 31 (1968) 1: 
270-289 at 271.
3. Usually the trustees were the children and other members of the family, and as 
trustees of the endowment they could enjoy part of the Income, M . Boyce,
'On the Sacred Fires of the Zotoastrlans*, BSOAS 31 (1968), 1: 52-68 at 62. 
For comparable Institution Tn Hindu law, see B .K . Muherjea, The Hindu Law 
of Religious and Charitable Trust, TLL, 1936, (Calcutta, 1962), 1-46. Also 
Derrett, RLSI, 482-512. The Indo-Iranlan cult of fire evidently goes back to 
the Institution of hearth fire . When a man set up his home he used to light a 
hearth fire and kept It alight as long as he lived, M . Boyce, (review of K. 
SchTppmann's Die Tranlschen FeuerhelllgtBmer), 'On the Zoroastrlan Temple 
Cult of Fire*, JAOS 95 (1975) 3 : 454-465 at 454-5 . On setting up of hearth 
fire by the Vedlc Indians, see G .D . Sonthelmer,EHJFI,42.
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property For ptous purposes only up to that extent which would not deprive his
wife and children of their lawful Inheritance J  He was allowed, however,
2
to give away ‘something of the house* to deserving people. It Is, Indeed, 
true that the law discountenanced a father's Indiscriminate use of joint family 
property even for pious purposes; this Is evident from a judgment of the epi­
scopal dignitaries. The decision, as translated by Bulsara, goes like this:
One was the de liberation that was announced 
that there was a certain Master of D ivin ity 
Mah-Atro Freh-Goshnasp (who) kept pertually 
aflame the Holy Fire at Ram-Shah puhar 3 when 
It could not (otherwise) be kept aflame continu­
ously, and (at last) he passedavay; (and) when 
(afterwards) It was not possible to keep that 
Holy Fire perpetually aflame from his personal 
assets, (It had been found as) becoming to keep 
It perpetually aflame from the property belong­
ing to the family of (that) Mah-Atr5 Freh- 
Goshnasp, according to the Episcopal Digni­
taries who had met together and commanded 
that way. 4
5
It Is not clear how far the decision Is jud icia lly Imperative; never­
theless, even merely as a responsum prudentlum, It does Indicate the absence 
of the right of disposition of jo int family property by a father.
1. MHD, XIII .+25 . , This should be taken as valid In respect of joint family 
property.
2. MHD, XXXVII.22.
3. A  c ity founded by one of the Shahpurs, probably the first, (A .D . 241-272).
4 . MHD, XLIV .4, B ulsara, o p .c lt., 616-8.
5 . See Bulsara, o p .c lt., 618, n .4 .
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V I .  Conclusion
But we should not overstate the Innate right of a son In the Sasanlan 
system In the context of a comparison with the Mltaksara birthright. Cer­
tainly, the family law of the Sasanians does not Indicate the existence of an 
Institution like the Roman patrla potestas, but, at the same time, It does not
exh ib it, as does the Mltaksara  ^ system, the crystallization of the son's right 
2
by birth In the whole corpus of property In the hands of the father. In
Sasanlan law, a father's freedom over separate property was unrestricted but,
In the Mltaksara system, the acknowledgement of the freedom over separate
3
property was a creation of Anglo-HIndu Law.
However, when we consider the common origin of the Hindus and 
the Iranians, we need not be surprised by the striking parallels between the 
Sasanlan and Hindu legal systems. The resemblances between the two systems 
which we have Identified are found where they were most to be expected, and 
the contextual variants which emerge may be taken as being conditioned by 
the respective cultural and environmental patterns.
1. Wrongly denied In Rao Balwant Singh v . Rani KIshorl (1898) 25 IA 54, for 
a fuller discussion, see Infra,7 4 5 -6 .
2. See Katama Nachlar v . Srlmut Rajah Moottoo (Rajah of Shlvaganga) (1863) 
9 MlA 539. For a discussion, see Derrett, 'Hindu Law: The Rights of the 
Separated Son', 19SCJ (1956), 103-111 at 108.
3. It should be borne In mind that the Mltalqara system does not represent a 
pure Indo-Aryan concept. Fora discussion on this, see Infra,488-~9*
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CHAPTER 9
FARTHER INDIA
I . The Historical and Juridical Background
In the context of our present study, the IndtanTzed civilizations of
1 2 Southeast Asia, commonly known as ^Greater India*, or ‘Farther India*,
should not suffer an unmerited neglect. ‘Farther India* Includes the old 
3
Hindu kingdoms In the present states of Sri Lanka, Burma, Malaysia, Thai­
land, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam. Excluding Ceylon, 
the rest of ‘Farther India* mainly comes under the geographical division South-
1. H .G . Quarltch Wales, The Making of Greater India, (London, 1974), 1.
2. G . Coedes, Hlstolre anclenne des etats htndouls& d*Extreme Orient, tr.
S.B. Cowing, sub.tit. The Indlanlzed States of Southeast Asia, (Honolulu, 
1968), Introd., xv. The phrase was used earlier by H . C lifford, Further 
India, (London, 1905). A IsoW .F. Stutterhelm, Indian Influences In the 
Lands of the Pacific, (G . Kolff & C o., Wetterreden), 1-9 at 1,4; SO AS 
Library: G 940/22299.
3. Prominent among these kingdoms were: Funan and Khmer In present Cambodia; 
Srlvljaya In Southern Sumatra; Sallendra In central Java; Champa on the 
east coast of the peninsula, between the mountain spur of Hoanh-son and the 
Mekong delta; Dvaravatl In the southern part of the Menam valley; £rlk»e*Ta 
In the lower valley of the Irrawaddy; for fuller discussion, see R. Le May,
The Culture of South-East Asia: The Heritage of India, (London, 1954), Ch.
11-IX. B. Harrison, South-fast Asia: A  Short History^ (London, 1964), 21- 
49. G . Coedes, Les Peuples De La Penlnsule Indochlnolse, tr . H .M .W right, 
su b .tit., The Making o f South East Asia, (London, 1966), 50-117; also his 
classic work, The Indlanlzed States of Southeast Asia, lo c .c lt . ,  etseq.
east Asta.^ The general cultural pattern Tn the whole area and, especially,
the difference in ethnic classification between h ill and valley peoples, are
2
‘despair to cultural cartographers*. With our knowledge mainly of conven­
tional societies, a mlcroanalytlcal study of the varied and complex societal 
phenomenon of Southeast Aslan culture Is Indeed very d ifficu lt, and In this 
respect, the observation of Laurlston Sharp Is worth noting: *E quipped only 
with the conventional cookle-cutter concept of culture, we find ourselves
Tn grave analytical difficulties when we turn to Southeast Asia, lying between
3
the great creative but self-producing civilizations of India and China*.
4
Among a ll the Southeast Aslan countries, Vietnam was completely slnlclsed 
and, aside from Vietnam, perhaps Thailand had the closest historical ties
5
with China.
1. Freedman, however, Is not In favour of Including Vietnam, the seat of the 
ancient kingdom of Champa, In Southeast Asia. According to him, V ie t­
nam should be grouped with the East Aslan countries which comprise the 
area of Chinese c iv ilization, M . Freedman, *An Epicycle of Cathay: or, 
The Southward Expansion of the Sinologists*, In R. J. Smith, ed., Social 
Organizations and the Applications of Anthropology: Essays In Honor of 
Laurlston Sharp, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London, 1974), 302-332 
at 302-3.
2. L. Sharp, ‘Cultural Continuities and Discontinuities In Southeast Asia*, 
JAS, 22 (1962), 3-11 at 5. Also G . Coedes, The Making of South East 
Asia, lo c .c lt . ,  32.
3. L. Sharp, ‘Cultural Continuities and Discontinuities Tn Southeast Asia*,
JAS 22 (1962), 3-11 at 5.
4 . G . Coedes, The Making of South East Asia, o p .c lt., 49-50.
5. H .J . Welns, Han Chinese Expansion In South China, (Hamden, The Shoe 
String Press, 1967), 345.
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The Indlanlzatlon or 'Brahmanlzatlon*  ^ of 'Farther India' started around
2the beginning of the Christian era, when the autochthonous societies of the area
3
were s till In fie midst of late Neolithic c iv iliza tion . In this respect, 'Indlan-
Izatlon must be understood essentially as the expansion of an organized culture
that was founded upon the Indian conception of royalty, was characterized by
Hlndulst or Buddhist cu lt, the mythology of the P u ra r^  and the observance of
n  4Dharmasastras, and expressed Itself In the Scjskrlt language'. However, Indian
5
culture could not engulf the popular Indigenous Institutions and most historians
1. G . Coedes, The Indlanlzed States of Southeast Asia, o p .c lt., 15. In using 
terms, such as, 'Brahmanlzatlon' or 'Hlndulzatlon', we must not overlook the 
fact that Brahmlnlsm was replaced by Buddhism In these regions and Buddhist 
philosophy played an Important part In the process of Indlanlzatlon, G .H .E . 
Hall, A  History of South-East Asia, (London, 1968), 12. A lsoB. Harrison, 
South-East Asia; A  Short History, o p .c lt., 15-16.
2. L.P. Briggs, 'A  Sketch of Cambodian History', FEQ 6 (1947) 4: 345-363 at 
346. B. Harrison, South-East Asia, lo c .c lt ., 12. R.C. Majumdar men­
tions the view that Indian colonization In the Far East could be pushed back 
to a time prior to the Aryan and Dravldlan conquest o f India, Hindu Colonies 
In the Far E ast (Calcutta, 1973), 7. Coedes also concedes that there was a 
community of culture between pre-Aryan India and the Far East, The Indian- 
Ized States of Southeast Asia, o p .c lt., 8. Also see, A . Lamb, 'Indian Influ­
ence In Ancient South-east Asia', In A .L . Basham, ed ., A Cultural History of 
India, (Oxford, 1975), 442-452 at 442; also the Appx. to the article by
H .H .E . Loofs, 452-454.
3 . Coedes, The Indlanlzed States of Southeast Asia, o p .c lt., 7-8 . R.C. Majum­
dar, Ancient Indian Colonisation In South-East Asia, (Baroda, 1955), 15,
L. Sharp, JAS 22 (1962), 3-11 at 7 -8 .
4 . Coedes, Ib id ., 15-16.
5. We should note that although a ll the regions of India contributed to this expan­
sion, the greatest part of the contribution was made by the South, H .G . 
Quarltch Wales, The Making of Greater India, o p .c lt., 28. On the nature 
and pace of Hlndulzatlon of Southeast Asia, see L.P. Briggs, The Hlndulzed 
States of Southeast Asia ', FEQ 7 (1948), 4; 376-393 at 378-9.
agree  ^ that ‘under the Indian veneer, most of the population preserved the
2
essentials of their own culture*.
Nevertheless, from the juridical point o f view, Hindu expansion 
In this part of the globe was significant. Along with Hindu culture and 
commerce, Hindu jurisprudence found Its way Into this region which Is elo­
quently emphasized by Furnlvall In these words:
. . .  the emigrants from India, Hindu and 
Buddhist , who laid the foundation of a new 
world In the Tropical Far East, took with them 
their law-book, the Code of Manu. Every­
where throughout the region Manu has left 
his mark: Ibln Burma both among Mon and ^
Burman, In Slam, Cambodia, Java and Ball.
Despite controversies over the extent of the Influence of the dharma-
sastras on the legal systems of the IndTanlzed states, It Is Indeed accepted that 
the Manavadharmasastra served as a model In form, and to a certain degree In 
substance, to the legal writers of ‘Farther India*. However, It w ill be unwise 
to think that the sastra alone was the source of law In this area; and, especially
1. On this point, note R.C. Majumdar‘s Indo-centrlc view. He disagrees 
■itfth those who ‘exaggerate the local factors and belittle the Importanceof 
Hindu element*, Ancient Indian Colonisation In South East Asia, o p .c lt,, 15
2. Coedes, The IndlanTzed States of Southeast Asia, o p .c lt., 33. Inscriptions 
from Java prove that the lower classes of Indonesian society were uneffected 
by Hindu element, W.F. Stutterhelm, Indian Influences In the Lands of the 
Pacific, o p .c lt., 5. Also J .M . Van Der Kroef, The HInduTzatTon of Indo­
nesia Reconsidered*, FEQ 11 (1951), 1: 17-30 at 21.
3. J.S. Furnlvall, *Manu In Burma: Some Burmese Dhammathats*, Journal of 
the Burma Research Society, 30 (1940) 2: 351-370 at 351.
in the sphere of family law, it is rather to be expected tM t, within the frame­
work of the sastra, the local customs continued to be followed.
Having taken into consideration the existence of local, traditional 
customs and the Introduction of the sastra through *BrahmanIzatIon‘ , the family 
law of ‘Farther India‘Is Important In the sense that It can provide valuable In ­
sights from two angles on the Mltaksara birthright. First, from a study of the 
sastra-oriented literature of the area, we may have an appraisal of the sastrlc 
position from a pseudo-sastrlc angle and, secondly, from the glimpses of the 
customary practices of the people, we would supplement our comparative know­
ledge of the jural behaviour of primitive societies In this part of Asia relative to 
the proprietary relationship between father and son.
11. Ceylon
Although Sinhalese chronicles record North-lndlan colonization In
Ceylon from the 6th century B .C .,  ^ reliable historical records of contact with
India are well-documented from the reign of Devanamplya TIssa (c. 250 -  210)
2
when Buddhism was o ffic ia lly  Introduced Into the Island. However,
1. F .A . Hay ley, The Laws and Customs of the Sinhalese, (Colombo, 1923),
Introd., 3 . T . Hettlarachchy, History of Kingship in Ceylon up to the 
Fourth Century A .D ., (Colombo, 1972), 1-6. T. Vlmalananda, The British 
Intrigue In the Kingdom of Ceylon, (M .D . Gunasena & Co. L td ., 1973), 
Introd., x lv l. The Vljaya legend which records the conquest of Ceylon by 
an Indian prince, has been doubted by G .C . Mendls, The Vljaya Legend*,
In Paranavltana G .C . Felicitation Volume, (Colombo, 1965), 263-279 at 279.
2. T. Hettlarachchy, Ib id ., 1.
Tt is clear that sea traffic emanating from 
distant parts o f India Impinged on Ceylon 
to such an extent that It transformed the 
culture of that Island and brought It w ith­
in the orbit of Indian c iv ilization. This 
was but a precursor of the Impact of Indian 
civilization on a ll of Southeast Asia. 1
In addition to North Indian voyages, Ceylon's contact with the Tamils of South
second
India can be traced back to the/century B .C ., and they undoubtedly started to
control effectively the North and East coast of the Island from the 13th century 
2
A .D . While the Tamil domination was mainly confined to the North, the
South, centering the mountainous region of Kandy, became the stronghold of
the Sinhalese.
a . The Tesawalamal
3
The Tamils of the North, commonly known as the Jaffna Tamils,
4
had a system of customary laws of their own. In 1706, the Dutch codified
5
this customary law as Tesawalamal, the 'Code* which 'was taken from the
1. C. Maloney, The Beginnings of C ivilization In South India', JAS 29 
(1970) 3 : 603-616 at 604.
2 . K. Indrapala, *EarIy Tamil Settlements In Ceylon', Journal o f the Ceylon 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 13 (1969) 43-63 at 46 and 63.
3 . T . Sri Ramanathan, Tesawalaml: The Laws & Customs of the Inhabitants of 
the Province of Jaffna, (Colombo, 4th ed ., 1972), 2.
4 . M .D . Raghavan, The Malabar Inhabitants of Jaffna: A  Study In the Socio­
logy of Jaffna Peninsula*, In Sir Paul Plerls Felicitation Volume, (Colombo, 
1956), 114-131 at 115. H.W. Tamblah, Principles of Ceylon Law, 
(Colombo, 1972), 199.
5 . Hayley, o p .c lt., Introd., 11. H.W . Tamblah, Laws and Customs of the 
Tamils of Jaffna, (Colombo, 1950), 43f. Derrett, 'Preemption In Tesawa­
lamal: a Problem In Choice of Residual Law*, University of Ceylon Review, 
19(1961) 2: 105-16 at 107-8.
mouths of the Mudaliars, but they possessed at that time some tradTtTonal sastrtc 
material, which would have been consulted if  Tt seemed necessary*. ^
Although the Tesawalamal contains a provision similar to the Hindu
2 3
rule of pious obligation of the son to pay the untainted debts of his father,
there Is nothing In the Code to suggest that a son among the Tamils of Jaffna
had any right In his father's property during the latter's lifetime. A  rule In
the Tesawalamal clearly states:
So long as the parents live, the son may not 
claim anything whatsoever; on the contrary, 
they are bound to bring Into the common 
estate 4 (and there to let It remain) a ll that 
they have gained or earned, during the 
whole time of their bachelorship excepting 
wrought gold or silver ornaments for their 
ladles, which have been worn by them and 
which have been either acquired by them­
selves or given to them by their parents, and 
that until the parents die, even I f  the sons ^ 
have married and quitted the paternal roof.
1. Derrett, 'Preemption Among Hindus In Malabar*, KLT (1962), 59-65 at 63; 
also UCR 19 (1961) 2: 105-16 at 107.
2. On the origin of pious obligation, see Kape, HD, III, 442ff. Derrett, 
Mndlca Pletas: a Current Rule Derived from Remote Antiquity*, Zeltschrlft 
der Savlgny-Stlftung fuer Rechtsgeschlchte. Rom.Abt., vo l.86 (1969), 
37-66; also Critique, 93.
3. T. Sri Ramanathan, Tesawalamal . . .  , o p .c lt., 35-6.
4. On this point, cp. the historical position In Hindu law, Sayana on Tal. sam. 
2 .6 .1 .6 ; D h.K . 1161a. Also Sayana on A l.A r . 11.1.8; Dh.K.1163a.
For a discussion, see Derrett, ZVR 64 (1962), 15-130 at 99, n.333; 19 
(1956) S .C .J ., 107. Sayana*s texts are discussed In fra ,530-3-
5. Sri Ramanathan, Ib id ., 4 . Ramanathan thinks that this provision was taken 
from the sastra. Cp. Manu, IX. 104^,D h.K . 1149b.
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b . Kandyan law
The Sinhalese of the Kandyan districts had their own customs and, 
so far as family law was concerned, these customs remained untouched by the 
Portuguese, Dutch and the British.  ^ It seems that the Sinhalese were a people 
of predominantly non-Aryan descent, but their ancestors were part of that amal­
gam which grew out o f the fusion of pre-Aryan with Aryan during the period be-
2
tween c . 1500 and 500 B.C. The amalgram Is reflected In the Kandyan
i
3system of Intestate succession which Is neither patrilineal, matrlllneal, nor
4
what we might call b llinea l. Among the Kandyans adelphlc polyandry
*5exists with *an ambiguous and uncertain type of patrlllny and descent Is
1. Hayley^ o p .c lt., Introd., 21-7.
2. Derrett, The Origins of the Laws of the Kandyans*, UCR 14 (1956) 3 & 4: 
105-50 at 148-9.
3. On pfctrtllneal and matrlllneal succession, see A.R. RAdcllffe-Brown,
Structure and Function In Primitive Society, (London, 1952, rept. 1971),32-48.
4. Blllneal descent Is a combination of matrlllneal and patrilineal descent. The 
two modes of a ffilia tion are followed concurrently. For definition and Illu ­
stration of blllneal system, see G .P . Murdock, 'Double Descent*, American 
Anthropologist, 42 (1940) 4, p t . l :  555-561 at 555, 557, 561. Blllneal des­
cent should not be confused with bilateral descent. The contrast between the 
two systems has been explained by W. H . Davenport, *NonunIlinear Descent 
and Descent Groups*, American Anthropologist 61 (1959) 4: 557-572 at 558. 
Also Murdock, Ib id ., 555, n . l .
5. E.R. Leach, 'Polyandry, Inheritance and the Definition of Marriage: with 
Particular Reference to Sinhalese Customary Law*, In E.R. Leach, Rethinking 
Anthropology, London School of Economics Monograph on Social Anthropology, 
N o.22, (University of London, Athlone, 1961), 105-113 at 109. We should 
note that the 'Sinhalese kinship (ndkama) Is an undifferentiated category Into 
which kin of a ll kinds Is merged', N . Yalman, The Structure of the Sinhalese 
Kindred: A Re-examination of the Dravldlan Terminology', American Anthro­
pologist, 64 (1962), 3, P t.l: 548-575 at 550.
traced through both sexes. ^  As a corollary to the peculiarity of marriage and
descent systems, the family as a unit possesses three categories of property,
‘namely, the entailed Inheritance of the father, the entailed Inheritance of
the mother, and the acquired property -  that Is, the property owned jo in tly  by
the parents by virtue of their operations as a business partnership during the
period of their marriage. The children of the marriage are heirs to a ll cate-
2
gorles of property, but the categories are not merged.
1. Bilateral social system Is found throughout Southeast Asia; for further study 
on this, see R. Firth, *BHateral Descent Groups: an operational viewpoint1, 
Occasional Paper No. 16, Royal Anthropological Institute, (London, 1963), 
22-37 at 22. F. Eggan, ‘Some Aspects of Bilateral Social Systems In the 
Northern Philippines*, In M .D . Zamora, ed ., Studies In Philippine Anthro­
pology f (>n Honor of H. Otley Beyer), (Quezon C ity, Philippines, 1967), 
186-201 at 201.
2. E.R. Leach, Rethinking Anthropology, o p .c lt., 109. Leach claims that 
similar categories of property are found In South India as w ell, Ib id ., 109.
In H^ndu law ‘entailed Inheritance of the father* and the ‘acquired property* 
are well attested, and It applies to South India as w ell. But, apart from
the strldhanam (= ‘strldhan* women's wealth), which generally passes on to the 
daughters, there seems to be no known category of property to the Hindus as 
the ‘entailed Inheritance of the mother*. On strldhanam, see Gooroodas 
Banerjee, The Hindu Law of Marriage and Strldhan, (Calcutta, 1923). Kane, 
HD, 111, ch.30. P.W. Rege, Ph.D. thesis, (London University, 1960) un­
published. Derrett, Critique, 193-7. The customary sources do not profer 
anything In support of Leach's claim. The Pramalal Kallar of Madura and 
Tanjore are patrilineal and heritage Is divided between sons, L. Dumont, 
‘Kinship and Alliance among the Pramalal Kallar*, Eastern Anthropologist,
4 (1950) 1: 3-26 at 4-5 . The customary law of the Vellalar Chettlyars 
shows that excepting ‘ jewels* women had no properly. Men were ‘ the abso­
lute masters of everything* and ‘sons Inherit first*, L. Rocher, ‘Jacob Mossel's 
Treatise on the Customary Laws of the Vella lar Chettlyars*, JAOS 89 (1969) 1: 
27 -50a ts . la, p .33; s.lVa, 35-6; ss.XIVa, X lVe, 46. Among the Udayar 
caste In Northern Tamil Nadu * the rule of Inheritance of property Is patrilin­
eal* and women do not hold title  to property by virtue of Inheritance*, G . 
Burkhart, ‘ Inheritance In South India: An "Anomalous” Case*, Man In India, 
55 (1975) 2: 85-97 at 87. It Is also a long-standing custom among the Hindus 
of Pondlchery that Inheritance Is patrilineal and there Is no suggestion of pro­
prietary Interest of wife or mother, S. Maharajan, ‘Administration of Franco- 
Indlan Laws -  Some Glimpses', JILI 15 (1973) 1: 122-137at 131. Despite 
these evidences, It Is submitted that research on this point Is far from complete.
Normally, a man's primary heirs were his sons, although in appro­
priate cases, daughters, until they were married, had a temporary joint Inter­
est In the landed property with their brothers.  ^ However,
In some situations maternal kindred are pre­
ferred to paternal kindred: at other stages, 
again, we find equal division between both 
sides of the house. Succession to males and 
succession to females differs, as In Hindu 
law, and the course of descent depends 
large ly upon the nature of the property,
Its source and time of acquisition. 2
It Is quite obvious that the Kandyan system represents a contrast to 
the Mltaksara system where, until a partition^ the corpus of family property Is 
maintained Intact In the hands of the managing coparcener.
Apart from this fundamental difference of descent and system of devo­
lution of property between the two systems, one must note that In Kandyan law,
3
as might be expected, there Is no Indication of son's birthright. A  son's right 
of succession to his father's estate (Plya Urume) would arise only after the death 
of the father. In this respect, the law Is stated thus:
1. R. Plerls, T itle  to Land In Kandyan Law', In Sir Paul Plerls Felicitation 
Volume, (Colombo, 1956), 92-113 at 104.
2. Derrett, The Origins of the Laws of the Kandyans', UCR 14 (1956) 3 and 4; 
105-50 at 126.
3. Hay ley, o p .c lt., 319-20.
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The PTya Urume right becomes of avail to the 
child subsequent to the fathers demise, and 
not previously, therefore In the father's life ­
time, the child has no right to lay claim to 
any portion of the father's estate not to be­
queath nor transfer, nor dispose of any por­
tion thereof, on the presumption that he or  ^
she had a right to anticipate the Inheritance.
In Kandyan law, a father had also the right to dispose of his property
2
by g ift to whomsoever he pleased. In earlier times, an undutlful or dlsquall-
3fled natural heir could be disinherited by the mere w ill o f the father, or
4
through a donation mortis causa, but later It became the rule that to exclude 
one or more legal heirs, a father had to disinherit them by a regularly executed
5
deed In favour of the chosen he ir.
It Is significant to note that^ In Ceylon, In neither of the two custom­
ary systems of family law, had a son any semblance of birthright In the property 
of his father.
1. T.B. DTssanayake and A .B . Colin de Soysa, Kandyan Law and Buddhist 
Ecclesiastical Lew, (Colombo, 1963), 140-1. r  ' •■■■- “
2. Hayley, o p .c lt., 290, 319-20. R. Plerls, T itle  to Land In Kandyan Law * 
In Sir Paul Plerls Felicitation Volume, (Colombo, 1956), 92-113 at 95.
3. T.B. DTssanayake and A .B . Colin de Soysa, lo c .c lt . ,  101.
4. Derrett, UCR 14 (1956) 3 & 4; 105-50 at 124-5.
5. R. Plerls, lo c .c lt ., 103.
III. Burma
a. Cultural and juridical contact with India
From the earlTest times, Indians and Indian Ideas have been able to 
penetrate Into Burma by both land and sea.^ With Hindu emigration, natur­
a lly , Hindu law books found their way Into Burma. Although scholars tend to
2
believe that the Code of Narada was brought to Burma from the east coast of
3
India, It Is, Indeed, the name of Manu which permeates a considerable part
4
of the legal literature of Burma. Some Burmese law books (Dhammathats)
and a few legal writers actually bear the name of Manu either alone or as a
5 6prefix to their names, but, In this respect, M . Maung opines, perhaps with
1. S lrC . E liot, Hinduism and Buddhism: An Historical Sketch, (London, 1921), 50.
2. C . E liot, Ib id ., 67.
3. J.S . Furnlvall, *Manu In Burma*, Journal of the Burma Research Society, 30 
(1940), Pt .2: 351. !R. LIngat, The Buddhist Manu or the Propagation of 
Hindu Law In HInayanlst Indochina*, ABORI 30 (1949), 284-297 at 284.
4 . Dhammathats or Dhammasattham are a corruption from the dharmasastra.
These are to be distinguished from the Rajasattham literature,, the science 
of kings* art of governing and adjudicating cases. On Rajasattham litera­
ture, see R. LIngat, Evolution of the Conception of Law In Burma and Slam*, 
Journal of the Slam Society, 38 (1950) 1: 9-31 at 18.
5. Out of 36 Dhammathats, 9 are attached with the name of Manu, see M .
Maung, Law and Custom In Burma and the Burmese Family, (The Hague,
N Ijhoff, 1963), Appx. 1. The name of Manu Is also attached to the name 
of legal writers like Manuraja who summarised the local decisions In the 
MahTrajadhammathat (c. 1640 A .D .) , C . E lio t, Hinduism and Buddhism, 
lo c .c lt ., 67. Also M .H . Aung, Burmese Law Tales: The legal Element 
In Burmese Folk-lore, (London, 1962), Introd*, 19.
6. M . Maung, Ib id ., 5.
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a certain degree of truth, that probably the prefix was used as an Inspiration 
In cases of works, and as a symbolic acknowledgement of scholarship In cases 
of writers.
Pioneers of Burmese legal research, like Forchhammer, believed that
Burma was Indebted to India for her family law and legal science,^ and that
2the Dhammathats did not represent Burman customary law; but Forchhammer*s
over-emphasis on the Indian contribution received only qualified acceptance,;
3 4even from the earlier jurists like Fuehrer and Jardlne, who observed that the 
Manavadharmasastra was not the only source of Burmese law. In this respect, 
Jardlne pointed out that the Hindu law of Manu was ‘modified by Buddhist fee l-
5
Ing and interleaved with local customs*. The legal topics In the earlier 
Dhammathats, like Dhammavllasa ^ (c. 1174 A .D .) and Waguru ^  (c. 1280
1. See Derrett, 'Review, *Aung, Maung Htln: Burmese Law Tales: The Legal 
Element In Burmese Folklore*, Orlentallstlsche LIteraturzeltung, 58 Jahr- 
gang (1963) 7-8: 391-394 at 3 ^
2. E. Forchhammer, The Jardlne Prize: An Essay on the Sources and Develop­
ment of Burmese Law from the Era of the First Introduction of the Indian Law 
to the Time of the British Occupation of Pegu#l (Rangoon, 1885), 107.
3. A .fuehrer, *Manusaradhammasattham, the only one existing Buddhist Law 
Book Compared with the Brahmlnlcal Manavadharmasastram*, Journal of the 
Bombay Branch of the IRoyal Asiatic Society, 15 (1882), 329-338, 371-382
a t.371.
4 . Sir J. Jardlne, *BuddhIst Law*, The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, 
4 (1897), 8: 1-9 at 1 (rpt. S .O .A .S . Pam. Law A . 14651).
5. Jardlne, Ib id ., 1. AIsolR. LIngat, *EvolutIon of the Conception of Law In
Burma and Slam*, JSS 38 (1950) 1: 9—31 at 14.
6 . M .H . Aung, Bunmese Law Tales, o p .c lt., Introd., 10-18.
7 . Aung, Ib id ., 18.
A .D .) correspond pretty closely  ^ to the Manusmftl and a considerable number
of substantive provisions in the Waguru and Tn the Manusmrtl are strikingly Iden- 
2
tica l; and such correspondence does not deserve to be considered purely acci­
dental. However, despite these textual similarities, Alan G tedh lll, with his 
juridical and judicial acquaintance with Burmese law, opines that *the actual 
content of the law In the Dhammathats owes very little  to the Dharmasastras.
Substantially the law In the Dhammathats Is the customary law of South East 
3
Asia*. GledhllPs view Is also enthusiastically shared by Burmese scholars
4 5like Maung Htln Aung, and Maung Maung. On this pointy M . Maung opines
1. Aung, Ib id ., 12-3.
2. R. LIngat, The Buddhist Manu or the Propagation of Hindu Law In Hlnayanlst 
Indochina*, ABORI 30 (1949), 284-297 at 289. M .K . Swl, The Judicial 
System In the Kingdom of Burma, Ph.D., thesis, (University of London, 1965), 
unpublished, 342. A  few relevant examples of textual similarity between 
Manu and Waguru: Manu, V II1 .153: W ,3; Manu, IX .105: W ,71; Manu, 
IX .114:W , 72, also Manu, IX .117; Manu , IX .153: W ,81. For further 
parallels, seeE. Forchhammer, The Jardlne Prize Essay, lo c .c lt ., 57-51. 
A IsoD . Richardson, The Dhammathat or the Laws of Menoo, (Rangoon, 1874), 
14 Vols. ,  V o l. IV . 11, 121. U. Shwe Baw, Origin and Development of Burmese 
Legal Literature, Ph.D. thesis, (University of London, 1955), 2 vols., unpub-
Ilshed, I, 82.
3. A . G le d h lll, *Burmese Law In the Nineteenth Century with Special Reference 
to the Position of Women*, Journal of World History, 7 (1962), 172-194; part 
of LLD. thesis (1958), IALS, Pamphlet, typed, GT 19.B 50169f, f . l ;  also 
The Status of Woman In Burmese Law*, Recuells de la Soclete" Jean Bodln,
Tome 11 (1959), 269-273 at 269. On GledhllPs opinion, see Derrett, OL 
58 (1963) 7-8: 393.
4. M . Htln Aung, Burmese Law Tales, o p .c lt., 13. Htln Aung*s method was 
criticised by M .K . Swl, The Judicial System In the Kingdom of Burma, op. 
c lt . ,  320, but Swl also concluded that the greater portion of the law In the 
Dhammathats was the customary law of Burma, Ib id ., 347.
5. M . Maung, Law and Custom In Burma . . . ,  o p .c lt., 5 -6 . This was also the 
opinion of U. Shwe Baw, Origin and Development of Burmese legal Literature, 
o p .c lt., 574. From Inscrlptlonal materials Than Tun also could not find the 
mention of the dhammasattha literature earlier than A .D . 1249 and, that also
/Continued on next page:
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that:
the HTndu Code of Manu was used more as 
a model for legal treatises than for its con­
tents; . . .  Tt was not Hindu law that the 
wise Manu expounded In the Burmese texts,
It was Burmese law and custom, and Manu 
was the convenient and prestigious mouth­
piece . 1
On the disclaimer of Burmese borrowing from Hindu law a long time ago,
Jardlne pointed out that ‘the national vanity of the people keeps these facts
In the shade; and they dislike to know or acknowledge the amount they have
1 2borrowed from India In law . . . *  However, despite Jardlne‘s pointer to
the possible ‘national vanity* of the Bur&mese scholars, the truth of the pro-
\1/
Burmese view cannot be totally denied. And It Is Indeed to be accepted
that, especially In the area of family law, the patriarchal and patrilineal
values of the Aryan family, as propounded In the dharmasastras neither coales- 
3
ced with Burmese customs nor could they obliterate the Burmese familial Instl- 
4
tutlons. Ethno-jurldlcal writings strengthen the view that Burmese family
INote 5 -  p .246 -  continued:
only once. From this, he concludes that ‘ there Is no truth In the dhamma- 
sattha of Burma claiming antiquity*, T. Tun, The Legal System In Burma A .D . 
1000-1300*, The Burma Law Institute Journal, 1 (1959) 2: 171-184 at 173.
1. M . Maung, Burmese Customary Law, lo c .c lt . ,  5.
2*r J. Jardlne, *BuddhIst Law*, IAQR4 (1897) 8: 1-9 at 1.
3. On the structure of Burmese family, see M .K . Swl, The Judicial System In 
the Kingdom of Burma, o p .c lt., 346. M . Htln Aung, Burmese Law Tales,
o p .c lt., Introd., 5-6 .
4 . Aung, Ib id ., 5 -6 .
accords with the customary law of Southeast Asla.^ Nevertheless, Tt should 
be stressed that the sastra served as a model in form, and, where compatible 
with local customs, In sbbstance as w ell, for Burmese legal writings, and un­
doubtedly the aura of Manu's name gave a moral valid ity to the common law of 
2
the people.
b. Social organisation and family property
-  3Burmese society was strikingly different from the Aryan society.
4
Although even at the present time, a few ‘ joint conjugal families* may be
found In Burma, Maung emphasises that ‘there Is no joint family as known to 
5
the Hindus . .  .* In Burma, there was no such Institution as ancestor worship, 
and there was no question of continuing the father's line through a son.^
] # See Alan G ledh lll, cTted supra, 246, n .3 .
2 . In this respect, R. LIngat remarks, ‘ It w ill ascribe to the prescription of the 
dhammasattham the same transcending nature as those of the smrlt? though 
they do not come from the mouth of a divine being . . , ‘ , ABORI 30 (1949), 
284-297 at 296-7.
3. Aung, lo c .c lt ., 5-6, 16.
4 . M . Nash, The Golden Road to Modernity: Village Life In Contemporary Burma, 
(New York, 1965), 44-5, 49. In his study of 94 households, Nash found that 
53 were nucleated units, 32 were extended conjugal families, and only 5 were 
joint conjugal families.
5. M . Maung, Law and Custom In Burma, o p .c lt., 6 -7 . Also Chan-Toon, The
Principles of~Buddhist Law also containing a Translation of Important Portions
of the Manu Thara Shwe My In, (Rangoon, 1903), 104.
6. M .H . Aung, Burmese Law Tales, o p .c lt., Introd., 16.
Than Tun informs us that *we find records using the word amuv mean­
ing the property either the land or the slave that came down from ancestors* ^
2
but such property has no special significance as Inown to the Hindus. The
Burmese concept of joint property of spouses conforms to the prevalence of the
3 4system In Southeast Asia. The spouses held equal Interests In a ll Lettetpwa
property, and a husband cannot alienate joint property, acquired by either of
5
them before or during the marriage, without the consent of the w ife.
The rules of Intestate succession In Burma were quite different from 
the Hindu system. Inheritance did not depend on the capacity of Hie heirs 
to take part In offerings to the spirit of the deceased.^ When we come to the 
theme of son's right In father's property, we find that Burmese law Is In contra­
position to the MItaksara system, nor does It come anywhere near the Dayabhaga 
variation. It Is a doctrine of Burmese law that no child at birth acquires any
1. T. Tun, *The Legal System In Burma A .D . 1000-1300', BLIJ 1 (1959) 2: 
171-184 at 180.
2. M . Maung, Law and Custom In Burma, o p .c lt., 7. Cp. YajrT.II.121 .
3. To some extent joint property of spouses Is found In Malay adat law ,
E .N . Taylor, *The Customary Law ofRembau*, In M.B. Hooker, ed ., 
Readings In Malay Adat Law, o p .c lt., 109. Also among the Kaltngas,
Infra,2.7 2 . Also Kandyan,supra<f 241.
4 . Lettetpwa means property which accrues to the family through one or both of 
the spouses by Inheritance, g ift or earning, Maung, lo c .c lt ., 90-1.
5. Cp. the concept of a communTo bonorum In the text: dampatyor madhyagam 
dhanam, for a discussion on this text, see Derrett, BSQAS, 18 (1956) 3: 490,
M . Maung, locc lt., 6.
interest Tn the property of hts or her parents.^
2
Although testamentary disposition was unknown, the parents had the
3
absolute right to transfer their property Inter vivos, and an heir could claim a
share only on the death of the person from whom he or she was entitled to In- 
4
herlt. A t the death of a parent, sons and daughters both Inherit with the
5
spouse re lic t. Although Buddhist philosophy enjoins equality for a ll
1. Dhammavllasa, X IV .3, cited by U. Shwe Bau, Origin and Development of 
Burmese Legal Literature, o p .c lt., 385. S. Vesey-FItzgerald, 'Hindu*, sub. 
*Law*, En.So.Sc!., IX, 257-262 at 260. M .T . Gywe, A Treatise on Budd­
hist Law, (Mandalay, 1910), 65. Chan-Toon, The Principles of Buddhist Law, 
o p .c lt., 104. Also Ko-zaung-kyop, or Navadhammasattham, see Forch- 
hammer, Jardlne Prize Essay, o p .c lt., 68T Note the mistake of Gywe when 
he says that the MItaksara rules were applicable to Bengal, Ib id ., 65.
2 . Chan-Toon, The Principles of Buddhist Law . . . , o p .c lt., 99. O.H.Mootham, 
Burmese Buddhist Law, (0 .U .P ., 1939), 69. M . Maung, Law and Custom Tn 
Burma . . .  , o p .c lt., 103. Gradually, testaments developed In Burma, A . 
Fuehrer, kManusaradhammasattham the only one existing Buddhist Law Book 
Compared with the Manavadharmasastram*, Journal of the Bombay Branch of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, 15 (1882), 329-336, 371-382 at 372. Than Tun 
disagrees with the view that w ills were unknown In Burma. He says, 'the 
practice Tn old Burma, I am afraid, was just the contrary*, *The Legal System 
Tn Burma A .D . 1000-1300.', BLIJ 1 (1959) 2: 171-184 at 171.
3 . Chan-Toon, Ib id ., 104.
4 . O .H . Mootham, Burmese Buddhist Law, lo c .c lt ., 86.
5 . J. Jardlne, Notes on Buddhist Law, V I, translation by MOung Theka Phyoo 
of the Law of Inheritance according to the MahavIcchedanT Dhammathat from 
Burmese manuscript, ed.,  E . Forchhammer, This Dhammathat was written In
c.1832 A .D . by Rajabala Kyawdln -  the most recent of the Burmese Dhamma- 
thats, (Rangoon, 1883), ss.1-4, 1. Also Manoo Wonnana Dhammathat, tr.
S. Minus, J. Jardlne, Notes on Buddhist Law, V , s. 10. Wagaru Dhammathat, 
t r . ,  E. Forchhammer, ( \ S 92- ) , s.2, 1.
chf Idren Tn respect of Inheritance, Irrespective of their age and sex, the
eldest child In Burmese law has a special position.^ The eldest son steps
Into the position of the father at the latter's death and the eldest daughter
2
Into that of her mother, thus becoming, the brasa with a right to a fourth 
3
share of the estate.
We cannot say with certitude that the position of the eldest In the
Burmese law of Intestate succession was a reflection of the sastra, because In
4
Southeast Asia, a similar preference for the eldest Is well-known. The posi­
tion of the wife as a consort Tn respect of property, and daughter's entitlement 
to a share In the estate along with the sons, were concepts not to ta lly un­
1. O .H . Mootham, Burmese Buddhist Law, o p .c lt., 91.
2. orasa has been borrowed from Sanskrit and Is a corruption of aurasa. In
Burma, It acquired a spdclal meaning; It came to signify a son who by
virtue of his position, would assume to the duties of the father, being 
vested with a defined right In the paternal estate. In course of time, 
the position was extended to daughters, Mootham, Ib id ., 91.
3. We are to note that among the Chin tribes, equal share for a ll children 
was the custom, Maung Tet Pyo's Customary Law of the Chin Tribe, 
(Rangoon, 1884), s.64, 5.
4 . See our discussion on Ifugao law, Infra,269 . Also Kallngas,
Infra,272 . The custom was also accommodated In the HInduIzed
laws of Java, In fra ,266-
known  ^ or outrageous to the sastra, but never jurid ica lly recognized. So, 
concepts which were not followed Tn the mainland of India could hardly be 
Imputed as sastrlc manifestations Tn a foreign so il.
People, although ethnographically different, may present Isolated
parallels In their customs. But, when customary norms are measured In terms
of their respective soclo-cultural matrices, the general juridical pattern comes
to the fore. The Dharmmathats like the Manusmftl, speak of the patriarchal
2
power of the father over his family and children. For Instance, a father could
sell a child Into slavery and could chastise It for correction. This authority may
sound familiar to scholars steeped In the dharmasastras; but the Aryan concept 
3
of patriarchal power does not harmonise with the Burmese social organisation 
and their rules of Intestate succession.
1. On traces of communlo bonorum between spouses among the Hindus, cp .
the text: dampatyor madhyagam dhanarp, *wealth Is common between spouses*, 
on the antiquity of the text, see Derrett, *An Indian Contribution to the 
study of Property*, BSOAS 18 (1956) 3 : 475-498 at 490, n .4 . One school 
of thought Tn Hindu legal philosophy advocated that daughters and sons should 
have equal rights of Inheritance, for relevant texts and discussion, see A .S . 
Altekar, *The Daughters Right o f Inheritance*, Tn P, SeshadrI, ed ., Har Bllas 
Sarda Commemoration Volume, (Ajmer/ 1937), 217-223 at 219. However,
Altekar*s views, In this respect, are to be taken with a grain o f salt.
2. M . Maung, Law and Custom In Burma, o p .c lt., 45. D . Richardson, The 
Dhammathat or The Laws of Menoo, ^Rangoon, 1874), IV, 121. Maung 
rejects the power of the father over the children and of the husband over
his wife by saying that •this power was more true Tn theory than Tn practice*, 
Ib id ., 45. But a recent study on this point runs counter to the remarks of 
Maung, G .A . Theodorson, ‘Attitudes of Burmese Men and Women to Male 
Dominance Tn the Family*, JB'RS 51 (1968) P t. l:  17-21 at 17-18.
3 . Maung, Ib id ., 45. Patrla potestas was absent In Burma, U. Shwe Baw, 
Origin and Development of Burmese Legal Literature, op. c l t . ,  I, 428.
IV . Indonesia
a. Hlndulzatlon
From the beginning of the Christian era, as a consequence of commerce
and cultural expansion, the presence of Hinduism was recognised In some of the
Indonesian Islands,^ and since then Hindu culture has survived up to the present
. 2time In the island of Ball. Apart from the religious and cultural aspects of
Hinduism, the Javanese and the Balinese were greatly Interested In the juridical 
3
aspect of dharma.
The peregrination of the dharmasJjstras is revealed In their written 
4
law-codes which contain a ‘considerable number of passages borrowed from the
_ 5
famous Manavadharmasastra and other Indian sources . . . *  However, despite
1. P .J. Chlnmutgund and V .V . Mlrashl, ed ., M .M . Chltraoshastrl Felicitation 
Volume: Review of IndologTcal Research In Last 75 Years, (Poona, 1967), 
323-4. J. Gonda, The Presence of Hinduism In Indonesia: Aspects and 
Problems*, India's Contribution to World Thought and Culture: A  Vlveken- 
anda Commemoration Volume, (Madras, 1970), 535-554 at 535.
2. J . Gonda, Ib id ., 549.
3. J . Gonda, Ib id ., 544. AlsoIR.C. Majumdar, ‘Hindu Law In Java and Ball*, 
KrlshnaswamT Alyangar Commemoration Volume, (Madras, 1936), 445-61 at 
445; Ancient Indian Colonies In the Far East, (Calcutta, 1938), II, P t. ll, 1
and 7.
4 . Main Javanese legal works are: Sara Samucaya; Sara Jambu; Stvasasana; 
Adlgama; Purvadlgama; Deva Panda; DhgrmcTVlcarq; Devagama or 
Krtopapatl; Dharmopapatl; Kutara-manava-sastra; Gajah Mada, see!R.C. 
Majumdar, KrlshnaswamT Alyangar Felicitation Volume, Ib id ., 445-6. Also 
Slametmuljana, The Story of Majapahlt, (Singapore University Press, 1976), 104.
5. J . Gonda, lo c .c lt ., 544.
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their debt to the sastra, the jurtdTcal literature of Java and Ball establishes that 
the sastric rules were modified  ^ to adjust to the social organisation and customs 
of the local population.
The most famous of the Hlndulsed law-codes of Java and Ball was the 
2Kutara-manava-sastra, and It was regarded as the highest authority In the
3
flourishing period of the Majapahlt empire (c.1222 -  1527 A .D .) . The 
Kutara-manava-sastra deals with various topics of c iv il law, such as debt, 
pledge, property, Inheritance, and regulations about women and slaves.
b . The society depicted In the juridical works
The picture of society during the Majapahlt time betrays strong borrow
Tngs from the Hindu view of life . The Hindu social stratification of four castes
4
(varna) and division of human life Into four stages were well recognised. The
family was patriarchal; In the household, the father was head and manager of
5
the joint family property. A  father’s power of chastising a son as ordained 
by Manu ^ Is restated Tn the juridical literature of Java7  According to the
1. R.C. Majumdar, lo c .c lt ., 445. J. Gonda, Ib id ., 544. Slametmuljana, 
lo c .c lt ., 104.
2. Slametmuljana believes that the Kutara-manava-sastra could be the result
of a combination of two works, namely Manava-sastra and Kutara-sastra,
The Story of Majapahlt, o p .c lt., 105.
3. R.C. Majumdar, Krlshnaswaml Alyangar Commemoration Volume, o p .c lt., 
447. Slametmuljana, Ib id ., 104.
4. Slametmuljana, Ib id ., 106-7.
5. Slametmuljana, Ib id ., 114.
6. Manu, V III, 299-300.
7 . R.C. Majumdar, lo c .c lt ., 455.
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Kutara-manava-sastra ( £78) a father could formally discard a son, and this re­
sulted Tn disherison.^
c. Inheritance and the position of a son
2
The twelve classes of sons detailed by Manu found acceptance,
✓- 3with Insignificant variations, In the Kutara-manava-sastra ( f  259). The
Influence of the Hindu caste system Is reflected In the laws of Inheritance and,
Tn tune with Manu (IX. 1 53), the shares of the children used to vary according
to the caste of the mother -  *the higher the caste of the mother, the bigger was
4
the portion Inherited by her children*. Up to this point, the Javanese Codes
1. *lf a child Is repudiated, the father and the mother no longer wishing to con­
sider It as their child because It behaves badly, evidence of this must be given 
to the headman bf the village or district; the father shall give the child rice 
and water for bathing and washing, also t0pung Tawar; there must also be w it­
nesses present so that the repudiation Is proved; I f  this has taken place the 
child may not take the goods of Its parents, but neither may It be called upon 
to pay their debts*. J .C .G . Jonker, Een Oud-Javaansch Wetboek Verge- 
leken Met Indlsche Rechtsbronnen, (Leiden, 1885), £78, 113, tr. from Dutch 
by Ronald Quick, language teacher, formerly of Holborn College, London.
2. Manu, IX. 158-60; for a discussion, see In fra ,T 60 -6 4 .
3. R.C. Majumdar, KrlshnaswamT Alyangar Commemoration Volume, o p .c lt., 460.
4 . Slametmuljana, The Story of Majapahlt, o p .c lt., 114. Also Majumdar, Ib id .,
459. *If a Brahmin has taken four wives, so that his children are of different 
castes, he must divide his possessions Into eleven parts; hie may not give an 
equal part to the child bom of a woman of the Brahmin caste as to the children 
bom of a woman of the Ksatrlya, Valsya or £udra caste; this Is law throughout 
the world*, J .C .G . Jonker, Een Oud ^ Javaansch Wetboek Verge leken Met 
Indlsche Rechtsbronnen, (Leiden, 1885), £258, 157, tr. 'Ronald Quick.
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show a striking similarity to the sastra; but, In details of Intestate succession, 
we realise that the common law of Southeast Asia asserts Itself with vigour.
According to the rules of Inheritance In the Javanese law codes, the
eldest male child was entitled to an additional share,  ^ and In some extreme
2cases, he Inherited four-fifths (catur uddhara) of the estate. The remaining
3fifth  part would go to his younger siblings. Indeed, some dharmasastras 
4
mention the preferential share of the eldest, but the llon^ share of four-
fifths Is nowhere ordained for him. In contradistinction with the Code of Manu,
5
according to which daughters do not Inherit In the presence of sons, the Java-
1. Majumdar, Ib id ., 459.
2. *|f anyone has several children of his marriage to a woman, and then dies the
eldest son may take a larger share of each estate In advance, which according 
to the Agama Is called udahara; the size of this Is as follows: If  the house­
hold effects am many, he may take a large part In advance, I f  they are few, 
then only a small part, so that the uddhara may amount to one, two, three or 
four tahlls according to the goods to be distributed. The greatest quantity 
which may be taken Is defined as follows: the household effects must be d iv i­
ded Into five parts; I f  the father has made ornaments from five tahlls of gold 
of similar shape and similar appearance, the eldest of the brothers may take 
four parts thereof; whilst the remaining part must be divided equally among 
the younger brothers; a ll effects must be dealt with In this way; It Is not per­
mitted, however, for him to take pantjoddhara, I .e . five parts, and the brothers 
Jointly must receive one part; the largest quantity he may receive more than 
his brothers Is four parts, caturuddhara; If the eldest brother behaves thus he 
shall gain a long life*, Jonker, lo c .c lt ., f l9 7 , 143- 4, tr. Q u ick,
3. Kutara-manava-“sastra , f  &197, cited by Majumdar, Ib id ., 459.
4 . Infra,3 76, ‘3 7 9 -S G -
5. Manu, IX . 185.
nese law books imply that, after the eldest son has taken hts preferential share, 
the rest of the property used to be divided equally among a ll the brothers and 
sisters. ^
Another peculiarity of the rules of intestate succession Tn the Javanese
law books is ‘that the children Inherit the property of both the father and the
2
mother, which Is different from the Hindu !aws‘ .
Although Majumdar was puzzled by the peculiarities of Javanese law, 
a ll the three rules, namely, the privileged position of the eldest son, the entitle­
ment of daughters to share the Inheritance with their brothers, and the children
Inheriting the properties of both the father and the mother -  are found almost
3
everywhere In the customary law of Southeast Asia.
d. The adat law of the Indonesians
The conspicuous presence of customary rules In the Hlndulzed codes 
o f Java turns our Interest to the local customary law of the Indonesians. Indeed,
1. On this point, a recent study , on Ball by Hlldred Geertz and Clifford Geertz 
show that when the daughters marry, they lose a ll claims to Inherit from their 
father, but I f  they remain unmarried and continue to live In the father's house 
they receive half as much as brothers of equivalent status. However, daught­
ers, In most cases, Irrespective of their marital status, receive from their 
father a large portion of property as g ift, H . Geertz and C . Geertz, Kinship 
In Ball, (Chicago/London, 1975), 142. For the Hindu law situation on this 
point, see Derrett, A .I.R . 1965 J .,  34; JILI 9 (1967) 4: 559; Critique, f f  
124-6.
2. !R.C. Majumdar, Krlshnaswaml Alyangar Commemoration Volume, o p .c lt., 459.
3. The first two are found In the Sastra but never jurid ically recognised, supra,iSi-252,
4 .  On the third, see our discussion on Ceylon, s u p r a ,  2 4 1 -
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the adat Iaw,^ or the local legal traditions of the Indonesians, was heterogeneous.
From the diverse customs of the people, one can set up some generally valid rules
2
*but no single rule has the same external form In a ll law-areas*. B. ter Haar 
Illustrates this point further:
The rule that at the death of a native possessor, 
the children take precedence Is only half-true 
In the Batak lands; namely, only with respect 
to the sons (although In this connection, the 
property which has been given to the daughters 
must not be left out of consideration). In 
MTnankabau, It Is only half true; namely, 
only with respect to the mother. Inheritance 
from the father goes to his sis ter *s children and 
not to those of his w ife . In the Lampongs, It 
Is only half-true, Insofar as there only the old­
est child Inherits, although he has the duty of 
treating the family of the father as his own 
family. The rule that after the death of the 
native possessor the estate remains undivided 
under certain circumstances brings about a 
different situation 3 In the Mlnahasa than J
among the Mlnangkabau, and In Ball and Java.
1. adat (Arabic = custom) Includes the oral legal traditions of the tribal people 
of the mountainous regions of Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes, B. ter Haar, 
Beglnselen en Stelsel van het Adatrecht, (GronTngeiylJatavTa, 1939), tr.
E .A . Hoebel and A .A . Schiller, sub .tit. Adat Law In Indonesia, (New York, 
1948), 3, 5 . Also on adat, seelR.J. Wilkinson, ‘Malay Law*, In M .B. 
Hooker, ed ., Readings In Malay Law, (Singapore, 1970), 1-47 at 14-5.
2. ter Haar, Ib id ., 195.
3. ter Haar, Ib id ., 195-6. With this one may add the observation of Van Vollen-
hoven: ‘Adat law can only be understood If  one never loses sight of the pro­
nounced communal characteristics of Javanese-Madurese life  . . . .  because
a ll rights are understood and applied Tn such a way that -  unlike Roman law, 
where the Individual element predominates -  the Interest of the community Is 
centred on the use of which the Individual's property Is put*, C . Van Vollen- 
hoven, Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-lndlS (Leiden, 1918) (The Adat Law
of the Netherlands East Indies), tr. and quoted by H.W . J. Sonlus, Introduct- 
lon to 4^>ects of Customary Land Law In Africa as Compared with Some Indones­
ian Aspdcts, (Leiden, 1963), 28. Diaz also Informs us that Tn central Java,
ownership of land rests In the village community as a unit, M .N . Diaz,
/Continued on next page:
Besides these varieties and divergences, one should note that the ex­
tended possessions (harta pusaka) of Mlnangkabau and the extended family lands 
(datl) of the HItu Peninsula of Ambon present a corporate regime. According to 
the customs o f these areas ‘every child that Is born Is a participant In the complex 
of persons which possesses extended family property . . .  The death of the Indi­
vidual man or woman leaves the complex undisturbed*.^ The system exhibits
an Institution approximately analogous to the MItaksara coparcenary, with the
2difference that the females are also Included In the complex, and partition
3
of the property by the members was never allowed. Undivided property of 
the extended family wgs a real means of keeping the extended family relation­
ship Intact through successive generations.
The self-acquired property of a person may pass on his death as an 
undivided unit to his descendants, and during the lifetime of the acquirer they
Note 3 -  p .258 -  continued:
‘ Introduction: Economic'Relations In Peasant Society*, In J .M . Potter,
M .N . Diaz and G .M . Foster, ed ., Peasant Society: A Reader, (Boston,
1967), 50-56 at 52. Also E.R. W olf, ‘Closed Corporate Peasant Commu­
nities In Mesoamerlca and Central Java*, In Peasant Society, Ib id ., 230-46 
at 231. '
1. B. ter Haar, Adat Law In Indonesia, o p .c lt., 196.
2 . See Critique, 149-53, on the role of females In Hindu |o!nt family property.
3 . In Mlnahasa partition of the complex was allowed provided a ll members con­
sented, ter Haar, Ib id ., 198.
1 2 stood as ‘warls* m relation to the possessions.
The foregoing discussion suggests that among some Indonesian peoples
ascendants and descendants enjoyed co-ordinate rights In the family property?
however, considered In a comparative context with the MItaksara birthright,
the two systems, though providing conceptual parallels, exhibit substantive
3
realities under differing social systems and kinship organisations, which should 
not be overlooked.
V . Malaysia
a . Ethno-juridical background
Although geographical and political boundaries separate the Malays
4
from the Indonesians, ethnologlcaIly speaking, they are Indistinguishable*
1. The term warls, derived from the Arabic term warlth, means simply *helr;
Inheritor1, R. Firth, ‘Relations between Personal Kin (Warls) among Kelan-
tan Malays*, In R. J. Smith, ed ., Social Organization and the Applications 
of Anthropology: Essays In Honor of Laurlston Sharp, (Cornell University
Press, Ithaca/London, 1974), 23-61 at 33.
2. ter Haar, lo c .c lt ., 197.
3. We are to note that the people of Mlnangkabau were matriarchal. A . J.
Barnouw, ‘Cross Currents of Culture In Indonesia*, FEQ 5 (1946) 2: 143- 
151 at 143. A lsoE .M . Loeb, ‘Social Organization and the Long House 
In Southeast Asia and Micronesia*, FEQ 6 (1947) 2: 168-172 at 169.
4 . B. ter Haar, Adat Law In Indonesia, o p .c lt., Introd., 1.
It is generally accepted that the Peninsular Malays emigrated from the Menang- 
kabau highlands of Sumatra, though a ll of them did not travel at the same time 
nor follow the same route J
Those who came directly to Malaya brought with them the matriarchal
adat perpateh plnang sa-batang from Menangkabau, while those who came through
2
Pelembang brought with them the patriarchal,adat tememgong. The ancient
3
Malay kingdom of Pelembang came under the Influence of the Hindu c iv iliza ­
tion of Java. The HTnduIzed juridical Influence of Java replaced the Menang-
4
kabau custom of matriarchy with alternative patriarchal norms. Thus, the 
group of people from the highlands of Sumatra who sojourned In Pelembang 
brought to Malaya, not their original matriarchal adat, but a Javanese- 
oriented Aryan conception of patriarchy.
1. P.E. de Josselln de Yong, Mlnangkabau and Negri Sembllan: Soclo Polltl— 
cal Structure In Indonesia, (Leiden, 1951), 9. !R. J. Wilkinson, ‘Malay Law*, 
In M .B. Hooker, ed., Readings In Malay Adat Laws, (Singapore, 1970), 1-47 
at 7.
2 . For a discussion oil these two types of Adat, see P.E. de Josselln de Jong,
Ib id ., 30-2 and 168-72.
3 . The Hindu kingdom of Pelembang or *Sarbaza‘ flourished between A .D . 900 
and 1375. The kingdom was ultimately destroyed by the Majapahlt empire 
of Java, R.J. Wilkinson, ‘Malay Law1, lo c .c lt ., 30.
4 . IR.J. Wilkinson, Ib id .# 38. On the Influence of sastrlc law In Malaya, see 
P.P. Buss-Tjen, ‘Malay Law1, In !R. Khan and S. Kumar, ed ., An Introduct- 
lon to the Study of Comparative Law, ILI, New Delhi, (Bombay, 1971), 125-6.
b. Adat perpateh
In the relevant situations, the two types of adat are found to co-exTst 
In Malaya.^ Adat perpateh Is predominant In the states which constitute the
2 3modem Negri Sembllan. The social organisation In this area Is matriarchal. 
In matriarchal communities, descent passes through the female line, so In Negri 
Sembtlan a man remains a member of his mother's tribe until by marriage he Is 
received Into the fold of his wife's tribe.
Unlike the patrilineal system, the Inferior position of the male under 
matriarchy Is reflected In the rules of adat perpateh concerning property. 
According to the customs followed In Rembau, a man Is excluded from the 
ownership of land. He may work on the land owned by his mother, sister or
4
his wife but, excepting maintenance out of the proceeds, he has no other right. 
However, In Rembau a couple may own joint property acquired by
1. J .M . G u lllck , *Sungel Ujong*, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society -  
Malayan Branch, 22 (1949) 2: 1-69 at 18.
2. The name Negri Sembllan traditionally Implied a grouping of nine states, 
but the actual number of the states varied from time to time, M.B. Hooker, 
'Readings In Malay Laws, o p .c lt., A ppx.III. It should not be overlooked 
that even In the predominantly matrllineal system of Negri Sembllan, there 
are patrilineal traits, M .B. Hooker, Adat Laws In Modern Malaya; Umd 
Tenure, Traditional Government and Religion, (O .U .P . Kuala Lumpur/
London, 1972), 30.
3. !R.J. Wilkinson, 'Malay Law*, In M .B. Hooker, ed ., Readings In Malay 
Adat Laws, o p .c lt., 1-47 at 12.
4 . R .J. Wilkinson, Ib id ., 27-8.
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their jo int effort, a feature not uncommon in other parts of Southeast Asia.
A man could own separate property which he acquired before marriage.
3
Such property would devolve on his death to the nearest female descendant.
Under adat perpateh, which Is a matrlllneal system, there Is hardly
any scope for the emergence of a proprietary relationship beiween father and
son; More appropriately, It could be compared with the matrlllneal system of 
4
the Malabar Hindus.
Despite this difference which contrasts with the Mltaksara system, 
the features of ancient law In respect of ownership of ancestral property are 
present In adat perpateh. Although ancestral property vests In the female
5
members, they actually hold It as trustees for the tribe rather than as owners.
However, for our present purpose, except for noting the peculiarities 
of adat perpateh In the context of SoutheastAsIan primitive law, further ramifi­
cation on the concept would be extraneous to our theme.
1. E .N . Taylor, The Customary Law of Rembay* In M .B. Hooker, ed .,
Readings In Malay Adat Law, lo c .c lt . ,  109-158 at 109.
2. See supra, 249.
3. P .P . Buss-T|en, ‘Malay Law1, In An Introduction to the Study of Compara­
tive Law, o p .c lt., 124.
4 . On Malabar matrlllneal families, see Derrett, IMHL,f572;f£>76-80. Also Infra, 
95-4- 5? .
5. E .N . Taylor, The Customary Law of Rembau*, In M .B. Hooker, ed .,
Readings In Malay Adat Law, o p .c lt., 109-158 at 126.
c. Adat tem eng gong
The adat temenggong which betrays Hindu Influence could not obliter­
ate the matrlllneal customs of the people. However, It penetrated the aristo­
cratic aspects of life . Thus, succession to titles and dignities In Perak follows 
the male line, while succession to lands and houses Is governed by adat perpateh.^ 
This co-existence of the matriarchal adat with Hlndulzed patriarchy Is a triumph
of the original customs of the simple societies which, In a later period, despite
2
the onslaught of Islam, remained considerably unshaken.
V I . The Philippines
a . Introduction
At an early period, Indian cultural Influence spread to the Philippines, 
though not directly from Indian soil but through Indo-Chlna, and especially
1. E .N . Taylor, ‘Aspects of Customary Inheritance In Negri Sembllan1, In M .B. 
Hooker, ed ., Readings In Malay Adat Law, o p .c lt., 159-249 at 163. P.E. 
de Josselln de Jong, Mlnangkabau and Negri Sembllan, o p .c lt., 168. For 
further explanations of this point, see M.B. Hooker, Adat Laws In Modern 
Malaya, o p .c lt., 28-31.
2 . See E .N . Taylor, Ib id ., 163. J. Mlnattur, The Nature of Malay Customary 
Law1, Malay Law Review, 6 (1964), 327-52. The Malayan Digests show that 
the laws of marriage and divorce were oriented by Islam but In the matter of 
Inheritance, the Quranic precepts had to compromise with local customs, tr.
J . Rigby and ed ., R .J. Wilkinson,The Nmety-nTneLaws of Perak*, In M .B. 
Hooker, ed ., Readings In Malay Adat Law, lo c .c lt ., 51-82 at 51, and f  33 
at 66. In fact, In respect of Inheritance, adat perpateh Is s till surviving In 
Negri Sembllan, see M .B. Hooker, ‘Adat and Islam In Malaya*, Malaya Law 
Review Legal Essays, ed ., G .W . Bartholomew, (Singapore, 1975), 164-87 at 
18K
through J a v a j From our study of HInduIzed jurisprudence Tn Burma and Indo­
nesia, we can form a broad idea of the reception of the sastra In the Philippines.
However, It Is not so much the course of sastrlc law In the Philippines
that Interests us as the norms and customs of the Indigenous population. The
2
customary law of the different races of the Philippines, being the behavioural 
norm of these unsophisticated peoples, Is very likely to shed light on the concept
of the Mltaksara birthright, which Itself seems to be the result of a symbiosis,
3 4mainly of two simple societies namely, the Aryans and the Dravidians.
1. The SrTvTjaya empire extended to the Philippines from Sumatra In the 11th 
century A .D . and two centuries later (c. 1377 A .D .) , the Mahapajlt em­
pire of Java made Its Influence fe lt In Manila and Sulu, M . TrosdaI,‘Foreign 
Influences on Cebuano-BIsaya*, In R. Rahmann and G .R . Ang, ed., Dr. H.
Otley Beyer, Dean of Philippine Anthropology: A  Commemorative Issue,
(The University of San Carlos, Cebu, Philippines, 1966), 63-70 at 64.
2 . On general racial classification of the natives of the Philippines, see H.W . 
Krleger, *Races and Peoples In the Philippines1, FEQ 6 (1945) 2: 95-101.
H .O . Beyer and J. De Veyra, Philippines Saga, (Manila, 1947); summarised 
by J.B. Ballen, ‘Studies In Physical Anthropology on the Philippines1, In M .D . 
Zamora, ed., Studies In Philippine Anthropology, (In Honor of H. Otley Beyer) 
(Quezon C ity, Philippines, 1967), 527-58 at 537-8.
3 . According to MarTja GImbutas, the history of the Aryans goes back to 5th 
millennium B .C ., M . GImbutas, ‘Proto-Indo-European Culture: The Kurgan 
Culture during the Fifth, Fourth and Third Millennia B .C .*, In G . Cardona,
H. Hoenlngswald and A . Senn, ed., Indo-European and Indo-Europeans, 
(Philadelphia, 197(J, 155-97; also The Beginning of the Bronze Age In Europe 
and the Indo-Europeans: 3500-2500 B.C .*, Journal of Indo-European Studies,
1 (1973), 163-214. The view Is endorsed by P. Harblson, The Coming of the 
Indo-Europeans to Ireland: an Archaeological Viewpoint*, JI5 3 (1975) 2: 
101-19.
4 . On the antiquity of Dravldlan culture, see S. Fuchs, The Dravldlan Problem*, 
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, 41-2 (1966-67), 153-63 at 161.
Also J.!R. Marr, The Early Dravldlans*, Tn A .L . Basham, ed ., A  Cultural 
History of India, (Oxford, 1975), 30-7 at 33.
b . The Ifugaos of Northern Luzon
Anthropological data are complementary to the study of comparative
jurisprudence,^ and Roy Franklin Barton, an anthropological behaviourist, made
2
a classic contribution In this fie ld by studying the customs of the Ifugaos of
3
the Philippines. The Ifugaos, who practice terraced cultivation o f rice
as their main livelihood, *have developed through the ages a most elaborate
4
system of substantive property law and personal law1.
The Ifugao people are divided Into a large number of hereditary clans
5
who are believed to be descended from a common ancestral pair and like many
1. E. Cotran and N .N . Rubin, ed., Readings In African Law, 2 vols., (London, 
1970), I, Introd., x v ll.
2. O f the three great racial stocks native In Southeast Asia, namely the Negrito, 
Pre-Dnavldlan or Veddold and the Malayan or Maritime Mongols, the Ifugao 
belongs to the Indonesian subrace of the Malayan race, J .J . Roglnsky and 
'R.F. Barton, Mfugao Somatology1, Philippine Journal o f Science, 74 (1941), 
349-65.
3. E.P. Dozier, The Kallnga of Northern Luzon, Philippines, (New York,
1967), 2 . !R.M. Lopez, The Origin of the Rice Terraces In Luzon and Their 
Presence In the Island of Cebu, Philippines: A  Brief Review of Hypotheses* 
Ined., R. IRahmann and G .R . Ang, Dr. Otley Beyer Commemorative Issue?,
(The University of San Carlos, 1968), 31-42.
4 . E .A . Hoebel, InlR.F. Barton, The Kallngas: Their Institutions and Custom Law, 
(Chicago, 1949, rp t., AMS, New York, 1973), Introd., 3 .
5. O .H . Beyer and R.F. Barton, *An Ifugao Burial Ceremony*, Philippine Journal 
of Science, 6 (1911) 5: 227-52 at 228.
people Tn the world they relate the living to theTr ancestors J  This unbroken
2chain of relationship between *the dead, the living and yet unborn* Is re­
flected In the Ifugao attitude toward family property. In this respect, Barton 
states that:
the Ifugao attitude Is that lands and articles 
of value that have been handed down from 
generation to generation cannot be the pro­
perty of any Individual. Present holders 
possess only a transient and fleeting possess­
ion, or better, occupation, Insignificant In 
duration In comparison with decaefes and per­
haps centuries that have usually elapsed 
since the field or heirloom came Into the 
possession of the family. Their possess­
ion Is more of the nature of a trust than an 
absolute ownership -  a holding In trust for 
future generations. 3
Among the Ifugaos, parting with family property was considered a mls-
4
fortune. However, a field could be sold In order to provide animals to
1. F. Eggan, *Some Aspects of Bilateral Social Systems In the Northern Philip­
pines*, In M .D . Zamora, ed ., Studies In Philippine Anthropology, o p .c lt., 
186-203 at 198.
2. E .A . Hoebel, Jhe Law of Primitive Man, (Cambridge, H .U .P ., 1954), 104-5. 
Cp. Vyasa, D h.K . 1587; Jha , HLS, I, 276: ye Jata ye*pyaiotas'ca ye garbhe 
vyavasthltah /  In the Hindu law context, see the text Infra, 340,71 •‘5.
3. R.F. Barton, Ifugao Law, (University of California Press, Berkeley/Los 
Angleses, 1969), 32. Cp. the fiduciary position of a manager of Hindu 
joint family, Derrett, IMHL, £426. In ancient Roman law, a paterfamlllus 
was considered as a trustee of an Inalienable heredlum, En.Br., 11th ed .,
V o l.23, 531.
4 . Barton, Ib id ., 32.
accompany the spTrTt of a deceased ancestor or Tn order to provide animals for
sacrifices to secufe the recovery from serious illness of some member of the
family.^ A  famlly*s attachment to ancestral property was greater than that 
2to acquired property, and this Is proved by the fact the sale price of ances­
tral property was considerably higher than that of acquired property even
3
though the Intrinsic value of both be the same. Selling of family property,
even In cases of family necessity, must be done with the consent of the mem- 
4
bers of the family.
From the age of ten or twelve, an Ifugao child *beglns to look upon
his parents* property as his own, or at least that portion of It that w ill fa ll to 
5
his share*. Normally, parents hand over their properties to the children
1. Barton, Ib id ., 32. Cp. Hindu law, apatkale kutumbarthe dhamarthe,
Br! . cited, M lta, 1.1.28; Dh.K.1588b.
2. Insastrlc literature, similar Importance Is attached to ancestral property,
Br . 15.6, Dh.K.803b; Br .15.2, Dh.K.802a; Br; .15.5, Dh.K.803a;
the Implication ofBr .14.5, D h .K .803 and Br .26.58-9, Dh.K.l222a 
Is also the same. In South India and Ceylon also *sa!e outright of an­
cestral property Is so obnoxious to Its owners, however Impoverished they 
may be, that they w ill go to any lengths to avoid It*, Derrett, *Kutta:
A class of Land-Tenures In South India*, BSOAS 31 (1958) 1: 61-81 at 66.
3. Barton, Ib id ., 33.
4. Barton, Ib id ., 34.
5. 'R.F. Barton, Ifugao Law, o p .c lt., 31. Cp. the Mltaksara rule where 
ownership accrues at birth, M lta, 1.1.27.
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as soon as they are able to marry and care for themselves J
Whether property is passing by assignment or Inheritance, children
2
of both sexes are entitled to their parents1 property, and the elder children 
Inherit greater portions of the property than the younger ones and the propor-
3
tlonal share Is determined by the ordinal rank of the children as to their birth.
The entitlement of the female children to succedd and the practice
of gradual primogeniture are In contrast with the Mltaksara system, but the
Ifugao attitude to family property, the children *s looking upon their prospect-
4
Ive share as their own and the absence of testamentary disposition -  are con - 
cepts not too distant, under a differential social organization, from the rationale
1. Barton Ib id ., 31. Cp. the obsolete Institution of Vanaprastha among the 
Hindus, Infra,3^5-402. Also the Japanese system of Inkyo, supra,'304-6. 
Pre-mortem transmission of property Is also known In other societies. Irish 
farmers pass on the control of the farmstead to their children when they marry, 
C .M . Arensberg, The Irish Countryman, (New York, 1937), cited byJ.Goody, 
Death, Property and the Ancestors: A  Study of the Mortuary Customs of the 
Lodagga of West Africa, (Stanford, California, 1962), 277-8”  In 13th cen­
tury England often the holder handed the tenement over to his heir, G .C. 
Homans, English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century, (Cambridge, Mass.,
1941), l44^ Similar citfom prevails among the Mbugwe of Tanganyika,
R.F. Gray, ‘Positional S uccesslon Among the Wambugwe*, A frica, 23 
(1953), 233-43 at 234-5. This Is also found among the Fularil, Goody,
Ib id ., 278. Goody points out that pre-mortem transfer Is also ‘Intergener- 
atlonal transmission*, Ib id ., 279. He Is apparently not Imputing any ele­
ment of co-ownership In pre-mortem transmission.
2 . Barton, Ib id ., 44.
3 . Ib id ., 44.
4 . Ib id ., 47.
behind the concept of the Mltaksara birthright of a Hindu son. 
c . The Kallngas
Barton's companion study of the Kallngas  ^ Is also a landmark In the 
comparative study of family law In India, with particular relevance to a system 
with a South Indian orientation, such as the Mltaksara birthright.
From anthropological studies and somatologlc data, we know that the
2features of the Kallngas resemble Indian features, a conspicuous variation from
3
the other mountainous peoples of Luzon. Among the Kallngas, Barton finds a
4
strong Infusion of Indian blood, a revelation which suggests a close link between 
the ancient Inhabitants of the Philippines and the proto-lndlans. Thus, In a
1. 'R.F. Barton, The Kallngas: Their Institutions and Custom Law (Chicago,
1949, rept. AMS, New York, 1973), The Kallngas have two major divisions, 
the Northern Kallnga and the Southern Kallnga. Barton's study Is confined 
to the Southern Kallngas, F. Eggan, 'Forward', IR.F. Barton, Ifugao Law, 
o p .c lt., xv. On the Northern Kallngas, see F. Eggan, 'Cultural Dfift and 
Social Change', Current Anthropology, 4 (1963) 4: 347-55 at 350. Also 
fo ra  fuller study, E.P. Dozier, The Kallnga of Northern Luzon, Philippines, 
(New York/London, 1967). The Kallngas are also rice cultivators like the
Ifugaos, Dozier, Ib id ., 2.
2. Some of them are of decided *Dravldlan' type, R.F. Barton, The Kallngas, 
lo p .c lt ., plate, V III. Even without these studies, It Is perfectly well-known 
that Kallnga Is an Indian name.
3. J.B. Ballen, 'Studies In Physical Anthropology on the Philippines', In M .D . 
Zamora, ed ., Studies In Philippine Anthropology, o p .c lt., 527-58at531. 
However, Inhabitants of Calnta, iRTzal are also thought to be of East Indian 
origin, R. Bean and F. Planta, 'Men of Calnta', Philippine Journal of Science, 
6 (1911), 7-14.
4 . R.F. Barton, The Kallngas, lo c .c lt . ,  13. This Is also accepted by L.A. 
Estel, 'Racial Origin In Northern Indonesia', University of Manila Journal 
of East Asiatic Studies, 2 (1952), 1-20.
comparative context, and besides the contribution to anthropological under­
standing, great jurisprudential Interest can be found In the fo lk -Ilfe  of the 
Kallngas.
As we have stated earlier,^ Barton *s study was confined to the
Southern Kallngas, but *wlthln the Kallnga community, whether north or south,
the elementary family Is dominant and makes up the household, sometimes with
2
the addition of one or two parents or other relatives of the couple*.
3
Kallnga parents have the power to chastise their children, but the
principal alms of parents Is the welfare of the children and giving them a good
start In life . According to customary practices In Kallnga, the parents hand
over their entire property to the children and often lead lives of poverty there- 
4
after. In this respect, Barton says:
It w ill probably be correct to say, then (1) 
that the properties of the parents become ^ 
vested In the children from their very birth
1. See n . l , p .270.
2. F. Eggan, ‘Cultural D rift and Social Change*, Current Anthropology, 4 
(1963) 4: 347-55 at 350. Two or more nuclear families form the extended 
families of the Kallngas, E.P. Dozier, The Kallnga of Northern Luzon, 
o p .c lt., 17.
3 . R.F. Barton, The Kallngas, o p .c lt., 65.
4 . Barton, Ib id ., 66. This Is also implied among the Northern Kallngas, 
Dozier, lo c .c lt ., 27. Cp. Vanaprastha of the Hindus, Infra,
5. Emphasis supplied.
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and (2) that the father, rather than the mother, 
holds the properties In trust. 1
This does not mean that the mother has necessarily less voice Tn apportioning
2
property to the children. Her rights are not Inferior to those of her hus­
band but 'he Is the active member In carrying out the joint decision of the 
two*.3
Unlike the Mltaksara system where father's property passes on to a ll
the sons Tn equal shares, the Kallnga system Is a peculiar combination of prlmo-
4
genlture and homoparental Inheritance. The eldest son Inherits the best
5
fields of his father and the eldest daughter, the best fields of the mother.
The younger children get the residue of parental property, ^ and their shares
1. Barton, lo c .c lt ., 114.
2. Barton, Ib id ., 116.
3. Barton, Ib id ., 116.
4 . In a system of homoparental Inheritance, the male children Inherit from thefiF 
father and the female children from their mother. However, among the 
Kallngas, when the eldest child Is a daughter and the mother has consider­
ably less wealth,then the daughter Is often given the father's fields. In a 
reverse situation, the son Is given the mother's fields, Barton, Ib id ., 115.
To a certain extent, homoparental Inheritance Is found In the traditional 
custom of the Isnegs, living In the mountains of Apayo, a part of the pre­
sent province of Kallnga-Apayo, H.R. Reynolds and L .K . Keyes, The 
Isneg Family', Part I, In H. Reynolds and F.B. Grant, ed.,  The Isneg of 
the Northern Philippines: A Study of Trends of Change and Development, 
(Anthropology Museum, SI I liman University, Dumagaete C ity , Philippines, 
1973), 106-7.
5. R.F. Barton, The Kallngas, o p .c lt., 115.
6. Barton, Ib id ., 116.
grow successively smaller after the second child J
Despite many bipolar factors of the Mltaksara and the Kallnga systems 
regarding devolution of property to children, one common factor emerges from
both, that is, the concept of Innate right of children Tn the property of their
2 -  parents. In fact, Tn the Kallnga system, as Tn the Mltaksara, 'the child­
ren know their rights, and the force of custom, public opinion, and the Influ­
ence of the kinship groups are so strong that even if the parent wanted to de-
3
prlve the child of his rights, he could not'.
1. Barton, Ib id ., 117.
2. This innate right of children Is a peculiarity of the Kallngas. The follow­
ing studies of the customs of different peoples of Philippines establish that 
generally the children Inherit after the death of their parents: M .N .
Maceda, The Culture of the Mamanua (Northeast Mindanao): As Compared 
with that of the Other Negritos of Southeast Asia, (Manila, 1964), 94.
F .L. Jocano, Sulod Society: A  Study Tn the Kinship System andSocTal 
Organization of a Mountain People of Central Panay, Monograph Series 
N o .2, Institute of Asian Studies, (Quezon C ity, University of the Philip­
pines Press, 1968), 237. The same rule among the pre-Spanish VTsayansfc 
M .J . Gamboa, An Introduction to Philippine Law, 7th ed., (New York, 
1969), 63. On similar Isneg customs, see H. Reynolds, 'Patterns of Status 
and Role*, Tn H .Reynolds and F.B. Grant, ed ., The Isneg of the Northern 
Philippines, o p .c lt., 54-78 at 74; also Tn the same volume, H.!R. Reynolds 
and L .K . Keyes, 'Family Routine and Life Cycle*, 79-132 at 106. But see 
the property law of the Ifugaos who come closer to the Kallngas, supra, 1&7-69. 
The Kankanays of Bakun area share a number of traits In material culture, 
religion and social organization with the Ifugaos. But the children among 
the Kankanays do not Inherit 'until after the death of their parents', M .C . 
Bello, Kankanay Social Organization and Culture Change, (University of
the Philippines, 1972), 35, 80.
3. Barton, lo c .c lt . ,  115.
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V II .  Summing up
It may be recalled that at the beginning of our present discussion,  ^
we pointed out that a survey of the reception of lastrlc law In 'Farther India* 
would help us In understanding the historical development of ihe respective 
proprietary rights of father and son In the mainland of India. It Is signifi­
cant to note that In the available £astra-orlented law of Southeast Asia, 
nowhere do we come across any semblance of a son's birthright In the property 
of his father.
Although sporadic borrowings from the dharmasastras of Yajnavalkya,
2
Brbaspatl and Narada 5^ are noticeable In the legal literature of 'Farther 
India', It Is Indeed the Code of Many which was the main source of Inspira­
tion In this region.
The most faithful adherence to Manu Is found In Cambodia, heir to 
4
the ancient kingdom of Funan. Robert Llngat points out that 'In Cambodia
1. Supra, 237,
2. R.C. Majumdar, 'Hindu Law In Java and B a ll', Krlshnaswaml Alyangar Com- 
memoratlon Volume, o p .c lt., 445-61 at 458.
3 . R.C. Majumdar, Ib id ., 458. Also C . E lio t, Hinduism and Buddhism, o p .c lt . ,67.
4. H.R.H. Kantol Norodam, *Comments on the Law and Practice In Cambodia*,
In Studies In the Law of the Far Hast and Southeast Asia, (Washington, 1956), 
75-83 at 75-6. Also K .K . Sarkar, Early Indo-Cambodlan Contacts (Literary 
and Linguistic), (Vlsva-Bharatl, Santlnlketan, 1968), 4 -6 .
as Tn India, Manu was to be the sole legislator* J  We should mention that,
_  2 
although Cambodian society Ts AryanTsed patriarchal, the kinship system of
ancient Khmer society was b ilateral. Significantly, the succession to certain
high priestly offices was matrlllneal which, according to Klrsch, was more a
3
political strategy than a general norm. But In Cambodia also, as Is expect­
ed, eplgraphlc evidences do not point to the existence of corporate ownership
4
of property; an owner could dispose of his land at his pleasure.
1. R. LIngat, ’Evolution of the Conception of Law In Burma and Slam* ,
Journal of the Slam Society, 38 (1950) 1: 9-31 at 12. In the Cambodian 
context, same view of A .B . Griswold and P. Na Nagara, *A Law Promul­
gated by the King of Ayudha In 1397 A .D .* , Eplgraphlc and Historical 
Studies, N .4 , JSS 57 (1969) 1: 109-48 at 109; also *On Kingship and 
Society at Sukhodaya*, Tn G .W . Skinner and A .T . Klrsch, ed ., (Bange and 
Persistence In Thai Society: Essays In Honor of Laurlston Sharp, (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca /London, 1975), 29-92 at 36, 72. ATsoS. Sahal,
*IRajyalastra In Ancient Cambodia*, VIshveshvaranand Jndologlcal Journal, 
9(1971) 1: 151-63 at 159.
2 . H.R.H. Kantol Norodam, *Comments on the Law and Practice In Cambodia*, 
In Studies In the Law of the Far East and Southeast Asia, o p .c lt., 75-83 at 
76; but It Is less authoritative than the Roman pater famllias.
3 . A .T . Klrsch, ‘Kinship, Genealogical Claims and Societal Integration In 
Ancient Khmer Society: An Interpretation*, Tn C .D . Cowan and O .W . 
Wolters, ed., Southeast Aslan History and Historiography, (Cornell Uni­
versity Press, Ithaca/London, 1976), 190-202 at l9 l ,  200- 1 .
4 . M.C.RIcklefs, *Land and the Law In the Epigraphy of Tenth-Century Cam 
bodla*, Journal of Aslan Studies, 26 (1967) 3: 411-420 at 413-5.
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The absence of a son's co-ownership with hTs father Tn the Hlndu- 
Tzed law of 'Farther Indta' brings to the fore the particular commentatorla! 
theory  ^ that the sostrlc literature, especially the Code of Manu, was not the 
origin of the concept of the Mltaksara birthright.
It Is accepted that the highest cultural Influence on 'Further India*
2
emanated from South India, and |uro-polltlcaIly this was supplemented by
3
the undisputed Chola expansion to the region. Had the concept of a son's 
birthright remained widely Tn vogue prior to Vljnanesvara In South India, It
should have left some mark In the legal literature of 'Farther India'. However,
4 „ -  5 _ 6
we know that Bharucl and Vlsvarupa from the South, and Medhatlthl from
the North mentioned the doctrine of a son's co-eval right with his father before
Vljnanesvara; thus, the absence of the concept In the Hlndulzed jurisprudence
of 'Farther India* does not negate Its existence as a norm; It lackecjonly a
Vljnanesvara to popularise and establish It on a solid juridical foundation.
1. See the view of Jlmutavahana, Infra, 53 5 -4  • Vljnanesvara also stressed 
the point that svatva was lauklka. However, he relied on Gastric texts as 
w ell, Infra, 5*14> 'ti.'B.
2. H .G . Quarltch Wales, The Making of Greater India, o p .c lt., 28.
3. On Chola expansion Tn Southeast Asia, see R.C. Majumdar, Hindu Colonies, 
(Calcutta, 1974), 38-9.
4 . Infra, 460, 'r »- \ •
5. Infra, 4 7 1 •
6 . Infra, 4 5 9 .
CHAPTER 10
CHINESE AND THE JAPANESE SYSTEMS
(1) Chinese Law
I.  Background
In the north-east quadrant of the Asian landmass, separated by
formidable natural barriers from other civilizations, lies China. It Is a vast
country with over three million square miles of territory.^ The Chinese c lv ll l -
2
zatlon Is one of the oldest, and It may be claimed that from the Neolithic
3
time onwards land had been cleared for agricultural use In the great a lluvial
plains of China; but It would be more appropriate to say that It was only from
c. 500 B.C. that China started to become the great agricultural country It was
4
to remain until modern times*
1. A .L . March, The Idea of China: Myth and Theory In Geographic Thought, 
(London/Vancouver, 1974), 7.
2. The Neolithic period covers from the 4th millennium to the beginning of the 
2nd millennium B .C .; the Bronze age covers from the 18th to the 6th cen­
tury B.C. Then starts the Iron age at about c.500 B .C ., J. Gernet, La 
Chine Anclenne, tr . 1R. Rudorff, sub .tltl Ancient .China from the Beginnings 
to the Empire, (London, 1968), 24-5.
3. YT-FuTuan, The World's Landscapes: I China, (London, 1970), 47.
4 . J. Gernet, lo c .c lt ., 14, 16, 46. M . Freedman, Lineage Organization 
In Southeastern China, London School of Economics Monographs on Social
Anthropology, N o .18, (University of London, The Athlone Press, 1958, 
rpt. 1970), 9. On the main theme of Freedman's work, see B. Pasternak, 
'The Role of the Frontier In Chinese Lineage Development1, JAS 28 (1969) 3: 
551-61.
Like the agricultural system, the Chinese famllTa! Institution and
Chinese law go back to the remote past and, 'In fact, with the Chinese law,
. . .  we are carried back to a position whence we can survey, so to speak, a
living past, and converse with fossil men* J  Therefore, despite being ethno-
graphlcally dissimilar and geographically divided by the Himalayas, China,
2
with Its ancient agrarian civilization of almost three thousand years, provides
3
a similar ecological setting fo r the development of family law, as do the 
agricultural plains of India.
1. E.H . Parker, 'Comparative Chinese Family Law*, The China Review, 8 
(1879-80), 67-107 at 69.
2. Agriculture was not the only occupation of the population. There were 
merchants, artisans and people of other professions, K .A . W lttfogel,
'Chinese Society: An Historical Survey*, JAS 16 (1957)) 3: 343-364 at 364. 
But, It seems that non-agrlcultural activities were discouraged by society 
and the king. It Is said In an *EdIct of Emperor Wen on the Primacy of 
Agriculture* (c. 163 B.C.) that natural calamity exists because many people 
are engaged In non-agrlcultural activities which are detrimental to agriculture, 
W .T. de Bary, ed ., Sources of Chinese Tradition, (Columbia University Press, 
New York, i960), 229. The Legalist School of 3rd and 4th centuries B.C. 
also believed that 'agriculture, as the basis of the economy, would be pro­
moted Intensively, while commerce and Intellectual endeavour were to be 
severely restricted, as non-essential and diversionary*, de Bary, Ib id ., 137. 
The classical literature of traditional times also frequently points to the In­
ferior status of the merchant In society, B. G a llln , *ChInese Peasant Values 
Toward the Land*, In J .M . Potter, M .N . Diaz and G .M . Foster, ed.,
Peasant Society: A  Reader, (Boston, 1967), 367-375 at 370. Cp. Gautama 
ordained agriculture as a mode of acquisition for the Valtfya caste^ Gautama, 
X .38-42. Also see Manu, X .116. Fora discussion on these texts, see 
Derrett, ZVR, 64 (1962), 34: RLSI, 125-6. Also Infra,403-10.
3. On this see, L.E. Stover, The Cultural Ecology of Chinese C ivilization: 
Peasants and Elites In the Last of the Agrarian States, (New York, 1974),
13^ 3:
II . Chinese Family System
Authors of the older generation put forward the view that since the
archaic period,^ the Chinese peasantry, who seem to have been an Important
group In the society, lived In great families, a pattern which became known
2
as the large family system of China. The family consisted not only of father,
mother, children, and perhaps grandparents, but also o f aunts, uncles, cousins,
nieces, nephews and representatives of other varying degrees of blood relatlon- 
3
ship. To these could often be added the adopted children, slaves and ser-
„  4 vants.
However, modem sociologists hold the view that the large family
system of China which structurally corresponds to the joint family of the
5 6 7Hindus, was not universal as a basic unit of Chinese society; the majority
T. The archaic period Is considered as between 18th and 8th century B .C .,
J . Gemet, Ancient China, o p .c lt., 45.
2. H .D . Lamson, Social Pathology In China, (Sanghal, 1935), 496.
3. R.F. Johnston, Lion and Dragon In Northern China, (London, 1910), 142-3. 
W .L. Parish, J r ., 'Socialism and the Chinese Peasant Family*, JAS 34 (1975) 
3:613-30 at 613.
4 . H .D . Lamson, lo c .c lt . ,  496.
5. On the joint Hindu family, see Derrett, RLSI, Ch. 12.
6. L.E. Stover, The Cultural Ecology of Chinese C iviliza tion, o p .c lt., 104.
7. The great family system Is Identified with the landlord class who were In the 
minority, Yang Llen-Sheng, ‘Great Families of Eastern Han*, In E-tu Zen 
Sun and J. de Francis, ed ., Chinese Social History, (Washington, 1956),
103-34.
of the families were much smaller Tn slze.^ In thTs respect, before we pass on 
to the juridical aspect of our discussion, Maurice Freedman's view on the struct­
ure of the Chinese family deserves closer attention. He suggests that economic 
factors determine the size of the family and the respective powers of father and 
son over family property. He points out that In this respect, legal traits
should be sought In the Interrelation of economic standards and the demographic
2
pattern of Chinese society. Freedman aligns himself with the view that In 
China some families were very large and could be
looked upon as a large politico-economic 
corporation with much power vested In the 
chief member. But thTs corporation 
could not go Indefinitely In membership y 
for with the death of Its senior generation 
It spilt along the lines laid down by the 
constitution of the next generation, every 
son having a right to an Individualized 
share of his father's estate on that man's 
death. 3
1. On the size of Chinese families, SybJ He van der Sprenkel says: 'the fact 
that It could Include a ll these relatives led to exaggeration Tn the supposed 
size of the family: recent studies have a ll shown an average between four
and six persons', Legal Institutions In Manchu China: A Sociological Ana­
lysis, (University of London, The Athlone Press, 1^62), 14. H.F. Schurmann 
also pointed out that the small family containing less than ten members was the 
principal social nucleus of over 90% of the country since lateHan times, *Tradl 
tlonal Property Concept In China', Far Eastern Quarterly, 15 (1956), 507-16 
at 512, also n . l l  thereof. Same view of M . Freedman, *The Family In China 
Past and Present*, Pacific Affairs, 34 (1961-2) 4: 323-36 at 326-7; also, 
Lineage Organization In Southeastern China, o p .c lt., 19-32.
2. M . Freedman, Pacific Affairs, 34 (1961-2), 327.
3. M . Freedman, The Family In China, 'Past and Present', Pacific Affaire, 34 
(1961-2) 4: 327.
281 .
at the other end of the social scale the family 
was, so to speak, scarcely Confuctan. Poverty 
and powerlessness produced, Instead of a strong 
patriarch, a weak father. He could ra lly no 
support from outside to dominate his sons. He 
had few resources to withhold from them. In 
fact, he might well have only one son growing 
to maturity. If, however, he had two or more 
sons reaching manhood, only one would be 
like ly to stay with him, and perhaps even 
this one would leave him too. Demography, 
economics, and the power situation at this 
level of society ensured that families of simple 
structure were a constant feature of the land­
scape . 1
Freedman wants to emphasise that wealth was the agglutinative factor
In ‘the great families1 of China and the decrease In wealth denotes a decrease In
2 3the size of the family, and a corresponding waning of the power of the father.
But, despite Its seemingly convincing tone, Freedman's hypothesis suffers from
certain limitations. He overrates the part played by economic factors as a
binding force In families of this archaic society. In few traditional societies
do reverence for parents and obedience to their w ill depend on their wealth.
Traditional people, In order to cling to social and religious mores, sublimate
poverty; thus, to a son, poverty may not be perceived as a stimulus to separate;
1. Ib id ., 327.
2. Olga Lang's study of forty Chinese peasant families corroborates this view 
of Freedman, O . Lang, Chinese Family and Society, (New Haven, 1946), 
350. But we must be conscious of the danger of generalizing from such a 
study on a vast populatl on.
3. M , Freedman, Lineage Organization In Southern China, o p .c lt., 30.
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on the contrary, it could be viewed as a divine admonition to accept the status 
1quo.
Irrespective of their economic standard, the spirit of a Chinese family
is constituted of the moral obligation of a ll members towards each other, and at
2
the centre of family morality Is the doctrine of f i l ia l piety. Confucius
taught: “when the parents are living, serve them with propriety; when they are
3
deadf  bury them with propriety*. The moral teaching of Confucius found ex­
pression In the Code of Tang which jurid ica lly strengthened the view that *the
4
father Is the Heaven of the son*. This shows that moral duties are Ipso facto
legal duties In the sense that the law sanctions them by penalizing their 
breaches . . .  This Is the enforcement of Confuclan ethics by the technical
5
methods of the Legalists.*
Law and morals should be viewed through the prism of Chinese agrar - 
lan society, which was divided between elites and peasantry. Between these 
two extremes of peasant society, the Chinese gentry-scholar-offlclaI class served 
as a hinge group to Integrate the society. They were the ‘cultural .
1. This attltufde to poverty of the peasants of Calabria and Lucanla Is an Inter­
esting example, F .G . Friedmann, “The World of "La Mlserla'1*, In J .M . 
Potter, M .N .D laz  a n dG .M . Foster, ed ., Peasant Society: A  Reader, 
(Boston, 1967), 324-36 at 326.
2. H .D . Lamson, Social Pathology In China, o p .c lt., 496.
3. The Analects, 2:5, quoted by John C .H . Wu, ‘Chinese Legal Philosophy:
A Brief Historical Survey*, Chinese Culture, 1 (1958) 4: 7-48 at 34. Also 
similar teaching of Confucius, K1 1, 1.5, The Texts of Confucianism, tr.
J . Legge, SBE, 28 (Oxford, 1885), 211.
4 . J .C .H . Wu, Ib id ., 34.
5. J .C .H . Wu, Ib id ., 35.
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brokers *  ^ and custodians of ethlco-jurldlc consciousness not altogether unlike
2
the Brahmins of traditional India or the local nobility of Mediaeval Europe.
Thus, considering the cultural factors and value affiliations of traditional
Chinese society, Stover seeks to explode the economy-based theory of the
3
structure of family, as put forward by Freedman and others. He states:
It Is true that some rich peasants have big 
families and some poor gentlemen have 
small families. But this continuum Tn 
family size between peasant and gentry, 
does not bridge the two life-styles. Folk 
culture Includes both poor peasants and 
rich peasants; the latter may own enough 
land to encourage the married sons to stay 
and work I t .  Some men of high culture 
are so poor that their consumption habits 
are as restricted as those of the majority 
of peasants; and their family size may be 
as small as that of a poor peasant and re­
duced to a conjugal type^, But these facts 
nonetheless do not allow a "typ ica l” Chinese 
family to be created out of statistics. Re­
ducing everything to a common denominator 
w ill yield an average family size of five 
persons. This Is useless Information. It 
does nothing to highlight the more Import­
ant fact that a legal distinction exists be­
tween an elite population and a mass de­
pressed nonellte population. The 6 llte , 
rich or poor, are Incumbents of a political 
privilege that allows them the luxury to 
orient themselves Intellectually to the
1. The phrase was used by E. Wolf, ‘Aspects of Group Relations In a Complex 
Society: Mexico*, American Anthropologist, 48 (1956), 1065-1078 at 1075-6.
2. M .N . Diaz and J .M . Potter, ‘ Introduction? The Social Ufe of Peasants*,
In Peasant Society, o p .c lt., 154-68 at 164-5.
3. Supra,280-^g i.
matters of high culture that are empire-wide 
in their distribution. And the families of 
these men tend to be large Tn number and 
organised as multlgeneratlonal joint fami­
lies. The nonellte, excluded from p o liti­
cal power, are captives of the Green Circle; 
their outlook Is not reflective and It Is local­
ized In the village and the marketing area.
The families of these men, for the most part, 
are small and organized as conjugal families.
No Idea of a typical Chinese family can be 
made to prevail over the fundamental distinc­
tion Tn life ways as between folk culture and 
high culture. 2
The gist of Stover's argument Is this: the rich members of the folk cul­
ture and the members of the elite culture, both rich and poor, lived In m ultl- 
generatlonal joint families. In the case of poor elites, It was their standard 
of values, whereas In the case of rich non-6Iltes, I t  was their economic prosper­
ity , that constituted the binding factors resulting In jo int liv ing. So Freedman's 
3
generalization that poverty connotes con jugal-family type Is applicable only
1. ch'Tng chuan or Green C ircle, the phrase Is used In the sense of folk commu- 
Ity that compose the rural landscape of China, L.E. Stover, The Cultural 
Ecology of Chinese C iv ilization, o p .c lt., 13.
2. Stover, Ib id ., 104-5.
3. W. Eberhard points out that to an Individual of traditional society 'family 
means security and warmth, the outside world means Insecurity and cold­
ness', 'On three Principles In Chinese Social Structure*, Chinese Culture,
11 (1970) 1: 21-33 at 30. In Chinese family too, the Individual relinquished 
some of his freedoms to the family and the security and warmth of the family 
had a centripetal rather than a centrifugal effect on Its members, Eberhard, 
Ib id ., 28-30. Earlier,Eberhard In his study of migrations of the Wu clan In 
South China, pointed out that sometimes an Individual moved alone but often 
It was a migration of a nuclear family rather than of a lone Individual, W. 
Eberhard, Social M obility In Traditional China, (Leiden, 1962), 116.
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to  the n o n -e lite s .
Moreover, when sons assert themselves or leave the house of a poor
father Tn search of a living,  ^ poverty may be a contributory factor towards hTs
weakness; but It does not necessarily prove the strength of the son Tn the
sphere of property ownership, because families suffering abysmal poverty have
hardly anything to divide or alienate. Thus, It would be fallacious to suppose,
2as Indirectly suggested by Freedman, that sons In poor families had more rights 
than those of rich families.
1. The Hindu experience as projected by Sonthelmer does not fu lly  corroborate 
Freedman's generalisation In the Chinese context. Sonthelmer In itia lly  
postulates: 'Nuclear families where sons would leave the families at marri­
age would especially occur wherethere was little  or no property to Inherit 
and where sons would have to seek for a living, and could readily build 
their own hut or home*,E'HJFI,41 . But on practical consideration, he 
modifies his statement almost Instantly by saying that *whereas for poor 
parents sons were needed for protection In old age, the wealthy family 
would require at least one son who would look after the estate eventually 
and Inherit It . . . '  ER JFI,4l . The VedTc literature does not show that 
In families with property joint living was universal. In families with means, 
the sons could have a share and set up their own households during the life ­
time of the father, Tal. Sam.2 ,5 ,2 ,7 , Kane, HD, III, 565. Also Artha- 
sastra, 3 ,5 ,21, Karigle, I, 104; II, 242. In classical Greece when a 
father's olkos was not large enough to provide a livelihood for a ll the sons, 
some of them used to leave the father's house and established for themselves 
a new home, W .K . Lacey, The Family In Classical Greece, (London, 1968), 
16. A  study on 94 households In Burma supports the view of Freedman:
'It Is only the very rich who can hold on to their sons and have the sons* 
families live In the same compound and under the authority of the father and 
mother*, M . Nash, The Golden IRoad to Modernity: Village Life In Contem­
porary Burma, (New York, 1965), 149. But, being a study on contemporary 
Burma, this does not falsify our view on traditional societies.
2 . Supra,a# I.
However, despite the claims of the sociologists to the contrary the 
juridical family in China does not seem to be so small as to hold only four to 
six members. This is apparent from the Code  ^ of the Manchu dynasty which 
made numerous provisions to protect the solidarity o f the fam ily. Section 32 
of the Code provides:
A ll relations In the first and second degree 
and living under the same roof, maternal 
grandparents and their grandchildren, fathers 
and mothers-In-Iaw, sons and daughters-Tn- 
law, grandchildren's wives, husband*s 
brothers and brothers wives, when mutu­
a lly  assisting each other, and concealing 
the offences, one of another, and more­
over, slaves and hired servants assisting 
their masters and concealing their offences, 
shall not In any such cases, be punishable 
for so doing. 2
However, legal provisions also suggest that children could separate after the
death of their father: *AII family property moveable and Immoveable must be
divided equally between a ll male children whether bom o f theprlnclpal wife
3
or of a concubine or domestic slave*.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   s------
1. The Code, known as the Ta Tslng Lu Lee* or the General Laws of the 
Imperial Dynasty o f Tslng, was promulgated In 1647, three years after 
the accession of the Manchu dynasty .
2 . Quoted by G . Ohllnger, ‘Some Leading Principles of Chinese Law*, 8 
M ich.L .R ev., (1910), 199-205 at 203.
3. L I .88 quoted by L.E . Stover, The Cultural Ecology of Chinese C iv iliza tion , 
o p .c lt . ,  102.
II I. Relationship between father and son
Robert LTngat tells us that, irrespective of Its kind, The Chinese
family Ts of the patrTarchal typeO  In a Chinese family, the senior male
member was the ruling head and his authority was nearly as absolute as that
2
of the Roman pater famlllas. On the power of the head of the Chinese 
family LIngat adds:
The head of the family, himself subject to 
the authority of the head of his clan (the 
clan Includes a ll those Individuals descend­
ed from the same founder), completely ab­
sorbs Into himself the personality of lesser 
members, who are In the position of the 
alien! juris o f Roman Law. The children 
and grandchildren cannot valid ly perform 
any act without his authorisation, and a ll 
they earn or acquire falls to the family 
patrimony, of which the head alone has 
the right to dispose. As long as the head 
of the family lives, the children are prohi­
bited from demanding partition of the 
family property and from having a separate 
establishment. Even after marriage, the ^ 
son remains under the authority of his father.
1. *La famllle chlnolse est du type patriarchal1, R. LIngat, Les Regimes M atrl- 
monlaux du Sed-Est de l*Asie, (Hanoi, 1952), V o l.I, 16, tr . H. Kanltkar, 
Department of Anthropology, S .O .A .S .
2. H .D . Lamson, Social Pathology In China, o p .c lt., 496. T ‘ung-Tsu Ch*u, 
Law and SocIetyTn Traditional (Etna, (Paris, 1961), 20.
3. *Le chef de famllle, soumls Iu!-meme a Ifautorlte'duichef de clan (le clan 
comprend tous les Indlvldus Issus d*une meme souche), absorbe completement 
la personnallte'de tous les membres Infeirleurs, qu! sont dans la situation des 
alien! juris du droit romaln. Ses enfants et petlts-enfants ne peuvent falre 
valablement aucun acte sans son authorisation, et tout ce quTls gagnet ou 
acqulerement tombe dans le patrlmolne familial dont II a seul' le droit de dis­
poser. Tant que le chef de famllle est vlvant, II est defendu aux enfants 
de demander le partage des blens famlllaux et d‘avoir un establlssement 
separare'', Meme quand II se marie, le fils reste sous la puissance du pere1,
R. LIngat, Les Regimes Matrlmonlaux du Sed-Est de l*AsIe, o p .c lt . ,  16-17;
/Continued on next page:
In a comparative context, it is interesting to note that, while the
authority o f a Roman father emanates from patrTa potestas,  ^ a Chinese fathers
2authority Ts based on the doctrine of f i l ia l piety (hslao). This doctrine, being
the linchpin of family morality, solidarity and perpetuation, demands absolute
3
loyalty to ancestors living and dead. Hslao was regarded by the Confuclan- 
Ists as the root of a ll virtues. It does not merely refer to the reverence due to 
parents; It Includes ancestor worship and succession. The former signifies con­
tinuity of love for one*s progenitors, and the latter, the continuity of the family 
lineage ^
Note 3 -  p .287 -  Continued:
tr . H . Kanltkar, S .O .A .S . Also for the same view, see T*ung -Tsu Ch*u, 
Law and Society In Traditional China, o p .c lt., 20. J. Escarra, ‘Chinese1, 
sub. ‘Law1, Encyclopaedia o f Social Sciences, ed ., E.R .A. Sel!gman£New 
York, 1949), IX, 252.
1. For a discussion oh the nature of Roman patrla potestas, see R. Nlsbet, "Kin­
ship and Political Power In First Century Rome*, In D. Black and M . Mlleskl, 
ed ., The Social Organization of Law, (New Yorl^l-ondon, 1973), 262-77 at 
263-5T
2. According to G . Jamieson, the Chinese term hslao, suggesting f i l ia l piety, 
should be translated as ‘f i l ia l duty* or ‘submission*, Chinese Family and 
Commercial Law, (Sanghal, 1921), 4 . On the significance of the term, also 
see, The Hslao King, SBE, (Oxford, 1879), 3; Ch• I—II, 449-68. On the 
Importance of  hslao on Chinese social life , see F.T. Cheng, ‘Fragments of 
Chinese Law Ancient and Modem*, Chinese Culture, 1 (1958), 3: 1-14 at 4 . 
A ll schools of philosophers accepted the doctrine of hslao, F. Yu-Lan, A 
History of Chinese Philosophy, tr . D. Bodde, (London, 1952), 1, 357-61.
3 . H .D . Lamson, Social Pathology In China, o p .c lt., 496.
4 . Wen-Yen Tsao, 'Equity In Chinese Customary Law*, Chinese Culture, 3 
(i960), 2: 9-28 at 14. The Chinese evidence substantiates the theme of 
The Ancient C ity of Fustel de Coulanges. In The Ancient C ity , It has been 
stressed that ancient classical society was centred In the family In a wide 
sense of the word -  joint family or lineage -  and that what held this group 
of agnates together as a corporation and gave It permanence was the ancestor 
cult In which the head of the family acted as the priest. On this particular
/Continued on next page:
It would be wrong to suggest that Chinese hslao was exactly similar 
to Roman patrTa potestas as we know it from developed Roman law. In this re­
spect, Parker's comment is hTghly significant:
China . . .  as regards the PatrTa Potestas 
. . .  remains in the position of the Roman 
Law -  not of the later Empire, not even 
of the AntonTne era; not even, again, of 
the early Empire, or the Republic at Its 
prime; but of the Roman Law anterior to 
the publication of the Twelve Tables,
2,200 years ago. 1
Here Parker emphasised the customary aspect of Chinese Law and anticipated the
observation of J . Dyer Ball who stated that:
the Chinese customary law . . .  undoubtedly 
rests, as did the Roman Law before the pub­
lication of the Twelve Tables, on the mores 
majorum, that Is . . .  upon customs long ob- 
served and s anctloned by the custom of the 
people. 2
Parker, who was a sinologue, says: *We believe that there Is no expression In
the Chinese language which conveys the Idea of "powers appertaining to the 
3
head of the fam ily"*. In Roman law a 'father possessed potestas over his
Note 4 -  p .288 -  Continued:
point of The Ancient C ity , see E.E. Evans-Prltchard, Theories of Primitive 
Religion, (Oxford, 1972), 51. However, In China hslao, and thereby, an- 
cestor worship was left to one's private judgment, H. McAIeavy, 'Chinese 
Law*, In Derrett, ed ., Introduction to Legal Systems, o p .c lt., 107.
1. E .H . Parker, 'Comparative Chinese Family Law', The China Review, 8 
(1879-80), 67-107 at 69.
2 . J . Dyer Ball, Things Chinese, (Sanghat, 1925), 330.
3 . Parker, lo c .c lt . ,  91. Also the same view of G . Jamieson, Chinese Family 
and Commercial Law, o p .c lt., 4 -5 .
children (patrTa), and slaves (dominium); manus over his w ife; and manclplum 
over his bondsmen.*  ^ A Chinese father has a ll these powers yet they cannot 
be said to be exactly the same as the powers of a Roman father. Unlike patrla 
potestas, hslao Is ‘respectful submission to the w ill of the father, which Is
9
assumed to arise naturally out of the relationship (between father and son).
This duty of submission on the part of the son extends not merely to the father
3but to a ll seniors In the agnatic group (Tsung). Thus, the doctrine of hslao
4points to a w illing  submission on the part of his son to his father.
Although there Is no definite Information, It could be suggested that
In a remote epoch of Chinese juridical history, a father had the power of life
and death (jus vitae neclsque) over a son; but from the time of the Han dynasty
(former Han, c . 202 B.C. - 9 A . D . ;  later Han, c . 25 A .D . - 2 2 0 A . D . )  It
became Illegal for a father to k ill his son; and gradually the power of life  and
5
death was consigned to the sovereign. However, In ancient China, a son 
could be banished for triv ia l reasons ^ and the selling of young children was 
also common.^
1. i .  H. Parker, ‘Comparative Chinese Family Law*, The China Review, 8 
(1879-80), 91.
2 . G . Jamieson, Chinese Family and Commercial Law, o p .c lt., 4 -5 .
3 . Jamieson, Ib id ., 4 -5 .
4.  T*ung-Tsu Ch*u, Law and Society In Traditional (Blna, o p .c lt., 21.
5. Ch*u, Ib id ., 21-23. Jamieson, lo c .c lt ., 4 -5 .
6. Ch*u, Ib id ., 27-28. This Is also supported from the customs of the Chinese
In Formosa, S. Okamatsu, Laws and Customs In the Island of Formosa,compiled, 
1900, t r . ,  1902, (Taipei, rpt. W / \ ) ,  Appx. xxiv. L”
7. Parker, lo c .c lt . ,  92.
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IV . Rights o f Father and Son Tn Fam ily  Property
a . Father's power and family property
In a society where fathers authority seems to be supreme,  ^ there Is
little  scope for any limitation on father's ownership In family property, fbrker
thought that *ln respect of property, the power of the Chinese father appears to
equal that of the earliest Roman father; no lim it of age, and no circumstances
of acquisition seems to deprive the father of his right to appropriate his son's
property . . .  J. Escarra Is also of the opinion that when the father was
alive, an adult son was not permitted to hold property separately or live apart
3
with his Immediate fam ily. Ch'u takes this point further and says:
Any Inferior who, without the consent of 
the family head, used family property for 
his private needs was punished with from 
ten to one hundred strokes, depending 
upon the amount of property he had appro­
priated. Any pawning or sale of family 
property by a son or grandson was Invalid 
before the law. 4
1 . T'ung -Tsu Ch'u, Law and Society In Traditional (Blna, op .c lt . ,  30.
2. E .H . Parker, The China Review, 8 (1879-80), 92. The same view of 
R. LIngat, supra,2 8 7 .
3. J. Escarra, 'Chinese', sub. 'Law*, En.So.Sc., IX, 252. Also, Ch'u, loc. 
c l t . ,  29. Separate property of children was allowed for the first time In 
the third draft of the Code In 1925. The draft gave right to parents to the 
usufruct of children's separate property, but they could not dispose of It ex­
cept In the Interest of the child, A rt. 1088, see M . Van der Valk, An Out- 
Itne of Modern Chinese Family Law, Journal of Oriental Studies of the 
Catholic University of Peking, Monograph, II, (Peking, 1939), 127.
4 . Ch'u, lo c .c lt . ,  29.
The ancient Codes of China also uphold the view that sons did not
have ownership during the lifetime of their father. As the Ta Chlng Lu ll, ^
or General Code of Laws of the Ch'Ing Empire, puts It: *DurIng the lifetime of
grandparents or parents, the sons or grandsons are not allowed to set up separate
establishments and register them as such, nor to divide the family property,
under penalty of one hundred blows, but the parents or grandparents must be 
2the complainants. 1 The law Is further explained thus: The fu ll penalty of 
the above law Is Incurred I f  the sons separate and divide the property, though 
they do not register themselves. If, however, the parents permit the division,
3there Is no objection to Its being done*. This envisages joint living without 
joint ownership, but before we draw a definite conclusion, we need a pause to 
examine some views which suggest the existence of son's co-ownership with the 
father.
b . Two views
Schurmann points out that In traditional China, ownership of property
1 . On this, supra,2.86 n . l.
2 . Lu.87, quoted by L .E . Stover, The Cultural Ecology of Chinese C iviliza tion , 
o p .c lt., 103.
3 . L I.87, quoted by Stover, Ib id ., 103.
was Fundamentally different from the concept of absolute ownership  ^ and,
even In the early twentieth century, In village China one could find traces
2of multiple rights over the same property. Indeed, *lt Is generally recog­
nised that some form of Joint family property has existed In China for at least 
3
two millennia*, but the disagreement among the scholars Is concentrated on 
the participants In such jointness. Schurmann puts forward the divergent 
views In these words:
Among the Japanese sociologists, two theories 
have been current. One Is a theory based on 
the private law of pre-war Taiwan. Accord­
ing to this theory, Joint family property comes 
Into being only upon the death of the common 
ancestor (father or grandfather). During the 
lifetime of the common ancestor, the property
1. H .F . Schurmann, Traditional Property Concept In China*, Far Eastern 
Quarterly, 15 (1956), 507-16 at 508-9. The same view of E . Kroker,
The Concept of Property In Chinese Customary Law*, In The Transactions 
of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 3rd Series, 7 (1959), 123-46 at 146,
The terms, such as ‘property1, ^ownership*, ‘possession*, used In context of 
Chinese property are not accurate. Schurmann says they are used as faute 
de mleux (for want of better). He stressed the difference between the 
Chinese concept of property and the German concept of Freles Elgentum, 
Ib id ., 508. On the Importance of use, the terms such as ‘proprietor* In 
English, ‘elgenaar* In Dutch, lElgentOmer* In German, ‘proprletarlo* In 
Italian, *proprletalre* In French, ‘domlnus* In Latin, see M . Gluckman, 
‘Concepts In the Comparative Study of Tribal Law*, In L . Nader, ed .,
Law In Culture and Society, (Chicago, 1969), 349-73 at 357. Cp. Hindu 
concept of svamT, see Derrett, *Development of the Concept of Property In 
India c . A .D . 800 -1800*, ZVR 64 (1962), 15-130 at 93-6.
2. Schurmann, Ib id ., 508.
3 . Schurmann, Ib id ., 510.
of the family is in fact the sole, personal 
property of the living common ancestor, In. 
whom the rights of disposition are vested.
The second theory, expressed by Nakata 
Kaoru and Nllda Noboru, Is based largely 
on a study of medieval Chinese sources.
This theory holds that joint family pro­
perty exists between ascendants and descend­
ants In the direct line ( I.e . between sons, 
fathers and grandfathers). 2
If the second theory Is correct, then It suggests the existence of an
Institution In China Identical to the-Mltaksara birthright of the Hindus. But
Schurmann Informs us that the Chinese medlfeval sources do not support the
3existence of joint ownership between father and son. He favours the view
that In China joint ownership meant ownership of brothers who held the estate
4
jo intly as co-helrs after the death of their father. A  commentary on a Ming 
statute suggests that, when brothers lived jo in tly, they 11$ved as tenants In 
common:
In common living and joint wealth, what 
Is there that Is not one*s own possession?
However, (all) Is collectively managed 
by superiors and elders (tsun she vu tsun- 
chang). Inferiors and juniors must not 
arbitrarily (use It). (Legally) this Is not 
called ‘ robbery* but ‘appropriation*
1. Cp. Da.bha.2.27.
2. H .F. Schurmann, Far Eastern Quarterly, 15 (1956), 510.
3. Schurmann, Ib id ., 510-11. This Is also supported by J.W . Dardess, The 
Cheng Communal Family: Social Organization and Neo-Confucianism In 
Yuan and Early Ming China*, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 34 (1974), 
7-52.
4 . Schurmann, Ib id ., 511-2.
(shan). In effect, i f  inferiors and juniors 
use wealth, this is in accordance with the 
law. But they may be accused of arbitra­
r ily  using It without askTng(thelr) superiors 
and elders. 1
Schurmann says that the passage Implies equal ownership of co-helrs In a 
brothers consortium and does not Indicate any descendants right during the 
lifetime of his father.
But McAleavy, who examined the views of the Japanese scholars,
claims that the second theory *ls supported by the weight of contemporary 
2scholarship*. He continues this argument by saying:
Leaving aside the evidence from dynastic 
codes which declared, for Instance, that 
theft could not be constituted between a 
son and father, and referred In what seem 
unmistakable terms to the existence of 
co-ownership between a father and his 
sons, the result of the Japanese Inquiries 
In North China during the war reveal 
that In many places people would at any 
Bate, not buy land from a father unless^ 
his sons joined In the conveyance.
1. Nllda Noboru, Toso horltsu monjo no kenkyu: The C ritica l Study on 
Legal Documents o flhe  T*ang and Sung Eras, (Tokyo, 1937), 574, quoted 
by Schurmann, Far Eastern Quarterly, 15 (]956), 511 and n.7 thereof.
2. H. McAleavy, ‘Certain Aspects of Chinese Customary Law In the Light of 
Japanese Scholarship*, BSOAS, 17 (1955), 535-47 at 544. The view Is 
supported by M . ffeedman, Lineage Organization In Southeastern China, 
o p .c lt., 14, n .3 .
3. McAleavy, Ib id ., 544; also ‘Chinese Law*, In Derrett, ed., An Intro­
duction to Legal Systems, (London, 1968), 105-30 at 117.
This Ts supported by Johnston who records the procedure of sale of land in the 
WeThaTwel district of North ChTna. He observed that when a man tries to 
dispose of his landed property he should fu lly  dtscuss the whole matter with a ll 
the prominent members and elders of the vtllage. In addition to the consulta­
tion with the village, Johnston points out, *But he Ts not the less bound to 
satisfy his uncles and brothers and cousins, as well as his own sons, as for hts 
desire to sell . . .  1  ^ On this point, Maurice Freedman, whose study was
concentrated on Southeastern China, states: * . . .  a man held his land Tn
2trust for hts sons and any sale required theTr concurrence*.
3
It seems that Tn China, as In many other archaic societies, the Ideal
4
of family continuity acted against alienation of the families* own land. In
most parts of China *land was either alienable only within the lineage or a llen-
5
able to outsiders only after options to lineage members had not been taken up*,
1. IR.F. Johnston, Lion and Dragon In Northern China, (London, 1910), 143.
2 . M . Freedman, Lineage Organization In Southeastern China, o p .c lt., 14.
3 . Aristotle declares that In many Greek cities It was not lawful to sell the 
kleros which had first been allocated to the family, Pol.VI, 2,5.(1319A). 
Plato considered the sale of land, although legal, as disgraceful, Laws,
923A; for a discussion on this, see W .K . Lacey, The Family In Classical 
Greece, (London, 1968), 22-3. For similar rules In ancient Jewish society, 
see our discussion at supra,204 . Also Nuzl, supra, 191-4* Cp. Hindu,
T.nfraj/"3 4 0 ~ 4 l.
4 . Schurmann, far Eastern Quarterly, 15 (1956), 544. Also, B. G a llln , ‘Chinese 
Peasant Values Toward the Land*, Tn J .M . Potter, M .N . Diaz and G .M . 
Foster, ed ., Peasant Society, (Boston, 1967), 367-75 at 369-70.
5. Freedman, lo c .c lt ., 14. Also Johnston, lo c .c lt . ,  143-4. E. Kroker, *The 
Concept of Property In Chinese Customary Law*, In The Transactlons of the 
Asiatic Society of Japan, 3rd series, 7 (1959), 123-46 at 137-8.
and even though property became freely alienable by Sung and Yuan times,
Tn the case of certain people the right of preemption was s till retained.
The three classes of option holders were: 9T(T) immediate agnates; (it)
neighbours; (III) mortgage holders.^ The first category consisted of
direct relatives In the male line of descent for whom mourning had to be 
2carried out. Schurmann points out that essentially the brothers belonged 
to the first category of preemptors, but the position of a son In the ‘mourning 
charts* leads us to believe that a separated son also would be considered as 
one of the first option holders, since he Is one of the nearest kin of the 
father.^
The two divergent Japanese views on joint ownership have recently
1 . Cp. preemptors In the Arthasastra, 3 .9 .1 -9 ; jnatl-samanta-dhanlkah . . . ;
also Br. XVII1.20, Alyangar, ed ., 158. Fora fu ller discussion, see Infra, 
6 5 5 - '“702.
2. The pre-code ‘mourning charts‘Indicate the ‘degrees of mourning* to which 
the members of the family were mutually obliged. According to the system 
contained In the charts, relatives were divided Into three groups: (I) 
Tsung-ch*!n (relatives descending through males from a common ancestor 
within the 8th Roman degree); (II) WaI-ch*In (relatives on the mother's side); 
(III) Ch*I-ch‘ In (relatives of the wife within 4th Roman degree), M . van der 
Valk, An Outline of Modem Chinese Family Law, Journal of Oriental Studies 
of the Catholic University of Peking, Monograph II, (Peking, 1939), 18, also 
Appx. I, 167. According to mourning grades, three relationships fa ll under 
nearest kin: ‘the relation between father and son Is one; between husband 
and wife Is another; and between brothers Is a third*, Han Y I Feng, The 
Chinese Kinship System, (Philadelphia, 1937), 180. Cp. mrtasauca and 
saplnda relationship of the Hindus,
3 . Han Y I Feng, The Chinese Kinship System, o p .c lt., 180.
been analysed by Shuzo Shiga,  ^ who prefers the view that the father had major,
i f  not the soler  control over family property; nevertheless, he makes the point
that the son had a definite expectancy in the inheritance, although he could not
2dispose of It on the basts of that expectancy during the lifetime of the father.
Coming back to the father's position as a trustee, we must bear Tn 
mind that the position of a Chinese father In traditional China should not be 
Interpreted In terms of the modern law of trust. The role of a Chinese father 
should be viewed In context of the Weltanschauung of an archaic oriental 
society. In pre-Industrialised agrarian societies, It was completely natural 
for a grown-up son to play a major part In sowing and reaping; so It  was not
3
unnatural for a father to consult his adult sons while alienating family lands. 
Similarly, It was also pragmatic for the buyers to have an old man's sons 
around while buying his lands so that the sons might not dispute the trans­
action In future. The position and function of an adult son In the family
makes him a de facto owner, although he may not assert his ownership In the
^ • 4 de jure sense.
1 . Shuzo Shiga, Chugoku Kazukuho no genrl: Principles of Chinese Family Law, 
(Tokyo, 1967), 149-216.
2. Shiga's views are summarised, Ib id ., 206-16. Dr. P. Chen of the Law 
Department, S .O .A .S . Informed me of Shiga's opinion. Dr. Chen also 
favours Shiga's Interpretation on the point.
3 . While alienating his own property, a separated son, In some parts of China, 
had to obtain the consent of his father. In the district of Klangsl, even a 
separated brother's consent was required for the sale of land, E . Kroker,
The Concept of Property In Chinese Customary Law*, In The Transactions 
of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 3rd series, 7 (1959), 141.
4 . Derrett, Law In the New Testament, (London, 1970), 104.
c. Conclusion
However, the geograph Tea I immensity of ChTna Implies appreciable
variation In climate, landscape, mode of life , customs and dialect from one
region to another,^ so that, If any useful statements are to be made on the
family law of the Chinese, they must be made keeping In mind the diversities
within the Chinese world. Chinese family law has mainly grown out of 
2
custom; and, despite legislation at different epochs, ‘the customary law
continued to exist In almost undiminished vigour until the Peopled Govern -  
3
ment In 1949*. But we should not consider the customary law throughout 
4
China as homologous. Thus, In some parts of China, testamentary dlsposl- 
5
tlon was allowed; In other parts, not. As In the Indian subcontinent,
1. J . Gemet, La View Quotldlenne En Chine A  La Veille  de LMnvasTon 
Mongole, l250-1276u.tr. H .M . Wright, sub, t i t .  Dally Life In China on 
the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250-1276, (London, 1962), 3 . Chang 
CHI -yun, ‘Geographical Distribution of the Chinese People1, Chinese 
Culture, 2 (1959), 1: 74-97.
2. Wen-Yen Tsao, lEquTty In Chinese Customary Law1, Chinese Culture, 3 
(1960), 2: 9-28 at 14.
3. H. McAleavy, BSOAS, 17 (1955), 535.
4 . E. Kroker, TASJ, 7(1959), 140.
5. E.H. Parker, The China Review, 8 (1879-80), 92, n.94. McAleavy holds 
the view that a father could not frustrate a son‘s expectations by testament­
ary disposition, ‘Chinese Law* In Derrett, ed ., ILS, 117. But, In fact, we 
come across a w ill as far back as the Western Han dynasty (c. 206 B.C. -  24 
A.D.) T*ang-YI-PI ShTh, tr. K .H . Van G u llk , (Leiden, 1956), 176-7. The 
work Ts a collection of 144 selected cases covering a period from c.300 B.C. 
to 1100 A .D ., cited by Wen-Yen Tsao, Chinese Culture, 3 (i960), 2 : 9-28 
at 26. Nllda Noboru points out that a father had unrestricted power of 
testamentary disposition, Toso horltu monjo no kenkyu, 114, cited by Schur­
mann, FarlEastomQuar|«F]y^3_(T955J73TT7^soliT6 thereof.
custom may vary from one region to another, and accordingly, there could be 
the possibility of variation Tn the juridical norm In respect of the differing 
rights of father and son on family property. The two Japanese schools we 
mentioned above, may be leaning on diverse customs; but until more materials 
are available, we should be reconciled with the available opinions as they stand 
today. Nevertheless, there Is much truth In the statement that ownership In 
China *Ts by no means a limitless or absolute power*  ^ of the Individual over 
the property In his hands.
(2) Japanese Law
I . Background
From primitive times Japan had a framework of maglco-rellglous
customary law; and In the sphere of family law, this consisted mainly of
2
rules of proper conduct within the family, clan or community. Masajlro 
Taklkawa points out that ‘unfortunately, records do not sufficiently reveal 
the primitive state In which the purely native law of Japan prevailed. The 
society depicted by the oldest extant records had already begun to be Influ­
enced by Chinese culture and Its Indigenous maglco-rellglous law was no
1. E. Kroker, TASJ, 7 (1959), 146.
2. B. James George, J r ., *Law In Modern Japan*, In J.W . Hall and R.K. 
Beardsley, ed., Twelve Doors to Japan, (New York /London, 1965), 489.
longer free from secular elements*.^
Despite Japan's heavy borrowing from Chinese culture during the 
2
eighth century, 'many of the basic structural elements of Japanese society
had been derived from a tradition quite different from that o f the Chinese
and had been set many centuries before Chinese Influence touched Japan In
3any significant quantity*. Similarly, notwithstanding many overlays of 
Chinese Influence, numerous aspects of Japanese fam ilial Institutions managed 
to remain unchanged and, matching the ebb and flow of Chinese Influence, 
the Japanese legal system, like Japanese culture, presents Its own variants.
4
However, 'the Intellectual roots of pre-M eljl Japanese law were
unequivocally Chinese. This meant that law functioned In subordination to
5 6Confuclan II . . . *  Thus, as among the Chinese, the Confuclan Ideology
of f i l ia l plety(hs:Taoln Chinese = ko In Japanese) ^  was equally Important among
1. M . Taklkawa, 'Japanese', sub. *Law*, En.So.Sc., IX, 255..
2 . J .H . Hall, The Historical Dimension*, In Twelve Doors to Japan, lo c .c lt . ,
122-84 at 160.
3 . J .H . H all, Ibid, 161.
4 . M e ljl period was from c . 1868 A .D . -  1912.
5 . R.W. Rablnowltz, *Law and the Social Process In Japan*, The Transactions 
of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 3rd series, 10 (1968), 5-96 at 13.
6 . Supra, 2 88 .
7 . Y. Watanabe and M . Rhelnsteln, The Family and the Law: The Individual­
istic Premise and Modern Japanese Family Law*, In A .T . von Mehren, ed ., 
Law In Japan, (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 364-98 at 368.
the Japanese. The relationship between parent and child was that of superior 
and subordinate and the child had to obey his parents unconditionally.^
II. Family In Japan
2 3The Japanese family (kazoku) system was patriarchal and the system
4
of Inheritance was patrilineal. The structure of the family was determined by
5
Japanese custom. In Japan, *a household was a corporation In the po litica l, 
economic, and ritual sense, and Its head ^ combined In himself the positions of
1. Y . Watanabe, Ib id ., 364, 368.
2 . B. James George J r., *Law In Modern Japan*, In Twelve Doors to Japan, 
o p .c lt., 509.
3. K. Steiner, The Revision of the C iv il Code of Japan: Provisions Affecting 
the Family*, FEQ 9 (1950) 2: 169-84 at 170.
4. For traces of matrlllneal system In Japan, see H. Befu, *Ecology, Residence 
and Authority: The Corporate Household In Central Japan*, Ethnology, 7 
(1968), 25-43 at 32. Chle Nakane argues that Japanese peasant society 
was not patrilineal. She holds the view that locality rather than kinship 
was the basis of corporate organization, Kinship and Economic Organization 
In Rural Japan, (London, 1967), 170. This study substantiates the view that 
the authoritarian patrilineal norm emanated from the e lite group, see C. 
Madge, The Relevance of Family Patterns In the Process of Modernization In 
East Asia *, Tn R .J. Smith, ed., Social Organization and the Applications of 
Anthropology: Essays In Honour of Laurlston Sharp, (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca/London, 1974), 161-95 at 165.
5. B.B. Appleton, The Law of Japan*, In Studies In the Law of the Far East 
and Southeast Asia, (The Washington Foreign Law Society, 1956), 1-28 at 18.
6 . In the noble and Samurai families, only men were allowed to occupy the posi­
tion of the head of a household. Since 1873, women are allowed to succeed 
to this position, I. Ryosuke, ed ., tr . W .J. Chambliss, Japanese Legislation 
In the M eljl Era, (Tokyo, 1958), 664.
a political leader, manager of the household property, and priest to propitiate 
the deceased member. HTs position was not shared by others, such as 
brothers. He was not primus Inter pares, though Informally, he did take Into 
consideration the advice and wishes of others In making a decision* J
III. Ancestor worship and Inheritance
Here It should be mentioned that the family system In Japan had Its
2root In the practice of ancestor worship, and this Is s till alive In the cultural
3
and legal system of Japan. The house-head Is the contlnuator of the ances­
tral sacra and, being the representative of the ancestors, he owned the house
property.
1. H . Befu, tco logy , Residence and Authority: The Corporate Household In 
Central Japan*, Ethnology, 7 (1968), 1: 25-42 at 33.
2. B.B. Appleton, *The Law of Japan* In Studies In the Law of the Far East 
and Southeast Asia, o p .c lt., 19. Ancestor worship was also practised 
among the Chinese, G . Jamieson, Chinese Family and Commercial Law, 
o p .c lt., 2 .
3. IR.J. Smith, Ancestor Worship In Contemporary Japan, (Stanford, California, 
1974), 34. On the social and cultural Importance of ancestor worship In 
modem Japan, see H. Wlmberley, *Self-reallzatlon and the Ancestors: An 
Analysis of two Japanese ritual procedures for Achieving Domestic Harmony*, 
Anthropological Quarterly, 42 (1969), 1: 37-51 at 50.
4 . B .N . Hozuml, Ancestor Worship and Japanese Law, (Tokyo, 1940), 163.
Cp. Roman Pontifical law: * Nulla heredltas sine sacrls*; also Cicero,
De Leglbus, II, 19,20: *Rellglon prescribes that property and the worship 
of a family shall be Inseparable, and that the care of the sacrifices shall 
always devolve upon the one who receives the Inheritance*. Cp. Manu, IX. 
136: . . .  dadyat plndam hared dhanam/ Yajn.11.132: plndado Vgsaharas'* 
calsflm /  Vlsnu, XV .40: y a fcarthaharah sa plndadayT/ .  For a discussion on 
these texts, see H. Chatterjee, The Law of Debt In Ancient India, (Calcutta, 
1971), 90.
This cult of ancestor worship and Its correlation with inheritance
gave property a supra generational entity and that Ts why *the person who
succeeds to the position of a house (sic) Is usually called the atotsugl (the
one who continues) . .  .*,  ^ and according to the Talho Code (c.701 A .D .)
2
succession meant -  succession to the ‘Important duty*. The o ffic ia l commen­
tary on the Code, *Ryo-no-gtge* explained It thus: *"to succeed to the Import­
ant duty" means "to succeed a father and Inherit the sacra, for the matter of
3
worship Is the most Important"*. So succession In Japanese law was both a 
legal and a ritual transmission.
IV . Inkyo or retirement of the househead
The Japanese system Indicates that the soclo-cultural Implication of
Inheritance was to continue the cult of the ancestors through the fam ily. It Ts
4
evident from the customary law of the Tokugawa Shogunate (c. 1603 -  1867
A .D .) that the eldest son used to succeed to the family property and dutyfc
5
either on the death of his lather or on his retirement. Normally the father
1 . Y . Kunlo, tr. C.S. Terry, Japanese Manners and Customs In the M e ljj Era, 
(Tokyo, 1957), 117-8.
2. HozumT, lo c .c lt . ,  164.
3. Hozumi, Ib id ., 164.
4 . J .H . Wlgmore, ed., Law and Justice In Tokugawa Japan, X parts, (Uni­
versity of Tokyo Press, 1969), Pt. V , (197l), 99. In some districts, as In 
Izu kunl, Tagata Korl, Irrespective of sex, the eldest child used to succeed 
to the headship, Ib id .,  111.
5. Wlgmore, Ib id ., 98. Y , Watanabe and M . Rhetnsteln,The Family and the 
Law: The Individualistic Premise and Modern Japanese Family Law*, Tn A .T . 
von Mehren, ed ., Law In Japan, o p .c lt., 369.
on his sixty-first birthday, used to hand over the family property wTth its 
temporal and sacerdotal responsibilities to his eldest son.
The Japanese term signifying ‘ the retirement of the head* Ts Inkyo, ^
2which Is comparable to the obsolete vanaprastha stage of the Hindus. The 
soclo-jurldlcal Implication of the Institution of Inkyo has been put forward by 
Kenne H -K . Chang In these words: *An underlying ideology behind this formal­
ized practice appears to be smooth succession of household headship by replacing 
an aging head with an active and young head under separate residential quarters
3
for the functional continuity of a harmonious household, a basic corporate unit*.
Thus, In Japan, succession to a family property was Inevitably linked with the
4
succession to the headship of the house (katoku-so-zoku).
1. Kenne H-K .Chang, The Inkyo System In Southwestern Japan: Its Functional 
U tility  In the Household Setting*, Ethnology, 9 (1970), 4: 342-57 at 342-3,
2. Fora discussion on this, see In fra ,3 3 5 -402- . Cp. Roman o4!um, Infra,
401 . Sometimes a Chinese father to escape the worries of managing
his property used to divide It among his children, but this was not exactly as 
the Inkyo In Japan, S. Okamatsu, Laws and Customs In the Island of Formosa, 
complied, 1900, (Taipei, rpt. 1971), Appx. xx III. In Greece, fathers of 
adult sons often handed over the management of their olkos to their sons, and 
virtually stepped down from the management of the house, W .K . Lacey, The 
Family In Classical Greece, (London, 1968), 117. Also G .S . Kirk, ‘Old 
Age and Maturity In Ancient Greece*, Eranos 40 (1971), The Stages of Life
In Creative Process, ed ., A . Portmann and R. RItsema, (Leiden, 1973),
123-58 at 131.
3. Chang, lo c .c lt ., 343-4.
4 . Okamatsu, lo c .c lt ., Appx. xx l.
The mystique of ancestor worship and the practice of inkyo Tn Japan 
transcend ownership o f property beyond the lim it of a particular generation and 
considerably support the implication of HoebePs generalisation that from the 
social anthropological point of view, Inheritance Is rather ‘the transference of 
statuses from the dead to the living . . . *   ^ However, the Japanese system has 
an additional characteristic: Tn appropriate cases, through the Inkyo, it could 
be a transference from the living to the living -  from the father to the eldest 
son. And this transferee, the eldest son of the house, has a definite, and 
thereby innate, expectancy regarding the property of the family which material 
Tses either at the death of the father or at his retirement (inkyo).
V . Variant customs
However, we must not overlook the fact that the custom of primo­
geniture was a traditional usage of the samurai or noble families of Japanese 
2
society. Among people other than the warrior classes, a man and hts wife
3
were the Joint heads of the family. It has also been pointed out by
1. E.A. Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A  Study Tn Comparative Legal 
Dynamics, (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 60.
2. Y . KunTo, ed., Japanese Manners and Customs Tn the M eljl Era, o p .c lt.,
3 . KunTo, Ib id ., 118-9. Cp. IR.V. 5.61.8; Br.U. 1 .4 .3 . dharmeca 
artheca kameca . . .  Also the anonymous text In the Smrtl-tattva, Jha , 
HLS, II, 249; dampatyor madhyagam dhanam, for the sTnglfTcance of the 
text, see Derrett, ZVR 58 (1965), 2 l9 ff; University of Ceylon Review, 
14(1956), 105ff., at 119, n.86; BSOAS 18 (1956), 490; also ZVR 64 
(1962), 62ff.
Takeyoshl KawashTma that concentration of authority In the hands of the head
of the family was a feature only of the samurai family; In middle and lower
class families, power tended to be diffused among the elders of the group J
However, the popular customs of the lower classes did not find their way Into
the Codes of Japan and the customary right of the first bom, as practised among
2the warrior classes, was jurid ica lly endorsed. The younger brothers could
set up branch families and a ll members, Including the aged parents after their
3retirement, had the right to be maintained from the family property.
V . Conclusion
Be that as It may, the Japanese system, despite being a contrast to 
the MTtaksara system Is, nevertheless, a paradigm of the primitive social Insti­
tution by which property ownership Is not strictly atomized In the Individual 
owner, but Is bound up with the purpose of property as a means of continuing 
socially-determined cultlc rituals while, In addition, serving as support for 
members of the family. The effects of the old and new C iv il Codes on the 
property structure of the Japanese family are, of course, outside our present 
concern.
1. Y . Watanabe and M . Rielnsteln, The Family and the Law: The Indivi­
dualistic Premise and Modem Japanese Law1, In A .T . von Mehren, ed ., 
Law In Japan, (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 369 and n.
2. Y . KunTo, ed., Japanese Manners and Customs In the M e ljl Era, o p .c lt., 
119.
3. Y . Watanabe and M . Rhelnsteln, lo c .c lt ., 369.
CHAPTER I I
AFRICAN LAW
I .  Introduction
Our present study of the MYtaksara birthright would remain Incomplete 
without putting It In a comparative framework with the customary laws  ^ of 
traditional African societies. Although the philosophy behind the Mltalqara 
concept of co-ownership between father and son Is extremely subtle, Its Idea­
tional aspects, like the African concept of property, are antiquarian. Both
In classical Hindu law and In the old Indigenous customary law of A frica, con-
2 3cepts such as ownership, possession, and rights derived from such concepts,
1. Our discussions Is confined to the customary law of A frica . From a generic 
point of view, African law Includes certain elements of European law (Roman 
Dutch, Portuguese, Belgian, French and English), M .G . Smith, The Socio­
logical Framework of Law*, In H. and L. Kuper, ed ., African Law; Adapt­
ation and Development, (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1965), 24-4-8 at 24.
2. Expressions such as ownership and possession clearly bear witness to the struggle 
with English and European legal concepts, T .O . Ellas, The Nature of African 
Customary Law, (Manchester University Press, 1956), 162-72. A .N . A llo tt, 
‘Family Property In West Africa: Its Juristic Basis, Control and Enjoyment1, In 
J .N .D . Anderson, ed ., Family Law In Asia and Africa,(London, 1968), 121- 
142 at 122-3. African ownership Is certainly not synonymous with Roman 
dominium and less so with the concept of ownership which Includes rights, 
‘utendi*, ‘fruendl*, ‘abutendl*, ‘fructus perclplendl*, ‘posslsendl*, * allenandl*, 
and Vlndlcandl*, W.W. Buckland, Elementary Principles of the Roman RTvate 
Law, (Cambridge, 1912), 64. T.E. Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, 
(Oxford, 1916), 209-10. J. Salmond, Jurisprudence, (London, 1924), 2 /7 -8 . 
In developed Roman law, ownership*may be defined as the unrestricted right of 
control over a physical thing . . . * ,  H .F. Jolowlcz, Historical Introduction to the 
Study of Roman Law, (Cambridge, 1972), 140. The right to Individual property 
under the French C iv il Code was *a return to the Roman conception of dominium*, 
C. Lewy, The Code and Property*, In B. Schwartz, ed.,  The Code and the 
Common-Law World, (New York, 1956), 162-76 at 164. Article 544 of the 
Code envisages an absolute ownership: *La proprlete est le droit de joulr et dis­
poser des choses de la manlere la plus absoTue, pourvu qu*on n*en fasse pas un 
usage prohlbg' par les lols ou par les rfeglements*, see Derrett, *An Indian Contrl-
butlon to the Study of Property*, BSOAS 18 (1956) 3: 475-98 at 475,n . l . On
/Continued on next page:
viewed in the content of the social relationships In which they occur, have 
different semantic and jural content than In counterparts known to Western
Note 2 -  p .308 -  Continued:
English concept of ownership, see G .B . J . Hughes, Jurisprudence, (London, 
1955), 391-401. African concept of ownership does not envisage an abso­
lute right. Similar to the MItaksara concept of ownership, In African owner­
ship there Is a convergence of several rights. There are four main theories of 
African ownership of land: (I) African law or the customary law of a specific 
African population group does not recognise the ownership of land; (II) an­
other view Is that ownership Is vested In groups or communities, H .W .J.
Sonlus, Introduction to Aspects of Customary Land Law In Africa As Compared 
With Some Indonesian Aspects, (Leiden, 1963), 18. (Ill) The third view Is that 
the land belongs to the king or chief who holds It as a representative of the 
nation or as trustee for the tribe, K.E. Jensen, The Social System of the Zulus, 
(London, 1936), 176. M . Gluckman, ‘African Land Tenure*, The Rhodes 
Livingstone Journal, (Northern Rhodesia), Human Problems Tn British Central 
Africa, III, June 1945, 3. This coalesces with the Hindu Idea contained In 
the text: dhananam Isvaro raja Brahmana parlkalpltah /  *Brahma arranged 
that the king was (to be) the owner of a ll wealth*, Derrett, *Bhubharana, 
bhu-palana, bhu-bhojana: an Indian conundrum*, BSOAS 22 (1959) 1: 108- 
123 at 114. (Iv) The fourth view Is that ownership of land Is vested In Indi­
viduals or In the joint descendants of Individual owner, the family or extended 
family, G .B .A . Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas, (London, 1958), 
16ff. This type of ownership Is also known among the Hindus. On African 
ownership of land, also see M . Gluckman, The Ideas In Barotse Jurisprudence, 
(New Haven, 1965), Ch.3.
N .3 -  p .308:
For the difficulties In defining the term ‘Inheritance* In African context, see 
Derrett, ‘Succession Tn Nigeria: the Patchwork of the Present Scene and the 
Common Problems of the Future*, In Derrett, ed.,  Studies In the Laws of 
Succession In Nigeria, (Nigerian Institute of Social Science and Economic 
Research, 1965), 1-32 at 5-6.
1 2legal thought. The following passage from Andre R. Robert contains the
correct understanding of African ownership of property:
Primitive law Is essentially a law of persons, 
much more than a law of property. It Is a 
law relating to life as It Is lived ( l it .  Maw 
of life 1), It Is In no way a set of rules regard­
ing property, Its ownership and transfer .
(R.P. Tempels, La phllosophle Bantoue, op. 
c l t . ,  97). Therefore, the law of property 
(Ts) subjective according to African custom: 
an Item (of property) forms the basis of a law 
only In consideration of the person who owns 
I t .  It Is not considered so of Itself, but 
through Its connection with Individuals.
The same Item, then, could become the sub­
ject of different laws according to the occa­
sion and by reason of the collective charac­
ter of customary law, the same Item w ill be 
capable of giving rise to different laws among 
different people. 3
1. A llo tt, *Law and Language In Africa*, ZVR 74 (1974), 124-36.
2. ” Le droit prlm ltlf est essentlellement un droit des personnes, blen plus qu*un 
code des blens. C*est un droit de la view, ce n*est point un droit des blens, 
de leur propr!6te". de leur translation” . (R.P. Tempels, La phllosophle 
Bantoue, o p .c ft . ,  97). En effet, le droit des blens dans les coutumes 
afrlcalnes subjectlf: une chose n*est la source d*un droit qu*en consideration 
de la personne qul en a la possession. On ne la consldere pas en elle-meme, 
mals par rapport aux personnes. Une m&me chose pourra done falre l*objet 
de droits dlfferents selon le sujet et en raison du caractere co llectlf du droit 
coutumler, la meme chose sera susceptible de falre nattre des droits dlstlncts 
chez plusleurs personnes*. A .P . Robert, L*Evolutlon des Coutumes de 
l*Ouest African et la Legislation francaIse, thesis, (Strasburg, 1954), 85; 
quoted by H .W .J. Sonlus, Introduction fo^Aspects of Customary Land Law
In A frica, (Leiden, 1963), 24-5. The same observation of M . Gluckman, 
^Property Rights and Status In African Traditional Law*, In M . Gluckman, ed ., 
Ideas and Procedures In African Customary Law, (London, 1969), 252-65 at 262.
3. Tr. Dr. H. Kanltkar, Department of Anthropology, SOAS.
In this, as well as Tn the interplay of collective and Individual
rights,^ African customary law Is closer to Hindu juridical concepts than the
2Western scheme of things. Thus, In the following statement directed at the 
problem of African family law, A llo tt has spoken for Hindu law as well:
In West Africa especially the family or 
lineage system Is sustained by the law 
of Intestate succession, and I f  the law 
Is changed so that self-acquired pro­
perty of deceased members no longer 
goes to enrich the corporate families, 
then the family as an Institution w ill 
quickly wither and d ie . 3
1. In this respect, Hoebel remarks that unlike the West, In African legal 
system, individual right Is kept more or less hemmed In by the superior 
right of the co llectiv ity , The Law of Primitive Man, (Cambridge, Mass., 
1954), 225-7. But see A llo tt, ‘African Law1, In Derrett, ed ., An Intro- 
ductlon to Legal Systems, (London, 1968), 131-56 at 147-49.
2. For a fuller discussion, see Derrett, Studies In the Laws of Succession In 
Nigeria, o p .c lt., 5 -9 .
3. A .N . A llo tt, The Future of African Law*, In H and L. Kuper, ed ., African 
Law . . .  , o p .c lt., 216-40 at 235. Elsewhere, A llo tt has pointed out that 
Tn West A frica, a family Is entitled to succeed to the self-acquired property 
of Its members who died without disposing of such property In his lifetime, 
A .N . A llo tt, Towards a Definition of Absolute Ownership*, Journal of 
African Law, 5 (1961) 2 : 99-102; rp t., E. Cotran and N .N . Rubin, ed ., 
Readings In African Law (hereafter as RAL), (London, 1970), I, 264-7 at 266. 
On the definition of ownership Tn African context, A llo tt Is criticised by
S.R. Simpson, Towards a Definition of Absolute Ownership*, JAL 5, No.3: 
145-48; rp t., RAL, I, 267-9 at 269. For AIIott*s riposte to Simpson*s c r it i­
cism, see JAL5 (1961) 3: 148-50. For specific customary practices In sup­
port of AIIott*s foregoing view, see A llo tt, The Akan Law of Property, Ph.D. 
thesis, (University of London, 1954), unpublished, 552. T .O . Ellas, 
Nigerian Land Law and Custom, (London, 1953), 157. N .A . Ollennu, 
Principles of Customary Land Law In Ghana, (London, 1962), 33, 153-4.
J . Matson, Testate Succession In Ashanti*, A frica, V o l.23, International 
African Institute, (1953), 224-32, rp t., RAL, II, (London, 1970), 316.
G . Goodman, The Family as a Corporation Tn Ghanaian and Nigerian law*, 
African Law Studies, 11 (1974), 1-35 at 14. Cp. Hindu law, Katama 
Nachiar v . The !Raja of Shlvaganga, (1863) 9 MIA 539; also Derrett, SCJ 
(1956), 103-11 and our discussion In fra,# 3 3 -4 2 ..
312.
The juridical canvas of pre-literate African societies portrays an
assortment  ^ of customary practices; but amidst this variegated panorama legal
2 3
scientists of repute have found an underlying unity pervading the diverse
4
African customs which sprang MJrectly from African consciousness
1. A llo tt, ‘Modern Changes In African Land Tenure1, IRAL, I, 236-42 at 236.
R.B. Seldman, *Law and Economic Development In Independent English- 
Speaking, Sub-Saharan A frica1, InT .W . Hutchison, ed ., Africa and Law: 
Developing Legal Systems In African Commonwealth Nations, (The Univer­
sity of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 3-74 at 30. M .G . Smith,‘ The Sociological 
Framework of Law*, In L . and H. Kuper, ed ., African Law, o p .c lt., 44.
2. A .N . A llo tt, Essays In Arlcan Law, (London, 1960), 71.
3. The unity of African laws has been refuted by A .N .A . ,  ‘review*, The Future 
of Customary Law In A frica, (being the transactions of the International Sym­
posium on Customary Law organised by the Afrlka Institute, Leiden, and The 
Royal Tropical Institute, Amsterdam, 1955), (Leiden, 1956), JAA 8 (1956) 4: 
207-9 at 208.
4 . A llo tt, *The Future of African Law*, In H. and L. Kuper, ed ., African Law, 
o p .c lt., 216-40 at 218. Robert Seldman believes that In the judicial context, 
customary law In  Africa ‘cannot conceivably reflect the common conscious­
ness of the people*, R.B. Seldman, "Law and Economic Development In Inde­
pendent English-Speaking Sub-Saharan Africa*, In Hutchison, ed., Africa 
and Law, o p .c lt., 9. On this point of possible unity In diversity of African 
customary law, he remarks: ‘Forging a ’'common" customary law based upon 
the lowest common denominator actually creates a new "customary" law that 
more like ly than not, reflects nobody*s Volksgelst, except perhaps the com­
piler's, Ib id ., 30. To this, one may add the observation of Gluckman on 
varieties of customary rights over land: *the Incidence of rights over land 
varies with the technology of the tribe concerned . .  .* M . Gluckman, 
‘Property Rights and Status In African Traditional Law*, In M . Gluckman, ed ., 
Ideas and Procedures In African Customary Law, (London, 1969), 252-65 at 
252. However, we cannot say that there Is any fundamental uniformity In 
African legal system or a single type of African law, but we can consider 
African law as a family of legal system which could be studied as a whole, 
A llo tt, Ib id ., 218.
Thus, from a general point of vTew, comparative appraisal o f the Hindu and African 
systems of family property Is a step In the right direction.
However, before going further In our discussion, we should remind our­
selves that the MTtaksara system of Inheritance Is essentially a patrilineal trans-
1 2mission of property. In Africa we come across both patrilineal and matrlllneal 
3
types of families. Since we are Interested Tn macro-tendencies rather than Tn
1. More than half the population of Ghana and a small proportion of that of 
Nigeria are matrlllneal. G . Goodman, The Family as a Corporation In 
Ghanaian and Nigerian Law*, African Law Studies, 11 (1974), 1-35 at 6. 
Also C .K . Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration In Nigeria and 
Cameroons, H .M .S .O ., 1957, 128-39, rp t., IRAL, I, 293-9 at 294. For 
a few examples of patrilineal system of Inheritance, see T .O . Ellas, on 
Yoruba succession; The Groundwork of Nigerian Law, (Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1954), 216-31. J .C .D . Lawrence, The Iteso, (O .U .P .,
1957), 228-31. H. Cory, Sukuma Law and Custom, (O .U .P ., 1953), 
153-61. R.G. Armstrong, ‘ Intestate Succession among the Idoma*, In 
Derrett, e d ., Studies In the Law of Succession In Nigeria, o p .c lt., 213-20. 
N .N . Rubin, The Swazi Law of Succession: a Restatement*, JAL 9 (1965)
2: 90-103 at 97-8.
2. On matrlllneal succession, see J .M . Sarbah, FantI Customary Laws,
(London, 1968), 100-13. N .A . Ollenu, The Law of Succession In Ghana, 
(Accra, 1960), 35-7. On characteristics of matrlllneal kinship organisation 
Tn Central A frica, see A .I .Richards, ‘Matrlllneal System*, In J. Goody, ed., 
Kinship, (Penguin, 1971), 276-89.
3 . Among some people, like the Ashanti, there Is a combination of matrlllneal 
and patrlllpeal descent; the two modes are followed concurrently. How­
ever, Inheritance and succession to authority follow the female line, R.S. 
Rattray, Ashanti, (Oxford, 1923), 77-8. G .P . Murdock, *Double Descent*^ 
American Anthropologist, 42 (19^0) 4 , p t. l:  555-61 at 555, 557. As a con- 
trast, although the Maya of Mesoamerlca followed double descent, their In­
heritance of property was strictly patrilineal and agnatic, T. Gann and J.E. 
Thompson, The History of the Maya from the Earliest Times to the Present Day,
( New York, 1931), 174, 177. Also M .D . Coe, The Maya, (London, 1966), 
144-5.
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micro-comparison, Hie existence of matrlllneal inheritance in Africa need not 
prove an obstacle to our present purpose.
I I . Corporate Rights In Land
Prellterate agricultural communities have a personal and mystical
association with land  ^ and, In this respect, African societies are no exception.
3
*Land throughout Africa has religious or supernatural significance . .  .*, and,
especially In West Africa, It belongs *to the ancestors as much as to the living 
4
occupiers1. Thus, multiple suprageneratlonal rights are tied up with the 
ownership of land In A frica . As a general norm, land In Africa Is held on 
kinship anchor local group basis, and the Individual's right Is qualified by his
5
membership of the group.
1. E. Frledl, *Dowry and Inheritance In Modern Greece1, in Peasant Society, 
o p .c lt., 57-62 at 62.
2. C .K . Meek, Land Law and Custom In the Colonies, (O .U .P ., 1946), 11-27, 
rp t., RAL, I, 247.
3. A .N . A llo tt, 'Modern Changes In African Land Tenure*, RAL, I, 238.
T .O . Ellas, The Nature of African Customary Law, o p .c lt., 162.
4 . A llo tt, Ib id ., 238.
5. C .K . Meek, Land Law and Custom In the Colonies, o p .c lt., 11-27, rp t., 
RAL, I, 249; also Land Tenure and Land Administration In Nigeria and the 
Cameroons, H .M .S .O ., 1957, 128-39, rp t., RAL, I, 293. A llo tt, RAL, I, 
237. M . Gluckman, 'Property Rights and Status In African Traditional Law1, 
In M . Gluckman, ed., Ideas and Procedures In African Customary Law, 
(London, 1969), 252-65 at 252, 262. The same tendency In East A frica,
N . Mugerwa, 'Land Tenure In East Africa: Some Contrasts*, In East African 
Law Today for British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1966, 
101-5, rp t., RAL, I, 252-4 at 252-3.
A concept* of ownership which transcends generations Implies a regime 
of property where the present holders act as trustees for the past, present and 
future generations, and In this respect, It comes very near to, though It Is not 
completely Identifiable w ith, the system of the Mltaksara co-ownership of pro­
perty.
The predominance of the group over the Individual In the ownership 
of land In Nigeria Is described by Meek thus:
However acquired, the lands of a lineage 
are held as by a corporation. Individual 
members have an absolute right to possess­
ion of a portion of lineage lands, but there 
Is nothing analogous to tenancy In common 
as known to Eng llsh law. Ownership Is 
joint and Indivisible, 1 no part being cap­
able of being alienated by any Individual 
occupier. A  deceased member leaves no 
separate estate In lineage land which can 
devolve on his heir. But sons normally 
succeed to their father's holdings. 2
The formation of the family or group Is explained by P.C. Lloyd In 
the context of Yoruba family property. He states: 'New members of the group 
belong to It by virtue of their birth, and they accede to their rights at the time 
of their birth (or, one might more logically add, at the time of their conception).
1. Lloyd considers the Yoruba descent group as joint tenants without any survivor­
ship, P.C. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, (O .U .P ., 1962), 78-9.
2. C .K . Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration In Nigeria and the Cameroons,
H .M .S .O ., 1957, 128-39, rp t., RAL, I, 293-9 at 19T .
3. Lloyd, lo c .c lt ., 78. Cp. Smrtlcandrlka. 258: *By the birth Itse lf', I .e . the 
meaning Is by the very commencement (of the formation) of their body In the 
womb of the mother*. Also, the lfugao custom, supra,267.
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But
the interest of each member of a family in 
the family land is neither strictly usufruc- 
tury in the IRoman sense, nor is it  a tenancy 
in common or a joint tenancy according to 
English land law. Again, It Is not proprie­
tary In the sense that It carries such a com­
plete power of disposal as Is enjoyed by an 
English fee simple owner of land; It Is 
equally Inaccurate to regard It as merely 
possessory, for the occupier ordinarily 
enjoys a degree of freedom of user which 
a fee simple owner might envy. 1
Despite close similarity to the Mltaksara birthright In respect of acquisition, the 
Yoruba system differs from the former In two major aspects. First, unlike the 
Mltaksara system, the rights held by the Individual member In the Yoruba system
are not heritable -  they are extinguished by his death; or, we may say, they
2 _revert to the group. Secondly, as opposed to the Mltaksara system, In some
cognatlc descent group, women could also be members of the Yoruba family 
3 -property complex. Under the Mltaksara system, which Is an agnatic descent 
norm, a son's membership of a coparcenary, and thereby his right to the family 
property, so to say, are Invariably dependant on his b irth . A  similar predomi­
nant position of Interest In his father's land Is strongly pronounced among the
1. T .O . Ellas, Nigerian Land Law and Custom, (London, 1953, rp t., 1956), 157.
2. Only the use and enjoyment of the family property devolve from one member 
of the family to another. M .O . Adesanya, 'Devolution and Distribution of 
Intestate Estates among the Yorubas', ZVR 74 (1974), 1-38 at 2.
3 . P.C. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, o p .c lt., 78, 83. This Is subject to what Is 
discussed by Derrett, IMHL, 413-4; Critique, 1 t f  149-54.
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Mbembe o f South-Eastern N igeria.  ^ 'Rosemary Harris informs us that among the
Mbembe: *A man, Tn fact, maintains his claim to his father *s land throughout
his life ; even i f  for any reason he Ts brought up by a different man, the son s till
2
has some claim on the land of hTs acknowledged father*.
The customary law of Ghana also encapsulates the idea of supragener- 
attonal corporate ownership and shows the same tendencies that we have just 
discussed regarding the status of the Individual vis-a-vis his group.
In Ashanti *Iand belonged to the ancestors and a ll the generations yet
to come,- and hence could only be alienated by a ll Its co-owners, who would
3
include the dead as well as the living*. To understand the role of the group,
which includes the dead, the living and the as-yet unborn, one must understand
the Institution of stool among the Akan people. The shrine containing the soul
4
and spirit of the family, the tribe or a nation Is called the stool or skin.
The absolute ownership of the land of the village, tribe or town vests
5
Tn the stool which means -  The land belongs to the ancestors*. So the ancestors
1. We should note that the Mbembe have both patrilineal and matrlllneal des­
cent groups. For the nature of their law of succession, see R. Harris, Mntes- 
tate Succession among the Mbembe of South-Eastern NTgergTa*, In Derrett, 
ed ., Sudles In the Laws of Succession In Nigeria, o p .c lt., 91-138.
2. R. Harris, Ib id ., 111.
3. A .N . A llo tt, The Ashanti Law of Property*, ZV!R (1966), 156-76, rp t.,
RAL, I, 356-67 at 365.
4 . N .A . Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law In Ghana, (London, 1962), 6.
5. K .A . Busla, The Position of the Chief Tn the Modem Political System of Ashanti, 
(Oxford, 1951), 44.
the land, and its ownership, were Inseparable.^ Only the usufruct of the 
2
land was separable. Thus, the highest title  an individual member of a
3family can hold In stool land Is an usufructory tit le , which he can transfer
4
Inter vivos only *by action of the entire lineage*.
III. Alienation
In societies where ownership of property Is vested In the group or 
family, alienation of property would naturally be forbidden or restricted by an 
Individual member or even by the managing member. In African societies, 
Inalienability of land
Is Interwoven with magico-reUgious Ideas 
In which the spirits of those burled In the 
land are Involved; besides this It has, how­
ever, an unmistakably economic background, 
namely that the means of livelihood of the
1. E .A . Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man, (Cambridge, Mass., 1954, rp t., 
1964), 226.
2. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, o p .c lt., 340; also Ashanti, 
(Oxford, 1923), l2 l-2 2 .
3. N .A . Ollennu, lo c .c lt ., 9-10. This Is denied by K .M . Malnl In context 
of customary land law In East A frica, Land Law In East A frica, (Nairobi,
1967), 5. However his subsequent observations at p .6 support our conten­
tion. To this, could be added the remark of Nwabueze: *lt Is o f course not 
true that Individual ownership was foreign to customary law before the advent 
of the British*, B .O . Nwabueze, Nigerian land Law, (New York, 1972), 32.
4 . Hoebel, lo c .c lt . ,  227. However, Ollennu gives the Impression that an Indi­
vidual could alienate his right of usufruct by his free w ill,  Ollennu, lo c .c lt ., 
10.
group, which depends for Its existence on 
agriculture (and/or cattle breeding), should 
not be lost. 1
This general norm of ancient agricultural societies Is manifested In classical
2Hindu law as much as In African customs. Apart from securing the mainten­
ance of the family, the restriction on transfer was also a device to protect the 
rights of the natural heirs who, like their ancestors, would act as trustees of 
the family property; flctltously for the past, and actually for the present and 
future generations.
In Ashanti custom:
a man had no lega I power to affect success­
ion to his estate; he could by Inter vivos 
g ift or by mortis causa bequest, give away 
his property temporarily or permanently; 
but, In order for such a g ift or bequest to 
be valid and have permanent effect, It was 
necessary that It should have been made 
with the knowledge and concurrence of his 
family, or at least should have been ra ti­
fied by them. 2
1. H .W .J. Sonlus, Introduction to Aspects of Customary Land Law In A frica, 
(Leiden, 1963), 22.
2. CE. the texts: sthavare vlkrayo nastl . . .  , Dh.K. 1589b; Vyasa, cited, 
Da.bha. , 11.27, Dh.K.1586b: na ca sthavarasya . . . ;  Vyasa, Jha, HLS, 
I, 276, D h .K .1587: sthavaram dvlpadam . . .  ye jata yelpyajatas'"ca . . .  
vrttl-Iopah-vlgarhltah: Narada, D h .K .l2 l9 b : . . .  sthavarasya tu sarvasya 
na pita na pltamahah. On these texts, see Infra, 3 4 0 ,^5 .
3. A .N . A llo tt, ‘Ashanti Law of Property1, ZV!R (1966), 184, rp t., IRAL, II, 
312.
In Nigeria also ‘a member of a Itneage or "Family" cannot legally give away a
piece of his allotment of lineage land . . . 1  ^ This is also supported by the
customary practices of the Yorubas, by which a man could not bequeath In-
2
herlted property ‘outside the kin group of the original creator . . . 1
IV. Testamentary Disposition
The corporate character of family property and, to a certain extent,
of self-acquired property, Is substantiated as much by the restriction on transfer
Inter vivos as on testamentary disposition. Thus, among the Akan people a man
could make an oral w ill of his self-acqulsltlons, but the consent of the lineage
3
to such a bequest was Imperative. Fantl customary law knew nothing of w ill
4
as such, and even In death-bed dispositions (samanstw) of self-acquired
1. C .K . Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration In Nigeria and the Cameroons, 
o p .c lt., 1821 In customary law of the patrilineal Haya, a g ift o f landed pro- 
perty by a father to persons who are not entitled to the Inheritance was not 
legal, H. Cory and M .M . Hartnoll, Customary Law of the Haya, (Lund Hum­
phreys for International African Institute, 1945), 29, rp t., IRAL, II, 315. This
Is also the Implication of Swazi law, N .N . Rubin, The Swazi Law of Success­
ion: a Restatement1, JAL, 9 (1965) 2: 107. But, as a contrast In Sukuma 
customary law, a father*s absolute power to disinherit a son Is tolerated. H. 
Cory, Sukuma Law and Custom, (O .U .P ., 1953), 169, rp t., RAL, II, 315.
2. P.C. Lloyd, *Yoruba Inheritance and Succession1, In Derrett, ed ., Studies 
In the Laws of Succession In Nigeria, o p .c lt., 139-73 at 154.
3. J . Matson, Testate Succession In Ashanti*, In A frica, V o l.23, (International 
African Institute, 1953), 224-32, rp t., RAL, II, 315-22 at 316.
4 . Such dispositions, however, do not Imply any right to make a w ill,  J .M . 
Sarbah, Fantl Customary Laws, o p .c lt . ,  97.
property the presence of the relatives of the donor was compulsory.^ However,
'the manager of family property has no power of testamentary disposition to
alienate any part or portion of the family estate, moveable or Immoveable from 
2the family*. In Sukuma customary law, the Institution of oral w ill was not
3
unknown, but, despite a father's Independence to disinherit a particular son,
a testator could never appoint an heir outside the circle of those who were en- 
3
titled to Inherit; the practice was used by a father only to express displeasure
4
with a son.
It may be urged that the sastra allowed more freedom to the Indl-
5
vldual regarding alienation of self-acquired property. Indlyldual right was 
not altogether absent from the African scene,* but as In sastrlc literature, It was 
generally confined to self-acquired property and chattels. In respect of personal 
chattels, Ellas points out that *the relationship between the owner and the thing 
owned Is one of absolute dominium, untramelled by considerations of the
1. J .M . Sarbah, Fantl Customary Law^, (London, 1968), 96.
2 . Sarbah, Ib id ., 97.
3 . H* Gory, Sukuma Law and Custom, (O .U .P ., 1953), 167-8, rp t., 'RAL, II, 
324-6.
4 . Cory, Ib td ., RAL, II, 325.
See texts, tnfra, 3 3 4 - 9 ’
6 . A .N . A llo tt, 'African Law *, In Derrett, ed ., An Introduction to Legal Systems, 
131-56 at 149-50; 'Family Property In West A fr ica ', In J .N .D . Anderson, ed ., 
Family Law In Asia and Africa, (London, 1968), 121-42 at 127.
competing claims of the family . . . *   ^ In cases of self-acquired land as w ell,
customary law allows the Individual a free hand, with the rights and privileges 
2
of an absolute owner; but although he Is allowed to make a nuncupative w ill
3
of his self-acquisitions, disherison of children Is extremely rare.
V . Conclusion
In general terms, one can draw parallels between the African and
Hindu systems; but, In the HIpdu context, even If  we confine ourselves to 
-  4the Mltaksara school, the differences between the two are as numerous as 
their slml Iarltles.
In the African system, new members belong to the family property 
5
complex by virtue of their b irth. Although It sounds similar to the Hindu 
system, we should keep the distinction between 'jo in t Hindu family* and 
'Hindu coparcenary* clear. Coparcenary Is a much narrower body than the
1 . T .O . Ellas, The Nature of Afrlqan Customary Law, o p .c lt., 168.
2. Ellas, Ib id ., 168. Same rule among the Fantl, J .M . Sarbah, Fantl Custom- 
ary Laws, o p .c lt., 97. ThTs Is true Tn Nigeria as w ell, C .K . Meek, Land" 
Tenure and Land Administration In Nigeria and Cameroons, o p .c lt., 182.
P.C. Lloyd, *Yoruba Inheritance and Succession*, In Derrett, ed ., Studies 
Tn the Laws of Succession In Nigeria, o p .c lt., 139-73 at 154.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7-------------------  ;
3. Ellas, Ib id ., 168.
i
4 . In an undivided Dayabhaga family the Interest of a coparcener Is considered 
as Individual property, Sreemutty Soorjeemony Dossee v . Denobundoo, (1857), 
6 MIA 526, 553.
5. P.C. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law, o p .c lt., 78.
jo int family.^ A  joint Hindu family consists of a ll persons lineally descended 
from a common ancestor. Wives and unmarried daughters are also included Tn 
the jornt famtly. But a ll members of a joint family are not owners of the joint
family property. The ownership Is restricted to the members of the coparcenary
who acquire by birth an Interest In the joint or coparcenary property. The ortho­
dox view Is this, that to determine the coparceners
the question In each case w ill be, who are 
the persons who have taken an Interest In 
the property by b irth . The answer w ll| be, 
that they are the three generatlops next to 
the owner In unbroken male descent. There­
fore, I f  a man has sons, grandsons and great- 
grandsons, a ll of these constitute a single 
coparcenary with himself. Everyone of 
these descendants Is entitled to offer the 
funeral cake to him, and everyone of them ^ 
obtains by birth an Interest In his property.
Thus, ‘membership of the coparcenary Is confined to the male descendants In the
3
male line from a common male ancestor up to four degrees Inclusive*.
We should not lose sight of the fact that the Mltaksara birthright
emanates from a secular concept of property. The African concept of corporate
4
property Is a conglomeration of magic, ritua l, religion and norm. Although
1. Derrett, IMHL, f  404, Raghavacharlan, Hindu Law, 4th ed., f2 3 4 .
2. Maine, Hindu Law and Usage, 11th ed ., f  266.
3. Derrett, IMHL, <k 405.
4 . The view that property Is meant for sacrifices (kratvartha) was rejected by 
VIjnanesvara, see 'RLSI, 13 * fh
VIjnanesvara slightly leaned on the doubtful text of Gautama (MIta, I.T.23) 
his theorising In historical context Is a major breakthrough toward secularisa­
tion of property. In the Mltaksara, In a purely proprietary sense, the ancestor 
has no role to play except by serving as a starting point, to determine the member­
ship of the coparcenary and, In a partition, for computing the portions of the 
heirs; but In the African system, the ancestor Is omnipresent,  ^ he exists as an 
owner with the living and the as-yet unborn -  thus, endowing property, especi­
a lly  land, with a metaphysical entity.
In the Mltaksara, the male descendant Is a co-owner with his father
2
and at the latter's death, a son's Inheritance to his father's estate Is automatic,
3 4but In some African systems Inheritance Is selective. Unlike the Hindu system,
tn African customary law, ff the father during his lifetime does not transfer his
1. The role of the ancestor In Hindu coparcenary Is explained thus: *But 
while fresh links are continually being added to the chain of descendants 
by birth, so earlier links are being constantly removed from the upper end 
of the chain by death) Maine, Hindu Law and Usage, 11th ed ., f266.
2 . Cp. Ibman law, supra,s i,
3. A .N . A llo tt, The Akan Law of Property, Ph.D. thesis, (University of 
London, 1954), unpublished, 552. Also A llo tt, The Law of Inheritance, 
Family Structure and Modem Economic Order In A frica1, ZVR 71 (1970), 
105-118 at 112.
4 . Katama Natchlar v. The Rajah of Shlvaganga, (1863) 9 MIA 539, 5^9; 
on this see our discussion, infra, 832-43.
self-acquired properly to his sons, at his death such property goes to the lineage,^ 
and not to hts descendants if  these do not belong to it .
However, having taken into consideration their relevant dlsslml lari ties 
Tn legal philosophy and soctal organisations, one broadly observes that both Tn 
the African and the Mltaksara systems ktnshtp Ts the determTnTng factor of owner­
ship. But for more detailed observations, the following passages, sequentially 
placed, explain respectively the similarities as well as the differences of pro­
perty rules In the family ownership of the two systems. From a general point 
of view, we can say that In African customary law:
. . .  family property Is vested In the family 
as a whole by a single, Indivisible t it le .
It seems almost unnecessary to add that the 
head of the family does not own the pro­
perty, nor has he any larger title , share 
or Interest In the property than other mem­
bers. No member has a separable Interest 
Tn the title  to family property, nor Is his 
right In the property attachable at law.
It Is Incorrect to describe the members of 
the family as Joint tenants, partners or ^ 
tenants-In-common of the family property.
1. A llo tt, lo c .c lt . ,  552: The Future of African Law1, In H. Kuper and L . 
Kuper, ed ., African Law . . . ,  o p .c lt., 216-40 at 235. K . BentsI^Enchlll, 
Ghana Land Law: An Exposition, Analysis and Critique, (London, 1964),
134. This Is not the custom among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of 
Ghana. The general rule of Ewe law Is that the family does not succeed
to any Interest Tn the self-acquired property of a deceased member. ‘Success -  
lon Is by right, as It were, by the proximate next-of-kin traced patrllineally*, 
A .K .P . Kludze, Ewe Law of Property, Ghana 1, Restatement of African Law: 
6 , ed ., A llo tt, (London, 1973), 269 for details, see Ib id ., 280-3.
2. A .N . A llo tt, The Akan Law of Property, o p .c lt., 215-6.
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In the Mltaksara system:
No Individual member of the coparcen­
ary can claim before partition that he 
owns a definite share either of the corpus 
or of Its Income. A  coparcener, however, 
has the right to be maintained; to demand 
partition and an account of the state o f the 
family property; to become manager; to 
alienate (In South India only) his undivided 
Interest In the jolnt-fam lly property; and 
to take so long as he remains undivided, by 
survivorship, his presumptive share of the 
Interests of deceased coparceners which w ill 
become ascertained for the first time at a 
partition. Thus coparceners have a commu­
nity of Interest and unity of possession of 
the jolnt-fam lly property and are comparable 
with jolnt-tenants In English law with bene­
f i t  of survivorship, save their Individual 
rights commence Independently and by 
operation of law and, not by transfer be­
tween parties. 1
1. Derrett, IMHL,M08. Also Raghavacharlqr, Hindu Law, 4th ed ., ^236. 
Katama Natchlar v . The Rajah of Shlvaganga, (1863) 9 MIA 539, 543, 611.
CHAPTER 12
THE PRE-DHARMASASTRA AND THE DH ARMAS ASTRA LITERATURE
I . Introduction
The birthright of a son Tn ancestral property and self-acquired pro­
perty of his father was one of the most controversial topics among the medl- 
eaval commentators on Hindu law.^ Owing mainly to their divergence on 
this point, the two schools of Hindu law, namely the Mltaksara and the
Dayabhaga,. have emerged and developed Into two legal philosophies and,
2
even today, they govern the family law of property among the Hindus.
Most of the smrtl texts have come down to us Tn fragmentary form,
3
mainly through the commentators. These commentators have quoted these
4
texts, manipulated and Interpreted them Tn order to establish their arguments
1. See M lta .1 .1.27; Da.bha, 1.20. For a discussion, see Kane, III, 553ff.
2. The statement should be read subject to the minor changes Tn the Hindu 
Succession Act, 1956. For a discussion of the Act, Infra, 935-4£.
3. For details, see Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, (Wiesbaden, 
1973).
4 . For a fuller understanding of the development of the sastra on this line, see 
Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973), 18.
Also R. Llngat, tr . Derrett, The Classical Law of India, (Berkeley/London, 
1973), 107 f f .  Cp. midrash (Interpretation) In Jewish law, G . Horowitz,
The Spirit of Jewish Law, (New York, 1953), 31; Derrett, Jesus*s Audience, 
(London, 1973), 108; Law In the New Testament, (London, 1970, rpt. 1974), 
Tntrod., x x x v l-x llll.  Also H .L . Strack, Introduction to the Talmud and 
Mldrash (Philadelphia, 1945, and New York, 1959). cp. the role of glossa­
tors Tn the C iv il law system, W. Seagle, The History of Law, (New York, 
1946), 167.
on the respective rights o f father and son Tn fam ily property. Thus commenting
on the role of the commentators vis-a-vis the smrtl texts, Mayne observes:
They modified and supplemented the 
rules Tn the Smrltls, In part by means 
of their own reasoning and In part In 
the light of usages that had grown up.
They did their work so well that their 
Commentaries and Digests have, In 
effect, superseded the Smrltls, at any 
rate, In very large measure. 1
But whatever may be the role and motivation of the Commentators,
the Importance of the commentatorlal literature can hardly be Ignored In the
2
development of Hindu law. During the early Anglo-HTndu law period, 
the availability of the smrtls alongside the Commentaries created some judicial 
confusion. On this point, Derrett rightly observes:
Sometimes the smrtl was taken as a stan­
dard, and the commentators Ignored, 
while at others the commentators were 
supposed the only valid authorities, 
whatever the smrtl might appear to say 
lite ra lly . A t times the commentators 
themselves were followed If  local usage 
supported them; at others the local 
usage could be presumed. In a ll cases,
1. S. SrlnlvasA Iyengar, ed., Mayne*s Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 
(Madras, 1938), 42. Also, LTngat , CLI, 110. Earlier H .H . Wilson, 
ed., R. Rost, Works by the Late Horace Hayman Wilson, (London, 1865),
III, 3 . However, J .C . Ghose warned that *the commentaries cannot over­
ride the law of the Smrltls when It Is clear and unambiguous*, The Principles 
of Hindu Law, 3rd ed ., (Calcutta, 1917), 1, Preface, v .
2. On the Importance of this literature, see LIngat , CLI, 109. Derrett, RLS1, 
307. LIngat rightly remarks: *PIaced as they were between the Immutable 
texts of Smrtl and the mobile traditions of custom, they fad lltated the pass­
age from the one to the other. We could say that they were the real organ­
isers of Hindu Law*, tr. Derrett, CLI, 175.
once the JTne of decisions had been esta­
blished, the court was reluctant to depart 
from Tt even when it was shown that the 
dharmasastra, treated historically, went 
the other way. 1
It Is tru e that the commentators brought the texts together in an 
2
attempt to harmonise them; they also enlivened the smrtls by Introducing a
3customary elemept Into their exposition. But one cannot overlook the fact
that In their process of simplification and synthesis, the writers brew up the
same old texts over and over again. They repeated them, and themselves,
4
and they copied from each other. Having taken these limitations of the 
commentator la I literature Into consideration, historical research warrants a 
juridical survey of the smrtl texts. In order to examine whether a Hindu son 
had birthright or not Tt Is better, for the time being, to dismiss the commentators,
1. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State In India, (London, 1968), 299-300. 
See Muttu Vaduganadha Tevar v . Dora SIngha Tevar., (1879) 3 Mad .309 at 
310. The P.C. took a correct stand In The Collector of Madura v . Moottoo 
Rama I Inga Sethupatty, (1868) 12 MIA 397 at 436: The duty, therefore, of 
an European Judge who Is under the obligation to administer Hindoo Law, Is 
not so much to Inquire whether a disputed doctrine Is fa irly deduclble from 
the earliest authorities, as to ascertain whether It has been received by the 
particular school which governs the District with which he has to deal, and 
has there been sanctioned by usage. For, under the Hindu system of law, 
clear proof of usage w ill outweigh the written text of the law*. The P.C. 
view wrongly criticised by N .C . Sengupta, Sources of Law and Society In 
Ancient India, (Calcutta, 1914), 101. For an exhaustive discussion of the 
problem, see Derrett, ’RLSI, 299 f f .
2. LIngat, CLI, 109.
3. Derrett, RLSI, 307.
4 . LIngat, CLI, 109.
and try to study and analyse the smrtl texts as they are.^
II* Categories of Property Yn the Dharmasastra and Birthright
a. General remarks
In general, we may observe from the smptY texts that property Tn the
2 3father *s hands was categorised as ancestral or self-acquired. These two
4
types of property could be either Tmmovable or movable, and the respectTve 
rights of father and son used to vary according to the category of property Tn 
the hands of the father. In most smftls we observe that Tn the property of the 
grandfather a son had co-ownershTp with the father and, Tn this respect, the 
majority o f the texts do not make any distinction between movables and Im-
5
movables. But before we draw any conclusion, Tt Is worthwhile to dwell a 
moment upon the texts as they stand.
1. On the method of examining a text, see Derrett, *” Quld posslt antlqultas 
Nostrls Leglbus Abrogare” The Role of the Jurist In Ancient Indian Law1,
Essays, I, 140-9 at 219-20. The core of the guiding principle Is: *Each 
smrtl text must be Identified for what It Is*, Ib id ., 219. Also, LIngat, tr. 
Derrett, CLI, 143-75.
2. By ‘ancestral property* we mean a ll property Inherited by a male from his 
father, paternal grandfather or paternal great-grandfather, Kane, HD, 111,576.
3. Kane, HD, III, 576-9, Derrett, The Development of the Concept of Pro­
perty In India c . A .D . 800-1800*, 2VR 64 (1962) 15-130; >rpt. Essays,
II, 8-130 at 50-5.
4 . Kane, HD, III, 574.
5. For example, <Yajn. II. 121. Br.xx vi.tf-dravye pltamahopatte jangame 
sthavare tatha, Kane, HD, III, 554, n.1032.
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b . Ancestral property
There Ts no doubt that the dharmasastra pays much attention to the 
mutual rights of father and son Tn family property.
Yajnavalkya enjoins equal ownership of father and son In property
acquired by the grandfather and, In this respect, the verse does not make any*
distinction between movables and Immovables.^ "The ownership of both
2 3father and son Is the same In land, a corrody, or wealth received from the
1. Yajn. 11.121; D h.K . 1775b. bhur ya pltamahopatta nlbandho dravyam eva 
va /  tatra syat sadrsam svamyam pltuh putrasya calva hi f f .
2. nlbandha has been Inadequately translated by Colebrooke as ‘corrody*,
Kane, HD, III, 575. ‘Corrody* means ‘a sum of money or allowance of 
meat, drink, and clothing due to the Crown from the abbey or other re li­
gious house, whereof It was founder, towards the sustentatlon of such one 
of Its servants as Is thought f i t  to receive It .  It differs from a pension In 
that Tt was allowed towards the maintenance of any of the KTng‘s servants 
In an abbey; a pension being given to one of the Klng*s chaplains, for his 
better maintenance, t i l l  he may be provided with a benefice*, Wharton*s 
Law Lexicon, 14th ed ., (London, 1949), 261. Also see J .H . Tlllotson, 
‘Pensions, Corrodles and Religious Houses: An Aspect of the Relations of 
Crown and Church In Early Fourteenth-Century England*, Journal of Reli­
gious History, 8 (1974) 2: 127-43; The corrody Is distinguished from the 
pension by the fact that whereas the latter was generally a grant of money, 
the corrody Implied a grant of a definite supply of goods (food, drink, dress 
and fuel) from the common store of a religious house*, Ib id ., 131. nlbandha 
has strong resemblance with nlvl (trust). On etymology and Interconnection 
of the meaning of n fv l, see'nTvT*, Derrett, Vlshveshvaranand Indological 
Journal, 12 (1974) 1-2: 89-95. nlbandhas could be created by two ways, 
the one type created by private owners as a source of profit, such as a betel 
garden, the other type from offic ia l or royal grantors, such as a periodic pay­
ment or allowance In cash or kind, permanently granted by a King, a corpor­
ation, or a village or a caste, to a person, a family, a math or a temple, 
Kane, HD, 111, 575, n.1082. The term has been fu lly  explained by Derrett, 
The Development of the Concept of Property In India*, ZVR 64 (1962), 15- 
130 at 74-5; also Critique, W 518, 531.
3. Although the correct rendering of the word dravya Is movable, sometimes, 
however, the word Is employed In the sense of a ll property, whether movable 
or Immovable, as In Brj^^dravye pltamahopatte . . . ,  Kane, HD, 111, 575.
On thTs, see Tnfra,
grandfather
VTsnu also declares that father and son enjoy equal ownershTp Tn pro-
2
perty acquired by the father's father. "But Tn regard to wealth TnherTted of
3
the paternal grandfather, the ownershTp of father and son Ts equal: 11
4 5In one of the texts of BrhaspatT, whTch Ts also attributed to Vyasa,
co-ownershTp Ts conferred on the father and son only Tn respect of ancestral 
Immovables. "Houses and landed property TnherTted from an ancestor shall 
be shared equally by the father and sons'1.^
Tn
An Isolated study of this verse leaves us/Ooubt whether BrhaspatT 
denies co-ownership of father and son Tn ancestral movables, but the doubt Ts 
resolved by another text which clearly ordains that father and son have equal 
ownershTp Tn property acquired by the grandfather.^ "O f property acquired
1. Tr. Colebrooke, MTta, I, v .3 . Cp. ArhannTtT, 63: There Ts equality be­
tween father and son as to a thing acquired by the grandfather. The son may 
restrain the father's activ ity  after (obtaining) a royal Injunction', text and tr* 
Derrett, 'Hemacarya's ArhannTtT: An Original Jalna Juridical Work of the 
Middle Ages', ABORI, 57 (1976), l- IV , 1-21 at 19.
2 . VTsnu, XVI1.2; D h.K . 1175a. paltamahe tu arthe pita putrayos tulyam 
svamltvam / /
3. Tr. Jolly, SBE, V II, 6 8 .
4 . Br. XX V I.10, ATyangar, ed ., 197; Dh.K.1180b. kramagate grha-ksetre
pita putrah samamslnah /
5.
6 . Tr. Jo lly, SBE, XXXIII, 370.
7. Br. X X V I.14, ATyangar, ed., 197; D h.K . 1179b. dravye piwmahopatte
sthavare jarigame tatha (variant plva) /  samam amsltvam akhyatam pltuh 
putrasya calva hi f f
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by the grandfather, whether Tmmovable or movable, father and son are declared
to be entitled to equal shares".^
_ 2 3 4
LTke Yajnavalkya, VTsnu, and BrhaspalT, Katyayana also propounds
the view that father and son have equal ownershTp Tn the property of the grand-
5
father. "Property of the grandfather Ts of equal ownershTp between both the 
father and hTs sons; but the son Ts not entTtled to ownershTp over what Ts acquTred 
by the father hTmself".^
c . Self-acquTred property of the father
We have just seen Tn the second part of Katyayana ks tex t,^  that co- 
ownershTp of father and son dTd not extend to the self-acquTred property of the 
father. Another eloquent example denying co-ownershTp to the son Tn self- 
acquTred property of the father may be quoted from BrhaspatT. It refers to any
1. Tr. Jolly, SJE^CXXIII, 370.
2. Yafn. II. 121.
3 . VTsnu, X /I I .2 .
4 . Br.XXVI .14.
5 . Katy. 839; D h.K . 1173b. paTtamaham samanam syat pTtuh putrasya cobhayoh/  
svayam coparjTte pTtra na putrah svamyam arhatT f f  ThTs text and the texts 
cTted at n .2 , 3 , 4  above embody the central conceptTon of the MTtaksara school 
as to the equal ownershTp of father and son Tn ancestral property, Kane, 
KatyayanasmrtTsarodhvara, (Bombay, 1933), 295, n.839.
6 . Tr. Kane, KatyayanasmrtTsaroddhara, 295.
7. Katy. 839b.
case Tn whTch a father recovers ancestral property which was lost; over 
such property and property which he acquired on account of his learning 
and valour, a father Is said to have exclusive ownership and free power of 
disposition. ^
In property belonging to the grandfather 
which had been taken away and has 
been (afterwards) recovered by the 
father through his own ab ility , as well 
as In property acquired by sacred know­
ledge, valour In arms the fathers 
ownership has been declared.
He may make a g ift out of that property, 
or even consume It, at his w il l .  But In his 
default, his sons are pronounced to be 
equal sharers. 2
While dealing with the topic ‘resumption of gifts* (dattapradanlkam),
BrhaspatT again has another verse which clearly explains the Incidents of self-
3
acquired property. The sage declares: "Self-acquired property may be given
away at one's own pleasure” .^
In respect of self-acquired property, the same Idea has been expressed 
again and again In the dharmasastra texts. Ya|navalkya, who undoubtedly
1. Br.XXVI. 58-9; ATyangar, ed., 205^ Br. XXV. 12-13, SBE, XXXIII, 371-2, 
D h.K .l222a. paltamaham hrtam pltra sva-saktya yad-uparjltam /  vldya 
sauryadlna praptam tatra svamyam pltuh smrtam / /  pradanam svecchaya
kuryad bhogam calva tato dhanat /  tad abhave tu tanayah samamsah parlkfrtltah / f
2. Tr. Jolly, SBE, XX III, 371-2.
3. Br. X IV .5; D h .K .803. sveccha deyam svayam praptam . . . /
4 . Tr. Jha, The Vlvadachlntamaijl, (Baroda, 1942), 60.
advocated co-ownership of father and son Tn ancestral property,^ declares Tn
2
respect of self-acquTsTtTons:
Whatever else Ts requTred by the co­
parcener hTmself, wTthout de VTment 
to the father‘s estate, as a present from 
a frTend, or a gTft at nuptTals, does not 
appertaTn to the co-heTrs. Nor shall 
he, who recovers heredTtary property, 
whTch had been taken away, gTve Tt 
up to the parceners: nor that has been 
gaTned by scTence. 3
4
There are sTmTlar texts Tn the ManusmrtT whTch run as follows:
f
If one earns somethTng by hTs own 
effort wTthout detrTment to the 
father*s property, that beTng pro­
perty acquTred by hTs desTre he need 
not gTve, agaTnst hTs wTH.
1. Yajn. 11.121, supra,331-2-.
2. Yajn. II. 118-9; Dh.K.1215a. pTtr dravyavTrodhena yad-anyat svayam-ar|Ttam/ 
maTtram-audhvahTkam caTva dayadanam na tad bhavet / /  kramad abhyagatam 
dravyam hrtam-abhyuddaret tu yah/dayadebhyo na tad dadyad vTdyaya labdham 
eva ca / /
3. Tr. Colebrooke, MTta, I . IV. 1. Edward Roer and W .A . MontrTou renders pTtr 
dravyavTrodhena as ‘wTthout dTmTnTshTng the paternal estate*, HTndu Law and 
JudTcature from the Dharmasastra of Yajnavalkya, (Calcutta/London, 1859), 
38-9. VTjnchesvara Interprets pTtr dravySvTrodhena as wTthout detrTment to 
the estate of the father or the mother, Gharpure, The CollectTon of HTndu Law 
Texts, V o l.I I ,  P t.IV , (Bombay, 1939^, 1008. For a critica l dTscussTon on this 
poTnt, see Derrett, CrTtTque, f f  91-103.
4 . Manu, IX, 208: anupaghnan pTtr-dravyam sramena yad upar|ayet/svayam ThTta- 
labdham tan nakamo datum arhatT^/
Manu, IX. 209: paTtrkam tu pTta dravyam anavaptam yad apnuyat/na tat putraTr 
bhajet sardham akamah svayam arjTtam U
If the father requires ancestral property 
which had not been recovered he need 
not, unless he wishes, divide that with 
hts sons, for It Is selfecqulred. 1
r
The above rendering of the text (Manu, IX .209) by Derrett agrees
2 3 - 4  5with those of CoIebrooke, Buhler, Jha and Gharpure, but I f  we accept
Sir William Jones‘s translation, It appears that this verse Is not meant to say
anything about ancestral property recovered by the father. Sir William
Jones‘s rendering conveys the Idea that lost paternal wealth, when recovered
by any brother, should be treated as self-acquired and that brother Is not
obliged to share It with others; thus, the text has hardly anything to do with
a partition by the father. Sir William Jones‘s rendering runs as follows:
And If  a son, by his own efforts, recover 
a debt or property unjustly detained, 
which could not be recovered before 
by his father, he shall riot, unless by 
(his ) free w ill,  put It Into parcen­
ary with his brethren, since In fact,
It was acquired by himself. 6
1. Derrett, Bharucl‘s Commentary on the ManusmrtI, (Wiesbaden, 1975), II, 
263-4. Note the printing mistake at the beginning of Verse IX .209; In­
stead of ‘ It* It should be Mf*. I follow the rendering by Derrett, which he 
gave In the margin of my first draft.
2. M lta, 1. v . l l .
3 . BiJhler, SBE, XXV, 375-6.
4 . Jha, Manu-smrtl, (Calcutta, 1926), V , 172.
5. Gharpure, The Collection of Hindu Law Texts, Yajnavalkya Sm|*tl, (Bombay, 
1939), II, IV, 1021.
6 . Sir William Jones, Institutes of Hindu Law: Or, The Ordinances of Menu, 
According to the Gloss of Culluca. Comprising the Indian System of Duties,
Religious and C iv il, (Calcuttq/London, 1796), 273.
As is well known, STr William Jones based his rendering  ^ primarily
2on the gloss of Kulluka. But even the comment of Kulluka, by the words, 
Putva'th saha na vtbhajet* (shall not share Tt with his sons), implies that a father, 
who recovered ancestral property which was lost, Is not obliged to share It with 
his sons. And, Indeed, even Joneses rendering supports, In general, the ab­
sence of co-ownership In self-acquired property by suggesting that ancestral 
property once lost, though subsequently recovered, loses (sentiment apart) Its 
character as ancestral property and falls Into the category of ‘self-acquired1 
without the Incidence of co-ownership.
There are similar texts In other smrtls which help us to a better under-
-  3standing of the text of Manu (IX . 209). Thus Katyayana declares:
A ll that (ancestral) wealth which was taken 
away (by force) from the family or was lost 
(to the family) and which was recovered by 
the lather himself by his own efforts, the 
father Is not liable to share with the sons 
at the time of the partition. 4
1. Grady seems to support Jones‘s rendering but, Indeed, he was carried away 
by the Bengali bias of Jagannatha and wrongly Ignored the correct opinion
of Sir Thomas Strange, S .G . Grady, A  Manual of Hindu Law, (London, 1871), 
214-6. The correct view of the majority, as expressed In the rendering of 
Derrett (Manu, IX .209) Is accepted by N .C . Sengupta, Evolution of Ancient 
Indian Law, TLL, 1950 (Calcutta, 1953), 219, 221; K5ne, HD, 111, 580.
2 . paltrkam I t l  /  yat-punah pltr-sambandhl dhanam tenasamarthenopeksltatvat 
anavaptam putrah sva-saktya prapnuyat tat svayamarjltam anlcehan putralh 
saha na v lb h a je t/ Kulluka on Manu, IX .209.
3. Katy. 866; Dh.K.l224a. svasaktyapahrtam nastam svayamaptam ca yad- 
bhavet /  etat sarvam pita putralh vlbhage nalva dapyate / /
4 . Tr. Kane, Katyayanasmrtl, 307.
338 .
Sankha, however, ordains: ^
Land (Inherited) In regular succession, 
but which had been formerly lost and 
which a single (heir) shall recover 
solely by his own labour the rest may 
divide according to their due a llo t­
ments, having first given him a fourth 
part. 2
✓
It needs to be mentioned that In this text, Sankha only deals with
ancestral land and enjoins a fixed share (one-fourth) for the recoverer. He
3
does not consider the whole of the recovered property as self-acqulsltlon.
It seems that by ordaining apportionment, Sankha Is rewarding Individual 
effort but at the same time, grudgingly upholding the rights of co-owners In 
ancestral land.
The Arthasastra, though not exactly an authority on sources of Hindu
4
law, also upholds the Impartlblllty of self-acquired property. Kautllya says:
’’What Is acquired by oneself Is not to be divided, except what Is brought Into
5
being out of the fathers property".
VTsnu also upholds a fathers Independence In respect of his self- 
acqulsltlons. The sage declares: ^ " I f  a father makes a partition with his
1 • Sankha, D h.K .l207a. purva-nastam tu yo bhumlroekas cet uddharet sramct/ 
yatha bhagam bhajanty anye dattvamsam tu turlyakam / /
2. Tr. Colebrooke, M lta, 1. Iv . 3.
3 . As we see In Manu, IX .209; Yajn.II.119; Br.XXVI.58 and Katy.866.
4 . Arthasastra, 3 .5 .3 , Dh.K. 1207b. svayamarjltam avlbhajyam, anyatra p ltr- 
dravya t u tth ltebhyah/R .P. KaAgle, ed ., Kautllya Arthasastra, (Bombay, 1960), 
1.104. ‘ *
5 . Tr. Karigle, Ib id ., (Bombay, 1963), II, 241.
6. Vlsnu, XVI 1.1; Dh.K. 1175a. pita cet putran vlbhajet tasya sveccha svayam 
upatteVthe /
339.
sons, he may dTspose of his self-acquired property as he thinks best.”  ^
The exclusive ownership of the father in self-acquired property is
2
again emphasised by Vlsnu In another text, which Is reminiscent of Manu,
IX .209. "But I f  a father recovers lost ancestral property, he shall not divide
3
I t ,  unless by his own w ill,  with his sons (for It Is) self-acquired".
The foregoing texts on self-acquired property Indicate that a son had
no right to demand a share In the self-acqulsltlons of his father. Moreover,
4
the texts on ancestral property, too, Indirectly strengthen this point by de­
claring that In grandparenta! property a son Is co-owner with his father.
d . Movables and Immovables
The texts on ancestral and self-acquired property, which we have just
5  '  .  6discussed (wl/h the exception of Sarikha^s text), do not make any distinction
between movables and Immovables In their consideration of the respective rights
of father and son. But, In fact, there are texts which give more latitude to the
father In dealing with his movables.
1. Tr. Jo lly, SBE, V II, 67,
2. Vlsnu, XXVIII.43; D h .K .1205. paltrkam tu pita dravyam anavaptam yad 
apnuyat /  na tat prutralr bhajet sardham akamah svayamariltam / /
3 . The verse Is Identical with Manu, IX . 209, and we adopt BUhler*s t r . ,  SBE, 
XXV, 375-6.
4 . Supra, 331 - 5 -
5 . Supra,
6 . Supra,358 .
Narada divided properly Into two broad categories, namely, movables 
and immovables, and concerning theTr respective incidents dTd not make any 
distinction between ancestral and self-acquired properties Tn the hands of the 
father. He denies a father*s exclusive ownership and unilateral power of 
dealing with Immovables but declares him to be the master (prabhu) of the mov­
ables.^
The father Is master of the gems, pearls 
and corals, and of a ll other movable 
property but neither the father, nor 
the grandfather, Is so of the whole Im­
movable estate. By favour of the 
father, clothes and ornaments are used, 
but Immovable property may not be 
consumed, even with the fathers In­
dulgence. 2
In respect of a son*s co-ownership with his father, Vyasa puts empha­
sis on Immovables and thereby enjoins that even self-acquired Immovables can-
3
not be alienated by a father without the consent of his sons.
1. Narada, D h .K .l2 ]9 b . manl-mukta-gravalanam sarvasyalva pita prabhuh/ 
sthavarasya tu sarvasya na pita na pltamahah f f  pltr-prasadat bhujyante 
vastrany abharananl ca /  sthavaram tu na bhujyeta prasade sat! paltrke f f
2. Tr. Colebrooke, Mlta , I, 1.21.
3. Vyasa, D h .K .1587; Jha, HLS, I, 276. Sthavaram dvlpadam calva yadyapl 
svayam-ar|ltam /  asambhuya sutan sarvan na danam na ca vlkrayah f f  ye jata 
ye‘pyajatas" ca ye garbhe vyavasthltah /  vrttlm ca te *bhlkanksantl na danam 
na ca vlkrayah f f  variant reading of the last eighteen words: vrttl-Iopah 
vlgarhltah : *deprlvatlon of maintenance Is morally wrong*, N .C . Sengupta, 
Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, o p .c lt., 209, n .78.
Though Tmmovables or bipeds have been 
acqutred by a man himself, a g ift or sale 
of them should not be made without con­
vening a ll the sons. They, who are born, 
as also they who are yet unbegotten, and 
they who are s till in the womb, require the 
means of support; no g ift or sale should, 
therefore, be made. 1
Indeed, such smrtl texts on the importance of Immovable property
should not surprise us a pried I .  In the pastoral and agrarian economy of pre-
industrial societies, Immovables form the main corpus of family property, and
It Is small wonder they became the objects of multlplerlghts and special 
2
rituals. In primitive societies, exclusive Individual ownership Is rare, 
and this feature of pre-llterate society Is repeated again and again In the 
dharmasastra texts.
3
Thus, Brhaspatl ordains: "Divided or undlvlded^all coparceners
are equally entitled to the Immovable property; no single co-parcener has the
1. Tr. J.R. Gharpure, The Collection of Hindu Law Texts, II.IV , Yajnavalkya 
Smrtl, (Bombay, 1939), 992. Jha renders the second verse as follows:
There can be no sale or gift of such property as would be the means of live ­
lihood for sons already born and those yet to be bom*, HLS, I, 276. However, 
the prohibition of sale Is not litera lly dependent on a condition of need for 
maintenance and for this reason, Jha*s rendering Is misleading. Colebrooke*s 
translation of the text (M lta, I ,i27) Is better than Jha*s but Gharpure*s Is 
more literal than Colebrookeks.
2 . M . Gluckman, The Ideas In Barotse Jurisprudence, (New Haverylondon, 1965), 
116-7.
3. Br. X V .7; Dh.K.803b. avlbhakta vlbhakta va dayadah sthavare samah/  eko 
hy anisah sarvatra danadhamana-vlkraye / /  variant reading for dayadah Is 
saptrujah; ' The variant does not make any change In the meaning,
J.C . Ghose, Hindu Law, I, 406. The text has also been ascribed to Vyasa, 
Da.bha., 11.27.
power to give away, pledge or sell I t . "  ^
The text, in Its literal sense, Indicates that the consent of the *dlvl -
ded* coparceners, as well as that of the undivided coparceners, was required
/
for alienation of Immovable estate. Unless the text Implies an Idea of pre­
emption, a rule such as this would make alienation of land very d ifficu lt Indeed, 
2I f  not Impossible. Alternately, one may be Inclined to think that Brhaspatl
laid down a rule for a social order where land used to be owned jo in tly by the 
3
village community* or by any members of a clan descending from a common
ancestor. But It Is not correct to say that alienation of land was altogether
unknown In the time of Brhaspatl; and our observation Is strengthened by the
fact that Brhaspatl devoted reasonable space to documents concerned with land 
4
transactions. And Lanman rightly comments that " . . .  these rules represent
actually prevailing legal custom and usage, even for the early centuries of
5
our era, Is absolutely certain". Thus, the sastra could not have propounded
1. Tr. Jha, Vlvadachlntamanl, (Baroda, 1942), 42.
2. Anglo-Hlndu law loosened this strict rule, Kane, HD, III, 593.
3. N .C . Sengupta, however, disagrees with this view, see his comment on a 
similar text, M lta, 1.1.31, Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, o p .c lt . ,  205.
4 . Br. V III, SBE, XXXIII, 304-9. In Brhaspatl, 18.4, (See L. Renou, ‘Notes 
sur la Brhaspatl-Smrtl*, Indo-lranlan journal 6 (1962), 81-102 at 95-6) there 
Is an elaborate smrtl sequence purporting to explain a formula that has been In 
use In conveyance of land for at least two thousand years, Derrett, Pharma -  
sastra: The Origin and Purpose of the Smrltl, In Contributions to the Study of 
Indian Law and Society, South Asia Seminar, University of Pennsylvania, 
(Philadelphia, 1966-67), cyclostyled, 18.
5. C.R. Lanman, *Hlndu Law and Custom as to G ifts*, rpt. from Annlversay 
Papers by Colleagues and Pupils of George Lyman Klttredge, (Boston, 1913), 
1-14 at 6. On eplgraphlc evidences to this effect, also see Ib id .
such a rigid rule as is purported by the literal meaning of the text. It would 
be jurid ically rational to Interpret this part of the text, namely, the necessity 
for the consent of ‘divided* coparceners, as a requirement Introduced to fa c ili­
tate the transaction and avoid any future doubt. ^  
the
Thus/sastra has yet another text which lays down the formalities to
be observed In transfer of land. Vljnanes vara In his Mltaksara cites a text,
2
which ran as follows: "Land passes by six formalities; by consent of towns-
3
men, of kinsmen, of neighbours, and of heirs, and by gift of gold and water".
The text substantiates Maine‘s general observation that tn ancient
4
laws conveyance was not written but ‘acted* and that Is why valid ity of the 
transfer of land was associated with gestures, words and other symbolic acts. 
The purpose of these acts was that transfer of land should be certain and w e ll-
1. See MIta, I .f  .30, VacaspatT MTsra by ‘divided* coparceners means that a 
division has taken place but their respective shares have not been a llo ­
cated and assigned; Jha, ed., Vlvadachlntamanl, o p .c lt., 62. Devanna-
bhatta takes the view that the mention of ‘divided * Tn the text Is only to • • •
emphasise the rights of the undivided coparceners, Smrtl-candrlka, 447.
2 . Anonymous text, cited, MIta, I, 1.31. sva-grama-jnatl-samanta-dayadanu 
matena ca /  hlranyodaka-danena sadbhlr gacchatl medlni / /
3. Tr. Colebrooke, MIta, 1.1.31.
4 . Maine, Ancient Law, 2nd ed ., 296. Also W. Markby, Elements of Law, 
6th ed ., 263.
344.
1
publtctsed.
Indeed, the rsts emphasised the Importance of Immovables and dis­
couraged their dissipation by unilateral or secret transfers but, as consummate 
connoisseurs of society, they were conscious of the fact that any rule of alien­
ation without fle x ib ility  could jeopardise the Institution of family In time of 
temporal and religious needs. That Is why, under special circumstances, even 
a single member of the family had the freedom to alienate Immovables.
1. Vljnanesvara's Interpretation that these acts were merely for the sake of publi­
c ity Is supported by another text of Yajnavalkya: *Let the acceptance be pub lick , 
especially of Immovable property; and, delivering what may be given and has 
been promised, let not a wise man resume the donation1, Colebrooke, Digest, 
(London, 1801), II, J6 0# The pouring of water as the accompaniment of a g ift,
Is found as early as Apastamba, II, 4 .9 .8 , SBE II, 121. The usage Is prescribed 
In other smrtls : Gautama, V , 18-19, SBE II, 201; Vlsnu, LIX, 15, SBE V II, 192; 
Cp. Manclpatlo In Roman law, G a l, 1.119; T .C . Sandars, The Institutes of 
Justinian, o p .c lt., Introd., x lv ll,  lv tt. Salic law needed 9 witnesses for trans- 
fer ofc property and certain ceremonies were also required, lex Sal Tea, Evolution 
of Law, (Boston, 1915), I, 507. Among the Lombards, sale of land was allowed 
only on absolute necessity and such a transfer had to be public by reading the con­
veyance In Court and calling on the by-standers to witness the transaction,
BOhler, Digest of Hindu Law, 3rd ed., I, 223, n .c . Also c<(p5Keytlng cere­
mony In the old law of Norway, (Gulathlngslaw, 292), In transfer of Odal land, 
A . Taranger, The Meaning of the words Odal and Skeytlng In the Old Laws of 
Norway1, In Essays of the IVth International Congress of Historical Studies, 
(London, 1914, rpt. NendeIn/Liechtenstein, 1972), 159-73 at 159-60. Among 
the Ifugao of Northern Luzon, transfer of land being rare, could be made under 
dire necessity and only with fu ll approval of kinsmen. To make the transfer 
public and complete, a ritual feast (Ibuy ceremony) had to be held In the buyers 
house In presence of witnesses, E .A. Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man, (HUP, 
Cambridge, 1964,), 105.
Thus, after pointing at the co-ownership of the dayadas, Brhaspatl 
eventually adds:^ "Even a single Individual may conclude a donation, mort­
gage or sale, of immovable property, during a season of distress, for the sake
2
of the family, and especially for pious purposes".
However, It should be conceded that alienation of Immovable pro-
3
perty by an Individual member of the family was the exception rather th a n  the 
4
rule which explains the paucity of such texts and rarity of such a common-
5sense provision. In a system of multiple ownership over the same property, 
the foregoing text empowers a father or manager to meet the essential needs 
of a family when the consent of the dayadas may not be forthcoming for a
1. Br. cited at MIta, 1.1.28; Dh.K.1588b. eko'pl sthavare kuryat danad- 
hamana-vlkrayam /  apat-kale kutumbarthe dharmarthe^t vlsesatah / /
2. Tr. Colebrooke, MIta, 1.1.28.
3. An anonymous text completely forbids the sale of land: sthavare vlkrayo 
nastl kuryad adhlm anu|naya/ ,  D h.K . 1589b; tr. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law,
I, 470: *Of land there cannot be a sale. It can only be mortgaged with the 
consent . . .*  The text Is Impractical and this proves that much of the sastra 
was mere admonition, see supra,342-3 . However, the text should Ee 
taken In the light of the mores of ancient societies. The bib lical lawgiver 
also tried to forestal the permanent alienation of Palestinian land by Intro­
ducing through the Jubilee Year, a periodic restitutio In Integram, Malmon- 
Ides, Code, Seklrut, 12, 14; also on this, see S.W. Baron, The Economic 
Views of Malmonldes*, In S.W. Baron, ed., Essays on Malmonldes, An Octo 
centennial Volume, (New York, 1966), 127-264 at 167-8; also F. Berolz- 
helmer, tr. R.S. Jastrow, The WorId*s Legal Philosophies, Modem Legal 
Philosophy Series, (Boston, 19l2), II, 43-4.
4 . This Is a feature of primitive society, Maine, Ancient Law, 1st ed., 258. 
Also, W. Markby, Elements of Law, (Oxford, 1885), 247-8.
5. Another feature of ancient law, Maine, Ib id ., 258.
reason such as legal Incapacity.
It Is tndedd significant to note that the preceding texts deal with the 
special Incidents of Immovable property In general. The absence of any dis­
tinction between ancestral and self-acquired Immovables would signify that even 
In self-acquired Immovable property, a son had a right analogous to co-owner- 
shtp, and It seems that he could Interdict an Improper alienation by the father 
of a ll categories of immovables.
I l l . The Father's power of Alienation
a. Introduction
In the preceding sections, we have noticed that In the property ac­
quired by the grandfather, and also Tn the immovable property acquired by the
father, many r§Ts enjoined co-ownership of a son with his father. O f course,
1we should not overlook the fact that certain dharmasastras made the father the 
master of a ll categories of movables. However, the two Ideas could well co­
exist.
The picture Illustrating the respective rights of father and son becomes 
clearer when we analyse the rules laid down Tn the smrtls regarding alienation of 
property. Indeed, one co-owner's right would negate or restrict the power of 
alienation of th^other co-owners over the same property.
1. Naroda/ D h .K .l2 l9 b ; supra, n . i.
The smrtl rules, in thTs respect, fa ll mainly into three categories.
In some of the texts, the smrtlkaras have mingled the rules of g ift wtth those of 
sale. But Tn others, they have only dealt wtth sale, whtle tn the thtrd category, 
the texts deal only wtth g ift. However, in general, the texts deal wtth alten- 
atton of different types of property and persons by the father. Our enquiry is 
to find out the extent of the limitation upon the fatheris power of alienation of 
property J n the presence of a son.
b . Fatheris power of making an alienation (gift or sale)
In the age of the dharmasastras, the act of making a g ift was held In
1 2high esteem and believed to be rewarded In heaven. Yajnavalkya says:
3
"Having given land, lamps, food, clothes, water, sesamum, clarified butter^
1. The Idea has Its foundation In the Vedas. In the TalHTnya Samhlta, 6 ,1 ,6 ,3 , 
a g ift of one*s wealth Is declared to be tapas. That character continued In 
the later times, Medhatlthl on Manu, IV, 5 . Among the late medleaval com­
mentators, Hemadrl In his Catur varga-clntamanl devotes a volume of over a 
thousand pages on g ift.
2. Yajn',1.210. bhu dlpanscanna-vastrambhas-tlla-sarpTs-pratls'rayan /  nalveslkam
svama-dhuryam dattva svarge mahlyate f f
3. Kane says: The g ift of land has been enloglzed as the most meritorious of a ll 
gifts from ancient times1, HD, II, 858. This should not mislead us to believe 
that g ift of land Is also mentioned tn the early Vedas, J. Gonda, *G!fts*, Tn 
his Change and Continuity In Indian Religion, (Mouton, The Hague, 1965), 
198-228 at 223-4. We come across reference to land as a grant In the Brahmana 
literature, A l.B r.8, 20; Sat.Br.7, 1, 1,4. In the Mahabharata laudatory com­
ment on the g ift of land, M .bh. 13, 62, 19. Also Vaslstha dh.su.XXIX, 16; 
SBE 14, 137. yatklmclt kurute papam puruso vrttlkarsltah /  apl gocarmamatrena 
bhumldanena sudhyatl f f  ‘Whatever sin a man distressed for livelihood commits, 
(from that) he Is purified by giving land, (be It) even "a bu ll‘s hide11*, tr.
BUhler, SBE 14, 137.
asylum, nalveslka, gold and b u ll, he Ts glorified Tn heaven".^
However, a text Tn the acara portTon of the sastra should not lead us to
belTeve that Tt Ts layTng down a defTnTte juridical rule on g ift of land. The text
Ts only a recommendation. Despite such recommendation and despite the belief
2
that the donor derives some unseen spiritual merit (adrsta or punya) by making 
a g ift, the act of actually giving away has to pass through a ll the juridical forma­
lities, and the donor cannot Ignore the rights of other dayadas In the same pro­
perty. Thus, significantly, Brhaspatl requires the consent of kinsmen for the
3
validation of a g ift of ancestral property.
When (a) Marriage-gift, (b) an Ancestral 
Property, (c) What has been won by valour 
Ts given away with the consent -  (a) of the 
Wife, (b) of Kinsmen, and (c) of the Master,
-  then the g ift acquires va lid ity . 4
Moreover, Brhaspatl seems to forbid the giving away of the ancestral 
5
property In toto: 11 In the case of property received as a marriage portTon, or
1. Tr. S.C. Vldyarnava, Yajnavalkya SmfltT, (Allahabad, 1918), I, 297.
2. Gonda, lo c .c lt ., 211.
3 . Br.XV.6; Dh.K.803b; HLS, I, 272. saudaylkam kramayatam saurya-praptam ca 
yat dhanam /  strl -jnatl-svamyanumatam dattam slddhlmavapnuyat f f
4 . Tr. Jha, The Vlvadachlntamanl, o p .c lt.^  61.
5. Br.XV.5, Dh.K.308a; HLS, I, 272. valvahlke kramayate sarva-danam na 
vldyate /
Tn her! ted from an ancestor, the bestowal of the whole Ts not admitted". ^
Aga|n Tn respect of alTenatTon, Brhaspatl categortcally declares that 
joint property, which Ts Indeed the property of the co-hetrs, cannot be an ob­
ject of gift
That which may not be given Is declared 
to be of eight sorts, joint property, a son, 
a w ife, a pledge, one's entire wealth, a 
deposit, what has been borrowed for use, ^ 
and what has been promised to another.
However, Brhaspatl ordains (seemingly) that even land, whether ances­
tral or self-acquired, may be given away; but only what remains Tn excess of pro-
4
vision for the feeding and clothing of the family. "What remains after defray­
ing (the necessary expenses for) the food and clothing of his family, may be given 
by a man”
The text Indicates that donable g ift Is what Ts left over after a ll the 
outgoings for the family have been met. In another text, Brhaspatl enumerates 
which properties are donable.^ "Whether ancestral or self-acquired, a dwelllng-
1. Jolly, SBE, XXXIII, 342.
2. Br.XV.2; Dh.K.802a; HLS, I, 265. samanyam putra-daradhl-sarvasva-nyasa
yacltam /  pratlsrutam tatha'nyasya na deyam t^ as tad ha smrtam f f
3. Tr. Jo lly, SBE, XXXIII, 342.
4. Br. X V .3; Dh.K.802b; HLS, 1, 270. kutumba-bhaktavasanat deyam yad
atlrlcyate /
5. Tr. Jolly, SBE, XXXIII, 342.
6 . Br.XV.4; Dh.K.803a; HLS, 1,270. saptagamat grha-k§etrat yad yat ksetram
pradlyate f  pltryam vatha svayam praptam tad datavyam vivaksltam f f
house and lands are declared to be what may be gtven away -  out of what has
]
been acquired through the seven sources of property".
Although one may be inclined to Tnfer from this text that Brhaspatl
ordains a general power of g ift of ancestral and self-acquired immovables, one
should always read this Tn conjunction wtth his other text which says that a
2
sfagle co-helr has no power to make a gTft or sale of immovables. Also,
one should take note that Brhaspatl enjoins that only ‘self-acquired property
3
may be gtven away at one's own pleasure'.
Then Brhaspatl mentions certatn properties whlcfer could be donated
as 'valid g ift*. The sage, however, allows a g ift of affection and, Tn this
respect, he does not make any overt dtsttnctto n between movables and Tmmov-
4
ables, though the context certainly suggests movables.
1. Tr. Jha, The VTvadachlntamaqT, op.cTt., 60.
2. Br. XV, 7; Dh.K.803b; HLS, I, 268. Katy, 854 Ts Identical. Also a ttr i­
buted to Vyasa In Da.bha, II, 27, D h.K . 1587a. The text Is quoted, supra,
3 41^ - 35.
3. B r.XV.5. Jha, The Vlvadachlntamanl, 60. The text Is quoted, s u p r a ,334,^3.
4 . Br. X V .8; Dh.K.803b; HLS, 1, 274. vrtls tustaya panyamulyam strtsulkam 
upakartne /  sraddhanugraha-samprltya dattamastavtdham smrtam / /  Should 
be read with Bf. X X V I.62, K .V . Rangaswaml Alyangar, ed ., Brhaspatlsmrtl 
(Reconstructed), (Baroda Oriental Institute, 1941), 206; pltr-prasaddd bhuj- 
yante vastrany abharananl c a /  Narada, D h .K .l2 l9 b ; and, Vrddha-Yajna- 
valkya, Dh.K.1588a, with slight variation (slddhantl In place of bhujyante),
Is Identical.
The following eight sort of gifts are recog­
nised as valid by persons acquainted with 
the law of gifts, v iz . wages, (what was 
given) for the pleasure (of hearing bards, 
or the like), the price of merchandise, 
the fee paid for (or to) a damsel, (and 
what was given) to a benefactor (as a 
return for his kindness), through rever­
ence, kindness, or affection. 1
There Is no doubt that the dharmasastra pays much attention to what 
Is adeya (unglvable) and, apart from BHiaspatl, other sages also have dealt with 
the topic.
Thus, Yajnavalkya also prohibits the giving away of one's entire pro- 
2
perty when one has descendants, and In this respect, the text Is Indeed signifi­
cant for our present purposes.
Only such things may be given away as 
do not Injure one's own family, the Wife 
and the Son being always excepted; the 
Entire Property also should not be given 
away, If  there Is progeny; nor should one 
give away what has been promised to 
another person. 3
1. Tr. Jolly, SBE, XXXIII, 343. Although Jolly's rendering of this text 
abounds In parentheses, It Is certainly better than Jha's clumsy translation 
at HLS, I, 274. However, Jha's rendering In The Vlvadachlntamanl, 63,
Is more organised.
2 . Ya jn.ll.175 ; Dh.K.796b. svam kutumbavlrodhena deyam dara-sutad r te /  
nanvaye satl sarva-svam yac canyasmal pratlsrutam / /
3. Tr. Jha, Vlvadachlntamanl, o p .c lt., 60. svam kutumbavlrodhena Is rendered 
by Mandllk as 'without causing detriment to the family property', V .N . 
Mandllk, The Yajnavalkya Smrtl, (Bombay, 1880), 228-9. But I prefer Jha's 
'as do not Injure one's own fam ily ', Jha, Ib id ., 60. Derrett also suggested at 
the margin of my first draft, 'without Injury to his own family .
Daksa goes further than Yajnava Iky a in safeguarding the rights of 
descendants. He declares the entire property as 'unglvable' I f  there is progen^y, 
even in times of distress. ^
Common property, what has been borrowed 
for a special occasion, a deposit sealed or 
open, a pledge, w ife, wife's property, 
and the entire property If there Is off­
spring -  these nine have been declared 
by the wise to be unglvable even In 
times of distress • 2
In similar vein, Narada discussed the conditions which justify
retraction of g ift. The positive conditions, however, are to be Inferred from
3
concrete and partly negatlye examples.
A Bailment for Delivery, an article 
borrowed fo ra  special occasion, a 
Pledge, Common Property, Deposit,
Son and Wife and the Entire Property 
when there Is progeny -  and also what 
has been promised to another -  these 
the Teachers have declared to be what 
should not be given away, even under 
distressful circumstances. 4
1. Daksa, D h .K .807; HLS, I, 269. samanyam yacltam nyasah adhlr darasca 
taddhanam /  anvahltam ca nlksepah sarva-svam canvaye sat! / /  apatsv apl 
na deyanl nava-vastunl pandltalh / /
2. Tr. Jha, HLS, I, 269. Derrett suggests In the margin of my first draft, a 
better and more literal rendering of na deyanl nava-vastunl pandltalh as 'the 
learned must not give these nine things even In times of distress'.
3 . Narada, IV. 4-5; Dh.K.798b, HLS, I, 268. anvahltam yacttakam adhlh 
sadharanam ca y a t /  nlk§epah putra-daram ca sarva-svam canvaye s a t ! / /  
apatsv apl hi kastasu vartamanena d e h ln a / adeyany ahur acarya yac canyasmal 
pratlsrutam / /
4. Tr. Jha, The Vlvadachlntamanl, o p .c it., 58. Derrett suggests a better render­
ing In the margin of my first draft of the portion: apatsv apl hi kastasu as 'when 
the Individual Is; (barely) existing Tn dire distress.’
Narada also Includes 'common property' (sadharanam)  ^ among eight
'non-donable' properties. Unglvablllty of a ll these eight just shows 'the lack
2of unqualified ownership, that Is, non-capacity In the owner to give*.
In respect of ancestral property, Katyayana also takes a similar view
and declares that a single coparcener cannot make a sale or g ift of such pro- 
3
perty. ”A  single (coparcener) has not In everyjday life the absolute power
4
to make even a partition of ancestral estate. One can only enjoy (the an-
5
cestral estate) but one cannot (by himself) make a g ift or sale of I t " .
1. In the MItaksara school the sadharana-dhana orsamudaya, 'common estate* 
belonged to the several generation jo in tly . In the smrtls, the manager of 
such common estate Is called Kutumbln 'family possessor*; grhtn,griiapatl, 
'householder; prabhu, *boss'; pradhana, 'chief*. These expressions coalesce 
with modem karta 'o ffic ian t', Kane, HD, 111, 592. Derrett, The Develop­
ment of the Concept of Property In India, c .800-1800*, 2!VR 64 (1962), 15- 
130 at 57; rpt. Essays, II, 8-130 at 50.
2 . C.!R. Lanman, 'Hindu Law and Custom as to G ifts ', rept. from Anniversary 
Papers by Colleagues and Pupils of George Lyman KIttredge, (Boston, 1913),
1-14 at 3.
3 . Katy, 853, Kane, ed ., Katyayanasmrtl . . . ,  103. loke ri<tha-vlbhdye*pl na 
kascit prabhutam Tyat/bhoga eva tu kartavyo na danam na ca v lk ra y a h //
4 . Tr. Kane, KdtydyanasmrtT, 300. Kane renders rktha as 'ancestral property*. 
Although It may well mean ancestral property, the significance of the term Is 
not wholly brought out by such a rtific ia l rendering, rktha may Include daya. 
daya Implies the share In the property of a deceased or living man. rktha has 
similarity with 'heredltas* -  being Inheritance ( I.e . properties) left by the de­
ceased. Fora discussion on this, G .D . Sonthelmer, The Concept of Daya:
A  Comparative Study, London University Academic Postgraduate Diploma In Law, 
(1962), unpublished, 15-16; also Sonthelmer, Ph.D. Thesis, EHJFI, 69-70. 
Derrett, ZVR 64, (1962), 34.
5. Tr. Kane, Katyayanasmrtl . . .  , 300.
Sim ilarly, Vrddha  ^ Yajnavalkya e xp lic itly  ordains that there can be
no g ift or sale of ancestral property and Immovables cannot be given away as a 
2
g ift of affection.
By the affectionate g ift of the father, the 
clothes and ornaments are gained; Immov­
able property Is not gained even with the 
fathers Indulgence. No one Is master of 
the Inheritance descended from ancestors, 
even when there Is partition of wealth.
It Is simply to be enjoyed; there can be 
no g ift or sale of the same. 3
A verse from Vyasa suggests that Immovable property should not be
4
alienated by a single coparcener without the consent of other co-owners.
1. The names with prefix like Vrddha or Vrhat does not necessarily mean any 
older sage from the point of view of chronology, Kane, HD, 1, P t.l, (Poona, 
1968), 581.
2. Vrddha Yajn, Dh.K. 1588a. pltr-prasadat slddhyantl vastrany abharananl c a /  
sthavaram na slddhyantl prasade paltrke satl / /  kaule rktha vlbhahe*pl na 
klnclt prabhutam ly a t /  bhoga eva tu kartavyo na danam na ca vlkrayah / /
3. Tr. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, I, 409-10.
4 . Vyasa, cited In Da >,bha, II, 27; Dh.K.1586b. na ca sthavarasya samastasya 
gotra-sadharanasya c a /  nalkah kuryat krayam danam paraspara-matam v ln a /7  
The word ‘gotra* has been defined by Brough as an ‘exogamous patrilineal slb- 
shlp*, J . Brough, The Early Brahmlnlcal System of Gotra and Pravara: A Trans­
lation of Gotra-Pravana-Manjarl of Purusottama-Pandlta, (Cambridge University 
Press, 1952), In trod., 2. On Its evolution, Ib id ., 2 -5 . Derrett points out 
that gotras are members of the same patrilineal clan. In a not unimportant 
sense, the gotra seems to have been a residual adh lka rl, whose rights were to
a large extent overshadowed by those of the King (except In the Instance of the 
property of Brahmans), and whose rights cannot have been a collective right In 
any technical sense. But the Hindu custom of preemption Is a survival of gotra 
right, Derrett, The Development of the Concept of Property c . A .D . 800-1800*, 
ZVR 64 (1962), 15-130 at 64-66. On the origin of gotra, B .N . Datta surmises 
that It Is derived from common pasturage, Dialectics of Land-Economics of India, 
(Calcutta, 1952), 7. Kosambl also Investigates the origin of gotra, D .D . 
Kosambl, *On the Origin of Brahmin Gotras*, Journal of the Bombay Branch, 
R .A .S ., 26 (1950), 21-80. Kosambl Is criticised by Brough, lb ld .r Preface, 
x lv -xv .
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,!A  single parcener may not, without consent of the rest, make a sale or g ift of 
the whole immovable estate, nor of what Ts common to the family” .^
2
Later smrtls are more severe and more explTcTt on the prerequisite
of consent of co-helrs Tn an alTenatTon of Tmmovable property. Thus, a text
of PrajapatT shows that a fathers power could be more openly questToned. The
sage declares that Tn the absence of co-helr vs consent any sale of Tmmovable
3
property Ts tota lly voTdable.
Not beTng assented to by the co-heTrs, 
whatever has been done Tn regard to Tm- 
movables, that wholly Ts to be regarded 
as not done, Tf even one does not agree*
Houses, landsp sacrTfTcTal perquTsTtes as 
also gTft by the father, as also from the 
mother when pleased, a dTvTsTon of these 
Ts not made. 4
1. Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha. 11.27.
2. Here we are not sayTng that Tn classTcal iTterature, chronology Ts accurately 
possible. The problem Ts discussed by LTngat, tr. Derrett, CL1, 123ff. But 
‘the more evolved smrtls worked upon earlier material, . . .  deployed It , and 
restated Tt‘ , Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973), 26.
3. PrajapatT, cited Tn J.R. Ghaiyure, ed., The Collection of Hindu Law Texts,
(N o .11), The SmrltTchandrTka, VYavaharakandam, (Bombay, 1918), (2), 2/ 7 . 
dayadalr nabhyanujnatam yat klnclt sthavare krtam /  tat sarvam akrtam jneyam 
yady eko'pl na manyate f f  grha-ksetranl yajyasca prasado yasca paltrkah f  
matrkasca prasado yas tad-vlbhago na vldyate f f  The text should be read with 
Br. cited In MIta, 1.1.28; D h.K .l588b: eko*pl sthavare . . . ,  supra,3 4 5 ,ti.i.
4 . Tr. J.R. Ghapure, The Collection of Hindu Law Texts, V o l.X X X l, The Smrtl" 
chandrlka Vyayahdra Kanda -  Part III, (Bombay, 1952), 597.
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c . The Prohibitions on alienation: an approYsal
After a long discussion, such as thTs, on texts either allowing or ^pro­
hibiting g ift or sale of certain properties, a modem reader may be tempted to de­
duce certain positive rules on alTenatTon of property Tn the dharmasastra, but that 
Ts extremely rTsky Tf we are dealTng wTth a pre-Iegal epoch. Indeed, when we 
attempt to dTscem the effects of these prohibitions Tn a purely legal context, our 
TnvestTgatTon Ts bound to be fraught wTth dTffTcuItTes and confusTon.
The dTffTcuItTes are enhanced by the fact that ‘the sastra contaTns no
rules of law whTch must be followed by judges on paTn of TlIegalTty . . . *   ^ The
2
sastra only contaTns ‘precepts*, and for thTs reason, one wTthout Tnward know­
ledge of early HTndu cTvTlTzatTon may mTstake the precepts for prTncTptes. Ero- 
htbTtTons are also negatTve precepts and, although there are consTderable dTffT­
cuItTes Tn TnterpretTng them, ‘subtle dTstTnctTon may be drawn between the pro­
hibited act whTch Ts valTd Tn law and the prohibited act whTch not only draws
3
vengeance upon the perpetrator but Ts otherwTse legally TneffectTve*.
Although, at this stage of our study, we are not dTrectly dealTng wTth
the commentators, Tt wTll not be altogether Trrelevant to have a general and dls-
4
passTonate observation of their opinion on this point. Derrett Informs us that
1. Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973), 3.
2. Ib id ., 3 .
3. Derrett, ‘Prohibition and N u llity : Indian Struggles with a Jurisprudential 
Lacuna*, BSOAS, 1957, XX, 203-15 at 203-4. Cp. the distinction between 
‘forbidden* and ‘void* Tn Islamic law, J .N .D . Anderson, ‘ Invalid and Void 
Marriages Tn HanafT Law*, BSOAS, X III, 2, 1950, 357-66.
4 . Ib id ., 207.
up to the twelfth century, and Tn some Tnstances until long afterwards, jurists
were Inclined to assume that if  an alTenatTon was forbTdden, It was voidable.^
Although the matter Ts obscure, Tn a ll probabllTty absolutely voTd alTenatTons
cannot have been known Tn ancTent and medTaeval IndTa except perhaps Tn
cases of alienation by non-owners or by some owners limited by dependence 
2(para tan tya).
However, the solution was often very Inconvenient, and therefore,
even from the late smrtl period conditions began to be attached to the words
of the rule In question so as to make the prohibition consort more happily with
common sense and usage. The problem was complicated by the fact that usage
varied from district to district, and what was an acceptable transgression In one
3
part was shocking In another.
Thus, marrying the words of the texts with usage did not work, and 
eventually mediaeval authors had to put the jurisprudential question: were the 
transactions, as such, In defiance of prohibitions voidable or, on the contrary, 
valid? On this, three schools of thought emerged.
1. Ib id ., 207.
2. Ib id ., 207, n .5 . On paratantrya ( ‘non-Independence‘) , see Derrett,
*The Development of the Concept of Property Tn India” , ZVR 64 (1962), 
15-130 at 96-7.
3 . Derrett, BSOAS, 1957, XX, 203-15 at 207-8.
AccordTng to one, the transaction Ts 
valid, but the transgressor sTns and Ts 
perhaps iTable to punTshment, depend-  
Tng upon the case. AccordTng to the 
second, the transactTon Ts voTdable and 
the transgressor does not sTn. The 
thTrd opTnTon holds that the transactTon 
Ts voTdable and the transgressor does 
sTn and Ts ITable to punTshment Tn an 
appropriate case. I
JTmutavaha^na's explanation of the prohibition coalesces with the 
first of these three opinions. The shrewd Bengali, who excelled Tn manipulat­
ing the smrtl texts to his own advantage, said that although texts tend to prevent 
a father's alienating self-acquired Tmmovable property without his son  ^ consent, 
the alienation without such prior consent would be an offence merely In con­
science, and not an offence at law. He holds the transactTon Itself as valid
2
and he comments, 'a fact cannot be altered by a hundred texts'.
A t the dawn of Anglo-Hlndu law, Jagannatha Tarkapancanana, quite
naturally, understood the Importance of the texts on prohibition and Tn his
-  -  3Vlvada-bhaftgarnava engaged himself In a lengthy discussion of the problem.
1. Ib id ., 208. For an analysis of the first opinion, see Jagannatha, Colebrooke, 
Digest, I, 399-422. For the second and third opinions, see the translation by 
Derrett of a vluable extract from Sankara-bhatta's fDharma-] dvalta-nlrnaya 
(c. 1580-1600), Derrett, Ib id ., 209-13. The original Ts edited by J.R. 
Gharpure, (Bombay, 1943), 123-4. Note the misprints as pointed out by 
Derrett, Ib id ., 209,n . l .
2. D a .bha .ll.30. For supplrt of JImutavahana's dictum, see U.C. Sarkar, Law 
Review, 18 (1966),7. For jurisprudential significance of the dictum, Derrett^ 
'Factum V a le t', 7 I.C .L .Q  (1958), 280; RLSI, 91. The P.C. was strongly 
Influenced by the famous dictum of JImutavahana In Raja Rao Balwant Singh v . 
Rani KIshort (1898) LR 251A 54 and In Sri Balusu Gurlullngaswamy v . Sri Balusu 
Ramalakshmamma, (1899) LR 26 1A 113; for a discussion In fra ,-745-6.
3. Jagannatha Tarkapancanana, Vlvada-bharfgamava: A  Digest of Hindu Law on
Contracts and Successions: With a Commentary by Jagannatha Tercapanchanana
/C on t 'd. next puge:---------------------
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Jagannatha opines that co-owners who violate the rule about alienating un­
divided property are liable to correction (he suggests actually punishment),
but the transaction as such Is not void. ^  However, Jagannatha‘s observa-
2
tlons are ‘coloured by a characteristic "Bengali” bias1.
Unfortunately and Inexplicably, Kaqe In his History of Dharmasastra,
3
has not paid the proportionate attention to the problem that I t  really deserves. 
While Kane remains silent, the Bengali biases of JImutavahana and Jagannatha 
were given additional support by Prlyanath Sen. He observes:
. . .  having regard to the general prin­
ciples of transfer of ownership, I think 
It w ill be going too far to say that a l­
though the owner makes a g ift of his own 
property, no title  w ill pass, simply be­
cause the Sastras have condemned such a 
g ift as Improper. 4
But, surprisingly, Sen did not apply his original mind to the problem, 
partly because he took Jagannatha‘s analysis as the final say on the point, and 
partly because he was eager to establish that Hindu law on this point could be
5
accommodated by the fundamental and universal principles of jurisprudence.
Note 3 -  p .358 -  Continued:
from the Original Sanskrit by H ,T . Colebrooke, Esq., . . . ,  (Madras, 1864-5),
I 399-422.
1. RLSI, 91.
2. Derrett, BSOAS, 1957, XX, 204.
3. Kane, HD, 111, 471-5.
4 . P .N . Sen, General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, TLL, 1909, (Calcutta, 
1918), 86.
5. Derrett, BSOAS, 1957, XX, 204.
*Quot homines -  tot senfentlae*  ^ -  this remark of Terence best
characterises the wide variety of opinions concern mg the texts on prohibition;
and, despite the attention of sastras at different epochs, much of the juridical
mystery of the texts remained unsolved. Small wonder Is It that once again In
our time Derrett dealt with the problem and gave a coherent picture of the ex-
2
tent of these prohibitions. We gratefully adopt his profound sastrlc and jurl 
3
dlcal Insight on this point.
The texts which we have quoted on prohibition may be arranged Into 
four categories:
The Sastra prohibits:
4
(1) alienation of land by sale;
5
(2) alienation by g ift of a ll one*s assets;
(3) alienation of common assets;^
1. *As many men so many minds or opinions1, Terence, Phormto , II .4.14.
2 . Derrett, BSOAS, 1957, 203-15.
3 . Ib id .; alsoRLSI, 75-96, 91, 248.
4 . Anon. MItaksara On Yajn . 11.114, Ya jnavalkyasmrtl, 5th edn., (Nlrnaya 
Sagar Press, Bombay, 1949), 219-20; J.C . Ghose,* Hindu Law, I, 470;
D h.K . 1589b.
5 . Y a jn .ll.175 , Dh.K.796b; Narada, V , 4, Dh.K.798b; Daksa, Dh.K.807a, 
HLS, I, 269; Br. XV, 2, Dh.K.802a.
6 . Yajn. I I .179 (only VIsvarupaks Balakrlda); Narada, V ,4; Daksa, Dh.K.807a; 
Br. X IV ,2, D h .K .829.
(4) alienation of ancestral assets without the consent of male
Issue, except under exceptional provision of law; ^
2
(5) alienation of son or w ife .
At this point, we should remind ourselves that the dharmasastras con-
  -  3
tain three parts: (1) acara ( ‘conduct1) , vyavahara (‘c iv il law*) and prayascltta
( ‘penance1) . Strictly speaking, of these three, only the vyayahara materials are
4
directed to the assistance of the King In solving disputes. The more modern of 
the dharmasastras contain a relatively large volume of vyavahara material.
Indeed, a ll civilizations regulate the acquisition and protection of proprietary 
rights and, expecting vyavahara to be taken seriously by judicial assessors, the 
more modem jurists Increasingly brought It within their concern because the
5
purposes of the Vedas could not be carried out without some tenure of property.
From an ethno-juridical point of view, the rules found In the acara 
and prayascltta sections of the sasira were Intended to be applied In a pre- 
legal environment as extra-legal rules. A transgressor of extra-legal rules
1. Br.XIV. T 5 and 6, Dh.K.803a, b.
2. Yajn£ 11.175; NSrada, V ,4 ; Br. XV, 2, Dh.K.802a, HLS, I, 265. 
Katyayana, 638-9, ed. Kane, (Bombay, 1933), 79, Dh.K.804a, 805a.
3 . On the development of this part, see Derrett, Dharmasastra and Juridical 
Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973), 18.
4 . Derrett, BSOAS, 1957, XX, 214.
5 . Derrett, DJL, 21.
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might be socially boycotted, but the transgression did not affect the practical
affaTrs in c iv il law (vyavahara).^ Consequently prohibitions, Tn non-vyavahara
contexts, are prohibitions which do not Invalidate transactions In breach thereof.
Thus, prohibition (1) In our list, namely, prohibition against alienation of land
by sale, may be taken as a mere admonition of the sastra, but prohibitions (2) -
(5), appearing In a vyavahara context, would render transactions In breach there-
2
of liable to be declared void.
However, having said that, It Is Indeed worth mentioning that a King's
^________  _  3
duty of ‘protection of his subjects1 (prajanam parlpalanam) ‘covers the whole
scope of dhapna, as the smrtls conceived It to be: acara, prayascltta and 
4vyavahara*. The King must warn his subjects against committing sins and also 
see to It that penances enjoined upon sinners In order to expiate their sins are
5
actually carried out. Thus, In classical epoch the three departments of the
1. See Medh. on Manu, V III, 164; for a discussion, Derrett, The Concept of 
Law According to MedhatlthI, A Pre-lslamTc Indian Jurist*, Essays, I, 174- 
197 at 191.
2. Derrett, BSOAS, 1957, XX, 215.
3 . LIngat, tr . Derrett, The Classical Law of India, o p .c lt., 222-3.
4 . Ib id ., 223.
5 . Ib id ., 223. Note that even In vyavahara context some smrtls prescribe penances 
for breaches, VUrtu, qu. Sarasvatl-vlfasa (Mysore, 1927), 278, Dh.K.794b; 
Narada, V ,6 , Dh.K.799a; Da Ida, anon.qu. BhavasvamI, Naradlya-manu- 
sarjihlta-tlka, V ,5 , Dh.K.807b; Harlta, qu.var. Dh.K.808a; and cp. MIta
on Yajff. I l l .290.
smrtls are not distinctly separable.
We have observed that In a vyavahara context, the prohibitions render 
the transactions void (or voidable). From the point of view of ownership, It 
shows that ‘the Hindu paterfamilias . . .  holds his property subject to the rights of 
his dependants*;^ also the prohibitions In the non-vyavahara sections, In their 
wider social context, highlight almost the same point because a ‘gift* In trans­
gression of a prohibition w ill not bring the desired unseen merit. As to giving 
that on which the family has a prior claim, Brhaspatl In an appropriately Apo­
calyptic phrase, observes that the religious merit of the man who does It,
2
‘though tasting like honey at first, w ill change Into poison In the end*.
Thus, both the vyavahara and non-vyavahara materials point to one 
thing, namely, that the Hindu father Is not the unqualified and absolute master 
of the family property. His ownership Is subject to the co-ownership of his 
male Issue and the relevant rights of other dependants.
Although this conclusion Is not consistent with the traditional Bengali 
3 y-solutlon of such problems, In the sastra the c omen on ownership of property be-
4
tween a father and his male Issue Is as ancient as It Is Inexorable.
1. C.R. Lanman, ‘Hindu Law and Custom as to G ifts*, rpt. from Anniversary 
Papers by Colleagues and Pupils of George Lyman Klttredge, (Boston, 1913), 
1-14 at 3 .
2. Br.XV.3, SBE, X X III, 342.
3. Da.bha. I I .30; Jagannafha, I, 411-12.
4 . Textual authority may be claimed, Tal.sam.Ill .1 .9 .4 . Manuh putrebhyo 
dayam vyabhajat, Kane, HD, 111, 543-4. A lsoR.V. I. 70.5, Kane, HD, III, 
564-5.
d. Conclusion
From the texts discussed above, we may draw the following conclusions
(1) The father or the head of a family was forbidden to give away or sell 
the whole of the family property; especially so when he had off­
spring joint with him.
(2) Consent of the co-heirs (presumably only jo in t, or even separate) was 
necessary to alienate ancestral property.
(3) Under normal circumstances, immovable property, whether ancestral 
or self-acqutred, could not be alienated without the consent of other 
coparceners. However, under special circumstances, such as Tn 
time of distress, for the sake of the family and for pious purposes, 
land could be alienated even by a single Individual.
(4) In relevant circumstances, a father had the freedom of making a g ift 
of affection to his children from his movables.
IV . Partition
a. Time of partition
In many of the texts discussed above, we have noticed that the dharma- 
sastras enjoin various elements of co-ownership between father and son In certain 
types of properties. Co-ownership of a son may indeed exist quite Independently 
of his right to demand partition against the w ill of his father. But, like a son's 
power to Interdict an Improper alienation of family property by hts father, the
right to demand partition Ts also another manTfestatTon of hts co-ownershtp Tn the 
same property with the father. Therefore, naturally, the question arises: did 
the dharmasastras allow a son to demand partition against the w ill o f his father? 
Let us see what the smrtTfcaras have to say on this particular question.
Gautama ordains:  ^ "After the father*s death let the sons divide his
estate. O r, during his lifetime, when the mother Is past child-bearing, I f  he 
2
desires I t . u
Similarly, Apastamba does not say anything on the right of a son to
demand partition against the w ill of his father. However, he disapproves the
preferential share of the eldest son and significantly enjoins that a father,
3
during his lifetime, should divide his wealth equally amongst his sons. "He
should, during his lifetime, divide his wealth equally amongst his sons, except-
4
mg the eunuch, the mad man, and the outcaste.”
It seems thatBaudhayanadoes not advoaate the Initiation of partition
5
by a son without the consent of his father. Thus, he declares: "While the
1. Gautama, X X V III.1-2; Dh.K.1144b. urdhvam pltuh putra rlktham vlbhajeran/  
n lvrtfe rajasl matur jlva tl cecchatl / /
2. Tr. Buhler, SBE, II, 299.
3. A g .dh.su. 11.6.14.1; Dh.K.1164a. jVan putrebhyo * dayam vlbhajet samam 
klibam unmattam patltam ca parlhapya// The equal division among sons Is also 
ordained In a passage attributed to Manuln the N lp jkta , III, 4 . avlsesena 
putranam dayo bhavatl dharmatah /  mlthunanam vlsargadau manulj svayambhubo
*brav7t/ /  In the extant Manu this passage Is not be found; however, there can 
be no doubt of Its authenticity, seeAp.dh.su. I I .6 .14 .6 , 10-12, Kane, HD,
III, 566. B .N . Chobe, Principles of Dharmasastra, (Allahabad, 1948), 27.
4 . Tra. BUhler, SBE, II, 132.
5. Baudhayana, 11.2.8; D h .K .ll4 6 b . pltur anumatya daya-vtbhagah sat! p lta rl/  
AIsoSonkha-Ilkhlta.dh.su, D h .K .ll4 8 b . jlva tl p ltarl rlktha-vlbhagoViumatah/
father lives, the division of the estate takes place (only) with the permission of 
the father".^
These texts of Gautama (XXVIII .1-2), Apastamba (11.6.14.1), Baud- 
hayana (II .2 .8), and Sankha-I TtkhTta (Dh.K. 1148b) declare that during the 
lifetime of a father, a partition can be made only with his consent.
Manu and Yajnavalkya opine that brothers could divide the property
amongst themselves after the decease of both the parents. Many explains that
this Is ordained because the sons are not ‘masters* of the property during the
2
lifetime of their parents. However, It Is doubtful whether the verse Is Indi­
cative of complete lack of ownership by the sons while their parents are alive. 
"After the death of the father and of the mother, the brothers shall assemble
and may divide the ancestral wealth. They are not masters of It while the two 
3
parents live” .
Devala ordains partition after the decease of the father and declares
4
that sons have no ownership during the lifetime of their father. "When
1. Tr. BUhler, SBE, XIV, 224.
2 . Manu, IX, 104; Dh.K . 1149b; Derrett, Bharucl, 1,170. urdhvam pltus ca matus'* 
ca sametya bhratarah saha /  bhajeran paltrkam rlktham anlsas te hi jlvatoh / /  
variant reading bhratarah saha as bhratarah samam, The Manusmrt l,  (10th ed., 
Nlmaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1946), 382. Btihler followed ‘samam* and trans­
lated as *ln equal shares*, SBE, XXV, 345.
3. Tr. Derrett, Bharucl, 11, 236. Y a jn '. ll.117; Dh.K.1151b. vlbhajeran sutah 
pltror urdhvam rlktham mam samam: *Let sons divide equally both the effects and 
the debts, after [th e  demise o f ]  their two parents*, tr. Colebrooke, M lta, I,
111. 1.
4 . Devala, Dh .K . 1156a. pltary uparate putrS vlbhajeyur dhanam pltuh /  asvamyam 
hi bhaved e§am nlrdose pltarl sthlte / /
the father Ts deceased, let the sons divide the father's wealth; for sons have not 
ownership while the father Is alive and free from defect.” ^
Narada also supports the view that sons should divide their father's pro 
2
perty after his death, but at the same time, he enjoins that this Is not the only
occasion when a partition of father's property takes place. He declares that
even during the lifetime of the father, there can be a partition of his property
3
under the following circumstances: "When the menstruation of the Mother has
ceased, when the Sisters have been given away, or when the Father's capacity
4
for enjoyment has ceased, or when the Father has ceased to have any desires” .
The text Indicates a family situation In which there Ts no possibility 
of the birth of another child to the parents. This Ts a safeguard against reopen­
ing a partition or readjusting the shares In case another child, especially a son,
Is born In the fam ily. The sloka Ts significant In the sense that It upholds the 
Innate right In property of those who are yet unbegotten and Indirectly Implies 
that perhaps sons could demand a partition from their father If  the conditions 
laid down In the text were present.
1. Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha.1.18.
2. Narada, X V I.2; Dh.K. 1152b. pltarl urdhvam gate putra vlbhajeyur dhanam 
pltuh (var. vlbhajeran dhanam kramat): 'After the death of the father the sons 
shall divide their father's property', tr . Jo lly, SBE, XXXIII, 189.
3. Narada, XVI .3; Dh. K . 1152b. matur nlvrtte rajas! prattasu bhaglnlsu ca /  
nlvrtte va'pl ramane pltary uparata-sprhe / /  Also BrhaspatT, XXVI .9; D h.K .
1155a. pltror abhave bhratmam vlbhagah sampradarsltah /  matur nlvrtte rajasl 
jlvotor a pi sasyate f f
4 . Tr. Jha, The VIvadachlntamanI, o p .c lt., 173.
Perhaps we may conclude that the texts denyTng a son the right to 
demand partition during the lifetime of hTs father may have been Intended to 
discourage a son from enforcing his right of co-ownership In order to maintain 
peace and cohesion In the familial Institution. As precepts, the sastrlc texts
against demanding a partition against the w ill of the father can hardly be 
divorced from their social context. The societal aspects of the texts are 
clearly visible In one of Gautama*s, which Implies that, In strict vyavahara 
context, a son could enforce a partition of the family property against the 
w ill of his father; but such a son was not socially acceptable.^
Let him not feed . . .
Nor, (sons) who have enforced a d iv i­
sion of the family estate against the 
wish of their father. 2
Here Gautama gives a list of people who should not be Invited to a 
sraddha dinner, and one of the persons to be excluded from such a feast Is a son
3
who has enforced a division of family property against the volition of his father.
1. na bhojayet . . .  pltra cakamena vlbhaktan, Gautama, XV, 15 and 19.
The Smrltl Sandarbha, Gurumandal Series No. IX, (Calcutta, 1954), IV, 
1900. Kage, HD, III, 567. Kane remarks: ‘One may concede that this 
sentiment continued long after even Gautama and Apastamba and even In 
the 20th century, a Hindu son suing his father for partition Incurs great 
opprobrium*, Ib id ., 567. C f. Albanian customary law, supra,94.
2. Tr. BUhler, SBE, II, 253-5.
3. See also Manu, III, 151, gives a list of persons who should be excluded from 
sraddha feast ( . . .  sraddhe na bhojayet). Manu Includes In this list a son 
'who wrangles or goes to law with his father*: pltra vlvadamanasca . . .  , 
Manu, 111, 159; tr . BUhler, SBE, XXV, 105. Medhatlthl*s comment on 
this part of the verse Is significant: *He who wrangles or goes to law with 
his father, e .g . who forces him to divide the family estate*, SBE, XXV,
105, n. Also Kane, HD, IV, (Poona, 1953), 392*3.
When the smrtt texts on tTme of partition are taken together, from 
theTr literal meaning it becomes really d ifficu lt to reconcTle the respective 
rules contained In the two groups  ^ of texts, unless we accept that the dharma- 
sastras did not presume the right to demand partition by the son against the w ill 
of the father as an Indlspenslble component or Incident of ownership.
It Is apparent from the texts that, on the one hand, the rsts enjoin a
2
son*s co-ownership In a ll categories of ancestral property, and self-acquired 
3
Immovables of his father but, on the other, they seem to be reluctant to 
approve the right of a son to demand partition against the w ill of his father, 
or to make such a right socially acceptable. Probably, In the days of the
dharmasastras, the social norm was joint living as enjoined In a text by Vyasa:
4
"For brothers a common abode Ts ordained so long as the parents live” . But
It Is too early to draw any conclusion before we take Into consideration a ll
5
other texts, and to put too much emphasis on an unproved social factor In
1. The 1st group advocating partition within the lifetime of the father with his 
consent: Gautama, XXVI11.1.2, Dh.K. 1144 b; Apastamba, 11.6.14.1, Dh.K. 
1164a; Baudhayana, I I .2 .8 , Dh.K.1146b; Sankha-I Ikh lta .dh.su, Dh.K .
1148b. Man , IX, 104, Dh.K. 1149b. The second group: Guatama, X V .15 
and 19: Indirectly Manu, III, 159.
2. For example, Y 5 jn . l l . l2 l ,  Dh.K.1175b; Br. X X V I.10, Dh.K.1180b; Br.
X X V I.14, Dh.K.1179b; VTsnu, V I I ,2, Dh.K.1175a.
3. Vyasa, Dh.K.1587a, HI5 , I, 276; Narada, D h .K .l2 l9 b .
4 . Vyasa, cited In D a .b h a .lll.8 . bhratrnam jivatoh pTtroh sahavaso v ldh lya te / 
tr . Colebrooke, Dabba.ll1.8.
5. Cp . other texts Implying that If , Instead of remaining united, brothers separate 
there Is Increase of spiritual merit; vlbhage tu dharmavrddhlh, Gautama, XXVIII.
4 . But see Manu, IX .I ll;  111.67; For a discussion, Kane, HD, III, 571-2.
the age of the dharmasastras might defeat our purpose.
b . Partition during the lifetime of the father : the pre-dharmasatt ra
literature
Our preceding study of the dharmasastra texts has shown that a parti­
tion of family property among the sons during the lifetime of their father was not 
unknown In ancient India. Indeed, the text of Gautama  ^ also Indicates that, 
although socially reprehensible, sons could partition the family property against 
the w ill of their father.
The pre-dharmasastra literature also shows that what Is Implied In the 
text of Gautama Is not the fsl*s own Invention; It has support from similar Vedlc 
and brahmana texts. There are hymns In the Vedas and passages In the samhltcs 
and the brahmanas which show that sometimes a father In his old age used to divide 
his property among his sons. Faint traces of this Idea may be found In the 
Pg-veda:^
AgnI, confer excellence on our valued 
cattle, and may a ll men bring us accept­
able tribute; offering In many places
1. Gautama, XV. 15 and 19; Kane , HD, III, 567.
2. R .V. 1.70.10, Dh. K . 1158a. gosu prasastlm vanesu dhlse bharanta vTsve ballm 
sarnah /  v l tva narah purutra saparyan plturna jlvrervt vedo bharanta / /
sacrifices to thee, men receives riches j 
from thee, as (sons) from an aged father.
-  -  2The Nabhanesdlsjha legend of the Rg-veda a lso alludes to son's
3
division of family property during the lifetime of their father:
1. Tr. H .H . Wilson, Rlg-Veda-Samhlta, (London, 1850), I, 186. Zimmer 
though!this hymn to be a parallel evidence of the ancient Germanic custom 
of exposing old parents, H. Zimmer, Altlndlsches Leben, (Berlin, 1879), 
326-8, cited by A . Kaegl, tr. R. Arrowsmlth, The Rlgveda: The Oldest 
Literature of the Indians, (Boston, 1886), 16, 112-3. It seems that Kaegl 
seems to disagree with Zimmer's view, Ib id ., 113. The view Is also c r it i­
cised by J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, I, 489. Note different renderings of the 
last part of the hymn: kas sons (divide) the property of the aged father', SBE, 
XLVI, 71; 'as sons obtain . . . ' ,  'as sons take . . . * ,  J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, 
I, 88, 488; * . . .  parting, as It were, an aged father's wealth', R .T.H. 
G riff ith , The Hymns of the Rlgveda, (Benares, 1896), I, 94. One should 
take the hymn as a whole. When we .lead both the lines of the hymn, the 
meaning and the simile become clear and the juridical Implication thereof 
comes to the fore. As Sayana comments: 'tvatto vlsesena h a ra n tl/ 
grhnantltyarthah /  . . .  then he explains the sim ile : yatha putra vrddhat pltuh 
sakasad-dhanam harantl ta d v a t/D h .K . 1158a. Kane considers this hymn as 
an evidence 'that sons divided the father's property during his lifetime when 
the father grew old*, HD, III, 564. Cp. Ja l.B r.III .156: tad u hovacabhl- 
pratarano jlmas^sayanah /  putra hasya dayam vlbhejTre /  Jalmlnlya-Brahmana, 
ed ., R. Vlra and L. Chandra, (Nagpur, 19^4), 419.
2. L iterally means 'nearest to the navel' -  an old word which could be found In 
the form of nabanazdlsta In the Zend Avesta, M . Haug, The Altareya Brah- 
manam of the Rlgveda, (Bombay, 1863), I, 24-7.
3 . R .V .10.61.1. Idamltha raudram gurtavaca brahma kratva sacyamamta-rajau/ 
krana yad asya pltara mamhanestah parsatpakthe ahanna sapta-hotrn / /
Nabhanedlstha (the son of Manu) being 
ready recited this hymn (1) pleasant to 
Rudra, accomplished by wisdom, In the 
midst of the sacrifice (celebrated by the 
ArigTfasas who had forgotten It) to the 
seven HotrTs on the sixth day. That 
hymn which his parents (and his brothers) 
who were dividing (the family property 
without giving hlma share) advised him 
to recite as a means of his acquisition 
o f ca ttle . 2
3The legend has been elaborated In the Altaxeya-brahmana, and In
_4  _ _
In the Talttlrlya-samhlta with Its context. The Nabhanedlstha legend shows
that the elder brothers divided the property of their father without allotlng any
portion to Nabhanedlstha, the youngest of the brothers, while he was away en-
5
gaged In Vedlc learning at the house of his teacher. At the completion of this 
period, Nabhanedlstha came back and asked his brothers about his share In the 
paternal wealth. His brothers advised him to go to the adjudicator (nlstava), 
that Is, to their father.^
1. R.V. 10.61.1. Idamltha raudram gurtavaca brahma kratva sacyamamta-rajau/  
krana yad asya pltara mamhanestah parsatpakthe ahanna sapta-hotrn / /
2. Tr. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, I, 489.
3. A l.B r .V . l4  (xTI.9), Dh.K. 1662a, Kane, HD,,tf;565.
4 . Ta l.S am .lll.1 .9 .4 ; Kane, HD , III, 565.« •
5. Kane, HD, III, 565.
6. A l.B r.V .l4  (xTI.9), Dh.K.1162a. nabhanedlstham val manavam brahmacaryyam 
vasantam bhrataro mrabhajanso*bravidetya kirn mahyarrJabhaktetyetameva . . .  /
./ '  !
373.
Nabhanedlstha Manava when he was per­
forming his studentship (1), his brothers 
deprived of any share (In his fathers 
property). Having returned, he said 
to them, ” what have you allotted to 
me?” 2
According to Kane, the legend "shows that the elder brothers divided 
a ll the father** property among themselves, and excluded Nabhanedlstha during 
the father*s lifetime, apparently without any protest from him or In spite of I t ” .
If Kane*s assumption Is correct, then the legend depicts the positive norm re­
garding a son*s right to divide his father*s property against his w il l .  However, 
Kane*s Interpretation Is not supported by the legend. The legend shows that
after the protest of Nabhanedlstha, the elder brothers advised him to go to the 
3
adjudicator, I .e . their father, and this negates the alleged defiance of paternal 
authority by the elder brothers.
In the Tal ttlrfya-sarphlta, the story of Nabhanedlstha Is told with a 
slight variation, and the utterance becomes more definite, stating that Manu him­
self divided his property among his sons, and did not a llo t any share to Nabhane­
dlstha who was away for his Vedlc studies.
1. Martin Haug renders more litera lly: brahmacaryam vasantam as ‘after his 
Investiture In the house of Guru*, The Altareya Brahcnanam of the Rlgveda, 
o p .c lt., II, 341.
2. Tr. A .B. Keith, Rlgveda Brahmanas: The Altareya and Kausltakl Brahmanas 
of the Rlgveda^ HOS, 25 (Cambridge, Mass., 1920), 236.
3. Haug, lo c .c lt ., II, 341.
The cructal part of the text runs as follows:  ^ "Manu divided hts 
2
wealth among hts sons".
1. Tat. Sam. III. 1 .9 .4, Talttlrlya Samhlta, (Bharat Press, Aundh, 1945), 132; 
Dh.K.1161a; Kane, HD, III, 565. manuh putrebhyo dayam vyabhajat/
Daya = share originally comes from the root da = ‘to share1, ‘to divide ‘ , 
Derrett, The Development of the Concept of Property In India‘ , ZVR 64 
(1962), 15-130 at 53, rpt. Essays, II, 8-130. jfmutavahana%s dlyate It! 
vyutpattya daya-sabdgy I .e . da means to give Is wrong, Da.bha. I, 4 .
Kane^s adoption of Jlmutavahana‘s defin ition Is careless, Derrett, Ibid, 53. 
Deflhltlon of daya, Bharucl: pltryam jnatl-dhanam va, ‘that which belonged 
to the father, or the property of a re lative4, Derrett, Bharucl, I, 226, II, 333; 
similar Is Apararka on Yain'. II, 115, 720. Medhatlthl on Manu, IX . 115: 
anvayagatam dhanam,‘property acquired by succession4. Jlmutavahana: 
purva-svaml-sambandhadhlnam tat-svamyoparame yatra dravye svatvam tatra 
nlridho daya-sab hah, ‘the word daya Is used In a specialised sense In respect 
of property In which property arises upon the cessation of the previous owner‘s 
ownership, Property ttseIf dependent upon a relationship with that owner4, 
Da.bha.1.3. Such a theory Is not unknown. It Is consistent with the maxim 
of English law: nemo est haeres vlventls, but Is widely different from the 
Mltaks#ara concept of ownership, H . Cowell, The Hindu Law, TLL, 1870, 8
(Calcutta, 1870), 94. Vljnanesvara: yad dhanam svaml-sambandhad eva 
nlmlttad anyasya svam bhavatl tad ucyate, ‘ i t  Is called daya when It Is pro­
perty which becomes the sva of another merely by reason of relationship with 
the Owner4, M lta . )prooem to Y a p . 11.114, Dh.K.1132a. An explicit 
definition of the Mltaksara school: plta-putra-samudaya-dravyam. 
vtbhagarham pltr-dravyam, ‘a thing common to father and son; a thing 
belonging to the father which Is f i t  for partition, Sarasvatl-vllasa,
Foulkes, ed ., W  5, 8. For an exhaustive discussion on daya, Derrett, 
Ib id ., 53ff; also, Sonthelmer, The Concept of Daya, o p .c lt., passim.
2* Tr. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, I, 88.
There are evidences In the Satapatha-brahmana that a father used to 
lead a retired life In his old age, leaving the management of property to his 
sons, and presumably he may have done so after dividing the property among 
his sons.^ "Whence In early life the sons subsist on (the resources of) their
2
father . . .  whence In later life the father subsists on (the resources of) hts sons” .
The above texts Indicate that a father was not always, not exclusively,
the absolute master of the family property. Moreover, I f  we accept Kane4s 
3  _
Interpretation of the Nabhanedlstha legend, we find that the w ill of the 
father was not always the ultimate determining factor In a partition during the 
father4s lifetime.
However, on the other extreme, we have the legend of Sunajpsepa,
4
who was sold by his father. We come to know from the legend that
Vlsvamltra adopted Sunahsepa and, using his patriarchal authority, deprived
5
his natural sons of their right of primogeniture.
1. Sat.B r.X II.2 .3 .4 , Kane, HD, III, 565. tasmat purva vayase putrah pltaram 
upa-jlvantl f  tasmad uttara-vayase putran pltopa-jlvatl f f  Gopatha Brahmana
IV .17 Is Identical with slight variation; In line one Go.Br. reads purve In 
place of purva. In line two uttame In place of uttara, D h.K . 1163a. This 
Idea of father*s retirement and living under sons4 dominion or to become a 
sannyasln Is also found In KausltaklBr. Upanlsad, see Kane, HD, III, 565.
2. Tr. Eggellng, SBE, XLIV, 157.
3. Kane, HD, III, 565.
4 . A t.B r. X X X III. I f f .  Kane, HD,‘“563; Llngat, CLI, 9.
5. A1 .Br. VII .3 .17. vlsvamltrah putranamamtrayamasa madhuchandah sfnotana 
rsabho renurastakah ye keca bhratarah stha nasmat jyesthayaya kalpadhvam It! /
VisvamTtrq then addressed his sons as 
follows: ” Hear ye now, Madhuchhand- 
ah, RTshabha, Renu, Ashtaka, and a ll 
ye brothers, do not think yourselves (en­
titled to the right of primogeniture , (1) 
whTch Ts hTs (Sunahsepa^s)11. (2)
3
The texts discussed Tn thTs section should be interpreted with caution.
They do not lay down any rule of law as such, but they relate to certatn customs
prevalent Tn those days whTch can be deduced from them. Moreover, we should
not lose sTght of the fact that the storTes o f NabhanedTsthaand of Sunahsepa are 
4
prTmarTly legends. Thus, on the jurTdTcal sTgnTfTcance of these legends, 
Robert LTngat remarks:
1. The award of the preferentTal share (jyestaipsa or uddhara) to the eldest son 
(or brother) Ts a usage closely connected with prTmogenTture under whTch the 
eldest son Ts the sole heTr subject to the maTntenance of hTs younger brother. 
Traces of both are found Tn the Vedas, Rg-veda, IV .17.11, tr. GrTffTth, 
(Benares, 1890), II, 120; PancavTmsa Brahmana, XV1.4, 3 -4 . tr. W.
Caland, (Calcutta, 1931), 431. Apastamba (11.6.14.6, 10-12) enjoTns 
equal dTvTsTon among sons and disapproves gTvTng a major part of the estate 
to the eldest alone, Kane, HD, III, 566. Preferential share to the eldest 
son Ts Included Tn the text on KaTlvarjya, Kane, HD, III, 926.
2. Tr. Haug, The Altareya Brahman am, II, 469.
3. Kane, HD, III, 564.
4 . Kane, HD, III, 564. According to Haug, Nabhanedlstha had no real exist­
ence. He Ts symbolic. HTs assistance Ts required when the sacrificial priests
are producing the new celestial body o f the sacrlflcer. In a mystical sense
he Is the guardian of a ll seeds. He looks down from heaven at his relative,
that Is, the seeds containing the germ of new life are poured out mystically
by the Hotrs In their prayers, Altareya Brahmanam, I, 27.
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In effect the dharma whTch Ts expressed Tn 
that part of RevelatTon whTch has reached 
us has, by reason of Tts orTgTn, an absolute 
an unquestTonable authority. But Tt was 
necessary that any passage Tn the VedTc 
texts whTch was actually Tnvoked should 
really amount to a rule of conduct, that 
Ts to say, Tt should be an TnjunctTon (vTdhT).
If Tt merely reported a fact, no rule of an 
TmperatTve character could be derTved from 
Tt; Tt was a sTmple arthavada. For example,
Tt Ts saTd Tn the Yajurveda (TaTttTrfya-samhTia,
III .1 .9.4) that Manu dTvTded hTs goods amongst 
hTs ten chTldren. Is thTs only a story, suggest- 
Tng no oblTgatTon upon fathers of famTlTes to 
follow Manu*s example? Or Ts Tt a practTce 
TnspTred Tn Manu by a consTderatTon of the 
spTrTtual benefits whTch Tt mTght procure 
and whTch ought, thereafter, to be converted 
Tnto a rule by any person concerned for hts 
salvatTon? Upon the answer to thTs ques- 
tTon depends the value of any VedTc text 
whTch Ts Tnvoked as a source of dharma.
In the same way the story of Rjrasva Tn the 
Rgveda, (1) the story of f  unahsepa (who 
was sold by hTs father) Tn the ATtareya- 
brahmana, and that of NacTketas (who was 
offered by hTs father to Yama) Tn the Katha- 
upanTsad, raTse the problem of the iTmTts of 
paternal authorTty. (2)
It may be assumed from these texts that the customs o f some unknown
part of the country were Tnterwoven Tnto the texture of the story and the smftT-
3karas took notTce of these customs Tn theTr works. The texts reflect a
1. In Rg-veda, I, 117,17, Tt Ts stated that the eyes of the Rjrasva were put 
out by hTs father because the former gave a hundred rams to a she-wolf. 
Kane opTnes that the verse mTght have some esoterTc meanTng or mTght refer 
to some celestTa! phenomenon, HD, 111, 564.
2 . LTngat, tr. Derrett, The ClassTcal Law of IndTa, op.cTt., 8-9.
3 . See Ap.dh.sG.2.14.10, Dh.K.1166a.
civilization  ^ in which sophisticated concepts of proprietary rights were yet to
2develop; and in a pastoral and agricultural society physical fitness was in­
deed a determining factor in qualifying for the management of the family pro­
perty. And that is why the father in his old age had to lead a retiring life in
3
a son's house as revealed in the texts.
It is significant to note that, in the Sunahsepah legend, Vlsvamitra's
patriarchal power did not go unchallenged. The fifty  sons who were older than
Madhucchanda challenged his decision and Visvamitra had to suppress them by
using his spiritual power of cursing. Similarly, in the Nabhanedistha legend,
although the old father could not redress the grievances of his youngest son by
4
giving him a share of the estate, he had to find out a spiritual device through
1. The stage the civilization had reached could be inferred from the Sunahsepa 
legend which shows that sons_could be sold. A father might have had this 
powerjn the hoary past but Apastamba held that there could be no gift of a 
son, Ap.dh.su. 11.6.J3, jo-12. The controversy over father's power is de­
picted by Yaksa: strinam dana-vikrayatisarga vidyante na pumsah/ pumso'- 
p if>eke saunahsepe darsanat/  Nirukta, 111,4. But Vasistha opines that sale 
of sons are mentioned in the Vedas, Vasistha, dh.su,XVII .31-32, SBE, X IV ,87. 
Sunahsepa legend also points to the prevalance of human sacrifice in the society, 
though condemned in the legend. Keith does not agree that the legend stands 
for any actual human sacrifice, A .B . Keith, The Religion and Phtlospphy of the 
Veda and Upanishads, (H .U.P. Cambridge, Mass .if 1925), H .O .S . 32, 348.
For an interesting study,see J .L . Sauve", The Divine V ictim : Aspects of Human 
Sacrifice in Viking Scandinavia and Vedic India*, in J. Puhvel, ed ., Myth and 
Law among the Indo-Europeans: Studies of Indo-European Comparative Mytho­
logy, (Berkeley, 1970), 173—91.
2. The VaTkhanasa-dharma-pra^na mentions of four kinds of householders: (i) 
yartavrtti ('subsisting on agriculture*),(ii) satfna, ( iii)  yayavara, (iv) ghora- 
carika; which shows that the civilization did not consist of organised settled 
population, Kane, HD , I, 1, (Poona, 1968), 258.
3. Sat .Br .XII .2 .3 .4 , G o .B r.IV .17; Kau.Up.ll .15.
4 . Manu advised Nabhanedistha to help the Arigirasah, who were performing the 
sattra sacrifice by reciting two hymns on the sixth day of the sacrifice, M . Haug, 
The Aitareya Brahamanam of the Rigveda, (Bombay, 1863), I, in tro d .,2 7 ;ll,34 l-2 .
379.
whTch the youngest son recetved a thousand cows or other valuables.
In short, these legends may be taken as records of two norms, namely 
the patriarchal power of a father and a son‘s emerging self-assertion, which may 
have co-existed In comparatively early society of India.
c . Partition during the lifetime of the father and his power to regulate the 
quantum of the sons* share
Earlier In our discussion,  ^ we have seen that, according to most of the 
dharmasastras, when the father was unwilling the sons could not demand a parti­
tion of the family estate during the lifetime of the father. Our next feiqulry Is 
as to the extent of a fathers power of regulating the quantum of share when he 
Ts dividing the property amongst his sons. The purpose of this Investigation Is 
to gauge how far a father could act arbitrarily while dividing the estate amongst 
his sons, and thereby to assess the relative rights of father and son Tn the family 
property.
In the Vedlc passages, there are evidences of unequal distribution of
wealth amongst sons by the father, and also of his nominating any one son to
2
succeed him at his pleasure. The custom of primogeniture Is also acknowledged
1. Supra, 365- 7.
2. Rg-Veda, IV. 17.1: Indira Ts acknowledged as the first-born and the leader and 
gods admitted his right of primogeniture, G riffith , II, 120. A ll his relations 
agree as (to his right) to the leadership, A l.B r.IV .25 ; Haug, 1,103; II, 304. 
Sat.B r.V .IV .2 .8 ; SBE, XLI, 97: *And to him who Is his (the KTng‘s) dearest 
son, he hands that vessel, thinking ‘May this son of mine perpetuate this 
vigour of mine” *. Pancavlmsa Brahmana, X V .4.4 : Therefore, they took upon 
those of the sons, who enters upon a (father‘s) biggest Inheritance, as upon one 
who w ill have success In the world*, tr. W. Caland, (Calcutta, 193J)/ 431, 
for the text with Sayana's comment, see Taptjyamahabrahmana or Pancavlmsa
/Continued on next page:
Tn the Vedas.^ However, these texts were not universally accepted as the
established norm and they do not seem to confer on the father any arbitrary
power of division. They represent only flexible principles to suit the special
2
needs of the Individual son by authorising the father to pursue his Inclination.
Although Apastamba was aware of the practice of a llotting a prefer­
ential share to the eldest son, he advocated equal division of wealth amongst a ll 
the sons. He opined that giving a major part of the estate to the eldest alone
/ -  3was against the correct Interpretation of the sastra.
That (preference of the eldest son) Is 
forbidden by the sastras. For It Is de­
clared In the Veda, without (making) 
a difference (In the treatment of the 
sons): Manu divided his wealth amongst 
his sons. 4
Note 2 -  p .279 -  Continued:
Brahmana belonging to the Sama Veda, (Chowkhamba, Benares, 1936), II, 221. 
T a l.S am .lll. l .9 .4 . also speaks of the eldest son being established with ancestral 
wealth, Kane, H D ,III, 565-6. A  father could take Into consideration the Indl 
vldual needs and loyalty of his sons: T a l.B r.2 .3 .11.4. susrusuh putranam 
hrdayatamah; Ja l.B r.2 .18.3 . yas tvava putranam krpanatamo (poorest) bhavatl, 
sa pltur hi’dayam apyetl, ed. R. Vlra and L. Chandra, (Nagpur, 1954), 239. 
Texts Indicating only the eldest son as the heir, Gautama, XXVIII, 3; 
Apastamba, 11.6.1.4.6; Manu, IX .105-10; Mahabharata, Anusasana Parva, 
105.17; Narada, X II I .5. For a discussion, Kane, HD, III, 566.
1. Ap.dh.su .11.6.14.6 and 10-12, Kane, HD, III, 566. N .C . Sengupta, Evo- 
lutlon of Ancient Indian Law, TLL, 1950, (Calcutta, 1953), 174.
2. See supra, 379, n .2.
3 . Ap.dh.su.I I .6.14.10-11, Dh.K.1166a, Kane, HD, III, 566. jyestho dayada 
Ityeke /  . . .  tacchastralr vlprtitlslddham /  Manuh putrebhyo dayam vyabhajad 
Tty avlsesena sruyate /
4. Tr. BOhler, SBE, II, 134.
With thTs srutl  ^ text, Apastamba refutes the advocates of unequal d lv l-
sTon but at the same time, he accepts the Importance and place of honour of the
eldest son. However, the rsT does not recommend a definite share but ordains* 4
the g ift of a valuable article to the eldest before dividing the property equally 
2
amonst a ll the sons. "After having gladdened the eldest son by some (choice
portion of his) wealth, . . .  he should, during his lifetime, divide his wealth equally
3amongst his sons, . . . ”
By advocating equal shares for a ll the sons, perhaps Apastamba was
4
taking the stand of a purist and TdealTsti Although his view goes a long way 
to prove the existence of the sons* Inherent right In the family property, he Ignored 
the fact that varied customs Tn different parts of the country could hardly be
5
squeezed Into a single rigid system of partition. And In this respect Gautama 
shows more fle x ib ility  than Apastamba.
Goutama does not enunciate a definite principle regarding the quantum 
of share In a partition. He gives four alternatives to the sharers to decide In
1. T a l.S a m .lll. l.9.4; Dh.K.1161a.
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2. Ap.dh.su.II. 13.13 and 11.14.1, Dh.K.1164a. eka-dhanena jyes^ham tosayltva/ 
jlvan putrebhyo dayam vlbhajet samam . . .  /
3 . Tr. BOhler, SBE, II, 132.
4 . Kane, HD, III, 566.
5. Katyayana quoted by VIvada-ratnakara, 505, and Arthasastra , I I I .7 . declare
that customs of countries, castes, villages and groups,varying rules of partition
should be enforced by the King, Kane, HD, III, 566. Also N .C . Sengupta,
Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, o p .c lt., 175.
what ways they could divide the property. First, the eldest son may take the
whole estate and can support hts younger brothers as their father J  The
second alternative ordains allotment of an additional share to a ll the brothers
2with the residue being divided equally amongst them. According to Gautama*s
3
third alternative, the eldest could have two shares and the rest, one each. If
the sons opted for the fourth alternative, Instead of taking a share from the whole
property, each of them could take only one kind of property In satisfaction of his 
4
share. Yet, In essence, Gautama does not deny the principle of equal d lv l-  
5
slon among the sons. "A ll the remaining (property shall be divided) equally. 
Or let the eldest have two shares, and the rest one each"
Baudhayana ordains without any ambiguity that the father should divide 
the property equally amongst his sons. In the light of the text In the Tatttlrlya- 
samhlta (111 .1 .9 .4 ), Baudhayana declares: ^  "(A father may, therefore, divide
g
his property) equally among a ll,  without (making any) difference".
1. Gautama, XXV111.3.
2. Gautama, X X V III.8.
3. Gautama, X X V III.9 . Dh.K.1182br
4 . Gautama, XXV1II.11, Dh.K.1182b.
5. Gautama, X X V III,8-10, Dh.K.1182b. samadhetarat sarvam / 8 /  dvyamst va 
purva jah s y a t/9 / ekalkam Itaresam/10/
6. Tr. BOhler, SBE, II, 300.
7. Baudhayana dh .su. 11.2 .2 .3 , Dh.K.1146b. samoVnsah saiyesam avlsesat/
8. Tr.BiJhler, SBE, X IV , 224. However, Baudhayana allows preferential share 
(uddhara) of one-tenth to the eldest, Bau,II .2 .6 -7 , Dh.K.1146b; N .C . Sen­
gupta, Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, o p .c lt., 174.
Kauttlya, tn his Arthasasfra, recommends that the father should dtvtde
the property equally among hts sons and should not exclude any one from tnhert-
tance without sufftctent ground.^ "In the case of partition durtng hts lifetime,
the father shall not show spectal favour to any one. And he shall not, without
2
ground, exclude any one from Inheritance".
However, tt should be mentioned that Kauttlya's sources are unknown; 
but probably, the rule stated tn the text represents customary norms whtch, owtng 
to thetr practtcabtltty and wtde acceptance, were approved by htm.
But some smrttkaras seek to gtve the father an unfettered power to dts-
trtbute property tn whatever way he ltkes. Thus Narada declares: "When a
4
father has dtstrtbuted hts property amongst hts sons, that ts a lawful dtstrtbutton
for them (and cannot be annulled), whether the share of one be less, or greater
5 6than, or equal to the shares of the rest; for the father ts the lord of a ll" .
1. Arthasastra, I I I .5,16 and 17; ed., Kangle, 1,104. jtvad-vtbhage ptta natkam 
vtsesayet /1 6 /  na catkam akaranan ntrvtbhajeta/17/
2. Tr. Karigle, II, 242.
3. Narada, X III. 15, Dh.K . 1172a. pttratva tu vtbhakta ye samanyunadhtkatr 
dhanatl? /  tesam sa eva dharmah syat sarvasya ht ptta prabhuh / f  vartant readtng, 
samanyunadhtkatr = htnadhtka-samatr; dharmah = dharmyah, Dh. K . 1172a, n . 1.
4 . Jolly's rendertng of. tesam sa eva dharmal^ syat as 'that ts a lawful dtstrtbutton 
for them* does not brtng out tn sastrtc context its real tmpltcatton. A better 
rendertng ts: ‘that ts righteousness Itself for them'. The meaning of the vartant 
dharmyah ts: 'consistent with dharma (righteousness), suggested by Derrett tn the 
margin of my first draft.
5. r prabhu ts a word of wtde meaning, Implying rather Independence of power than
to ta lity of ownership} Derrett on the margin of my first draft.
6 . Tr. Jo lly , SBE, X X III, 192.
BrhaspatT has also a text to the same effect with the addition that Tf
the sons do not accept the unequal division, they w ill be punTshed  ^ (with ex- 
2
communTeatlon). ’’Those (sons) for whom their shares have been arranged by
the father, whether equal, less, or greater, must be compelled to abTde by such 
arrangement. OtherwTse (Tf they try to alter the arrangement), they shall be 
punished”
Yajnavalkya also ordatns that Tf the father acts righteously, an unequal
4
distribution of his estate to his sons should be considered va lid . "A  partition
made by the father among sons separated with greater or smaller shares, I f  just 
5
Is pronounced valid” .
To a hasty reader unfamiliar with the total complex of norms stated 
In our texts, the last three texts might seem to deny the existence of co-owner- 
shlp o f sons with their father In family property. But In a study of the dharma- 
sastras, one must try to understand the ancients on their own ground.
The texts are far from conveying the Idea that a father could arbitrarily 
or whimsically distribute his property among his sons, if n this respect, It Is In­
deed clear that a father had to act as a righteous person and this Is Indeed Implied
1. B r.XXV.4, D h.K . 1173a. samanyunadhlka bhagah pltra yesam prakalp ltah/ 
tathaiva te palanlya vlneyas te syur anyatha / /
2. Variant reading: patltah syur anyatha, D h.K . 1173a, n . l .
3. Tr. Jo lly, SBE, XXXIII, 370.
4 . Ya|n. II.116b, Dh.K.1169b. nyunadhlka-vlbhaktanam dharmyah pltr-krtah
smrtah /• • '
5. Tr. Colebrooke, MIta, 1,11.13.
by the use of the word dharm^yah (conststent with righteousness*) by Narada ^
2and Yajnavalkya. Nor do these texts, by implying unequal division by the
father, erode Tn any way the co-ownership of sons wtth their father as ordained
3 -  4Tn some texts. Thus, when Narada says: sarvasya hi pita prabhuh, -  Tt does
not mean that the father Ts the exclusive owner of the entire property; by the 
word prabhu, the sage merely emphasises that as grhapatl the father has Inde­
pendence of power over the whole family property. Therefore, these last 
three texts only uphold a fathers power of adjustment In a partition, consider­
ing the needs of particular sons; and It Is most unlikely that Tn ancient Hindu 
society, a son would challenge a righteous action of his father.
V . Vanaprasthya (father's retirement Into the forest) and the respective rights 
In property between father and son
a . Introduction
The structure of ancient Hindu society was the combination of a nomi­
nal vertical stratification of the population Into varnas and an equally nominal
5horizontal division of the male Individual's span of life Into as'ramas. The
1. Naradaf  X III. 15, Dh.K . 1172a.
2. Y a jn . II.116b, Dh.K.1169b.
3. Y a irT .ll. l2 l, D h .K .l 175b; Br.XXVI. 10, Dh.K.1180b; B r.X X V I.l4 , Dh.K. 
1179b; also Narada (manl-mukta . . . ) ,  D h .K .l2 l9 b .
4 . Narada, X I I I .15, Dh.K.1172a.
5. asrama signifies a ‘stage1 In the progress through life of the twice-born Hindu. 
Literally, aifama means *a stopping or halting place*, K .V .R . Alyangar, Aspects 
of the Social and Political System of Manusmftl, (Lucknow, 1949), 137.
386.
The general Fact Ts certain enough, though there are disagreements, that the 
asrama scheme of life was divided Tnto four stages J
Our enqutry Ts conftned to the effect of thTs asrama scheme on the 
respective rights Tn property between father and son, especially at father's 
retirement to the forest as a hermit.
b. Traces of the Order
2In early texts vanaprastha Ts synonymous with valkhanasa and It Ts
1. K. MotwanT, Manu Dharma Sastra (Madras, 1958), 58-60. Veda MTtra's 
division of each stage Into 25 years Ts a rtific ia l and not supported by texts,
India of Dharma Sutras, (New Delhi, 1969), 6. There were prolonged 
studentship, Bau.dh.su. 1-2,1-5, SBE, X IV , 149; Gautama, II, 45-7; SBE,
II, 189; Apastamba, 1.1.2.11-16, SBE, 11,7; Manu, 111,1, SBE, X X V ,74; 
Y a jn .|.36 , MandlTk, ed ., (Bombay, 1880), 164-5; also Jha, Manu I I I . 1, 
Comparative, (Calcutta, 1929), 160. See Manu V I.2; Kane, H D ,III, 198.
On the theory of the four stages of life , R. LIngat, tr. Derrett, The Classical 
Law of India, (Berkeley, 1973), 45 ff .
2 . Valkhanasagrhyasutram, IX. 1, W . Caland, ed ., (Calcutta, 1927), 122: 
grhasthah soma-yajl putram pautram ca drstva tat-putradln grhe samsthapya 
maundyarp krtva prajapatyam krcchram c a re t/ *When a householder who has 
performed the sacrifice of soma, beholds his son and his son's son, he should 
establish his son, son's son and so on (after having made them marry) Tn his 
house, he should shave his hair off (except his top-lock and his eye-brows), 
perform the prajdpatya-krcchra penance and go forth*, tr . Caland, (Calcutta, 
1929), 197^ Valkhanasa Ts the name of a mythical group of  rsls, Vedlc Index,
II, 327. Traces In the Rg-veda, as a race of saintly hermits sprung from the 
nails of PrajapatT, G riffith , II, 318; also Ta l.A .1 .23 connects the valkhanasa 
with the nails of PrajapatT: ye nakhas-te valkhanasah. The Mahabharata ex­
plains valkhanasas as preachers against the acquisition of material wealth, 
Santlparva, 20.6-7, (Poona, ed ., 1949), X II I ,76,. For their classification, 
Bau.dh.su. 111.3, SBE, X IV , 291-4. Kalidasa's Sakunta lam, 1.26: valkhanasam 
kirn anaya . . . ,  HOS,XVI, (H .U .P ., 1922), 13. MallTnatha Tn his commentary 
explains that valkhanasa and vanaprastha are the same, (Calcutta, 1860), 23.
Also on this, see Kane, HD, I, 1, (Poona, 1968), 257-60. W. Caland, Valkhan- 
asasmartasutram, (Calcutta, 1929), Introd., ? 6, P .xvl. K. Rangacharl, 
Valkhanasa Dharma Sutra, (Madras, 1930), 15.
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evident that the four orders of life were notorious at the time of Gautama. ^
"(The four orders are, that of) the student, (that of) the house holder, (that of)
2the ascetic (bhlkshu), (and that of) the hermit tn the woods (vaTkhanasa).
Baudhayana explains that a vanaprastha Ts he who follows the duttes 
3
expounded by VTkhanas. "A  hermit Ts he who regulates hTs conduct entTrely
4
accordTng to the TnstTtutes proclaTmed by VTkhanas".
5
Gautama and Apastamba place vanaprasthya as the fourth asrama 
Tn order of sequence, but Marudeclares vanaprasthya as the thTrd stage of Itfe, 
the one TmmedTately after the stage of householder.^ "The student, the house-
1. Gautama, dh .su .lll .2. brahmacarT grhastho bhTksur vaTkhanasah /
2. Tr.BUhler, SBE, II, 190.
3 . Bau.dh.su.I I .6.11.14. vanaprastho va Tkhanasa-sastra-samudacarah /
4 . Tr. BOhler, SBE, X IV , 259. But Baudhayana also states that orTgTnally there 
was only the order of the householder and the other orders were created by the 
demon (daTtya) KapTla (dTfferent from the one Tn the Svetasvatara UpanTsad,
V .2 , VedTc Index, I, 136) to weaken the gods, Bau.dh.su. 11.2.28, SBE, XIV,
345, Tndex to V o l.X IV . The legend Ts expanded by K.V.R. ATyangar, Some 
Asppcts of the HTndu VTew of LTfe AccordTng to Dharmasastra, (Baroda, 1952),
153; Aspects of the Social and Political System of ManusmrtT, (Lucknow, 1949), 137.
5. Gautama, dh.su.3.2, SBE, 2, 190and n.2; Apastamba, 2 .9 .21 .1 , SBE 2,151, 
but see Apastamba, 2 .9.24.15, SBE 2, 159, where he Ts not rigid Tn placing one 
order before the other, though he Ts apparently against pure asceticism, Ibid, n.15.
6. Manu,VI .87. brahmacarT grhasthas ca vanaprastho ktha bhlksufcah /  ete grhastha- 
prabhavas catvarah prthag asramah//This Ts the majority view, Vastetha, V II,
1-2; also Manu, 11*1,77, SBE, X X V ,85. Bau.dh.su, 2 .6 .17 . Support In the srutl 
Jabalopanlsad, 4: brahmacaryam parl-samapya grhf bhavet, grhl bhutva vanlbhavet, 
vanl bhutva p ravra je t/ For tr . S. RadhaxrTshnan, Principal UpanTsads, (London, 
1953), 896. These four stages are also seen Tn the epics and classical sanskrlt 
literature, Ramayana, 11.106-21-2; 11.2.9-10; V . 13.38; I I I .9.23; I I I .9.27, see 
N . Vyas, India In the Ramayana Age, (Delhi, 1967), 70-1. The Mahabharata , 
Sontlparva, 245.1-14, Kalidasa, Raghuvamsam, 1.8, (Bombay, Iv4b},5. Mentions 
of these orders by Kalidasa may be a social norm of the day, B.S. Upadhyay,
India In Kalidasa, (Allahabad, 1947), 174.
holder, the forest-hermTt, and then the renunctate -  a ll these four distinct stages 
of Itfe spring from the householder".^
c. TTme of entry Tnto the ofder of Vanaprasthya
AccordTng to Manu and Yajnavalkya, entry Tnto the order of forest-
2hermit Ts allowed only after the person has served the world as a householder.
When one has patd accordTng to the law, 
hts debts to the great sages, to the manes, 
and to the gods, let hTm make over every-  
thTng to hTs son and dwell (Tn hTs house), 
not carTngfor any worldly concern. 4
d . SuperTorTty of the order of householder
By passTng the order of householder and avoTdTng the responsTbTlTtTes
of worldly iTfe have also been dTscouraged Tn the srutTs. We fTnd thTs passage
5Tn the ATtareya-brahamana:
1. Tr. Derrett, BharvcT, II, 28.
2. Y a jn . l l l .45. Vanaprasthya was not meant for sudra, Tt was only for the 
three hTgher classes, Manu, V I, I, SBE, XXV, 198.
3. Manu, IV, 257. maharsT-pTtr-devanam^gatva-Wnyam yatha vTdhT/ putre 
sarvam samasajya vasen madhyasthyam asrTtah / /
4 . Tr. Bi/hler, SBE, XXV, 169, also cp. Manu, V I, 34, SBE, XXV, 205. 
The sloka Ts very sTgnTfTcant from the poTnt o f vTew of vyavahara.
5. AT.Br. V II .3.13, Haug, ed ., (Bombay, 1863), \, 178. kTnnu malam kTm 
ajTnaijiklrou smasrunT kTm tapah; putram brahmana Tcchadhvam sa vaT loko
’vadavadah /• ■
What Ts the use of ItvTng unwashed, 
weartng the goGt skin, and beard?
What Ts the use of performTng auster- 
TtTes? You should wjsh for a son,
O Brahmans. Thus people talk of 
them. 1
But accordTng to some texts, a person Ts permTtted to enter the order 
of sannyasa (the fourth stage) even Tn chTldhood or TmmedTately after finishing 
his studTes of the Vedas.
2A text Tn the Jabalopanlsad runs as follows:
OtherwTse(Tf a suitable occasTon 
arTses ) let one reoounce even from 
the state of a student or from the 
state of a householder or from that 
of a forest hermit. 3
4
Gautama took cognizance of these texts, but like ■ Manu,
5
he also emphasised the Importance of the order of householder.
1. Tr. Haug, AT.Br. II, 461. On the superiority of the householder, see 
Brhadaranyakopanlsad, I,Tv, 16.
2. JabalopanTsad, 4 . Yadl vetaratha brahmacaryadeva pravrajet, grhad va
van<3d va /
3. Tr. RadhaKrlshnan, Principal Upanlsads, o p .c lt., 896.
4 . Gautama, III, 1, (Mysore, 1917), 58, SBE, II, 190. Also Vaslstha, V II .3, 
SBE, X IV , 40.
5. Gautama, I I I .3. (Mysore, 1917), 63, SBE, 11.190. Manu, V I .87.
The controversy was further continued by the vedantlns,  ^ and the 
-  -  2mlmamsakas through the Interpretations of sruft texts. The most controversial
3among these texts was one from the Chandogyopanlsad:
There are three branches of duty, sacri­
fice, study of the Vedas, alms-giving -  
that Is the first. Austerity (4), Indeed,
Is the second. A  student of sacred know­
ledge (brahmacarln) (5) dwelling In the 
house of a teacher, settling himself perma­
nently In the house of a teacher, Is the 
third. A ll these become possessors of 
meritorious worlds. He who stands firm 
In Brahma attains Immortality. (6)
1 • Vedanta Is one of the six orthodox systems of Hindu Philosophy, founded on 
the Upan!§ads. Literally means, ‘acme of the Vedas*, Benjamin Walker,
Hindu World, (London, 1968), II, 559-60; also Encyclopaedia Brltannlca,
(London, 1970), X X II, 929.
2. School of Hindu Philosophy, founded by Jalmlnl, Hindu World, Ib id ., II, 70-1.
3. C h .tJ .2 .23 .1, Eighteen Principal Upanlsads, (Poona, 1958), I, 93. trayo 
dharma skandhah f  yajno'dhyanam danamltl prathamah /  tapa eva dvltlyah /  
brahmacary acarya-kula-vast trtlyo 'tyantam atmanam acarya-kule 'vasadayan/ 
sarva ete punya-loka bhavantl /  brahma-samstho Wtatvametl f f , / f
4. Self-mortlflcatlon practised by householders during the third stage of life , Swaml 
Nlkhllananda, The Upanlsads, (London, 1959), IV. 179.
5. Celibate student who dwells In the teacher's house studying the Vedas and prac­
tising continence and other spiritual disciplines. Two types: (I) upakurvana, who 
leaves the teacher's house after the completion of his studies and becomes a house­
holder; (11) nalstlka,who dwells in the teacher's house t i l l  death, Ib id ., 179.
6. Tr. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanlsads, (London, 1931), 200.
The text, by three divisions of dharma, described the four stages of 
life . The first division refers to the order of householder which Is the second 
stage. The second division signifies the third stage, the stage of the forest -  
hermit and the third and the last division signify respectively, the stage of 
brahmacarln and sannyasa. ^
To some the goal of life Is svarga (heaven) which Is connected
with the fulfilment of sakama wishes; to others, the goal Is moksa which Is void
of any desire or reward. To Hindus, both paths are open, and both are recog-
2nlsed and sanctioned In the sastra.
For both vedantln and mlmamsaka, the ultimate goal of life Is moksa
(salvation), but they differ only with regard to the means of achieving It . The
vedantlns take the view that without taking recourse to the order of householder,
one Is allowed by srutl and smrtl to belong to the other three asramas, because 
-  3atma-vldya (true knowledge) which leads to salvation Is Independent of action 
(karma) ^
1. Radhaxrlshnan, Principal Upanlsads, (London, 1953), 374.
2. Derrett, *The Basic Presuppositions of the Dharmasastra and their Relation to 
Hindu Society1, History of Indian Law, (Leiden, 1973), 18. Also these two 
paths of pravrttl and n lvrttl Is explained by Derrett, RLSI, 68-72, 69-70, n .2 . 
Also W . Caland, Valkhffnasasmartasutra, V III, 9b, text (Calcutta, 1927), 118, 
tr . (Calcutta, 1929), 192-3. Manu, X II, 88, Derrett, Bharucl, I, 283.
3. B. Walker, H|ndu World, (London, 1968), I, 55.
4 . On sacrifices and duties of the householder, see P. Deussen, The System of 
the Vedanta, tr. C . Johnston, (Chicago, 1912), 361-2.
r* IThe Vedanta says: 11 And (knowledge belongs) to those who observe
chastity ( I.e . to sannyaslns) because (this fourth stage of life Is mentioned) In the 
2
scripture11.
3
AccordTng to JalmT^ nt , those £rutl passages contain no Injunction,
4
but only a reference and mere glorification of asramas other than those of a 
5householder. ” JaImTnT (thinks that the passages mentioned In the previous
sutra contain) a reference (only to sannyasa) and not Injunction, for (other 
6 7
texts) condemn (sannyasa)” .
1. Vedanta Sutra, I I I .4.17, Vedantasara, (Adyar Library, 1953), 345. Urdhva 
retahsu ca sabde hi /
2. Tr. RadhakrTshnan, The Brahma Sutra, (London, 1960), 509.
3. Here Jalmlnl speaks specially of C ha.U .2.23.1 .
4 . On Injunction (vldhl) and explanatory material (arthavada), Derrett, RLSI, 
87-8. Cp. vldhl and ar thavada respectively with mldrash ha labhah (which 
lays down the law) and midrash haggadah (whfch uses the text to Illustrate 
something else), of Rabbinical law, RLSI, 87. V .M . Apte, Brahma Sutra, 
(Bombay, 1960), 737.
5. Br.Su.Ill .4 .18. paramarSam jalmlnlr acodanac capavadatl h i /
6. lsa.U.2; Ta l.U .1 .11.1; Sat.Br.XI1.4 .1 .1 ; Tal.Br .V II. 13.12. C f. action 
lauded, St. James, 11.26, St. Gregory, . on Job, XXXI, 102, but con­
templation as superior to action Tn Luke, X .38-42, Mary being contemplative 
chose the better path than the path of action, see Principal Upanlsads, o p .c lt., 
281.
7. Tr. RadhakrTshnan, The Brahma Sutra, o p .c lt., 510.
Badarayana refbtes the Tnterpretatton of JatmTnT and holds the view
that the three asramas other than that of the householder are also sanctioned by 
2 -  -the Vedas. "Badarayana (thinks that sannyasa or monastic life) Is to be 
accomplished for the text (cited) applies equally (to a ll the four stages of life )11. 
"Or rather (there Ts) an Injunction as Tn the case of the carrying (of the sacrifi­
cial fue l)^".
1. AccordTng to JalmlnT C ha.U .2.23.1, Implies that the order of the house­
holder Ts to be compulsorily performed, the other orders are for those who are 
Incompetent to be a householder^ The order of the householder Ts the vldhl 
(Injunction) as Is the case of upavtta, J a I.S u . lll. IV . l-9 , Sacred Book of the 
Hindus, (Allahabad, 1923), XXVIII, I, 124-6, also Ja l. Su., II I . IV .9 .a .b . 
b .c . ,  TbTd., 139-40, where JalmlnT re-emphasises his view. RadhakrTshnan 
thinks that themfmamsakcs were exaggerating the Importance of the VedTc rites, 
Indian Philosophy, (London, 1928), II, 449. But according to Sankaracharya, 
lsa.U.2 Is applicable only to the ‘Ignorant1, his Introduction to Altareya Upanl- 
sad, The Upanlsads, ed ., NIkhllananda, (London, 1957), 16;^ but see Vachas- 
pat! MTsra‘s Interpretation of Jabala 4, Bhcmatl, (a gloss on Sankara Bhasya),
I . I . l ,  (Benares, 1880), 47-8.
2. B r*S u .Ill.4.19-20. anusteyam badarayanah samya-sVuteh/  vldhlr va dharanavat/
3. Tr. RadhakrTshanan, The Brahma Sutra, o p .c lt., 510. Here Badarayana refutes 
JalmlnT ‘s view on Cha.U.2.23.1, by taking advantage of JaImTnT‘s Interpretation 
of Apastamba Srautra Sutra, IX, 11.8-9. Jalmlnl (sesa-laksana), l l l , IV .9 f ,  
vldhts tu dhcrarje‘purvatvat, The Sacred Book of the HTqdus, ed. B.D. Basu, tr. 
M .L . Sandal, (Allahabad, 1923), XXVIII, I, 140-1. ‘On the other hand, It Ts
a vldhl In holding by reason of Its being new‘ . As the last clause of A.S .Su.IX.
II.8 -9  has been Interpreted by JalmlnT as an Injunction because of Its newness 
(a-purvata), so also C ha.U .2.23.1, Ts an Injunction, see Date, o p .c lt., 511; 
a lsoV .M . Apte, Brahma Sutra, (Bombay, I960), 741-2. Fora discussion on 
Jalmlnl and Badarayana, see Kane, H .D ., (Poona, 1962), V o l.V , II, 1160-72. 
Kcne does not attribute B r.S u .lll.IV .20 to Badarayana, Ib id ., 1168, but his 
reasons for the doubt are not convincing. Sankara‘s view was qualified. He 
did not deny the mandatory nature of the sacrificial Injunctions In the Vedas, 
but he thought those were meant for the ordinary people, but the upanlsads 
were Intended to be followed by the wise, S .N . Pasgupta, A  History of Indian 
Philosophy, (London, 1932), I, 431, a Iso S. RadhakrTshnan , The Vedanta Accord­
ing to Sankara and Ramanuja, (London, 1928), 183.
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These phtlosophtcal controversies were not divorced from society and
life , rather both society and philosophy drew Inspiration from each other. The
jrilmCTnsakas'emphasis on the order of a householder seems to be a natural reaction
against the'Buddhlst philosophy of asceticism. But this Buddhist Impact on
Hinduism should not be overemphasised.^ Right from the srutl period, Hlpdu-
Ism Itself contained a stream of philosophical thought which encouraged escapism
from one's duty to the world. On the other hand, complete renunciation by
2all or an easy sannyasa was never the accepted doctrine of Buddhism.
Though many were avoiding their worldly responsibilities by resorting
3to a monastic life , the Puranlc teachings of superiority of karma-yoga over 
{nan a-yoga were not exclusively designed for the sake of opposition to Buddhism; 
they were a revival and restatement of a philosophy which derived Its authority 
and strength from the Vedas and dharmasastras.
1. As done by Dr. R.C. Hazra, Studies In the Puranlc Records on Hindu Rites 
and Customs, (University of Dacca, 1940), 229.' See K.V.R. Alayangar, 
Rajadharma, (Adyar, 1941), 125-7.
2. Buddha did not advocate the abolition of the order of householder, he ex­
plains the duties of a householder to Dhammlka, The Sutta-Nlpata, Dhammlka 
Sutta, SBE, 10 , 2 (Oxford, 1881), 62-66 at 65 and 66, Sudlnna Kalandaka, 
even after becoming a monk fu lfils his duties towards his parents by procreating 
a son, Vlnaya Pltaka, III, N . Wagle, Society at the Time of the Buddha, 
(Bombay, 1966), 81.
3. Matsya Purana, 52,5b-7a; story of Indradyumma Ip Kurma. ft. 1.1.60-1,
(CaIcutta, 1*890), 9, Kurma, Ri.l .12.249, Ib id ., 136; Agarwala, Matsya 
Purana a Study, (Varanasi, 1963), 170. Mark.Pu.95.19b (CaIcutta, 1862), 
491, tr . Parglter, (Calcutta, 1904), 528.
The Puranas concentrated their teachtngs on the Importance of
vamasrama  ^ by declarTng that people must pass through a ll the stages of life ,
as enjoined by the sastras and of a ll the four orders, the order of the householder,
2(garhasthyasrama) was very much lauded.
The VedTc revival during the Puranlc period turned Hinduism Into a 
dogma of superficial rituals and Sankaracharya, ‘tried to bring back the age
3from the b rillian t luxury of the Puranas to the mystic truth of the Upanlsads*.
Apart from Its temporary setback during the Buddhist period, varnasrama
dharma remained as the potent force In the social scheme of ancient and medleaval
society. There are definite evidences In the Puranas that people resorted to the
4forest during the third stage after the stage of leading the life of a householder.
1. Mark.Pu. Chaps.95f, The story of Prajapatl RucI, the paying of the three debts; 
alsoGaruda Pu. 88-90, (Varanasi, 1968), 243-55; Mark Pu.95, 14b—16 and 
19-20, tr . Parglter, (Calcutta, 1904), 528; also N .Y .D esa l, Ancient Indian 
Society, Religion and Mythology as Depicted In the Markandeya Purana, (Baroda, 
1968), 24. Matsya.R. 141.61-2 (Poona, 1907) 264_, Mat. Pu.22.80, Ib id ., 39; 
VIsnu, [w .lll.8, 9-11, (Gorakhpur, 1952), 228; Kurma. Pu. 1.12 (Calcutta, 
1890), text, 136-7, tr . 249-50.
2. Kur.Pu.1.2.51-2, (Calcutta, 1890), 26; C f. Manu, 9.96, SBE, 25, 344; 
Mark.Pu.71.9-11, (Calcutta, 1862), 383, tr. 430.
3. S. Radhakrlshnan, Indian Philosophy, (London, 1927), 449. For an Illuminating 
discussion on the reform movement of Sankara, see K .V . Subramanya A lyer, 
‘Religious A ctiv ity  In Ancient Dekhan*, In Historical Sketches of Ancient Dekhan, 
(Coimbatore, 1969), III, 31-64 at 49-55. Also A .K . Majumdar, ‘ Impact of 
Samkaracarya on Indian Thought*, VIsvabharatl Quarterly, 37 (1971 —72J 1:1 —51.
4 . Matsya. Pu. 144.23-24, (Calcutta, 1876), 556; Mark.Pu.36.4, (Calcutta, 1862), 
219, tr. Parglter, (Calcutta, 1904), 186, the story of RItadhvaja who departs to 
forest after anointing his son; also Mark.Pu.28.23-7, (Calcutta, 1862), 182, tr. 
Parglter, (Calcutta, 1904), 150.
Sankara*s emphasts on jnana-yoga could not stem the tide of popularity of 
vamasrama; and espectally the order of the householder found shelter in the 
growing materialism In the society and# not to speak of sannyasa, even the
I
vanasprasthya gradually vanished as kall-varjya (deprecated In the Iron 
age of sin).
Apparently, entry Into the order of forest-hermlt was not compulsory.;
In his Introduction to Krtyakalpataru (Moksa kan da), K*V.R. Alyangar says
about vanasprasthya and sannyasa that *belng part of the enjoined order,
2
they must be lived by those who elect them*. Even taking the view that
entry Into the order was voluntary, the reason for Its popularity lies not only
In scriptural Injunction but also In the psychology of an old person, who being
deprived of his physical abilities In a pastoral and agricultural community,
3fe lt redundant and neglected by the younger generation. In such a society, 
the range of vision towards life being very limited, an old person had only two 
alternatives left; either he could stay at home as a retired person, being
1. atha kalau nlslddhanl: mamsa danam tatha sraddhe vana~’prasthasramas tatha, 
Pandit Hrlshlkesa Sastrl, ed ., The VHiannaradlya Purana, (Calcutta, 1891), 
294. Kaslncdha Upadhyaya, Dharmaslndhu, (Varanasi, 1968), 705. Karje,
HD, III, 928, 941. B. Bhattacharya, The Kallvarjyas, (Calcutta, 1943), 
68-74, 167.
2. Krtyakal, 14, Moksakanda, (Baroda, 1945), 24. Manu, 6.36. BUhler trans­
lates mano mokse nlvesayet as *may direct his mind to (the attainment of) final 
liberation*, SBE, 25, 205, Ganganath Jha*s translation, *shall turn his mind 
towards liberation* strikes a mandatory note, Manu Smrtl, (Calcutta, 1922), III, 
I, 220, but see Medhatlthl, Ib id ., 220-222, which puts the weight of evidence 
on Alyangar*s side and proves B0hler*s translation to be correct.
3. Alyangar, Some Aspects of the Hindu View of Life According to Dharmasgstra, 
(Baroda, 1952), 151.
dependent on hts son or he could lead an eremitical Itfe tn the forest J
2
The procedural law reveals a society^ attttude towards elderly people
by disqualifying them to act as wttnesses, ^because of thetr tendency to be un-
2
mindful of the toptcs gtvtng rtse to lawsuits1.
Thts apathy towards the elderly people was nothtng pecultar to the
ancient Hindu society. In many ancient societies, elderly people had little  
‘4 5role to play. There was a proverb tn Rome, *Sexagenartos de ponte*,
]6meaning, *sexagenerlans from the bridge*. The proverb used to be gener­
a lly  Interpreted that once men had reached the ageof sixty, they should be 
thrown In to the Tiber and drowned. ^O vld  thought that the underlying
1. Only a brahmana could take refuge Tn the contiguous wood, not others, 
Arttasastra, 2 .1 .32 .
2. Vyayaharaclntamanl, 283, ed. Rocher, (G ent.,1956), text, 87, tr.25 l; 
Narada, 1.157, 158, also VyavaharanTrnaya, (Adyar Library, 1942), 105, 
$BE , XXXIII, 82. Manu, V II I .65, SBE,*XXV, 265.
3 . V y .C h I.Ib ld ., n . l  at 251. Also Thakur, Hindu Law of Evidence, 73-4.
4 . L.W . Simmons, The Role of the Aged Tn Primitive Society, (New Haven, 
1945), 36-49, 177^
5. Sextl Pompel Festl, ed. W .M . Lindsay (Lipslae, 1913), 450. Herafter cited
as Festus.
6. Publll OvTdIT NasonTs Fastorum Llbrl Sex, tr. Sir James George Frazer, 
(London, 1929), IV, 81. Hereafter cited as Fasti.
7 . The custom developed during the famine, after the capture of Rome by the 
Gauls Tn 390B .C ., Festus, 452, Fasti, 81, n .3 .
meaning of the .proverb did not contain any Idea of drowning the elders but
there was a practice to disfranchise them at the age of sixty. ^  But whatever
may be the InterpretatTon$,they undoubtedly show that old people In ancient
Roman society had to face a similar fate, though In a different form, as their
counterparts In the ancient Hindu world. With many ancient peoples there
were customs either to k ill their elderly folks or sometimes voluntarily aged
2peoples wanted to be killed by their kinsmen. The Massagetae and the 
3
Wends used to k ill their old men and this was deemed to be the happiest of 
a ll deaths.
Among the ErulT, a Teutonic tribe who lived beyond the Ister (modern 
Danube), *as soon as one of them was overtaken by old age or by sickness, It be­
came necessary for him to ask his relatives to remove him from the world as
4 . 5 6quickly as possible*. Similar customs were found In F iji, and In Vate
(or Efat), one of the New Hebrides.
1. For a discussion, L.R. Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies, Jerome Lectures,
8th series, (The University of Michigan, 1966), 92. J .P .V .D . Balsdon,
Life and Leisure In Ancient Rome, (London, 1969), 169.
2. Herodotus, I ,  216, tr. A .D . Godley, (London, 1920), 271.
3 . The Fasti of Ovid, 110, n .2 .
4 . Procopius, De bello Gothlco, (The Gothic War), History of the Wars, Bk.VI, 
14, tr. H.B. Dewing, (London, 1919), text, 402, 404, tr . 403, 405.
5. Charles Wilkes, Voyage Round the World, Narrative of the United States Ex­
ploring Expedition, (Philadelphia, 1849), 396, 397.
6. George Turner,^amoa, (London, 1884), 335.
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Vanaprasthya was a manifestation, Tn a different form, of the same 
psychosis of an old person. His prescribed foods  ^ and his practising of severe
austerities by standing Tn the midst of five fires, his standing In the open In
2 3rains by wearing wet garments In winter, and his great journey (mahaprasthana),
are nothing but a process of gradual physical deterioration, a form of slow suicide
under the veneer of religious penance, sublimating the pains of self-mortlflcatlon
4
In expectation of attaining heaven.
e . Juridical significance 
5Kane studied vanaprasthya only Tn the context of penance. He did 
not apply his mind to find out Its effects on vyavahara. But any study of vyav«- 
hara Is Incomplete without exploring the other departments of the smrtls. In 
traditional Hindu law, legal rules are oriented by the philosophy of relig ion. 
Hinting at this, Derrett has pointed out, ‘ this distinction between pravrttl and 
n lv rttl Is not mere philosophy divorced from law*. ^
1. V lsnu.95.5-6, SBE, 7,278; Manu,6.19-21, SBE, 25, 202; Y5jn.3.50,
Mandllk, 155; Apastamba, 11.9.23.2, SBE, 2,156; Manu, 6 .31 ,SBE,25,
204; also Vlsnu.95.7-12, SBE, 7,278.• •
2. Manu.6.23-24, SBE, 25, 202-1; Yain.3.52; MandlTk, 156; VTsnu, 95.
2 -4 , SBE, 7, 277-8.
3 . Manu.6.31, SBE, 25, £04; Ycijn.3.55, Mandlik, 156, HD, II, 924-7.
4 . Baudhayana, I I I .3.22, SBE, 14, 294, LTngat, CLI, 50.
5 . Kane, HD, II, 2, 917-29.
6 . RLSI, 70.
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Thus, vanaprasthya, though an order for undergoing penance, had 
significant Implications on the mutual property relations between father and 
son. Before betaking to the forest, a father used to surrender a ll his pro­
perties to hts son.^ Manu provides that after the death of their parents,
2
the brothers should dtvtde the paternal estate. Vanaprasthya being a 
symbolic death, the sons were entitled to divide their father's property after 
his departure to the forest; but, In fact, It was a division during the lifetime 
of the father, because he was disinterested In the property. This division by 
sons during the lifetime of father does not depend on any wish of the father 
excepting his decision to enter Into the order of forest-hermlt.
So, when the order of vanaprasthya was In vogue, as soon as the
father resorted or decided to resort to the forest, the sors used to be the owners
of their father's property. Even I f  the father stayed at home at his old age,
he was not In actual control of his property. In pre-llterate societies, even
the most firmly entrenched property rights are d ifficu lt to enforce In the late 
3stages of life . Medhatlthl on Manu IV .257, explains that after making
over everything to his son, 'he (father) shall remain In the house "fixed In 
4
neutrality"' ( I.e . not caring for any worldly concern). It Is clear that at
1. Manu, IV .257.
2. Manu, IX, 104.
3. L.W . Simmons’, ,  The Role of the Aged In Primitive Society, o p .c lt., 177.
4 . Jha, Manu, II, II, 499. Also SBE, XXV, 169, n.257.
this stage, the father lived as a dependant on his son.^ These mutual depend­
encies and realisation of son's right in father's property a t his vanasprasthya may 
be the Inclden ts of a system of common ownership of property between father 
and son
The system becomes highlighted when we compare It with the Roman
system of patrla potestas vls-a-vls father's retirement at old age (otlum). To
3
the Romans, otlum was 'to rest after their labours'. It was an escape from the
strain and bustle of active life  Into the calm o f solitude but did not Imply the
4
existence of an anchorite. Even In his retirement, a Roman father, unlike
5
his Hindu counterpart, remained In control and owned his property, until his 
decease.
1. Sat.Br. 12 .2 .3 .4 . D h.K . 1163a.
2 . Fora comparative view, Llngat, CLI, 50.
3. usurpare otlum post labores, Tacitus, The Annals, 14.55.2, tr . J. Jackson, 
(London, 1937), IV, 194-5.
4 . extol lens laudibus quletem et solltudlnem, 'and to give his eulogies to quiet 
and solitude', Tacitus, The Annals, tr . J . Jackson, III, 74-5. Balsdon,
Life and Leisure In Ancient Rome, (London, 1969), 170. Cp. Greek hyloblos 
Is a literal translation of vanaprasthya, Llngat, CLI, 48 ^  J . Gonda opines 
that the usual Identification between the hyloblos and vanaprasthya *ts In
a ll probability Incorrect', Change and Continuity In Indian Religion, (The 
Hague, 1965), 274.
5 . Tacitus, The Annals, o p .c lt . ,  14, 55 .2 .
f .  Conclusion
When vanaprasthya dfs an order camlfcunder a cloud as kall-varjya,  ^
the presence of the old father at home and his natural reluctance to part with 
his material wealth, and the son's Insistence on realising his share In the pro­
perty through a partition, probably became contributory factors In family
2
quarrels and led to litigation between father and son.
In the meantime, society also became complex. Trades and handi­
crafts flourished and old people by helping their family In different trades and 
crafts , found a role to play Tn the family. They became assets and not just 
liabilities to be maintained.
This change In the social atmosphere probably led to a movement 
amounting to a compromise between father and son regarding their respetrlve 
rights In property. Vanaprasthya being deprecated as kall-varjya , texts like 
Manu, IV .257, became otiose and the father was no longer obliged to make 
over or distribute his property to his sons.
So In a way, vanaprasthya , though basically an order to be practised 
as penance, greatly Influenced the respective rights In property of a father and 
son, and Indirectly consolidated the concept of son's right by birth.
1. See above,^596.
2 . Fining a witness In a litigation between father and son was abolished as 
ka ll-varjya. It means that the society and the King did not discourage 
any more litigation between father and son, Kane, HD, 111, 932; Bhatta 
charya, The KalTvarjyas, (Calcutta, 1943), 103-4.
VL. Acquisition of Ownership of Property Tn the Smrtl Texts
a . Introduction
When we come to discuss VTjnanesvara's theory of property, we
shall see that the learned author consistently emphasised that property (svatva)
Is a matter of popular understanding and, therefore, property can arise by mere
birth. ^  Counter to VTjnane^vara's view Ts the theory that property (svatva)
2Is to be understood from the sastra alone. Since these two theories, namely 
janma-svatvavada and uparama-svatavada, permeate the works of the commen­
tators, It Is worthwhile to see what the sastra says on the modes of acquisition of 
property (svatva).
b. The smrtl literature
It Ts evident from the texts that the smrtlkaras made an attempt to give
a [urlstlc definition of the sources of property, but they were confronted with a
3
society, based on the caste system, where each caste had Its own place In the 
society and members of a particular caste were supposed to pursue their pre­
scribed trade or profession. On the theoretical and Idealistic plane, only a 
a few smrtlkcicas set up some code of conduct for acquisition of property by the
1. Kane, HD, III, 548.
2 . Ib id ., 548. Fora scholarly discussion, Derrett, RLSI, C h.5.
3. Derrett# RLS1, 125.
members o f the four castes (vamas). ^
Gautama's list of the modes of acquisition of svatva Ts well-known.
2
He declares:
An Owner occurs Tn cases of Inheri­
tance, purchase, partition, garnering 
and finding. For the Brahmin acqui­
sition Is an additional mode; for the 
Ksatrlya conquest; for the Valsya and 
the Sudra wages. For the Valsya addi­
tional modes are agriculture, trading^ 
tending cattle, and money lending.
Manu laid down seven 'dharmya' modes of acquisition of property:
Seven acquisitions of wealth are con­
sistent with dharma: daya (acquisition 
of joint family property by membership 
or ancestral property by advancement 
or Inheritance), presents, purchase, 
conquest, lending at Interest, employ­
ment In labour, and acceptance from 
a virtuous person. 5
1. Derrett explains four vamas as four castes. However, he says, *better, per­
haps, "four classes” , RLSI, 125.
2 . Gautama, X .38-42, D h.K . 11229a, 1123a, 1124a. svaml rktha-kraya- 
samvlbhaga-parlgrahadhlgames^ /  brahmanasyadhlkam labdham /  ksatrlyasya 
vljltam /  nlrvTsJtam vals'ya-sudrayoh . . .  /  valsyasyadhlkam krsl-vanlk- 
pasupalya-kusldam /
3 . Tr. Derrett, ZVR 64 (1962), 34, also RLSI, 125-6.
4 . Manu, X.115, Dh.K . 1126b. sapta vlttagama dharmya dayo labhah krayo ja ya h / 
prayogah karma-yogasca sat-pratlgraha eva ca f f
5. Tr. Derrett, ZVR 64 (1962), 34, also RLSI, 126. Sir William Jones, being In­
fluenced by the commentators, has divided the seven modes to different classes 
which Is not found In the text, Manu, o p .c lt., 357. The rendering of  dharmya 
as 'law fu l' by BUhler, SBE, XXV, 426, and by Jones as 'virtuous' are a rtific ia l. 
Derrett*s fconslstent with dharma' brings out the sastrlc spirit of the word 'dharmya' 
which Includes both c iv il and religious precepts.
Manu has yet another verse which also enumerated ten additional
means of subsistence.^ "Learning, mechanical arts, working for hire, service,
cattle-keeping, trade, agriculture, contentment (or restraint?), begging, and,
2
money-lending: these are the ten means of livelihood".
Narada's enumeration of the modes of acquiring ownership Is more 
elaborate than those of Gautama and Manu. He divides property, In general,
3Into three types according to Its modes of acquisition and these cover twenty-
one types of modes, seven types being In each category. This broad division
shows the degrees of approval or condemnation by the sastras of a particular
4type of acquisition. Narada says: "Again wealth Is of three kinds: white,
5 6spotted, abd black. Each of these (three) kinds has seven sub-divisions" .
Apart from these three broad divisions of property, Narada says that 
there are twelve different modes of acquisition of ('pure1) wealth, of which 
three are open to a ll castes and the rest are modes peculiar to each caste7
1. Manu, X . 116, Dh. K. 1127a. vldya stlpam bhrtlh seva go-raksyam vlpanlh krsth /  
dhrtlr bhaksyam kusldam ca dasa jlvana-hetavah/ /  Cp. Y a in .IlI, 35-42.
2. Tr. Derrett, BharucTg II, 334.
3 . As 'pure', 'Impure*, and 'partly Impure', Derrett, RLSI, 128.
4 . Narada, IV.44, D h .K .ll2 9 b . tat punas-trlvTdham jneyam suklam sabalam eva c a /  
krsnam ca tasya vljneyah prabbedah sap tad ha prthak / /  variant reading punah In 
place of prthak.
5. Cp# the expressions In modem India: *black money*, *black market*.
6. Tr. Jolly, Narada, 1.44, SBE, XXXIII, 53.
7. Narada, IV .50, D h.K . 1130b. tat punar-dvadasa-vldham pratl-vamasrayam 
smrtam /  sadharanam syat trlvldham sesam nava-vldham sm rtam //
Wealth Ts agatn declared to be of twelve 
sorts, accordTng to the caste of the ac- 
quTrer. These modes of acquisition, 
whTch are common to a ll castes, are 
threefold. The others are saTd to be 
nTnefold. 1
These dTfferent modes of acquTsTtTon, prescrTbed by Gautama, Manu
and Narada are sTmTlar Tn the Tr general tone, but they are not consTstent wTth
2regard to theTr categorTsatTon. AccordTng to Narada, a ‘partly Tmpure*
wealth (spotted) can be a pure acquTsTtTon by a lower caste, vTz., commerce
3 4and tTlIage Tn the case of Valsya, whTch Ts generally prescrTbed by Manu.
For a ll as ‘means of subsistence* ^ (Tn tTmes of dTstress) AgaTn, ‘ lending at
Interest* Ts one of the seven modes of ‘dharmya1 acquTsTtTon ordaTned by Manu/
-  8whTch Ts consTdered as ‘partly Tmpure1 by Narada. It Ts very sTgnTfTcant for
us that neTther Manu nor Narada mentTons vtbhaga (partTtTon) as a mode of
9
acquTsTtTon by whTch one becomes owner accordTng to Gautama.
1. Tr. Jolly, SBE, XXXIII, 53.
2 . Narada, IV .46, Dh.K. 1130a.
3. Narada, IV.54, Dh.K.1131b.
4 . Manu, X.116, Dh.K.1127a.
5 . Derrett, ZVR 64 (1962), 34.
6. BUhler, SBE, XXV, 426; also STr WTllTam Jones, Manu,op.cTt., 357.
7. Manu, X.115, Dh.K.1126b.
8. Narada, IV.46, Dh.K.1130a.
9. Gautama, X .38, Dh.K .1 l22a.
407.
Brhaspati, by implication, accepted the seven modes of acquTsTtTon
prescrTbed by Manu:  ^ "Whether ancestral or self-acquired, a dwellTng 
2
house and lands are declared to be what may be gTven away -  out of what
3
has been acquTred through the seven sources of property."
Besides, seven sources ordatned by Manu, there are texts Tn the
ManusmrtT whTch show that the modes of acquTsTtTon of property could exTst Tn
dTfferent forms at dTfferent stages of cTviITzatTon. Moreover, the folIowTng
4
verse suggests that the seven modes ordatned by Manu were not exhaustive.
"The knowers of antiquity call thTs Earth the wtfe of Prthu. They declare the
field to belong to the one who cleared the jungle, and the deer to the owner 
5
of the da rt".
1. B r.XV.4, Jha, HLS, I, 270^Dh.K.803a. saptagamat grha-ksetrat yad yat
ksetram pradtyate /  pttryam vatha svayam-praptam tad datavyam vivaksitam / /
3 . An improvement on HLS, I, 270, where i t  was translated as *other property*.
3 . Tr. Jha, V i.cT, 246. The accent of the text Ts on the need to give out lands 
acquired by one of the seven dharmya methods.
4. Manu,IX .44, Dh. K. 1127b. prthor apimam prthivfm bharyam purva-vTdho viduh /  
sthanu-cchedssya kedaram ahuh salyavato mrgam/7
5. Tr. Derrett, BharucT, II, 221. Acquisition suggested in this sloka comes within 
adhTgama of Gautama, X . 38-42. The same idea among the Eskimos, A . Hoebel, 
The Law of Primitive Man, (Harvard U. Press, 1954), 79: *game that can be taken 
by individual effort belongs to the person who makes possible the k ill* .  * . . .  
ancient Indian law knew the principle of a res nullTus, ora res derelicta*, L. 
Stembach, Juridical Studies Tn Ancient India, (Delhi, 1967), II, 21. Cp. Apa­
stamba, II, 10,4, mentions collecting of nivara (wild paddy) as a means of life 
for Brahmin, see K .V .R . Aiyangar, Aspects of Social and Political System of 
ManusmrtT, (Lucknow, 1949), 113.
408.
The concept o f acquisition revealed Tn this text represents the norm 
of a society In which men were hunters or cultivators, and It Is well-known 
that at the primitive stage of civilization unoccupied land was res nulllus.
c . Conclusion
1 2 Excepting Gautama, Manu, Narada, Vlsnu and Brhaspati, no
_ 3
other smrtlkara has dealt directly with the subject of acquisition of ownership.
It Is also d ifficu lt for any jurist to enumerate The modes of acquiring property 
for a ll times and a ll ages. Every society Ts passing through a process of evo­
lution, and with the passage of time, human relations become more complex 
and a new variety of property relations emerges every day. So no jurist can 
reach the stage of fina lity  In enumerating modes of acquisition of property.
We should admit that In spite of the religious and sastrlc gloss, the smrtlkaras 
were also bound by these limitations because of the changing pattern of the then 
society. That Is why Kane says: " I t  must be remembered that the enumeration
of the means of acquiring property In the dharmasastra works Ts hot exhaustive
4
but only Illustrative11.
1. Vlsnu cited In the Sarasvatfvllasa, 402, Dh.K . 1125a.
2. Also see Baudhayana, II, 2.16, SBE,, X IV, 235.
3 . It Is dealt with Indirectly by Vyasa, 1.84; Vlspu, V , 186;Yajng> 11,24, and 
Narada, 1,78, while dealing with adverse possession as a means of acquisition 
of ownership.
4 . HD, III, 550, n.1027. Same view of P .N . Sen, The General Principles of
Hindu Jurisprudence, (Calcutta, 1918), 53.
Derrett cast a legitimate doubt regarding the professional conduct of 
the members of the four vamas. He thinks that probably even during the 
dharmasastra age, the different castes were Intruding Into the profession of bther 
castes, and were contravening the modes of acquisition prescribed or endorsed 
by the sastra. He rightly remarks: "Perhaps as early as Gautama himself, It 
was common for Brahmins to earn by methods appropriate to administrators and 
commercial fo lk” .^ At the time of the Buddha, significantly, Wagle observes:
Though there was considerable division 
of labour and much active trade, trade 
differentiation also does not seem to 
have crystallised Into a rigid caste 
system as yet. People might often 
change their occupations. 2
Thus, the rigid hereditary occupational classification prescribed by
, - 3  4the sastra could not be strictly followed on practical grounds, and the theory
1. RLSI, 125. For an opinion of the pandits, In this respect, see Vyavastha 
N o .2 l: The question was: Whether buying and selling of spirituous liquor 
by two Brahmins were approved by the sastra In Bengal and In the Western 
Provinces. The pandits opined that It was not approved by the sastra as a 
mode of acquisition for Brahmins. However, they added that the profit could 
be divided jby the two Brahmins In equal shares, S. Jha, ed ., Dharmasas- 
trTya V^*yavastha Sangraha: A  Collection of the Opinion of the pundits on 
Hindu Law, (Allahabad, 1957), 63.
2. N . Wagle, Society at the Time of the Buddha, (Bombay, 1966), 157.
3. For a discussion on occupational classification, K .V .R . Alyangar, Aspects of 
the Social and Political System of ManusmftI, (Lucknow, 1949), 112-24.
4 . For example, see the opinion of five pandits of Patna; they opined that 
saundlkas were originally ksatrlyas but because of their profession, namely 
dealing In spirituous liquor, they became Valsyas, Vyavastha-patra, (Allaha­
bad, 1926), 5, 9, India Office Library, San.B.876(P.). (Vyavastha In Hindi).
that ‘property Ts to be understood from the sastra alone* was arttfTcTal and, 
therefore, property could well be ‘a matter of popular understanding* J
V I I . Father and Son Relationship In the pre-Dharmasastra and Dharmasastra Works
The respective property rights between a father and his son may be In­
fluenced by a particular soclety*s attitude towards Its male children; and, there­
fore, our present study needs an Investigation Into the attitude to sons reflected 
In the sastrlc literature.
In the Vedlc, Brahmana and the smrtl literature, It Is consistently
found that the desire for a son was very ardent among Hindus. In the Rg-veda
2
there are several Invocations for a son. "O  agnl, give us this good (wealth) 
that we get (a son) who would perform the sacrifice ( yajna) and be of good m ind".
1. For a discussion, Derrett, RLSI, 145-6.
2. R .V .7 .4.10 . Yeta no agne subhaga dldlhyapl kratum sucetasam vatema /  
Invocation for son also In R .V. 1.64.4, tr. G riffith , 1.89. Prayer for son In 
R .V .3 .4 .9 , tr. G riffith , 1,322. Invocation to Indra for sons to a bride Tn 
R.V. 10.85.45, tr. GTfflth, II, 506.
3. Tr. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, 1,49. G riffith  ( II,7) In his translation of the hymn 
does not mention a son. But I f  we read the hymn with R .V .7 .4 .8 . the allusion 
to a son becomes clear. In R .V .7 .4 .8 , It is said that men do not look with 
pleasure and affection at an adopted son. They want to have their own. The 
last half-verse of R .V .7 .4 .8  has been Interpreted by Wilson as an Invocation for 
a son; so R .V .7.4.10 may be treated as an extension of the Idea contained In 
R .V .7 .4 .8 , see G riff ith , II, 6 ,n .8 .
4 11 .
The Veda enjoins that a father attains Immortality by seeing the face 
of a son, born living J
Inasmuch as I who am a mortal 
earnestly Invoke three who arir 
an Immortal, praising thee with 
a devoted heart; therefore,
Jatavedas, (2) grant us food, 
and may I obtain Immortality 
through my posterity (3)
The continuation of the Vedlc Idea could be found In the smrtls. Thus,« *
4
Vaslstha states: "The father throws his debt on the (son), and obtains Immortality,
5
I f  he sees the face of a living son".
f . R .V .5.4.10 Dh.K.1253a (partly), yas tva hrda klrlna manyamano *martyam
martyo johavtml /  jataveda jaco asmasu dheht prajabhlr agne amrtatvam asyam / /
Also Tal.Sam.1.4.46.1; same Idea In A l.B r.V II .13 (xxx tH .l), Dh.K.l259b, 
tr. Keith, H .O .S . 25 (rpt. Delhi, 1971), 299-300.
2 . Jatavedas= Agnl.
3 . Tr. Wilson, Rlgsreda, (London, 1857), III, 241-2. Wilson at 111,242, n . l  ex­
plains Immortality through our progeny as the ‘unbroken succession of descendants*.
The Idea Is also Tn R.V. 10.39.14: the son Is described as *our stay for ever*.
Wilson Interprets this as *the eternal performer of rites*, see G riffith , Ib id .,
n.14. In R.V. 10.56.6, an offspring Is described as *a thread continuously spun
out*, G riffith , II, 460.
4 . Vaslstha, dh.su.X V II. 1, Dh.K.1271b. mam asmln-samnayatl amrtatvam ca 
gacchatl/  pita putrasya jatasya pasyeccej jlvato mukham / / Vlsnu, X V .44,
Dh.K. 1279a Is Identical. Bandhayana, II .9.16.6 slightly differs; he says 
through grandsons one attains immortality. Also Manu, IX .137; though Manu 
Is speaking of the eldest son, the Idea is the same In Manu, IX . 107.
5. Tr. BOhler, SBE, X IV , 84.
412.
It Ts also ordaTned in the Vedas,^ that men are born with three debts 
and they repay theTr debt to their forefathers (pTtrs) by the procreation of a son. 
This Indebtedness of a man to his forefathers Ts Illustrated In theTalttlrlya-samhlta.
A Brahman on b ir th  is  born w ith  a 
| th re e fo ld  debt, o f p u p ils h ip  to  the  
i  R s is , o f  s a c r i f ic e  to  the gods, o f  
i  o ffs p r in g  to the P i t r s .  3
i
i. .
This Idea continues In the Dharmasastras,^ and the birth of a son,
apart from being an occasion of worldly rejoicing, attained a spiritual and
5
metaphysical significance.
1. The Atharvaveda, 6.117.3, Whitney, ed., (Berlin, 1924), 136; SBE, X II,
190, b . l . For a discussion, see H. Chatterjee, The Law of Debt In Ancient 
India, (Calcutta, 1971), 84.
2. Tal.Sam.6 .3 .10 .5 , Dh.K . 1258b. jayamano val bixhmanas trlbhlr-mava 
brahmacaryena rslbhyo yajnena devebhyalj prajaya pltrbhya /  Also one addi­
tional, Sat.Br.f .7 .2 .1 . ( . . .  pltrbhyo manusyebhyah), D h .K .1261-2. The 
Mahabharata, 1.120.17 mentions of four debts (mals*caturbhlh), Dh ,K .l283b; 
also Jalmlnl, 6 .2 .31, B.D. Basu, The Sacred Book of the Hindus, (Allahabad, 
1923), 325. Jha, Sahara-bhasya, (Baroda, 1934), II, 1037-8.
3. T r .  A .B .K e ith , The Veda o f the B lack Ya.ius School e n t i t le d  
Ta i t t i r i y a  S a n h ita , P a rt 2: I V - V I I ,  H .O .S . X IX , (Cambridge, M ass., 
E .U .P .,  1 9 1 4 / , 526.
4 . Baudhayana, 2 .9 .16 .5  and 7, Smrltl Sandarbha, 3, 1836, SBE, 14, 21, quotes
this passage. See also Apastamba, 2 .9 .24 .1 , SBE, 2, 158. Manu, 9.137; 
VTsnu, 15.46, Dh.K. 1279a are Identical. A  slight variation In Vaslstha, 11, 
48, SBE, 14,56. A trl also mentions that the debt to the ancestors Ts paid by
the father as soon as a son Is born, Dh.K. 1352b.
5. A son Ts also considered as one who delivers (trayate) the father from the hell
called put: put, a he ll, and tra, to protect. See Go.Br. 1.1.2, Dh. K.1262;
Manu,'T7T387"Dh.K. 1290a; “ Harlta, Dh.K.l264b; VTsnu, 15.43, Dh.K.1279a.
Other derivation of putra; putra from pur, to f i l l ,  and tro_to deliver, who fills  
-----------------  /Continued on next page:
413 .
It Ts revealed Tn the Srutl and Br^imanas that men are supposed to
conquer three worlds as a duty. O f these, the world of men Ts conquered by
a son J  "Next there are verTly three worlds, the world of men, the world of
the fathers, the world of the Devas. The world of men can be gaTned by a son
2
only, not by any other work (sacrifice)” .
Baudhayana restated the passage with a slight difference and Identi­
cal Ideas can also be found In the works of other smrtTkaras. Baudhayana says:
4
"Through a son he conquers the worlds".
For both spiritual and secular reasons, Hindus crave for more than one
, 5
son. This wish for plurality o f sons goes back to the time of the Vedas. The
Note 5 -  p .412 -  continued:
the holes left by the father, a stop gap, see B r.U .l .5.17, SBE, 15, 96, fn .2 , 
also see S. Radhakrlshnan, Principle Upanlsads, (London, 1953), notes 179-80.
1. B r .U .l.5.16, Eighteen Principal Upanlsads, (Poona, 1958), I, 195. atha trayo 
vava lokah /  Manu^ya-Iokah pltr -loko deva-loka It! sovyai? manustya-lbkah 
putrenalva jayyo nanyena karmana/y. Sat.Br. 14.4.3, 24-5, Dh.K.l262a Is 
Identical.
2. Tr. Max Muller, SBE, XV, 95-6, Also for tr. see Hume, Thirteen Principal 
Upanlsads, (New York, O .U .P ., 1921), 89; S. Radhakrlshnan, lo c .c lt . ,  178-9.
3. Baud.dh.su.2.9.16.16, Smrtl Sandarbha, III, 1836. Manu, IX, 137, Dh.K. 
1289, excepting the last two words of the sloka, Ts Identical. Sahkha-LTkhlta, 
D h.K .j282; VTsnu, X V .45, Dh.K.l279a7“ WsTstha, X V II, 5, D h.K .l27J-2  
and Harlta, Dh.K.l264b are Identical with Manu. Also same Idea Tn Ya jn. 
1.78, MandlTked., 105 and 171.
4 . Tr. BOhler, SBE, X IV , 271.
5. R.V. 10.85.45. Yajur-veda, 19.48, G riffith , 213.
sastras enjoin that offering of plnda at Gaya by a son paves the way to heaven 
for the soul of deceased ancestors. So If  one has many sons, at least one can 
go to Gaya and perform the sraddha, In case others fa ll or predecease the father.
Also, In an agricultural and pastoral society, the possession of more than one 
son would be a multiple asset to the father.
Thus, A tr l saysJ "Many sons should be secured I f  even one may go
2 3to Gaya or perform the horse-sacrlflce or dedicate the N lla -bu II".
A father also wishes for a son so that In old age he can be maintained
and protected by the son. In BrhaspatT we see the blending of spiritual and
4
material benefit derived by a man from a son. "(The son w ill affect the dedi­
cation of a bu ll, w ill perform (the prescribed) domestic and public sacrifices,
1. A trl, Dh.K . 1352b. estavya bahavah ptitra yadyeko*pl gayam v ra je t / yajeta 
va'svamedhena nflam va vrsam -utsrjet// The sloka, though attributed to 
Brhaspatl by Golap Sastrl, Hindu Law, 4th ed ., 121, and Included by Alyangar 
In Brhaspatlsmrtl (V.64), 335, there are doubts about Its attribution to BrhaspatT, 
see Alyangar, Introd., Brhaspatlsmrtl, Baroda, ed ., 175. The text Ts also 
found In the VaimTklramayana, 2. jpT. 13, D h .K .1328-9; Usana, 111, 134,
Smrtl Sandarba, (Calcutta, *1952), III, 1573.
2. On significance of Gaya, C . Jacques, Gaya Mahatmya, (PondTchery, 1962),
passim; also Kane,HD, IV, 643-77.
3 . Tr. Golap Chandra Sastrl, Hindu Law, 4th ed ., 121. vrsotsarga Is the dedi­
cation or letting loose of a bull and heifer to the southern direction during 
sraddha which enables the spirits of the deceased to cross the hot-stream 
Valtarlnf Tn the other world. By this, It Is believed by the Hindus, the preta- 
condition of the departed comes to an end and enables him to cross the ocean of 
mortality, Pandey, Hindu Sanskaras, (Delhi, 1969), 266. For details, Kaie, 
HD, IV' 539-42.
4 . Br.V.66, Alyangar, ed., 335, Dh.K. 1349a. karlsyatl vrsotsargam Tsta-purtam
tathalva ca /  palaylsyatl vardhakye sraddham dasyatl canvaham //
415.
w ill protect his parents Tn thetr old age;^ and perform funeral and commemora-
2
tlve ceremontes for them” .
From the above discussion, Tt appears that a son was very Important Tn
the worldly as well as Tn the spiritual life of a father. Against this background,
of the eulogized and exalted position of a son, we are to analyse a few texts and
legends which seem to hint at the patrla potestas of a Hindu father over his son.
3 4From the Rg-Veda we come to know that Rjrasva was robbed of his
✓ —
eyesight by his father. From the Sunahsepa legend, we learn that King Harls’-
5
chandra proposed to sacrifice his son Rohlta to the god Varuna. The sacrifice 
was put o ff by the King under different pretences. A brahmana named AjTgarta
1. Cp. S at.B r.X II.2 .3 .4 , Dh.K.1163a; G o.B r.IV .17; Manu, IV.257.
2 . Tr. based on K .V .R . Alyangar, Brhaspatlsmrtl, 175, and Improved by Derrett 
In my first draft.
3. R .V .1,116.16; R .V .1.117.17; Muir, 1.101, tr. G riffith , 1,156. Rjrasva*s 
blindness Is also alluded to : R.V. 1.112.8.
4 . Rjrasva was one of the sons of Vrsaglr, see R.V. 1.100.17. The she-wolf 
(vrkl) for whom he killed the sheep was one of the asses of Asvlns Tn disguise, 
who consequently restored to him the eyesight. See Wilson, (London, 1850), 
1,311, n .b ,c ; G riffith , 1,156, n.16, mark the printing mistake Tn the n. 
Instead of 1.101.17, It should be 1.100.17, see Wilson, 1,259. Macdonell 
and Keith consider It to be *a legend of quite obscure meaning*, Vedlc Index, 
1,108 and 109.
5. B. Bhattacharya thinks that the legend Is a ‘definite piece of evidence* for the 
existence of human sacrifice Tn ancient time, Kallvarjyas, (Univ. of Calcutta, 
1943), 23. Kane Includes *Human Sacrifice* Tn his list of Kallvarjya and 
thereby accepts the prevalence of this practice In ancient times. See HD, III, 
96land 928, n.1798.
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sold hTs son Sunahsepa to be sacrTfTced tn place of Rohlta. Ultimately,
-  1
Sunahsepa was released and Vlsvamltra adopted him as hTs son.
2
NacTketas, according to the legend, was offered by hTs father to 
3
Yamaf the King of Hades.
If these legends are taken litera lly , we get the picture of a Htndu 
father Tn ancient India as an autocratic pater famlllas, fu lly  endowed with the 
patriarchal power of selling or k illing  a son. But It Ts of much significance 
that In each case the sacrifice was averted at the end. This may be for the
1. A l.B r .7 .14-17^ Haug, (Bombay, 1863), 1, 179-83, t r .2, 462-5; also 
Keith, H .O .S . (rpt. Delhi, 1971), 25, 301-9.^ In the Rama yana, Balakan^a, 
Adhyaya, 60, 61, we find the legend. There Sunahsepa Ts described as the 
son of the sage Rlchlka and was sold to King Ambarlsa to be offered to the 
gods Tn sacrifice, Ramayaija, (Baroda, I960), 320-8.
2 . T a l .B r . l l . i l ,  8; K atha.U .I.1 -4, Macdonell and Keith opine *hls historical 
reality Is extremely doubtful1, Vedlc Index, I, 432.
3. Hume thinks that Naclketas voluntarily offered himself to be sacrificed, 
Thirteen Principal Upanlgads, (New York, O il) .P .,  1921), 341. Radhakrlsh- 
nan*s view Ts also the same, and he adds the spiritual Interpretation to the 
legend. He says that to a sannyasln personal relation has no meaning and 
‘there can be no quickening of the spirit until the body d ie1, Principal Upanl- 
sads, (London, 1953), 596. Cp. St. Paul: Thou fool, that which thou sowest 
Is not quickened except It die*, I Corinthians, 15.36. The higher stage of a 
sannyasln Is explained In the Brhadaranyaka Upanlsad , 4 .3 .22: atra pita
a pita bhavatl mata amata loka a loka deva adeva veda avedah /  t r .  Roer, 
(Calcutta, 1908), 241: Then the father Ts no father, the mother no mother, 
the worlds no worlds, the gods no gods, the Vedas no Vedas1. So, according 
to Its spiritual Interpretation, the legend has not much relevance to the rela­
tionship between a father and son. On this, also see Kane, HD, V , l l# 
(Poona, 1962), 1555.
4 1 7 .
reason that strict Implementation of patrTa potestas was not Tn conformity with the 
social ethos of the time. Moreover, most of these legends have no historical 
basis. ^  As legends they are Intended for disseminating moral virtues rather
j
than any legal rules. But It Is d ifficu lt from the materials available before us
to form an opinion and pass a judgment In favour o f any particular standard.
2
We have Instances of curtailment of fathers power over his sons, and the Vedas
3 4abound Tn evidences of f i l ia l love. Kapadla thinks that a Hindu father 
lacked strict patriarchal power. He portrays a father as the very embodiment 
of natural love and affection, but Tn his Idealistic way he misses the point that 
natural love and affection and property relations are two different things. In 
the former, people are guided by their Instincts and Tn the latter, they face the 
hard facts of life . Moreover, Kapadla does not take any notice of the vast 
Buddhist literature which has a direct bearing on the contemporary social and 
lega I system.
1. Supra,3*7$, n .4  ) A
2. The Nathanedlsth&legend, R .V. 10.61.1; A l.B r.22 .9 .5 .14 , Dh.K.1162a. 
Tal.Sam.3 .1 .9 .4 , Dh.K.1161a.
3. R .V .l .1 .9 , father depicted as ‘easy of access* to his son, Wilson, (1850), I,
5 . R.V. 1.38.1, father as dear to his son, G riffith , 1,53. R .V .1 .68 .5 ., ‘as 
sons obey their slre‘s behest1, G riff ith , 1,92. R .V .3 .53 ,2b, a child grasps 
his father‘s garment's hemf  G riff ith , I, 372. R .V .4.17.17. ‘as Friend, as 
Sire, most fatherly of fathers', G riffith , I, 415. R .V .5 .43 .7 . ‘as on his 
father's lap the son, the darling*, G riffith , 1,508. R .V .7 .103 .3 ., ‘greets 
him with cries of pleasure as a son his father', G riffith , 11,97. A .V .3 .30 .2 , 
Whitney, ed ., (Berlin, 1924), 48; A .V .5 .14 .10 , Ib id .88, A sva .G r.S u .l. 
15.3, SBE, 29, 182.
4 . Hindu Kinship, (Bombay, 1947), 83.
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It Ts depTcted Tn the PalT Canon that on the Tdeal plane the relatlon-
shTp between parent and son Ts that of love and affection.^ As Wagle quotes,
"Parents are iTke Brahma; they are the ancTent teachers, they are worthy of
gtfts. The wTse worship them, honour them and satisfy their material needs,
2
for they are compassionate to their children” . But there are other Instances
3
which show that sometimes sons used to show disrespect to their parents, and
as an extreme case It can be cited that Ajatasattu killed his father BTmbTsara 
4
for the throne. Buddha himself saw a rich Brahmaga looking worn out and
Til-dressed and enquired about his state. The Brahmana replied that his four
5
sons and their wives had driven him out of the house.
Smrtl texts Indicate that a father had power to apply corporal punish­
ment to correct his son but (we are told) he should apply the rope or stick only 
on the back part of the body.^ A son also, In turn, had to show respect to his 
parents.^ However, this does not mean that the atmosphere was one of Implicit 
obedience by the son. The dharmasastras reveal that the smrtlkaras had to make
1. N . Wagle, Society at the Time of the Buddha, (Bombay, 1966), 81.
2. Anguttara Nlkaya, II, 70, cited by Wagle, Ib id ., 81.
3. Wagle, Ib id ., 81.
4 . Dlgha Nlkaya, I, 85-88, cited by Wagle, Ib id ., 81.
5. Samyutta Nlkaya, I, 176, cited by Wagle, Ib id ., 82.
6. Manu, V III, 300, also Manu, IV, 164; Gautama, 11.43-4, SBE, II, 189.
7. Manu, II, 225, 226, 228, 232 , 234, 237 and 111.159.
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rules to dissuade the sons from suing their fathers.^ According to some
smftikaras, as we shall presently see, a litigation between a father and son
2 3Is completely non-justiciable; others devised social or legal deterrents; 
but they could not completely Ignore the existence of such litigation. A l­
though In procedural law, a father or a son could not bring a suit against 
each other as adversaries, the King by his Inherent jurisdiction suo motu
4
could take cognizance when a legal matter arose between a father and a son.
V II I . The Concept of Identity of Father and Son
a . Son as the father reborn
The Idea of Identity of father and son or the Idea of son as the father 
reborn might have Influenced the relationship between father and son In the 
social and legal spheres. The Idea of son as the father reborn could be found
1. Br. 1.124; Alyangar, ed ., 21.
2 . Gautama, XV. 19, Kane, HD, III, 566-7; HD, IV, 392-3. Manu, III, 159,
HD, IV, 392-3; SBE, XXV, 105, n. thereof.
3. Vlsnu, V , 120-1; Narada, I, 187.
4 . Narada, X V II.3 . Fora discussion on this, In fra,452.
5. The Idea of reappearance of father In the body of the son was prevalent among
the Jews, Eccleslastlcus (Slrachldes), 30:4, cited by Derrett, Jesus*s Audience,
(London, 1973), 32, n .8 .
Tn the Rg-veda: "GracTous to our fleet courser be the hero: may we trans-
2
plant us, Rudra, Tn our children” .
The concept Ts well-known also Tn the dharmasastras. Baudhayana
3
acknowledges the Tdea and quotes: "Now they quote also (the folIowTng
verse): ‘From my several iTmbs (of my body) art thou produced, from my heart 
art thou born; thou art "self" called a son; mayest thou iTve a hundred autumns*".
Apart from Tts b To logical truth and spTrTtual sTgnTfTcance, the Tdea of 
the father beTng reborn Tn the son probably contrTbuted to a great extent to the 
tone of the law of TnherTtance among the HTndus.
b. Death bed transmTssTon
The bTrth of a son Ts the emergence of father through the son and on 
the eve of hTs death, he agaTn transplants hTs own personalTty, physTcal and 
psychTc, Tn the son. So, accordTng to thTs Tdea, the son Ts not a separate 
entTty from the father; throughout hTs exTstence he Ts the alter ego of hTs father.
1. R .V .2 .33 .1 . abhT no vfro arvatT ksameta praJayemahT rudra prajabhTh/.
2. Tr. GrTffTth, 1,299. Also Sat. Br. 5 .4 .2 .9 , SBE, XLI, 97, *hTm who Ts the
son, he makes the father, and hTm who Ts the father, he makes the son*.
Also AT.Br.7.3.13, Haug, 1,178-9, KeTth, 299-300. Sat.Br. 1 2 .4 .3 .1 .,
SBE, XLIV, 187, Dh.K . 1262a.
3. Baud.dh.su. 11.2.15.16, D h .K .1268, SBE, II, 14. athapyudaharantT -  angad 
angat-sarhbhavasT hrdayat-abhTjayase /  atma vaT putra-namasT sa jTva saradah 
satam TtT / /
4 . Tr. SBE, X IV , 226. Baudhayana*s text Ts TdentTca! wtyh Kau.U.2.11, but
slTghtly dTffers from Sat.Br. 14 .9 .4 .8 . The same Tdea Ts Tn Apastamba, 11,9.
24.1-2. Manu, IV, 184, IX .8 and Y ^ jn . l.56.
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It Ts very much revealed Tn the ancTent rTtual act of fathers •transmission* to hTs 
1son.
1. Cowell, ed., Kausltakl UpanT|ad, 2.15, (VaranasT, 1968), 68-72. Also
S. Radhakrlshnan, ed ., The Principal Upanlsads, (London, 1953), 772. 
athatah plta-putrlyam sampradanam-Ttl cacalcsate pita putram presyann 
ahvayatl. navals-trnalr-agaram samstoryagnlm-upasama-dhayodakumbham 
sapatram-upanldhayahatena vasasa sampracchannaj} pita seta etya putra 
uparlstad-abhlnlpadyata Tndrlyalr-TndrlyanT samsprsyapl vasma aslnayabhl- 
mukhayalva sampradadhyad-athasmal samprayacchatl vacam me tvayl dadhanltl 
pita vacam te may! dadha TtT putrah pranam me tvayl dadhanftl pita pranam te 
may! dadha TtT putrah caksur-me tvayl dadhanltl pita caksus-te may! dadha Ttl 
putrah srotram me tvayl dadhanltl pita srotram te may! dadha TtT putro *nna -  
rasan-me tvayl dadhanltl plta-anna-rasamste mayl dadha Ttl putrah karmanl 
me tvayl dadhanltl pita karmanl te mayl dadha Jtl putrah. sukha-du^khe me 
tvayl dadhanltl pita sukha-duhkhe te mayl dadha It ! putrah anandam ratlm 
prajatlm me tvayl dadhanltl pita anandam ratlm prajatlm te mayl dadha TtT 
putrah Ttyam me tvayl dadhanltl pltetyam te mayl dadha Ttl putro mano me 
tvayl dadhanltl pita manas-te mayl dadha It! putrah prajnam me tvayl 
dadhanltl pita prajnarp te may! dadha It! putro yadyu va upabhlgadal^ syat 
samasenalva bruyat-pranan-me tvayl dadhanltl pita praqamste may! dadha 
It! putro-atha dakslijavrd-upanlskramatl tarn pltanumantrayate yaso brahma- 
varcasam klrtls-tva ]u^atam-ltyathetarah savyam-amsam anvaveksate 
panlnantardhaya vasanantena va pracchadya svargan lokan kaman apnuhltl 
sa yadyagadah syat-putrasyalsvarye pita vaset pari va vrajet . . .  / /  15 / /
After karmanl (deeds), some versions add a sentence about sarlram (body) 
sarfram me tvayl dadhanltl pita sarlram te mayl dadha It ! putrah, tr . 
Radhakrlshnan, 773, The Father: "Let me place my body Tn you". The 
son, "I take your body In me"*. Variant reading, pita sete: Father 
remains lying; svayam syetah: himself Tn white, Radhakrlshnan, Ib id .,
773.
Next follows the fathers tradition to the 
son. Thus do they In truth relate I t .  The 
father, when about to die, calls his son. 
Having spread the house with new grass, 
and duly laid the fire , and placed a vessel 
of water with a pot of rice -  clothed with 
an unworn garment, the lather lies (await­
ing him). The son having come approaches 
him from above, having touched a ll his 
organs with his own organs; or else let the 
lather perform the tradition with his son 
seated In front of him. Then he delivers 
the organs over. "Let me place my 
speech In thee", salth the father; "I take 
thy speech In me” , salth the son. "Let 
me place my breath In thee", salth the 
lather; "I take thy breath In me” , salth 
the son. "Let me place my sight In 
thee", salth the father; "I take thyslght 
In me", salth the son. "Let me place 
my hearing In thee", salth the father;
"1 take thy hearing In me” , salth the 
son. "Let me place my flavours of food 
In thee", salth the lather; "I take thy 
flavours of food Tn me” , salth the son.
"Let me place my actions In thee", salth 
the father; "I take thy actions Tn me", 
salth the son. "Let me place my pleasure 
and pain Tn thee", salth the lather; "I 
take thy pleasure and pain In me", salth 
the son. "Let me place my enjoyment, 
dalliance and offspring (1) In thee", 
salth the father; "I take thy enjoyment, 
dalliance and offspring Tn me", salth the 
son. "Let me place my walklpg (2) Tn 
thee", salth the father; "I take thy 
walking Tn me", salth the son. "Let 
me place my mind In thee", salth the 
lather; "I take thy mind Tn me", salth
1. Rendered by Radhakrlshnan, ‘procreation*, o p .c lt., 773.
2 . A lt. rendering ‘going1, Hume, o p .c lt., 318, ‘movement*, Radhakrlshnan, 
o p .c lt., 772.
the son. "Let me place my knowledge (1) 
in thee*, salth the father; "I take thy 
knowledge tn me", saTth the son. Or tf 
the father be unable to speak much, let 
him say at once, "Let me place my vita l 
airs Tn thee", and let the son say, "I take 
thy vita l atrs Tn me". Then the son goes 
out, having walked around hTs father, keep­
ing hTs right side towards him, and the father 
cries after him, "May glory, holiness and 
honour attend thee” . Then the son looks 
back over his shoulder, holding his hand (2) 
or the end of his garment before his face,
(saying), "Obtain thou the swarga worlds 
and thy desires". Should the father after­
wards recover let him dwell In the authority 
of his son (as a guest) or let him become a 
wandering ascetic. (3)
A father*s benediction and transmission of charge has also been related 
4In the Brhadaranyak^Upanlsad. "When a father who knows this, departs this
1. A lt.  rendering, ‘Intelligence*, Hume, Ib id ., 318, ‘wisdom*, Radhakrlshnan,
772.
2. panlnantardyaya vasanantena va praechadya, rendered by Radhakrlshnan:
‘Having hidden his face M th his hand or having covered It with the hem of 
his garment*. Hume‘s rendering Is also similar to Radhakrlshan*s.
3. Tr. Cowell, Kau§ltakl Upanlsad, (Varanasi, 1968), 159-60. On this, see 
Minoru Hara, Transfer of Merit*, Adyar Library Bulletin, 31-2 (1967-68), 382- 
411 at 387. ‘Deliverance* In the sense of ritual transfer of rights and duties to 
a son has been mentioned In B r .U .l.5.17. Also BharucT on Manu, V I, 86, 
Derrett, Bharucl, II, 27. Cp. the death bed blessing administered by the 
patriarchs Ip the Patriarchal Narratives, Gen.27.1-40; On this, E .A . Spelser,
*1 Know Not the Day of My Death*, In J .J . Flnkelsteln and M . Greenberg, 
ed ., Oriental and Biblical Studies, (Philadelphia, 1967), 89-96. Nuzl texts 
on death bed declarations are Interpreted as records of bequeathing material 
goods, HSS 16 56, E .A . Spelser, Tn R.H. Pfeiffer and E .A . Spelser, ‘One 
Hundred Selected Nuzl Texts*, AASOR 16 (1934-35), 107. Also cp. the 
transmission by a Samoan chief to his son: ‘Receive the succession of my 
office with a ll the wisdom necessary for Its fulfilment*, L .W . Simmons, The 
Role of the Aged In Primitive Society, (New Haven, 1945), 242.
4 . B r .U . l.5.17, Eighteen Principal Upanlsads,(Poona , 19581,J jJ ? 5. sa yadalvam-
vTd-asmat-Iokar pralryarhulbhfr-evu pialialh saha puTramavlsafT /
world, then he enters Tnto his son together with hTs own spirits (with speech, 
mind and breath)."  ^
In Kau?ltakT,-Brahmana Upanlsad, the ritual Is more elaborate than 
In the Brhadaranyaka Upanlsad, but In the latter It Ts more subtle and transcend­
ental than Tn the former. It Is a total transmission of a father*s personality to 
the son.
From the vyavahara point of view, the ritual Ts very significant.
This Is a donatio which Is Immediately taking effect from the moment of trans­
mission and unlike donatlones mortis causa, there Ts no revocation at the sur­
vival of the donor. If the father recovers he dwells under the authority of his 
son, or wanders about as an ascetic (vanaprasthya).
2
Pawate commenting on K.U .2.15 says, ‘ there Ts not a single word 
said In It about property*. By saying so, he misses the significance and symbol­
ism of the ritua l. If property would have been mentioned Tn so many words, the
sublimity o f the moment would have been marred. Moreover Tn ancient India,
3
there was a strong view that property was In existence only for sacrifices 
(kratvartha).
4
So when the father says, ’'tvam brahma tvam yajnah tvam loka TtT
5
(you are Brahman, you are sacrifice and you are the world)’bnd the son answers,
1. Tr. Max Muller, SBE, XV, 96.
2 . Res Nulllus, (HublT, 1938), 187; his quotation from K .U . Ts numbered as 2.10, 
which does not ta lly  with Cowell, Hume, R .K. and the Poona ed ., 1958, and 
seems to be Incomplete.
3. For a fuller and erudite discussion, see RLSI, 122-47.
4 . B r .U .l.5 .17.
5. Tr. Radhakrlshnan, Principal Upanlsads, o p .c lt., 179.
‘aham brahma, aham yajnah aham loka Ttl  ^ (I am Brahman, 1 am the sacrTfTce,
I am the world)1, the transmTssTon of property seems to be symbolTcally Included.
As STr Henry MaTne rTghtly says, ‘Among the HTndoos, the relTgTous element Tn
law has acquired a complete predomTnance. Family sacrTfTces have become
2
the keystone of a ll the law of Persons and much of the law of things*.
ThTs act of transmTssTon was evTdently a cTvTl death of the father, at
the same tTme, Tt Ts hTs spTrTtual resurrectTon Tn the son. ThTs notTon ofs’urvTval
Tn the son was also known Tr? prTmTtTve Roman Law. ‘HaeredTtas est successTo Tn
unTversum jus quod defunctus habult* ( ‘an Inheritance Ts a successTon to the entTre
3
legal position of a obceased man*). MaTne goes on expIaTnlng this, "the
notTon was that, though the physTcal person of the deceased had perTshed, hTs
legal personalTty survTved and descended unTmpaTred on hTs HeTr or co-heTrs, Tn
whom hTs TdentTty was continued". AnquetTl du Perron also on K .U .2 .15 says:
‘hoc testamento pater ens suum totum ad fTlTum suum transfert, Tn Tllum trans-
4
fundTt et sTc Tn eo et delnceps Tn fTlTT fTlTo vTvIt* (*By thTs testament the father
transfers to hTs son a ll hTs entity (or being). He pours Tt Into him and so he lives
5
Tn him and thereafter Tn the son of hTs son*).
1. Variant reading, brahmaham yajno*ham loka Ttt.
2. Ancient Law, (London, 1930), 213. Modern scholarship would substitute
for the two underlined words: ‘maintained* and Vare*.
3 . MaTne, Ib id ., 213.
4 . K .V . Cowell, ed ., (Varanasi, 1968), 160, n . AnquetTl translated K .U . from
Persian.
5. Translated to me by Derrett with a note that, as AnquetTl was a pioneer, a ll hTs 
studies must be used with caution.
c . Conclusion
The difference between primitive Roman Law and Hindu Law on this 
point, Ts this, that Tn the former the father Ts actually deceased while In- the 
latter, there Ts not always an actual death. But both the systems reveal that 
the legal personality of the father continues Tn the son. From his very birth, 
the son seems to have a vested right being the prospective heir or donee of his 
father's property at his death or transmission. ThTs sort of son's vested right 
can also be found Tn the Code of Hammurabi.^ The father could not disin­
herit the son at his w il l .  The son's fault had to be proved by the father Tn a
2court. In ancient Egypt during the Pharaonic tim e, Tt has been found that 
the son was the Inheritor of parents* property excluding others. These Instances 
do not show any co-ownership between father and son, but they prove that the 
son had an expectancy, a dormant right In the property of his father. Even If
1. Tr. Rev. A .H . Sayce, *lf a man decides to thrust out (disinherit) his son,
and say to the judge, ” 1 w ill thrust out my son"; then the judge shall examine 
Into his reasons, and I f  the son have no grievous fault, which justifies his being 
thrust out, the son may not be cut o ff from sonshlp*, Code, * 168; Primitive 
and Ancient Legal Institutions, Evolution of Law Series, ed ., Kocurek, A . and 
Wlgmore, J .H ., (Boston, 1915), 1, 422. But see supra, 1 7 4 -
2. The case of  Mes v . Khay, Egyptian Inscription of MES, discovered by Professor 
Lorret In the tomb of MES at Sakkara, where by appeal the son's right of Inheri­
tance was upheld when he proved his descent from his parents, Kocurek and 
Wlgmore, Ib id ., I, 537-63, n . l  at 557. Cp. Manu, IX ,185; Y a jn .II.135-6. 
Also N . Wagle, Some Aspects of Indian Society . . . ,  Ph.D. Thesis, London UnT 
verslty, 1962, the story of gahapatl PojqITya who hands over the Inheritance to 
his son during his lifetime, 190, n . l .
we do not go so far as to call Tt a quasT-bTrthrTght, at least Tt dTd not appear 
antagonTstTc to the Tdea of a true bTrthrTght as devTsed by the later commen­
tators.
IX. The JurTdTcal PosTtTon of the Son and hTs Dependence on the Father 
a^ IntroductTon
We have seen Tn some texts  ^ that a father could not alTenate the 
joTnt property Tn general and Tmmovable property Tn partTcuIar, wTthout the 
consent of hTs unseparated sons. ThTs ITmTtatTon on a fathers power of alTen- 
atTon supports the concept of co-ownershTp between a father and hTs son. But 
there are texts Tn the dharma£astras whTch leave scope for doubt regardTng the 
true nature of a son's co-ownershTp wTth hTs father. These texts, on the sur­
face, have denTed any proprTetary rTght to a son and have also emphasTsed hTs 
TncapacTty to enter Tnto any transactTon.
b. Manu, V III, 416
(1) LTteral meaning of the text
Manu declared that the father was the absolute master Tn the famTly
2
and denTed any rTght Tn property to the wTfe and son iTke the slaves.
1. Supra, 3 4 0 -4 6 ,
2. Manu, V II I .416. bharya putras"ca dasas"ca traya evadhana smrtah/  yat te 
samadhTgacchantT yasya te tasya tad dhanam f f
"The w ife, the son, and the slave, these three are known by tradTtTon to be
(
property-less: whatever they acqutre Ts the propertyof him to whom they 
belong".^
Indeed, thTs verse (on the surface) Ts Tn conflTct wTth the Tdea of co-
ownershTp between a father and hTs son. ThTs Ts also Tn direct conflTct wTth the
Tdea of self-acquTsTtTon by the son for hTmself. But before we go further, the 
2
text deserves closer attentTon.
(TT) mTmarpsa (exegetTcal) TnterpretatTon
-  3We shall presently see that the text does not stand the test of mTmamsa.
The text seems to deny women the rTght to property. But the VedTc text svargo
4kamo yajet applTes equally to a ll men and a ll women, because both sexes have a 
desTre for svarga (heaven). To attaTn svarga one should perform sacrTfTce and the
5
Veda TnsTsts that sacrTfTces must be performed wTth property (sva). Here property
1. Tr. Derrett, BharucT, II, 209-10. The same sloka Ts repeated Tn a slTghtly 
dTfferent form Tn The Mahabharata, 5.33.57, V .S . Sukthankar, ed ., The 
Mahabharata: Udyogaparvan, ed ., S .K . De, (Poona, 1940), 134. The 
Mahabharata’ has glorTfTed certain texts of Manu, but that does not gTve any 
added {urTdTca! sTgnTfTcance to the texts, Kane, HD, (Poona, 1930), I, 136.
On relationship between Manu and The Mahabharata, see TbTd.,  136-9, 151-9.
2. Manu, V III, 416.
3. On mTmamsa or exegetlpal TnterpretatTon, see LTngat, The ClassTcal Law of IndTa, 
op.cTt., 148 ff .
4 . A .S . Natara|a Ayyar, Mlmamsa Jurisprudence, (Allahabad, 1952), 37.
5. Derrett, RLSI, 132.
means only those objects over which one has undisputed ownership.^ Thus,
Manu, V II I. 416, Is tn conflict with the Srutt.
The mtmamsakas say that "When there ts a confltct between the Smrttt 
and the Vedas, the Smrttt should be disregarded; because Tt ts only when there
r
ts no such confltct there ts an assumption of the Vedtc text Tn support of the Smrttt” .
Sabara concludes:^ "The woman who destres the result of Swarga followtng from
a sacrtftce should set astde the authortty of the Smrttt, should acqutre property
4and should then perform the sacrtftce".
y
On Manu, V III .416, Sabara says? that Tt ts wrong to say that the wife
5
and the rest are devoid of propertyv.
(ttt) Texts Inconsistent wtth Manu, V II I .416
There are texts Tn the ManusmrtT whtch declare that the wtfe could
have property of her own; this contradicts the purport of verse V III .416. Manu 
6says:
1. TatttlrTya-samhtta, V I.1 .6 .3 . Jatmtnt, V I, t, 10-24 , 39-40; Ttt,2 I f  v tt, 5 ,7 .
2. Ayyar, lo c .c tt., 35. Jatmtnt, I , t t t , 3 . vtrodhe tu anupeksam syat asatt hi 
anumanam.
3. tasmat falarthtnt satT, smrtTm ca apramantkftya dravyam ca part-grhntyat yajet 
ca tt t, quoted by Ayyar, lo c .c tt., 37.
4 . Ayyar, Tbtd. ,  37.
5 . Sabara on Jatmtnt, V l , t . l4 ,  Sabara-Bhasya, tr . Jha, (Baroda, 1934), II, 981. 
Kane, HD, III, 578.
6. Manu, IX. 194. adhyagnyadhyavahantkam dattam ca prttt-karmant/  bhratr-motr 
pttr-praptam sad-vtdham strt-dhanam smrtam / f
What (was given) before the (nuptial) 
fire , what (was given) on the bridal 
procession, what was given In token 
of love, and what was jrecelved from 
her brother, mother or father, that Is 
called the six-fold property of a 
woman. 1
Manu also upholds property of children when he says that at the wlfe*s
death, her property would be Inherited by her children, even though the husband 
2
was s till a live .
Also whatever g ift Ts made subse­
quently or by a husband out of 
affection, that property shall be­
long to her offspring If  she dies ^ 
while her husband Is s till a live.
Moreover, In verse IX .217, Manu accepts by Implication that the son
4
could have property of his own during the lifetime of the father. "A  mother
shall obtain the Inheritance of a son (who dies) without leaving Issue, and, If
5
the mother be dead, the paternal grandmother shall take the estate".
The verse Implies that when a childless son dies, according to Manu,
the mother Inherits the property of such a son and not the father.^ These verses
1. Tr. BOhler, SBE, XXV, 370-1.
2 . Manu, IX. 195. anvadheyam ca yad dattam patya prltena calva y a t /  patyau
jlva tl vrttayah prajayas tad dhanam b h a v e t//
3 . Tr. Derrett, BharucI, II, 261.
4 . Manu, IX .217. anapatyasya putrasya mata dayam avapnuyat/ matary apl ca 
vrttayam pltur mata hared dhanam f f
5. Tr. BOhler, SBE, XXV, 379.
6. See BharucI on Manu IX .217, Derrett, BharucI, II, 265.
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show that sons and wives were capable of holding property, Independently of 
the head of the family.
But, how could the son have property, i f  fu ll effect Ts gTven to verse 
VIII .416? ThTs shows that The Manu-smrtT does not contain the Tdea of pro­
prietary right of any particular period. It has come down through the ages 
and the rules have been promulgated by different authors at different periods
of history.^ "Many passages show that the author, far from having been the
2
first legislator, had numerous predecessors". The author of our Manu expected 
3
them to be Interpreted In such a way as to enable them to make sense together. 
We may say that verse VI11.416 represents the Idea of a period when the father's 
power was at Its apex.
(1v) Commentatorlal remarks
At this stage, parenthetically, we may note that the literal meaning 
of the text (Manu, V II I .416) Is not borne out by commentatorlal literature. 
BharucI In his The Manu-sastra-vlvarapa, the oldest extant commentary on Manu, 
states:
1. Kane, HD, I, 152-3.
2. R. Llngat, The Classical Law of India, o p .c lt., 87.
3. Manu, V II I .416 and IX. 194, IX. 195, IX .217.
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i
The words "w ife", "son” heredo not have 
their normal meaning, for th iy  appear Tn 
this sectTon so as to throw a particular 
light on the "slave", whom they resemble.
Consequently Tt Ts not the propertyless- 
ness of these three which Ts the principal 
point of the verse. On the contrary, we 
must gather that their goods may be u ti­
lised only with their consent . . .  Their 
” propertyless-ness" must be understood 
to be propounded a secondary (or 
figurative) sense. 1
2Medhatlthl, the most famous of the commentators on Manu, said:
3
"What Is meant by the text Is only that they are dependant".
(v) Light thrown by Hindu juridical concept of property (svatva)
Indeed, the significance of the text Is related with the concept of
dependence (paratantrya) In classical Hindu jurisprudence. According to
Hindu juridical theory, a person may have ownership (svatva) but he may not
have Independence (svatantrya). ThTs shows that, unlike Western jurisprudence,
4property (svatva) Is by no means dependent upon Independence (svatantrya).
One who Is Independent (svatantra) needs to ask no consent of others to deal 
with his property. Although a male Hindu at MTtaksara law Ts bom with his
1. Derrett^ BharucI, 11, 210. evam ca satl gaunam esam nlrdhanatvam vljneyam, 
BharucI, I, 155.
2. para tan trya-vldhanam etat, Medhatlthl on Manu, V II I .416, Jha, II, 239; 
tr. Jha, V , 435. Kane, HD, III, 771. Also Kulluka, etacca bharyadlnam 
para tan trya pradarsanarthaparam, The Manusmrtl, 10th edn., (The Nlrnaya 
Sagar Press, Bombay, 1946), 363.
3. LTngat, CLI, 111-12.
4. Derrett, The Development of the Concept of Property Tn India . .  .*, ZVR 
64(1962), 15-130 at 98.
birthright (janma-svatva) Tn the famtly property, paratantrya (*non-Tndepend-
ence*) Ts the state Tn whTch a ll persons are born and, Tn thTs respect, a MTtak-
sara male Ts no exception J  Svatantrya (Independence) Ts acquired by rela-
2tTvely few. Narada says: "Three persons are svatantra In this world: the
king, and also the spiritual teacher; and Tn every caste, caste by caste, the
3
master of the house Tn his own house".
Svatantrya comes with age, seniority, and the death of ancestors. 
durTng
A son Ts never jsvatantra /  the lifetime of his father unless the father hands
4
over the property to his son. Narada explains: "Non-Independent are
women (wives), sons, and slaves together with the household. Independent
5
there Is the householder, to whomsoever It has come by descent (or, Tn order)."
Katyayana also declares:^ "The father whose own father Ts living 
Is not Independent, nor a brother, a nephew, a younger undivided relative, 
likewise a slave, or a free labourer” .^
1. Ib id ., 96.
2. Narada, IV .32, Dh.K.561a. Kane, HD':, III, 413. trayah svatantra loke*smIn 
rajacaryas tathalva ca /  pratl varnan ca sarvesam vamanam sve grhe grhl / /
3 . Tr. Derrett, Ib id ., 96.
4 . Narada, IV .31, Dh.K.560a, 695a. asvatantrah strlyah putra dasasca saparl- 
grahah /  svatantras tatra grhl yasya syat tat kramagatam / /
5. Tr. Derrett, ZVR 64 (1962), 15 -I3 0a t97 .
6. Katy, 466, Dh.K.563a. Kane, Katyayanasmrtl, 59. pita ‘svatantrah pltrman 
bhrata-bhratrvya eva ca /  kanlsto *vavibhakta-stho dasah karma-karas tatha / /
7. Translated to me by Derrett, a better rendering than those of Kane, KatyayansmftI , 
207 and J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, I, 408, The karma-kara differs from these two 
(means dasas and ahlka, the person pledged with the creditor when contracting a 
debt) In that he Ts not In the power of another person. He only contracts to do a 
specific work fo ra  specified wage*, Kartgle, Arthasastra, III, 227-8,
(vY) Disposition of property by non-independent person
The absence of independence of a son might lead to a popular con­
clusion that as a non-Tndependent person he had no power to deal wYth property. 
This popular notTon Ys strengthened by the rule that a contract of sale Ts YnvalYd 
when the vendor Ts a person who Ts not Tndependent.
BrhaspatT declares: ^
What has been sold by one YntoxTcated 
or Tnsane, or at a very low price, or 
under the Ympulse of fear, or by one 
not hTs own master, or by an TdTot shall 
be relTnquTshed (by the purchaser, or Tt) 
may be recovered (from the purchaser)
... 2
AccordTng to Katyayana, a dependent person has no power of hTs own
3
to enter Tnto a valTd transactTon unless he Ts authorised by hTs master.
The gTft, mortgage and sale of fTelds, 
housese and slaves entered Tnto by 
those who are dependent do not a t- ^ 
taTn valTdTty, Tf they are not approved
1. B r.V III.4, ATyangar, ed ., 155. STmTlar Ts, Ya[n'.II.32, Dh.K.557b. 
mattonmattena vTkritam hTnamuIyam bhayena va /  asvatantrena mudena 
tyajyam tasya punar bhavet f f
2. Tr. Jolly, SBE, XXXIII, 350. The text Tllustrates that ‘non-Tndependence*
Ys a sort of TncapacTty and not a state of ‘propertyless-ness*, see our dTscus- 
sTon on dYsqualYfYed coparceners, Tnfra,ft6|-6"3.
3. Katy. 467-8, Dh.K.563a. na ksetra-grha-dasanam danadhamana-vYkrayah/  
asvatantra-krtah sTddhTm prapnuyur nanuvarnTtah / /  pramanam sarva evaYte 
panyanam kraya-vYkraye /  yadT samvyavaharam te kurvanto hy anumodYtah / /
4 . The word anuvamTta Ys rendered as:*f5ermTtted* or ‘authorised*, D h .K ., I, 1, 
Tndex, 4 .
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(by those on whom they are not depend­
ent). A ll these (dependent persons) 
have authority for sale and purchase of 
marketable goods, t f  they are supported 
(by theTr masters) when they enter Tnto 
the transaction. 1
2Narada says: " I f  a son has transacted any business without autho­
risation from hTs father, Tt Ts also declared an TnvalTd transaction. A  slave and
3a son are equal Tn that respect".
It Ts true that ownership Tn the public mind and Tn Western jurlspru-
4
dence Ts Inseverable from mastery and the power to deal with property, but 
juridical distinction between svatva (ownership), svatantrya (Independence), and 
paratantrya (dependence) In Hindu jurisprudence points to the fact that although 
a non-independent person could not enter Into a valid transaction, he could well 
be an owner.
1. Tr. Kaije, KatyayanasmrtT, 207-8. Also Harlta, Dh.K.1146a: jTvatl pltarl 
putranam arthadana-vlsargaksepesv asvatantryam: *WhIle the father Is living 
the sons have no Independence In respect to the appropriation, g ift or realisa­
tion of property1.
2. Narada, IV .30, Dh.K.559b: putrena ca krtam karyam yat syad acchandatah p ltu h / 
tad apy akrtam evahur dasah putra sea tau sam au//.
3. Tr. Jo lly, SBE, XXXIII, 50. Cp. similar rule In Roman law, A .A . Schiller,
The Business Relattons of Patron and Freedman In Classical Roman Law*, In
M . RadlnandA.M . Kidd, ed ., Legal Essays In Tribute to Orrln Kip McMurray, 
(Berkeley, 1935), 623-9; discussion, supra, 70 n .2 .
4 . SeeT.E. Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, (Oxford, 1916), 209-10.
J . Salmond, Jurisprudence, (London, 1^74), 2 /7 -8 .
c. Fathers power to sell or abandon their chtldren
Vaslstha declares: ^• •
Man formed of uterine blood and virile  
seed proceeds from his mother and his 
father (as an effect) from its cause.
(Therefore) the father and the mother 
have power to give, to sell, and to 
abandon (2) theTr (son) .(3)
When the son was not Independent and when he could be an object of 
sale or g ift by the father, It Is quite logical that the son's position as a co-owner 
with the father should be doubted.
However, It seems that Manu condemns the sale of an offspring when
4
he forbids a father to receive a gratuity for giving his daughter In marriage.
"No father who knows (the law) must take even the smallest gratuity for his 
daughter ; for a man who, through avarice, takes a gratuity, Is a seller of
5
offrorlng".
1. Vaslsthadh.su., Smrtl Sandarbha, III, 1506; P .N . Sen, The General 
Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, TLL, 1909, (Calcutta, 1918), 252. 
sonlta-^ukra-sambhavah puruso mata-pltr-nlmlttakah /  tasya pradana- 
vlkraya-tyagesu mata-pltarau prabhavatah / /
2. Better Is'relinquish*.
3. Tr. BiJhler, SBE, XIV, 75. Cp. similar power of father In Germanic and 
Roman law, S .J . Stoljar, 'Children, Paretrrs and Guardians', International 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, IV, 16-17, for a discussion, supra,U K
ZT.
4. Manu, 111.51. na kanya^h pita vldvan grhnlyac chulkam anvapl/grhnan 
sulkam hi lobhena syan naro'patya-vlkrayl / /
5. Tr. Bdhler, SBE, XXV, 84.
In the Katyayanasmrtl, we ftnd a qualification of the general power 
conferred to a father In Vaslstha's  ^ text. With regard to the father's power 
of selling the son, Katyayana seems to deduce a conclusion from the sastras 
that only In time of adversity may one sell or give away one's wife or son, 
also he Introduced the element of consent on the part of the wife or the son In 
such transaction.^
Wives and sons, I f  unwilling, should 
not be made the subjects of sale or g ift, 
wives, sons and one's entire wealth 
could be employed by a man himself 
(for any purpose of his own); but tn 
times of adversity one may sell or 
give away (even one's wives and 
sons), but he should not proceed to 
do so otherwise (I.e . In the absence 
of adversity). This Is the definite 
conclusions of the sastras. 3
Then Katyayana clarifies the father's power over his dependent and
4
his power of selling the son. He declares:
1. Vaslstha, SBE, X IV , 75.
2 . Katy. 638-39, Dh.K.804: vlkrayarp calva danam ca na neydh syur antcchavah /  
darah putra^ca sarvasvam atmanyeva tu y o ja y e t/ /  apatkale tu kartavyam danam 
vtkraya eva va /  anyatha na pravarteta It! sastra-vlnlscayalj//
3. Tr. Kane, Katyayanasmrtl, 250. In Sasantan law 'only the father Is entitled
to sell hts children Into slavery and that under adverse circumstances', M.Shakl, 
The Sassanlan Matrimonial Relations', archlv orlentalm, 39 (1971), 322-45 at 336.
4. Katy. 471, Dh.K.563b: sutasya suta-dardnam vasltvam tvanusasane/  vlkraye 
calva dane ca vasltvam na sute pltuh / /
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The dependence (on the father or hus­
band) of the son or of the wtfe (con­
sists only) Tn hts (fathers or husband's) 
right to control them (or their actions), 
but the father has no power over the 
son so far as selling or gifting him Is 
concerned. 1
d . Concluding remarks
-  -  2
Katyayana, 471, Is In conflict with the text of Vaslstha which em­
powers a father to sell his son. To a casual reader of the dharmasastras, con­
flic t of the literal meaning of one text with that of the other Is Indeed confusing. 
But the techniques of sastrlc Interpretation and the predicament of a lay scholar
are, fundamentally, two different things. The principal task of the Interpreters
3
was to extract the rules of dharma from the mass of authoritative texts, and 
according to the rules of Interpretation, a provision In one text does not auto­
matically Invalidate another text with a contradictory provision. On this 
point, Derrett says:
The necessity of Interpreting each text 
In the light of parallel, and often appa­
rently Inconsistent texts In equally valu­
able and binding sources -  according to
1. Tr. Kane, Katyayanasmrtl, 208.
2 . Supra,4 3 n . l j  also with Katyayana, 638-9.
3 . LTngat, CLI, 157. On techniques of Interpretation, Ib id ., C h.I, Derrett, 
RLSI, Ch.3.
the hermeneutTc theory of ekavak- 
yata (1) (all the sages were Tn har- 
mony) -  leaves ample scope for the 
Introduction of alternatives, and the 
applTcatton of conditions, where the 
text gives no hint of such. (2)
The r sis envisaged a situation Tn which the Ihera! meaning of two texts might 
conflict with each other. That Is why Yajnavalkya says: "In case of a conflict 
between two smrtls, reasoning (nyaya) guided by the practices of the past has 
(more) force"
1. The principle of ekavakyata Insists on the equal valid ity and harmony of
a ll texts on dharma. It Is rare to find an expression of revolt from accepted 
rule In a smrtl unless In s till more ancient works the divergence of view ex­
pressed by the revolt finds a basis, and by a consequent option (vlkalpa) the 
right to differ Is conceded. The Sakhantaradhlkarana of PurvamTmamsa main­
tains that a ll sakhas speak with one voice, K .V.R. Alyangar, Rajadharma, 
(Adyar, 1941), 81-2, 150-2; also Brhaspatl, (Baroda, 1941), Tntrod., 129-30. 
However, It was a pretention that the sages spoke with one voice, when there 
were In fact, a great many unresolved alternatives, Derrett, ‘ Intellectual 
Weaknesses In the Dharmasastras1, History o f Indian Law, (Leiden, 1973), 36. 
Cp. In Jewish law the great d ifficu lty  of reconciling divergent opinions on a 
point of law was met with the blank assertion, They are a ll the words of the 
One Living God‘ , (Erubln, 13b). However, It Is a Mlshnalc tradition that 
even after the Halakha was established, dissenting opinions were recorded and 
studied In order to enable a later generation to prefer the view which was dis­
carded to that which was adopted (Eduyot, I, 4-6), H .H . Cohn, Jewish Law 
In Ancient and Modem Israel, (Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1971), Mntro-
ductlon‘ , x -x l.
2. Derrett, RLSI, 86.
3. Y a jn . ll.2 l:  smrtyor vlrodhe nyayas tubalavan vyavaharatah, tr. CLI, 168. 
Kane, HD, III, 866. Gharpure and Mandllk translate nyaya as ‘equity1.
But the translation of nyaya by equity Is debatable, see Llngat, CLI, 161,
n .40.
Yajnavalkya*s phrase ‘the practices of the past* leaves ample scope 
for usages Tn the Interpretation of texts. LTngatsays: * . . .  the usages prac­
tised by the men of the past, that Ts to say from tTme Immemorial, are comfort­
able to the teaching of the Sages*.  ^ Thus, the texts discussed above, should not 
be taken litera lly as Inconsistent with each other. One should see how far the 
rules contained In these texts were confirmed by custom and the norms of Hindu 
family life consistent with dharma.
X . Litigation between Father and Son
a . Nature of litigation
In general terms, the dharmasastras allowed parties to bring their cases
2
to court when they suffered Injuries cognisable In law.
If one, aggrieved by others In a way 
contrary to the smrtls and the esta­
blished usage, complain to the King, 
that (subject) Ts one of the titles of ^
Vyavahara ora judicial proceeding.
1. CLI, 168. Colebrooke says: The usage presumes a recollection, which 
again presupposes revelation*, H.T. Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays, 3 
Vo Is. (London, 1873), II, 338. The practices of good men and the usage 
of particular communities are not contrary to the Veda, A .S . Nataraja 
Ayyar, MTmarrea Jurisprudence, (Allahabad, 1952), 50.
2. Yajn.11.5, D h . K . I . l ,  III, smrtyacara-vyapetena margenadharsltah paralh/
avedayatl ced rajne vyavahara-padam hi tat f f
3. Tr. Mandllk, Yajnavalakya-smrtl, (Bombay, 1880), 128.
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The general rule was that Tn a ll types of cases, the partTes had to
Initiate theTr proceedings before a judged ThTs shows that ancient Hindu
2law had what we call In modern terms an adversary system of litigation.
Under the adversary system, In a judicial'contest between two parties, the
role of a judge Ts like that of an Impartial umpire. Theoretically, this was
3
also the procedure In classical Hindu law but, In cases the judge could ask
4
questions to the partTes. However, the system of litigation In classical
1. Gautama, dh.su.13.27 (New Delhi, 1969), 205, SBE, 2,245; Manv, 8.43; 
Vaslstha, dh.su. 16.2-3, SBE, 14, 78; Katyayana 27,30, Kane, ed ., 3,
Agnl Purarja, 253, 35 (Varanasi, 1966), 368, a re-statement of Yajn. 11.5; 
Abhlllagltarthaclntamanl or Manasollasa of King Somesvara, 1.2.1265 and 
1.2.1275, (Mysore, 1^26), 175, 176.
2. On the nature of adversary system, see I.H . Jacob, The Present Importance of 
Pleading*, Tn Current Legal Problems, 1960,175. On two parties at the bar, 
Derrett, Vyavahara: Light on a Vanished controversey from an Unpublished 
fragment*, B .S .O .A .S ., 1953, XV, 3, 598-602 at 601.
3. Narada, 1.34: samah syat sarva-bhutesu . . . ;  also Rocher, ed ., Vyavahara- 
clntaman l, (Ghent, 1956), text, 40-41, t r . 171. R. Llngat, CLI, 249-50.
For the system of tria l, Kane, HD, III, 279-80. See the tale of the cat as 
judge between the partridge and the hare Tn the Pancatantra, L . Stembach, 
Juridical Studies In Ancient India, (Delhi, 1967), II, 14^30 at 29. Another 
secondary and jurid ica lly unreliable evidence of tria l Tn Sudraka*s Mrcchaka- 
tlka, ed ., R.D. Karmakar, (Poona, 1937), Ch.IX , 253-91.
4. Indirectly proved; the judge could not question one who ought not to be 
questioned, Arthas*', 4 .9 .14 , .Kangle, ed., I, 143, II, 322. In Medha- 
tlthl*s view, the judge must act as Inquisitor, Medh. on Manu, V III, 14; 
Derrett, The Concept of Law According to Medhatlthl, a Pre-lslamlc Indian 
Jurist*, In Essays Tn Classical and Modern Mlndu Law, I, 174-97 at 181.
HTndu law was not purely adversary.
Many disputes could not be brought by 
the aggrieved parties, but were pro­
moted suo motu as the outcome of the 
Klng*s officers1 enquiries, Including 
espionage. Pupils could not with 
propriety bring actions against their 
teachers, nor wives against their hus­
bands nor sons against their fathers, 
but the substance of such disputes 
would come within the Klng*s juris­
diction on the basis of what would,
In our Canon law, be called “ In­
stance procedure” . 1
b. Parties with special relationships
2It seems that upon the broad principles laid down by Yajnavalkya
3and others regarding Initiation of a suit, the sastras have put restriction In a 
few cases where the parties had a special relationship with each other.
4
Brhaspatl declares: "A  lawsuit cannot be Instituted mutually between
a teacher and his pupil, or between father and son, or man and w ife, or master 
and servant"
1. Derrett, The Corpus Juris of Hindu Law In 1972*, History of Indian Law, 
(Dharmasastra), (Leiden, 1973)^ 13.
2. Yajn. I I .5.
3. Supra, 44 L n . l-
4 . Br., Dh.K. I, 1, 121: guru-slsyau plta-putrau dampati svaml-bhftyakau/ 
etesarp samavetanam vyavaharo na sldhyatl/ /  Vyavahara-matrka, A . Mooker 
jee, ed., (Calcutta, 1912), 285, cites the text as of Brhaspatl; M£ta. on 
Yajn. II .32 as anonymous with variant reading: In place of etesam sama- 
vetanam, vlrodhe tu mlthas-tesam, ‘even I f  they are at conflict with each 
other*, tr. Gharpure, Mltdksara, (Bombay, 1938), III, 750.
5. Tr. Jo lly, SBE*; XXXIII, 234.
Superficially, the text seems to convey a meaning that a conflict 
between father and son Is not to be considered as a Iltlgable Issue. But else­
where, while enumerating the topics of litigation, Brhaspatl has accepted that
1 2there can be a litigation between husband and w ife, or master and servant.
3Moreover, there Is a variant reading In the Vyavaharasaukhya where In
4
place of na sldhyatT It Is na vldyate which litera lly means ‘not known1 and
does not carry as strictly a prohibitory sense as na sldhyatl. Though jlm uta-
5
vahana has attributed this verse to Brhaspatl, Vljpanesvara was doubtful about 
Its authorship and cited It as anonymous.^ Jolly has attributed the text to
Narada, ^ and K.V.R. Alyangar has Included the verse In his reconstruction
8 -of the Brhaspatlsmrtl. Rocher has accepted both Brhaspatl and Narada as
9
Its authors.
1. Br.11.7, (Baroda, 1941), 2; SBE, 33, 284.
2. Br.11.3, SBE, 33.283; SmrttCh. (Bombay, 1918), 1.
3 . See Brhaspatlsmrtl, (Baroda, 1941), 21, n .9 .
4 . V .S. Apte, The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary, (Bombay, 1912), 856; 
L. Rocher has translated na sldhyatl as ‘not accepted*, I .e . ‘not acceptable*,
I .e . ‘not to be recommended* which Is worth noting, ‘Matrimonial Causes 
According to the Dharmasastra* In Family Law In Asia and Africa*, J .N .D . 
Anderson, (London, 1968), 116 . 3
5. Vyavaharamatrka, In o p .c lt., 285.
6 . Mlta on Yajn. 11.32; on anonymous texts and their admissibility se?, K.V.R. 
Alyangar, Rajadharma, (Adyar, 1941), 152.
7. SBE, 33, 234.
8 . Bfhaspqtlsmrtl, (Baroda, 1941), 21.
9. Rocher, ubl c lt., 111.
If we accept that both Narada and Brhaspatl were the authors of this 
text, It Is possible that each of them attached a different meaning to I t .  We 
have shown above that Brhaspatl like other smrtlkaras  ^ accepted a conflict be­
tween husband and wife or master and servant as topics for litigation which
_  2
could be Initiated by the respective parties against each other (vadl-krta).
It Ts not likely that he should declare such Investigations as absolutely prohibited. 
Narada has Included a litigation between father and son In his chapter on 
praklmaka. The topics for litigation enumerated under this chapter are not 
Instituted by the partTes, but are Investigated and Initiated by the king. From 
this we can Infer that Narada only meant by the verse under discussion that a 
litigation between father and son cannot be Instituted as vadl-krta but their re­
spective rights can be determined as praklmaka, suo motu by the king.
But these Internal studies do not lead us very far. An Isolated study 
of a particular text, conveying a doubtful meaning, should be Interpreted Tn the 
light of other smrtls and for finding out the correct principle lying behind such 
text, a ll other dharamasastras stand Tn equal Importance.^
f . Fora taxonomy of vyavaharapadas (topics for litigation), see Kane, HD, 111,249.
2. Mark the comment of Rocher, ‘Matrimonial Causes According to the Dharmasadtra*
o p .c lt., I l l ,  n .3 . Medhatlthl says a dispute between husband and wife ‘Is to be 
brought up before the King*, rajanl vlvadltavyam Ytl, Jha, Manu-Smrtl, text, 
(Calcutta, 1939), II, 241, tfc. (Calcutta, 1926), V , 1 . ‘
3 . Narada, X V III, 3, SBE, XXXIII, 214.
4 . See the principle of ekavakyatva (the theory of the unity o f Idea between the 
different sources of Hlpdu Jurisprudence), K .V.R. Alyangar, Rajadharma, (Adyar, 
1941), 150-2, also his Some Aspects of the Hlpdu View of L ife, According to 
Dharmasastra, (Baroda, 1952), 81-2; C.S. Sastrl, Fictions In Hindu Law,(Adyar, 
1926), 166ff, especially 172, 179. Also supra, Al>% n . i .
Even Tn the Arthosasfra, there are clear Indications that father and son,
master and servant and preceptors and disciples could sue each other,and KautTlya
respectively makes provisions for fines In case of their being defeated In a suit J
2
11 And In case of their suing each other, the betters, I f  defeated shall pay one-
3
tenth (as fine), the Inferiors, one-fifth11,
c . Father and son
4 5There are evidences In Gautama and Manu that litigation between 
father and son did exist. Gautama has stated that a son who has enforced a d iv i­
sion of family estate against the wish of his father should be excluded from being 
an Invitee to a jfraddha dinner. ^ This Implies a dispute and perhaps one that, 
at least, went to arbitration.
Similar Is also the Implication of Manu. III. 159.^ Medhatlthl's
1 . Arthas. 3.11.33. Kangle, ed ., (Bombay, i960), I, 113. ‘parasparabhlyoge 
calsam uttamalj paroktah dasa-bandham dadyuh, avarah panca-bandham /  should 
be read with Arthas*. 3.11.32. Also see Arthas'3.1.1*9-20.
2. Means the respected ones, e .g . masters, priests, and preceptors and parents,
Kangle, Arthasastra, II, 264, n.33.
3. Tr. Kangle, II, 264.
4 . Gautama, dh.su .XV. 19, SBE, II, 255.
5. Manu, III .159.
6 . pltra ‘kamena vlbhaktan. Gautama Dharma Sutra, (Delhi, 1969), 265, SBE,
II, 255. Kane, HD, III, 566-7; HD, IV, 393.
7. Manu. I l l . 159. pltra vTvada-manas'ca . . .
comments on the verse coalesce wtth the Injunction contained In the text of
I -  4 -Gautama. Medhatlthl explains, *pltra vlv<|dafmanas^ca: *He who wrangles
or goes to law with his father . . .  1 of Manu as ‘He who quarrels with his father;
I .e . talks rudely to him; and goes to court against him as party to a suit Instl- 
2
tuted for partition*.
The question arises, what happens to a son who does not care for this 
social sanction, or who does not care for an Invitation to a sraddha dinner, or 
the ostracism this Implies? The obvious answer Is that at least In law (vyava- 
hara) nothing prevents him from suing his father for division of the family estate. 
But the answer may not be as simple as that. The question must be answered In 
the light of contemporary social setting during the times of Gautama and Manu, 
and In those days, very few sons would be bold enough to Invite sastrlc sanctions 
and social Indignation as a penalty for realising his legal rights.
Commenting on the supposed non-justlclablllty of disputes between
father and son e tc ., In the text of Brhaspatl under discussion, Jlmutavahana says
that this text was applicable only to offences of a minor character (alpaparadha 
3
vlsayam). But when a son finds that his lather Is dissipating the entire property 
to prostitutes and degraded people, he can resort to an officer of justice and a
1. Gautama, dh.su.XV. 19.
2 . Jha, Manu-Smrtl, (Calcutta, 1932), I, 276, the number of the, verse Is 111.149; 
tr . (Calcutta, *1921), 11(1), 182. Mandllk, Manaya-Pharma Sastra, (Bombay, 
1886), 377. Bdhler, SBE, XXV, 105, n.159^ Also see our discussion on 
Medhatlthl on Manu, Infra,463*
3 . Vyavahara-matrka, ed. A . Mookerjee, (Calcutta, 1912), 285.
suit w ill arise even between father and son. Here Jlmutavahana uncon­
sciously recognises some vested right of a son In family property during the 
lifetime of a father. Vljnanesvara opines that a son could sue a father In
order to Interdict a sale of land, acquired by the grandfather, because In such
2
land the ownership of father and son Is equal. But Vljnanesvara was con­
scious of the social Implications of such suits and he put forward worldly and 
spiritual reasons to prevent a son from coming to court. He comments,
Therefore the purport of the verse be­
ginning with "Between preceptor and 
the pupil e tc .”  Is that as a dispute 
with a preceptor etc. .w i l l  bear no ^ 
good result In this world or the next, 
so the pupils and others should In the 
first place be Induced away (better, 
dissuaded) by the King In company 
with assessors. 4
1. Ib id ., 285; to Rocher, Jlmutavahana *s Interpretation Is unsatisfactory. But 
In explaining this text, Jlmutavahana was on a precipice, he could not go 
further at the risk of acknowledglng a birthright In the son. Significant that 
Jmnutavahana does not justify It by the doctrine of factum valet, as at Dayab- 
haga, 11.30, Colebrooke, (Calcutta, 1810), 32. O f course, by general agree -  
ment, giving away of entire property by father Is an example of void grant, 
adatta, (unglven), P .N . Sen, General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, 
(Calcutta, 1918), 85-6; Derrett, ‘Prohibition and N u llity : Indian Struggles 
with a Jurisprudential Lacuna*, BSOAS, 20 (1957), 203ff at 205, 206 and 215 
hold this transaction as void; same view Medhatlthl on Manu,8.164, giving 
away of entire property, a void contract, text. Jha, Manu-smrtl, (Calcutta, 
1939), tr . Jha, (Calcutta, 1926), IV . 1.213—4. For discussion, supra,3 5 6 -(S3.
2. Y a jn .11.121.
3. dfsta (seen), adrsta (unseen), for a discussion, see A .S . Nataraja Ayyar, 
MTmarnsa Jurisprudence, (Allahabad, 1952), 10-13; Colebrooke, Miscellaneous 
Essays, (London, 1873), 11, 343; Llngat, CLI, tr. Derrett, 155-6; for drsta 
and adrsta, though discussed In a different context, see Derrett, RLSI, 131—3.
4 . Tr. Gharpure, YajnavaIkyasmrtl, (Bombay, 1938), II (3), 750.
In these words, VTjncnesvara Ts suggesttng an Tdea of preventive
justtce  ^ through a machtnery which could arrange an amicable settlement out
of court. This Ts not a total deprivation of the right to redress as conferred Tn
2broad terms by Yajnavalkya and other smjtlkaras, but only a discouragement
3
of litigation between persons standing Tn particular relationships.
But certain Issues may be too complex or serious to be settled out of
court and human emotion and psychology also play major parts Tn the aetiology
-  -  -  4
of litigation. Vljnanesvara, like Jlmutavahana, was conscious of these possl-
5
bllltles and that Is why he added: " I f  however, the parties press hard, a suit
has to be commenced even (when Instituted) by the pupil e tc . 11 ^
In our time, N .C . Seng up ta airs a particular point of view concerning
7 -  8Br. XXVII. 1, amd Narada X V III. 1, saying, "The exclusion of these topics of
1. On ‘Preventive Justice1, S.C. MTsra, Studies In Law, Patna Law College 
Golden Jubilee Commemoration Volume, (Bombay, 1961), 195-209 at 198, 
202.
2. Yajn .11.5.
3. See S. Varadacharlar, The Hindu Judicial System, (Lucknow, 1946), 137-8.
4 . Vyavahara-matrka, o p .c lt., 285. AIsoB. Bhattacharya, The Kallvarjyas, 
(Calcutta, 1943), 104.
5. Yajnavalkyasmrtl, (Varanasi, 1967), 196. atyanta-nlrbandhe tu slsyadlnam 
apy ukta-rTtya pravartanlyo vyavaharah /
6 . Tr. Gharpure, YajrTavaIkyasmrtl, (Bombay, 1938), II (3), 751.
7. SBE, XXXIII, 386.
8 . SBE* XXXIII, 214.
law from what Ts meant to be a chapter on vyavahara means only this, that 
these were not matters whtch came up Tn hTs days, before the KTng‘s court 
for litigation".^ However, Sengupta‘s argument appears to be fallacTous.
WTth a careful scrutTny, he mTght have doubted whether the real situation Tn
2 ; those days was not the opposTte of what he had thought. Brhaspatl Tncluded '
Tn hTs vyavahara-padas a iTtTgatTon between husband and wTfe, master and ser­
vant, and Narada mentToned ITtTgatTon between father and son on hTs chapter 
on praklmaka whTch were iTtTgatTons dTrectly under the KTng (nrpasfaya) ^  
Rocher says, " . . .  the stanza of Narada and Bj+iaspatl TmplTes that such law-
suTts could exTst, that they dTd exTst, but that they should be avoTded as much 
5
as possTble". The true explanation may well be no more than this -  that 
ITtTgatTon of thTs type, even Tf justified, was Injurious to dharma Tn general and, 
therefore, to be deprecated -  further, from a practical point of view the emo­
tional tensions Tn those relationships ought not to be released by the Initiative 
of the partTes concerned.
1. N .C . Sengupta, Evolution of Indian Law, (Calcutta, 1953), 231.
2 . By ‘In his days*, Sengupta means the days of BrhaspatT (whichever they were).
3 . Emphasis mine.
4 . See Pandavlveka of Vardhamana, ed ., K .K . Smrtltfrtha, (Baroda, 1931), 262.
5 . L . Rocher, ‘The Theory of Matrimonial Causes According to the Dharmas'astra*,
o p .c lt., 116.
As we have seen before, the two of the many plausible reasons ^
for which a son could sue his father were to Interdict his fathers alienation
2 3 4of the entire family estate, or land, which was acquired by the grandfather,
5
and suing the father for a partition.
d . prakfrgaka
Probably the Influences of social factors were so overwhelming that,
In spite of having a good cause of action, a son had to refrain from using his 
strictly legal right of suing his lather. This might explain why Narada put a 
litigation between father and son under miscellaneous heads, (praklmaka).
The lawsuits under praklnjaka ^ depend on the king. The king In i­
tiates the case, ‘when, and only when he thinks It appropriate*.^ Brhaspatl
clear ly points out the difference between disputes which are commenced by the
-  8 -  parties (yadl-krta) and those which are Instituted by the king (praklr -
1. Another subject-matter of litigation between father and son could be abandon­
ing each other which comes under sahasa, YajrT. II .237.
2. Jlmutavahana, Vyavaharamatrka, o p .c lt., 285.
3. Vljnanesvara on YajrT. 11.32.
4 . The question of the son*s birthright In the father*s acquired property Is dealt 
with below at pp. 5 \ 8-2.7-
5. Gautama, dh.su.X V II. 1; Medhatlthl on Manu, 111.159.
6 . The root meaning of the word Is Yelatlng to what Is scattered*, V .S . Apte,
The Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary, (Bombay, 1912), 639.
7. Llngat, CLI, 238, Kane, HD, III, 264.
8 . Though the Initiation was by the king, the general adversary system of procedure 
In tria l continued. The king had to take upon himself the position of a defend­
ant (pratlvaidl) In such cases, Smftl Candrlka, (Bombay, 1918), V y,9 , tr. 
(Poona, 1948), I, 15.
naka). ^  "This (aggregate of rules concerning) lawsuits has been declared; I
w ill declare (next the law concerning) Miscellaneous Causes Instituted by the 
2
king (In person)."
The cases under praklmaka comes under the extraordinary jurisdiction 
of the king. In this respect, Varadachartar observes: "The general theory of 
the ktngY duty to protect his subjects Involves the recogiltlon of a kind of resi­
duary or miscellaneous jurisdiction tn him somewhat on the analogy of the king
3
being Parens Patriae11.
4
Describing the nature of the topics dealt with under miscellaneous, 
K.P. Jayaswal (?) states that:
1. Br .X X V II.1, SBE, >0(XIII, 386; Alyangar, ed ., XXIX.1_, 266. e$a_vSdT- 
krtah prokto vyavaharah samasatah /  nrpasrayam pravaksyamt vyavaharam 
praklmakam f f
2. Tr. Jolly, SBE, XXXIII, 386. The definition of praklmaka Ts the same Tn 
Narada, X V II I .1, SBE, XXXIII, 214 (No. of the text, X V II.1). In the Agnt 
Purana, 253.30, (Varanasi, 1966), 368, nrpasraya Is substituted by mra£raya 
(bereft of shelter or In itia tor). B. MTshra thinks that the Purapa definition 
‘denotes a general lessening of the Importance of the Royal writs and the klngffe 
authority*, Polity In the AgnT Purana, (Calcutta, 1965), 126. MTshra Ts en­
titled to hold his own view but the Puranlc substitution does not change the 
fundamental character of these litigations.
3. Sir S. Varadacharlar, The Hindu Judicial System, (Lucknow, 1946), 87. The 
role of the king as parens patriae Is found In Sfakuntala, of Kalidasa, V I, 23, 
ed. Kale, (Bombay, 1957), 246-7. Also Manu, V II .3; V II I .27.
4 . In Canon Law this Is called ‘Instance procedure*, Derrett, ‘Corpus lurls of
Hindu Law*, Tn 1972, HTstory of Indian Law, (Dharmasastra), (Leiden, 1973),
13.
they a ll bear more or less public aspect.
It Ts very rarely that Individuals qua Indi­
viduals are affected by them and the king 
acts not as an arbiter between subject and 
subject but as the guardian of the social 
order and public organisation. 1
Litigation between father and son, looked upon as a duel between two 
contestants^ discouraged by saslras, nevertheless the king as the ‘guardian of 
social order1 had to redress certain grievances between father and son through 
this Inquisitorial jurisdiction.
Narada‘s Inclusion of litigation between father and son as a topic 
within prakTrnaka served two purposes. It saved a son from social stigma for 
bringing an action against his father on his own In itia tive, and at the same time, 
a son‘s grievances were redressed by the ktng‘s court at Its own motion.
2Narada mentions the disputes under praklmaka; "Disputes between
father and son, neglect of (prescribed) penances, abstraction of gifts (made to
3
worthy persons), the wrath of anchorites" (as w e ll).
Apparently, to discourage a father and his son from suing each other, 
as well as to avoid publicity due to the Involvement of third parties, and to
1. K.P. Jayaswal, The Miscellaneous Chapter1, CWN, 15 (19h)j 
cxxxv lll-cx ll at cxxxlx; reference of this article could be seen, K.P. 
Jayaswal, Manu and Yajnavalkya, a Basic History of Hindu Law, TLL,
1917t (Calcutta, 1930), 2, n .2 .
2 . Narada, X V II.3 (Calcutta, i960), 61, SBE, XXXIII, 214 (Text N o .V III.3 ). 
plta-putra-vlvadas' ca prayas'cltta-vyatlkramah /  pratlgraha-vllopas'ca kopa 
asramlnam a pi / /
3 . Tr. Jolly, SBE,t  XXXIII, 214.
dtscourage the latter from embroiling Families, a witness used to be fined for
giving evidence In such litigation.^ "For witnesses In a feud between father
2
and son, the fine Is three panas11.
The amount of this fine, for being a witness In these cases, appears
to have Increased, which could be an Indication that despite the provision laid
3down by Yajfiavalkya , people were coming forward to act as witnesses. To
4
deter the public at large from taking part In family quarrels, V T s q u  Increased 
5
the fine to 10 panas. This upward tendency of fine could be taken to suggest 
an Increase Tn number of litigations between father and son
The evidence of a witness could be vita l to a case, but Its absence was 
not completely fatal to the cause of action because other evidences, such as docu­
ments e tc ., were admissible.^ Moreover, In absence of any evidence, the
1. Y a jn.ll.239# Mandllk, ed., 146. plta-putra-vlrodhe tu sakslnam trl-pano
damah /• *
2. Tr. Mandllk, 236. paija Is a copper coin of certain weight, Vardhamana*s 
DandavTveka, o p .c lt., Tntrod., v l l.  Vardhamana enumerates eight cate- 
gorles of state offences of which the fifth one Is ‘Quarrel between father and 
son*. Punishment for the fifth  offence (I.e . furnishing grounds for the 
quarrel between father and son) Is the fine of uttama-sahasa (I .e .  copper coins 
ranging between six hundred and one thousand), Ib id ., Introd. ,  xxIT.
3. Kane, HD, III, 932.
4 . VT§nu, V . 120-1, Adyar Library ed., (Madras, 1964), I, 115. Krtyakalpataru: 
Vyavaharakanda, (Baroda, 1953), 563, SBE, V ll,  35.
5. During the Puranlc age this was 200'damab, Matsya Purana, 227,198, (Poona, 
1907), 481. ’ ; 7
6. It Is not usually believed that fines expressed Tn numerals were to be taken 
lite ra lly . Taken as a group, they Indicated relative severity.
7. On the relative Importance of different kind of evidences, A . Thakur, Hindu Law
of Evidence, (Calcutta, 1933), 11-12.
n
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king's decision was Final. ^
In family transactions and especially In dealings between father and 
son, documentation was like ly to be rare. Therefore, the evidence of witness 
became necessary In meting out {ustlce and as an Inevitable result, the restrict­
ion of witnesses In form of fine was abrogated as kalT-varjya (deprecated Tn the 
2
kali age). "Fining a witness In a dispute against the father (Is one of the)
3
five things to be deprecated In the ka il age” ,
e. Conclusion
The above discussion reveals that litigation between father and son 
as a topic of vyavahara provoked attention In classical Hindu law. The dis­
couragement and disapproval of such litigation by smrtlkaras and commentators 
and the ultimate abolition of the provision of fine for witnesses are developments
having a bearing on the substantive right In property between father and son.
4
From Gautama, It appears that sons used to demand a partition of property
5
even against the w ill of their fathers, and this demand presupposes the existence
1. PTtamaha and Vyasa, cited In the Smrtl Chandrlka, (Bombay, 1918), 54.
2. Dharmaslndhu, (Varanasi, 1968), 709. . . .  pltr-vade sakstI-dandam kalau panca
vlvarjayet.
3 . Tr. mine. Also on this, see Kane, HD, III, 932. B. Bhattacharya, The Kall-
varjyas, (Calcutta, 1943), 11. On the kall-varjya theory, LIngat, CLI, 189-95.
4 . Gautama, dh.su.XV. 19.
5. For the modern discussion of this subject, Derrett, Critique, 204. Also
Tnfra,$ 6 5 - 3 6  .
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of the right of a son Tn family property from hTs bTrth. However, Tt Ts apparent 
that social considerations stood Tn the way of this legal right of a son and co­
hesion and harmony In a family were matters of prime concern for the smrtlkaras, 
commentators and also (Tn their view) for the king. But the abolition of fining 
a witness In a litigation between father and son, as kall-varjya, signifies that 
social factors or commentatorlal opinion could not suppress the substantive right 
of a son any longer.^
1. Kane, HD, III, 932.
CHAPTER 13
EARLY MEDIAEVAL COMMENTARIES
I . The Birthright and the Manubhasya of MedhatTtht
The commentator par excellence on Manu Ts MedhatTtht. However, 
the bhasya of BharucT (called Manu-sastra-vTvarana) Ts the oldest extant commen­
tary on the Manu-smrtT.  ^ BharucT represents a southern tradition, but hTs com-
2ments are short to be used for frequent comparTson. MedhatTtht, the author
_ 3
of the Manubhasya, had BharucT before him, Tn any case. Very Itttle Ts known
4
about MedhatTtht save that he Itved Tn Kashmir. MedhatTthl's area of ortgtn 
gives added Importance to hTs work. The topography and historical Isolation 
of Kashmir from the rest of the subcontinent saved It from many changes and spe-
1. LTngat, CLI, III. BharucT Ts now available Tn print. Edited and translated 
by Derrett, Bharucl's Commentary on the ManusmftT, 2 Vols.,(Franz Steiner 
Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1975). For the date of BharucT, Derrett, Ib id ., I, 
Tntrod., 9-17.
2. LTngat, CLI, 112.
3. LTngat, Ib id ., 112. On the Importance of BharucT, Derrett, 'BharucT on the 
Royal Regulative Power In India', JAOS, 84 (1964), 4: 392-5; *A Newly- 
Discovered Contact Between Arthasastra and Dharmasas tra: the role of 
BharucT, ZeTtschrTft der Deutschen Morgen Iflndlschen Gesellschaft, 115 (1965),
134-52; BharucT, I, Tntrod., 1-36.
4. Llngat, CLI, 112. BOhler, SBE^XXV, Tntrod., cxx lll-cxx lv . Kane, HD, 
(Poona, 1968), I, 1, 574-5. Manu-smrtT (Bharatiya VTdya B ha van, Bombay, 
1972), Tntrod., x l.
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d a lly  From the influences of the Deccan J  Being re presen tatTve of north
2
Indian view on Manu during the 9th century, MedhatTthl's work Ts of Tm- 
mense value to hlstorTcal jurisprudence.
To reach the age of MedhatlthI, we have to come a long way from 
Manu. During the centuries which elapsed between Manu and MedhatlthI,
3probably quite a few commentators on Manu emerged, and also customs and
popular practices made Inroads Into the area of dharma. He Interpreted Manu
In the light of other dharmasastras and prevailing customs and frequently supple-
4
mented Manu's utterances with his own opinion. In this respect, he used the 
comparative method and could be called an early exponent of comparative juris­
prudence In South Asia.
Strangely enough, no verse has been attributed to Manu similar to
_ 5
Yajnavalkya 11,121 or Brhaspatl 26.14, which directly conveys a meaning
1. M .A . Stein, Kalhana's Rajatarariglnl, (Westminster, 1900), Preface, xv l. 
However, BharucT was available to MedhatlthI certainly throughout the Seventh 
Book, Derrett, 'BharucI on the Royal Regulative Power Tn India1, JAOS, 84 
(1964) 4: 392-5 at 394.
2. MedhatlthI Is supposed to have flourished between 825 and 900 A .D ., Kane, 
HD, I, 1, 583, SBE, XXV, ev il. Manu-smrtI, Bharatiya VIdya-Bhavan, ed ., 
(1972), x l.  *“
3? SBE, XXV, Introd., cvTII, cxx.
4. R.K. Sarvadhlkarl, The Principles of the Hindu Law of Inheritance, TLL, 1880, 
(Calcutta, 1882), 322. LTngat, CLI, 112.
5. Dh.K.1179b, also Br.26.10, Dh.K.1180b, and VIsrju, X V II.2 , Dh.K.1175a.
that Tn ancestral property, the ownership o f father and son Ts co-extensTve.
In a number of verses, Manu ordatned that self-acquTred property was not
partible.^ Manu ordains that Tf a father recovers ancestral property which
was lost, he does not need to share Tt wTth hTs sons, because Tt Ts hTs self- 
2acquTred property. Manu's specTftc utterances on self-acquTred property 
mTght be taken to suggest that a father had to share ancestral property wTth 
hTs sons, thereby perhaps TmplyTng that a son had a bTrthrTght Tn the property 
of hTs grandfather, but he avoTds sayTng thTs -  and Tt Ts sTgnTfTcant.
MedhatlthI was fu lly  aware of the texts whTch conferred a bTrthrTght
to sons Tn theTr grandfather's property. ThTs becomes apparent when he quotes
Yajnavalkya's text (11.12]) and comments: "HavTng thTs right, a ll the sons
are entTtled to equal shares Tn theTr grandfather's property; sTnce shares only 
4
follow the right” , Or rather,
And because the son has ownershTp, 
a ll of them are, without any except- 
Ton, entTtled to share Tn the paternal
grandfather's assets as long as the 
property has not reached theTr hands 
(iTterally, "to the extent that they 
have not got Tt"), for partTtTon has 
Property as Tts precondTtTon. 5
1. Manu, IX, 206; IX .208.
2. Manu, IX .209.
3. Medh. on Manu, IX .209, Jha, Manu-smrtT, (Calcutta, 1939), II, 302. 
satyapT ca putrasya svamye yavad apraptas tavat sarvatha vTsesabhavat sarve 
pTtamaha-dhana-bhajah svatvapurvakatvad vTbhagasya /
4 . Tr.Jha, Manu-smrtT, (Calcutta, 1926), V , 173. ThTs Ts a good example of 
Jha's loose style of translation.
5. An Improvement by Derrett on the margin of my first draft.
Here MedhatTtht exp lic itly  admits that partition follows a pre­
existing right but being fettered by sastrlc considerations, he cannot accept 
the right of a son to force a division of ancestral property against the w ill of 
a father, because such a division would be against dharma and the sons would
Incur sin.
He says:^
In actual practice, even though, under 
the circumstances, the sons have a right 
over ancestral property, yet from the de­
precatory assertion -  "the sons who d i­
vide the property against the father's 
wish are to be deprecated" -  It follows 
that the sons who force the partition on 
their father Incur sin. Such as even 
though one may acquire property by re­
ceiving constant gifts, yet the act of 
acquiring such property Ts blameworthy.
Similarly, even though the property 
(thus shared with the unwilling father)
Is the hereditary property of the sons, 
yet Tt Is open to censure. 2
But despite prohibitive Injunction of the sastra, MedhatlthI concedes
that In time of extreme necessity the sons could ask for a division of ancestral
3
property from their father. "For this reason, so long as they have any other
1. On Manu, IX .209, Jha. 11, 302. acarena satyapl casyam avasthayam putrajam 
svamye 'pltra cakamena vlbhaktan I t ! '  nlnda-darsanad balad-vlbhajayantah papa 
Tty anumlyate /  yatha sakrt-pratlgrahena bhavatl svamym dojsas tu purusasya /  
tenanvayagatamltldream as'uddham eva /
2. Tr. Jha, V , 173. For 'open to censure'read 'tainted (wealth)'.
3 . Medh. on Manu, IX .209, Jha, 11,302. atah sambhavaty-upayantare na pita 
'rthanlyah /adharmo hi tatha s y a t/
460.
means the sons should never ask theTr Father for a partition: as such asking 
would be Immoral” .^
Thts Indicates the existence of a so6*s birthright Tn ancestral pro­
perty; but MedhatlthI, according to whom acquisition of wealth should be 
through the rules of dharma, dissuaded a son from realising his birthright by
demanding a partition against the w ill of his father. He was aware of ‘actual 
  2
practice* (acarena satyapl) and the juristic purport of Yajnavalkya*s text 
3
(II .121) but he could not outsoar his age, In which the division of property
by sons against the wish of their fathers was deprecated, and property acquired
4
by sons through such forced division used to be considered Impure (asuddha).
1. Tr. Jha, V , 173. For ‘Immoral* read ‘contrary to dharma*. Bharuc!‘s com­
ment on Manu,IX.209 Ts very useful. He says: pitamaha-dhanasyetare ‘pTsata
Ity anaya sankaya pratlsedhah /  anena ca darsanena satyam vlbhaga-pratlpattau
vTttarp sarvam vlbhajanlyam /  pltra-putra-vlbhagasyaltad darsanam /  jlva - 
pltrkanam astl vlbhaga Ity etad darsayatl/ ,  Derrett, ed ., Bharucl, I .  185:
*Thls Is a prohibition, for one might suspect that the others are masters of Tt be­
cause It was (originally) the grandfather*s property* This example shows that 
when a partition Is Instituted every Item of property must be divided. This also 
exemplifies the fact that sons may divide from their father; that Ts to say It 
makes plain the fact that there can be a division between sons of a father who Is 
s till alive*, tr. Derrett, Bharucl, II, 264.
2. Medh. on Manu, IX, 209, Jha, 11.302.
3. Colebrooke thinks that this verse contains the rule regarding son*s birthright
In ancestral property, Digest, V , xc l, (London, 1801), 34. But BUhler seems 
to have apprehended that MedhatlthI on Manu, IX .209, misunderstood that 
Manu admitted son*s birthright In ancestral property, SBE, XXV, 376, n.209.
4 . Medh. on Manu, IX, 209, Jha. 11.302.
The ‘superimposed corrective*  ^ of this sdstrlc gloss may appear arbitrary, but
Tt ts consistent with Medhatlthl*s conception of ownership. He admits that
but
the sons have an Innate ownership (svamya) In property from their blrth/by that
2
ownership they do not become masters (Isa) before the decense of their parents
3
or before a partition made by the father himself.
4Medhatlthl emphasises: "In fact, the revered teachers have de­
clared that as soon as the son has been born, he becomes the owner of entire 
5
property".
From this opinion of the acaryas quoted by Medhatlthl, one might be 
tempted to think that he accepted the son*s birthright but subsequently he quali­
fies this general remark by reference to Manu*s text (IX . 104)
Since It has been declared that "son 
becomes the owner of the property as 
soon as he Is bom” (so that the owner­
ship of a ll brothers over the ancestral 
property Is Innate In them); but as long
1. G .D . Sonthelmer, The Joint Hindu Family, Ph.D. Thesis, unpublished, 
University of London, (1965), 205.
2. Isa means *master*, Monler Williams, Sanskrit English Dictionary, (Oxford, 
1899), 171, C o l. l .  Apte, 252, c o l.^ i
3 . Medh. on Manu, IX .209.
4 . Medh. on Manu, IX. 156, Jha, II, 291. *utpanno varthasvamyam Tty acarya*
I t f /
5 . Tr. Jha, V , 144. Bracket ‘entire*.
6. Medh. on Manu, IX .212, Jha, II, 303. yata uktam -  *samutpanno vacyah
svdmltl /  amsaste hi [Ivatoh (IX . 104) I t l tatra pltur-uidhvam samanantaram eva
putrdnam svamyam dar£ayatl /
as the parents are a live, they have no 
mastery over It"  (9.104) which shows 
that the sons acquire ownership Imme­
diately after the fathers death. 1
A son, according to Medhatlthl, Is anfsa during the lifetime of his
parents, nevertheless he admits that the son*s right to Inherit does not accrue
from the moment of their parents* decease, but originates from the moment of
the sons* b irth . This Is apparent from Medhatlthl*s Interpretation of Manu, IX .
212. This verse deals with the problem of devolution of the property of a de-
2
ceased brother of the fu ll blood, who was separated from some or a ll other 
brothers before his death. One Illustration w ill explain Medhatlthl*s view on 
this point.
(F) 1 Even though B1 was
(W) separated from the rest
(W2) Qf  the brothers before
B2 died, B1 being a 
brother of the fu ll
B1 B2 B3 blood with B2, w ill
exclude B3 from In - 
separated from herltance.
B2 and B3
1. Tr. Jha, V ,176. For *becomes* read *ls called*.
2 . Jha, V, 175, and Bdhler, SBE, XXV, 376, have translated sodara as uterine 
brother. Though litera lly correct (samanam udaram yasya sah), It Is substan­
tia lly  wrong. In the Hindu sens? sodara should be rendered as *brother of 
whole blood*, see BOhler, SBE, XXV, 377, n .2 l2 , where he rectified himself; 
also Monler Williams, 1248-1249; Apte, 999. Cp. Arabic akhwah-ll-um 
(uterine brothers, litera lly brothers through the mother). Also see Y a jrl.ll.138 . 
Ya jn.ll.139  Is similar to Manu, IX.212. On these two texts of Yajnavalkya, 
see K .L . Sarkar, Mlmansa Rules of Interpretation as Applied to Hindu Law, 
(Calcutta, 1909), 399-405.
463.
Medhatlthl explains why a brother of the half-blood, even though 
united with the deceased brother, Is excluded by the brother of the fu ll blood 
who Is separated from the deceased. He says, ‘among uterine brothers, even
» i
when separated there Is always some sort of "proximity11 (sannldhyam). .  This
proximity means that the right of the separated brother of fu ll blood did not accrue
from the moment of death of the united brother, but It accrued from his birth, be-
2
cause ownership of a ll brothers over ancestral property Is Innate In them.
Despite this acceptance of son's Innate right In ancestral property, a
son can gain complete mastery over It either at a partition by the father or at a
3
partition after the retirement or death of the father.
But some sons may transgress the sastrlc Injunction and may divide 
property against the wishes of their fathers. According to Medhatlthl, pro­
perty acquired at such partition confers absolute ownership on the sons, but In 
the eye of dharma such ownership Is tainted. Such property Is considered by
Medhatlthl as Impure, because purity and Tmpurtty can only be determined 
4
from the sastra. "So that It Is only from the scriptures that It can be deter-
5
mined what Is purity and what Is Impurity” .
1. Medh. on Manu, IX .212, Jha, II, 176.
2. Ibid.
3. On son's paratantrya (non-Independence), see Derrett, *The Development of 
the Concept of Property in India*, ZVR 64 (1962), 95-101. frUc frbcvt PP. 4 3 * - 5  %
4 . Medh. on Manu, V .U O , Jha, 1,474. atah suddhyasudho ubhe apt sastra- 
vaseye /
5. Tr. Jha,HI, 1, 137.
However, the relevance of thTs passage Ts ritua l. Indeed, scrupu­
lous Brahmins would not perform ceremonies for families who paid them out of
‘tainted* wealth, but by the time of the MTtaksara such scruples were regarded 
1 _  ‘  2 
as unnecessary and even Medhatlthl took a liberal view on the subject.
Medhatlthl*s view on partition and ownership Ts also explained by 
his definitions of  daya. According to him, daya Is ‘property acquired by 
succession*. It means, daya stands for that property which Is obtained by 
descent. This definition Implies that property w ill first belong to the father 
before It devolves on the son.
In another Instance, Medhatlthl has explained daya to mean pro- 
4
perty ‘which Is given* by a father to the son when the latter has finished his
study of the Vedas and Ts about to take to the order of householder. However,
the one definition w ill not exclude the other, for an advanced share naturally
adeems a share at a partition later, or at the father*s death.
  5
Medhatlthl has also used the term ‘dayada* In the sense of owner.
Pointing out the significance of such use, Derrett says, ‘daya was not an ex­
pectancy but a subsisting right subject however to obstructions and limitations
1. Derrett, RLSI, 137-40.
2. Medh. on Manu, IV, 226, Jha,II, 2, 476-7.
3. Medh. on Manu, X.115, Jha, 11,363. dayo ‘nvayagatam dhanam/
4 . Medh. on Manu, I I I .3 , Jha, 1,205. dfyata It! dayo dhanam /  tr. Jha, II, 
1, 16.
5 . Medh. on Manu, V III, 27, Jhfl/ | |# 84, tr. Jha, IV , 1,38. dayadah 
svamyotrocyate /
of one kind or others*,,  ^ whtch also sums up Medhatlthl's treatment of the
son's birthright. He acknowledged Its existence subject to the restriction
that the father had a power of deciding on partition during his lifetim e.
Medhatlthl highlights the purport of Y a jn . l l . l2 l,  by emphasising the need 
2
for such a restriction. "As a matter of fact, I f  there were no such restrict­
ions, the sons would become entitled to their grandfather's property as soon 
3as they were born". (The emphasis here Is on the word Isate).
Medhatlthl does not accept the notion that a Hindu father had patrla
potestas like his Roman counterpart, as one might think from a superficial Inter-
4pretatlon of the famous verse Manu, V II I .416. According to Medhatlthl, a
5
son could acquire property, but he lacked the power to deal with It freely 
during his father's lifetime or until he gets his share In a partition made by his 
father. He explains the meaning of the sloka by saying,^ "What Is meant by
1. Derrett, Journal of Indian History, 30 (1952), 36ff at 42. dayada a lso meant 
svaml (owner), saplnda and son, Hataydha, Abhldhanaratnamala, 833, cited by 
Derrett, Ib id ., 42, *n .2 l. Also Derrett, ZVR 64 (1962), 53.
2 . Medh. on Manu, IX ,209, Jha, II, 301. anyatha tu yadalva praptah putra 
bhavantl tadalva te pltamaha-dhanasyesyate /
3. Tr. Jha, V , 173. For 'entitled'read 'masters of*.
4 . Manu, VIII .416. bharya putras" ca dasas ca traya evadhanah smrtah /  yat te
samadhlgacchantl yasya te tasya tad dhanam /A u *- 4a7-44o.
5. See Derrett, RLSI, 137.
6. Medh. on Manu, V III. 416, Jha, II, 239. atrocyate/  paratantrya-vldhanam e ta t /  
asatyarp bhartur anujnayam na strlbhlh svatantryena yatrakkvacld-dhanam vlnlyok- 
tavyam /  evam putra -dasayor-api drstavyam /
the text Ts only that they are dependant, subservient; the meantng being that 
"without the husband's sanction, the wife should not employ her wealth any­
where she may choose'. Similarly with the son and the slave". ^
It seems that according to Medhatlthl, a son's subservience does not 
continue for the whole period of his father's lifetime. He places some weight
2
on the fact that at the age of sixteen, a son becomes entirely master of himself, 
but this Is a dangerous argument. Probably he meant one reaches legal compe­
tence at the age of sixteen. We have already pointed out one achieves
3svatantrya on the death of parents.
4
Elsewhere, Medhatlthl explains:
1. Tr. Jha, V , 435. For similar view, see Sahara on Jalmlnl, V I, I, 14,
Sahara says It Is wrong to say that the wife and the rest are devoid of pro­
perty: nlrdhanatvam anyayam-eva scutTvTrodhat, Katje, HD, III, 578;
Sahara Bha?yq. tr. Jha. (Baroda. 19341. II. 981. For Jalmlnl, B.D. Basu, 
ed ., The Sacred Book of the Hindus, (Allahabd, 1923), XXVII, I, 302. On 
this point, the overriding authority of the £rutl over smrtl Is explained by 
A .S . Nataraja Ayyar, Mlmansa Jurisprudence, (Allahabad, 1952), 36-7.
2. Below., n .4.
3. Supra,43 3 .
4 . Medh. on Manu, V II1 .163, Jha, 11.154. putrasyapl yat-p ltarl parantantryam 
tad aprthak-krtasya tad-grhe nlvasatah /  yada tu pltr-vlbhakto dhanam svayam- 
ariltavams tada "urdhvam tu sodasad varsat-putram mltravad acaret" It ! 
svatantryam e v a /
And what ts meant by the su$*s subject- f  S'
Ton to hts father refers to the state Tn
which the son lives with the father and
has not set up a separate household and
acquired hts own property, then, ‘ the
son shall be treated as a friend, after
the age of sixteen years*; which means
that he Is entirely master of himself. 1
Indeed, the unseparated son Ts like a minor son, no matter how old 
he Is, but the psychological, social and legal subjection of the son Is not to be 
so neatly disposed of.
Merely attaining the age of sixteen, Indeed, w ill not entitle a son 
to be the master of ancestral property. If a father divides the property and 
allots a share to his son, then only w ill a son be the effective owner of the pro­
perty because Tn order to be owner Medhatlthl would not accept any other means 
of acquisition except the modes prescribed by the sastra, and the father's grant­
ing division does amount to his abdication of his superior authority, at least to
a notable extent.
Adhering to his conceptions of property and ownership, Medhatlthl
2 3says: "Acquisition by Itself does not produce property".
1. Tr. Jh5, IV, I, 212.
2. Medh. on Manu, V III, 416, Jha, II, 239. A .S . Nataraja Ayyar, The 
Mlmamsa View of Property*, Vyayahara Nlrqaya, 4 (1955), I: 46-64 at 64, 
arjanam svatvam napadayatl7
3. Tr. Derrett, RLSI, 136* The text remained obscure In Jha's Inept translation, 
Jha, IV, 2, 434. Medhatlthl used this Purvapaksa view *ln establishing the 
rights to property of the son, the slave and the wife who were a ll thought to 
be deprived of their acquisitions*, A .S . Nataraja Ayyar, Ib id ., 64. Cp. 
Prabhakara, MTtaksara, Colebrooke, 1, 1.10, RLSI, 139 ff .
Here Medhatlthl distinguishes between mere possessory title  and pro­
perty. By acquiring goods one may have possession but a ll possessions w ill 
not confer property (svatva) unless acquired by the rules of dharma, (sastra- 
nlyatagama).  ^ Medhatlthl uses the term property (svatva) Tn a purely juristic 
and technical sense. Svatva Is the Intangible aspect of a thing but most vital
for having Isa (mastery) over that thing. So to have Tsa, one must acquire pro-
2perty through the modes prescribed by the sastra, and must not suffer from legal 
or social Impediment of the order of subservience (paratantrya), as In the case of 
a son during the lifetime of his father. It Ts easy to see how some jurists over­
emphasise paratantrya (Incorrectly) to deny the subjects svatva and most of the 
discussion of our problem turns on the delicate balance between the concepts.
One who Is paratantrya has svamltva but not the total bundle of rights amounting 
3
to svatva, but what happens when he becomes svatantra? Some jurists (as we 
shall see) made his svatva retrospective to his conception.
A son's right to demand partition against the w ill of his father Is a 
corollary of his birthright. Medhatlthl accepts that svatva precedes partition 
but since he holds the view that partition against a father's wish Is against dharma, 
he had to make a compromise between the Innate right of a son In property and
1. Derrett, RLSI, 137.
2. Medh. on Manu, XI , 194, SBE, XXV, 470, JhS, X I, 192, V o l.II , 432,
X I, 193, tr . Jha, V o I.V , 500.
3. For an exhaustive discussion on svatva, svamltva, svatantrya and paratantrya, 
see Derrett, The Development of the Concept of Property In India*, ZVR, 64 
(1962), 95-101.
the prohibitory TnjunctTon of the sastra against forced dtvTston by a son.
Medhatlthl upholds joint ownership of father and son by preventing 
a father from alienating ancestral property except for the maintenance of the 
family.^ "The father, after the birth of his son, shall not Invest his ancest­
ral property In mortgages and purchases; but using It for the proper malnten-
2
ance of his family however has been permitted.”
This general endorsement of son's birthright In ancestral property has 
been tempered by sastrlc denunciation of a forced devlslon by son which, In 
turn, Is concomitant with Medhatlthl's Idea of the origin of property.
Despite his cognizance of customs and actual practices, he never lost 
sight of the sastra, and especially of Manu. He knew that the spirit of the sastra 
was very far from the flexible and that Is why practicability of the law was his 
first consideration. In the course of hts exposition, he continually brings In
views opposed to his own, and disposes of them by reasoning, rather than by
3
the citation from other smrtls. Hls;reasonings are often too substle, but they
are as often practical and have an eye to actual usage. "He was probably the
4
greatest jurist of his science".
1. Medh. on Manu, IX .209, Jha, II, 302. bandha-krayadl-krlyasu pltr-dhanam 
jata-putrena na nlyoktavyam/ yoga-ku{umba-bharanadau tu vlnlyogo darsltah/
2. Tr. Jha, V , 173. Also Medh. on Manu, V II1 .164, where he conslders_glvlng 
away of one's entire hereditary property as an "Illega l” contract, (sastracara- 
vlruddham), Jha, II, 154, tr . IV . 1*214; also on Manu, V III, 197-9, where 
Medhatlthl says, and onauthorlsed sale or g ift Is void and Is a punishable 
offence, see Derrett, 'Unauthorised Alienations of Joint Family Property: Can 
They Ever be Void Rather than Voidable', Bombay L .R .J. 55 (1953), 105-111 
at 107.
3. Derrett, The Concept of Law According to Medhatlthl, a pre-lslamlc Indian 
Jurist', Essays, I, 174 -97a tl76 . 4 . Ib id ., 175.
I I . Son's Birthright Yn the Balakrlda of VTsvarupa
As well as betng the earliest known commentary  ^ on the Yajna-
vaIkya-smrtl, VTsvarupa *s Balakrlda Ts of great Importance to the study of the
Mltaksara birthright. Possibly V I jnanesvara being nearer In time to VTSva-
rupa than we are, came across a commentary on the vyavahara section of the
2 “
Yajnava Ikya-smrtl by Vlsvarupa, as voluminous as his acara and prayascltta 
sections, which could not be restored. Though his vyavahara section Is con­
spicuously slender, yet the contents embodied In the section Illuminate the 
views of Southern jurists concerning Interpretation of son's birthright In the 
dhamrasastras.
1. Though not very sure, Kane thinks Vlsvarupa flourished between 800 to 825 
A .D ., H .D ., (Poona, 19*68), I, 1,564. U .C . Sarkar uncritically agrees 
with Kane's chronology, Epochs In Hindu Legal History, (Hoshlarpur, 1958),
174. Sarvadhlkarl's conjecture that Vlsvarupa's time was 11th century Is cer­
tainly wrong, The Hindu Law of Inheritance, (Calciita, 1882), 329. According 
to Derrett, the Balakrlda was written not later than the end of the 7th century, 
The Corpus Iurls of Hindu Law In 1972*, History of Indian Law^ (lelden, 1973), 
15. From the Internal evidences put forward by T . Ganapatl Sastrl, Derrett*s 
view seems to be the correct one, see Introduction, The YajnavaIkyasnirtT with 
the Commentary of VTsvarupacarya, (Trivandrum 1922), Iv . LTngat, CLI, 113, 
doubts Kane's chronology . J .C . Ghose, while writing about the commentators, 
covering the period between A .D . 600 to 1000, puts Vlsvarupa as the first com­
mentator; by Implication placing VTsVarupa In the 7th century: The Principles 
of Hindu Lawj( Calcutta, 1917), II, 1.
2. See Vljnanes'vara's remark on Vlsarupa's work as vlkata (profound), Yajnava 1- 
kyasmrtl, (Varanasi, 1967), 1. Kane, HD, I, 1, 553. Kane thlnkts that 
some texts of VTsvarupa In the Vyavahara section are either corrupt or deficient, 
Ib id ., 560.
VTsvarupa has not stated anythtng spectftcally on the concept of
i  i
son*s birthright, nor, like Medhatlthl, Ts there anything such as quoting views 
of other jurists  ^ on the topic Tn the extant pages of the Balakrlda* His views 
on the birthright are to be deduced from his comments on partition and origin 
of ownership.
In paternal grandfather^ property, VTsvarupa admits the co-owner-
shlp of father and son. He accepts the plain meaning of Yajnavalkya*s text
2
and In unambiguous terms explains, " In land derived from the grandfather,
3
Indestructible property or other movable property, the right of both
4
father and son Is equal. This Is undoubted".
In support of his views, Vlsvarupa refutes the three arguments which 
are generally put forward against the existence of co-ownership between father
1. Medh. on Manu, IX .209, IX .212. On MedhatTthI*s technique, Derrett,
*The Concept of Law According to Medhatlthl, a pre-Islamic Jurist*, Essays,
I, 174-97 at 175-6.
2. VTsvarupa on Yajn. 11.121, 11.124, (Trivandrum, 1922), 244-5. S. SUarama 
Sastrl, ed ., (Madras, 1900), 3 . J .C . Ghose, The Principles of Hindu Law, 
(Calcutta, 1917), II, 22. D h.K . 1175b. bhur-ya pltamahopfltta 
nlbando va alqaya-nldhlh anyad eva va dravyam, tatra pltd-putrayos-tylyam 
prabhutvam syat pratyetavyam /  It Ts Important to note that VIsyarupa glosses 
svamyam by prabhutvam thus eliminating doubt as to whether any discretion 
attached to Hie male Issue.
3 . I .e . right to Income from a capital held on trust or otherwise. On 
nlbandha, supra,3 3 ^ n .2 .
4 . Tr. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, II, 5 . Alternatively: Mills ( I.e . the mastership, 
ownership) Is what Ts to be understood*.
and son. Firstly, the objectors say the common ownership by father and son 
contravenes the Vedtc injunction of performing sacrifices through one's own 
wealth and since It would be Impossible for a father, having co-ownership with 
his son, to obey the Vedlc Injunction, It Is to be understood that the Vedas or­
dained absolute ownership of father In property.
Secondly, I f  co-ownership of father and son Is accepted, the text of 
Yajffavalkya  ^ which leaves the mode of partition to a father's discretion, would 
appear Incongruous.
Lastly, one cannot argue that a sacrifice (at the birth o f a son) could 
be performed with the permission of a son, because a person does not attain legal 
competence to give permission as soon as he Is bom.
VlsVarupa refutes these arguments one by one and establishes his 
Interpretation that ownership Is pre-existent to partition. He answers that co- 
ownership between father and son In ancestral property cannot be an Impediment 
to obeying the Vedlc Injunction, because a father Is free to perform sacrifices 
with his self-acquired property. In absence of a sufficiency of a father's self- 
acquired property, he can Initiate a partition with his sons In order to procure the 
necessary property for the performance of a sacrifice. Vlsvarupa considers that a 
father's absolute discretion regarding modes of partition, as ordained by Yajna-
1. Yajnf. II. 114, II. 118, Trivandrum, 241. Icchaya (a t , the pleasure); more­
over I f  one takes the 'through the father' at 11.123, to mean 'at the father's 
discretion*, Is translation which would beg the question.
va lkya ,^ Is applicable only Tn respect of self-acqutred property.
As for the objection to the Impossibi­
lity  o f performing sacrifices, e tc ., 
they can be performed with the self- 
acquired wealth, or by Instituting a 
partition of a portion then and there.
As for the text of smrtl which lays 
down partition at his pleasure alone, 
that Is applicable to the owner of self- 
acquired property. Therefore, It Is 
settled that right to partition arises ^ 
only from possession of ownership.
Yajnavalkya ordains that I f  a son Is born subsequently to a partition
made between father and sons or even after a partition made by the sons after
their father's death, Tn the former situation, the after-bom son w ill exclusively
succeed to his father's property and Tn the latter, the partition w ill be reopened
4
and he w ill take his shares from his brothers. From the point of view of the
1. Y a jn .ll .114.
2. Vlsvarupa on Yajn. II . 12] , 11.124, Trivandrum, 245; D h.K . 1175b. 
yattvanusthana-vlrodhadl codyam, tat svayamar|ltenapl tat-slddhema k ln c l t /  
tadanlm-eva va vlbhajyanuslbanam a s tu / ya tvlcchaya vlbhaga-smrtlh sa 
svayamup^ta-dravyavato drastavya /  atah svatve sat! vlbhaga It !  sTddham /
3. Tr. Sltarama Sastrl, 5 .
4 . Yajfif.ll .1E2, . -Sltarama Sastrl ed.,  II. 119; Trivandrum, 11.125, J .C . Ghose, 
V o l.II , 22-3. A  controversial text, and there are considerable differences 
among the commentators regarding the construction of the verse. VTjnanesvara 
splits the verse Into two according to the two situations of partition, Yajna-
vciIkya-smrtl, (Varanasi, 1967), 277-9, tr. Gharpure, (Bombay, 1939), II (4),
1023-4. Apararka agrees with VTjnanesvara, (Poona, 1904), 729. Sulapanl 
regards the whole text as applicable to the latter of the two situations, Ghar­
pure, Ib id ., 1026.
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son's birthright, VTsvarupa*s comment on this verse ts very significant. He
does not accept the purport of Gautama's  ^ text that ownership ts created at a
partition. He points out that I f  ownership originates from partition, the son
born after a partition would not get any share. But this rule of Yajnavalkya
proves that son's right to property does not accrue from partition, but his
ownership Inheres Tn the property from his birth ( I.e . conception). VTsyarupa
2
substantiates his view with a logical argument, " I f  however, right to pro­
perty were to accrue from partition, then no share w ill go to the after-born son.
3
But It Is here stated that he also has a right to the property",
4
He emphasises this point by saying: "Therefore, It has been said
5
that only where there previously exists ownership, there Is partition".
Vlsvarupa accepts the Innate right of a son Tn ancestral grandparental 
properly, but he does not exp lic itly  say that a son can demand partition during 
the lifetime of his father. From his comment on two verses ^ when read with his 
comment on Yajn. II .121, It appears that the sons could not demand a partition 
of ancestral property against the w ill of their father, but at the same time, when
1. Gautama£*38-42. P' J
2. Vlsvarupa on YajiT. 11.119, Trivandrum, 11.125 at 245. yadl hi vibhagena 
svatva-sambandho 'bhavlsyat, tato vlbhakta-jasya dravya-sambandho nopa- 
patsyata /  asm In punar astyeva tasyapl dravya-sambandhah /
3. Tr. Sltarama Sastrl, 3 .
4 . Vlsvarupa on YajfT. 11.119, Trivandrum, 11.125 at 245. tasma t svatve satyeva 
Ity-uktam /
5 . Tr. Sltarama Sastrl, 3 .
6 . Yajn. II . 114, 11.116.
a father makes a division of ancestral property o f his own accord he had to make 
an equal distribution among his sons. Only with regard to his self-acquired pro­
perty did a father have absolute discretion regarding the time and mode of distri­
bution J  "The meaning Ts that the father shall not be compelled to make a
2partition or to make It Tn a certain manner by his sons at their pleasure".
Again on Yajn .11.116, VIsyarupa says that by authority of smrtl texts,
3
a father's decision Is final with regard to the allotment of shares to the sons.
"The meaning Is that that partition alone which Ts affected by the father among
4
the sons Ts declared to be lawful".
But this general statement of the father's absolute discretion has been
qualified by VlsVarupa and should be taken as only applicable to self-acquired
5
property of the father. "As for the text of smrtl which lays down partition at 
his pleasure alone, that Is applicable to the owner of self-acquired property” .^
1. VIs'varupa on Yajn. 11.114, Trivandrum, 11.118 at 242; D h.K . 1168a. . . .n a  
putrecchaya/ na putralh pita vlbhagam visesa-nlyamam va karayltavya Ttyarthah /
2. Tr. Sltarama Sastrl, I. Also see Jha, VTvadacIntamanT, (Baroda, 1942), 174, n. 
Also J.C . Ghose, Hindu Law, II, 1 .
3 . Vlsvarupa on Yajn. II .11#, Trivandrum, II, 120 at 242; Dh.K.1169b, vlbhaga- 
dharmah pltra yah krtah, sa eva smrto vlhlta Tty-arthah /
4 . Tr. Sltarama Sastrl, 2.
5 . Vlsvarupa on Ya jn . II, 121, Trivandrum, II, 124 at 245; Dh.K.1175b. yctv
Icchaya vibhaga-smrtlh sa svayam-upatta-dravyavato drastavya /
6 . Tr. Sltarama Sastrl, 5. Kane's statement that Vjsvarupa allows the father un­
restricted freedom of distribution of property among his sons during his lifetime 
Ts not wholly correct. Kane states I t  as a general rule of VlsVarupa's opinion
on partition In a ll categories of property. A t this stage, he seems to have over­
looked VTsvarupua on Yajn.11.121, HD, I, 1,560; but see Hd, III, 557, n.1040, 
where he cites the comment which he overlooked at V o l l , as proof of son's b irth­
right.
VTsvarupa as a commentator remained close to Yajnavalkya, and tn 
spite of his unambtguous acceptance of son‘s ownership with hts father tn an­
cestral property, he did not elaborate the Incidents of such ownership, which 
makes his work a j t t le  less striking.
Despite this seeming deficiency, the most pioneering contribution of 
Vlsvarupa as a jurist was (apparently) his declaration that wealth Is one of the 
four objects of human endeavour by which he means that the object of wealth 
Is also worldly and, not exclusively, the performance of sacrifice. ^
As wealth Is an object of human purpose.
The Texts that ordain that wealth should 
be taken away, when sacrifices like the 
Agnlhotra are not performed, are meant 
as warning to wrongdoers and not as lay­
ing down that the only object of wealth 
ts the performance of sacrifices. 2
He used this Interpretation to establish that a ll brothers should get
equal shares In a partition, Irrespective of their standard of Vedlc learning or
3
zeal for performing the Agnlhotra. This Implies that a son gets his share 
not as a consideration for performing sacrifices or as a reward of his Vedlc 
learning, but as a satisfaction of his worldly status as a son which, In turn, Is 
the crystallisation of a pre-existing right from his birth.
1. Vlsvarupa on YajrT.II• 117, Trivandrum, II, 121 at 243. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, 
11, 2 ].. tatru purusarthatvad dravyasyayuktam evetl gamyate/ yanl tv agnlhotrady- 
akarane dravyapaharanadl-vdcananf, tany a nyaya va r tl -  pur u§a -prasasa narthan I , na
tu dravyasya kratvarthata-pratlpadakanl /
2 . Tr. J.C . Ghose, Hindu Law, II, 3 .
3 . Vlsvarupa on Yajn. 11.117, Trivandrum, II, 121.
Thus, VTsvarupa, by Importing the doctrine of PurvamTmamsa  ^
opened a new vista of juridical Interpretation and by his statement that the 
purpose of wealth could be worldly, he anticipated VTjnanesvara who de­
veloped the worldly concept of property for justification of his theory of the 
2
son*s birthright.
III. Apararka
3When Apararka commented on the Yajnava Ikya-smrtl , the birth­
right of a son, whether by the Influence of local customs or by that of commen-
4 5tatorlal literature had become well-established, at least In property acquired
by the paternal grandfather. Apararka went so far as to say that not only sons
but also daughters ^ acquired rights Tn the property of their fathers from the
1. Kane, HD, I, 255-6.
2 . See Derrett, RLSI  ^ 131-40.
3 . Apararka (to be dated A .D . 1115 to 1130) was a contemporary of VTjnanesvara. 
The work was compiled at the order of Aparadltya-deva I, (A .D .l 110-1140) of 
the Sllahara family of the Konkana, Deccan, K .V .R . Alyangar, ed ., Laksmld- 
hara, Krtya-Kalpataru, Dana-kanda, Introd., 21, 24, 45.
4 . Kane, HD, I, 328-34. Alyangar and Kane claim that Apararka had knowledge 
of VTjnanesvara *s work, Alyangar, Ib id ., 21, and Kane, Ib id ., 330-1. But 
theft* claim has not been conclusively proved, Derrett, *A New Light on the 
Mltaksara as a Legal Authority*, JIH, 30 (1952) 49-58; also, DharmaSastra and 
Juridical Literature, In A History of Indian Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973), IV ,50.
5. The work being complied at the order of the King was obviously followed In Kon­
kana but I t  had great Influence In Kashmir as w ell, J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law,I I ,  
Introd., vlT.
6 . Derrett, JIH, 30 (1952), 50; also The Relative Antiquity of the Mltaksara and 
the Dayabbaga*, MLJ (1952), 1-9 at 2.
____________
moment of b irth.  ^ " It should be understood that, Tn the case of daughters,
2
ownership Tn the father's wealth arises by birth Itse lf, as Tn the case of a son” .
But this general remark on birthright Tn the property of a father should 
not be construed as all-pervading. His comment on Yajit. 11.121, clarifies that 
It Is only In ancestral paternal, grandparental property that son's ownership Is 
co-extenslve with his father's. Moreover, where Vlsvarupa Is non-committal, 
Apararka gives fu ll effect to the son's birthright In paternal grandparental pro­
perty by his unambiguous utterance that a son could demand a partition of such
property even against the w ill of his father and the father was obliged to make
3
an equal division among his sons.
In the grandfather's property, the grand­
son has an ownership equal to that of his 
father. Therefore, even If  not w illing 
to make a partition, the father should 
make a partition of his father's wea Ith 
at the desire of his (own) son. The 
division should be an equal one, and 
not an unequal one as In the case of 
his self-acquired property. 4
1 . Apararka on Yajn. II. 135, (Poona, 1904), 746. duhltrnam putrava|-janmanalva 
pltr-dhane svaml-bhava-slddhlr Ttl vedltavyam /
2 . Tr. Srinivasa Alyar, Apararka on Yajn. (Madras, 1911), 44. Cp. Bharucl,
Saras va t l- v l lasa ,t402 and Vljnenesvara on Y a jf II .114, who admitted b lrth - 
rlght only of the son.
3 . Apararka on Yajn. II, 121 (Poona, 1904), 728. pltamaha-dhane pautrasya sva- 
pltra tulyam svamyam, tena vlbhagam anlcchann apl pita sva-pltr-dhanam putra- 
vlbhagecchaya v lb h a je t/ samas^  ca vlbhago na svarjlta-dhanavad-vlsamah ka ryah /
4 . Tr. Srinivasa Alyar, (Madras, 1911), 16.
According to Apararka, partition cannot be the origin o f ownership,
because It merely apportions Into particular shares the property which Is owned
by father and son In common (sadharanam). ^  He tackled the sastrlc purport
of Gautama's text on partition as one of the approved modes of acquisition of
ownership, by accepting It In Its very narrow and mathematical connotation.
Apararka considers that partition simply applies to the fact of settling TndTvI-
2
dual ownership In a specific portion of the property out of the jo int stock.
-  3On the relationship of ownership with partition, Apararka says:
The origin of ownership Is  not by parti­
tion; because (In that case), the father 
w ill not be the owner before partition; 
while partition settles the ownership 
of each owner In particular portions 
of the common properties that belong 
to several owners, It does not create 
new ownership. 4
Apararka consistently adheres to the view that ownership pre-exists 
partition, and ownership In paternal grandparental property being already cre­
ated at birth, cannot be created again at partition. He considers that It Is
1 . sadharanam = sa +  adhara; a + Mhf* (dharatl) = to hold, keep, support.
sa dhara lite ra lly  means *havlng or resting on the same support*. Sadharanam 
generally means common property Tn partnership, business or joint property of 
the brothers after father's death. But VTjnanesvara and Apararka used It Tn a 
technical sense as the common property o f father and son. SontheTmer, Daya, 
52-63; also EHJF, 91-7. Derrett, JIH, 30 (1952), 43-4; ZVR 64 (1962); 15-130.
2 . Apararka*s definition of  vlbhaga (partition) has a striking resemblance with that 
of the Mltaksara, 1.1.4 . See Derrett, JIH, 30 (1952), 50.
3. A para rkaonya jn .il, 121 (Poona, 1904). 729. na ca samvjbhagat SLVamyojpattlr, „ 
yena prag-vlbha gat-pTta na svaml s y a t/ samvlbhago hi s&1dharana-dhan6ncAn svafni 
name ekalkatra bhage svamlna ekalkasya svamyam vyavasthapayatl, nSpurvam
utpadayatl /
4 . Tr. Srinivasa A lyar, 18.
fallacious to accept that partitTon creates ownership. To have the right to 
demand partition one must have ownership In the property concerned, and from 
Apararka's view, It emerges that a son's pre-partition ownership exists In the 
property of the paternal grandfather only. In the self-acquired property of the 
father, he does not speak of any such pre-existing right on the son's part.
He argues that a forced division of father's self-acquired property by
a son would create ownership, I f  partition had been the origin of ownership.
But In the absence of a pre-existing right, the son would not acquire ownership
even though he might divide and possess his father's property by force.^ " I f
partition Is the cause of ownership, It w ill create It In the case e .g . of a
2
compulsory partition".
With regard to the objection that a father having common ownership 
with his son would not be able to obey the Vedlc Injunction of performing sacri­
fices with one's own wealth, Apararka put forward three solutions. He says 
that a father can perform the Agnlhotra either by permission of his son, or by 
separating and setting aside the share of his son, or by acquisition of other 
wealth.^
1 . Apararka on Yajn". II, ]2 l ,  (Poona, 1904), 729. yadl ca vlbhagah svamltve 
hetus tada hathadlna krlyamano'pl taj janaye t/
2 . T r. Srinivasa Alyar, 18.
3. Apararka on Yajn. II, 121, (Poona, 1904), 729. na hi jata-putrasya dhane 
svamyam apaltl, yena sva-dhana-sadhyarthalj srutayo vlrudhyeran /  yady-apl 
tad-dhanam svasya putrasya ca sadharanam tathapl putranumatya putra-vlbhaga- 
prthak-kararjena dravyantararjanena va sakyata evagnlhotrad! kartum /
____________         kJ
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The ownership of the father Ts not lost by 
the birth o f a son by reason of the Incon­
sistency (that w tl! arise) to the srutts lay­
ing down the objects (ceremonies like 
Agnyadhana etc.) that should be accom­
plished by one's wealth. Though that 
wealth (grandfather's wealth) Ts common 
to himself and his son, yet the perform­
ance of Agnlhotra, e tc. I f  possible 
either by permission of the son or by 
making the son's share separate or by 
acquisition of other wealth. 1
Apararka contends that son's Innate right Tn ancestral Immovable pro-
2
perty cannot be destroyed by a supervening loss or usurpation. So when a 
father recovers ancestral Immovable property, which was lost, without the con­
sent of the co-owners, he Is not entitled to the whole as his self-acqulsltlon.
A father recovers such property on behalf of a ll co-owners and In absence of
their consent, he must divide It among his sons and as a reward of his exertion,
3
he gets one-fourth as an extra share.
1. Tr . Alyar, Ibid. This agrees closely with Vlsygurupa's Ideas, supra,
Also on Apararka*s view, see Derrett, MLJ (1952), 8 .
2. Also on YajfiMI .175, Apararka reiterates that a father cannot give away 
entl entire property (ancestral and particularly, Immovable) when there are sons.
Derrett, JIH, 30(1952), 51.
3. Apararka on Yajd'.l1. 119, (Poona, 1904), 724. yat-purva-purusa-kramayatam 
ksefraramadlkam dravyam katham-apl parenapahrtam yo dayadanumat ya '-  
bhyuddharet tad asau dayadebhyo na da dya t/ yat-punar-dayadanumatlm- 
antarenoddhrtam tasya caturtham-amsam-uddharta grhmyat /  sesam uddharakena 
saha sarve vlbhajeran /
That which ts descended from ancestors 
downwards, such as lands, gardens, e tc ., 
but whtch had been taken away by 
strangers and recetved (rather ‘recovered*) 
by one with the permission of coparceners 
need not be gtven to them (the coparcen­
ers) . O f that whtch ts recovered without 
thetr permtsston, the acqutrer should take 
a fourth. The rest, a ll ,  Including the 
redeeemer, shall share. 1
Apararka attaches great tmportance to ancestral property and especl-
a lly  to tmmovables and to support hts tnterpretatton, he goes beyond the purport
2of Yajnavalkya*s text (11.119) and cttes IJsyasrnga as hts authortty. " I f  one
alone redeems property that has been lost prevtously that (property) the rest
3
shall share proporttonately after giving the redeemer a fourth share".
4 5At another place, on this point, while Interpreting Brhaspatt*s text,
Apararka takes the majority view on ancestral property recovered by a father, by
declaring tt as purely self-acquired and endows exclusive ownership on the father.^
1 . Tr. A lyar, 11. JimutavahcBia*s allotment of shares In this situation Is the same 
as Apararka*s, but he does not deal with the situation where permission has 
been given prior to the recovery, Da.bha. V I .11. 38-9.
2. Cited by Apararka on Yajn. II, 119 (Poona, 1904), 724. purva-nastam tu yo 
bhumlm-ekas' cabhyuddharet kramat /  yathamsam tu labhante *nye dattvams'dm tu 
turlyakam / /
3. Tr. A lyar, 11.
4. Apararka on Yajn. II, 121, (Poona, 1904), 728.
5. paltamaham hrtam pltia . . . ,  cited on Yajn. II, 121, (Poona, 1904), 728.
6 . tatra pltur-eva svamyam na putranam /  Apararka, (Poona, 1904), 728.
But the use of the two words, dayadanumatya and dayadanumatl,  ^ reveal that
2Apararka was talking about the consent of the sons. So by Introducing this 
element of consent, Apararka establishes that a son's right In ancestral pro­
perty Is Inherent from his b irth .
3
Like Vlsvarupa, Apararka looks at self-acquired property o f the father
as a distinct category from ancestral property. Medhatlthl also accepted the
4
division of property Into ancestral and self-acquired , but with regard to the
mutual rights of father and son, he held both categories to be fathers property
until the division of such property by the father among his sons, or devolution
on the sons at their father's decease. Unlike Medhatlthl, In Apararka we find
more Indlvuallsm o f a son so far as his rights In the family property are concerned.
According to VlsVarupa, a father has absolute power to determine the time and
5mode of partition of his self-acquired property, but In Apararka *s opinion, a 
father's power depends much on the nature of Its acquisition. In self-acquired 
property, Apararka restricts co-ownership to a very narrow lim it. A  son has no
1. Apararka on YajrT. II, 119, (Poona, 1904), 724.
2 . Apararka equated daya to rlktha, dayo rlktham, on Yajn. 1.51, which he ex­
plains as property of the father, Apararka, 77. Again on Yajft. 111.227, he 
says dayam pltrordhanam, Apararka, 1046. So dayadanumatya would mean 
consent of the sons, dayadah means putrah, Halayudha, (Varanasi, 1958), 352. 
According to Apararka, dayada Includes also daughters, Derrett, JIH, 30 (1952), 50.
3. Vlsvarupa on Yajn. 11.121.
4 . Medhatlthl on Manu, IX .209.
5 . Vlsvarupa on Yajn. 11.121.
4 8 4 .
ownership In father's self-acquired property I f  such property was not acquired 
by the help of the property of the grandfather.^
By Implication Apararka extends the son's birthright to self-acquired
property of a father, proportionate to the help Incurred by a father from grand-
2
father's property In the accumulation of his self-acqulsltlon.
A father could make an unequal division of his self-acqulsltlons
among his sons, but such division should not be considered as the manifestation
3
of a father's absolute power but It was so because of Jastrlc rules. Apararka
4 5explains Narada's text on father's power of partition: "The rule of prefer­
ence Is not by reason of the father's free agency (or 'discretion*), but because 
of the sastra."  ^
So, a father who was more or less a patriarch In Medhatlthl emerged
as a manager In Apararka. Moreover, while living Jointly with their father,
1 . Apararka on Yajn. II, 121, (Poona, 1904), 728. tr. Alyar, 16.
2. Apararka vaguely anticipated the line of thought put forward by Derrett,
'Acquisition of Joint Family Property through a Coparcener: Let Sastrlc and 
Equity Principles Join Hands', Bombay LRJ, September, (1969), 87-93, especi­
a lly  at 77 and ns.9 and 10 thereof. Also Critique, 73-4, 7-10 at 74. More 
clearly In 'Acquisition of Joint Family Property and Recent Decision of the 
Supreme Court', S .C .W .R ., X III, 24, J . (1969), 29-35, n .6 a t3 2 -3 .
3. Apararka on Yajn. 11.114, (Poona, 1904), 717. Also Jha, ed ., Vlvadaclntamanl,
(Baroda, 1942), n. at 174.
4 . Cited by Apararka on Y a jn .II. 114, (Poona, 1904), 717, pltralva tu vtbhakta ye . . .
5 . Apararka on Yajn. II, 114, (Poona, 1904), 717. na hy uddhare pltuh prabhutvam
klm tu sastrasya /
6 . Tr. A lyar, Ibid.
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the sons could have property of theTr own i f  it was acquTred without the help
of ( I.e . without their being currently maintained by) the paternal estate and
the sons were not obliged to share It with their father. Apararka squeezes
self-acquisition and Its Impartlblllty to a narrow lim it wh^ch betrays a great
Southern Influence In hts work.^ " I f  the brothers had acquired wealth
jo intly (I.e . by ‘jo int enterprise^" without detriment to the paternal estate,
then even If  the father be liv ing , the brothers alone are the participators tn 
2
the wealth".
In Apararka, we come across an elementary family, where an Indi­
vidual member, especially father or son, may have ownershtp tn three types
of property, either jo in tly or severally, at the same time. Firstly, the common
t
ownershtp offather and son tn paternal grandfathers property turns It Into a 
common fund. Secondly, the self-acquired property, I f  acquired through 
the help of ancestral property, also constitutes a common fund, the extent of 
ownershtp of whtch between a father and a son, varying proportionately to the 
detriment' (or help) of the joint stock. Thirdly, there may be purely self-
1. Apararka on Yajn. II. 135, (Poona, 1904), 743. tatrapt catsa vyavastha
yadt tad-bhratrbhlh sva pltrdhananupaghatena sambhuya samutthanena dhanam 
arjltam,tada pttroh sadbhave‘pt bhratara eva dhana-grahtnah /  On Yajn.11.118, 
(Poona, 1904), 723, Apararka defines anupaghatena (without detriment) as 
anupajtvanena (without living off tt), see Derref; JIH 30 (1952), 50.
2. Tr. A lyar, 38. The context tn whtch this question ts dealt with ts the right 
of the widow, whose right to the property held jo in tly by her husband and 
brothers ts expressly excluded.
acquired properly, acquired either by a son or a father without the help of the 
joint ancestral property. Though, In this way, ownership of family property 
became diffused and computation of shares, at a partition, d ifficu lt, yet a 
three-tier system of property owning obtained, according to the origin and 
nature of the relevant acquisition.
The situation was undoubtedly complex because of the simultaneous
co-extenslve Interests of the family members In the common property,^ but
Apararka saved the structure of family In the South by a synthesis. On the
one hand, he saw the father as a manager of a joint concern, but on the other,
2
he continued the son's non-Independence during the lifetime of his father. 
Here, he also made a compromise between son's birthright and father's pre­
dominant Interest In the family.
3
Like Vljnanesvara, Apararka did not make much use of the mTmdmsa 
doctrine to establish son's co-ownership with the father. He brought together 
different smrtl texts and commented on them. By the force of his argument, he 
pointed out the paradox In Gautama's text, and showed that partition could 
not be the origin of ownership. Here, Indirectly, he was shifting towards the
1. G ,D . Sonthelmer, The Evolution of Hindu Joint Family, London University 
Ph.D. Thesis, unpublished, (1965), 215.
2. Unseparated son's asvatantrya admitted by Apararka on Yajn. II. 114, (Poona, 
1904), 718.
3 . M lta, Colebrooke, 1.1.8-10.
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concept that ownership could originate by means outside the modes prescribed
by the sastra. It Is apparent that he was conversant with the rules of mTmdmsa
and did not agree with the orthodox view that property was only for sacrifices.
On this point, he Is closer to VIsvarupa  ^ than to Vljftanesvara, because like
VIjnanesvara, he does not attempt to establish that property Is temporal.
2
Though In a different context, Apararka simply doubts the authority of the
3
proposition that a ll kinds of wealth are for the purpose of sacrifices. "For
there Is no authority (for the position) that the production of a ll kinds of
4
wealth Is for the purpose of sacrifices".
Whatever might be the line of argument, It remains to be said that 
In Apararka, a son*s birthright In the property of ithe grandfather Is well en­
trenched, and a fathers absolute ownership Is confined only to those self- 
acquisltlons which are acquired without any detriment to the grandparental 
estate.
1. Supra, 4*76-7.
2. On Yajn. II. 135. Here Apararka refutes the argument that a wife whose 
husband Is deceased without leaving a son cannot take wealth since wealth 
Is for sacrifices, and a woman Is not f i t  for performing sacrifices.
3. Apararka on YajrT. II, 135, (Poona, 1904), 743, sarvasya eva dhanotpatter 
ya jnartha tve pramanabhava t /
4 . Tr. Atyar, 39.
IV .  Son*s Right by Birth  Tn the M ltaksara
a . Introduction
The Mttak$ara,  ^ VIjnanesvara *s comprehensive commentary on the
-./v  2Yajnavalkya-smrtl, was published between 1120 and 1125 A .D . The pre-
3 -Mltaksara age In the Deccan Is marked by Its continuing assimilation of Aryan
Influence on the way of life of the local people. Thus, the juridical framework
of the South could not stay aloof from this transition; but, while the Aryan
notion of jurisprudence was beginning to take effect, the dharamasastras were
1. Means ‘measured In Its syllables*. Purports to be an abridgement of Vls'va- 
rupa*s commentary, the BalakrTda. It Is also described as Rjumltaksara or 
Pramltakgara, Kane, HD, 1, 287.
2. Kane thought that the Mltaksara was written between 1070 and 1110 A .D .,
HD, I, 290. K .V.R. Alyangar disagrees with Kane, see Krtyakalpataru, 
Danakanda, (Baroda, 1941), Introd., 31, 34-8, especially 35 and n.2
at 38, where he rightly explains VljnanesVara *s panegyric. There are evidences 
that the Mltaksara was unquestionably published between 1120 and 1125 A .D ., 
see colophon to the Mltaksara which points to the period of the greatest prosper­
ity  of the Calukya emperor, Vlkramadltya VI of Kalyana (formerly In the Nizam*s 
Dominions, now In Maharastra) who reigned between 1076 and 1127 A .D ., 
Derrett, The Relative Antiquity of the Mltaksara and the Dayabhaga*, M .L . J ., 
1952, V o l.2 , Journal Sect.9-14; also *A New Light on the Mltaksara as a 
Legal Authority*, JIH, Vol.30 (1952), 35-55 at 36. Also his DhaVmas'dstra 
and Juridical Literature, A  History of Indian Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973),
50 and n .322 thereof.
3. That VIjnanesvara*s home was In South India Is undoubted, see the 4th verse 
at the end of the Mltaksara, where he gives his personal history, Kane, HD,
1, 288-9. Llngat, Q J , l f 3 .  Mark K.P. Jayaswa|*s glaring mistake In 
supposing that the author of the Mltaksara was from Western India, TLL, 1917, 
Manu and Yajnavalkya, (Calcutta, 1930), 264, again at 267.
merely superimposed on traditional local customs. As a result, In many cases, 
the rules of vyavahara and such customs existed concurrently, much to the confu­
sion of the people as well as of the judges. Moreover, by the beginning of the 
twelfth century, this dichotomy had (If we may safely judge by the outcome)
led to a demand that the smrtl rules be Interpreted In the light of the prevailing
customs and popular usages.
VIjnanesvara, the yogln  ^ (ascetic) and (It has been guessed) at one 
2time a judge, with his profound scholarship and practical knowledge of the law,
was best suited for bringing about a fusion between vyavahara and custom, and
^ 3
reinterpreting the dharmasastras In their ecological surroundings. This was done,
not with a sense of revulsion either from the sastra or towards custom, but with/ — 9
manipulation and resolution of the two.
Whether or not he was actually ever appointed a judge, VljpanesVara 
probably frequently encountered legal problems between father and son, and he 
most like ly observed that strict adherence to sastrlc Interpretation of the northern 
commentators, like Medhatlthl, might amount to a denial of justice to the parties, 
I f  In practice these followed their own usages and their rights had mainly fallen 
to be determined according to popular custom.
1. Kane, HD, I, 288. Llngat, CLI, 113.
2. Derrett, JIH, 30 (1952), 37, n .6 . In an extant letter to Derrett, Kane denies 
any recognisable trace of VIjnanesvara *sjhe Id any judicial appointment.
3 . Derrett, VIjnanesvara and the Future of Hindu Law*, Allahabad University Law 
Journal, 2 ( l9 67), 4-11.
b . Birthright; VIjnanesvara^ contribution
VIjnanesvara gave a new Impetus to the concept of the son *s birth­
right and what was a passing reference In Medhatlthl,  ^ or an obscure analysis 
_ 2
In the BalakrTda, found bold expression In the Mltaksara and became the linch­
pin of proprietary rights In the joint family, especially as between father and son. 
He enlivened the customs and popular practices of property ownership by the force
of the sastra and derived a rule regarding a son*s birthright which was as such,
3
very probably, beyond the scope and ordination of the smrtls. Though some
4
smrtls (as we have seen) espoused the doctrine of janmasvatvayada, yet Its 
range was not so wide as enunciated by VIjnanesvara. Therefore, because of 
VIjnanesvara*s handling of the smrtl texts, many of the local customs of the South 
were endowed with the force of the sastra (were made, I .e . sastrlcally viable) and, 
as a result, on the one hand the aspirations of the people found a juridical express­
ion, and on the other, the iask of a judicial tribunal In the South must have become
* 5easier.
1. Medhatlthl on Manu, IX, 209, Jha, (Calcutta, 1939), II, 302; supra,458-9 .
2. Vlsvarupa on Yajn’. II. 121; supra, 471.
3. Derrett, Allahabad University Law Journal, 2 (1967), 9.
4 . Texts discussed supra ,3 3 1 -3 3 ,
5. The Mltaksara was accepted as an authority In South India but, at the time of 
or Immediately after Its publication, It was not an authority In Northern India: 
Sir Ganganatha Jha, Hindu Law In Its Sources, (Allahabad, 1930), I, 17.
This was natural.
VTjnanesvara was not the originator of the concept of the son*s 
birthright, but It Is appropriate to call him the grand compiler of a school of 
thought which was running parallel to the patriarchal notion of society and 
sastrlc origin of property ! His compilation was not a blind Imitation of 
a particular school of Ideas, and he was conscious of the fact that mere Imita­
tion would not serve his purpose. He wanted to formulate legal rules to suit 
the exigencies of his time and the area In which he lived, and In order to 
achieve this aim, apart from resorting to other methods, he became selective 
In his choice of definition of the various legal concepts.
c . daya
(1) Definition
-  2 The definition of daya which Vl|nanesvara used was not his own. He
adopted It because It  agreed with his Ideas concerning a son*s birthright and the
common ownership of property among the dayadas. To suit his purpose and to
uphold the Idea of multiple ownership In property, he defines daya as property
1. Kane, HD, III, 557. B .N . Sampath, The Joint Hindu Family Retrospect 
and Propsect*, Banaras Law Journal, I (1965), 1, 33-77 at 37. IS. Pawate 
goes so far as to say that the Mltaksara theory Is older than the sastrlc theory 
of property, Daya-vlbhaga, (Dharwar, 1945), Preface, 11-vl. Mayne, Hindu 
Law and Usage, 10th ed., 330*
2. Asahayaks definition of daya was similar to that of Vl|nanesvara, Sarasvatlvl- 
lasa, ed ., Foulkes, (London, 1881), 5 . Also see Derrett, JIH, 30 (1952), 
46, n .35.
which becomes the sva of  another merely by reason of relationship with the
1 2 owner. ’f t  Ts called daya when Tt Ts property whTch becomes the sva of
3
another merely by reason of relationship wTth the owner” .
1. Mltaksara, prooemTum to Yajn. II. 114, D h.K . 1132a. yad dhanam svaml- 
sambandhad eva ntmittad anyasya svam bhavatl tad ucyate /
2. da/a Ts rendered by Colebrooke, (MTta/ | . l  .2) as 'heritage*, but this Ts not 
the correct rendering; Go lap Sastrl, Hindu Law, 4th ed ., 200. It Ts better 
to keep It as daya, which Is derived from the root, da = to cut, divide, mow, 
and It  Implies the share In the property of a deceased or living man. While 
rendering daya as 'heritage1, probably Colebrooke had In mind the legal maxim 
of Roman Law of the classical period -  *heredltas est successlonls In unlversum 
lus quod defunctus habult*. The Brahamanallterature tends to show that daya Is 
derived from the root da and supports the MTtaktara concept of daya, Tal. 5am. 
3 .1 .9 .4 -6 ; Pan. Br. 16.4.3-4; Jal.Br.3.l56;* A l.B r .5 . l4 .2 ff .  Kane, HD,
III, 546, wrongly followed Jlmutavahana's (Da.bha.l.4-5) faulty understanding 
of the word daya, where he took the meaning of the root da as 'to give*. A .B . 
Shlnde, despite his scholarly discussion of the topic, has blindly swallowed Kane's 
following of Jlmutavahana, *What Is daya?*, ABORI, 53 (1972), 236. There Is 
no mention of daya at Gautama, 10.39 but his rlktha may Include daya. Rlktha
Is derived from rlc = *to leave*, litera lly means *what Is left*, I .e . the property 
over which the son's power has arisen after the cecesslon o f father's power, 
Sonthelmer, EHJF, L .U . Ph.D. thesis, 1965, 63. Mention of daya In Manu, 
X.115 Implies a share In the estate of a deceased or a living man. Pawate 
doubts the Sanskrit origin of the word daya and stretches his Imagination to the 
Dravidian root Dan = 'stretch beyond*. The use of the word In the Rg Veda, 
10.114, In Brahmana literature and In the smrtls makes Pawate's claim weak, I f  
not Improbable. For different definitions of daya and a detailed discussion, see 
Sonthelmer, The Concept o f Daya, London University Diploma In Law, thesis, 
1962, 12-3; also his EJHF, Ib id ., 213-6. Derrett, ZVR, 64 (1962), 53.
3 . Tr. Derrett, Ib id ., 54.
(TT) Unobstructed (apratibandha) and obstructed (sapratlbandha) daya
The daycidas, according to their proximity or remoteness of relationship 
to the owner, form two concentric circles of relations which are comprised out
of two distinct types of adhlkaras (rights) in the property of (dhana). ^  To explain
 ^ 2 
these two clrcules, VIjnanesvara adopted the terminology of older commentators.
After defining the term daya, VIjnanesvara distinguishes and Illustrates the two
types of daya
It Is o f two sorts: unobstructed (apratibandha) 
or liable to obstruction (sapratlbandha). TKe 
wealth of the father or of the paternal grand -  
father becomes the property of his sons or o f 
his grandsons, In right of their being his sons 
or grandsons: and that Is an Inheritance not 
liable to obstruction. But property devolves 
on parents (or uncles), brothers and the rest, 
upon the demise of the owner, I f  there be no 
male Issue: and thus the actual existence of 
a son and the survival of the owner are Im­
pediments to the succession; and on their 
ceasing, the property devolves (on the suc­
cessor) In right of his being uncle or brother.^
This Is an Inheritance subject to obstruction.
1. Derrett, Ib id ., 55.
2. Derrett, JIH, V o l.30 (1952), n*35 at 46. He might have Improved on 
Bharucl*s; see Sarasvatt-vllasa, ed. Fou1kes,f403.
3. On Yajn. 11.114. The variant readings do not affect our discussion.
sa ca dvl-vldhah /  apratlbandhah sapratlbandhas" ca /  tatra putranam pautranam 
ca putratvena pautratvena ca pltr-dhanam pltamaha-dhanam ca svam bhavatlty- 
apratlbandho dayah /  pltr(vya)-bhratracfinam tu putrabhave svamy-abhave ca 
svam bhavatltl putra-sadbhavah svaml-sadbhavas'ca pratlbandhas, tad-abhave 
plti*(vya)tvena bhratrtvena ca svam bhavatltl sapratlbandho dayah /
4 . Tr. Colebrooke, 1.1.3. Gharpure renders apratibandha as *unobstructtble* and 
sapratlbandha as ‘obstructible*; same rendering by Mayne, Hindu Law, ?274„ 
Pawate pointed out that the rendering of both Colebrooke and Gharpure were 
opposed to the rules of Sanskrit grammar and vocabulary and did not convey the^  
sense of da ya as used In the Mltaksara. Pawate renders the two words respectively
/Continued on next page:
The sapratlbandha-dayadas comprise the outer circle and their coming
Into ownership Is dependent on a possibility namely, the extinction of the dayadas
who form the Inner circle.^ An understanding of spratlbandha-daya Is not
germane to our purpose, but an analysis of Its nature and Incidents Is Indirectly
helpful to understand apratlbandha-daya, with which we are directly concerned.
Both the types of daya become property of the dayadas, ‘merely by reason of re-
2Iatlonshlp with the owner*, but the basic and fundamental difference between 
the two Is this: In the case of apratibandha-dayadas, their birth puts them Into 
the position of co-owners, but In the case of sapratlbandha-dayadas, birth has 
no such significance except In establishing a relationship with the owner. O f 
course, we should not overlook the point that even In the case of sapratlbandha-  
dayadas, by birth they acquire a subsisting right In the daya, though this right Is 
subject to obstructions and remains dormant so long as the apratlbandha-dayadas
Note 4 -  p .493 -  continued:
as ‘existing with no obstruction* and ‘existing with one or more obstruction*, 
Daya-vlbhaga, (Dharwar, 1945), 43-55. The sapratlbandha/apratlbandha 
distinction Is found In no smrtl. Mention of this commentatorla I distinction 
(from the Mltaksara onwards, I .e . A .D . 1125+) Is found In the Jalna legal work 
Arhannltl, v .2, Derrett, *Hemacarya*s Arhannltl: An Original Jalna Juridical 
Work of the Middle Ages*, ABORI, 57 (1976) 1-4: 1-21 at 21, n.90.
1. Cp. It could be vaguely assumed that the oldest Germam ic rule of herltal suc­
cession rested upon a distinction between a narrower anda wider circle of heirs. 
But It Is only with d ifficu lty  that evidence can be drawn from the sources for an 
answer to the question according to what rule the more remote kindred were 
called to the Inheritance, Huebner, A History of Germanic Private Law, o p .c lt., 
722.
2 . M lta, Prooemlum'to Y a jn .ll, 114, tr. Derrett, ZVR64(1962), 54. Also 
Colebrooke, 1.1.2.
exist. But the right of a sapratlbandha -da yada should not be confused with a 
mere expectancy, as VIjnanesvara expounds tt, t t  ts a subsisting adhlkara *but 
from the practical point of view It Is purely contingent upon the death e tc ., 
of the owner without leaving any heirs of a nearer category surviving him1. ^
To come Into ownership a sapratlbandha-da yada has to be freed from 
two obstacles (prattbandha) namely, the life of the particular owner and also the 
survival of those who stand as apratibandha-dayadas In relation to that particular 
owner.
Pawate tried to explain pratlbandha by showing the similarity between
 2
the predicament of a mortgagor and sapratlbandha-daf’ada. But Pawate failed
to comprehend that the pratlbandha (obstruction) In a mortgage and In sapratlbandha
daya were not of the same type. A mortgage Is a pratlbandha In a very limited
sense and nothing prevents the mor^agor from making a g ift or sale of the property
3
subject to the mortgage. Moreover, In a ll types of mortgage the mortgagor had
4
the right of redemption unless such right was surrendered by an agreement.
1. Derrett, ZVR, 64 (1962), 55.
2. Daya-vibhaga, (Dharwar, 1945), 27-42.
3 . Derrett, Ib id ., 82 and n.270a thereof, second mortgage was notallowed only
In mortgages of landed property, Ib id ., 84. P .N . Sen, TLL, 1909, The General 
Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, (Calcutta, 1918), 201-2.
4 . Y a jn .II.62; Br . X .66; Katy. 178-80. See L. Stembqch, Jurldlca 1 Studies In 
Ancient Indian Law, (Delhi, 1965), Pt.l,109-52;P.N.Sen/Oplnlons of pundits In 
their vyavastha , Macnaghten, Hindu Law, II, 18u9, (case 17 on sale), 307.
On the rules of equity of redemption, seeMegarry and Wade, The Law of Real 
Property, (London, 1966), 884-6, 931-3; also ft.W . Turner, The Equity of 
Redemption, (Cambridge, 1931).
* GPHJ, 193.
Pawate's analogy Ts valtd only In cases where the morgagor contracts out hts power 
of exerctstng his rtght of ownership, such as hts rTght to redeem, sell or mortgage 
the property for the second or subsequent time. In the case of sapratlbandha-daya, 
the pratlbandha is removed by operation of law, but Tn the case of mortgage, the 
pratlbandha  ^ Ts created or removed by act of partfes.
The adhtkara of an a pratlbandha-da yada Ts vested from the moment of
hTs bTrth and unlTke the case of a saprotlbandha-dayada, the vesting does not de-
2pend on the extinction of any Impediment. The sons, grandsons, and other
agnatic descendants, being a pratlbandha-dayadas, occupy the Inner circle and
this categorisation Into two types of dayadas becomes the bedrock ofVIjnanes"-
vara's theory of the son's right by b irth . VIjnanesvara *s definition of daya
limits the acquisition of property Vested Tn possession' by birth to a limited cate-
3
gory of relations, namely, the son and the grandson.
1. pratlbandha should be compared with sambandha. sambandha = claim and 
pratlbandha (apart from mortgage analogy pointed out by Pawate) Implies nega- 
tlon of claim, non-claim, so *bar'. A t Eplgraphlca Camatlca VI Kadur 152
(? 1235 A .D .) , a lady renounces claims on land or Its Income. The word 
'sambandha' occurs tw ice. "I have no claim on the land . . . "  A t a mahazar 
(1611 A .D .) pointed at V .K . Rajavade, Marathyarlcya ItihasacTm Sadhane, 15 
(Bombay, 1912), N o.6, 22-8: sambandha nahlm = I have no claim.
2. P .N . Sen, The General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, o p .c lt., 128.
3. Extended to great-grandson by Mltra Mlsra on Yajn. II, 121, Gharpure, 
Yajnavalkya Smrtl, (Bombay, 1939), 1021. See Sampatte criticism of Mltra 
Mlsra's opinion, Banaras Law Journal, I (1965), 1, n . l  at 41.
d . VIjnanesvara *s theory o f Property (svatva)
VIjnanesvara was not fu lly  satisfied by merely defining daya or relat­
ing his Interpretation of Yajnavalkya and other smrtl texts to the customs of the 
area In which he lived, to which Indeed he refers very casually and Imperfectly 
here and there. To endow his commentary with an authority o f universal accept­
ance, he had to establish first that birth could also be one of the modes of acqui­
sition of property. In order to establish birth as one of the means of acquisition 
of ownership, VIjnanesvara had to surmount the monumental obstacle of Gautama*s 
text,  ^ which ordained the five approved modes of acquisition of property and did 
not Include birth as one of those modes.
To establish the son*s right by birth, VIjnanesvara had to prove first 
that property could be acquired by modes other than those prescribed by the Sastra. 
Throughout his commentary, VIjnanesvara has emphasised meticulously that the
Idea of property has Its basis on popular recognition without any dependence on
2 3
the sastra. With a shrewd analytical approach, he first discusses the views
of those who advocate that ownership Is deductble only from the commands of the
sacred texts. Then he demolishes their arguments one by one, and attempts to
establish the view that property Is temporal. From the point o f view of historical
jurisprudence, the temporality of property Is more sound than the Idea of Its sastrlc
1. X .38-42. But see: utpattyalvartham svamltval Iabhate, Gautama quoted In 
the M lta . on Yajn. 11.114, D h .K .il2 4 a .
2. On Y a jn . 11.114; Colebrooke, 1.1.9-10.
3 . Colebrooke, 1.1.8.
prtgTn. In anthropological terms, VIjnanesvara *s vtew Ts that property Ts an
outcome of socTal evolution and smftlkaras like Gautama and Manu, merely
complied the socially acceptable modes of acquisition of ownership, like
Pcnlnl, who did not create or lay down new words but simply laid down with
an original technique, a principle of their formation and application which
were already Tn existence.^ So according to the Mltaksara view, wards
such as Inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure or finding are ‘mere physical
events which are Invested with the sense of proprietary rights by the voice of 
2
the people‘ . To be more precise, we can say that the Vlght of acquisition
not merely historically preceded the formulation of the rules of Gautama and
3
the rest, but deprived those rules of exclusive right to describe Tt legally” .
VIjnanesvara deliberately spends a few paragraphs on this topic, and 
ultimately concludes that property Is temporal. As he puts It ,  the objectors try 
to prove with a citation from the dharmasastra of Manu that right of ownership Ts 
deduclble only from the sastra. Manu ordains, ”A  Brahmana who seeks to ob­
tain anything, even by sacrificing or by Instructing, from the hand o f a man,
4
who had taken what was not given to him, Is considered precisely as a thief” .
1. Kane, HD, III, 551.
2. K .L . Sarkar, TLL, 1905, The Mlmansa Rules of Interpretation as Applied to 
Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1909), 391.
3 . Derrett, RLSI, 135. Also Kane, HD, III, 551.
4 . Manu was discussing the extended application of the term ‘th ie f1; Manu, 
V II I .340, It. Colebrooke, 1.1.8. Medhatlthl on Manu, IV .226, took a 
liberal view on this point.
If property were temporal, Manu would not have prescribed punishment for a 
Brahmana who acquired tainted wealth by means ordained by sacred texts.
A  worldly Idea of property should give the Brahmana a good title , but In that 
case, Manu‘s text would be Irrelevant. Moreover, objectors argue that I f  
ownership be a purely worldly matter, there would be chaos In society and 
mere possession of a thing by a trespasser or a thief would give him good title ; 
against the true owner.^
VIjnanesvara refutes these arguments by emphasising that property 
Is apprehended from worldly usage. To support his contention by way of I llu ­
stration, he draws an analogy between different characters of svatva and of 
fire . He points out that a Vedlcally consecrated fire has two separate charac­
ters, (the sacred one) of oblation, and the worldly one of combustion. In the 
strict theoretical sense, the Ahavanlya fire serves only the spiritual function 
relating to the offerings In It and Is not useful for effecting worldly purposes. 
VIjnanesvara admits that even the Ahavanlya fire has the capacity to boll food
but such boiling Is effected not by Its sastrlc nature but by Its ordinary nature 
2
as fire . In other words, he says that a sacred fire cannot perform secular acts 
In Its sacred capacity. Similarly, he wants to show by analogy, that I f  
svatva were apprehended only from sastra, It could not have secular manifestations,
1. Colebrooke, 1.1.8.
2 . It Is submitted that VIjnanesvara‘s view Is scientifically untrue. It Is also 
logically wrong, Derrett, JESHO, l / l  (1957), 87.
such as acts like sale or mortgage. Like fire , each Item of property has two 
characters. One ts Its visible form and the other ts the Intangible aspect of 
ownership (property or svatva) In that particular Item of property.
The objector argues that gold or other valuables would effect the
secular purpose of sale and purchase, In Its character as gold or such like, not
In that of property, and to effect these worldly transactions property need not
be temporal. VIjnanesvara replies that these transactions are worldly and
property Is also worldly because the sale or purchase of a thing Is effected not
2
through Its visible form but by reference to property (ownership) In that thing. ;
But, here, It Is not through Its visible 
form, either gold or the like, that the 
purchase of a thing Is effected, but 
through property only. That, which Is 
not a person‘s property In a thing, does 
not give effect to his transfer of It by 
sale or the like. 3
VIjnanesvara continues and puts to an objective test by comparative
4
method, the Sastrlc Idea of property and shows that the sastrlc doctrine has no 
universal acceptance and It cannot be a general rule applicable to the whole 
human race.
1. Transactions like sale do not conflict with sastrlc origin of property. Manw, 
(X.115) has categorically mentioned kraya (purchase) as one of the modes of 
acquisition and every purchase presupposes a sale.
2. On Y a jn .II. 114. lha tu suvarnadl-rupena krayadl-sadhanatvam, apl tu 
svatvenalva /  naht yasya yat svam na bhavatl tat tasya krayadyartha-krlyam 
sadhayatl /
3 . Tr. Colebrooke, 1.1.9.
4 . Such comparative method must be used with the greatest caution, Derrett, 
JESHO, 1 /1 , (1957), 91, n . l .
Even among the Inhabitants of the countries  ^ of the frontier or
those who have no knowledge of the practice enjoined by the sacred Institute,
the Idea of property arising from purchase, sale and other transaction Is ob- 
2
served. This proves that property Is apprehended from worldly usage and 
sastrlc modes are merely compilations of existing practices among the people.
This secular and sociological Interpretation of the concept of pro­
perty was not likely to be acceptable by the sastrlns who were steeped In the 
tenets of the sastra. To have an universal acceptance of his theory among
the dharmasastrlns, VIjnanesvara resorted to the aid of  mlmamsa, *the logic
3 -  -  -
of the law*. The mlmamsa Interpretation -
was used by Vljhanesvara as a lever to 
shift an encumbrance that was as trouble­
some to lawyers as to the lay public, and 
which could not have been shifted by Inde­
pendent juristic pronouncement, that Is to 
say, so long as traditional sastrlc techniques 
were to be adhered to. 4
The lauklka concept of property was not VIjnanesvara*s original Inno­
vation -  that was his reliance on and manipulation of Prabhakara*s Interpreta-
1. pratyantavasl, according to Amarakosa, *the country of the Mlecchas, 
pratyanto mlecchadesah syat, Amara, 2 .1 .7 . Colebrooke translated as 
‘Inhabitants of barbarous countries*, 1.1.9.
2. Colebrooke, 1.1.9.
3 . Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays, (London, 1873), II, 342.
4 . Derrett, RLSI, 132.
tatlon  ^ of JaTmtnT IV .1 .1-3. VIjnanesvara‘s purpose Tn exploring the mlmagisa
was to establish that svatva was lauktka. Though he does not find a definite
2utterance In Prabhakara to this effect, yet the conclusion of Prabhakara that
3acquisition Itself Is purusartha (subserving the alms of man) helped him to esta­
blish that property being the effect of acquisition Is also purusartha and thus 
lauklka ^
5
VIjnanesvara explains:
1. Admitted by VIjnanesvara with the word ‘Guruna*, on Yajn .11.114. *Guru* 
was Prabhakara, see Jha, The Prabhakara School of Purva MTmamsa, (Allaha- 
bad, 1911), 14, also 312 and n. thereof. Derrett, RLSI, 142. That *Guru* 
was Prabhakara Is established from another manuscript, Gurusammata Padarthah 
(Trivandrum, 1954), Introd., 1. On the popularity of Prabhakara as a leader 
of a school of  mlmamsa In the Deccan (VIjnanesvara*s home country), see the 
Inscription referred to by Derrett at History of Indian Law, (Leiden, 1973), 23, 
n.6 (an Inscription of VIjnanesvara *s lifetime).
2 . It was for Bhavanatha to say: loka-slddham varjanam janmadl, cited, Madana- 
ratna-pradlpa, ed ., Kane, (Bikaner, 1948), 324. Kane, HD, III, 550, n.1027. 
Derrett, RLSI, 135, n . l .
3# Literally means for the man In contrast to ‘directed to the ceremony/observance/ 
ritual*. It Ts what a man ordinarily undertakes for securing the reward of happi­
ness, Kane, HD, V , II, 1232-5. Jha, Purva Mlmamsa In Its Sources, (Benares, 
1942), 292-7. K .L . Sarkar, Mlmamsa Rules of Interpretation, (Calcutta, 1909), 
391-3. Derrett, RLSI, 132.
4 . Derrett, RLSI, 144.
5 . On Yajn. 11.114; the underlined words are the actual words of Prabhakara, see 
manuscript 91117 of S .O .A .S . copied from a manuscript, shelf N o .38.B.6 .4 . 
of the Adyar Library (Jalmlnl, IV .1.2 only), 1-6 at 2 and 4 . Text followed from 
Yajnavalkyasmrtl, ed. Dr. Umesh Chandra Pandey, (Varanasi, 1967), 266.
kin ca, nlyatopayakam svatvam loka-slddham evetl nyaya-vldo manyante/ 
tatha h i — llpsa-sutre trtlye vamake dravyarjana-nlyamanam kratvarthatve 
svatvam eva na syat/svatvasyalauklkatvad I t l  purva-paksasambhavam asankya, 
dravyarljanasya pratlgrahadlna svatva-sadhanatvam loka-slddham It l purva-paksah 
samarthlto Guruna — nanu ca dravyarjanasya kratv arthatve svatvam eva na 
bhavatltl yaga eva na samvarteta f  pralapltam Tdam kenflpT ‘arjanam svatvam" 
napddayatTTtl vlpratlslddham It !  vadata /  tatha slddhdnte’ pT svatvasya laukTkatvam 
angTkrtyalva vlcara-prayojanam uktamy ato nlyamatlkramah purusasya na kratoh
/Continued on next page:
Moreover, such as are conversant with the 
science of reasoning deem regulated means 
of acquisition a matter of popular recogni­
tion. In the third clause of the LTpsa sutra, 
the venerable author has stated the adverse 
opinion, after (obviating) an objection to It , 
that, " I f  restrictions, relative to the acquisi­
tion of goods, regard the religious ceremony, 
there could be no property, since proprietary 
right Is not temporal"; (by showing that) "the 
efficacy of acceptance and other modes of ac­
quisition In constituting proprietary right Is a 
matter of popular recognition” . Does I t  not 
follow, " I f  the mode of acquiring the goods 
concern the religious ceremony, there Is no 
right of property, and consequently no cele­
bration of a sacrifice?" (Answer) " It  Is a 
blunder of any one who affirms, that acqui­
sition does not produce a proprietary right; 
since this Is a contradiction In terms” . 
Accordingly, the author, having again ac­
knowledged property to be a popular notion, 
when he states the demonstrated doctrine, 
proceeds to explain the purpose of the dis­
quisition In this manner, "therefore a breach 
of the restriction affects the person, not the 
religious ceremony": and the meaning of 
this passage Is thus expounded. " I f  re­
strictions, respecting the acquisition of 
chattels, regard the religious ceremony,
Its celebration would be perfect, with such 
property only, as was acquired consistently
Note 5 -  p.502 -  continued:
It ! /  asya cartha evam vlvrtah: — yada dravyarjana-nlyamanam kratv- 
arthatvam, tada nlyamarjltenalva dravyena na kratu-slddhlr I t l  na purusasya 
nlyamatlkrama-dosah purva-gakse /  raddhante tv arjana-nlyamasya purusar- 
thatvat tad-atlkramencrjltenapl dravjreija kratu-slddhlr bhavatl, purusasyaIva 
nIyamatikramado§a It! niyamctlkramarjitasyap'jf niyam atikrom arjT tasyapT svatvam  
angtkrtam , — anyatha kratu-stddhyabhavat /
with those rules; and not so, I f  performed 
with wealth obtained by Infringing them; 
and consequently, according to the adverse 
opinion, the fault would not effect the man,
I f  he deviated from the rule: but, according 
to the demonstrated conclusion, since the re­
striction, regarding acquisitions, affects the 
person, the performance of the religious cere­
mony Is complete even with property acquired 
by a breach of the rule; and It  Is an offence 
on the part of the man, because he has v io l­
ated an obligatory ru le ". It Is consequently 
acknowledged, that even what Is gained by 
Infringing restrictions, Is property: because, 
otherwise, there would be no completion of 
a religious ceremony. 1
Colebrooke*s rendering, In spite of being old-fashioned and unldto* 
matlcf  has acquired an authority of Its own, and authors like J.R. Gharpure, 
follows It  very closely. Now an Improved translation of the passage Is avail 
able from the pen of Derrett, which brings out Its meaning somewhat better:
Moreover scholars of mlmamsa believe that 
Property, the means of acquisition of which 
are limited, Is a concept of a secular charac­
ter. For example, In the third clause of the 
LIpsa sutra , two Interpretations of the purva-  
paksa (prlma facie view) are possible. Acoord- 
Ing to the first, the proposition Is this: " I f  the 
nlyamas (restrictive precepts) regulating the 
acquisition of assets were directed to the pur­
pose of the sacrifice, Property Itself would 
fa ll to exist, since Property Is a secular con­
cept". According to the second, It means 
"The fact that (technical) means of acquisi­
tion, starting from (religious) acceptance, 
cancreate Property Is Itself a secular fac t".
Prabhakara realised that the first was Impos­
sible, and accepted (or propounded) the second.
1. Tr. Colebrooke, 1.1.10.
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He said, **It Ts objected that sacrifice I t -  
self could not take place, since Property 
would not exist I f  the acquisition of assets 
subserved the purpose of the sacrifice.
The nonsensical statement that acquisition 
does not produce Property Is a contradict­
ion In terms". When he comes to the 
slddhanta (conclusion) he admits that Pro­
perty Is a secular concept, and states the 
object of the discussion: "Consequently 
breach of the nlyama £ nlyama means 
"restrictive rule of a facultative character”!  
affects the Individual sacrlflcer and not 
the sacrifice Itself. ”
This Is the meaning : the purva-paksa 
would suggest that I f  the nlyamas relating 
to the acquisition of assets subserved the 
purpose of the sacrifice, the sacrifice 
would be achieved only with objects ac­
quired according to the regulations, but 
not with the aid of objects acquired by 
or In breach of a regulation, whereas 
the Individual sacrlflcer would not be 
tainted by the fault of breaking the nlyama.
But the conclusion -  on the contrary -,re ly - 
Ing upon the doctrine that the nlyama-s 
relating to acquisition subserve the purposes 
of the Individual himself, Is that the sacri­
fice can be achieved successfully even with 
the aid of assets which have been acquired 
In breach of those regulations, while the 
Individual himself Is tainted by breach of 
the regulations. Such a conclusion In­
volves the admission that Property exists 
In a thing acquired In breach of a nlyama .
Unless this were admitted the achieving of 
the sacrifice would be prejudiced. 1
Once, VIjnanesvara, by the help of Prabhakara*s Interpretation, 
established that property was Iauklka, he had no d ifficu lty  In reasserting the
1. RLSI, 144-5.
mimamsa doctrine that- the modes of acquisition of property were not creatures
of the dharmasastras.^ This temporal concept of property did not conflict
with the Vedic injunction of performing sacrifices, because according to
Prabhakara, "the wealth acquired by temporal means can certainly be used
2
in the performance of sacrifices” . Property tainted through acquisition
by reprehensible means could be used for performing sacrifices and the taint
would affect only the sacrificer and not the sacrifice, although the sacrificer
3
would have to perform some expiatory rites.
4
Vijnanesvara did not probe the rationale of Prabhakara *s doctrine;
— — *  wm
1. Prabhakara*s Brhatl is a comment upon Sabara *s Bhasya on Jaimini. Prab­
hakara does not normally d iffer from Sabara, but here he deviates and out­
strips Sahara to the advantage of Vijficnesvara, Jha, Prabhakara Mimamsa, 
(Allahabad, 1911), 12. For exhaustive and critica l discussion, RLSI, 137,
142-4. Also A .S . Nataraja Ayyar, The Mlmamsa View of Property*,
Vyavahara Nimaya, 4 (1955), 1:46-64.
2 . Jha, ib id ., 312. Jaimini, IV .1.5: "the object being not connected (with
the cause)", The Sacred Books of the Hindus, XXVII, (Allahabad, 1923), 1,201.
3 . Jh a ,ib id ., 312. Colebrooke, 1.1.10. Derrett, *An Indian Contribution to 
the Study of Property*, BSOAS, 1956, X V III/3 , 480; RLSI, 145.
4 . K .L . Sarkar explains as to why Vijnanesvara relied exclusively on Prabhakara:
*You should also notice that Vijnanesvara utilises the Mimansa Adhtkarana as 
interpreted by Guru Prabhakara who Is reputed to be an heterodox propounder 
of the Mimansa Sutras, while the orthodox interpretation of the Adhikarana as 
given by Savaraswami and Kumarila Bhatta gives no support to Vijnanesvara*s 
views. For these commentators explain the Adhikarana as merely showing the 
difference between Kratu Dharma and Manushya Dharma without any reference 
to the Idea of popular recognition*, K .L . Sarkar, Mfmamsa Rules of Interpre- 
tation, o p .c it., 395. Nataraja Ayyar does not agree with Sarkar and opines 
that there Is no basic difference among the views of Sabara, Kumarila and 
Prabhakara. There is a unanimity o f opinion among the three jurists; and 
each has arrived at the same conclusion on the same basis of reasoning with 
explanations having only some minor shades of difference*, Vyavahflra Nirnaya/
4 (1955) 1:64. It seems that Sarkar did not have the relevant passage ot Kumarila 
before him. However, These conundrums defeat the specialists no less easily than
general readers of the texts*, Derrett, RLSI, 143, n . l .
to strengthen hts thests, he stmply used hts tnterpretatton as a jurist's atd which
1 2 had its foundatton tn Jatmtnt, and also tn the Vedas.
The objector argues that t f  property be temporal, even what ts ob-
tatned by robber y or other nefarious means ts property. Vijnanesvara had no
dtfftcu lty tn tackltng thts objectton of the purva-pakstn. He potnted out that
even the popular notton of proprietary rights whtch ts based on accepted general
3
moral conduct of the people does not approve of robbery and such Itke means
9 4
as any basts of "acquisition. " It should not be alleged, that even what ts ob­
tained by robbery and other nefarious means, would be property. For proprte-
5
tary right tn such tnstances ts not recogntsed by the world".
Regardtng the objectton that t f  the concept of property ts temporal, 
no one can complatn that 'my property has been taken away by him*, Vtjnanes'- 
vara says that thts Itne of thought ts not correct. Even a tribunal whtch accepts
j
the temporal concept of property would entertatn such complatnts and would verify 
the valtdtty of worldly transactions such as purchase and sale, and a defecttve
1. Jatmtnt, IV . 1.2. For Sahara's comment, Jha, Sabara Bhasya, (Baroda,
1934), II, 707-13. A IsoA.S . Nataraja Ayyar,l-oc.ctt., 46-64.
2. Tat. B r . ll,  t t ,  4 .6 ; see M tta. on Y a jn .II. 135-6, Colebrooke, II, t.23 . 
Gharpure, 1078-9, alson.1 at 1079. Jatmtnt, 111,IV.8, Jha, tb td ., 510-12, 
RLSI, 145.
3. For a dtscusston, Derrett, 'An Indtan Contribution to the Study of Property', 
BSOAS, X V II1/3, 480-1.
4 . On Y a jn . I I .114. na cattavata cauryadt-praptasyapt svatvam syad tt t mantavyam/ 
loke tatra svatva-prastddhyabhavat, vyavahara-vtsamvadac ca /
5. Tr. Colebrooke, l. t .1 1 .
transaction would definitely vitiate the proprietary right arising from such a 
transaction, In Its worldly context.^
As for the remark that, I f  property were 
temporal, It could not be said "my pro­
perty has been taken away by him"; that 
Is not accurate, for a doubt regarding the 
proprietary right does arise through a doubt 
concerning the purchase, or other trans- ^ 
action, which Is the cause of that right.
After discussing the mlmarpsa doctrine and putting forward these
commonsense arguments, Vljnanes"vara turns to the sastra. He opines that even
Manu by Implication accepted the wordly nature of property. Manu (XI. 193)
ordains: "When Brahman have acquired wealth by a blam able act, they are
3
cleared by the abandonment of I t ,  with prayer and rigid austerity".
4
VI|hanesvaravs comment on this verse Is very Interesting. He says:
1. On Yajn. II. 114. yad apl mama svam anenapahrtam I t l  na bruyat svatvasya 
lauklkatva I t l;  — tad apy asat; svatva-hetu-bhutakrayadl-sandehat svatva- 
sandehopapatteh /
2. Tr. Colebrooke, 1.1.15.
3. Tr. Colebrooke, 1.1.15.
4 . On Yajn .11.114. sastralka-samadhlgamye svatve garhltenasat-pratlgraha- 
vagljyadlna labdhasya s/atvam eva nastltl, tat-putrcnam tad vlbhajyam eva /  
yada tu lauklkam vatvam tadasat-pratlgrahadllabdhasyapl svatvat tat-putranam 
tad vlbhajyam eva /  ‘ tasyotsargena suddhyantl* I t l  prayasclttam arjayltur evam, 
tat-putracflnam tu dayatvena svatvam I t l ,  na tesarp dosa-sambandah; ‘sapta 
vlttagama dharmy^i dayo labhah krayo Jayah/ prayogah karma-yogas ca sat- 
pratlgraha eva c a / / l t l  (10.115) Manu-smarana t /
Now, t f  property be deductble only from 
sacred ordnances^' that which has been ob- 
tat ned by accepting presents from an Im­
proper person, or by other means which are 
reprobated, would not be property, and con­
sequently would not be partible among sons.
But I f  I t  be a worldly matter, then even what 
Is obtained by such means Is property, and 
may be divided among heirs; and the atone­
ment abovementioned regards the acquirer 
only: but sons have the right by Inheritance, 
and therefore no blame attaches to them, 
since Manu declares "There are seven 
virtuous means of acquiring property, v iz .
Inheritance (daya), etc. 1
Vijnanesvara *s Interpretation of Manu, X I. 193, In the light of Manu. 
X.115, betrays his motivation for establishing the lauklka concept of property 
with the aid of  sastrlc texts. His argument Is that Manu at XI .193, only lays 
down a penance for the acquirer but does not specifically deny that wealth ob­
tained by such reprehensible acts becomes his property. Here, Vijnanesvara 
places emphalls only on penance, but he does not say anything about Manuks 
prescription for abandonment of such wealth. Medhatlthl^ Interpretation of 
this verse Is very different from that of Vijnanesvara. Medhatlthl says that 
utsarga (abandonment), japa (repeating of texts) and tapa (austerities) laid down
by Manu are not alternative prescriptions with freedom of selection, but one
2
penance of which a ll three parts are to be performed together. "For one who
1. Tr. Colebrooke, 1.1.16.
2. Jha, The Manubhasya of Medhatlthl, (Calcutta, 1939), 432; number of the 
verse In Jha Is X I. 192. tena ye Vjayantl dhanam karmana tasyotsarga-japa- 
tapcmsl trim samuccltanl prayasctttanl /
earns wealth by such means, the expTatTon consists of *glvtng up*, Ireerpecf I fK
of texts1, and ‘austerities*, a ll three combined” .^
The cogency of Vijnanesvara *s argument may be tested by a technical 
point. Suppose a Brahmana, Immediately after acquiring property by reprehen­
sible means, expires without having any opportunity of relinquishing It , would
his sons Inherit his property? Vijnanesvara *s answer to this question Is In the
2
affirmative, but considering the purport of Manu, V II! .340, which Vljnanes^- 
vara does not actually quote, the answer could conceivably be In the negative.
Medhatlthl does not put forward any specific answer to this problem, 
but It Is Implied In his comment that the sons should abandon the property after 
Inheriting It , In other words, they Inherit It  subject to the obligation to abandon 
It and It Is d ifficu lt to see how they could call for any remedy against Interfer­
ence of their apparent property In It , or possession of I t .
If Vijnanesvara had accepted overtly Manu*s prescription of abandon­
ment, It would have posed yet another problem for him. According to the M ltak­
sara view, a son*s right Is co-extenslve with his fathers even In the father's self­
1. Tr. Jha, Manu-Smrtl, (Calcutta, 1926), 500-1. For Medhatlthl utsarga 
means tyago mamata-nlvrttlr danena va , text Jha, Ib id ., 432: *ReIlnqulsh- 
Ing; renouncing a ll sense of ownership with regard to It , or actually giving 
It away*, tr . Jha, Ib id ., 500. Bharucl also says that these verses are meant 
to be connected *wlth relinquishment of the property*, on Manu, XI .193, 
Derrett, Bharuchl, 11, 399.
2 . Manu, V I I I . 340. *lf a Brahmin seeks, even by sacrificing for another or teach 
Ing him, to obtain property from the hand j?f one who took what was not given 
to him, he Is like a thief*, tr . Derrett, Bharucl, II, 194.
acquisitions and as soon as a father acquires property, especially Immovable 
property, even by reprehensible means, It would be owned by sons as w ell, 
as co-owners with their father, and the father would lose the right of re lin­
quishing the whole except to the extent of his own unspecified share. Aban­
donment by the minor sons seems out of the question.
The question can be put whether wealth, talNed because of being 
acquired by the father through blameable means, would vitiate the title  of the 
sons when they acquire It as daya or rlktha. VIjnanesvara said that they could 
because of Manuks text (X.115, X I. 193), but did not go Into details of the 
controversy.^ To confcrm with the view of Prabhakara, he accepts the
1. The author of the Madana-ratna-pradfpa was not happy with VIjnanesvara *s 
utilitarian approach towards Manu, X I. 193 and X.115, but his reasoning also 
was not very dissimilar to that of his forerunner. In fact, he elaborates 
VIjnanesvara *s reasoning by bringing about the function of  daya as a purify­
ing process. According to him, It  Is better to hold that property acquired by 
means reprobated In the sastra Is property reprobated by usage as w e ll. But 
when such property passes to the sons through means approved by the sastra, 
the sons get a good t it le . The sastrlc mode works as a purifying ‘strainer* 
and the taint Is taken out of the property when Inherited by the sons as daycy. 
Madana-ratna-pracJfpa, ed ., Kane, (Bikaner, 1948), 325. It Is a remarkable 
example of manipulation of the Sastra for a lauklka end and despite the c la rifi­
cation at Madana-ratna, VIjnanesvara deserves the whole credit. The lauklka 
aspect of property has been discussed by Nllakantha In his Vyavahara Mayukha, 
but excepting a general Indebtedness to the Madana-ratna, the author does not 
show much Ingenuity on this particular topic. He boldly shows the lack of 
logic In holding that the sastra Is the origin of property, V y .M a ., ed .,
Mandllk, (Bombay, 1880), 31-6. Extensive discussion at the Vfra-mltradoya, 
ed ., Golap Sastrl, (Calcutta, 1879), sec.12-43, but sec.38 should be approach- 
ed with caution which Is a misunderstanding of Prabhakara. More original 
approach could be found In the Sarasvatf-vllasa which holds that the relation­
ship between heir and the estate of a deceased person Is not based upon texts, 
ed. Foulkes, (London, 1881), sec.399-477. Also see Kane, HD, III, 552, 
whose statement on Madana-ratna Is blurred by brevity. Elaborate discussion 
by Derrett, JESHO,"" 1/1, (1957), fn .2  at 85-7.
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spiritual therapy of penance for purifying the acquirer but ‘dissociates the 
spiritual condition of the acquirer from the legal title  to the object acquired'.^
It by no means follows that this was the prevailing, s till less the traditional 
view In Brahmin circles In the Deccan at or before his time.
*
There were otherproblems which needed VIjnanesvara*s attention.
The Veda ordains that *a man, whose hair Is yet dark and who has had a son,
2should consecrate the sacred Vedlc fires*. The Veda also Insists that sacri­
fices must be performed with one's own wealth over which one has exclusive 
3
ownership* The opponents of the son's right by birth put forward the view
that I f  the son's co-ownership with the father Is accepted, then, as soon as a
son Is born , the father lacking an undisputed ownership of property cannot obey
4
the Vedlc Injunction of consecrating Vedlc fires. So, a son's right by birth
Is grossly Inconsistent with the Vedlc command. Vlsvarupa and Aparadltya,
5
who accepted son's right by birth, suggested, as we have seen before, that 
the father should acquire wealth for performing the Agnlhotra. But VIjnanesvara 
was reluctant to put forward the same argument because according to him, even 
In the father's self-acqulsltlon, a son had a co-extenslve right. VIjnanesvara
1. Derrett, RLSI, 146.
2 .  Kane, HD, III, 5 5 2 .  The . Vlramltrodaya, 1.6, ed., Golap Sastr?; 
(Calcutta, 1879), 4.
3 . Talttlrtya SamhTta, V I ,1.6,3; etat kalu vava tapa Ityahuh yah svam dadatl I t l /
4 . Colebrooke, 1.1.8.
5 .  S u p r a ,4 7 3 ;  4 8 0 - 1 .
had to fa ll back on the Vedlc Injunction Itself. He says that *by cogency of 
the text Itself .'which enjoins their performance and which Is In the nature
j
of a command*,  ^ the father Is Invested with the authority to utilise property 
for purposes prescribed by the Vedas.
Here, on the one hand, VIjnanesvara Is nullifying the argument that 
son's birthright Is Inconsistent with the Vedlc Injunction of performing the Agnl- 
hotra by the father, and Indeed, on the other hand, by relying on the Vedlc 
command, Is accepting that the purpose of property Is not exclusively temporal: 
but It was never argued by anyone that property, when acquired, did not enable 
spiritual objects to be attained.
The champions of the exclusive sastrlc concept of the acquisition of
property also argue that common ownership between father and son goes against
the smrtl texts, which empower a father to make gifts of affection of moveables
to his w ife, daughters, sisters and sons. VIjnanesvara answers that, by special
provision of the relevant smrtls, despite son's right by birth In a ll his father's and
grandfather's property, moveable property, whether ancestral or paternal, Is under
2
special control of the father.
In K .L . Sarkar's opinion, It was not necessary for VIjnanesvara to take 
the trouble to establish that property Is temporal. According to him, even If
1. Mlta on Y a jn . I I . 115114: yad-apy-artha sadhye§u valdlkesu karma svanadhlkara 
I t l ,  tatra tad-vldhana-balad-evadhlkaro gamyate/  Colebrooke, 1.1.26.
2 . Colebrooke, 1.1.24, 27.
the concept Is accepted that property Is acqutred for sacrifices, VIjnanesvara *s 
theory of son*s co-ownership wlfh the father would have remained unaltered,
for, In Adhlkarana I, C h.II, B k.v l,
Jalmlnl lays down the principle that 
every member of a family who joins 
Ip the family worship, has the fu ll 
benefit of that worship. In other 
words, according to Jalmlnl, of the 
two, the father and the son, each 
gets the fu ll benefit of the properties 
offered as sacrifices. By analogy 
from this, It might well be said that 
each member of a joint Hindu family 
consisting of a father and sons, was 
jo in tly  with the rest, owner of the 
whole of the family property. 1
Though far-fetched, this argument consists with mlmamsa technique of which, 
of course, Sarkar was a master.
iv_ 2 
But It was not VIjnanesvara *s Intention, as Sarkar himself realised,
3
to accept the sastrlc concept of acquisition of property. By trying to find a 
a way through the sastra for VIjnanesvara *s theory, Sarkar Is exposing his mis­
understanding of the Mltaksara doctrine. VIjnanesvara *s purpose Is to prove 
that acquisition of property Is not within the exclusive category of subserving 
spiritual or symbolic purposes, It Is purely a worldly phenomenon producing human 
‘happiness*. Thus, the Invisible (adrsta) result achieved by each satrl In a
1. K .L . Sarkar, MljnamsaRules of Interpretation, (Calcutta, 1909), 388.
2. Ib id ., 388.
3. However, VIjnanesvara did not hesitate to use Gautama *s text: utpattalvartham 
svamltval labhate, Colebrooke, 1.1.23.
gaU rg  ^ sacrifice would have been Irrelevant to VIjnanesvara's worldly concept 
of property. Moreover, the analogy between joint ownership and saUrssacrl- 
flces may explain jo int exertion and joint enjoyment, but It does not help much
regarding the son*!s Innate right In property o f the father and the grandfather.
/
The analogy ofsatW Is more appropriate to partnership and joint acquisition by
father and son than to the co-extenslve right to property of a son with his father,
2
acquired by the fact of b irth .
e. Property (svatva) and partition (vlbhaga)
We have seen that VIjnanesvara did not accept the sastrlc concept of 
acquisition of ownership. Nevertheless, curious as It  may seem, he put forward 
a sastrlc text, on son's right by birth, which he might have found In a less author­
itative edition of Gautama which he possessed, or taken from some digest now lost.
1. s attracts a sacrificial session, performed by a plurality of priests (sattvdwhose
number Is not less then seventeen and not more than twenty-four, The Mfmamsa 
Sutras of Jalmlnl, (Allahabad, 1923), 314. Also Jha, Shabara-Bhasya,
(Baroda, 1934), II, 1013.
2. Jalmlnl, V I .11.1 and 2; The Mtmamsa Sutras of Jalmlnl, (Allahabad, 1923), 
314-5. Jha, Ib id ., 1014-5. Also Apararka on Yajn. 11.121, 729: yatha 
loke sambhuya-samuthaylnam vede ca sattrlnam svamyutthane /
3 . Similar text of V l|nu, ata eva Vlspuh janmana svatvamapadyate « I t l /  Saras- 
vatl-vllasa, f4 6 1 , ed. Foulkes, (London, 1881), 90. Also D h.K .1 l25b.
But Bharucl accepts right by birth only for sons, not for daughters; putrasyalva 
na tu putrlkaya I t l  Bharucl, Sarasvati-vllasa, Ib id . ,  ^ 462. Jlmutavahana 
mentions the knowledge of a similar text In a passing remark. Da.bha.1 .20, but 
some commentators on the Davabhaaa attributed It to Gautama, see Karje, HD, 
III, 558. Srlkrsna Tarkalankara rejected the text as amula (unauthorised), 
SrTkrsna on Dayabhaga, 1.19, ed. Stokes, (Madras, 1865), 187, n.19. Does 
not occur In Vlsvarupa or Apararka, but occurs In the Bhasya of Medhatllb! In a 
slightly different form: 'utpanno varthasvamyam Ity acarya* I t l  Medhatlthl on 
Manu, IX .156 and on IX.212. Kane, HD, III, 557. Derrett, JESHO 1/1, 
(1957), 82, n . l .
The text runs as follows":  ^ " Let ownership of wealth be taken by
bTrrti".
VIjnanesvara cites this text In order to refute the arguments of those
who propound that partition Is one of the modes of acquisition of ownership and
3
to establish the view that property pre-exists partition. To VIjnanesvara,
partition Is not a phenomenon wh|ch creates proprietary right but merely adjusts
diverse rights In property held jo in tly by applying those rights In particular por-
4tlons of the joint stock. "Partition (vlbhaga) Is the adjustment of divers
rights regarding the whole, by distributing them on particular portions of the 
5aggregate” .
Vljncnesvara could not be satisfied by merely defining partition In a 
way which was opposed to Its traditional sastrlc notion. He Indulged In a cate­
chism to substantiate hjs definition which (as we are now ready to understand) 
was based on the temporal notion of property and acquisition of property by birth
1. On Yajn. 11.114, Dh.K.1124a. utpattyalvartham svamltval Iabhate/
2 . Tr. Colebrooke, 1.1.23.
3. The view was already expressed by Vlsvarupa, on Yajn.11.121, 245, D h.K . 
1175b. Also Apararka on Y a jn .II. 121, 729.
4 . On Yajn.II .114. vlbhago nama dravya-samudaya-vlsayanam aneka-svamyanam 
tad ekadesesu vyavasthapanam /
5. Tr. Colebrooke^1.1.4.
6 . On Yajn. 11.114. klm vlbhagat svatvam uta svasya sato vlbhaga I t l  /  . . .  klm 
sastra 1 ka-samadhlgamyam svatvam uta pramanantara-samadhlgamyam I t l /
Does properly arTse from partition?
Or does partition of pre-existent pro­
perty take place? . . .  whether pro­
perty be deduced from the sacred Insti­
tutes alone, or from other (and tempor­
al) proof. 1
As so he proceeds, as we have seen.
f .  Bl rthrlght and different categories of property
For the purpose of the Mjtaksara doctrine, questions such as whether
ownership pre-exists partition, or whether property be deduced exclusively from
the sastra or from temporal proof, presupposed the most vita l question, namely,
whether property could be acquired at b irth. Probably Vljnanes'vara knew
that the text of Gautama (above) on janmasvatvavada, which he cited, would
not be accepted by the sastrlns, especially In the North, as one of unimpeachable 
2authenticity. That Is why, before Its citation, Vlinanesvara bu ilt up an atmo-
sphere/  with the aid of mlmarjisa, favouring Its unquestionable acceptance as an
ordination of the sastra, the effect of which was nothing but an anticlimax and
3
aroused doubts about Its genuineness.
4
Be that as It may, this sets the stage for his famous utterance:
1. Tr. Colebrooke, 1.1.7.
2. Derrett, RLSI, 135.
3 . Madana-ratna-pradfpa maintains son's birthright both by reason of the text and 
by reason of the temporallty of property, ed. Kane, (Bikaner, 1948), 323.
4 . On Yajn.11.114. tasmat paltrke paltdmahe ca dravye janmanalva svatvam/
'Therefore (It ts settled that) ownershtp Tn the father's or grandfather's estate 
is by birth"
Thts general statement of VIjnanesvara seems to convey the meantng 
that a son's rtght by btrth extends to a ll categories of property of hts father and 
grandfather. But the all-pervading range of thts utterance has been curtailed 
by VIjnanesvara tn hts subsequent explanations. Here, he was faced with the 
problem of reconciling the day-to-day functioning of a family headed by a 
father, and a son's Inherent right In the paternal and grandpatema! property. 
VIjnanesvara had to make a synthesis between the Northern notion of morally- 
Ilmlted patriarchal power and the Southern customary law of common ownership 
between father and son, a compromise between Individual and communal owner­
ship of property.
A  detailed study of VIjnanesvara's text reveals the extent of son's co- 
ownership, from birth, of the property belonging to his father and grandfather.
With regard to ancestral Immovables and self-acquired movables of
the father, VljnanesVara*s view can be ascertained without d ifficu lty . In an-
2
cestral Immovable property, a son's birthright can be described as 'complete'.
A  father has no power of alienation of such property without the consent of his
1. Tr. Gharpure, II (4), 991. Colebrooke renders pattamahe as 'ancestral', 
1.1.27. But paltamahe litera lly  means *belonging to the father's father*. 
J .C . Ghose renders as 'grandparental', The Principles of Hindu Law, (Cal­
cutta, 1917), V o l.II , 91 and n. thereof! Ghose and Gharpure's rendering 
Is better, and Colebrooke's'ancestral' Is liable to raise confusion and^wldens 
the ambit of son's birthright In property more than VIjnanesvara envis aged. 
Mayne prefers, 'grandfather's'; he considers Colebrooke's 'ancestral' Is a 
mistake, Hindu Law and Usage, 10th ed ., 331, n .g .
2 . GolapSastrl, Hindu Law, 4th ed ., 211-2*
son,  ^ and a son can force a division of ancestral Immovables even against the 
2
w ill o f hts father.
In his self-acquired movables, the lather has fu ll Tndependence. He
3
can altenate such property at hts pleasure , and unltke ancesttal Immovable
i
property, a son cannot enforce a division against the wishes of hts lather. But 
the fu ll Independence of a father In his self-acquired movables Is not a complete 
denial of son's birthright. Until a partition both lather and son live on a ll the 
property as I f  there Is no difference between ancestral and self-acquired assets, 
and a separating son takes a share at his father's discretion even In the self- 
acquired movables of his lather. Moreover, at his father's death, a son who 
was united with his father takes 'a ll the property of the lather, of whatever sort, 
which could be Identified at the father's death.
1. M lta. on Yajn. 11.121; Colebrooke, I .v .9 .
2. Stated unambiguously on Ya jn .11.121, Colebrooke, I . v .3-5; l.v .8 ; also 
on 11.114, Colebrooke, 1.1.24-5. But qualified when he states the time for 
partition. Only when the lather Is Incapable diseased or vicious, and the 
mother also Is then past the age of child-bearing, a son can enforce a division 
against his lather's w il l ,  1.11.7; an unhappy synthesis of the Northern and 
Southern views, N .C . Sengupta though , seems to be unhappy at p .206, yet 
admits at p .205 that the texts have given the son a right to demand a partition 
of ancestral Immovables against the wishes of the father, Evolution of Ancient 
Indian Law, (Calcutta, 1953), 205-6. Narayana, the author of Vyavahara- 
slromanl and a disciple of VIjnanesvara, does not Impose the conditions as at
1.11.7, but confers on the son the right to demand partition of ancestral pro­
perty at his w il l ,  Derrett, JIH, V o l.30 (1952), 49.
3. On YajfiMI .121; Colebrooke, l .v .9 .
4 . Derrett,SCJ. 19(1950), 107. P .N . Sen, General Principles of Hindu Juris­
prudence, 146.
According to VIjnanesvara, where self-acquired Immovables are
concerned, father's Independence has been curtailed by the son's birthright.
VIjnanesvara cites Vyasa's text,  ^ Tn order to give a sastrlc justification of his
view about a son's Inherent right In the Immovable property acquired by the 
2
father. "But he Is subject to the control of his sons and the rest, In regard
to the Immovable estate, whether acquired by himself or Inherited from his
3
father or other predecessors” •
This passage gives us an unambiguous Impression that In Immovables 
acquired by a father, the ownership of father and son Is co-extenslve. Be­
tween ancestral Immovables and self-acquired Immovables, the difference Is this, 
that with regard to the former, a son can compel his father to come to a parti­
tion, but In the latter a son has no such right.
If VIjnanesvara had stopped here, there would have been no scope for 
confusion. But he had yet to explain the relative rights of father and son In a 
father's self-acquired Immovables. While discussing the power of disposition 
by an unseparated father, It might be wrongly Interpreted, that VIjnanesvara 
seems to have confcerred on him general power of disposition at his pleasure over
1. sthavaram dvlpadam . . .  supra,3 4 0 , ti.3 ,
2 . On Y a jn . I I .114. sthavare tu svarjlte pltradl-prapte ca putradl-para- 
tantryam eva /
3 . Tr. Gharpure, II (4), 991-2. Colebrooke, 1.1.27. Jolly rightly thought that 
the father did not have absolute power to alienate self-acquired Immovables, 
Outlines of an History o f the Hindu Law of Partition, Inheritance, and Adoption, 
TLL, 1883, (Calcutta, 1885), 111-13.
a ll categories of hts self-aqulred properly. In the following passages, VIjna­
nesvara exptatns a son's power of Interdiction Tn hTs father's alTenatTon of self- 
acquTsTtTons. ^
So Itkewtse, Tf the unseparated father 
Ts makTng a donation, or sale, of effects 
Inherited from the grandfather, the grand­
son has even the right of prohTbTtTon.
But Tf the effects were acquired by the 
father, he has no right of prohTbTtTon, 
as he Ts dependent on hTm. On the con­
trary, he must gTve hTs consent.
Consequently, the difference Ts this: 
although he has a right by birth Tn his 
father's and Tn his grandfather's pro­
perty, s til l,  since Tn regard to the 
father's property, he Ts dependent on 
his father and since the father has a 
predominant Interest as It was acquired 
by htmself, the son must give his consent 
to the father's disposal of hts own ac­
quired property. 2
3
The faulty rendering of juridical sanskrlt In these two passages con­
veys the Idea that VIjnanesvara Ts contradicting his earlier statement of 1.1.27,
j
where he declared son*? birthright In a ll Immovable properties, whether acquired 
by father or grandfather. A  careful study of Vljnanes'vara's language In these
1 • On Yajn. 11.121. tatha avlbhaktena pltra paltamahe dravye dlyamane v lk r i-  
yamane va pautrasya nlsedhe 'pyadhlkarafi pltrarjlte na tu nlsedhadhlkarah, 
tat para-tantratvat /  anumatls tu kartavya /  tatha hi -  paltrke paltamahe 
pltr-paratantratvat pltus'carjakatvena pradhanyat pltra vlnlyujyamane svarjlte 
dravye putrenanumatlh kartavya /
2 . Tr. Gharpure, 1020. Colebrooke, I . v .9-10.
3 . Colebrooke, I . v .9-10.
passages reveals that he left son's birthright In father's self-acquired Immov­
ables Intact and never Intended to modify what he had said before In I.  i .27.^ 
VIjnanesvara*s emphasis In l.v .9  and l.v .1 0 , Is on father's self-acquired mov­
ables and this Is apparent from his use of the word 'dravya' « The word dravya 
which VIjnanesvara himself categorically mentioned to signify 'movables* had 
been wrongly translated as 'effects* or 'property*. On this point, the pioneer­
ing statement o f Ram Charan Mltra Is very Illuminating. He points out the 
misunderstanding of the word dravya and says, "But the word which has been 
translated Into 'property' really means article or 'movable property*. If the
commentary had been correctly translated, there would not have been any 
2contradiction” . Thus, the word dravya which VIjpanesvara himself cate­
gorically Intended to signify movables has been wrongly translated and this
3m Is understanding led to a conclusion which VIjnanesvara never meant to be 
reached. Even the acute mind of P .N . Sen missed the significance of the 
word dravya and he arrived at the correct conclusion, not by textual Inter­
pretation of the MItaksara, but by relying on Mltra MIsTa's elaboration that
* the sons must give their assent to the disposal by the father of his self-acquired
4
property excepting land . . . .  *
v T 7 ~
1. Pandit/Josh! of the Deccan College , Poona (sometime at S .O .A .S .) agreed
w l th our view on this point.
2 . R.C. M ltra, The Law of Joint Property and Partition In British India, TLL,
1895-6, (Calcutta, 1897), 105.
3 . A t M lta . tr. Colebrooke, I. v. 9-10, supra, 521.
4 . P .N . Sen, General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, o p .c lt., 132-3.
Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrl considers son's right Tn father's self-
acquTred Tmmovable property as an'Imperfect right*,  ^ because Tn such property
a son has no right to oppose an alienation or to enforce a partition against the
wishes of his father. Despite his knowledge of the sastra, Sastrl was led 
2
astray by the wrong translation of the word dravya , and did not apply his 
scholarly mind to render It correctly. Though he calls son's right In father's
self-acquired Immovables an 'Imperfect right*, yet he admits the Inherent right
3
of a son In such property and quite correctly blames the decisions of the courts 
for Incorrect exposltlon of the sastra. He remarks^
It should, however, be borne In mind 
that such property, I f  undisposed of by 
the father, Ts taken by sons and the 
like, by survivorship and not by des­
cent . . .  the right of a son to his 
father's self-acquired property may 
be called an Imperfect one, but It 
has been made more so by our courts 
. . .  4
1. Hindu Law^' 4th ed., 213-4.
2. So also J .C , Ghose, Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1917), II, 111.
3 . The cases cited by Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrl are: Muddun v . Ram (1863)
6 W.R. 71: a father Is competent to sell his self-acquired Immovables without 
the concurrence of his sons; also Sltal v . Madho (1877) 1 A ll 394; Bawa v .
Rajah (1868) 10 W.R. 287. To this could be added Rao Balwant v . kanl Klshort 
(1898) 25 1A 54, for a criticism, see Infra,744-46.
4 . Hindu Law, 4th ed ., 214. See Mayne's uncritical following of case law on this 
' point, Hindu Law, 10th ed ., (Madras, 1938), 352. So also J .C . Ghose, The
Principles of Hindu Law, 2nd ed ., (Calcutta, 1906), 422-3. Also N .R. Ragha- 
vacharlar, Hindu Law, Principles and Precedents, 6th ed. (Madras, 1970), 262.
But see Mayne, 464, where he admits that a father has not absolute power to dis­
pose of self-acquired Immovables^ Slromanl's view that father has absolute power 
over his self-acquired property, whether movable or Immovable, Is not correct, 
Commentary on the Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1885), 171, also 157, para.4, where 
he misunderstood VIjnanesvara.
But authors, like SastrT and Sen, overlooked R.C. Mltra's correct 
rendering of the word dravya Tn I . v .9-10, and did not gtve due Importance to 
the crucial passage In the Mltaksara (1.1.27). When we read these passages 
together the total Impression Ts this: that,
these texts establish that a ll joint pro­
perty Is ‘owned* equally by father and 
sons, but the father has special power 
of alienation with reference to some 
properties. It Is clear by custom, how­
ever, partition at the demand of sons 
against the father*s w ill were unusual 
unless the father was utterly Incapable; 
and similarly, sons were sparing In 
their control over their father's disposi­
tions . 1
So It  should be borne Tn mind that though VIjnanesvara did not confer 
on the son, Tn his father's self-acquired Immovables, the right to enforce a par­
tition , yet he did not deny the son's birthright In such property and did not give 
the father unfettered power of disposition without asking for the consent o f the
son. The son's consent was necessary even for gifts of self-acquired Immovables
2through affection to w ife . This Ts a situation where VIjnanesvara had to make 
a compromise between the patriarchal notion of father's power and ison's Inherent 
right In his father's property. VIjnanesvara never says that son's consent Is not
1. Derrett, ZVR, 64 (1962), n.168 at 56. See also Henry Maine, Ancient Law, 
261, where he says that the Indian tendency Ts the reverse of the Idea of 
Western Europe, 'Nemo In communlone potest TnvTtus detlnerl*, ("No one can 
be kept Tn co-proprietorship acplnst his w il l1), -  a partition rarely takes place 
Tn India. This may have been the case over a century ago, It w ill not do as 
a statement of fact today.
2 . M lta , Colebrooke, 1.1.25. Derrett, 'Hljidu Law: the Rights of the Separated 
Son', S .C .J . 19(1956), 107.
required while a father alienates his self-acquired property; he only emphasises 
that by reason of a son's dependence on his father and because of a father's pre­
dominant Interest In self-acquired property any reasonable son would morally be 
bound (and perhaps would conclusively be presumed) to acquiesce In such an 
alienation.
A son's dependence on his father or a father's predominant Interest In
his self-acquired property  ^ Is not a denial of the son's birthright In such property;
but as In Indian society an Individual member sacrifices some of his Individual
rights for the greater Interest of the family, In this case also a son condescends
2
to modify his birthright for a reasonable transaction entered Into by his father.
A  son retains his right to withhold consent In cases where a father dissipates his
3 -self-acquired Immovables, and Vyasa's text quoted by VIjnanesvara with appro-
4
val, categorically confers that right on a son.
To Vljnanes'vara, the Interest of the family was of paramount Importance 
and Individual rights, though duly recognised, were subservient to the welfare of 
the fam ily. He was not In favour of propounding a juristic principle which
1. M lta, Colebrooke, l.v .1 0 .
2. See the discussion on son's dependence (paratantrya) at Derrett, ZVR, 64 
(1962), 15-130 at 96-7.
3. P .N . Sen, General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, o p .c lt., 136.
4 . Vyasa cited at 1.1.27. For the correct meaning of L 1.27, see Madana- 
ratna-pradlpa, ed ., P.V. Karje, (Bikaner, 1948), 210: ^varjltam-apl 
sthavaram dasddtkam ca putresu praptavyavaharesu tad-anumatyatva datavyam/ 
Also Derrett, ZVR, 64 (1962), n.168 at 56; RLS1, 417.
would provide no rule authorising expenses Tn cases of family necessity, unfore­
seen emergencies, and for the pursuit of dharma within the fam ily. He did not 
turn the requirement of consent of co-owners for an alienation Into a rigid rule 
of substance (which It was open to him to doandnow appears In judicial decisions 
as to the effect of death after 1956), but made fu ll use of Brhaspat!*s text  ^ for 
upholding transactions even of Immovables by a single co-owner for legal or 
dharmya necessities when the other co-owners lacked legal capacity for giving 
consent. But this also supports VIjnanesvara *s earlier statement that the consent 
of a son with legal capacity was necessary for alienating a ll categories of Immov­
ables even when the transaction was for special purposes as enumerated In his 
comment on Brhaspatl:^
The meaning of that text Is this: while the 
sons and grandsons are minors and Incapable 
of giving their consent or doing similar acts, 
or while the brothers are so and continue un­
separated, even one person, who Is capable, 
may conclude a g ift, hypothecation, or sale, 
o f Immovable property, I f  a calamity affect­
ing the whole property require It , or for sup­
porting the family, or for performing Indis­
pensable duties, such as obsequies of the 
ancestors (manes). 3
1. Briiaspatl cited at M lta, 1.1.2$. The text quoted supra,345 , r*• l •
2. On Yajn. 11.114. asyartha aprapta-vyavaharesu putresu pautresu va nujnanad 
asamarthesu bhratrsu va tatha-vldhesv avlbhaktesv apt sakala-kutumba-vyaplnyam 
apadl tat-po§ane va Vasyam kartavyesu ca pltr-sraddhadlsu sthavarasya dana- 
dhamana-vlkrayam-ekokpl samarthah kuryad-ltt /
3. Tr. Gharpure, 992-3, Colebrooke at 1.1.29 renders pltr-sraddhadlsu as 
‘obsequbs of the father or the like*.
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However to Impute to the word 'sthavare' (tn respect of Tmmovables) 
M Tta,[l.t.27J two meanings -  one tn case of ancestral Tmmovables and an­
other tn case of self-acquired tmmovables -  (tn the Itght of l.v .10) would 
amount to the vtolatton of the nyaya prtnctple that a word, once pronounced, 
could convey only one meaning,  ^ and the contradTctTon of tmputtng to tt a 
double meantng was hardly to be expected from the pen of a commentator Itke 
VIjnanesvara.j
When we turn to VIjnanesvara‘s pronouncement on the fathers power 
over ancestral movables, we realtse that he belteved htmsfelf bound to modify 
the son*s btrthrtght Tn such property even though Yajnavalkya ordatned co-
2
extensTve rtght of father and son tn a ll categortes of property of the grandfather.
Even tn ancestral property, VtjjrTanesvara treats movables as a special 
category, distinct from tmmovables. In famtltes which Itve on agrtculture or 
partly on agrtculture and partly on commerce, the tmmovables form the nucleus 
of common famtly property and are the main sources of matntenance for the
1. sakrd-uccarttah sabdah sakrd-artham gamayatt/ ctted by P .N . Sen, 
G .P .H .J ., 137. Also J .N . Bhattachorya, Commentaries on Hindu Law, 
(Calcutta, 1909), I, 128. Dattaka MTmamsa, I I .35. Cp. Dayabhaga, 
i l l . t t .3 0 , where the word ‘mother* cannot be ordtnartly taken to Tnclude 
‘stepmother*. Contrast Jatmtnt, I . t v .18, where the sTtuatTon ts not the 
same; Mttaksara, I . t .27, does not need any subsequent elaboration on the 
potnt of self-acqutred tmmovables of the father. At l.v .1 0 , V tjn . was 
stmply clarifying the Incidents of self-acqutred movables of the father, see 
Sabara on Jatmtnt, I . tv . 18, Jha, Shabara-bhasya, (Baroda, 1933), 1,164-5.
2. Y a jn .II. 121, supra,5 3 1 ^ *  i*
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family. Therefore, restrictions are Imposed against alienation of tmmovables
by the father without the consent of the son. But Tf the same restrtctTons
agatnst altenatton are attached to movables, a deadlock tn the famtly mtght
result. VIjnanesvara here mantpulated the texts, and tn order to keep the
sttuatton flutd tn a famtly he resorted to a compromise between the texts of
Yajnavalkya and Narada,  ^ and dtd not adhere fu lly  to the purport of etther.
He dtd not confer on the father unrestricted absolute power to deal with an- 
2
cestral movables. A father could deal Independently with ancestral movables
3
only tn a spectal sttuatton and for spectfted purposes.
S till, It  (also) stands (as good law) that 
the father has Independent power Tn the 
disposal of effects other than Immovables 
for Indispensable acts of duty, and for 
purposes prescribed by the text of law, 
as gifts through affection, support of the^ 
famtly, re lie f from distress and so forth.
1. Y a jn . II .121; Narada, Man! mukta . . .  cited at MTta, l.t.2 1 , quoted 
supra,3 3 b'n ' ,3 34oy t). i .
— *
2. Jogendra Smarta Stromanl, Commentary on the Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1885), 
171. R.C. M ltra, TLL, 1895-6, The Law of Joint Property and Partition In 
British India, (Calcutta, 1897), 103. P .N . Sen, GPHJ, 138-9.
3. On YajrT. 11.114. tathapt pltur-avas'yakesu dharma-krtyesu vacanlkesu prasada 
dana-kutumba-bharanapadvlmoksadlsu sthavaravyattrtkta-dravya-vlnlyoge 
svatantryam Ttt sthltam /
4 . Tr. Gharpure, 991; Colebrooke, 1.1.27.
g. Summing up
We can sum up by saying that according to Vljnanes’vara, the son*s 
right by birth Is not merely limited to property of the grandfather, but It ex­
tends to the self-acqulsltlons of the father as w ell,^ although the extent of the 
right has been modified by factors such as religious and family necessities, and 
a father^ predominant position and responsibility as the senior-most male member 
of the family.
V . Jlmutavahana*s Treatment of the Son*s Right by Birth In the Dayabhaga 
a. Introduction
In the Mltaksara Vlfnanesvara established the theory of the son*s right
-  2 -  -by birth (janma-svatvavada) on a solid, objective foundation. But Jlmutava-
3 -
hana*s Dayabhaga constituted a trlumjinfor uparama-svatvavada (acquisition of
4 5right on the demise of the previous owner). Not Infrequently authors have
1. P .N . Sen, General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, op«clt., 131.
2 . Kane, HD, III, 547.
3 . He flourished between 1090-1130 A .D .,  Kane, HD, I, 326. Derrett, M .LJ. 
(1952) 1; a Iso Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, (Wiesbaden, 1973) , 51.
4 . B .N . Sampath, BLJ, (1965), I, 1, 37.
5 . Herbert Cowell, The Hindu Law, TLL, 1870 (Calcutta, 1870), 102. Also 
Stokes, Hindu Law Books, (Madras, 1865), 187, n.19.
thought that Jimutavahana wrote hts long and elaborate thests to dispute the 
arguments of VIjnanesvara put forward tn the Mltaksara, but there ts no conclu­
sive evidence for thts, and It was htghly Improbable that Jimutavahana had a 
personal knowledge of the celebrated work of VIjnanesvara. ^
To a student of comparative jurisprudence, the two works are of Immense 
significance from the points of view o f their genre as well as their theme. The 
contents o f both works are comments and Interpretations of virtually one and the 
same body of  smrtl rules, but their jurisprudential Interest lies In the fact that 
they differ both In their arguments and In thSr conclusions. They both looked 
for and emphasised those arguments which proved their respective points to f it  
In the framework of their Ideas on ownership In joint family property.
The concept of co-extenslve right In property between a father and
son which Is accepted In the Mltaksara Is absent from the Dayabhaga where a
2
father, so long as he Is a live, Is considered as the absolute owner of both 
3
ancestral and self-acquired property.
1. Jo lly, Outlines of an History o f the Hindu Law of Partition , Inheritance and 
Adoption, TLL, 1883, (Calcutta, 1885), 26. Kane, HD, I, 242. Thoroughly
enamlned by Derrett, The Relative Antiquity of the Mltaksara and the Dayab­
haga *, M .L .J ., 1952, 1-9 at 8. *
2 . SampathjBLJ, (1965), I, 1, 43, n .2 .
3 . R.C. M ltra, The Law of Joint Property and Partition In British India, TLL,
1895-96, (Calcutta, 1897), 178. K .L . Sarkar does not agree with M ltra, MRI, 
396. A recent opinion, though superficial and uncritical, agrees with M itra l:
S.P. Khetarpal, ‘Codification of Hindu Law*; Family Law and Customary Law 
In Asia: A  Contemporary Legal Perspective, ed ., D .C . Buxbaum, (The Hague,
1968), 215.
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b . daya
At the beginning of the treatise, Jimutavahana^ definition of daya 
rules out the possibility of co-extenslve right between father and son.^
The word daya Is used In a specified sense 
In respect of property In which Property 
arises upon the cessation of the previous 
Owner*s Ownership, Property Itself depend^- 
ent upon a relationship with that Owner.
Despite deriving the term daya from the root da (to give), Jimuta­
vahana does not attach much Importance to Its literal meaning. He points out
3
that the use of the verb Is metaphorical, since there Is no actual abdication
4(tyagq) on the part of the previous owner. Here the act o f giving Is not
voluntary but takes place by operation of law at the death, relinquishment or
r . 5retirement of the owner.
It has already been pointed out ^ that the correct derivation of the
1. Da.bha.l .5 . The texts followed as edited by Jlvananda Vldyasagara, 2nd 
ed., (Calcutta, 1893). tata^ca purva-svaml-sambandhadhlnam tat-svamy 
uparame yatra dravye svatvam tatra nlrudho daya-sabdah /
2. Tr. Derrett, ZVR, 64 (1962), 54.
3. Da *b ha. 1.4.
4. See Derrett, MLJ (1952), 6 . Macna^ghten thought that an Inchoate right 
arose at birth to the son which became perfected at the death o f the owner,
Hindu Law, 1,2; but Bengali authors were reluctant to accept I t ,  see Shamachum 
Sarkar, Vyavahara Darpana, 2-3, who does not agree with Macna^cjhten.
5. Cowell, The Hindu Law, TLL, 1870 (Calcutta, 1870), 94. Also K .L . Sarkar, 
Mlmansa Rules of Interpretation ., TLL, 1905, (Calcutta, 1909), 394.
root da ts 'to cut*, *to divide*, which leads to a different connotation of the term 
daya from Jimutavahana*s derivation. The term daya In jimutavahana*s sense 
coalesces with the term rlktha  ^ (the property of a deceased person) which suits 
his scheme of work.
c . Denial of the birthright
It seems that Jimutavahana did not envisage any concept of joint
ownership of property between father and son. A son*s right arises only after
the extinction of his father's ownership. So according to the Dayabhaga doc-
2trine, daya Is always (after a manner of speaking) sapratlbandha. The survival 
of an unblemished father remains (It appears) as a pratlbandha towards the accrual 
of ownership In the son. This view of  daya has been further clarified by Jimuta­
vahana
(1) Texts of Manu and Devala
< 4Hence the text of Manu and the rest must be taken as showing, that
1. On rlktha, supra, 4&2.<,'n -2"
2. Kane, HD, III, 547. Also supra,4 9 3 -  6 .
3. Da.bha. 1.30, 1.31. ato jlvatoh pltror-dhane putranam svamyam nastl klm 
tuparatayor-ltl jnapanartham manvadt-vacanam ekafci sab do *paras" carthab/
na coparama-matram-eva vlvaksltam klm tu patlta-pravrajltatvady upalaksayatl 
svatva-vlnasa-hetuta -samyat/
4 . Da.bha.1.18: Jimutavahana refers to the text of Devala: *When the father Is 
dead, let the sons divide the father's wealth: for sons have not ownership while 
the father Is alive and free from defect*. The text Is quoted supra, 366, n .4 . 
VIjnanesvara forgot about this text \
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sons have not a right of ownership tn the wealth of the living parents, but Tn the 
estate of both when deceased. One position Is conveyed by the terms of the 
text; the other by Its Import.
Mere demise Is not exclusively meant; for that 
Intends also the estate of a person degraded, 
gone Into retirement, or the like; by reason of 
the analogy, as occasioning an extinction of 
property. 1
(II) Texts on the Identity of Father and Son
Later, towards the end of his treatise, jimutavahana has discussed the
  2
dayadashfpof sons and has dealt with the texts which we have earlier seen to be
establishing the Identity of personality and the common ownership of property as
-  -  3between father and son but, to Jimutavahana, these texts only Indicate the
central position of the son In continuation and preservation of the family, but
do not signify any co-extenslve right In property during the lifetime of the father.
(III) Birth: not a mode of acquisition of property
Though Jlmutav3iana rejected the Idea of acquisition of ownership by 
birth, yet he had knowledge of the concept and applied his mind to refute the 
arguments of Its advocates.
1. Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha.1.30-1. Also see Da.bha.1.12, where this point Is 
again clarified.
2 .Supra, 419-27.
3. Da.bha .XI .1.31-6.
He opens the discussion with the view o f the objector.^
Acquisition Is the act of the acquirer; 
and one, who has the state of owner­
ship dependent on acquisition, Is the 
acquirer. Is not birth therefore, as 
the act of the son, rightly deemed his 
mode of acquisition? and have not 
sons, consequently, a proprietary righ t,; 
during their father's life , (even without 
his being degraded or otherwise disquali­
fied); and not by reason of his demise? 
and therefore, Is It declared: 'In some 
cases birth alone (Is a mode of acquisi­
tion) as In the Instance of a paternal 
estate*. %
In the preceding passage, the objector says that In order to become 
the owner of an object, there has to be acquisition (arjana), and arjana Is an 
activity (vyapara) on the part of the acquirer (arpyltr). For this reason, the 
acquirer acquires the status of an owner contingent upon his activ ity  of acqui­
sition. For example, birth Is an activ ity  of the son (putra-vyapara) and, there­
fore, I t  constitutes acquisition of a proprietary right. Consequently, the son,
at his birth, acquires this right during the lifetime of his father, not after the 
3
demise of the father.
Jimutavahana refutes this objection. He says that acquisition may 
not be an activ ity on the part of the acquirer: *The right of one may consistently
1. Da .bha .1.13. nanv arjayltr-vyaparo 'rjanam arjanadhlnasvaml-bhavas' 
carjaylta, tena putra-vyaparo janmalvarjanam yuktam. ato jlvaty eva pltarl 
putranam tatra svatvam na tu tan nldhanat. ata evoktam kvaclj janmalva 
pltre dhane /
2. Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha.1.13. See the text of Gautama, s u p r a ,£ J 6 ,n . i .
3. L. Rocher, 'In Defense of Jfmutavahana*, JAOS 96 (1976)1: 107-9 at 107.
arise from the act o f another • .  . '^  Therefore, the death of the father ( I .e .
the father's act of dying) can create his son's proprietary right^ without any
2
activ ity on the part of the son.
Jimutavahana refutes son's right by birth In the paternal estate with 
3
reference to Manu's text:
1. Da.bha. 1.21.
2. This coalesces with Jimutavahana's definition of daya, Da.bha.1.5 . The 
parallel situation which Jimutavahana refers to In support of his argument 
Is that of  g ift (dana) and says that 'In the case of donation, the donee's 
right to the thing arises from the act of the giver (Da.bha.1.21).
The passage Implies that a g ift is completed by the donor's act alone and 
the acceptance of the donee Is not necessary, see Raman Nadar Vlswanathan 
Nadar v . Snehappoo Rasa lam ma, AIR, 1970 SC 1759 (in the context of a be- 
quest to an unborn person), Jlmutavahana's view Is severely criticised by 
Derrett, MLJ Jan-June, (1971), 42: The Dayabhaga position to the effect 
that g ift Is the work of the donor Is shortly 'nonsense1. Rocher attempts to 
rehabilitate Jimutavahana with the aid of Panlnl, the grammarian. Panlnl 
(1.4.49) says: kartur Tpsltataman karma ('the karman of an act Is that which 
the agent (kartr) wants to achieve more than anything else1), Rocher, Ibid,
107. From this Rocher says: The agent (kartr) ,1n this case the datr, Is the 
one and only element that, In the action of da "giving” , acts Independently 
and autonomously', Ib id ., 108. In Panlnlan terms, Rocher's argument Is 
correct, but the grammar of language and the grammar of law are two d iffer­
ent things. Jurlsprudentlally, Jlmutavahana's thesis Is speculative and not 
strictly conclusive. As Rocher himself observes, Jimutavahana qualified his 
statement that 'the acceptance of the donee Is not necessary to complete a g ift, 
by the stipulation of'adonee who Is cetana (Da.bha.1.21), I .e .  someone who 
Is mentally capable of realising that the object Is his and that he can use It at 
w ill,  Rocher, Ib id ., 108. This Is Indeed significant. Fora criticism of 
Jlmutavahana's view on g ift and acceptance, see M l tram Is ra, Vyavahara- 
prakasa, Chowkhamba ed., 426-7. Also Derrett, Ib id ., 43-4.
3. Manu, IX. 104, Da.bha.1.14. D h .K .ll4 9 b . naltat manvadl-vlrodhat. 
yatha manuh urdhvam pttus ca Hiatus'ca sametya bhratarah samam /  bhajeran 
paltrkam rlktham anlsas te hi jlvatoh /
That Is not correct; for ft contradicts 
Manu and the rest ‘After the (death of 
the) father and the mother, the brethren, 
being assembled, must divide equally the 
paternal estate: for they have no power 
over It ,  while thfelr parents live . 1
(Iv) Ownership (svatva) does not pre-exist partition
JTmutavahana consistently sticks to his argument that sons have no
2
property (svatva) before partition. This view on Narada Is again reiterated
3 4In the light of the foregoing text of Manu. "This text Is an answer to
the question, why partition among sons Is not authorised, while their parents
5
are living: namely *because they have not ownership at that time*."
To clarify this statement, Jlmutavahana adds an explanatory note 
regarding the status of a son. He says, " I t  should not be argued, that the 
text Intends (mere) want of Independence"
1. Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha.1.14.
2. D a .b h a .I.ll on Narada, X II I .2.
3. Manu, IX, 104.
4. Da.bha.1.15. jvatorapl pltroh putranam kuto na vlbhaga Ity  asankayam 
Idam uttaram tadanlm asvamltvad I t ! /
5. Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha.1.15.
6 . ‘(mere) ‘ added. nasvatantryabhlprayam It l,  Da^bha.1.16. Cp. Apararka 
on Devala, asvamyam asvatantryam: kno power means want of Independ 
ence‘, J .C . Ghose, The Principles of Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1917), II, 274, 
239.
He also substantiates this view by citing the text of Devala.^
Devala ordains that there should be partition after the decease of the father ,
2and while the faultless father lives sons have no svamya. "Devala, too,
3
expressly denies the right of sons In their fathers wealth” .
_  _  4
Jlmutavahana fu lly  utilises these two texts, and puts forward an­
other argument against the cogency of the concept of ownership by b irth .
He argues that I f  ownership by birth Is accepted, then the son w ill have to be 
allowed the right to demand partition against the w ill of the father; and the
5
acceptance of such right w ill go against the precepts of Manu and Devala.
Besides, I f  sons had property In their 
father‘s wealth partition would be de- 
mandable even against his consent: 
and there Is no proof, that property 
Is vested by birth alone; nor Is birth 
stated In the law as a means of acqui­
sition .
1. pltary uparate putra . . .  , Da.bha.1.18, Dh.K.1156a; quoted supra, 366, 
n .4 .
2 . Da .bha .1.18. devalas" ca pltrdhana asvamyam spastayatl.
3 . Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha.1.18. For ‘right* read ‘ownership*.
4 . Manu, IX .104, and Devala, Da.bha.1.18, Dh.K .
5 . Da.bha.1.19-20. klnca jlvaty apl pltarl pltr-dhane putranarp svamltve pltur 
anlcchayapl vibhagah syat janmanalva svatvam Ity atra pramanabhavac 
carjanarupataya janmanah smrtav anadhlgamat /  kvaclj janmalvetl ca janma- 
nlbandhanatvat pita-putra-samba ndhasya pltr-maranasya ca svatva karanatvat 
paramparaya vamanam f f
In some places it Ts alleged: that 
there, by the mention of birth, the 
relation of father and son, and the 
demise of the father are mediately 
Indicated as causes of property.
(v) Property: not a matter of popular recognition
It Is clear that Jlmutavahana Is refuting janma-svatvavada with the 
aid of the sastra but except at the end of the paragraph, 1.19, he does not 
directly enter Into the discussion on origin of property. But the statement re­
veals that Jlmutavahana was an advocate of the sastrlc origin of property and
3
opponent of the concept that property was a matter of popular recognition,
4
since he categorically rejects the Idea of the proprietary right of son so long
5
as the father survives.
Hence the texts of Manu and the rest 
must be taken as showing, that soni 
have not a right of ownership In the 
wealth of the living parents, but ln^ 
the estate of both when deceased.
1. Stokes thinks that Jlmutavahana Is betraying his knowledge of the passage 
of Gautama on birthright cited In the Mltaksara, 1.1.23, Hindu Law Books, 
(Madras, 1865), 187-8jf  n.19 and n .20a t 188. However, there Is no 
conclusive evidence that he found It In the Mltaksara and nowhere else, 
see Derrett, MLJ (1952), 1-9.
2. Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha. 1.29.
3. K .L . Sarkar, Mlmansa Rules of Interpretation, o p .c lt., 393. Derrett, MLJ, 
(1952), 3.
4 . Da .bha. 1.29.
5. Da .bha.1.30. ato jlvatoh pltror-dhane putranam svamyam nastl klntuparatayor 
I t l  jnapQHSpfhQip manvadl-vacanam /
6 . Tr. Colebrooke, Da .bha. 1.30.
(vl) Interpretation of Yajn. 11.121.
Jlmutavahana based his doctrine mainly on the strength of the texts 
1 2of Manu and Devala. He relies on the literal meaning of these texts.
But,why did he refrain from accepting the literal meaning of the famous text 
o f Yajnavalkya (II. 121), the bed-rock of the Mltaksara doctrine on son's
right by birth, unless he was trying to uphold the doctrine of uparama-svatva-
_ 3
vada? He evaded the purport of Yajnavalkya (II. 121) and found his favour
4
able comment In the statement of Udyota, one of those commentators whose
5 6work could not be restored. Despite the appreciation by some authors of
Jlmutavahana*s 'forensic acumen* In explaining this text (Yajn". II. 121), the
presentation by Jlmutavahana of Udyota *s view Is Indeed a laboured piece of
juridical work.
Jlmutavahana explains away the text o f Yajnavalkya by adopting 
Udyota's Illustration of a situation:
1. Manu, IX .104.
2. Devala, D h.K .^US^ Sapra,3 6 6 ,^ .4 .
3 . Jogendra Smarta Slromanl thought that Jlmutavahana wanted to get rid of 
the plain meaning of the text, Commentary on the Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 
1885), 313.
4 . Udyota, learned predecessor of Jlmutavahana, who has been described by 
Jlmutavahana as a scholar of 'unblemished learning*, (niravadyavldya), 
D 5.bh5.IL9. Kane, HD, III, 556; HD, I, 323-4.
5. Jo lly, TLL, 1883 (Calcutta, 1885), 25.
6 . Sampath, BLJ, (1965), 1, 5.
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(F)
1 2
s' (ST
1
1 2 2F has two sons, S and S . S dies leaving a son, SS. Then F 
dies. Udyota says that by the authority of the text of Y a jn .ll.121 , both 
and SS w ill equally TnherTt the property of F at his decease, and S  ^ w ill not 
exclude SS from inheritance though S  ^ Is nearer to F than SS. The rationale 
behTnd this distribution Ts thTs: both S^  and SS offer ptndas of the same e ffl-  
cacy to F In the parvana-sraddha and because both of them can perform thts 
supersensory benefit for F, they are entitled to TnherTt. ThTs equalTty of offer­
ing of plnda, In Udyota*s opinion, Is signified by the words Vidrsam svamyam* 
(which litera lly means Mike or similar ownership1), and not the co-extenslve 
right of father and son In the property of the grandfather.^
When one of two brothers whose father 
Is liv ing, and who have not received 
allotments, dies leaving a son; and the 
other survives; and the father afterwards 
deceases; the text, declaratory of simi­
lar ownership, Is Intended to obviate the 
conclusion, that the surviving son alone
1. Da.bha.II .9 . yatra dvayor bhratror jfvat-pltrka^or aprapta-bhagayor ekah 
putram utpadya vlnasto Viyo jlva tl, anantaram pita mrtah tatra putra eva tad 
dhanam prapnoty atlsannlkarsat: tadartham sadrsam svamyam It !  vacanam. 
yatha paitamaha-dhane pltuh svamyam tathalva tasmln mrte tat-putraQam 
apl na tatra sannlkarsa-vlprakarsabhyam ko *pl vlsesah parvana-vldhlna 
plnda-danena dvayor apl tad-upakarakatvavlsesad Tty abhlprayah .
obtains his estate, because he Ts next of 
k tn . As the father has ownership Tn the 
grandfather's estate so have his sons, Tf 
he be dead. There Ts not, Tn that case, 
any distinction founded on greater or less 
propinquity^ for both equally confer a 
benefit by offering a funeral oblation  ^
of food, as enjoined at solemn obsequies.
Such Is the author's meaning.
Jlmutavahana carries It further, and to disprove the ownership of a 
son In the grandparental estate during the lifetime of his father, he gives an­
other Illustration.
(F)iii
i
i
i
SS
He points out that I f  sons had ownership In their grandparental estate
during the lifetime of their father then, should a division be made between S^
2and S after the decease of Fy SS w ill also participate In the division. How­
ever, custom obviously did not contemplate this In circles for which the jurist 
was writing. Here Jlmutavahana*s brilliance Is dimmed and his apprehension 
Is misconceived because the advocates of janma-svatvavada have also iaKen
heed of such situations; under the Mltaksara Interpretation also SS w ill not 
automatically get any share while there Is a partition between S  ^ and
1. Tr. Colebrooke, D a .bha .II.9.
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To such a famous and crucTal text as Y a in .ll.1 2 ], jlmutavahana
has not given any Interpretation of his own excepting that It does not establish
2
son's right to demand a partition.
As a second explanation, he has resorted to the comment of
-  ✓ 3 -  4 5Dharesvara, which by no means accepts the uparama-svatvavada as a whole.
Or the meaning of the text may be, 
as set forth by Dharesvara, WA father, 
occupied In giving allotments at his 
pleasure, has equal ownership with 
his sons In the paternal grandfather's 
estate. He Is not privileged to make 
an unequal distribution of It ,  at his 
choice, as he Is In regard to his own 
acquired wealth. 11 6
1. aneka-pltrkanam tu pltrto bhaga-kaIpana/Yajn.11.120. 'Among grandsons 
by different fathers, the allotment of shares Is according to the fathers', 
Colebrooke, I .v .1 -2 .  Derrett, MLJ (1952), 4 .
2. Da .bha. II. 18.
3. Bhojadeva, King of Dhara. Kane thinks that he reigned between 1000 and 
1055 A .D ., HD, I (1930), 279. According to Derrett, Dharesvara flourished 
between 1150 and 1200 A .P . ,  Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, opyclt., 
54. Dharesvara *s work perished.
4. That svatva was sastralkasamadhtgamya was the view of Dhares'vara (= Bhoja), 
Kane, ed., Vyavahara Mayukha, 478.
5. D a.bha.II.15. ayam va dharesvara-puraskrto vacanarthah. Icchaya vlbhaga- 
dana-pravrttasya pltuh paltamaha-dhane sadrsam svamyam putralh saha na tatra 
svoparilta-dhana Iva nyunadhlka-vlbhagam tcchatah kartum a rh a tltl.
6. Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha. 11,15.
543.
The reason why jlmutavahana adopted the comments of Udyota and 
Dharesvara, and, desptte hts knowledge of the BalakrTda,  ^ did not mention 
or refute the interpretation of VTsvarupa on this text (Yajn. 11.121s 11.124 Tn 
the BalakrTda) remains unexplatned; the only plausible explanation of this can 
be that he was not w illing  to jeopardise his own theory of uparama-svatvavada 
by accepting the explanation of the commentators who Interpreted the text as 
authorising a co-extenslve right on the part of the father and son In the pro­
perty of the grandfather.
d . Partition
Dharesvara leaves the Impression that to some extent ancestral pro­
perty and self-acquired property of the father are two distinct categories sis far
as the mutual rights of father and son are concerned In the case of a partition
2 _ _
Initiated by the father. Considering Jlmutavahana *s views on son*s right
3
by birth, the alleged obligation of a father to divide the ancestral property
4
equally among his sons, unlike his self-acquTsltlons, does not directly Indicate 
the acceptance by Jlmutavahana of any co-equal ownership between father and 
son. According to Jlmutavahana, a father has his double share In the property
5
Inherited from the grandfather and partition takes place only at the w ill of a
1. Jlmutavahana had knowledge of the Balakrlda of Vlsvarupacarya, Kaije, HD, 
I, 322-33.
2. D a .b ha .II.15.
3 . Da.bha.1.14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 29, 30.
4 . As stated by Dharesvara, Da .bha .11.15.
5. Da.bha. 11.20.
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father J  Jtmutavahana's dental of a son's right to demand partttton and hts
2
rtght of ownershtp tn the grandparental property leaves a son wtth hardly any
3
substanttve rtght except (as Sonthetmer optnes) a moral tnjunctton dtrected 
agatnst a father to dtstrtbute the ancestral property equally among hts sons 
after havtng hts double share, if  and when he dectdes to dtvtde the assets.
-  -  4
Jlmutavahana says:
It ts consequently true, (stnce the texts 
above ctted do not tmply co-ordtnate 
ownershtp) that the father has hts double 
share of wealth tnhertted from the grand­
father or other ancestor; and that a dts- 
trtbutton takes place at the w tll of the 
father only, and not by the chotce of 
hts sons. 5
He adds:
But, accordtng to our tnterpretatton, 
the phrase, Met htm separate hts sons 
accordtng to hts pleasure1, relates to 
hts own acqutred wealth; whtle the 
allotment of the best share, and an 
equal dtstrtbutton, both regard an ^ 
estate tnhertted from the grandfather.
Ibtd.
See hts vtew on Yajru ll.121, D a.bha.II. 15.
Sonthetmer, EHJF, 241.
Da.bha. 11.20. atah pattamahadt-dhane pttur-bhagadvayam pttur-tcchata 
eva vibhago na putrecchayett stddham /
Tr. Colebrooke, Da. bha. 11.20.
Colebrooke, D a.bha.II.79. Here Jtmutavahana ts followtng Dharesvara,
D a.bha .II. 15. However, a father's obligation to dtstrtbute the residue of the 
grandparental property equally among hts sons leaves the question open whether 
tt ts a mere 'moral tnjunctton' or an Indirect acceptance by Jtmutavahana of sons' 
birthright tn grandparental property at the hands of their father.
1*.
2 .
3.
4 .
5.
6 .
545.
e . Fathers power of alienation
The next test of the existence of son's birthright seems to be attached
to the question of how far, according to Jlmutavahana, a father was allowed to
alienate the ancestral and his self-acquired property without the consent of his
sons. In Jtmutavahana's opinion, a father Is undoubtedly the absolute master
of his self-acquired properties.^ Let us examine how Jlmutavahana has dealt
with the smrtl texts which prohibit a father from alienating certain fq rilly  pro-
-  2pertles without the consent of his son. The text of Yajnavalkya (manl-mukta)
allows a father absolute ownership over a ll movables but he has no power to
3alienate the whole of the Immovables (sthavarasya tu sarvasya).
Jlmutavahana accepts the general proposition that the prohibition
on alienation of Immovable property Is due to the fact that It forms the basis of 
4
family maintenance. Before giving his final verdict on the father's power of
alienation, Jlmutavahana builds up his thesis step by step. First, he quotes Manu's
text to show that maintenance of the family Is specifically enjoined tn the €astra,
and a scrupulous following of the Injunction Is spiritually rewarded, while a breach 
5
Is punished.
1. Da.bha. I I .22.
2. Cited In the D a.bha.II.22; also attributed to Narada, D h .K .l2 l9 b .
3 . Dh.K.1219b.
4 . D a .bha .II.23. SeeVyasa: vrttl-lopah vlgarhltah, 'deprivation of mainten­
ance Is morally wrong', N .C . Sengupta, Evolution of Ancient Indian Law, 
o p .c tt., 209, n.78. For Vyasa's text, D h .K .1587; Jha, HLS, I, 276. For 
a discussion, supra, 340-1.
5 . Manu cited at D a.bha .II.23. bharanam posya-vargasya prasastam svarga- 
sadhanam /  narakam pTdane casya tasmad yatnena tarn b h a re t/ /
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The support of persons who should be 
maintained ts the approved means of 
attaining heaven. But hell ts Hie 
man‘s portion if  they suffer, there­
fore let a master of a famtly 
carefully maintain them. 1
2
Then he draws the logical conclusion from the text of Yajnavalkya
that a father can make a g ift or sale of a small part of the Immovables I f  this
3
w ill not jeopardise the support o f the family.
The prohibition Is not against a dona­
tion or other transfer of a small part not 
Incompatible with the support of the 
family. For the Insertion of the word 
‘whole* would be unmeaning (If the 
g ift of even a small part were for­
bidden *). 4
And the prohibition against disposing the "whole" does not stand If
5
the family Ts Tn distress. Even the whole of the Immovable property, 
Jlmutavahana understandably says, can be sold for the preservation of the 
fam ily.^ Here on the one hand, Jlmutavahana Is conferring unfettered
1. Tr. Colebrooke, Da .bha. I I .23. The text Ts not found In the Institutes of 
Manu. It Is a matter of Interest that the obligation to maintain Ts often 
stated by the smrtlkaras In moral, not legal terms.
2. manl-mukta . . . ,  YajiT. cited at D a.bha.II.22; D h .K .l2 l9 b ; see above, 
p .340, n . l j  c lta j N£r*da',s»
3. Da.bha.24. alpasya tu kutumba-vartanavlrodhlno na danadl-nlsedhah 
sarvasyetyanarthakyapatteh / /
4 . Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha. 11.24.
5 . apat = distress. On apat-dharma and Its applicability to prohibition, see 
Derrett, IRLSI, 95-6.
6 . D a .bha .II.26.
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power on the head of the family, giving the father, In most cases, unrestricted 
freedom of disposition of family property both movable and Immovable, while, 
on the other hand, he Is unconsciously recognising the rights of family members 
to be maintained, because wte n an alienation would secure their maintenance 
no prohibition fetters the father's power. In other words, whatever the nature 
of the right to be maintained, the general rights of family members over certain 
categories of property are accepted by Jlmutavahana. But there Is no reason 
to suppose that a right of maintenance Is synonymous with a son's right by b irth . ^  
In these passages, Jlmutavahana was dealing with the texts on resumption of g ift 
(dattapradanlkam), but he was manipulating them so as to strengthen his theory 
of the absolute power of a father.
To be consistent with his denial of the son's right by birth, Jlmutava­
hana faced difficulties In Interpreting two texts of Vyasa which en{o!ned the in­
alienability of Immovables by a single parcener without the consent of other 
2
common owners. He approached the prohibitory purport of these texts from 
two angles and neutralised It .  First, he puts forward the logical tests of owner­
ship, namely, that the essential nature of ownership Is the power of absolute
disposition or, In other words, he who has the power of valid and free dlspost-
3
tlon has proprietary right (svatva) In the thing.
1. K .L. Sarkar goes too far Tn supposing that a right of maintenance Is equiva­
lent to the right of having a share In a partition, MImansa Rules of Interpre­
tation, o p .c lt., 410.
2. Vyasa: sthavarasya samastasya . . .  , and vlbhakta avlbhakta . . . ,  D h.K . 
1586-7; quoted and discussed as of Brhaspatl, supra, 341, n . l .
3. P .N . Sen, G .P .H J, 156. K5ne, HD, III, 555.
On the two texts of Vyasa, Jlmutavahana says:^
It should not be alleged, that by the 
texts of Vyasa ( . . . )  one person has 
not power to make a sale or other 
transfer of such property. For here 
also as tn the case of other goods, 
there equally extsts a property con­
sisting Tn the power of disposal at 
pleasure. 2
But If  this Incident of yathesta-vlnlyogarhatva of property Is applied
to his definition of partition, namely, that each owner*s right Ts attached to a
3
particular portion of joint property which Is determined In a partition, then a 
single owner w ill have no power to alienate beyond his own portion. Jlmutava­
hana knew that to dissipate this tncongruTty,m he needed to explain further, and 
accordingly stated that the offence of alienating beyond one*s own share would
-  -  4be only a moral offence (adharma-bhaglta-jnapanartham).
The two texts of Vyasa dealt with above could be explained as not 
applicable to father and son, since Jlmutavahana rejected the son*s birthright 
Tn the property of his father or grandfather. But he could not avoid the other
5
text which specifically mentioned father and son, and probably he could not
1. D a.bha.II.27. etad vyasa-vacana-dvayena ekasya vlkrayady anadhlkara It! 
vacyam yathesta-vlnlyogarhatva-lalsanasya svatvasya dravyantara Tvatrapy 
avlsesat / /
2. Tr. Colebrooke, D a.bha .II.27. On yathesta-vlnlyogarhatva (*the fact that 
a thing Is morally and legally f i t  for employment at pleasure*), see Derrett,
‘An Indian Contribution to the Study of Property*, BSOAS, 1956, XVI11/3,475-98,
3. Da.bha.1.8. For Raghunandana*s criticism of Illog ica lity  of Jlmutavahana*s 
definition of partition, see Stokes, Hindu Law Books, (Madras, 1965), 184, n .8 . 
Also P .N . Sen, GPJH, 148-9, 157":
4. D a.bha.II.28. See Cowell, Jhe Hindu Law, TLL, 1870(Calcutta, 1870), 95.
5. Vyasa, quoted In Da.bha.11.29; D h.K . 1587. sthavaram dvlpadam calva yadyapT
______________ __________________ /Continued on next paqe:
find an Interpretation to suit his own view among any of his predecessors, like
Udyota or Dharesvara as he had In the case of Yajnavalkya, 11.121 He
gives his own Interpretation, but cannot altogether Ignore the express prohibition
against alienation of Immovables even though they are self-acquisitions of the
2
father. He first says that this text also should be Interpreted In the same way 
3
as the other two. "So likewise other texts . . .  must be Interpreted In the same
4
manner. For here the words ‘should be made* must necessarily be understood".
He accepts the sastrlc prohibition In substance, but adds that when the
transaction Is made In fact, the factual situation overrides the substantive precept.
-  -  5
This Is his second angle of approach. Thus, Jlmutavahana says:
Note 5 -  p .548 -  Continued:
svayam arjltam /  asambhuya sutan sarvan na danam na ca vlkrayah / /
1. He avoided quoting another text (pTtr-prasadat bhujyante • . .  , D h .K .l2 l9 b ). 
Since we cannot Impute Ignorance, Jlmutavahana probably avoided Its specific 
mention because of his disadvantage and tackles It Indirectly at Da.bha.II .29. 
See Derrett, MLJ (1952), 4.
2 . Vyasa :s4havaram . . .  , D h.K . 1587, D a.bha .II.29.
3 . D a.bha.II.29. evaiTca . . .  Ity evamadlkam tad-apy evam-eva vamanTyam. 
tathapT kartavya-padam-avasyam atradhyaharyam.
4 . Tr. Colebrooke, D a.bha.II.29. To show that the prohibition Is not a legal 
but only a mere Impropriety, Jlmutavahana Tn the place of ‘should not be made* 
In the original text, supplied the word ‘should* (kartavya). This Is an Instance 
of adhyahara (Interpolation of a word In a text for bringing out Its meaning), see 
J .N . Bhattacharya, Commentaries on Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1909), I, 114-5.
5. Da.II .30. tena dana-vlkraya-kartavyata-nlsedhat tat-karanat vldhy atlkramo 
bhavatl, na tu danady anlspattlh, vacana-satenapl vastuno ‘nyatha-karanasakteh.
Therefore, since It Is denied, that a g ift 
or sale should be made, the precept Is 
Infringed by making one. But the g ift 
or transfer Is not null: for a fact cannot 
be altered by a hundred texts. 1
2
He supports this so-called doctrine of factum valet by an apparently 
3Irrelevant text from Narada:
Accordingly (since there Is not In such 
case a nu llity  of g ift or alienation)
Narada says: Vhen there are many 
persons sprung from one man, who have 
duties apart and transactions apart, and 
are separate In business, and character,
I f  they be not accordant In affairs, 
should rfiey give or sell their ownshares, 
they do a ll that as they please, for they 
are masters of their own wealth. 4
5
This text, as has been suggested by many Interpreters, should be 
understood to declare the separate and Independent right of co-heirs after 
partition (*.), but as a text justifying the transaction of a co-owner It remains 
unconvincing. But I f  we start from Jlmutavahana *s views on a father's absolute
1. Tr. Colebrooke, D a.bha.II.30.
2 . Quod fie ri non debult, factum valet. For a discussion of this maxim of Roman 
law and Its application In Hindu law, see Derrett, ‘Factum Valet: the adven­
tures of a maxim*, 7 I.C .L .Q . (1958), 280-94.
3 . Narada, X III, 42-3; fclted at Da.bha. 11.31. ata eva Naradah: yady 
eka-jata bahavah prthag-dharmah prthak-krlyah /  prthak-karma-gunopeta 
na cet karyes#u sammatah / /  svabhagan yadl dadyus te vlkrlnlyur athapl va /  
kuryur yathestam tat-sarvam Isaste svadhanasya v a l/ /  Variant reading: 
samyak for prthak and krtyesu for karyesu.
4 . Tr. Colebrooke, Da.bha. 11.31.
5 . SmrtI Candrlka, ed ., Gharpure, (Bombay, 1918), 309. Stokes, Hindu Law Books,
o p .c lt., 207.
power and hts dental of a son*s birthright, the text can, somewhat bizarre j y ,  
be taken as a precept to valtdate a transactton by a father.
These prohtbtttons or Itmttattons on a fathers power to altentate family 
property have engrossed the mtnds of almost a ll the commentators and thetr Inter­
pretations of prohibitory texts have swung like a pendulum between the fathers 
power over properties of the unseparated sons and recognition of son*s birthright 
In property of the father and the grandfather, and the range of the prohibition 
has varied from very wide to very narrow limits.
As a general rule, the dharmasastras themselves have discouraged
alienation of property by a father In presence of male Issue  ^ or by a co-owner
i
! without the consent of other co-owners. But the Interpretations of the commen-
I
tators hardly agree with one another. In this respect, the Interpreters cannot be 
blamed for a particular bias because the ambiguities are actually contained In 
the sastrlc precepts.
Out of these Interpretations on the exact Implications of the prohibi­
tions, three main streams of thought have emerged. Jlmutavahana belongs to
2the school which holds that the transaction Is valid but the transgressor sins.
1. Texts cited on dattapradanlkam, supra, 347 ff .
2 . It Is Interesting to note from the point of view of Anglo-HIndu law that this view 
of Jlmutavahana on ‘Alienation of Immovable Property* was communicated by 
Prosonno Coomar Tagore on 20th June, 1859, to the Secretary to the Board of 
Revenue In reply to his communication No. 120, dated 29th May, 1859, calling 
for Tagore*s opinion on the subjects adverted to by the Right Hon*bIe, the Secre­
tary of State for India In his Despatch N o .4 of the 25th January, 1859, P.C. 
Tagore, Loose Papers, (Calcutta, 1868), 5; SOAS Library, A345.4/316496. 
Horace Wilson criticised Jtmutavahana*s view as the wrong exposition of Hindu 
law, R. Rost, ed ., Works by the Late Horace Hayman Wilson, (London, 1865), 
III, 71-3. The two other schools: (I) the second school holds that the trans-
/ContTnued on next page:
He attaches the Immorality of such a transaction to the altenor alone. His stn 
is purely personal; penance w ill exonerate him from the sin, but the property 
v/TlI pass despite the Infringement of the injunction because the nature of a 
transaction cannot be altered by a prohibitory text.^ Jlmutavahana apparently 
considers that :
a precept which belongs to the domain 
of ecclesiastical I .e .  spiritual law, 
had not In the domain of vyavahara
I.e . litigation , the same force as a 
positive and clear rule of the vyavahara 
Itself has. 2
3As regards va lid ity , a ll corrmands to be found In the sastra were equally binding,
4
and In Sanskrit there Is nothing synonymous to strlctlsslml juris, yet Interpreters
Note 2 -  p .551 -  Continued:
action Is voidable and the transgressor does not sin. (II) According to the third 
school, the transaction Is voidable but the transgressor does sin. Discussed In 
Sankarabhatta‘s topic of dattapradanlkam (concerning non-dellvery of gifts), 
(Pharma)-dvalta-nlrnaya, ed. Gharpure, (Bombay, 1943), 123-4. Also for 
the relevant passages In translation and critica l review, see Derrett, ‘Prohibi­
tion and N u llity : Indian Struggles with a Jurisprudential Lacuna*, BSOAS, 20 
(1957), 203-15. Fora discussion on this topic, supra, 356-63.
1. J .N . Bhattacharya, Commentaries on Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1909), I, 114-5, 
149-50. Explanations added.
2. K .L . Sarkar, Mlmansa Rules of Interpretation, o p .c lt., 395.
3 . Derrett, !RLSI, 77.
4 . Cp. Vljnanesvara on the Llpsa Adhlkarana, The Mltaksara, 1.1.10. See 
K .L . Sarkar, Mimansa Rules of Interpretation, lo c .c lt . ,  395.
Itke Jtmutavahana turned a new leaf and expiated the subtle and complex co- j P
extstence of reltgtous and postttve law tn the sastra.^ However unconvtnctng
tt may be from the potnt of vtew of acceptance of the Itteral meantng of the
dharmasa stras, yet tt became an accepted method that the commentators
2
were at liberty to apply lauktka nyaya (prtnctples of secular reason) to
bring out the meantng of a sacred text. The utterance of Jtmutavahana at
Dayabhaga, 11.30, can be taken as an example of lauktka nyaya. He wants
to emphastse that 'a rule which reasonably follows from the substance (property)
Itself, must have precedence over a rule relating to accidents no matter how 
3 _ _
authorttattve'. Jtmutavahana wants to uphold the fathers power and deny 
the son's rtght of tnterdtctton by saytng that:
although smrtt texts tend to prevent 
a father's altenatlng self-acqutred 
Immovable property without hts son's 
consent, the altenatton without such 
prtor consent would be an offence 
merely tn conscience, and the trans­
action (per se) 4 ts valtd. 5
1. Derrett, RLSI, 96.
2. N .C . Sengupta constders secular reason or lauktka nyaya as an accessory 
source of law, Sources of Law and Soctety tn Anctent India, (Calcutta,
1914), 82-3.
3. N .C . Sengupta, Sources of Law and Soctety tn Anctent India, o p .c tt., 83.
4 . My addition.
5. Derrett, RLSI, 91. Similar approach of VtjnanesVara, though tn a different 
context, M tta. I. t.1 6 . Jtmutavahana by emphasising the transaction as such 
ts unconsciously dtssoctattng property from the sastra, a triumph of expedlencey 
over authority, an Instance of accommodating written texts to the practtcal needs 
of the time, RLSI, 96. Also Jolly, Outltnes of an History of the Hindu Law of 
Partition, Inheritance, and Adoption, As Contatned tn the Ortgtnal Sanskrtt
Treaties, TLL, 1883, (Calcutta, 1885), 113.
Jlmutavahana *s dealing wtth the smftt text wtth the aid of the doc­
trine of factum valet or lauktka nyaya leaves the tmpresston that for practi­
cal purposes, the prohibition would be waived only tn the case of alienation 
of self-acquired Immovable property by a father and, as K .L . Sarkar  ^
rightly thought, that the doctrine would not apply to alienation of grand- 
parental property by a father without the consent of hts sons. It ts apparent 
that Jtmutavahana dtd not treat ancestral and self-acqutred property on the 
same footing, though he considered the whole as the father's property.
Hts treatment of the topic of mode or time for partition makes tt clear that 
a father's power was not considered to be as absolute over ancestral pro­
perty as over hts self-acqutstttons. In ancestral property, apart from 
having a double share for htmself, Jlmutavahana does not confer on the 
father any arbitrary power of distribution among hts sons. Secondly, so 
long as the mother ts not past the age of child-bearing, a father cannot 
(perhaps, should not) make a partition even though he may wish to do so.
1. K .L. Sarkar thought that without the breach of dvayo-pranayantt nyaya, 
the doctrine of factum valet could not be applied to ancestral Immovables. 
Mtmansa Rules of Interpretation, o p .c lt., 396. Sampath also accepts 
the view of Sarkar, Benaras Law Journal, 1 (1965) 1: 43.
In procedural law, Jtmutavahana has stated that t f  a son ftnds hts
father ts dtsstpattng the entire property, a son could bring Tt to the cognizance
of an officer of justice and thus a suit would He between father and son J  It
was, after a ll,  universally a<k nowledged that It was part of the King's duty to
2
uphold dharma which Includes morality as well as scriptural law. 
f .  Summing up
The restriction on a father's power regarding mode and time for parti­
tion and the son! right to sue the father for Improper alienation might lead us to 
assume that Jlmutavahana accepted a son's Innate right In property of the grand­
father. But we should not lose sight of the fact that Jlmutavahana had cate-
3
gorlcally denied son's right by birth and explained away the literal meaning
-.~  4 5of the texts of Yajnavalkya, 11.121 and Vlsnu, which ordained co-extenslve 
right of a son with his father In property of the grandfather.
The denial of son's right by birth In the Dayabhaga remains a puzzling 
question. Many scholarly attempts have been made to explain the motivation 
which led Jlmutavahana to his Interpretations but none of them are satisfactory 
or convincing; and quite a few have left It without any opinion One of the
1. Vyavahara-matraka, ed ., A . Mookerjee, (Calcutta, 1912), 285; discussed 
tn deta il, supra,440-55.
2 . See Llngat, CLI, 222-3.
3 . Da.bha.1.14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 29, 30.
4 . D a .bha .II.9.
5 . D a .b ha .II.16, 17.
6 . Kane, H D ,III, 560. Sampath, BLJ 1 (1965) l:3 7 ,n .3 ,  40.
earliest views was put forward by Jolly,  ^ which to a great extent remains valid
even to-day. He says, 'whether these various doctrines were shaped Into a
system by Jlmutavahana himself or by earlier writers, whom he may have followed,
2tt  Is Impossible to decide” . He goes on, ” thus much Is certain that hts doc­
trine ts not only tn accordance wtth those opinions o f earlier teachers which are
-  -  3refuted tn the Mltaksara, but Is readily deduclble from the old texts themselves” .
Jolly was rtght tn saying that "the views of Jlmutavahana were neither peculiar 
to himself nor to the Bengal school of lawyers", but there ts no denying the fact 
that It was not possible to recover the works of predecessors of Jlmutavahana In 
which he could have found the origination of his doctrine In an embryonic form.
J .D . Mayne's conjecture that the Influence of Brahmlnlsm completely
remodelled the law of Inheritance In Bengal did not find favour with later jurists.
Justice Sarada Charan Mttra, P .N . Sen, Golap Chandra Sastrl and S.S. Setlur,
took Issue wtth Mayne and stated that Brahmin tea I Influence could not be a
factor tn moulding Jtmutavahana's doctrine since Benares, being a greater centre
of Brahmtntsm, followed the Mltaksara. It could be true tn a limited sense that ' - - » - - - — .
the Bengali brahmins, tn order to suit their own self-interest tn having gifts, 
might have applied thetr minds to evolve, a sastrlc formula for easing alienation
1. Jolly, TLL, 1883, 25.
2 . Ib id ., 114. Also K.P. Jayaswal thought that Jfmutavahana had textual 
authority behind him, especially of Manu and the Arthasastra, Manu and 
Yajnavalkya, a Basic History of Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1930), 255, 263.
The speculative character of Jayaswal's work Ts well-known (so Kane, passim). 
Kane also thought that the doctrine was older than Jlmutavahana, HD, 111,257. 
Also Sampath, BLJ 1 (1965) 1: 37.
3 . Jo lly , Ib id ., 114.
of property, especially land, by a father. Inscrlptlonal and eplgraphlc materials 
prove that buying and selling of land were In great vogue In ancient and mediae­
val Bengal and In many cases the transfer of land was done In order to make a
1 2 g ift to a brahmin. But this suspicion finds no special anchorage In Bengal.
According to Justice M ltra, the main causes for the growth of a d iffe r­
ent system of law of property In Bengal were the Influence of the Buddhist tantras
3
and the commercial and maritime activities of the people of Bengal. None of
4
these contentions hold water and they are of no special peculiarities of Bengal.
In other parts of India where the Influence of Buddhism was greater than In Bengal,
-  -  5the Mltaksara principles were followed.
It is true that Bengal was a leading centre of trade, and a trading 
community would find any restriction on freedom of alienation of property Incon­
venient . But Bengal was not the only trading province of India and coastal
1. N.R. Roy, Bangallr Itlhas, 1st ed ., (Calcutta), 209-55, especially at 251 •
2. We should not forget that In other paetsof India too, g ift o f land was not un­
known, Kane, HD, II, 858. C.'R. Lanman, ‘Hindu Law and Custom as to
Gifts*, rpt. from Anniversary Papers Collected by Colleagues and Pupils of 
George Lyman Klttredge, (Boston, 1913), 1-14. J . Gonda, ‘G ifts*, Tn his 
Change and Continuity In Indian IRellglon, (Mouton, The Hague, 1965), 198—
228. For a discussion, supra,3 4 7 -6 4 .
3. In Justice M ltra‘s opinion, Buddhist tantras attributed to the freedom of women 
with which we are not directly concerned, but the ownership In severalty of the 
Dayabhaga grew out of the commercial and maritime activities, Law Quarterly 
Review, T\ (1905), 380-92; 22 (1906), 50-63. Mayne also considered commer­
cial activity as a contributory factor for the peculiarity of the Hindu law In 
Bengal, Hindu Law, 320. Also P .N . Sen, GPHJ, 165. Fora criticism, Kane, 
HD, III, 559-60.
4. Kane, HD, III, 559.
5. S.S. Setlur, The Origin and Development of the Bengal School of Hindu Law*, 
Bom.L.R. J. 9 (1907) 7: 135f  137.
and seafaring people Tn other parts of India like Andhra and Maharastra, remained 
scrupulous followers of the MTtalqara. ^
-  2Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrl*s opinion, that the doctrine of spiritual 
benefit was used as a pretext by Jlmutavahana for assigning In the order of suc­
cession a higher position to some near and dear cognates In preference to remoter 
agnates, Is not d irectly concerned with the son*s right by b irth . This affection 
theory of Sastrl, like a ll guesswork^suffers from unreliability and there Is no reason 
to suspect that the people In other parts of India were less affectionate to their 
near cognates, or that the dharmasastrls tn those parts were less capable of com­
prehending natural human relations and evolving a doctrine similar to Jlmutava­
hana *s.
3
In a recent artic le , Ludo Rocher took a completely different view 
from his predecessors, and In fact, supported the excuse put forward by Jlmu­
tavahana for composing his work. According to Rocher, "the authors of the
commentaries and nlbandhas never Intended to codify differing local laws and 
4
customs” . He does not think that the commentaries were connecting them
1. Kane, HD, III, 559.
2 . P .N . Sen uncritically supported this view of Sastrl, GPHJ, 166. Also see 
Derrett, ‘Religion and Law In Hindu Jurisprudence*, (1954), AIR Jr. S.C .
79 at 84.
3 . L. Rocher, ‘Schools of Hindu Law*, J . Gonda Congratulatory Volume,
(Leiden, 1972), 167-76.
4 . Ib id ., 172. This argument Is not supported by facts, see the Mltaksara, I . ».
10, where Vljnanesvara Is accepting principles which are loka-slddha. Rajah 
Rammohun Roy also points out that the Dayabhaga doctrine reflects the ancient 
usages of Bengal, Essays on the Right of Hindoos over Ancestral Property Accord- 
Tng to the Law of Bengal, 2nd ed ., (London, 1832), 5-6, 12.
559.
Tn any way with dTfferent geographical areas. Rocher elaborates his view that
Jtmutavahana Tn the Dayabhaga was not codTfyTng BengalT customs, and he even
refuses to accept the Dayabhaga as a purely legal treatTse. He says,
the Dayabhaga was studTed Tn the to Is -  
as Tt Ts to-day, not by students who had 
to be taught the local law of TnherTtance 
to prepare them for practTce Tn the courts, 
but by tradTtTonal dtsctples who studTed 
dharma as one of the branches of HTndu 
leamTng. 1
He falls back on jTmutavahana's own ju s tT fT c a tTon for the work whTch Ts set out
2at the outset of the Dayabhaga.
That means: the wTse have not so far 
gTven enough thought to the numerous 
and seemTngly conflTctTng rules on Tn­
herTtance proclaTmed by Manu and 
others; as a result they have dTffered 
Tn theTr overall TnterpretatTons of these 
rules. Tfie Dayabhaga wTll try to pro- 
vTde a more accurate TnterpretatTon by 
assTgnTng each TndTvTdual rule Tts pro­
per place wTthTn the whole. 3
Rocher accepts thTs plea of JTmutavahana and concludes, ”We have no
rTght, however, to accuse the author of dTshonesty, and say that he used the ancTent
4
smrtTs as a pretext to lay down or codTfy the law of Bengal” .
1. Rocher, TbTd.,  174; also Mn Defense of JTmutavahana, * JAOS, 96 (1976) 1: 
107-9 at 108.
2. ManvadT-vakyany avTmrs ya^yesam yasmTn vTvado bahudha budhanam /  
tesam prabodhaya sa dayabhago nTrupanfyah; sudhTyah srnudhvam//
3. Rocher, TbTd., 176. Not a transIatTon: a tendentTous paraphrase.
4 . IbTd.
From the study of a work, such as the Dayabhaga, where a Sanskrlt- 
Tst concludes, a lawyer begins. Jlmutavahana Tn essence polTshed and developed 
the North IndTan vTew of the fathers power and Tn effect, refuted the vTews of 
the Southern commentators. Was Tt, as Rocher thTnks, merely an Tntellectual 
exercTse on the dharmasastra? It Ts dTffTcult to accept that the motTvatTon be- 
hTnd the composTtTon of the treatise was as simple as that. From an analysis of 
the Dayabhaga Tt appears that Jlmutavahana was conscious that he was dealing 
with a substantive part of the vyavahara which determined respective rights 
amongst the various members of the family Tn a mediaeval society. The re li­
gious aspirations, popular practices, conflicts and Interactions among members 
of a particular society contribute to the formulation of a social syndrome, which 
Influences legal writings. On this point, Kane*s remarks on the authors of 
dharmasastra are worth noting. He says:
The number of authors and works on dharma- 
sastra Ts legion. A ll these numberless 
authors and works were actuated by the 
most laudable motives of regulating the 
Aryan society Tn a ll matters, c iv il,  re li­
gious and moral, and of securing for the 
members of that society, happiness In 
this world and the next. 1
The commentators on dharmasastra have freely quoted the texts.
But this practice should not mislead us Into the belief that their works were 
exclusively for the teaching of dharma In traditional Institutions like to l.
1. K5ne, HD, I, (1930), 466.
The society and structure of family from the time of the Aryan settlement was 
passing through a process of social and economic transformation. The society 
of the time of Jlmutavahana needed the precepts of the vyavahara to be Inter­
preted, and Jlmutavahana In turn, had to Incorporate the practices of the people 
In his worljas best he could. Every commentator was faced with the problem of 
‘Inerrancy of scripture*. To say something new, theystrll had to speak In terms 
of the sastra. Jlmutavahana had to set out with a belligerent thesis and like a ll 
revolutionaries, he was confronted with the conservativeness of an old c iv ilisation . 
Though much of his thesis Is original, knowing the Incredulity and suspicion of 
the mediaeval society he had to create a sastrlc Illusion, by quoting from the 
smrtls, to make a work of c iv il law acceptable to the minds of the members of 
the religious and juridical community of the then Bengal.
So far as his Interpretations weieconcemed, Jlmutavahana made a trans­
mutation of the sastra and thus tended to Influence the social norms of his tlme.^
On this point P .N . Sen‘s remarks Is Interestlng-
The altered direction of the popular feel­
ing, therefore, demanded that there should 
be a corresponding alteration In the law; 
and when Jlmutavahana took the matter 
up, he found that there was only one way 
of doing It; he could not legislate, but 2 
had only to Interpret the existing law . . .
1. Sampath, BLJ 1 (1965) 1:43.
2 . P .N . Sen, GPHJ, 167; O f course there Is no evidence of ‘direction* of 
feeling, ‘popular* or otherwise: Sen Is guessing. Also S.S. Setlur, Bom. 
LRJ 9 (1907) 7:136.
But a sociological factor alone cannot bring out a jurisprudential 
transformation. The reasons behind the views on the son's birthright In 
Jlmutavahana*s work may well have been multiple, ranging from religious 
tradition to social customs, but the most Important factor w ill have been the 
positive attitude of the author towards his religion, the sastra and the customs 
of the people of the region In which he flourished.
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V o l. II
CHAPTER 14.
THE LATE MED 1AVEL COMMENTATORS
I • The Son's Birthright In Vara da rajahs Vyaya hara-nlmaya
After Jlmutavahana's Dayabhaga and VljnanesVara's Mltaksara, 
the commentatorlal literature stood at a crossroads and the subsequent Inter­
pretations followed or developed the approach of one master or the other.
Varadara|a*s Vyavahara-nlmaya,  ^ a compact treatise on dharmasastra by a 
  2
mtmamsaka, represents the South Indian vTew on the son's rTght by birth.
There Is no authentic proof as to whether Varadaraja knew of jlmutavahana's
works or not, but he was at least familiar wTth the school of thought whTch the
3
Bengali master developed and enlivened. Stnce the author does not mentton
-  4any wrTter or jurtdTca I wrTtTng later than the MTtaksara, t t  may be presumed to
be the only major work on smrtT after Vijnanesvara and before Devanna-bhatta's
Smrti-candrtka.
— •
Varadaraja dTd not Indulge Tn much theorTsTng regarding ownership 
or the modes of Its acqulsllbn. He put forward the smrtl texts and Interpreted
1 . 1220 A .D . Ignored by Kane In HD, I, 736. See K .V .R . Alyangar, ed. 
Vyavahara-nlrnaya, (Adyar, 1942), Tntrod., I.H I, H—IV . Derrett, 
Dharmasastra and Juridical Literature, o p .c tt., 53.
2 . Alyangar, Ib id ., IXX.
3 . Ib id ., xx lx -xxx .
4 . Ib id ., xx lx ; also V y .N l.409.
them with direct utterances.
Like Vljnanesvara, he adheres to the vtew that a son becomes owner 
through his relationship wtth his father and mother. He Indicates that owner­
ship Is acquired at birth and does not originate at a partition becausel partition 
Is the distribution of property which Is already one*s o w n .l
Varadaraja Is consistent with the view that ownership arises before
- -  2partition. This Is apparent from his comment on the text of Harlta that the 
word vlbhajet ( let him divide) which Is found In smrtls, Implies the existence of 
ownership of the sons prior to partition. Otherwise, I f  partition created owner­
ship, the smrtlkaras would have used the terms putrebhyo dadyat (let him give to 
his sons), which would have Implied no property In the son prior to partition. 
Moreover, the fa llacy In the theory, that ownership originates at a partition,
Is exposed when we consider the devolution of parents* property to an only son.
Despite the fact that there cannot be any partition when the parents are deceased 
leaving an only son, property devolves (so to speak) on the son automatically 
without a partition. This proves that property exists before partition and also 
Implies that a son acquires ownership In property as soon as he Is bom. Vara­
daraja emphasises that merely by entering the kula, I .e .  merely by b irth, a
3
son acquires ownership In the property of the father and grandfather.
1 . Text as ed. Alyangar, 413. evam pltr-matr-sambandha-prabhj-tl tad-dhanes.u 
tesam tatha svamltvam astltl /  svasya sato vlbhagalj /  na vlbhagat svatvam I t l  /
2 . V y .N I.4 l2 , Dh.K.1146a. jlva tl pltarl putranam arthadana-vlsargaksepesu na 
svatantryam I t l /
3 . V y .N !.4 l2 .  klm ca pui*vam eva svatvam utpannam Ity  asmln pakse sarva-smrtlsu 
vlbhajed I t l  yujyate /  anyatha vlbhagat purvam svatvcbhave putrebhyo dadyad I t l  
vaktavyam /  tatha vlbhagat svatva-pakse eka-putrasya mata-pltror-urdham vlbha-
gabhavat svatvam na sya t/te n a  kula-pravesad eva pltr-paltamaha-dravye *pl 
putrasya svamyam asty eva / /
But wTth regard to a son's rTght to demand partition, Varadaraja
makes a distinction between ancestral and self-acquired property of the father.
In respect of self-acquired property of his father, a son has no right to demand
a partition. In such property, partition takes place only at the w ill of the
father because of his revered  ^ position In the fam ily. This statement on self-
acquired property allows us to surmise that according to Varadaraja, a son
could demand partition of the ancestral property unilaterally. B ut Varadaraja's
language on this point Is not very clear. The meaning can be that both father
and son had Independence to demand a partition of ancestral property, which
means that either the father could divide the ancestral property among his sons
during his lifetime, or a son could demand a partition of ancestral property In
the hand of the father. Alternately, (as the word ca, rather than va, 'or*
suggests) the meaning could be that a father and son could come to an agree-
2
ment regarding the time for division of ancestral property.
Varadaraja's statement probably betrays the Northern Influence of
patriarchal authority, but his Interpretations never deny the Innate right of a
3 4son either In grandparentaI property, or Tn the self-acquisitions of a father.
1. pradhanyat (superiority, Implying Independence).
2 . Vy.NT.413. tena svayamarjlte pltur-Icchaya vlbhagah, arjakasya pradhanyat/
kramagate tu pltur Tcchaya putrecchaya ca vlbhagah / /
3 . evamadlbhlr vacanalh paltamahe putra-pautrayoh svamyam samam / ,  V y .N T .4 l1 ; 
on Vyasa (manl-mukta . . . )  and on Y a jn .ll .121.
4 . pltuh svayamarjlte svatantryam It !  gamyate , but he explains the sonfcasvatan- 
trya while commenting on Devala's text: (pltar uparate . . . )  It ! evamadiny 
asvatantrya paranl/  na svatvabhavaparanltl . . . / ,  V y .N T .4 l2 .
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I I . The Son's BTrthrTght Tn Devanna-bhatta's Smi*tTcandrTka
_  _
1 -  2 Devanna- bhatta's SmrtTcandrTka, despite Tts following of the
MTtaksara doctrTne, bears the stamp of orTginalTty and mature research.
Devanna-bhatta could look back about a hundred years stnce the MTtaksara
v v  W  *-----------
was wrTtten, and could see how the work of VTjnanesvara was accepted among 
the socTetTes of the Deccan and, perhaps, coastal Andhra. Devanna-bhatta 
had before hTm a ll the major works of hTs predecessors and between the MTtak­
sara and the SmrtTcandrTka, excepting Varadaraja *s Vyayahara-nTrnaya, there 
was probably no Tmportant contributTon on vyayahara from the South.
When Devanna-bhatta wrote, the MTtaksara concept of the son's 
rTght by bTrth was popular, he sTmpIe re-stated the doctrTne wTth some varTa- 
tTons. On the theme of the orTgTn of property, iTke the author of the MTtak­
sara, Devanna-bhatta took up the argument of the objector that ownership as
/ -  3well as property were deducTble only from the sastra.
4He answered that ownershTp and property were temporal, and the
sacred TnstTtutes were merely compTlatTons and demonstratTve of the rules that
5
have been establTshed and recognTsed by the world.
1. Or Devanna, see Derrett, DJL , 54.
2 . Composed, A .D . 1225, Kane, HD, 1,345.
3 . SmrtTcandrTka, ed. Gharpure, 257; tr . Gharpure, Vyayahara Kanda, Part III,
(Bombay, 1952), 542.
4 . Devanna accepted the statement of Bhavanatha, the author of Naya-vTveka; 
ata evOnTdam-prathama-loka-vTsaya Tty avasthTta nTbandhanartha smrtTh /  
vyakaranadT smrtTvad TtT/ S .C ., 257.
5. S.C. 257-8.
Devanna-bhatta showed orTgma Iffy Tn Interpreting the text of
1 2Gautama on acquTsTtTon of ownershTp.
RTktham 'Inheritance', T.e. acquTsTtTon 
by TnherTtance; Tn short, the TnducTng 
cause of (the rTght o f ) ownershTp Tn the 
property o f the lather and the !Tke Ts 
the bTrth of a son, e tc. 3
Then he supports the vTew by the aTd of the text of Gautama on
„ 4bTrthrTght, quoted by VTjnanesvara.
Moreover, (thTs) has been stated by 
Gautama as the cause of the acquT­
sTtTon of the paternal estate vTz.,
*by the bTrth Ttself, he may acquTre 
(rTght of) ownershTp, so (says) the 
venerable teacher" . . .  *By the 
bTrth Ttself', T.e. the meanTng Ts by 
the very commencement (of the form- 
atTon) of theTr body Tn the womb of 
the mother . . .  5
Devanna-bhatta accepted Gautama's text on bTrthrTght wTthout cast- 
Tng any doubts on Tts authentTcTty. He more or less used the same arguments as 
VTjnanesvara, but explored new sources to reTnforce the laukTka aspect of property.
1. Gautama, X .39-42.
2. S.C. 254, rTktham rTktharjanam, pTtradT-dhane svamTtvapadakam putradTjanmetT 
yavat /
3 . Tr. Gharpure, S .C .544.
4 . MTta.l.T.23. S.C. 258. tatha ca paTtrka-dhana-Iabha-hetutvenoktam 
Gautamena -  "utpattyaTvartham svamTtval Iabhata Tty acarya” TtT/  utpatt- 
yaTva matr-garbha-sarTrotpattyalvety a rth a h /
5. Tr. Gharpure, S .C .544. ThTs Ts the first Tnstance where (iTve) b T r t h  (janma)
Ts expIaTned (rTghtly) as conception, the moment of which Ts s till Imputed by law.
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He gtves a new Tnterpre fatten to rtktha. He takes I t  as property of a I Tv mg
person. He says that rtktha Ts ownershTp whTch orTgTnated Tn respect of father's
wealth on account of bTrth. He emphasTses that the dharmasastra Ts the record
of popular practTces. BTrth Ts also recognTsed there as a mode of acquTsTtTon.
So the orTgTnatTon of rtktha Ts by bTrth, and there Ts no conflTct between the
sastra and popular practtce stnce they both accept bTrth as a mode of acquTsTtTon.
Devanna-bhatta elaborated the rules of popular practTces and put bTrth as one
of the modes of acquTsTtTon along wTth partTtTon, purchase, seTzure and fTndTng.
He made use of the NayavTveka of Bhavanatha who had a specTfTc statement ^
2
on the IaukTka modes of acquTsTtTon.
These modes of acquTsTtTon, e .g . *by 
bTrth e tc. are recognTsed by popular 
practTce'. The meanTng of thTs Ts 
that, bTrth, purchase, partTtTon, seTz­
ure and fTndTng etc. are the only 
prTmary (rather 'TmmemorTal1) modes of 
acquTsTtTon of ownershTp establTshed 
Tn popular usage. 3
4
Devanna-bhatta valuably Tnterprets the text of Devala, 'whTch 
iTterally denTes a son's rTght by bTrth Tn a father's estate, Tn the iTght of recog­
nTsed practTces among the people. He expiates asvamya of a son durTng the
1. VTjnanesvara saTd somethTng sTmTlar but dTd not TndTcate the source, MTta,
I.T.23. For Bhavanatha's contrTbutTon to the study of property, see Derrett, 
RLSI, 136.
2 . S .C .257. laukTkam Tdam carjanam janmadTtT/janma-kraya-samvTbhaga- 
parTgrahadhTgamady eva anTdam-prathama-Ioka-sTddham arjanam eva 
svatvapadakam . . .  Tty arthah /
3 . Tr. Gharpure, S.C. 543.
4 . Supra, 3 6 6  ,T\ ■ A .
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1 2lifetime of a father as asvatantrya (want of Independent power).
Here ‘want of ownership1 referred to In 
this text should be construed as demon­
strating want o f Independent power; for 
It Is a fact well established In the world 
that (even) when the father Is free from 
(any) defect the sons have the (right of) ^ 
ownership by birth In the paternal estate.
Devanna-bhatta emphasises the point that the texts should not be 
4
construed lite ra lly . The texts are nothing but congealed commonsense and 
compilations of popular practices, and that Is why they should be Interpreted 
In the light of existing social norms and practices of the age In which the 
Interpretation Is put forward.
For the sake of practical necessity, the Mltaksara doctrine Is a 
challenge to the Immutability and In fa liab ility  of the Sastra, and this challenge 
Is eloquently developed In the Smrtlcandrlka. But the Inroad made by the 
dharmasastra Into the customs of the South was discernible at the time when It  
was written. Devanna-bhatta, however, accepts the origination of ownership
1. This Is also his Interpretation of Manu,x IX, 104: anlsa asvatantra Ity arthah /  
The same Interpretation to the text of Saiikha, (na jlva tl p ltarl putrah rlktham 
bhajeran), see S.C. 256: Illustrated as, arthasvatantryam arthadana-prada- 
nayor asvatantryam /  S .C .256. Also see Gharpure, S.C . t r . ,  539, n .8 .
2 . S.C. 256. atrasvamya-vacanam asvatantrya-pratlpadanartham I t l  mantavyam/ 
nlrdose pltarl sthlte pltr -dhane putranam janmana svamyasya loka-slddhatvat/
3 . Tr. Gharpure, S .C .539.
4 . S.C. 258.
of the sons at bTrth Tn theTr fathers property, yet denTes them the rTght to demand 
a partTtTon agaTnst the wTII of the father.^ >
The meanTng of thTs:- Although, by these 
sons TmmedTately after theTr own bTrth has 
been acquTred the rTght of ownershTp Tn 
the paternal wealth, stTll whTle the father 
Ts !TvTng, they shall not dTvTde the pater­
nal estate. STnce on account of want of 
Tndependent power Tn regard to wealth 
over relTgTous matters Qrather *Tn regard 
to secular matters and righteousness* ]  ,
Tn the matter o f capacTty for makTng a 
partTtTon the sons are Tncompetent. 2
ThTs vTew has been made clearer, and the TncTdents of ancestral and
self-acquTred propertTes have been dTstTnguTshed wTth regard to mutual rights
3of father and son. WhTle explaTnTng the famous text of Yajnavalkya on co- 
extensTve rights of father and son Tn ancestral property, Devanna-bhatta supports 
those who accept the iTteral meanTng, and upholds the bTrthrTght of a son Tn such 
property.^
1. S .C .256. yady apT taTh putraTh svakTya-janmanal] pascad anantaram eva pTtr- 
dhane svamyam adhTgatam praptam tathapT jTvatT pTtari pTtr-dhanam na vTbha- 
ja re n / yato *rtha-dharmayor asvatantryad vTbhaga-kartrtayam anarhah putra 
Tty arthah /
2 . Tr. Gharpure, S .C .538. My modTfTcatTon.
3. Yajn.11.121.
4 . S .C .279. Mysore e dn .lll/2 ,6 4 9 . kecTt tu yathasrutarthatam evasya vacanas- 
yangT-kurvate /  tatha ca pautra-matrecchaya *pT pTtamaha-dhana-vTbhago *pT 
bhavatT, pTtur Tccha-matrena ca kramayata-dhanadTkam na bhavatT/ tatra 
pautrasyapT svamy abhTdhanad Tty ahuh /  tad atrapT grahyam samanjasatvat /  
Gharpure*s text Ts Tnnacurate. The Mysore edn. variant readTng anjasatvat 
(S.C. 279, n .7), for samahjasatvat: the former means ‘dTrectness, relevance*.
Some, however, accept-a literal s lgn lfl- 
cance of this text and say that even at 
the desire of the grandson alone, a parti­
tion of the grandfather's property may 
take place, and that at the mere wish of 
the father, a partition of the hereditarily 
descended property cannot take place- 
slnce an equal right of ownership of the 
grandson In such property has been stated
-  that may be accepted here also, as be -j 
Ing reasonable [ra ther'su itable  * ] . . .
Devanna-bhatta explains that In ancestral property, the son acquired
both svamya and svatantrya, but In self-acquired property he acquires merely
-  2svamya but not svatantrya. This becomes apparent when Devanna-bhatta 
explains the respective rights o f father and son In ancestral and self-acquired 
property
In the case of the grandfather's property 
even, the ownership (svamyam) and also 
Independent power (svatantryam) both are 
equal In the father and the son; whereas 
In regard to the father's property, while 
he Is alive and free from defect, hls^ 
alone Is the power of Independence.
However, a father's 'power of Independence' over his self-acquired 
property does not Indicate the absence of birthright of a son In such property.
1. Tr. Gharpure, S.C. 602. Also see It . ofSetlur, V o l.I ,  255, para.20.
2. We have already pointed out that lack asvatantrya does not necessarily 
mean lack of svatva (ownership), supra,452—3 3 .
3 . S .C. 279-80. paltamahe dhane 'p i plta-putrayoh svamyam svatantryam eva 
tulyata /  paltrke tu jlva t! p ltarl nlrdose tasyalva svatantryam Ity /
4 . Tr. Gharpure, S.C. 603.
And certainly according to the correct Interpretation of the M ltakara ^ a father
could not allenateany categories of Immovables without the consent of his sons.
k
Devanna-bhatta does not deviate from the MTtaksara position on this point, but
2
his comment on Brhaspatl's text Is very significant.
He supports the general smrtl rule that when a father recovers ancestral
property which was lost, he may deal with It Tn any way he pleases. He con-
3
slders such property as almost a father's self-acqulsltlon. He also suggests
that a son had no power to demand partition or Interdict an alienation of self-
4
acquired property o f a father. He comments on Brhaspatl:
The purport of the above passage Ts that 
I t  Is admissible that the father, even 
without his son's oonsent and on the 
strength of his ownpowerof Independ­
ence, Ts competent to make a g ift or 
the like of his property particularly 
mentioned In the topic ofpartltlon 
during (the father's) lifetime, or to 
make an unequal partition. 5
1. M lta, 1.1.27; l.v .9 -1 0 .
2 . Br. XXV. 12-13.
3 . S.C. 280 svarjltaprayam yat-kramayatam.
3 . S.C. 280. On Br. XXV. 12-13. sutananumatlm-antarenapl pltuh svatantrya- 
balad-danadlkam jlvad-vlbhagokta-vlsaya-vlsese vlsama-vlbhaga-kalpanam ca 
yujyata I t l  tatparyarthah /
5. Tr. Gharpure,S.C. 604.
If we take the comment lite ra lly  and Isolate It from Devanna-bhatta's 
general attitude to birthright, I t  seems that the power of a father Tn self-acquired 
property Ts greater Tn the SmrtTcandrTka than In the MTtaksara. Indeed, this 
'Independence' of a father over self-acquired property narrows down the 
effectiveness of the birthright of a son, but Northern Influence and perhaps 
the day-to-day necessity of running a family and family trade, demanded more 
fle x ib ility  In the father's favour.
III. CandesVara's VTvada-ratnakara • *
Candesvara's  ^ VTvada-ratnakara which was composed between 1290 
and 1370 A .D ./loes  not have anything directly on the son's right by birth, but
his Interpretations of texts Indicate that he accepted the co-equal right of father 
and son In the property of the grandfather.
He explains that co-equal ownership (sadrsam svamyam) of father and 
-  ~  2son recognised by Yajnavalkya In property of the grandfather has two Implica­
tions on partition and alienation by a father. First, In a partition a father can­
not have a greater share than the son. Secondly, a father had no power to
1. A  nlbandhakara of great Influence over M lth lla  and Bengal. He wrote at 
the command of King Bhavesa of M lth lla . He was a Chief Judge and a 
Minister for Peace and War, Kane, HD, I, 336, 368 , 370, 372. Derrett, 
DJL, 54.
2 . YajrT.II. 121. Vlvada-ratnakara, ed ., Pandit DTnanatha VTdyalankara, 
(Calcutta, 1887), 461.
make a g ift of ancestral property without the consent of hTs son. ThTs comment 
on Yajnavalkya shows that Candesvara accepted the son's right by birth In pro­
perty of the grandfather.^ ’’ ‘Ownership being the same* means that there
shall be no greater share allowed to the father and no g ift (of the property) at 
2
the father's choice” .
Being a Northern commentator, Candesvara could not completely
follow Vl|nanesvara on son's right to demand partition against the w ill of a
father even In property of the grandfather. But he says that when the father
Is not afflicted with any disease, there can be a partition during his lifetime
3
with his consent. While commenting on Vlsnu, he reiterates his view that 
a father's absolute power to divide property Is applicable only to his self-
4
acquisitions which are acquired (by him) without the help of ancestral wealth.
5
"This applies to property acquired without the aid of the father's w ea lth".
He brings out the contrast between the Incidents of self-acquired
1. V .R. 464. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, llf  592. sad ream svamyam natram- 
sadhlkyam na va pltur Icchaya danam f
2. Tr. S.S. Setlur, A  Complete Collection of Hindu Law Books on Inheritance, 
(Madras , 1911), II, 162. J .C . Ghose translates more clearly: *£qual owner- 
shlp means that the father has not a larger share and that there cannot be a g ift 
at the father's pleasure', The Principles of Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1917), 11,556.
3 . Vlsnu, X V II, 1, J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, II, 593.
4 . V.R . 464. J .C . Ghose, Ib id ., II, 593, pltr-dravyanupaslesarjlta-dhana- 
vlsayam e ta f/
5. Tr. Setlur, II, 164, J .C . Ghose, II, 558.
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and ancestral property clearly Tn hTs comment on Yajnavalkya, 11.114.^ "ThTs
text also refers to self-acquTred property of the father; for Tn property acquTred
2
by ancestors, the father and the son are saTd to be entTtled to share equally".
Candesvara TmplTes by hTs sTlence that a son mTght TnterdTct an alTena
tTon of ancestral property by hTs father. It seems that Candesvara could not
favour the Tdea that a son could demand partTtTon agaTnst the wTshes of hTs
father. The patrTarcha! power of a father was stTlI respected Tn Northern
3
IndTa and precepts of the smrtTs iTke Gautama had already shown that a partT­
tTon agaTnst a father's wTshes was condemned by socTety.
Candesvara's treatment of Baudhayana's general statement that partT-
4
tTon takes place wTth the consent of the father Ts very sTgnTfTcant: "PartTtTon
5
(shall take place) wTth the father's consent".
He accepts thTs precept as a general rule but relates the practTces 
among the people Tn general whTch Ts also en|oTned by the smrtT, namely, that 
a father normally would partTtTon the wealth amongst hTs sons before enterTng 
Tnto the order suTtable for an aged man, or may remaTn Tn the householder's 
order after dTvTdTng a small portTon of the wealth
1. V .R . 464. J .C . Ghose, HTndu Law, II, 593, *A father when makTng partTtTon
can dTvTde Tt among hTs sons as he pleases, eTther gTvTng to the eldest the best
share or Tn such wTse that a ll share equally*, J .C . Ghose, II, 558. etad apT 
svarjTta-dhana-vTsayam, purva-purusarjTte pTta-putrayoh samam^TtvabhTdhanat /
2. Tr. Setlur, II, 164. J .C . Ghose, II, 558.
3 . Gautama, X V . 16-19; Manu, II I. 159, supra,343, 1, 3;.
4 . Baudhayana, V.W. 463. J .C . Ghose, II, 593, pTtur anumatya daya-vlbha ga /
5 . Tr. Setlur, II, 164.
6. Candesvara on HarTta, V .R .463. J .C . Ghose, II, 593, t r .557.
In essence, Candesvara accepts the son's bTrthrTght Tn the property 
o f the grandfather, but unlTke VTjnanesvara cannot confer on the son the rTght 
to demand a partTtTon agaTnst the wTlI of the father. After a consTderatTon of 
hTs comments, the extent of son's rTght by bTrth Tn ancestral property cannot be 
gouged defTnTtely; but hTs rTght cfTnterdTctTon Tn a case of alTenatTon of any 
of Tt by hTs father Ts accepted. ThTs rTght of TnterdTctTon may not be exactly 
synonymous wTth the rTght by bTrth; yet Tn effect, the one presupposes the 
bther.
IV . The Parasara-madhavTya of Madhavacarya
Madhavacarya alTas VTdyaranya, the statesman and the scholar, com­
posed the parasra-madhavTya between 1330 and i 1360 A .D .^  Being the work
of a minister of the founders of VTjayanagara kingdom, and composed Tn response
2to the needs of the Infant empire, this famous commentary on the Parasara-smrt!
attained a semblance of positive law though Tt was not actually codified at the
3
command of a sovereign.
There Ts nothing original Tn the work on the definition of  daya or on 
the theory of property as a matter of popular recognition, or on birth as a mode
1. Kane, HD, I, 380.
2 . Derrett, DJL, 54-55.
3 . For an ancient TnscrTptTona I reference to Tt, see Derrett, JAOS 94 (1974) 1: 
65 f f ,  70.
of acquTsTtTon. On these poTnts, and also on the poYnt of partTtTon, 
Madhavacarya has followed VTjnanesvara wYthout adding anythYng of hYs own 
to the work of hYs great predecessor.^ ThTs does not mean a slavYsh TmTta- 
tYon of the MYtaksara; on the contrary, many mTsunderstandYngs of the MTtak­
sara have been cleared up Yn the MadhavTya.
Madhavacarya's dTscussTon on tTme and mode of partTtTon Ts elabor­
ate and exhaustTve, and throws lYght on the bTrthrTght of a son Yn the property
3 4of hYs father and grandfather. HYs comment on BrhaspatY and Yajnavalkya
reveals that a son's co-equal rTght wTth the father Yn the property o f hYs grand-
5
father was well establYshed Yn practTce among the people.
In what was acquTred by the grandfather 
by acceptance of gTft, purchase,etc., 
the equal rTght of father and son Ys well 
known Yn the world. Hence there Ys partT­
tTon, sTnce ownershTp Ys equal, the partY- 
tTon Ys not by the father's choYce alone, 
nor Ys there a double share. 6
1. Parasara-madhavTya, (Calcutta, 1899), defYnYtYon of daya, 326; ownershTp 
by bTrth, 329, 331.
2. MYta. I.T.27; l.v .9 -1 0 .
3. Br. X X V .8: dravye pYtamahopatte . . .
4 . Y a jn .ll .121.
5. P.M . 338. yat pTtamahena pratYgraha-vYjayadY-labdham, tatra pTtuh putrasya 
ca svamyam loka-prasYddham YtT vYbhahjo 'stY /  hT, yasmat, sadrsam samanam 
svamyam, tasmat na pYtur YcchayaYva vtbhago napY pYtur bhaga-dvayam/
6. Tr. Setlur, 324.
According to Madhavacarya, the son's rTght by birth tn a ll categorTes
of grandparental property ts complete.^ ” ln respect of grandparental property
there can never be unequal partTtTon. Also Tn grandparental property, when Tt
Ts beTng wasted or sold by the father, the grandson (T.e., son of the father) has
2
the rTght to forbtd such acts".
Madhavacarya dtsstpates any doubt by saytng that even Tn self-
3
acqutred Tmmovable property, a father was not Tndependent of hTs sons. "In 
regard to Tmmovables, e tc ., though self-acquired, the father Ts not certatnly 
Tndependent of [  rather 'Ts certatnly dependent upon* 1 the sons e tc .”^
A  father can deal Tndependently wTth self-acqutred Tmmovables Tn a 
time of distress, but under normal circumstances a son's birthright remains fu lly  
effective, and this Ts one of the proofs of the son's right by birth Tn hTs self-
5
acquisitions also. "Hence, Tt has been well said that ownershTp Ts by mere 
bTrth” .
1. Text: J .C . Ghose, Principles of Hindu Law (Calcutta, 1917), II, 651. 
pattamaha-dhana-vtsaye tu na kvapl vtsama-vlbhagah -  TtT /  tatha avTbhaktena 
pttra pattamahe dravye dtyamane vlkrlyamane va pautrasya nlsedhe 'pyadhtkaro 
's tltl gam yate/
2 . Tr. J .C . Ghose, II, 622.
3 . P.M . 322. sthavaradau tu svarjtte *pt putradl-paratantryam eva /
4 . Tr. Setlur, 320. My modification Introduced.
5 . P.M. 332. tasmat susthuktam |anmanaTva svatvam TtT/  ThTs explains Devanna- 
bhatta, S .C . 280 see above p .5 7 2  .
6 . Tr. Setlur, 320.
We have seen that Madhavacarya accepts son's right by bTrth Tn 
father's property, but because of son's dependence durtng the iTfetTme of 
a father, he Ts reluctant to allow a son to demand partTtTon agaTnst the 
wTshes of hTs father.^
On bTrth, sons become possessed of the 
cause of gettTng paternal wealth stTlI 
as long as the father Ts iTvTng, they 
should not dTvTde that wealth because 
they are not deservTng of or 'Tncompe- 
tent to claTm' partTtTon on account of 
theTr want of Tndependence Tn regard 
to wealth and relTgTous works ^better 
'Tn regard to rTghteousness and secu­
lar matters^/. 2
From the above comment, Tt Ts clear that the sorts dependence, as
declared Tn the texts of Sankha, HarTta and Devala, Ts applTcable only Tn the
case of the father's seIf-acquTred property. From a subsequent comment of
Madhavacarya on TncTdents of ancestral property lost and recovered by a father,
3
the chance of any confusTon has been removed. "In property acquTred by the
1. Madhavacarya on Sankha (na jTvatT pTtarT . . . ) ,  text, J .C . Ghose, II, 645. 
yady apT janmanantaram eva putrah pTtr-dhana-nTmTttam pratTpannah tathapT 
pTtarT jTvatT tad-dhanam na vTbhajeran /  yato dharmarthayor asvatantryad 
vTbhaga-karane 'narhalj /  Also see hTs comment on HarTta (jTvatT pTtarT 
putraijam), where he explaTns, arthadang as upabhoga (enjoyment of pro­
perty); vTsarga as vyaya (expendtture), Eksepa as bhrtyadeh sTksartham 
adhTksepadTh (spendTng for the TnstructTon of servants and the iTke), TbTd., 
645, 615. Also he explaTns asvamya of son Tn Devala's text (pTtayur 
uparate tatra . . .  ) as asvatantrya and adds pTtr-dhane putranam janmana 
svamyasya loka-sTddhatvad /  TbTd. ,  645.
2 . Tr. J .C . Ghose, II, 615. My mod TfTea tTon.
3 . Text, J .C . Ghose, II. 651. paTtamahopatte 'pT kvacTt pTtur TcchayaTva 
svarjTtavad-vlbhagobhavatT /
grandfather, Tn some cases, there may be dtvisTon according to the father's desTre, 
as Tn regard to hTs self-acquTred property.” ^
The word kvacTt shows that as a general rule wTth regard to the partT­
tTon of ancestral property, the father's desTre was not the determTnTng factor.
From the above dTscussTon, we may conclude that Madhavacarya 
accepted the son's rTght by bTrth Tn the property of a father and grandfather, 
but a father had fu ll Tndependence Tn hTs self-acquTred movables. In a father's 
self-acquTred Tmmovables, hTs son's bTrthrTght was complete, exceptTng that he 
could not demand partTtTon agaTnst the wTlI of the father, but Tn grandparental 
property the rTghts of father and son were completely co-equal.
V . Sayana
The joTnt and co-extensTve ownershTp and enjoyment of property be-
Iween father and son was a notorTous feature Tn South IndTa durTng the 14th
2 -century. The comments of Sayana on Aranyaka iTterature, though elaboratTng 
a concept durTng the VedTc perTod, are, Tn fact, depTctTng a contemporary legal 
concept.
A t the startTng poTnt of the Aryan law, the son's acquTsTtTons were 
prTma facTe regarded as hTs father's, but that sTtuatTon was gradually amended
1. J .C . Ghose, TbTd., 622.
2 . Younger brother of Madhavacarya, Kane, HD, I, 376.
towards the recognition of son's exclusive ownership of his self-acqutsltlons.^
-  2Sayana's comment on the passage of the Talttlrlya-samhlta beings out this
Idea clearly, but at the same time, upholds a son's co-extenslve right In a ll
3
categories of property acquired by the father.
Indeed In practice a boy w ill earn pro­
perty and, keeping I t  with the object 
of preventing It from being common pro­
perty and so having some means of live­
lihood for himself In future, w ill go and 
hide It Instead of giving It to his father 
or brothers. But whatever Is acquired 
by a father becomes the common property 
of the boy, his sons, and his brothers.
A ll of them In fact live upon such pro­
perty. 4
5In the comment on the passage of the Altareya-aranyaka, the common 
ownership and mutual enjoyment of the respective property of father and son is un­
doubtedly accepted and any scope for Individual acquisition Is minimal.^
1. Derrett, The Development of the Concept of Property'ln India C . A .D . 800- 
1800*, 7 V R , 64, (1962), 15-130, at 99, n.333.
2. Tal.sam .2 .6 .1 .6 , D h.K . 1160b; pita val prayajah praja'nuyaja yat prayajanlstva 
havlnsyabhldharayatl pltalva tat putrena sadharanam kurute /
3 . Sayana on Tal.sam.2 .6 .1 .6 , D h.K . 1161a. loke hi balena yad uparjltam tad 
dravyam sa putra uttarakale svajlvanartham asadharanatvena samghrya guptam 
karotl na tu pltre prayacchatl na tu bhratrbhyah /  pltra tu yad uparjyate ta t- 
plturbala-putrasya tad-bhratrnam ca sadharanam b h a va tl/ tena dravyena sarve'pl 
jlvantl /
4 . Tr. Derrett, (1956), 1 9 S .C .J ., 107.
5 . A . I .A .  I I#1.8 . yatra ha kva ca putrasya tat-pttur yatra va pltus tad va putrasyet 
yetat tad uktam bhavatl/  Dh. K. 1163a. Altareya-aranyaka, e d ., A .B . Keith, 
(Oxford, 1909), 107, tr.210.
6. Sayana on A l.  A . 11.18, D h.K . 11 63a . loke putrasya vastu yatra ha kva ca yasmln 
kasmlnn apl gramantare vldyamanam tat sarvam pltuh svam bhavatl// CcjntV^^on
In practice an object belonging to a son 
becomes In Its entirety the property of 
his father wherever It  may be, that Is to 
say, In whatever different village It may 
be located; and the father w ill send for 
I t  and enjoy I t .  Moreover should any 
object connected with the father come 
to light In another village, It becomes 
his son*s property also, and even the son 
w ill send for It and enjoy I t .  For equity 
demands such reciprocal rights of enjoy­
ment (or "union consists In the mutual^ 
enjoyment of one another*s goods”) .
This right of common enjoymait of property by father and son pre­
supposes son*s ownership In property from birth and the accrual of ownership 
does not depend on a partition, because until a partition they a ll live on a ll
the property, both ancestral and self-acquired, "as If  there had been no jdlffer-
2
ence between the two classes".
Though Sayana*s comments had universal acceptance In India, yet 
from the jurid ical point of view, his utterances regarding the two texts should 
be taken as depicting the practice only In South India (specifically the Deccan, 
from where Sayana and Madhavacarya came) because the patriarchal family 
structure In North India was not commensurate with the sonks ownership In a ll
Note 6 -  p .581 -  Continued:
pita h i tad anlyanubhavatl /  athava pltuh sambandhlyad vastu gramantare 
vldyate tadva tadapl putrasya svam bhavcTieva/ putro*pTtadanlyanubhavatl /  
paraspara-dravyanubhavena yadalkyam a s t l /
1. Tr. Derrett, (1956), 1 9 S .C .J ., 107. Note: sambandha-  claim; sambandhl = 
to which X has a claim.
2 . Derrett, (1956), 19S .C .J. 107.
categories o f property acquired by the father.
V I . Madana-parljata
One of the North Indian digests Is Vlsves'vara-bhatta's  ^ Madana-
_ _ 2 -  3
parlfata which was patronised by King Madanapala of Kastha.
The commentator does not say anything new on the son's right by 
birth, but as a juridical guide of a North Indian terfltory the work throws light 
on the relative proprietary rights of father and son In family property towards the 
second half of the fourteenth century.
VlsVesvara-bhatta recognises a son's co-equal rights with his father
In ancestral property. He conveys this Idea In unambiguous terms In his com-
4ment on Yajnavalkya II. 121.
In the property of the grandfather consist­
ing of a II these, the ownership of both 
father and son Is equal. Therefore, the 
meaning Is that the restrictions such as 
"while the father Is alive partition should 
take place only with his consent", "the
1. Bom In South India but migrated to Northern India In search of patronage, 
Kane, HD, I, 385.
2 . 1360-1390 A .D ., Kane, Ib id ., 389. Derrett, DJL, 55.
3 . Modem Kath on the Jumna to the north of Delhi, Kane, Ib id ., 386.
4 . Madana-parljata, (Calcutta, 1893), 660. J .C . Ghose, II, 534. etadrsl 
samaste paltamaha-dhane pltuh putrasya svamyam samam eva /  ato jlva tl pltarl 
pltur Icchayalva vlbhagah /  pltus ca dvay amsau pltrto bhaga-kalpanetyddl 
nlyama na santlty arthah /
584.
father shall take two shares” , and "the 
allotment of shares shall be according^ 
to the fathers” , e tc ., do not apply.
2
The author has considered the four periods of partTtTon, and those
3
perTods Tnclude the partTtTon of grandparental property as w e ll. The opTnTon 
of the commentator on these four perTods of partTtTon TmplTes that a son had not 
the rTght to demand a partTtTon agaTnst the wTlI of a survTvTng unblemished
4father. But the comment on Yajnavalkya 11.121, shows that Tn ancestral 
property, a son could demand a partition agaTnst the w ill of hTs father, which 
strengthens the Idea of son's right by birth Tn such property.
ThTs apparent contradiction should not distract us from the fact that 
this author has accepted the principle of the son's birthright Tn ancestral pro­
perty.
V I I . Madanaratna-pradTpa (VyayaharavTvekoddyota)
5Madanaratna-pradTpa Ts one of the most scholarly and extensive
1. Tr. Setlur, II, 524. J .C . Ghose, II, 520.
2. J .C . Ghose, II, 531-2, t r . ,  515.
3 . The word 'paternal' here Ts symbolical of grandparental and the like, J .C . 
Ghose, II, 515.
4 . M .P. 660 on Yajn. II. 121. jTvatT pltarl pltur TcchayaTva vlbhaga . . . j
5. Work compiled b^ four brahmins under the patronage of MadanasTmha Deva, King 
of Gorakhpur, Kane, HD, I, (1930), 391-2. Kane thought that the work was
/Continued on next page:
digests on the dharmasastra. Being a North Indian compilation, the learned 
authors freely differed from the Mltaksara on some points, but at the same time, 
held Vl|nanesvara In high esteem.
The North Indian compilers could not Ignore the Impact of the views of 
Vijnanesvara, but they realised that since their loka ‘public* was different, the 
loka-sTddha doctrine of acquisition of property needed a recasting. They attempted 
to see the lauklka aspect of property and the concept o f son's right by birth (janma- 
svatvavdda) through the haze of the sastra then available to them, and the result 
was a synthesis of the Northern orthodox sastrlc school and the views put forward 
In the Mltaksara.
In considering a son*s alleged asvamya during the survival of an un­
blemished father,^ the compilers of Madanaratna-pradlpa have maintained the
explanation of most of the authors who were Inspired by the Mltaksara, and
2endorsed their view that asvamya Is nothing but paratantrya (dependence).
Vljnanesvara‘s definition of daya and Its categorisation Into apratl- 
bandha and sapratlbandha, has been retained by the Madanaratna. But the
Note 5 -  p .584 -  Continued:
composed between 1425-1450 A .D ., IbTd., 393. Also Derrett, DJL, 55.
Kane revised his opinion and placed It between 1350 and 1500 A .D ., 
Madanaratna-pradlpa, ed ., Kane, (Bikaner, 1948), Introd., x l l .
1. MRP, 322-23.
2 . anlsa asvatantra, Madanaratna on Manu, IX, 104, MRP, 322. etesv asvatantryam
pltranu|nam vlna svecchaya na pravartltavyam talr Ity arthah, on HarTta, MRP, 322. 
tatrasvamyam asvatantryam Ity  artha, on Devala, MRP, 323.
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significance of these two categories of daya has been Illustrated In a slightly
different sense from the Mltaksara's. The Implication of a dormant right of
sapratlbandha-dayadas In the Mltaksara  ^ Ts absent In the Madanaratna because
the cause of property Is birth In the case of apratlbandha daya, whereas In the
case of sapratlbandha daya I t Ts essentially (birth apart) the disappearance of the 
2
obstruction.
The Madanaratna's Is broadly the Mltaksara doctrine of the son‘s right
by birth, but It tries to establish that the blrthrlgh, though allegedly a creature
of popular recognition, Ts also approved by the sastra. Though he quotes 
3
Gautama's text on birthright, yet he emphasises that popular recognition Is
the reason for the acquisition of rights from birth In the property of a father and 
4
grandfather.
-  5Then he puts forward the antique view of the Samgrahakara who 
opines that ownership of property Is deduced only from the sacred Institutes
1. M lta .l.1 .3 . Derrett, ZVR 64 (1962), 55.
2 . MRP, 323-4. atrapratlbandho dayo janmanalva svatva-hetuh sapratlbandha-
dayas tu pratlbandhapagame satltl jnatvyam /
3 . utpattyalvartha svamltval labhate . . . ,  M lta , 1.1.23.
4 . MRP, 323. satyapT nlrdose pltarl putra-pautranarn janmana arambhalva p ltr-
pltamaha-dhane svamltvasya loka-slddhatvat/  This view Ts reiterated while 
commenting on Bhavanatha: loka-slddham varjanam janmadl; Madanaratna 
explains, ]anmadl putra-|anma pltr-pltamaha-dhane svatva-hetuh, MRP, 324.
5. MRP, 323.
(sastraYka-samadhYgamya). ^  The comptlers want to resolve the conflYct between
loka-prasYddhY and sastra by sayYng that Yn the case of apratYbandha daya, the
2cause of property Ys bYrth and, rYktha betng aprattbandha daya, bYrth Ys auto-
matYcally approved by the sastra as a means of acquYsYtYon and comes wYthYn the 
3
text of Gautama on acquYsYtYon of property.
ConsYderYng the authors* dYscussYon on tYme and mode of partYtYon, Yt 
Ys apparent that partYtYon wYll take place accordYng to the sastrYc precedents and 
a son cannot normally demand a partYtYon agatnst the wYll of the father unless the 
faults prescrYbed by the sastra are present.^
ThYs can safely be taken to apply to father's self-acquYred property,
but wYth regard to the grandfather's property Madanaratna drops the hYnt that
5
sometYmes there can be a partYtYon agaYnst the wYll of the father.
But the Madanaratna*s opYnYon on partYtYon does not help us Yn assess- 
Yng the extent of the son's bYrthrYghtYn the property of the grandfather.
1. MRP, 323.
2 . rYktham apratYbandhah dayah, MRP, 323.
3 . Gautama, X . 39-42; rYktha-kraya . . .  The dYfference of thYs treatment upon
the MYtaksara Ys evYdent.« -
4 . See MRP, 326-33. It Ys explaYned at MRP. 326: nYrdose pYtarY sthYte-YtY 
vacanat-sadose pYtarY jYvaty apY putranam na tat-paratantryam YtY bhavatY 
tesam secchaya vYbhaga-kartrtvam /
5 . Madanaratna on Vyasa, kramagate gi+ia-ksetre . . .  MRP.333. pYtary anYcchaty 
apY paitamaha-dhana-vYbhago bhavatYty aha vyasah /
The authors throw light on the mutual rights and powers of father and 
son In their topic of dattapradanlkam and the scope of such powers Ts well-defined. 
The rights o f the saplndas to be consulted Tn a case of alTenatTon of Immovable 
property have been enjoined by the smrtl In vague terms. ^  The compilers bring 
out the purport of the text and relative rights of the divided and undivided co­
parceners. In the light o f their subsequent statement, the opinion of the authors
2
on this text should be taken as referring to ancestral Immovables.
Divided coparceners even are equal, how 
much more undivided coparceners? The 
employment of the word ‘divided* Is for 
the sake of the rule ’’how much more” ? 
but does not purport to confer ownership 
to the divided. The uselessness of par­
tition would be the result. 3
So the authors point out that only the undivided saplndas, e .g . the un­
divided sons, had the power to Interdict an alienation of ancestral Immovables by
-  4a father. They go further and clear the supposed Mltaksara ambiguity by stating
that even self-acquired Immovables and slaves of the father can only be alienated
5
with consent of the adult sons.
1. vlbhakta avlbhakta va saplnda . . .  , MRP, 210, Dh.k.^tfOSb, S up ra j34 lj n -3 .
2. MRP, 210. vlbhakta apl sthavare samah klmutavlbhakta I t l  kalmutlka-nyaya- 
pradarsanartham vlbhakta-grahanam na tu vlbhaktanam tatra svamltvam astltl 
pratlpadanartham /  vlbhagasya valyarthyapatteh.
3. Sonthelmer, EHJF, 312.
4 . M lta, 1.1.27.
5. MRP, 210. svair jltam apl sthavaram dasadlkam ca putresu prapta-vyavaharesu 
tad anumatyalva datavyam /
589.
The above analysts establishes that according to the Madanaratna, 
the birthright of a son was well-established In a ll categories of Immovable pro­
perty. This was a big step towards curtailing the patriarchal power of a father 
In Northern India. In fact, It Is a triumph for the Mltaksara, but at the same 
time, I t  should not be considered as a blind following of their Southern predeces­
sors by the compilers because In essence, It Is a restoration of the smrtl texts,  ^
which enjoined co-extenslve rights to the father and son In ancestral and self- 
acquired Immovables. The authors also kept an escape route from any rig id ity  
that might be done to the son's blrthrlgh, In order to keep the functioning of the
family smooth and In case of distress or necessity, a father could alienate even
2
ancestral Immovables.
In theorising on the origin of property and birth as a mode of acquisi­
tion, and also on textual comment, the opinions put forward In the Madanaratna- 
pradlpa show the stamp of mature and original minds by way of a restatement of 
the Mltaksara birthright In their North Indian setting.
V II I.  Sarasvatl-vllasa of Prataparudradeva
The Saras vatl-vllasa (Recreations of the Goddess of Learning) of 
Prataparudra-deva stands out as a mature work on the dharmasastra during the
1. e .g . YajfT. 11.121. Narada.
2 . MRP.210. See M lta .1 .1.27-9. apat-kale kutumba-posanartham avasyaka-pltr- 
sraddhadharya-kanya-vlvahadl-dharma-karyartham putra-bhratrady anumatl- 
rahlto *pt kramaga-sthavaradanadtkam k u ry a t/
first quarter of the 16th century. ^  In order to produce a work of practical u ti­
lity , the author attempted to compile a uniform compendious digest from the
divergent texts and commentaries In relatively popular, though self-consciously 
2scholarly style.
In the Saras vatl-vllasa, the concept of son's birthright was revitalised
and the secular character o f the ownership of property was made more conspicuous 
-  3
than In the Mltaksara. Prataparudra-deva argued that ownership Itself was
the offspring of secular causes, and he thus completely removed ownership from
a ll nexus with spiritual things both In regard to Its origin and as to Its secular
4
results, so rendering It completely secular In Its nature. "A  scriptural
5
character does not exist In the connection between property and Its proprietor".
1. Kane, HD, I, 413. Foulkes thinks It was compiled In 1515 A .D .,  S .V ., 
(London, 1881) , Preface, X V III. Derrett places It between 1500 and 1525 
A .D .,  DJL, 56.
2 . Foulkes, Ib id ., x v llt .  It Is misleading to ca ll I t  (as Kane has done, HD, I,
412) a work of positive law In the Austtnlan sense. The work was compiled by 
a committee supervised by Lolla Laksmldhara. See DJL, 56 and ns. 355, 356.
3 . Foulkes, Ib id ., Preface, xx t.
4 . S .V* Foulkes, ed ., 400-01. sva-svaml-sambandhasya vacanlkatvabhavat/
. . .  tatha hi svatvam lauklkam, lauklka-krlya-janyatvat vrlhyadtvat /
5 . Tr. Foulkes, 81. It w ill be recollected that the word sambandha has In Sanskrit 
the overtones and often the meaning 'claim1: hence, It would be admissible to 
render this sentence, 'Since an owner's claim on his asset Is based on no text . . . '
"That Ts to say, ownership Ts secular; because of Tts orTgTn Tn secular acts, 
like rTce and other things".^
Before dealing with the sources of ownership, the author has spent,
2 3
appropriately, a few sections on the discussion of the nature of ownership.
In these sections, he explored the mlmamsa and even Improved on Vljnanesvara*s
use of I t .  First, he establishes the secularlty of ownership and Interprets the 
5
text of Gautama as Visible* ( I.e . *secular*) means of acquiring property
6
(drstartha dhanarjanopayah) and as sources of ownership prevalent In the world.
He takes the term rlktha as meaning the acquisition of proprietorship by sons In
8
the property of their father. "The term ‘Inheritance* means the acquisition of
Inheritance; (I.e .) that proprietorship which sons and others obtain by birth In
9
the property of their father and others".
1. Tr. Foulkes, 81.
2 . S .V . H  400-56.
3 . S .V .* *  457-77.
4 . S .V . M 404, 413 , 455, 456. Cp. M lta .I.1 .10 .
5. Gautama, X .39-42.
6. S .V . f  457.
7. S.V .*471. He has taken Manu, X . 115, as demonstrative of righteous and 
worldly sources of property and that Is why even property acquired Improperly 
by a Brahmin Is divisible amongst his sons. Cp. the approach of the Madana- 
ratna who took Manu, X .115, as listing the modes of sastrlc acquisition.
8. S .V . * 459. rlktham nama rlktharjanam /  pltradl-dhane svamTtvapadakam 
putradl-janmetl y a v a t/
9. Tr. Foulkes, 93. rlktha Is also considered as unobstructed heritage, S .V . ?464.
592.
He reinforces the birthright o f a son by quoting unhesitatingly the
text of Gautama as cited In the Mltaksara,  ^ and adds also a text of Vlsnu to
— -
2 3
that effect. ’’Hence also Vlsnu: ‘Ownership accrues by birth*” .
He refutes the argument of the Sarigrahakara that property( owned-
4
ness) svatva Is secular (lauklka) but proprietorship (svamya) *ls non-secular 
5
(aulauklka) and proprietorship can only be obtained by means as ordained In 
the sacred Institutes. To this argument, Prataparudra-deva answers that pro­
prietorship and ownership are Interconnected like yoga ^ and ksema.^ "The 
establishment of the secularlty of either of them Is, In rea lity, an establishment
g
of both". The author Is not ready to accept proprietary right as the creature
1. M lta . 1.1.23.
2. S .V . ? 461. ata eva vlsnuh/  janmana svatvam apadyata I t ! /  Not found 
In the Institute of Vlsnu. Bharucl on this text, accepts the birthright of a son 
but not of a daughter: putrasyalva na tu putrlkaya It ! Bharuclh, S .V . ^ 462. 
Unfortunately, this Is not verifiable from the surviving text of Bharucl: See 
Derrett, B harucl‘s Commentary on the Manusmrtl, (Wiesbaden, 1974), I,
7, n.30. It was probably In his commentary on Vlsnu.
3 . Tr. Foulkes, 93.
4 . On Hindu concept of property (svatva) e tc ., see Derrett, BSOAS 18/3 (1956), 
475-98; . - ZVR 64 (1962), 15-130, rpt. Essays, II, 8-130.
5 . S .V . ? 474.
6. The obtaining of that which has not been obtained; a sacrifice, S .V . ‘*189, 
M lta, I . lv .23.
7 . The preservation of that which has been obtained; a deed of charity, S .V . f  fc 
189-91. M lta .I. lv .2 3 . The phrase yoga-kTsema, though originally a compound 
of two distinguishable terms had long since become a single term Indicating ‘means 
of support* and In modem times has declined s till further to mean ‘welfare*.
8 . S .V . f  475.
5 9 3 .
of sastra and according to him, sastra Is merely a handmaiden of worldly practices 
and not a source of acquisition of ownership. Once the secularlty o f property 
Is established, I t  can safely be assumed that birth Is one of the modes of acquisi­
tion. So according to him, It seems that sastra has not much Importance In
establishing birth as a mode of acquisition though (characteristically) he has not
1 2refrained from citing the texts of Gautama and Vlsnu on son*s right by b irth .
But apart from these doubtful texts, texts (as we have already seen) of the 
dharmasastra on the son's co-equal rights were there In abundance; any commen­
tator composing a treatise had to apply his doctrine of property to assess the ex­
tent of the mutual rights of father and son In family property, as ordained by the 
texts.
Prataparudra-deva's comments on the smrtl texts are precise, direct
and free from ambiguity. In the grandfather's property, a son could demand a
3
partition against the w ill of his father, and had the power to Interdict an allena-
4
tlon of such property by the father.
In the Sarasvatl-vllasa, the distinction between the Incidents of an­
cestral and self-acquired property Is well brought out. The dependence of a son 
during the lifetime of a father Is applicable only with regard to father's self-
5
acquisitions. In such property, a father could not be compelled to a forced
1. S .V . *460.
2 . S .V . f 461.
3 . S .V . * 220.
4 . S .V . i  221.
5 . S.V.<i218.
division by his son J  This does not mean that Prataparudra-deva does not
recognise a son's birthright In father's self-acquisitions. On the contrary,
son's birthright Is accepted both In ancestral and self-acquired property but In
self-acquired property, because of the dependence of the son during the survival
of a father, the son must not Interfere with his father's power of dealing with 
2
his self-acquisitions.
It Is to be understood, that, although 
proprietorship In the property of a father 
and grandfather Is by birth alone, never­
theless, since the son Is dependent on his 
father In the Instance of the paternal pro­
perty, and his father has supreme power 
of acquisition £ rather, *has superiority 
due to the mere fact that he was the ac­
quirer* ]  , consent must be made by the 
son In the case of a disposition by the^ 
father of his self-acquired wealth.
Here we meet again the Mltaksara Idea, based upon the alleged merit 
of the father In making the acquisition, I .e . an acquirer (provided he acquires 
without detriment to his father's estate) has a 'superiority* In respect of the 
article acquired which the other persons, who de facto enjoy, are morally 
bound to recognise.
1. S .V . $224.
2 . S .V . f  222. anumatls tu k a rta v y a // paltrke paltamahe ca svamyam yady apl 
janmanatva, tathapl paltrke pltr-paratantratvat pltuscarjakatvena pradhanyat 
pltra vlnlyujyaiidnesvarjtta-dravye putreijanumatlh kartavya / f
3 . Tr. Foulkes, 47. My modification.
595.
Unlike Vljncinesvara, Prataparudra-deva has broadly divided properly 
Tnto ancestral and paternal, but It remains a question whether he sub-divided 
each Tnto movable and Immovable. The word dravya (which TmplTes ‘movables*) 
seems to Indicate that the Saras vatl-vllast retains the Mltaksara distinction.
In his very definition of daya, Prataparudra-deva has reiterated the
existence of common ownership between father and son. He defines daya as
1 -  2‘wealth common to father and son* (pita putra-samudaya-dravya). He
3quotes a text of Brhaspatl which gives the Impression that the term daya Is de­
rived from the root da = ‘ to give*. But this objective derivation of the root 
leads to the general definition of the term as wealth common to father and son.
IX. MTtra MTsra‘s V ! ramltrodaya ^ Vya vaharaprakasa
Mltra Mtsra*s Vframltrodaya ^  Is a scholarly and elaborate digest on
vyavahara. HTs time and genius were both advantageous to him In making a re-
5appraisal of the conflicting views of the Interpreters of  dharmasastra. The great 
works of the commentators like Laksmldhara, VTjnanesvara, Jlmutavahana and
1. S .V .^ 5 ,  6.
2. S .V .^ 5 ,  6 .
3 . dadatl dlyate pltra putrebhyas svasya yad dhanam, SV. f  6.
4 . Composed between 1610 and 1640 A .D .,  Kane, HD, I, 446. Also Derrett, 
D X , 57.
5 . V .M . 1.1.
Devanna-bhatta, and many other predecessors were tn front of him. With great 
scholarly acumen he also looked at the sastra through the prtsm of  mlmarnsa.  ^
This plethora of material dtd not blur hts vtston rendering his work superfluous 
or Im itative; on the contrary, It helped him to re-examine and reach a summa­
tion on the points of disagreements among the champions of the different schools 
of thought.
The conflict between the protagonists of janma-svatvavada and 
uparama-svatvavada Is as old as the sastra, and even today we cannot say that 
the conflict has been resolved. It was natural for Mltra Mlsra to take up ihls 
topic and make his own contribution.
The concept of the son*s right by birth, though mainly a South Indian
2 3
phenomenon, was not foreign to the srutt or smrtl literature, which were sup­
posed to be followed meticulously In the Aryan society of Northern India. But 
VTinanesvara's recognition of popular practices under the veneer of sastra could 
not be Ignored by the Nofth Indian masters. On the other hand, though the 
cogent arguments of Jlmutavahana In his Dayabhaga were running through the 
same stream of sastrtc Interpretation as the Mltaksara, the water of the two never 
mingled. This confusing situation needed a bold North Indian utterance and the 
the Vlramltrodaya, as a complete treatise on vyavahara, served this purpose.
1. Bhavanatha, V .M . 1.35; Prabhakara, V .M .1.38; Kumarlla, V .M .1 .39.
2 . Tal.sam. 3 .1 .9 .4 . supra,3 7 4 * - 7 5 .
3. Ya|ru 11.121, e tc ., s u p r a , I
First, he took up the basic difference between VTjnanesvara and 
Jtmutavahana on the definition of daya. He endorsed the definition of V I jnanes- 
vara and rejected the deftnttTon put forward by Jtmutavahana  ^ by saytng that
to assert that the meaning of a term ts derlva- 
ttve as well as technical, after assuming a 
figurative meaning of Its root, ts useless,
Involves the fa llacy of mutual dependence, 
ts against the order tn which meanings are 
naturally suggested by words, and Is a 
reductlo ad absurdum. 2
He accepts VTjnanesvara *s classification of daya Into aprattbandha and sapratl- 
3 -  -
bandha and rejects Jtmutavahana's contention that In every case daya Is sapra- 
4
ttbandha. By endorsing Vtjnanesvara's view, Mltra Mlsra upheld the son's 
right by birth In the father's and grandfather's property as aprattbandha dayada.
In itia lly , Mltra Mlsra does not disturb the concept of the sastrtc origin 
of property. Taking It for granted that ownership Is to be deduced from the sacred 
Institutes, he tries to prove that the birthrightof a son was enjoined Tn the £rutl 
Is presumed to be endorsed by the smrtl. The srutl enjoins that 'one who Is black-
5
haired and to whom a son has been bom shall establish the sacred fire '. Those
T. Dha.bha.1.4 -5 .
2. Golapchandra Sarkar Sastrl,ed., The Vlramltrodaya, (Calcutta, 1879), 1.3.
The definition of daya Is extended with reference to the dictum of the Nlhantu: 
vlbhaktavyam pttr-dravyam dayam ahur-manlslna Ityaha /  The property of the 
father which Is to be divided, the sages ca ll heritage*. The term 'father' stands 
for any relation. He takes vlbhaktavyam (to be divided) as vlbhagarham (cap­
able of partition) which Indicates that father's property Is not compulsorily to be 
divided as In the devolution In the case of an only son.
3 . V .M .1 .5 . M lta.1.1.3, supra,4 9 3 -4 .
4 . V .M .1 .6 . supra, 5 3 Z .
5 . V .M .1 .6 ; 1.23: krsna-keso'gnln adadhl I t e t l /
who oppose the existence of the concept of birthright of sons Interpret this srutl 
text to their advantage by pointing out that I f  a son had common ownership with 
his father, I t  would not be possible for a father to follow the Injunction of esta­
blishing the sacred fire with his own wealth because during minority or legal 
Incapacity o f a son, the necessary permission would not be forthcoming. 
VTjnanesvara refuted this argument by stating that the Injunction Itself presupposed 
(or rather, obviated need for) a permission.^ He wanted to show that the Injunc­
tion had no apparent conflict with the existence of a soni right by birth. But 
Mltra Mlsra views the Injunction from the opposite angle and answers Jlmutava-
hana and his followers who hold that son's right arises after the extinction of the
2right of the father . Mltra Mlsra contends:
If It  be only on the extinction of the right of 
the father and others, that the right of the 
sons etc. accrues to their £ I .e . the antece­
dents' ]  property In that case I t  would follow 
that while the father and others are alive and 
free from defect, the sons would be Incompe­
tent to perform the ceremonies enjoined by 
the Vedas. 3
Mltra Mlsra*s approach to the srutl text Is Ingenious, logically sound 
and an Improvement on VTjnanesvara*s Interpretation. He accepts that a son re­
quires his father's permission to perform sacrifice but this Is required only because
1. M lta .1 .1.26.
2. V .M . 1.23. yadl pltradl-svatvapagama eva putradlnam tad dhane svatvam tarhl 
nlrdose pltradau jlva tl tesam dhana-sadhya-valdlka-karmasv anadhlkara . .  . /
3 . Tr. Golap Sastri, 13.
of the dependence of a son during the survival of his father. A  father, on the
other hand, being Independent, does not require the permission o f the son,^
whereas of course, as VTjnanesvara saw, the Vedlc text Itself overrides any
legal objection*. Mltra Mlsra also points out that permission to sacrifice
does not generate property; the competence arises out of the fact that both
2
father and son have common ownership In the property.
And the supposition, I f  made for the above 
reasons, that right Is generated by permis­
sion of the father and the like, Is £pre-J 
supposed by neither sacred nor profane 
[  I .e .  secular! authority. 3
This Is a subtle answer to those who hold that property Is deduclble
only from the sastra, and also a pointer towards the fact that son's right by
birth "rests on the authority of the srutl, the smrtl > the puranas and the custom
4
observed by the learned". It Is Important to note that a Northern Indian 
writer, like Mltra Mlsra, can also appeal to 'good custom* as a support ( If a 
suitably Inferior one) for the practice.
But M ltra Mlsra knew that the notion of sastrlc origin of property 
accepted by Dhatesvara ^ could not stand the test of reason.^ He had to fa ll
1. V .M .1 .24 .
2 . V .M .1 .23 . pltrady anumateh svatvotpadakatvan caltad anurodhat kalpyamanam 
alauklkam asastrlyanca /
3. Tr. G olap Sastrl, 14. My modification.
4 . V .M .1.23. srutl-smrtl-purana-slstacara-slddhasya /  Mltra Mlsra thinks that 
birth Is Included In the text of Gautama, X .39-42 In the word adhlg^majfind­
ing), Ib id ., reiterated again at 1.31.
5. On Dharesvara's view, supra,5 4 2 , n -4 .
6 . V .M .1.32: vastutas tu na svatvasya sastraIka-samadhlgamyatvam yuktl-yuktam /
back on the argument of VTjnanesvara that property was lauktka. He elaborated 
and Tmproved on the Mltaksara and brought forward more vtews of the mlmamsakas 
and the nalydytkas to strengthen the theory o f the lauktka orTgin of property,^ 
and to refute the optntons of Dharesvara and the author of the Sangraha, 
namely that orTgin of property stemmed only from the sastra.
Both from the materialistic and metaphysical Idea of property, Mltra
Mlsra *s focal point o f discussion remained hinged on son's right by birth, and;
-  -  -  2Jtmutavahana *s contention that birth was not the Immediate cause but the 
mediate cause of properly was rejected.
The objectors to the Idea of son's right by birth put forward another
means of argument, namely the texts on Imparttblllty of pre-partltlon g ift by
father to a son. The objectors argue that the prohibition against parti b lllty
signifies the father's unilateral power to deal with property and the absence of
3
the son's common ownership with the father. The objection Is refuted by 
Mltra Mlsra's saying that one can assume son's permission In case of a pre- 
partltlon g ift by a father, and the texts only ordain the Invalidity of an
1. Mltra Mls?a quotes Bhavanatha: loka-slddhln'carjanam janm ad l/, V .M .1 .35 . 
Prabhakara: arjanam svatvam napadayatltl vTprattstddham, V .M .1 .38 . 
Kumarllasvamln Is also of the opinion that the notion of property Ts derived from 
profane authority, V .M .1 .39 . Parthasarathl: raga-praptes tavad arjanam na 
sastroyam, V .M .1 .40 . See V.M .1.41 for the difference In approach between 
Prabhakara and Kumarlla, though their conclusions were the same, namely 
that property was derived from profane authority. For a critica l discussion, see 
Derrett, 'RLSI, C h.5.
2. V .M .I .  49-50.
3 . V .M . I .7 . The same objections put forward with reference to husband's 
affectionate g ift to w ife, 1.8 .
affectionate g ift of Immovables.^ Alternatively, the texts declare that mov-
2
ables can be given by the father unilaterally by reason of his Independence.
For they may be reconciled as having refer­
ence to (the sons1) permission, and as having 
the object of establishing [.or, Vein forcing1]  
the Invalid ity of the affectionate g ift of Im­
movable property: or, what Is declared (In 
those texts) ts the Im partlb lllty, by reason 
of the father's Independence, of what, 
other than Immovable property, has been 
given by him, even without the per­
mission of the sons. 3
By this Mltra Mlsra does not mean that a son's birthright was operative
only In the Immovable property. It was all-pervading, but from the practical
point of a view, a father had Independence to deal with movable property for
specific purposes, e .g . the necessities o f the fam ily. Birthright could not be
a stumbling block to the Hindu joint family as a viable Institution; It had to
4
make room for family necessity.
1. Here Mltra Mlsra Is closely followelng the Mltaksara, 1.1.19-20; 1.1.25.
2 . V .M . I .28. anumaty abhlprayena sthavara-prltl-danabhava-sthlrlkaranarthat- 
ayopapatteh /  svatantryad va pltur-anumatlm antarenapl tena datte sthavara- 
vyatlrlkte putranam avlbhajyatvam ucyate /  also see 1.9. Mltra Mlsra also Inter­
prets son's asvamya In the texts of Manu, Natuda and Devala as lack of Inde­
pendence , V .M  . I .27.
3 . Tr. Golap Sastrl, 16.
4 . V .M . I .30. tasmat paltrke paltamahe ca dravye putradlnam yady apl Janmanalva 
svatvam, tathapl p!tur-ava£yakesu dharma-krtyesu vacanlkesu ca prasada-dana- 
kutumba-bharanapad-vlmoksadjsu ca stha varavyatlrlkta-dravya-vlnlyoge svatan- 
tryam I t l  dhyeyam /  sthavaradau tu svarjlte pltradl-parampara-prapte ca putradl- 
paratantryam tulyam eva /
Hence It Ts to be observed, that a l­
though the right of the sons etc. to the 
property of the father and the grand­
father accrues by birth alone, s till for 
the performance of the necessary re li­
gious ceremonies and for the purpose 
of affectionate gifts, maintenance of 
the family, deliverance from danger 
and the like that are prescribed by 
the sacred texts, the father possesses 
Independence In dealing with the 
(joint) property, other than Immov­
able: but with respect to Immovable 
property, whether self-acquired or 
Inherited from the father or other 
ancestor, the dependence on the 
sons etc. Is alike . . .  1
In this paragraph, Mltra Mlsra Is re-emphasising In clearer language 
-  2the Mltcksara position on the relative extent of the son's birthright and
father*s power over joint family property. He also makes It clear that the
son's lack of Independence during the lifetime of his father does not In any
way hinder, In law, the bringing of an action for partition against the father
even though It would be abhorred as a breach of the rules of morality and 
3
relig ion. This Is perhaps the clearest statement of this dichotomy.
This problem was taken up again by Mltra Mlsra while refuting
Jllmutavahana's doctrine of factum valet and the special Importance of Im-
4
movable property has been restated In the following words:
1. Tr. Golap SastrT, 16-17.
2. Mlt<F. 1.1.27; I . v .9-10.
3 . V .M . I .19; tatha satl drstadrsta-vlrodha-matram bhaved vyavaharos tu 
slddhyed e v a /
4 . V . M . II .1.22. tatravlbhaktanarp madyaka-dravye samyasamyad-anTsatvam 
anyanumatlm vlna slddham apl sthavare vlsesatas tadadarartham ucyate /
603.
Although the Tncompetency without 
the consent of the others ts settled by 
reason of the co-equallty of owner­
ship, In jo int property, of undivided 
coparceners, s till the same Is here 
particularly mentioned In respect of 
Immovable property for the purpose 
of extolling Its worth. 1
-  -  -  2He specifically refutes Jlmutavahana *s approach to the two texts
of Vyasa which forbid' alienation of Immovable property by a coparcener or a
3father without the consent o f the dayadas. As we have stated before, accord-
-  -  -  4Ing to Jtmutavahana, such an alienation Is only a moral offence and when the
transaction Is made In fact, It cannot be altered despite Its sastrlc prohibition. 
Mltra Mls'ra attacks this seemingly convenient doctrine of factum valet of 
Jlmutavahana by saying that It Is a mistake to assume an ‘ultra-mundane* ob­
ject In a rule of positive law I f  the rule Is directed to seen (drsta) and not to 
unseen (adrsta) objects. He points out the fallacy In Jlmutavahana *s argu­
ment by saying that I f  the rule only amounts to the moral offence of Injuring 
the family, then even In an alienation with consent of a ll the dayadas, the 
objection of distressing the family In the form of committing a moral offence 
would s till arise. His point Is that the ‘unseen* offence relates to scriptural 
law, and no ‘seen* consideration, such as consent, could prevent Its
1. Tr. Golap Sastrl, 87.
2 . D a.bha .ll.27 .
3 . Supra, 6 6 1 - 2 .
4 . Da-bhd. 11.28.
operating I ^
And since I t  Ts unreasonable to assume 
an ultra-mundane object Tn a rule of 
posTtTve law, when there may be a 
vTsTble object, such as facTlTty of proof 
Tn case of dispute: otherwise, even Tn 
case of the consent of cosharers, the ob­
jection of Injuring the family may arise; 
hence the texts would have to be Inter­
preted as referring solely to sin In conse­
quence of Injuring the family, as Is laid 
down In other texts. 2
Mltra MTsra-s rejection of the factum valet concept as a means of 
validation of an otherwise Invalid transaction, Tn effect, confirms his accept­
ance of son's birthright Tn a ll categories of Immovable property. Thus, the 
Mltaksara view on this point was reinforced and Jtmutav&hana's denial of 
son's birthright, though probably Tn the meantime gaining In popularity, was 
held technically unacceptable.
Even among the commentators who apparently belong to the Mltaksara 
school, there Is no unanimity on certain texts. Regional practices might have 
Influenced their Interpretations, and confusion had Increased owing to the bulk 
of the literature. Mltra Mls'ra did not leave these problems untack led. He 
pointed out the difference of opinion between Devanrja-bhatta and Laksmldhara
1. V .M .II.T .2 3 . vyavahara-sastrasya vyavahara-saukaryyadl-drsta-prayojana
sambhave-'drsta-kalpananupapctteh /  anyatha 'numatav apl tadapattel^ kutumba- 
vTro^h<irianya,“vacan° ntiara,"Pra^P°<9 ta dharma-prayojakata-param a s tu /
2 . Tr. Golap Sastrl, 89. The rule not to posit an 'unseen' object when a 'seen' 
object ts possible Is a notorious mTmamsa principle.
<*■
on the text of Sarikha-LTkhTta. The text ordains:
The sons shall not dTvTde the heritage 
while the father Is alive; although 
ownership Is subsequently acquired by 
them, the sons are certainly Incompe­
tent by reason o f the absence of Inde­
pendence In respect of wealth and 
religious duties. 1
The explanation of Devanna-bhatta runs as follows:
‘Although ownership* In the property 
of the father ‘ Is by them1, I .e .  by the 
sons ‘acquired*, I .e .  gained ‘subse­
quently*,^ I .e .  Immediately after 
their birth and not afterwards, s till 
‘while the father Is alive* they shall 
not divide his wealth except at his 
desire, the sons being Incompetent 
to make partition *by reason of the 
absence o f Independence* I.e . by 
reason of their being dependent on 
the father ‘In respect of property and 
religious duties*. 4
1. V .M . I .11 • na jlva tl p ltarl putra rltham bhagjeran /  yady apl svamyam pa£cad- 
adhlgatam talr anarha eva putra artha-dharmayor-asvatantryad I t l  /
2. V . M . I . l l .  Smrtlcandrlka, Gharpure, ed ., 256, supra,5 70,n.i.yady apl talh 
putralh svakTya-janmanah pascad-anantaram eva pltr-dhane svamyam-adhlgatam 
praptam tathapl jlva tl p ltarl tad dhanam tad-lccham vlna na vlbhajerann artha- 
dharmayor asvatantryat pltr-paratantryad vtbhaga-karane ‘narhah putra I t l  /
3 . The word causes d ifficu lty  Into connotation.
4 . Tr. Golap Sastrl, 7 . Smrtlcandrlka, tr . Gharpure, 538, cited supra,6 7 0 -
606.
Mltra MTsra points out the different tnterpratTon of the same text by 
Laksmtdhara, the author of the Krtyaka Ipataru. ^
Although ownership Is subsequently ac­
quired In the wealth’ galned by the sons 
through learning e tc ., without making 
use of the paternal property; s till by 
reason of the absence, during the life ­
time of the father, of their Independ­
ence In respect of property and re li­
gious duties, there Is not (absolute) 
ownership even In the property so ac­
quired — then what ownership can 
there be In the fathers estate? 2
According to Mltra Mlsra, the explanation In the Smrtt-candrlka 
Is preferable. Mltra Mlsra thinks that an Interpretation of sastra must be kept 
close to the text as far as possible, otherwise a cumbersome explanation might 
destroy the force of an argument. Laksmldhara*s Interpretation of Saiikha-
Llkhlta*s text suffers from the defect of Inference of many terms (bhuyah-
-  -  3 4padadhyahara), like Acquired by learning etc.* , whereas Devanna-bhatta*s
1. See Krtyaka Ipataru, Vyavahara-kanda, (Baroda, 1953), 649, with K .V . 
Rangaswaml A|yangarks valuable notes. Mltra Mftra has neatly para­
phrased Laksmldhara*s text. V .M . I .  11. Emphasis alludes to the text 
commented upon, yady apl pascad-adhlgatam pltr-dhana-vyapara-nlra- 
peksalh putraIr vldyddlbhlr upatte dhane svamyam, tathapl tatrapy asvamyam 
jlva tl p lta rl, klmuta pltr-dhane, artha-dharmayos tesam pltarl jlvaty asvatan- 
tryad I t l  /
2* Tr. Golap Sastrl, 7.
3 . V .M . I .26.
4 . V .M . I .11.
5. V .M . I . 11.
interpretation ts better tn the sense that less Inference of terms (alpadhyahara) 
ts necessary.
The Interpretation, however, of the 
term 'birth* (tn the Interpretation gtven 
tn the Smrtlcandrlka) ts not unreasonable, 
because tt presents Itself through the 
suggestion of the terms sons e tc . ,  and 
because of the Importation Is of fewer 
terms • 1
^ 2  3
Mltra Mlsra concludes that the texts of Manu, Narada and Devala ,
which also seemingly deny the right of the son during the survival of a faultless
father, are to be construed as referring only to the lack of Independence of such
a son, but not to absence of his ownership.^
Any commentator In Mltra Mlsra's position would be under cross-fire 
from the two opposing camps,of the Mltaksara and the Dayabhaga. The Dayabhaga 
principles were bound to gain ground In the minds of some people of North India 
who were used to the patrilineal and patriarchal structure of the fam ily. The 
doubts created by the KaIpataru's Interpretation of Sankha-Llkhlta's text demanded 
a statement lest It be taken as support for Jlmutavahana at least In the matter of 
self-acquired property of the father.
1. V .M .I .  26: janma padadhyaharastu putratvadyaksepepasthlteralpadyaharacca 
nayuktah /  tr . Sastrl.
2 . V .M . I . 27.
3 . V .M . I .10.
4 . Kane's observation that Mltra Mlsra disapproves the son's right by birth In his 
father's self-acquired property Is wrong and a misunderstanding of the V lram l- 
trodaya, Notes, Vyavahara Mayukha, ed ., Kane, (Poona, 1926), 125T
As regards the son's right tn property, Mttra Mlsra goes one step
further than VTjnanesvara. The concept of the Mltaksara btrthrtght Ts com-
bTned wtth the notTon of  putratva (sonshTp) whTch TmplTes the prTme and untque
posTtTon of a son who TnherTts as well as beTng charged wtth the dutTes and o b ll-
gatTons of the father after hts death.^ MTtra Mlsra says that ownershtp Tn the
2
father's and grandfather's property Ts caused by putratva rather than by bTrth.
He thought that putratva or sonshTp as a concept was stronger than the birth -  
rTght. A  son could be dTsqualtfTed because of degradatTon or physTcal or 
psychopathTc causes, but hTs ownership of the property of the father and other
ancestors was so Inherent that It would not be affected even by a partition or
* 3reunion.
Mltra MTsra's Importing of the ancient notTon of putratva made It 
easier for the juridical society of North India to swallow the lauklka aspect of 
the son's birthright as envisaged by VIjnanesvara. But we should not overstate 
the Incidents of putratva. Putratva Itself emerges at birth and from birth, a son 
Is endowed with his rights and obligations.
In effect, Mltra Mlsra defended the concept of common ownership be­
tween father and son, and rejected the concept of father's absolute power In 
family property as popularised by Jlmutavahana.
1. See the texts, In this respect, Da .bha .XI .1.31-3.
2 . pltradl-dravya-avamye putratvad, V .M .IV .1 2 .
3 . See Mltra Mlsra on Hdrlta: harltena ca vtbhagottaram apl plta-putrayoh 
paraspara-dhanadhlkara pratlpaidanac ca /  V .M . IV. 12.
X . Vyava hara-mayukha
In Nilakantha Bhatta's Vyavahara-mayukha,  ^ the Mltaksara doctrTne 
of the son's acquisition of ownership by birth has been thoroughly restated.
Nilakantha goes straight Into the problem of origination of ownership.
He defines ownership as a kind of capacity (saktl) which arises from purchase or
2
acceptance, or other means of acquisition. To endorse the lauklka origin of
property, Nilakantha adopts the arguments of Vijnanesvara. He points out that
the means of acquisition, like purchase e tc ., are recognised only by wordly usage
3
because even among the people who are Ignorant of the sastra, the concept of 
ownership is well known. Then following the authors^of  Smrticandrtka and 
Madanaratna, he puts forward the opinion of Bhavanatha, namely, that the con­
cept o f ownership is !oka-*lddha. The means of acquisition which are enumerated
4
in the text of Gautama, are merely compilation and repetition of the sources
5
which were notorious in ordinary worldly life .
Against the traditional orthodox views of Dharesvara and the author of 
the Sarigraha that sons have no ownership during the survival of the father, 
Nilakantha puts forward the text of Gautama ^ on ownership by birth and the
\
1. Composed between 1610-1640 A .D ., Kane, HD, I, 440. Also his ed. 
Vyavahara-mayukha, (Poona, 1926), in trod., xxv i. Derrett, D X , 57.
2 . V y.M a. Kane, 89.
3 . anabhljfianam apl, cp. Vijnanesvara's pamara. loka-slphaiva krayadlnam 
ka ranat5 /  V y . M a.,  92.
4 . Gautama, X .39-42.
5 . Loka-siddha-karananuvadakam /  V y .M a .,  89.
6 . Mlta . 1.1.23. Vy.M a . ,  89.
text of Yajnavalkya (II .121) which enjoins co-extenslve right of father and son 
In the property of the grandfather. Nllakantha points out that the correct 
Interpretation of Yajn .11.121, i Indicates that the cause of accruaI of owner­
ship Is not the death of the grandfather but the birth of the son • Here he brings 
out the fallacy In the Interpretation of commentators like jfmutavahana who 
hold the view that ownership arises at the extinction of ownership of the 
previous owner. ^  Nllakantha says that I f  a view like that of Jtmutavahana 
Is accepted, then a grandson not bom at the time of the death of the grandfather
would not have any ownership In the property of the latter but, In fact, such
2
grandson has ownership In the property of his deceased grandfather.
It cannot be said that this (text) conveys 
that the cause of the ptoductlon of owner­
ship Is the death of the grandfather and 
not the birth of the son, since ( If that 
view were accepted) there would arise 
the unacceptable result that a grandson 
not bom at the death (of the grandfather) 
would have no ownership (In what was 
his grandfather's property). 3
4Nllakair tha shows novelty In his approach to the text of Devala, 
which seems to deny a son any right In property during the survival o f his father.
1. D a .b ha .|.5 .
2 . V y .M a ., 90. na cedam pltamaha-maranasyalva svatvotpattl-hetutvam 
gamayatl na putrotpatteh /  marana-kalenutpanne pautre tad abhavaprasangat /
3 . Tr. Kane and Patwardhan, Vyavahara-mayukha, (Bombay, 1933), 79.
4 . pltayur-uparate putra . . .  See above, ^6*6,n.4; "Dh.K*
He relies more on mlmamsa to bring out the meaning of the text and says that the
first half of the text, the terminal suffix,^ vlbhajeyuh ('should divide*) Is In Its
nature an Injunction or a command. It enjoins a rule (vldht) to the period of
partition. It does not Involve the birthright of a son which Is assumed to be
existing Irrespective of a division. The latter half of the text Is commendatory
2of the time of partition. It gives the reason and so Is a mere arthavada. This
portion Is not to be taken Iltera lly . With the support of this mlmamsa Interpre-
 1—
tatlon. N llakantha  takes the same view as other commentators of the Mltaksara • » * *
\ J
school, that asvamya of a son during a faultless father's survival Is mere depend-
3
ence and not Indicative of his want of ownership .
The first half (of this verse) only enjoins 
the time of partition, as the potential 
termination Is found (In the word vlbha­
jeyuh), while the latter half only com­
mends the time (of partition laid down) 
and Indicates that the sons are depend­
ent, but Is not to be construed as laying 
down absence of ownership (In them dur­
ing the father's lifetim e). 4
1. vldhl-pratyaya: vldhl means Injunction, pratyaya means a termination or 
terminal suffix.
2 . arthavada only recommends a vldhl; see Jalmlnl, 1.2.26-30: hetuvan- 
nlgadadhlkarana/ Llngat, CLI, 153-4.
3 . V y .M a ., 90. tatra purvardham tavad-vlbhaga-kala-vldha^kam v ldh l- 
pratyaya-sravanat uttarardham tu tasyalva stutyarthatayasvatantryaparam na 
tu svatvabhavaparam /
4 . Tr. Kane and Patwardhan, 79.
In the Vyavahara-Mayukha the birthright o f a son has been extended
to a greater degree than In the Mltciksara, In the sense that Vlinanesvar*aIlows
the lather to make gifts of affection of ancestral movables,^ but Nllakandia
2denies this power to the lather In his comment on Yajnavalkya and Inter­
prets the text as allowing the father only the Independence of regulating their 
3use.
That text signifies only this that the 
lather Is Independent only In the matter 
of wearing ear-rings, rings, e tc ., but 
I t  does not signify that the father Is 
Independent as regards the g ift of 
these nor Is I t  meant to exclude the 
birth of a son giving rise to owner­
ship. 4
N il akanHtha does not accept the view that ownership Is not pre­
existent to partition. He takes the view that ownership Is created at birth and 
partition merely manifests the ownership In a particular thing which was already 
In an unrecognised portion.**
1. M lta . 1.1.27.
2 . man! mukta . . .  , Nllakantha takes the words monl mukta pravalanam (gems, 
pearls and corals) as Illustrative of only those movables which do not deterior­
ate by use, V y . M a., ed. V .M . Mandallka, 34, n . l . The same Interpreta­
tion to the text, sthavaram dvlpadam calva . . .  /  For the texts of Y a jn ., see 
above,"340,71.1, Ct4e.d <x6
3. V y .M a .,9 1 . tat-kundalangullyaka-dharanadav eva pltuh svatantrya- 
matrartham, na tu danadau na va putrotpatteh svatva-karanatva nlvrtty artham /
4 . Tr. Kane and Patwardhan, 81.
5 . V y . M a ., 91. purvam-eka-desa-sthltam evotpannam vlbhagena padartha- 
vlsesa-nlsthataya jnapyate /
(Ownership) which previously (to parti­
tion) existed In an Indeterminate portion 
(of the things jo in tly  owned) Is made 
known by partition as subsisting In de fi­
nite things. 1
According to Nllakantha, a son could demand a partition of grand-
parental property against the w ill of his father. It Is clear from his comment 
2
on Brhaspatl's text, that In grandparental property the son's birthright was 
3
fu lly  operative.
The meaning Is that It follows as a matter 
of course that they (sons) can claim parti­
tion even against his (father's) w il l of 
what was acquired by their grandfather 
and the like . 4
Nllakantha accepted In broad terms the son's birthright over the
father's self-acquisitions, but could not allow a son the unilateral power to
demand a partition of self-acquired property and constructive self-acquired 
5property against the w ill of his father because, unlike Vljnanesvara, the 
Incident of community of acquisition and common ownership between father 
and son had to recede Into the background to make way for practical purposes
1. T*. Kane and Patwardhan, 81.
2. kramagate grha-ksetre . . .  , V y . M a ., 95; Br. quoted above,3 3 2 , T>h*K-H8ob
3. Vy .  M a ., 95. arthat pltamahady arjlte tad anlcchayap! vlbhaga7ha Ity 
arthah.
4 . Tr. Kane and Patwardhan, 88. Ancestral lands recovered by the father's own 
power, see next note, also Brhaspatl cited by Nlllakantha Immediately after 
Manu/Vlsnu.
5 . See Nllakantha on Manu, IX . 209; Vlsnu, X V III, 43; V y. M a ., 95.
614.
tn the patriarchal and patrilineal family of Northern India. Nllakantha's 
modesty In withholding this power of demanding partition of self-acquired pro­
perty Is noteworthy. He would, however, allow such partition If  the father 
becomes disqualified to manage the estate by disease, etc.
Nllakanfha defines daya as partible wealth which Is not reunited
(asamsrsta) and which Is not brought together Into common stock for the sake
of gain and the like . The definition Is different from Vl|nanesvara%s, but
his classification of daya Into apratlbandha and sapratlbandha has been retained
by Nllakantha and his explanation of apratlbandha daya Indicates In unambiguous
2
terms the existence of the son's birthright In paternal property.
But where ownership accrues to sons and 
the like solely by relationship to the 
owner Independently o f any other means 
(source) o f acquiring wealth, that Is 
apratlbandha daya, for example, the 
father's wealth. 3
X I . The Birthright In Sulapaql's D lp a llk a / Dlpakallka
In course of time, the denial of the son's birthright by Jlmutavahana 
In his Dayabhaga became as highly regarded as I f  I t  was the representative view
1 . asamsrstam vlbhajanlyam dhanam dayah / labhady artha-samsrsta-dhana-
vyavrttayesamsrstam It! /  V y . M a. ,  93.
2 . V y . M a., 93. yattu svaml-sambandhad eva putrader dhanarjanopayantara
nlrapeksatvat svatvam bhavatl so'pratjbandhah /  yatha pltr-dhanam /
^ . Tr. Kane and Patwardhan, 86.
of the sastrlns of  Bengal, laying down the law of the region; but It has been more
-  ]or less overlooked that three centuries later Sulapanl, the most authoritative
-  -  -  x -  2writer next to Jlmutavahana on dharmasastra, did not speak with the same voice.
His work, Dlpallka, a commentary on the Yajnavalkya-smrtl has been consplcu-
3ously Ignored by subsequent Bengali jurists, like Raghunandana and Sri Krsna.
The Importance of this short commentary lies In the fact that the author's Bengali
origin and the pervading shadow of the Dayabhaga doctrine In no way dim his 
4
originality of mind.
On this point of a son's common ownership with his father In grand-
parental property, Sulapanl significantly arrived at conclusions which were more
akin to VlsVarupa's than those of his Illustrious Bengali forerunner, Sulapanl did
not view the texts through the rules of  mlmamsa , nor did he resort to accepted
 5
techniques of Interpretation, like adhyahara, but he relied on the plain mean­
ing of the text and, where relevant, reinforced Yajnavalkya's utterances with 
those of the other smrtlkaras.
With this closeness of approach to the sastra, Sulapanl accepted the 
son's right by birth In grandparental property as ordained by Yajnavalkya. ^
1. A .D . 1375-1460: Kane, HD, I, 396.
2. Kane, ib id ., 393. S ignificantly, Sulapanl does not make any reference to 
Jlmutavahana In his Dlpallka .
✓ _
3. On Raghunandana and Sri Krsna, In fra ,618—2 4  •
4 . He has made copious references to the Mltaksara, but has not b lindly followed It, 
J.R. Ghflrpure, The Yajnavalkyasmrtl and the Mltaksara, The Collection of Hindu 
Law Texts, (Bombay, 1944), xx lx , Introd., 63.
5 . As used by Jlmutavahana, D a .b h a .,II.29. 6 . Yajn. 11.121.
He does not seem to have said anything on the restriction of a father's power 
of alienation, nor has he commented on the text o f Gautama  ^ on acquisition 
o f property by b irth, but his opinion Is quite clear that In grand parental pro­
perty, a son's ownership Is co-extenslve with his father. On his comment on
-  ~ 2 3Yajnavalkya, he says: "In these, I.e . land, e tc . ,  the ownership of the
father and the son Is equal. In such property, there can be no partition at
4
the w ill of the father and the shares of the father and the son are equal” .
Since In grandparental property, father's and son's ownership Is co­
equal, there cannot be a partition of such property merely at the father's vo li­
tion, but according to the commentator, a partition w ill take place probably 
on mutual agreement by the father and son. But when such partition of grand- 
parental property takes place, a son's birthright Is guarded In the sense that the
father's share w ill be equal to that of the son, and a father cannot play an arb l-
5
trary role with regard to partition. "(In regard to grandparental property)
1. M lta .I.1 .23 .
2 . YajrT.11.121 , D lpallka, 11.122, J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, II, 551y In 
Gharpure *s edn. (1939), V .12]  (55).
3 . J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, II, 551. esu bhumyadlsu pltuh putras ya ca tulyam 
svamyam /  atra pltrlcchaya na vlbhago'mso *p! sama eva /
4 . Tr. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, 11, 554. Gharpure reads atah putrecchaya vlbhago 
'mso *pl sama eva ('Consequently, at the w ill £ option] of the son a partition, 
that Is to say, the share £ of eachj Is Invariably equal'). Ghdfrpure had the 
earlier edition before him and three manuscripts Including one very superior one.
His reading Is preferable -  but the meaning, from our point of view Is the same:
a son can demand partition and an equal share In ancestral assets.
5 . Sulapanl on Yajn. 11.114, D lpallka, II, 115, J.C. Ghose, Hindu Law, 11,_ 550; 
Gharpure, edn., V . 114 (54). Sulapanl also quotes Vlsnu, XVI1.2: "paltamahe
tu pltaputrayos tulyam svamltvam, svecchaya na vlbhagah” , I t l atrasvamyam hetub/
617.
there cannot be partition In any way the lather likes, because of hTs want of 
complete ownership." ^
The point Is this, that sons have ownership In the ancestral assets,
not In self-acquired property, but Sulapanl goes on to quote Narada that sons
can Initiate (and perhaps enforce?) a partition of the fathers self-acquired
property when the mother Is past child-bearing, the sisters married o ff, and the
father w ill beget no more Issue. According to Sulapanl, the father's dominance
2
Is (this last apart) complete In his self-acqulsltlons. His view stands midway 
between the views expressed In the Dayabhaga and In the Mltaksara. Jlmuta­
vahana considered both grandparental property and self-acquired property of 
the father as the father's property, but according to Vljnanesvara, with the
exception of slight concessions to the father In the form of expenses for family
3 4necessity, basically the son's birthright was all-pervadlng. But Sulapanl's
position In the Dlpallka Is equidistant from these two extremes and casts doubt
on the popular be lie f that Jlmutavahana was stating the right law with regard
5
to the son's birthright In grandparental property prevalent In Bengal.
1. Tr. J .C . Ghose, Hindu Law, II, 542. The reading asvamyam (above) Is 
not adopted by Gharpure, but because of the text o f Devala that follows,
It  Is d ifficu lt to say that Ghose's reading was not correct.
2. Sulapanl, on Y a jn .II.114.
3. M lta .l.1 .2 9 .
4 . M lta.1.1.27.
5. Gharpure, op. c l t . ,  In trod., 63. S lignlflcantly and boldly, Sures Chandra 
Banerjee says: 'Sulapanl has very clearly and ably given us an exposition of 
the then current legal system with a thorough grasp of the subject m a tte r '^  
'Sulapanl*, New Indian Antiquary, May, (1942), V o l.5 , N o .2, 31-5 at 32.
XII .  Raghunandana*s Dayatattva
Jlmutavahana's rejection o f a son's right by birth found support Tn the
writings of later commentators tn Bengal. The foremost among these jurists was
Raghunandana.^ From his acceptance of Jlmutavahana's definition of daya, It
Is apparent that Raghunandana upholds the theory that son's right arises after the
2
extinction of the right o f the father at his demise.
3
Gautama's text on a son's right by birth has been approached by
Raghunandana from an angle opposite to that set forth In the Mltaksara. He
accepts birth as a major criterion which endows the son with sonshlp, but It
does not cretate ownership In the son as soon as he Is born. Birth creates In
the son the most Important relationship with his father In the sense that at the
4
demise of a father, his son excludes a ll other relatives from the Inheritance.
As regards the text of Gautama cited 
In the Mltaksara: 'the teachers say 
that ownership accrues by b irth ', the 
meaning of It Is that on the cessation 
of the father's right, on account of
1. Literary ac tiv ity  between 1520 and 1570A .D ., Kane, HD, I, 419.
Derrett, DJL, 56, n.358.
2 . D.T.1.5; J .C .  Ghose, Hindu Law, III, 259, Setlur, II, 469.
3 . M lta .|. | .2 3 .
4 . Text, J.C. Ghose, III, 259. yat tu mltaksarayam 'utpatty alvartham svamltval 
labheta Ity acaryah* I t l  gautama-vacanam, tad apl pltT-svatvoparame 'hgajatva- 
heiutvenotpattl-matra-sambandhenananyasambandhadhlkena janaka-dhane 
putranam svamltvad dhanam putro labheta nanya-sambandhltyacarya manyante/ 
na ca pltr-svatve vtdyamane *p! janmana tad-dhane putra-svatvam I t l  vacyam, 
devala-vacana-vlrodhat /
the cause of being born of the body, by 
vtrtue of the sole reason of birth, the 
relationship being superior to that of 
others, there being the ownership of 
the sons in the wealth of the father, 
the son succeeds and no other rela­
tion: this is the intention of the 
teachers.
It should not be said that even during 
the continuance of the father's right, 
the sons have ownership in his wealth 
by birth as that is inconsistent with 
the text of Devala. 1
Raghunandana has based his interpretation mainly on the literal mean-
2 3 . 4
ing of texts of Baudhayana, Devala and Narada. By his avoidance of the
text of Yainavalkya (11.121), on the point of son's right by birth, his arguments
suffer from the weakness of onesidedness. Raghunandana does not question the
-  5authenticity of the text of Gautama which is cited in the Mttak$ara, which 
proves that he might have had knowledge of the text alleged to be Gautama's.
If he had no pre-conceived notion about the son's birthright, why did he take 
three ^ texts litera lly and set out to explore the intentions of the sages in the
1. TR . J .C . Ghose, III, 233.
2. satsangajesu tadgami hyartho bhavati: Baudhayana, 1.5.11.11. D.T. 1.6.
3. pitayur-uparate putrah . . .  , D.T. I . 8 j  t>h.k.H56.
4 . Narada, XI11.3; D.T. 1.9;T>h.K.II52..
5. M tta . l. i.2 3 .
6 . Baudhayana, Devala and Narada, see ns. 2 ,3 ,4 above.
text of Gautama? Raghunandana knew that birth was a potent factor Tn the 
ownership of property, but Jimutavahana's regional popularity and popular prac 
tice in Bengal influenced the manipulation of the sastra by the jurist. The 
wavering of Raghunandana is discernible while he brings out the importance 
of birth as the origin of the son's right, which becomes operational only at the 
demise of the father. Here Raghunandana, though not giving categorical 
acceptance, yet, in effect, is talking about the dormant right o f a son Tn the 
property of his father -  the cause of this right being his birth.^
Thus in the text of Devala, i t  being de­
clared that the sons have no ownership 
in the lifetime of the father, the text 
of Gautama: The teachers say that 
ownership accrues by b irth ' means that 
after the cessation of the father's right 
the son's right accrues by reason of 
birth and he obtains the property by 
ownership, and not after birth during 2 
the continuance of the father's right.
Jimutavahana in his Dayabhaga probably overstated his case. He 
took both ancestral property and paternal property as father's property. 
Raghunandana accepted the distinction between grandfather's property and 
father's self-acquired property. According to Raghunandana, a father's power 
was not absolute even when he was separating his sons at his own w il l .  He
1. Text, J .C . Ghose, III, 259-60. tasmat devala-vacane pitari vidyamane tad- 
dhane putranam asvamya-sruter utpattyevartham svamitval labheta ityacaryah 
i t i  gautama-vacanam pitr-svatvoparamantaram eva janmana putra-svatva- 
sampadanat svamitvena tad-dhane putro labhetety etatparam, na tu p itr- 
svatva-kale janmanantaram/
2. Tr. J .C . Ghose, III, 233.
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could take the decision unilaterally to make a partition among hts sons, but the
manner of distribution dTd not depend on hts personal w il l .  Raghunandana
follows the text of Vtsnu,  ^ whtch forbids a father to make an unequal dtstrt-
butTon of grandparental property among hts sons. This was also the case for
2
a father's self-acqutred property, unless there were special grounds to dis­
criminate between his sons.
3
Raghuhandana also envisaged a situation where a ll the sons unani­
mously could request the father to divide the property. On this problem, he 
has cited a text of Manu which ordains: " I f  the undivided brothers do, with
one accord, desire partition, then the father shall, on no account, make an 
4
unequal distribution” .
5
The citation and the comment show that Raghunandana accepted 
the rule that even tn the distribution of self-acqutred property o f the father, 
hts w ill was not the determining factor. A  son's right was manifested tn the 
form of an entitlement to an equal share even tn hts father's self-acqulsltlons. 
This may not be considered equivalent to a birthright, but such a substantive 
right of an equal share definite ly stems from birth though Jlmutavahana or
1. Vtsnu, XVI 1.1; D .T . 11.3, Dh.K.1175.
2 . Existence or absence of f i l ia l piety of a large^ family, o f 'Inability* and the 
like (of any son): bhaktatva-bahu-posyatva ksamatvadl: Raghunandana on 
Katyayana, D .T .II .4 . Ghose, 111, 262.
3; It might have been tn practice tn Bengal.
4 . Not found tn the Institute of Manu; D .T . 11.6; Setlur, I t . ,  II. 474.
5. D .T . 11.6.
Raghunandana would not, at least theoretically, admit I t .
Despite hts btas towards uparama -svatvavada, the jurist was conscious 
that he was Incapable of laying down a uniform code of devolution or ownership 
o f property for the whole of Hindu society In India. He was aware that the law 
regarding the partition of  daya could vary according to diversity of class, trade, 
custom or religion, and thus, Indirectly, the va lid ity of other Interpretations of
r- /v- 2the sastra, such as Vljnanesvara*s, was upheld.
Katyayana cited In the Kalpataru and 
the Ratnakara thus lays down that there 
may be different rules of partition In 
different countries: The rules of suc­
cession should be according to the 
customs of a country, of a caste, of 
an assembly of artisans or of a village*,
Bhrgu says, *ls understood. 3
X III. Srlkrsna Tarkalankara*s Daya-kygma-sangraha
Srlkrsna Tarkalarikara*s Daya-kvama-sarigraha Is mainly an elabora­
tion of the Dayabhaga of Jlmutavahana. The author kept his concept of b lrth -
1. Raghunandana follows Jlmutavahana on Y a jn .II. 121, and Vlsnu,
XVII .2, and does not take the texts lite ra lly , D .T . 11.20-1. Da.bha.
I I .9. Y a jn . I I .121 and Vlsnu, X V II.2  quoted above,3 3 3 3 2 - j11-*2.-
2 . Text, J .C . Ghose, III, .261. desadlbhedenapl vlbhagam aha kalpataru- 
ratnakarayo katyayanah, desas^a jateh sanghasya dharmo gramasya yo bhrguh /  
udltah syat sa tenalva daya-bhagam prakalpayet f f  bhrgur ahetl sesah /
3 . Tr. J .C . Ghose, III, 236.
4 . A  work of the middle of the 18th century.
rTght untouched Tn thts work, but elsewhere he commented on the text of 
Gautama on birthright as amula (not original).^
He takes Yajnavalkya's text (11.121) on common ownership Tn ances­
tral property between father and son as merely Intended to restrain the father's 
w ill against an unequal distribution of Immovable property among his sons.
But at the same time, Srlkrsna expresses his opinion that during the lifetime
2
of the father a son's ownership cannot exist.
For (although contrary to the received 
opinion of equal ownership between 
father and son) It  Is Impossible that,
as long as the father, the owner of the ,
ancestral property, continues to survive,^ 
his sons should have ownership therein.
The restriction on father's w ill regarding distribution of property was
4
not applicable Tn cases of ancestral movables.
Srlkrsna Is also of the opinion (following Jlmutavahana on the point)
that sons should have no right to demand partition during the survival of the mother,
5
although ownership Is vested In the son after the demise of the father.
1. Srlkrsna on Da.bha.1.19; Stokes, Hindu Law Texts, (Madras, 1865), 187, n.19.
2 . D .K .S ., V I. 18; J.C . Ghose, III, 459. satl pltamaha-dhana-svamlnl pltarl 
tat-putranam pltamaha-dhana-svamltvaprasakter yathasrutarthabadhat /
3. Tr. J .C . Ghose, III, 418. Setlur, II, 145.
4 . D .K .S ., V I. 19.
5. Srlkrsna on Manu, IX, 104, D *K .S ., V II . 1.W W W  •
With regard to ancestral Immovables, when the father dectded to 
divide the property among hts sons, he was obliged to make an equal d istri­
bution among them , but this Injunction by Itself does not prove the existence
Ya , _
of son's right by b irth . The Daya-k/ma-sangraha clearly shows that Srlkrsna, 
like Jlmutavahana, did not recognise the birthright of sons.
X IV . The navya-nyaya school and the concept of son's right by birth
A major Intellectual event during the 17th century was the flourishing
of the Bengali logicians (navya-nyaya; or the New School of Logic),  ^ who were
extremely we 11-versed In the sources of law and for our purpose, applied their
minds to the tangled webs of the popular conflict between the advocates of
janma-svatvavada and uparama-svatvavada. The literature Is mostly In
2
manuscript, much of It s till unexplored, but two works of Importance In our
3
present context have been brought to light by Derrett.
1. The movement started as early as the 13th century with Gangesa In 
M lth lla , and was given a new f l l ltp  In Bengal by Raghunatha Slromanl 
(1475-1550 A .D .) . See D .H .H . Ingalls, Materials for the Study of 
Navya-nyaya Logic, (H .U .P ., 1951), 1, 4, 9.
2 . Derrett, 'An Indian Contribution to the Study of Property', BSOAS 18/3 
(1956), 475-98 at 477, n .3 .
3 . 'An Indian Contribution to the Study of Property', BSOAS^ 1956 X V II1/3, 
475-98 and *Svatva-Rahasyam: a 17th Century Contribution to Logic and 
Law*, Annals of Oriental Research, Centenary Volume, Madras, 42-8.
One of these works Ts Svatva-vlcara  ^ (a discussion of Property), 
which deals with the theory of Property and throws light on the concept o f the 
son's right by b irth . Whether father's death or son's birth be the cause of 
property was a question as controversial and puzzling to the logicians as to 
the jurists. If a faultlessfather Is the absolute owner of property then joint 
ownership with his son Is Inconceivable and the existence of the son's birthright
Is Illog ica l. On the other hand, I f  a son acquires a right In his father's pro-
/
perty as soon as he Is bom (or rather conceived), then the father's death cannot 
be the cause of property. This Interesting and debatable point naturally 
attracted the talents of the navya-nalyaytkas and expressions to that effect 
are found In the f^ /atva -v lcara.
The logician starts with the enumeration of the traditional causes of
2
property: (1) purchase, (11) acceptance, (111) the predecessor's death, his em­
bracing the order of ascetics, or his fa ll,  and (tv) finding an abandoned object.
According to the category of property, the opinions of the commenta­
tors have differed with regard to a son's right by birth. Broadly, there are two 
main views. Onei/tew ^ Is that a son acquires a right by birth In the ancestral,
1. Text published: Derrett, The Anonymous Svatva-vlcara: A  Legal Study by a 
Seventeenth Century Logician*, Charu Deva Shastrl Felicitation Volume, 
(Benarasgj 1974), 605-11; rp t. Essays, I, 358-64. The author was probably 
a Bengali, but there are possibilities that he could have been a M atthlla.
The date of the work could most like ly be the first-quarter of the seventeenth 
century; Derrett, BSOAS, 18/3 (1956), 478.
2 . S v a .v t.ll. It Is significant that causes of property, such as partition and 
seizure In Gautama's dictum (Gautama, X .39-42) are absent here.
3 . As Vtjnanesvara's In the Mltaksara, 1.1.27.
as well as tn the self-acqutred property of the father. The other vtew ts that 
so long as the faultless father lives, hts sons have no ownershtp etther tn ances­
tral or tn paternal estate. ^  There existed a third vtew midway between the 
Dayabhaga and the Mltaksara doctrine, namely, that the death of the father 
produces property tn the son only Insofar as the father's self-acqutstttons are
concerned; but tn grandparental property, by authority of the scriptural text
2 3(Yajn.11.121), a son acquires property (svatva) from the moment of his b irth .
-  4In the Svatva-vlcara the doctrines of janma-svatvavada and uparama-
svatvayada have been put to the test of logic under the guise of arguments between
an Imaginary objector and an Imaginary opponent representing and advocating each
doctrine. The supporters of ja n ma -s va t vaopine that In grandparental property,
ownership Is created In the son during his father's lifetime because this has been
5
ordained by Yajnavalkya. This then explains the rule that a son may compel 
his father to divide the assets of his grandfather.^
Moreover, the necessity for the consent of a son to the alienation of 
the grandparental estate ^  by a father also proves the son's property In that
1. Da.bha.1.19.
2 . See above, 3 3 !, n .i.
3 . S va .v l.lV .2 .
4 . S va*v!.IV .2 .
5. Y 5 jn . ll.  121.
6. M lta . | .v .5 . ,  but denied In Da.bha. 11.7 -8 .
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estate durtng the survival of the father. Then the author deals wtth the notton 
that property artstng Tn the successor excludes or obstructs the property of the 
predecessor. The advocates of  janma-svatva suggests that betng jotnt owners 
of grandparental estate, a father and son do not stand towards each other as 
obstructed and obstructor, whtch Ts possible Tn the case of a vendor and vendee 
or donor and donee. There Ts a dTfference between property passTng by descent 
and property passTng by voluntary transfer. The sTtuatTon of obstructed and ob­
structor between father and son has been falsTfTed by posTtTng an analogy wTth 
the exTstence of common property between husband and wTfe. A  text supposed 
to be Tn the Veda (but certaTnly accepted as genuTne by BengalT and other |urTsts) 
ordaTns that *wealth Ts common between spouses' (dampatyor madhyagam dhanam).^ 
If joTnt owners, as Tn the case of husband and w ife, would stand mutually as ob­
structed and obstructor wTth regard to property, then the text would be meanTng- 
less and the wTfe's joTnt acquTsTtTon of husband's property would not have been 
sanctToned Tn the srutT. From thTs, by analogy, a concIusTon could be drawn that 
a son also can acquTre a rTght by bTrth as a co-owner wTth hTs father Tn the estate
of the grandfather; and the son's joTnt ownershTp wTlI not obstruct the ownershTp 
2
of the father. Moreover, a son may take hTs father's (self-acquTred) property
1. The VedTc orTgTn of the text has been doubted by Derrett, BSOAS, 18/3 
(1956), 490, n .4 . But Sabara-svamT, SuIapanT, Raghunandana knew Tt; 
also Kulluka notes dampatyor aTkyam on Manu, IX .45. That the dhana of 
spouses Ts sadharaoa Ts stated by MedhatTthT on Manu, V II I .  163 (cf. 111.202) 
Devanna-bhatta, S.C. (Mysore edn.), 654. Also see Derrett, ZVR, 64 
(1962),’ 62-4.**
2 « Sva.vT., IV .2.
by gtft or sale,  ^ and Tt Ts not supposed to be the rule that a son takes hts 
fathers property only by successton. So the death of the father or grand­
father cannot be the real cause of property Tn the son.
Then the author affects to show the logTcal TncongruTty of the above
arguments through the TmagTnary objector. He says, ’’not so, for the property
2
of one person obstructs the property of another” . The objector does not accept 
the concept o f joTnt ownershTp of father and son. HTs own defTnTtTon of property 
Ts not wTde enough to Tnclude a co-exTstence of rTghts amountTng to property wTth- 
Tn a group whose tTtles arose Tndependently. He holdsthe vTew that at the grand­
fathers death, hTs property passes to the father and at the father's death, the
3
property devolves on the son. That means father's and son's ownershTp can­
not co-exTst: "so to put Tt shortly, the cause (of the son's successTon) operates
4
through the non-exTstence of anythTng characterTzed by hTs father's property".
Next, he poTnts out the TlIogTcalTty of the Tdea that a wTfe Ts co-owner 
wTth the husband. If we accept the vTew that wTfe's property Ts created durTng 
the exTstence of her husband, then son's property also can be created durTng the 
survTva! of the father. But the naTyayTka poTnts out the fallacy Tn the premTse.
He says that Tn fact, wTfe's property Tn the husband's estate Ts never created at
1. WTthout prejudTce to the general rule that only dTvTded relatTons may take 
transfers Tnter se (of the sastra's provTsTons as to TndTcTa of  partTtTon).
2 . Sva.vT., IV .4 . See Jagannatha, VTvadabhangarnava, Colebrooke, (London, 
1801), II, 520.
3 . VTew of JTmutavahana, Da’.bha. III.T .19.
4 . Sva. vT., IV .4; T.e. the son succeeds because there exTsts, on the father's 
death, nothTng Tn whTch the father's property Tnheres.
a ll J  If a wtfe ts a co-owner wtth her husband tn a real sense, then after the 
death of the husband, as long as the mother survtves, the son's property would 
not come tnto extstence. But tn fact, the son excludes the wtdow as an tnhert 
tor, and a homologatton of texts places a son before the wtdow tn order of suc­
cesston. He does not deny that females have property tn strtdhana, but, wtth
an extreme vtew, concludes that even the strtdhana belongs to the husband be-
2
cause he "has property tn the females themselves". So the analogtcal
1. S va .v t., IV .5.
2. S va .vt., IV .5. Seems to be Itteral acceptance of Manu, V II I .  4 ]6 , text 
quoted above, 427, tj-Z . Even Jtmutavahana dtd not go to thts extreme, 
Da.bha. 1.16. On the tmpltcatton of Manu, V III, 416, Kane, HD, III, 771. 
Ltteral meantng exploded by Jatmtnt, V I, 1 .10-16. Also see Derrett, ZVR,
64 (1962) 30, 98-9. Also our dtscusston, supra, 4X7-"3 S' - Srlkrsna on 
Sulapant's Sraddha-vtveka, (Calcutta, 1939), 124 potnts out that tn the text 
dampatyor madhyagam dhanam, the word dhanam refers to the husband's and 
not the wife's estate, for the husband ts not the owner of her saudaytka assets, 
Derrett, BSOAS, 1956, X V III/3 , 479, n .2 . The author of the Svatva-rahasya 
takes thts text as merely gtvtng authortty to the wtfe to make certatn uses of 
her husband's property, Derrett, A .O .R . Centenary Number, 42-8 at 45. 
However, sale of a w tfe, though deprecated, was not tnconcetvable. 
Jtmutavahana, Vyavahara-matrka, ed ., A . Mookerjee, 285. Derrett, 
Dharmasastra . . .  , (1973), 20 ,reveals that sale of a wtfe was a stn (not 
necessartly votd) tn sptte of Manu's deprecation at IX .46 (and see XI .621)
to thts effect. A vyavastha a lso throws Itght on thts: One Sarikaradasa 
sold hts wtfe Raghuvamst to Ramacarana for forty rupees, cash or an under­
taking of debt (tamasuka) by Ramacarana for fifty  rupees. The pandits opined 
that sale of a wtfe wasiastra-vtruddha but tn fact, t t  happened. However, t f  
a person does anything which ts s astra-vtruddha, the Ktng can punish, Strt- 
vandhaker vyavastha, 1st of May, 1827, Sadar Ntzamat Adalat (from the Court 
of Ajtmabad, West India), S. Jha, ed ., Dharmasastrtya Vyavastha Sangraha, 
(Allahabad, 1957), 114.
630.
establishment of jotnt ownershTp between father and son on the basts o f the 
Tdea of jotnt ownershtp of husband and wtfe does not stand the test of logtc.
Then the author enumerates the causes of exttnctton of property, 
namely:- (t) death; (tt) embractng the order of ascettcs; (TTT) 'fa l l ';  (Tv) 
destructton of the object tn whtch property tnhered; (v) reltnqutshment;
(vt) sale; and (vtt) lapse of a spectftc pertod. Death of the predecessor 
betng the cause of exttnctton tmpltes the cause of creatTon of property tn the 
successor. So tn the ulttmate analysts, btrth ts not accepted as a cause of 
property.
The other work Svatva-rahasyam  ^ ( ' The Secret of P rop e rtya jso
deals wtth the cause of property. The author devotes Chapter III to the Tnvestt-
gatton of Itfe as a general cause of property. The tnterpretatton of Gautama's 
2
dtctum, "wealth ts taken by btrth alone", shows hts rejectton of son's rtght by
btrth. Accordtng to htm, the text "refers to the btrth of chtldren to slaves
and cattle and not to property betng produced by the btrth of sons, e tc. tn 
3
themselves".
1. The work ts anonymous. No tnternal evtdence avatlable for dattng the work, 
but the author was later than Vtjnanesvara, VacaspatT MTsra, Jtmutavahana, 
Kamalakara and almost certatnly, later than MTtra MTsra. The work has been 
tentattvely dated 1600-1610 A .D . , but most probably the author was Gadad- 
hara, 1650-1690 A .D ., Derrett, *Svatva-rahasyam: a Seventeenth Century 
Contribution to Logtc and Law', A .O .R ., Centenary Number, 42-48 at 45.
It ts open to doubt that the authon could be Mathuranatha, Derrett, BSOAS, 
18/3 (1956), 479, n .4 . On Mathuranatha, (1600-1675), see Ingalls, o p .c tt., 
20-5.
2 . MTta. I . t.2 3 .
3 . S v a .ra . ll l .
In Chapter IV, the author's vtew becomes more eloquent and he cate­
gorically states that "sons have no right In their father's property during his life ­
time” J
From a purely Juristic angle, the navya-nyaya view on birthright may 
be considered by some as the hyper-realism of logicians, but as a rational ana­
lysis of different Interpretations of the sastra, by Unking logic with practical 
legal problems, It Is as equally Important as the doctrine of the mlmamsa.
These seventeenth century logicians In their own ways gave Intellectual support 
to the Dayabhaga doctrine of Jlmutavahana and gave It a new stimulus among the 
sastrlns of Bengal.
1. Derrett, A .O .R . Centenary Number, lo c .c lt . ,  45. Cp. the view o f^  
Anantarama, author (?) of a Svatva-vlcara. Anantardma (later than Sri 
Krsna Tarkalankara, c . 1750) believed that property In a father's estate was 
obtained by birth (f.lOb) , MS, I .O . l278b=Egg. 1530, cited by Derrett, 
'An Indian Contribution to the Study of Property*, BSOAS, 18/3 (1956), 
475-98 at 478, n .9 .
CHAPTER 15.
JURIDICAL COMPILATION UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF THE BRITISH
I . Treatment of Son's Right by Btrth tn the Vlvadarnava-setu (The Code of 
Gen too Laws)
From the potnt of vtew of Individual effort or tnsptrattons from the 
Htndu ktngs to comptle digests, the etghteenth century was a pertod of deca­
dence tn lastrtc learning. But towards the oud of the century, a new chapter 
opened tn Htndu legal history.
The East Indta Company acqutred the dtvant (ctvtl admtntstratton) of
Bengal, Bthar, and Ortssa tn 1765 and tn 1772 dectded to a dmtntster justice
relattng to the sutts belween *Gentoos* on tnherttance e tc ., accordtng to the laws
of the 'ShasterO From the existence of the provinces of Bthar and Ortssa tn the
Company's dtvant and also because of the Inclusion tn the Plan of the 'suits re- 
2
gardtng Inheritance', tt was obvtous that cases Involving the concept of son's 
right by btrth would also come before the British judges. A t the In itia l stage,
1. Warren Hasttng's Plan for the Administration of Justice Extracted from the Pro­
ceedings of the Committee of C ircuit (Cosslmbazar) 15 August 1772, being 
pp. 13-25 of Extract of a Letter from the Governor and Council a t Fort William 
to the Court of Directors, 3 November 1772, Regulation II of 1772, s .27.
See Derrett, *The Administration of Hindu Law by the British*, Comp.Studies 
In Society and History, 4 (1961)^ 11-52 at 24ff. Also RLSI, 229-33.
2 . 'Inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages of Institutions', s.27, 
Regn .11 of 1772.
the judges themselves were Ignorant o f the sastra and they had to re ly on the
vyavasthas  ^ of the pandits. But thts system proved to be unsatTsfactory, and
2
somettmes Issues were decided differently from case to case, and even the In-
3teglrty of the pandits In Issuing vyavasthas was doubtful.
The search for certainty and search for justice led to the search for
the sastra, and In May 1773, eleven pandits were appointed to compile a digest
4 -  -  5of Hindu law. They finished the work, Vlvadarnava-setu (*brldge across
1. Opinions of pandits on the sastra: Cp. responsa prudentlum. Cp. In Rome 
the priest consulted on a question of law Issued responsum. Such a responsum 
was considered binding, even on Roman Magistrates, J.P. Dawson, The 
Oracles of Law, (Ann Arbor, The University o f Michigan Law School, 1968),
TOT. Also cp. the role o f the Roman jurisconsults, who advised the praetor 
and the judge, but had no legislative or judicial responsibility, J .H . Merryman, 
The C iv il Law Tradition, (Stanford, 1969), 60. Also the Rabbinical opinions In 
Jewish law, the responsa (‘replies*, or juridical ‘opinions J, Z .W . Falk, ‘Jewish 
Law‘ , o p .c lt., 3T.
2. Halhed, The Code of Gentoo Laws, (London, 1776), 5 .
3 . Sir William Jones , although an admirer of Hindu law, could not ‘with an easy 
conscience concur In a decision merely on the written opinion of native lawyers,
In causes In which they could have the remotest Interest In misleading the Court*, 
Lord Telgnmouth (Sir John Shore), Memoirs of the L ife , Writings and Correspond- 
ence of Sir William Jones, (London, 1835), II, 43. W .H . Macnaghten, regl- 
strar of the Sadr Dlwanl Adalat In Bengal from 1822-30, saw pandits as *venal‘ , 
W .H . Macnaghten, Principles and Precedents of Hindu Law Being a Compilation 
of Primary Rules Relative to the Doctrine of Inheritance, Contracts and Miscel­
laneous Subjects, (Calcutta, 1829), Iv . RLSI, 239. The French experiment of 
settling disputes within the framework of the sastra, was a success to a certain 
extent, Leon Sorg, Avis du Comlte Consultatlf de Jurisprudence lndlenne,(|Pondl- 
cherry, 18231 Also mentioned by Joseph Mlnattur, Justice In Pondicherry, 1701 
to 1968, ILI, New Delhi, (Bombay, 1973), 15-16.
4 . Halhed, The Code of Gentoo Laws, or Ordinations of the Pandits, (London, 1776), 
Preface, x . RLSI, 239-40.
5 . Soon afterwards acquired the tit le , Vlvadanjava-bhanjana (*breakwater to the 
ocean of litigation*).
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the ocean of IttTgatTon'), by the end of February 1775.  ^ The views expressed
Tn the Code matnly conform to those Tn the Dayabhaga but the MTthTla vTews
2
are also superTmposed where appltcable.
Halhed wrttes Tn the translators* preface to the Code,
these laws also strongly elucTdate the Story 
of the ProdTgal Son Tn the ScrTptures; 
sTnce Tt appears from hence to have been 
an TmmemorTal custom Tn the East, for sons 
to demand theTr PortTon of InherTtance dur­
Tng theTr father's iTfetTme, and that the 
Parent, however aware of the dTssTpated 
InclTnatTons of hTs chTld, could not legally 
refuse to comply wTth the ApplTcatTon. 3
If the word *East* Tn thTs passage Tncludes Bengal, then defTnTtely Halhed Ts 
poTntTng to a custom Tn that provTnce whTch Ts nothTng but son's rTght by bTrth 
Tn the property of the father. But the Code Ttself, on the one hand has gTven, 
but on the other hand, has taken away a son's rTght by bTrth. The Code prohTbTts
1. Kate's date (1773 A .D .) at HD, I, 465, Ts wrong, Halhed, TbTd., 5 .
Derrett, 'SanskrTt Legal TreatTes CompTled at the Instance of the BrTtTsh*,
ZVR, 63 (1961), 72-117, at 85ff; also RLSI, 239.
2 . The Bengal and MTthTla vTews are put forward Tn the fash Ton: * . . .  TtT SrTkrs- 
natarkalankara-Smartabhattacarya-JTmutavahana-prabhrtayah; . . .  TtT tu 
MTsrah, VTvadamavasetu, (Bombay, 1888), 42; agadn * . . .  TtT SrTkrsnatar- 
kalankara-Smartabhattacaiya-jTmutavahanadayah prahuh; MaTthTlas tu . . . ' ,  
TbTd., 79; also, •Smarta-JTmutavahanadayah prahuh MaTthTlas tu . . .  Ttyahuh*, 
TbTd., 80, or when the two schools agree * . . .  TtT Smarta-Dayabhagakaradayah*, 
TbTd., 83. See Rocher, 'Schools of HTndu Law', India MaTor, J . Gonda Con­
gratulatory Volume, (LeTden, 1972), 168-9. The texts are also compared wTth 
the Vlvadarnava-setu, Adyar Library, (mTcrofTlm), Very kTndly lent by Derrett.
3 . Halhed, The Code of Gentoo Laws, op.cTt., preface, IvT. ThTs analysTs of 
thTs parable Ts without foundation, see Derrett, Law Tn the New Testament, 
(London, 1970). Also our discussion, supra, %\ 4 - 1 7 .
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a father from gTvtng away or selling ancestral property without the consent of 
the sons, but at the same time, modifies this position by stating that a father 
can alienate the surplus, over and above what Is needed for the maintenance 
of his Immediate dependants.^
On the partition point, the Code Is very exp lic it and does not give 
any power to the son to demand partition against the wishes of the father:
If It  be not the Fathers choice, the sons 
have no authority to take from him by 
Force their respective Shares of their 
Ancestors* Property; even If  there Is 
no Expectation that their Father shall 
ever have another Son, s till they have 
not Authority to take I t .  2
It can be said that In the Code, the Dayabhaga views became predomi­
nant and the compilers did not give Its due weight to the concept of the son's 
right by b irth .
II. Jagannatha Tarkapancanflna's Treatment of Sons* Right by Birth In the 
Vlvada -bhangama va
The Vlvadamava-setu did not solve a ll the problems for the solution
of which It  was complied. To the court pandits, In relation 1o other sastrlc
3
sources, It was a sibling rather than a sequel. The Inadequacy of the Code
1. Halhed, C h .II. X I, 83. This Is pure Dayabhaga law.
2. Halhed, C h .II, X I, 82.
3. RLSI, 241-2.
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as well as the anomaly of the vyavasthas led to the compTlatTon  ^ of Vlvcida-
2 -  3bhangamava under the guidance of Jagannatha Tarkapancanana, the most
celebrated of the pandits of his time. Despite the predominance of Bengali
4
pandits among the compilers, resulting In a 'Bengali btas*, to different jural
concepts, the work was a success. Jagannatha's method o f surveying the two
doctrines of M lth lla  and Bengal by stating both and sometimes without leaving
5
any conclusion, made his work more an emergent than a resultant. But being
6
*a living encyclopaedia of law ', he referred to a ll available gastric learning, 
and to present an analytical exposition of the controversial problem of the son's 
right by birth, he repeatedly assembled the smrtl texts and the opinions of the 
commentators In his work.
He opens the discussion with the question: 'what Is the cause of
1. For the detailed reasons of the compilation and the role of Sir William Jones, 
see RLSI, 241-5.
2 . Compiled between 1788-1794, translated by Colebrooke, under the tit le ,
A  Digest of Hindu Law. Another work preceded this: Vlvada-saramaya, 
'Ocean of A ll Disputes', a code on the M lthlla school, by Sarvoru Sarma 
Trlvedl In 1789 (RLSI, 245).
3 . Born In or about 1695-7; Kane, HD, I, 466.
4 . Derrett, BSOAS, 1957, XX, 204; RLSI, 246. Rocher disagrees, *SchooIs of 
Hindu Law*, J . Gonda Congratulatory Volume, (Leiden, 1972), 172. Rocher 
Is technically right but on a total assessment of Vlvada-bhangarnava, It appears 
that his observations are doubtful. Also Derrett, DJL, 62.
5. RLSI, 247, Llngat, CLI, 121.
6 . RLSI, 245.
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1 _  2
property?* He puts forward the vtew of Vacaspatl Bhattacarya who holds
3
the optnton that 'acquisition Is the sole cause of property*, and *blrth of sons
4
and the rest constitutes acquisition*. Jagannatha explains Vacaspatl's view
J5by stating that *ln case of Inheritance, birth alone Is the cause of property . . .
But Jagannatha Immediately reverts to the text of Devala,^ the corner-stone of 
the Dayabhaga view and puts forward the crucial problem In the form of a question:-  
*may not a son have property In the wealth of a living parent?* ^ To this, he comes 
out with the peculiar answer:- Met It not be answered, this Is admissible; for It 
would contradict the law. Devala declares, that, while the father lives, his
Q
sons have no ownership of his estates*.
Jagannatha opines that, In effect, Devala assigns the death of the 
father as a mediate cause of property vesting In the son. But It does not mean 
that death or degradation of the father produces dlvesture of property and, being 
Indirect causes, they may produce other effects. The Immediate cause ofproperty
1. A  Digest of Hindu Law, tr. H .T. Colebrooke, (London, 1801), II, 507.
2 . I do not know I f  anything Is known of him.
3. II, 507.
4 . II, 508. Here Vacaspatl cites the text of Gautama as In M lta, I, 1, 23, and
also another anonymous text of the same purport, *!n some Instances acquisition
Is by birth*.
5. II, 508.
6. Dh.K.1156a.
7 . II, 508.
8. II, 508.
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vesting In the son Is the dtvesture of the father's property.^ Then Jagannatha 
poses the problem by saying that I f  dlvesture Is the Immediate cause and death 
of the father Is the mediate cause of vesting property In the son, then, after a 
father's death, property could divest continually because of the continuous sub­
sistence of the relationship offc ther and son. If continuous dlvesture Is correct,
then father's property w ill divest at the moment of his son's b irth . But 'property
2
Is established to be an Impediment to concurrent property' ( I .e . the property of
A  obstructs the property f in  the same asset] of B [a  questionable proposition ]  )
3
and 'no property vests In the son while the father's property subsists*, which
4
leads to the conclusion that 'a son has no ownership while the father Is living*.
In effect, Jagannatha Is supporting the concept o f uparama-svatva and points out 
that there Is (normally) no dlvesture of property until after the death of the fattier. 
A t the same time, Jagannatha does not fa ll to mention the opinion of the commen­
tators who hold that the sons *have title  In the estate while the father lives, but
5
cannot appropriate It  at pleasure without his command'.
1. II, 509.
2. II, 509.
3. II, 510. Here Jagannatha Is following the Dayabhaga school and especially
Sri Krsna who says: 'for those two concurrent rights o f the same nature are In­
compatible', II, 520. That 'ownership vests after his (father's) death* -  on 
this point, besides Jlmutavahana, Raghunandana and KuIIuka, Jagannatha had 
the support of Candesvara and Vacaspatl Mlsra, II, 521; 111,4.
4 . II, 510.
5. 11, 522.
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Whtle discussing the toptc of partition by a father, Jagannatha agatn
takes up the text of Gautama  ^ on son's right by birth, and examtnes Tt tn view
of the father's power of unequal distribution among hts sons. If a father wants
to deprive or exclude a son from his share on the ground o f lack of f i l ia l love
or animosity o f the son, a father's decision Is not final unless he proves the grounds
2
for such exclusion In the presence of the King or a public assembly. Jagannatha 
had (so far as we know) no smrtl or commentatorlal authority for this last Idea.
Even In the case of self-acquired property, In the light of Baudhayana and 
Katyayana's text, a father can be punished by the King for his unjustified ex­
clusion of a son from his share (again the authority Is wanting) but Jagannatha
explains that since the texts do not ordain a fine for the offence, such a father
3commits only a moral offence. Jagannatha reminds us that the advocates of
son's right by birth do not accept a father's power of depriving his son of his 
4
share, but at the same time, he Is not ready (notwithstanding their efforts to
prove a concurrent property) to accept the existence of the son's ownership
during the lifetime of the father on the ground that there Is not authority for
5
establishing 'property within property'. But under extraordinary circumstances,
1. Mlta .1.1.23.
2. I l l ,  2. This probably contemplates a testament similar to the testamentum 
calatls comltlls tn early Roman Law, Institutes of Roman Law by Galus, t r . ,  
Edward Poste, (Oxford, 1904), II ,  101; 176. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 
1905), 174.
3 . 111,2-3.
4 . 111,3.
5. I l l ,  4; also II, 521.
such as oppression by stepmother 'or the like* a son may appeal to the King for
protection of his right only In ancestral property and obtain a partition from his
1 t0 father. The source once again of this Idea Is noj/be found. Though a cate­
gorical admission Is missing, what else Is Jagannatha hinting at In this passage 
but birthright?
According to Jagannatha, a right to be maintained or a right to have
equal share Is not a vested right In the strict sense of the term and does not coalesce
with such vested right as right by b irth . For his contention he finds support In
Vacaspatl who also does not admit ‘the son's vested title  In the paternal estate
2
during his father's life*.
Jagannatha states that a partition of property Inherited from the grand­
father Is granted by the sole w ill o f the father, and categorically expressed the
3
view that the father Is the owner of the grandparental estate. With this view,
4
he reconciles the textual attribution of son's co-ownership In grandparental
property by saying that a father's ownership remains unhindered by such texts,
5
because In these texts 'ownership Is figuratively attributed to the son*.
1. 111,47.
2 . I l l ,  5.
3 . I l l ,  42. The same point Is emphasised at II, 524-6.
4 . Yajn. 11.121.
5. 111,43. My emphasis.
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Jagannatha does not seem to accept the co-extensTve right of father
and son even tn Immovables of the grandfather. He repeatedly rejects the
birthright o f a son In paternal and grandparental estate on the strength of the
text of Devala.^ Those who say that *a title  In the estate of the father and
2
grandfather Is vested by birth alone* are wrong, ‘for It would contradict the
text of Devala: ‘they have no ownership (or fu ll dominion), while a faultless 
3
father lives*.
But It Is too risky to Identify the view of a particular commentator as
4having the approval of Jagannatha. The famous text of Yajnavalkya which 
ordains common ownership of father and son In grandparental property, has been 
left with the comment of Sulapanl:- *over these, namely over land and the rest, 
the father and son have equal dominion. Partition Is made even by the choice
5
of the son; and the shares are equal . .  .* But for the explanation of the 
phrase, sadrsam svamyam ^ In the text, Jagannatha has resorted to the V lvada- 
ratnakara which probably partially suited his purpose: ‘ "equal dominion” ; In 
this case no greater share Is allotted to one than to another; nor can the father
1. Dh.K . 1156a.
2 . I l l ,  6.
3 . I l l ,  6.
4 . Y 5 jn . l l . l2 l .
5. I l l ,  34. See above for versions of SulapanT.
6 . Y a jn .11.121.
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gtve away such property at his pleasure1.^ Jagannatha's acceptance of the
-  -  - 2correctness of the view of the author of the Dlpallka shows that he seems to 
have accepted the blrthrlghtbf a son Tn the property of the grandfather, but hts 
reliance on the Ratnakarats explanation of the words sadrsam svamyam on the 
partition point Is nothing but an endorsement of Jlmutavahana %s view on that
3text (Y a jn .ll .121). Here Jagannatha has obfuscated rather than Illuminated 
the correct purpose of the text of Yajnavalkya.
Jagannatha has sided with Jlmutavahana on the Interpretation of texts
which prohibit a father to make a g ift or sale of Immovable property. He asserts
that a g ift of Immovable property to one son without having the prior consent of
4
the others, though Immoral, Is va lid . Again, unequal distribution of grand-
5
parental property by a father Is also merely a moral offence.
Jagannathaks emphasis on the comcept of moral offence In jural problems 
Is not his own Innovation. It Is a sign of the Influence of Jlmutavahana*s Inter-
1. I l l ,  35 , also III, 36. See Candesvara, Vlvada-ratnakara, (Calcutta, 1887), 
461. "
2 . 111,35.
3 . See Jlmutavahana*s treatment of Y a jn .ll .121, supra, 5 3 $ -A A  .
4 . I l l ,  35-7. For a discussion, Derrett, BSOAS, 1957, XX, 204-15.
5 . I l l ,  38-9.
pretatlon o f the texts of Vyasa  ^ which prohibit alienation o f ; property by one
coparcener without the consent of other co-owners. Jagannatha applied and
-  -  2 extended jlmutavahana's solution to the law of partition, and stated that an
unequal distribution of grandparental property by a father among his sons was 
nothing more than a moral offence. But a moral offence being only an Infringe­
ment of rules In conscience, having no penalty In the worldly sense, makes the 
administration of justice d ifficu lt and leaves uncertain the law on those rights, 
Infringement of which constitutes moral offence alone.
The raison d'etre of Vlvada-bharigarnava was an exploration of sastrlc 
law from the smrtls, commentaries and the ntbandhas. On the topic o f assessing 
a son's right by birth, I t  seems that Jagannatha has overstressed the Dayabhaga 
view and has underplayed the MTtaksara doctrine. Despite Jagannatha's pro­
found and wide sastrlc erudition, the weight of the works of the Bengali commen­
tators and the Influence of his own surroundings probably moulded the pattern of 
his work. But from the evidence of authentic zetesls Tn the work, It can be said 
that he never wanted to create juridical mirage out of the sastra, yet never made 
any pretence of not seeing the looklng-gl ass hidden In the pages of the texts with 
which he was dealing.
*
His d if f ic u lt ie s  that the texts themselves were never comprehensively
1. Da .bha. II .28-30.
2 . The difference of the application of this solution between g ift and partition 
has been explained by Jagannatha at III, 47.
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reconciled  ^ and explained, and actual practice was ambiguous and divergent. 
From the textual standpoint, It could as easily be claimed that the father was 
owner of a ll the types of assets In question, subject to reservations In his Issue's 
favour, as that the sons were co-owners with their father subject to certain p riv i­
leges on his part, some by way of encouragement to activ ity  and Enterprise, and 
some by virtue of his Inevitable funcfbn as the family's leader, manager.
1. For a discussion on this point, see R. Rost, ed ., Works by the Late Horace 
Hayman Wilson, V o l. I l l :  Essays on Sanskrit Literature: Review of 5Tr h.W . 
Macnaghten's Considerations of the Hindu Law, as It Is current In Bengal, 
(London, 1865), 2 -3 . ~~
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CHAPTER 16.
THE BIRTHRIGHT IN  THE VYAVASTHA SUB-LITERATURE
I. IntroductTon
1 2 Warren Hastings1 Plan to settle disputes on Inheritance e tc ., be­
tween Hindus according to their sastra was not without difficulties In Its Imple­
mentation. The sastras were written In Sanskrit, a language which, In most
3cases, was unknown to the judges, and even though a scanty minority of  sastrlc
4 5materials were translated, their purports remained Inscrutable, due to unfamlllar-
Ity with the religious tradition, ancient usages and contemporary practices of the
Hindus. Nevertheless, administration of justice had to be done according to the
1. Discussed, supra,6<52, n-1.
2 . G .W . Forrest, Selections from the State Papers of the Governor Generals of 
India, II, Warren Hastings Documents, (Oxford, 1910), 295-6, RLSI, 289.
3. See the honest confessions of their Lordships at the pinnacle of the judicial 
system as to their disadvantage In not knowing Sanskrit, Qalusu v . Balusu, 
(1899), 26 1A 113 at 146 (PC).
4 . Th. Goldstdfcker, *On the Deficiencies In the Present Administration of Hindu 
Law*,: a paper read at the meeting of the East India Association on the 8th 
June, 1870, (London, 1871), 6 -7 . RLSI, 298.
5 . The point emphasised In Rungamma v . Atchamma, (1846) 4 MIA 1, 97-8 
(P.C).
646.
Plan,^ and neither the Government nor the IttTgants could watt for the day when 
a ll 2
a judiciary wlth/4he relevant learning would be available.
3 ✓-It has already been pointed out that to overcome the crisis on sastrlc
learnings, a group of people were attached to the Company's Courts for Interpret­
ing the sastra to the {udges. These were the pandits or the sastrlns who were 
supposed to be conversant with sastrlc lore.
1. The Plan was anticipated by the Charter of 1726 which laid down that custom 
and Institutions of ttalndlans shop Id be left undisturbed, T .K . Mukherjee, 
'Mayor's Court ane/lnalan Residents of Calcutta1, Bengal Past and Present, 
80(1951) 133: 42-5 at 44.
2. On the lack of confidence of the public on the Hindu lawyers, see Rajah 
Rammohan Roy, Exposition of the Practical Operation of the Judicial and 
Revenue Systems of India, (London, 1832), 11; on lack of judicial ab ility  and
outlook of the judges, Ib id ., 2; and Rammohan *s recommendation that European 
judges sent to India should not be under 24 years of age and should have a certi­
ficate of proficiency In English law, Ib id ., 47. Discussed also by Derrett, 
•Justice, Equity and Good Conscience* In J .N .D . Anderson, ed ., Changing 
Law In Developing Countries, (London, 1963), 140-1; also RLSI, 231-2. On 
the deficiency of qualifications of vakeels (pleaders) and their Improvement by 
Lord Cornwallis, see Kallklnkar Datta, ‘Some Records Relating to the Method
of Appointment of the Vakeels In the Administration of the East India Company*, 
Bengal Past and Present, 71 (1952) 134: 44-52. Apart from Ignorance of the 
sastra, the allegation of a legacy of corruption In the judiciary was not wholly 
unfounded, T .K . Mukherjee, *A Note on the Administration of Justice by the 
Calcutta Mayor's Court (1726-1774)*, Bengal Past and Present, 71(1952) 134: 
85-92 at 91. RLSI, 275.
3. Supra, 6 3 2 - 3 3 ,
The remittance by the Courts of a particular point o f Hindu Law to
the pandits for their opinion was not entirely a British Innovation. Even during
the Muslim rule In India, the same role often used to be played by the pandits
when the parties to the disputes were Hindus.^ The continuation o f this
2
system by the British was founded on political and juristic compulsion, and
3
the pandits were appointed to the Supreme Court Itself from 3rd February, 1777.
Eventually, pandits were attached to a ll types of Courts, such as District Courts,
4Provincial Courts and the Sadr Dlvanl Adalat.
The Issues on son's right by birth, having been coupled with the topic 
of 'Inheritance', not Infrequently came before the pandits for their opinion.
The cases Involved with the topic of a son's birthright broadly cover two areas.
In some, the father's capacity to alien and Incumber the family estate was
1. G .C . Rankin, Background to Indian Law, (Cambridge, 1946), 3 ff. T.E. 
Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays of H .T. Colebrooke with a Life of the 
Author, (London, 1873), I, 96. RLSI, 229. Even at the remoteqaoch of 
Hindu legal history this was not unknown, Manu, V III. 1 and the comment of 
Medhatlthl, Jha, Manu-sm.rtl, (Calcutta, 1924), 4 . Gautama, X II I .26, SBE, 
II, 245. Y a jn . l l .1, 3 . Vaslstha, X V I.2 , SBE, X IV , 78 and n.2 thereto. 
Vlsnu, 111.72, SBE, V II, 20. ■«
2. On this point, see the observation of Sir William Jones In his letter to the 
Supreme Council of Bengal, 19 March, 1788, G .H . Cannon, ed ., The 
Letters of Sir William Jones, (Oxford, 1970), 794.
3. RLSI, 236.
4 . 'Cornwallis Code', Regulations of 1793, W .H . Morley, An Analytical Digest 
of A ll the Reported Cases, (London, 1850), I, In trod., x lv l.  B .K.Acharyya, 
Codification In British India, TLL, 1912, (Calcutta, 1914), 57-9.
challenged by the son, and Tn others a son's right to demand a partition of 
family property against the wishes of the father, or a father's arbitrary power 
of unequal distribution among his sons had to be determined. The vyavasthas 
do not always portray a specific pattern of opinion restricted to a particular geo1 
graphical area, and sometimes within the same geographical region, 'the deci­
sions arrived at have In some respects, been almost as various as the Courts that 
pronounced therr.'J
I I . Father's Power of Alienation and Partition of Property
The majority of the vyavasthas, regarding disputes between Bengali 
Hindus In different courts of Bengal, Indicate that a father had absolute power 
of disposing of the family property without the consent o f his sons. But one 
cannot say that this Is the whole truth, because there are opinions of  pandits 
which reveal considerable restrictions on a father's power of unilateral a lien­
ation and arbitrary partition of certain categories of family property In Bengal. 
The divergence of opinion among the pandits of different courts, or within the 
same court, show that there was no undisputed or universal acceptance of 
Jlinutavahana's Dayabhaga as the only authority In Bengal.
2The vyavastha In the case of Juggulklsson Addle was a forerunner
1. West and BOhler, A Digest of Hindu Law, (Bombay, 1884), I, preface, v .
2 . (1781), Supreme Court, Calcutta, Strange, Hindu Law, II, 324.
Tn uphofdTng the Dayabhaga doctrine Tn Bengal. JugguIkTsson had property, 
both ancestral and self-acquTred. He dTsposed of the whole estate Tn equal 
shares between hTs wTfe and son by a wTll. On a dispute over hTs wTlI, the 
matter was referred to the pandits for theTr opTnTon. The pandTts certTfTed Tn 
favour of the wTll. A fter the death of JugguIkTsson, the son would have In - 
herTted the whole estate, but by the wTll half of that estate went to the wTdow. 
The case Ts sTgnTfTcant Tn the sense that the pandTts upheld a father's absolute 
power to dTspose of property of evdr y - descrTptTon and thus denied the son 
hTs birthright even Tn the ancestral property at the hands of the father.^
2But Tn 1810, the vyavastha at a District Court Tn Bengal was that 
without the consent of his son, a father could give only a small portion of an­
cestral Immovables to his daughter's son. The significance of the opinion was 
that alienation beyond a small portion of ancestral Immovables was not within 
the power of the father without the concurrence of the son.
3In another d istrict, following ’Raghunandana's Dayatattva, the 
pandits declared that In Bengal a father could give away a ll his self-acquired 
Immovables to one of his sons, depriving the others.
1. Sutherland remarked that a father did not have absolute power over 'real 
ancestral estate', Strange, II, 324-5.
2. (1810), Z lllah 24 Pergunnahs, Case No.36, W .H . Macnaghten, Principles
and Precedents of Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1828), II, 244.
3 . (1821), Z lllah  Jungle Mehals, Case N o .28, Macnaghten, II, 236-7.
In GangagobTnda Sen v . Ramlochan Saha,  ^ Ramjjf Saha made a g ift
of hts whole property to hts daughter-Tn-law Tn the presence of hts sons and
2
grandsons. Three questions were put to the pandTt by the court:
(T) Whether accordtng to the sastra, a gtft of a father's self-acquTred 
property to a daughter-Tn-law would be valTd Tn presence of sons 
and grandsons?
(TT) Would the saTd gTft be valTd Tf the property Tn questTon Ts ancestral?
(TTT) If some of the property gTfted Ts seIf-acquTred and some ancestral,
|s  the whole gTft valTd?
STnce the pan^Tt of  the DTstrTct Court, SrT SrTrama Tarkalankara was 
not avaTlable, the questTons were referred to the pandTts of the Sadr DTvanT 
Adalat for theTr opTnTon. PandTt VaTdyanatha MTsra of the SDA followed the 
Dayabhaga Law and dTd not make any dTstTnctTon between ancestral and self- 
acquTred property Tn respect of son's rTght by bTrth. He opTned that wTthout 
being deceTtful or Tnfluenced by wrath, normally a father could make a gTft of 
a ll propertTes Tn hTs hands, provTlled he left suffTcTent property for the maTntenance
1. (1826), a case from Jessore, Bengal, DharmasastrTya Vyavastha Sangraha:
A  ColIectTon of the opTnTons of the pundits on HTndu Law, ed ., S. Jha, 
SarasvatT Bhavana Granthamala, N o .85, (Allahabad, 1957), 240. The work 
Ts a compilation from the manuscripts of the copies of the vyavasthas of the 
Sadr DTvanT A da la t, between 1824 and 1836, which PandTt VaTdyanatha 
MTsra of the SDA kept Tn his possession. The juridical value of the work 
lies Tn the fact that It contains many vyavasthas which are not reported Tn 
the extant Law Reports, Ib id ., preface, 1. Tfie questTons put to the pandTts 
are Tn Bengali language Tn devanagarl script and the vyavasthas are Tn Sanskrit.
2. Ib id ., 242-3.
of hts sons and grandsons.^ He declared the gtft under dtscusston as tnvaltd 
on the ground that tn any gtft made wtthout sufftctent provtstons for matnten- 
ance (annacchadanopayuktam dhanam) of sons and grandsons , decett (chaladt) 
and wrath would be presumed, and thts presumptton would make the gtft tn­
valtd ?"
A fathers absolute power of disposition, however, was upheld tn the 
^  3Dtstrtct Court of Beer bhum, where the pandtts declared that the gtft of part
1. Ib td ., at 244-5. The pandtt relted on Da.bha.; V t.bhang.; Vt.setu;
Hts answer to the second questton was: yadt ca tad eva sarvam vastu ramjt 
saha sajnakasya pattrkam bhavatt tada sva-putra-vadhum uddtsayatva tadrsa 
danam prathama prasnottara Itkhtta prakareija chala-krtatvat krodha-krtatvat 
pattamahe sthavaradau putra-pautrady anumattm vtna pttur etadrsa-dane 
prabhutvabhavac ca stddham bhavttum na saknott/  tb td ., 245. He relted 
on Da.bha. I I .23.
2. Ib td ., 244. On thts poTnt, the followtng texts are relevant.
Manu, V II I .  163, D h .K .I, 1, 552. mattonmattartadhyadhtnatr balena stha- 
vtrena v a /  asambandha-krtas* catva vyavaharo na s td h ya tt// *A transactton 
ts not valtd when done by an tntoxtcated person, a lunattc, one dtstressed, 
a dependent, a chtld, one sentle, or one who has no connectton wtth the 
bustness*, tr . Derrett, Bharuct, II , 145.
Manu, V III, 165, D h .K .I, 1, 554. yogadhamana-vtkrttam yoga-dana-pratt- 
graham /  yatra capy upadtm pasyet tat sarvam vtntvartayet f f  'Fraudulent 
mortgage and sale, fraudulent gtft and acceptance, and wherever he detects 
decett - a f l  these he shall nulltfy*, tr . Derrett, Bharuct, II, 146.
Manu, V III, 168, Dh.K . I, 1, 556. balad dattam balad bhuktam balad yac 
capt lekhttam /  sarvan bala-krtan arthan akrtan Manur abravtt / /  *What has 
been gtven by force, enjoyed by force, caused to be written be C by] force -  
a ll things done by force Manu declared to be void*, tr. Derrett, Bharuct, II, 147. 
Also Y a jn '.ll. 31-2, D h .K .I, 1, 557. However, the pandtts failed more or 
less uniformly to gtve due weight to these texts.
3 . Z lllah Beerbhum, Case N o. 14 on G tft, Macnaghten, II, 221. The pandtt 
followed the Dayabhaga. He thought that property purchased wtth the pro­
duce of patrimonial estate did not constitute patrimony, tb td ., 221.
or the whole of the Immovables purchased wtth the produce of ancestral property 
was good and valtd even though the donor had sons and grandsons survtvtng.
Pandtt Htrananda Mlsra tn Chttra Dasl's Case,  ^ apparently admitted 
that because of co-ownershtp between father and son, a father's alienation of 
ancestral property, especially of ancestral Immovables, Is Invalid both accord­
ing to the sastra and loka-vyavahara. Moreover, even In a g ift o f self-acquired
2
property, the right of maintenance of the dependents cannot be Ignored.
3
Vatdyanatha Mlsra takes note of the Sastrlc precept that a father cannot
alienate ancestral property and self-acquired Immovables without the consent
4
of his sons, but In the light of the Bengali authorities, he explains the Impli­
cations of such texts by saying that an alienation by the father In contravention 
of the sastra Is valid as a transaction, but because of the contravention he Incurs 
sin.'*
1. (1830), Mussummaut Cltra Dasl, a case from Jessore, Vyavastha No. 100,
DVS, 284; Ramkoomarv . Klshenkunker, (1812), IDOS, V I, 398 distinguished.
2 . paTfamahe sthavarasthavara dhane pltuh putrasya ca tulya svamltvena bahu 
svamlkalka padarthasya parasparanumatl vyatlrlkenalka-kartfka dana vlkrayadau 
svamsa danadt slddhl vyatlrlkena paramsa danady aslddeh, sastra loka-vyavaha- 
robhaya-slddhatvat, paltamahe sthavara dhane pltur vlsesatah svacchanda 
vrttltaya apl nlsedhacca, sastre putrady anumatl vyatlrlkena svoparjlta sarva 
sthavarasthavara dhana danasyapl nlsedho'stt, j>osya vargasyavasyam bharanl- 
ya tva t,ta^ anva/ a svatva prayuxta sarvasva dcinasya vrttl-lopasya ca n lsedhat/, 
Ib id ., 288-9.
3 . Vyavastha, No. 101, DVS, 292.
4 . Ib id ., 294-5.
5 . tadrsa vacananam tatparyyarthah —^ a d l ca pita tad eva sastroktajnajatam 
ullanghya svoparjlta sthavara samudayasya paltrka samudayasya va putranumatlm 
vlna danam vlkrayam va karotl, tada tad danam vlkrayo va slddhyaty eva, klntu 
pltuh sdstrollanghana janyah pratyavayo b h a v a tl/a t 292; relied on D a.bha.II. 
30, DVS, 294.
In Rajtvalochan Satpatt v . Becharam Roy,  ^ Pandtt Kamalakanta 
VTdyalankara distinguished the Dayabhaga and the Mttaksara vtews Tn respect 
o f a father's power of altenattng ancestral land tn the presence of a mtnor son.
The pandtt affirmed that according to the Mttaksara, a father having a minor
2 -  son could not sell ancestral land unilaterally, but according to the Dayabhaga
3he could, even though he would Incur sin by such a l&nation. The Pandit
also pointed out that for the Utkal (from Orissa) brahmins, the vyavastha should
_ -  - _ _ 4
be according to the Mttaksara and for the radlya and dak$tna radlya brahmins
It should be according to'the Dayabhaga. This vyavastha was reviewed In the
SDA by Vatdyanatha Mlsra, who opined that according to the sastra followed In
5
both Bengal and Orissa, the alienation under discussion was va lid .
The vyavasthas discussed, Indicate that In Bengal a father could alien­
ate every category of property In his hands without the consent of his sons.^
But there were vyavasthas of pandits which differ ed from the opinions 
referred to above. Going back to 1817, we come across a case In the District of
1. (1835)r a case from Mldnapore; Vyavastha, No.203, DVS, 622.
2. Ib id ., at 623.
3 . Ib id ., at 624.
4 . Both radlya and dakstna radlya brahmins are Bengalis.
5. DVS, 625-6.
6. Also discussed In context of testamentary power of a father; Rushlklal Diita v . 
Choytun Churn Dutta, (1789), Strange, I, 263; Eshanchand Rat v . Eshorchand 
Ral, IDOS, V I, 2; Ramtanu Mai Ilk v . Ram Gopal M a lllk , (1807), Strange, I, 
266; Ramkoomar v . Klshenkunker, (1812), ID OS, V I, 398,
Nuddea  ^ (Nadiya) Tn whtch the pandtt accepted a son's right by btrth tn ancest­
ral Immovables, and denied a father, even according to the Dayabhaga, any 
right of alienation of such property per set The vyavastha emphasised that a 
father was entitled to alienate ancestral Immovables under two conditions: 
either he must have the consent of the son prior to such alienation, or the a lien­
ation should be necessary for the support of the fam ily. If neither condition 
exists, the sale Is void.
2Another case seems to merit discussion In some deta il. In this, 
the pandits differed on the va lid ity of a deed of partition by which Ramkaunt, 
a Bengali Hindu made an unequal allotment o f shares of his estate, consisting 
of movables and Immovables, ancestral and acquired, among his sons. The case 
was fought at a ll judicial levels. The Z lllah Judge was of the opinion that the 
father had no power to make an unequal distribution of his ancestral property 
without the consent of a ll his sons. The ftovlnctal Court o f Calcutta reversed 
the opinion of the District Judge. On appeal to the Sadr Dlvanl AJa Iat, the case 
was referred to the Hindu Law Officers to ak:ertaln the merits of the case. The 
pandits opined that a father had no power to make an unequal distribution of his 
ancestral estate, but In respect of self-acquired property, a father was permitted 
by the sastra to make an unequal distribution unless such distribution was Influenced 
by perturbation of mind or wrath.
But the final decision of the case was left to another judge. In order
1. (1817), Z lllah Nuddea, Sale Case N o .22, Macnaghten, II, 312. Shamachurn 
Sircar, Vyavastha Darpana, (Calcutta, 1867), 620.
2. Bhawanychurn Bunhoojea v . The Heirs of Ramkaunt Bunhoojea, (1816), IDOS, 
V I, 556 = 2 Sel. Rep. 260. Discussed In context of w il l ,  Infra , 7 3 3  ff.
655.
to clear up the HTndu Law point, the senior judge put the followtng questton to 
the pandtts:
If Ramkaunt Tn hts IteftTme had put a!! 
the parties, excepttng the p la in tiff, Tn- 
to possession of the shares allotted to 
them Tn the deed respectively, and have 
divested himself of a ll the proprietory 
right, would such distribution of pro­
perty, movable and Immovable, whether 
acquired or ancestral, be valid (notwith­
standing the declared Illega lity  of an un­
equal distribution of ancestral Immovable 
property), aravlng from Its analogy to the 
case of a g ift, against which there exists 
a legal prohibition; but the va lid ity  of 
the donation Is nevertheless maintained 
by the author of the Dayabhaga? 1
✓ ^
The pandits of the SDA, Chaturbhooj and Sobha Sastrl differed with each
other* Chaturbhooj made the point that the Dayabhaga did not allow unlimited
discretion to a lather In dividing his ancestral Immovables beyond a twentieth part
2In favour of the eldest son. Where In the Dayabhaga, Jlmutavahana upholds the
3
valid ity of a prohibited g ift, that should always be considered as a proviso. A  
proviso presupposes a power to do an act. Since the lather has no power to distri­
bute ancestral Immovables arb itrarily, the proviso regarding validation of prohibited 
gifts would not be applicable In a case of partition. That means Chaturbhooj re­
fused to extend the maxim of factum valet beyond the boundaries of g ift and stressed 
the point that the maxim had no application to the division of ancestral Immov-
1. (1816), IDOS, V I, 560.
2. Da.bha. 11.37, 43. Chaturbhooj, s answer to the second question, IDOS, V I, 
at 562-3.
3. Da.bha.II. 30.
6 56 .
ab les. ^
Pandit Chaturbhooj was also not Tn favour of conferring on the father
a general power of unequal distribution of his self-acqulsltlons. His opinion
was that I f  a father made an unequal distribution of his own acquisitions among
his sons, his motive must be examined. He adds that the law looks upon a
father making an unequal distribution as having been Influenced by consldera-
2
tlons as permitted by law. The motives permitted by law, by which a father
could be actuated by the desire to give more to one son than others, are:
(a) a token of esteem on account of his good qualities, or (11) for his support
on account of having a large family, or ( ill)  through compassion by reason of
3
his Incapacity, or (Tv) through favour by reason of his p iety. In the absence
of any apparent legal motive under the Impulse of which he might lawfully give,
4the law would consider his acts as Invalid.
The other pandit, Sobha §5strf, concurred with Chaturbhooj on the
point of ancestral Immovables, but regarding unequal and arbitrary distribution
1. Chaturbhooj relied on Dharesvara on YajrT.II .121; Da.bha .,11.15; Vlsnu, 
17.2; Da.Ka.San.VI. 18; IDOS, V I, 563.
2 . Here Chaturbhooj was Interpreting jlmutavahana, Da.bha. 11.74, to be read 
with Da.bha. 11.83.
3 . The motives which generally render the act as Invalid are: (1) perturbation of 
mind occasioned by disease or the like, or (11) Trtltatlon against any one of his 
sons, or (111) through partia lity for the child o f a favourite w ife, IDOS, V I, at 
563, D a .b ha .ll.83.
4 . C f. the same view of Valdyanatha Mlsra on chala (deceit) and krodha (wrath), 
Chltra Das^s Case, DVS, at 262.
5. See the remark, IDOS, V I, at 568, note thereto.
of self-acqulsltlons by a father, hts optnton was that by such distribution a father
would Incur sin occasioned by Infringement of the Iaw;^ nevertheless, the dls-
2
ttfbutton must be upheld as va lid .
In fact, he extended the maxim factum valet to the law of partition; 
such extension according to Chaturbhooj would have been ultra vires.
3
In two previous cases, the SDA had already upheld a father's power
to make a g ift of his entire property to one son, depriving the others, neverthe-
4
less condemning such an action as Immoral. In Ramkoomar v . Klshenkunker,
the point for decision was the va lid ity of a g ift by a Brahmin of his entire estate,
comprised of movables and Immovables, ancestral and self-acquired, to his
younger son, excluding the elder. Chaturbhooj and Sobha Sastr? declared the
g ift valid even though such an act Is held to be sinful by the sastra. Considering
his opinion on arbitrary partition by a father In Bhawannychurn's Case, Chaturbhooj's
approval of the g ift of ancestral property In Ramkoomar's Case Is understandable.
5
He declared valid the g ift In the latter case because It was a g ift. When the
1. IDOS, VI at 565.
2. On the point of Immovable property, Sobha Sastrl relied on Vlsnu, XVI1.2, 
and on self-acquired property, relied on the Dayabhaga, IDOS, V I, 565-6.
3 . Eshanchand Ral v . Eshorchand Ral, (1792), IDOS, V I, 2; the opinions of  pandits 
from different parts of the country were taken In this case, and the majority view 
was that the w ill of Raja Klshenchund was 'just and proper'. Because of the d if­
ference of opinion, the SDA ultimately relied on the views of 'Jagganauth Turka-
punchanun, Klrparam Turkabhoosun and Hurrynarayan Sarbobhom [  SarvabhaumaJ ' 
who concurred with the majority opinion, IDOS, I, 399. The other case was 
Ramkoomar v . Klshenkunker, (1812), IDOS, V I, 398. The authority of both 
these cases were doubted, although not formally overruled, In Bhawannychurn's 
Case, see IDOS, I, 401.
4 . (1812), IDOS, V I, 398.
5 . Fol lowing Da .bha. 11.30.
problem came before the SDA tn Bhawannych urn's Case, Chaturbhooj's place
was taken by Pandtt Ramtunoo who was called upon to put forward an optnton 
on the potnt. Ramtunoo optned that a father could make a gtft of a ll ancestral 
movables and of a ll hts self-acqutstttons, but a gtft of the whole of the ancestral 
tmmovables by a father was not valid . ^
The authortttes ctted tn the vyavastha' tn the case of Ramkoomar v .
2 3Ktshenkunker dtd not seem to support the optnton put forward tn t t .  To ex-
platn thts contradiction, the survtvtng pandtt Sobha Sastrt, was called upon by
4 5SDA for any explanatton he could offer. He relted on Manu and Devala, 
and put forward the Dayabhaga vtew whtch was as follows:
"the father ts master of the gems, pearls, 
e tc.1*, thts text, accordtng to the Dayab­
haga, extends to the property of the grand­
father, accordtng to whtch authortty also 
the father has ownershtp tn a ll the property 
tnhertted from the grandfather. Thts ap­
pears to be the case, because havtng pro­
pounded the texts "for they have not power 
over tt whtle thetr pare nts Itve" (and) "for 
sons have not ownershtp whtle thetr fattier 
ts a Itve and free from defect" the author 
concludes by observtng, that these texts, 
declaratory of a want of power and re- 
qutrtng the father's consent, must relate 
also to property ancestral. 6
1. IDOS, V I, at 570. The vyavastha was accordtng to Dayabhaga and other 
authortttes current tn Bengal.
2 . IDOS, V I, 398.
3. IDOS, V I, 569.
4 . Manu, IX. 104, D h .K .I 149b.
5. Devala, D h .K .I 156a. IDOS, V I, 569.
659.
The Irreconcilable differences of opinion turned the situation Into a 
baroque muddle which was symptomatic of the formative stage of Anglo-HTndu 
Law. Finding Its own pandits* views discordant, the SDA placed the Issues 
before a board of four pandits,  ^ who unanimously opined that
I f  a father, whose elder son Is a live , 
make a g ift to his younger, o f a ll his 
acquired property, movable and Immov­
able, and of a ll the ancestral movable 
property; the g ift Is va lid , but the 
donor acts sinfu lly. If during the life ­
time of an elder son, he make a g ift of 
to his younger, of a ll the ancestral Im­
movable property, such g ift Ts not 
va lid . Hence, I f  Tt have been made,
It must be set aside. The learned have 
agreed that Tt must be set aside, because 
such a g ift Is a fortiori Invalid; Inasmuch 
as he (a father) cannot even make an un­
equal distribution among his sons of an­
cestral Immovable property, as he Ts 
not master of a ll;  as he Is required by 
law, even against his own w il l ,  2 
make distribution among his sons of 
ancestral property not acquired by him­
self ( I.e . not recovered) as he Is In­
competent to distribute such property 
among his sons until the mother's 
courses have ceased, lest a son subse­
quently bom, should be deprived of 
his share; and as, while he has 
children living, he has no authority 
over the ancestral property. 3
Indeed, very few vyavasthas can have had so much Ink spent on them by the
1. Tarapershad and MrTtyoonjyee of the Supreme Court; Nurahuree of the 
Calcutta Provincial Court; Ramajya, a pundit attached to the Col lege of 
Fort W illiam ', IDOS, V I, 571.
2 . The emphasis Is mine.
3 . IDOS, V I, 571.
pandits as had this. The vyavastha echoes the smrtl texts,  ^ which enjotn co- 
ownershtp of father and son Tn ancestral Tmmovables, but nothing could be more 
significantly Interesting than to observe that though the pandits based their opi­
nion on Bengali authorities, yet they reached a conclusion which could not be
2found In the Dayabhaga of Jfmutavahana.
The rationale with regard to ancestral Immovables In Ihawannychurn's
-  3Case was not an Isolated opinion In the SDA. In another vyavastha, Pandit
_ 4
Valdyanatha Mlsra of the SDA opined as a general rule that even In Bengal, a
father could alienate ancestral Immovables without the consent of his son only
for family necessity. When there Is no such necessity and the consent of the
5
son Is not forthcoming, the alienation w ill not be valid .
1. Y 5 in .ll.121 ; Br., Dh.K.1179a; Vy5sa, Dh.K.1180b; Vlsnu, D h.K . 1175a.
2. The authorities cited by the pandits were mainly the Dayabhaga and once Dvalta 
Nlrnaya. The carelessness of the pandits also could be marked when they cited 
as 'text of Vl|naneshwara cited In the Medhatlthl:- 'Let the judge declare void 
a sale without ownership, and a g ift or pledge unauthorised by the owner"', at 
ID OS, V I, 571, Medhatlthl on Manu, V II I .  199, an analogous text to that one 
which Is cited above does not say anything about Vljnanesvara, Jha, Manu-smrtl, 
IV, 1.247. Vlinanesvara cited an analogous text of Katyayana, 612. Gharpure, 
Yajnavalkya Smrtl, (Bombay, 1939), II (4), 1183. Even I f  the textual citation
of the pandits would have been correc^chronologlcally I t  would have been an 
anachronism.
3 . Vyavastha, N o .89, undated, but between 1824-36, DVS, 251.
4 . I t l  variga-desa-callta . . .  DVS, 253.
5 . yady uparl-llkhlta-kutumba-bharanady avasyaka-karma-karanartham pltra na 
vlkrltam klntu svecchaya svabhlprayena va vlkrltam tada putranam anumatls 
cet slddhyatl, no cen na slddhyatl/  DVS, 252; answer to question 1.
661.
A father's power, however, Tn respect of altenatton of ancestral Im­
movables came Tn 1831 for determTnatTon before the SDA Tn Juggomohan Roy v . 
Sreemutty Neemoo Dossee,  ^ whTch had been referred by the Supreme Court to 
the judges of the Sadr DTvanT Ada lot for theTr opTnTon on the poTnt of HTndu Law.
The judges of the SDA opTned that a HTndu could alTenate a ll hTs property, Tnclud-
2
Tng ancestral Tmmovables wTthout the consent of hTs son.
Shakespear J. of the SDA, drew up a mTnute explaining hTs vTew on the
3
poTnt. The weTght of opTnTon Tn the Nuddea Case, and Tn the case of Bhawanny-
4
churn ~v. Ramkaunt, was not overlooked by Shakespear J . He made an attempt 
at great length to neutralTse the ratTonale of the Nuddea Case pap l^Tt's opTnTon by 
means other than sastrTc precepts. On the poTnt that a father could alTenate an­
cestral Tmmovables only for the support of the famTly, hTs remark was, 'thTs doc-
trTne however clearly admTts of great latTtude of constructTon; for after a ll,  who
5
ought to be so good a judge of the necessTty of sellTng as the father hTmself'.
The observatTon shows a clear TnclTnatTon to endow the father wTth absolute power 
of alTenatTon through hTs absolute dTscretTon.
Secondly, he poTnts out from everyday experTence Tn a bench that the 
non-consent of the son Ts pleadedogaTnst father's alTenatTon Tn very few Tnstances,
1. (1831) ID OS, I, 358.
2. (1831) ID OS, I, 367.
3 . (1817), ZTlIah Nuddea, Sale Case No.22, Macnaghten, II, 312. o v c fr  6 5 ^ ,
4 . (1816), IDOS, V I, 556.
5 . IDOS, I, 359.
662.
which 'afford(s) a strong presumption, that Tn the esttmatton of the people, the 
consent of the son Ts not necessary to the legaltty of the transfer'.  ^ It need 
hardly be satd that such an Tnference Ts at best questionable.
ThTrdly, Shakespear J. observed that upholdTng son's bTrthrTght Tn
ancestral Tmmovables would go far to conflTct wTth the pure law of contract,
2
and two-thirds of the Putnee Taluks created under Bengal Regulation V III of 
1819 would be Tn jeopardy, whTch would lead to a series of iTtTgatTons. He
i
saTd, *Tt Ts only when salesVnvoIve question of Inheritance, that they need be
i
decided by the rules of HTndu Law. AH simple contracts are determinable by 
3
the regulations*.
But It Ts very d ifficu lt to maintain this differentiation between sales 
Involving a question of Inheritance and sales as pure contract. Any unilateral 
sale by a father which Ts not for support of the family could be Interpreted as a 
simple contract between the vendor (father) and the vendee but, In essence, this 
sort of sale Is Involved (once the concept of entails Is firm ly excluded from our 
view of the Hindu law) with the question of Inheritance, as It would reduce a 
son's expectancy In the mass of ancestral property. ThTs shows a tendency to
1. IDOS, I, 360.
2. Putnee Tenures were Inheritable by their conditions and were capable of being 
transferred by sale, g ift, or otherwise, at the discretion of the holder, as well 
as answerable to his personal debts, s .III, Bengal Regulation V III of 1819, 
Sutherland, The Regulations of the Bengal Code In Force Tn September, 1862, 
(Calcutta), 919-931 at 921.
3 . IDOS, I, 360.
circumvent the precepts o f the sastro by giving prio rity  to the statutes.
Shakespear J. also tried to reject the decision Tn Bhawannychurn*s 
Case on the ground that ‘the pundits consulted Tn 1818, who are considered to 
have pronounced the true doctrine, were none of them officers of the Court*. ^
On this point, I t  could be said that among a ll the pandits whose opinion was 
sought Tn Bhawannychum*s Case, there was no disagreement on one point, 
namely, that a father had no power to make an unequal distribution of his 
ancestral Immovables (which at least Infers the sons* equal rights Insofar as 
they are genuine expectancies), and this precept was the basis of the opinion 
of the four pandits who fina lly  opined that a father could not make a g ift o f his
2
ancestral Immovables. The views of the three pandits of  the SDA, Chaturbhooj,
a -  -  3 4Sobha Sastrl, and Ramtunnoo were not dissimilar on this point. Shakespear*s 
J . remark was technically right In respect of the opinions of the four pandits on 
the ground that none of them were HTndu Law Officers of the SDA. But even I f  
we give Importance only to o ffic ia l assignment and Ignore scholarship, It Is appa­
rent that their vyavastha was not very different from Ramtunoo*s who was the Hindu
5Law Officer of the SDA at the time. Moreover, the vyavasthasof  a ll the HTndu
1. IDOS, I, n. at 362.
2 . IDOS, V I, at 562.
3 . IDOS, V I, at 565, and n. at 568. He contradicted himself In reassessing 
his view Tn Ramkoomar v . Klshenkunker, IDOS, V I, 569.
4 . IDOS, V I, at 570.
5 . One of the cases Shakespear J. relied on was Esanchand RaT v . Eshorchand Ral, 
IDOS, V I, 2, where despite their acknowledged scholarship, technically none 
of them were Hindu Law Officers of the SDA, see IDOS, V I, 569, para.3.
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Lww Officers of the SDA Tn this case at different stages, denied a father the power 
to distribute arbitrarily his ancestral Immovables.
Shakespear's J. minute was not unlikely to be well received by the 
judges of the Supreme Court, because they were also eager not to unsettle the 
decisions which upheld a father's absolute power over the properties In his hands.
Grey, C .J . ,  In delivering the actual judgment In Juggomohun Roy's
Case,  ^ observed that Mr. W .M . Macnaghten thought that Bftawannychurn's Case
2
disturbed the decision In three former cases. His Lordship took the opinion of
3 r'the judges of the SDA as based on usage of Bengal. He remarked that Mcnagh-
t
ten might have erred, but at the same time, observed that Macnaghten's view was
. 4
the general law of the Hindus, 'but In Bengal a different usage prevails'.
From Ryan's J. remark Ibidem, It becomes clear that the Supreme Court 
was not Tn favour of unsettling titles which were acquired from transfers (I.e . 
alienations by fathers beyond the powers laid down by the majority of the pandits) 
conformable to the judgments even though such judgments did not themselves con­
form to the precepts of Hindu Law. His Lordship asserted,
1. Franks J . ,  and Ryan J . ,  concurring, (1831), IDOS, I, 358.
2. He alluded to Russlck Lall Dutt v . Choytu Churn Putt, (1789), Strange, I, 263;
Eschand RaT v£Shorchand Ral, (1792), IDOS, V I, 2 , and Ramkoomar v . KTshen- 
kunker, (1812), IDOS, V I, 398.
3 . IDOS, V I, at 365.
4 . Ib id ., at 366.
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Tt Ts notorious that tttles of property, of 
Tmmense value and great extent, Tn thTs 
town, are founded on thTs constructTon 
o f law, 1 whTch has been confTrmed by 
a series of decTsTons. Now, I would 
not dTsturb these tTtles, nor moot a ^ 
questTon settled by so many decTsTons.
On Macnaghten*s poTnter to the decTsTon Tn Bhawannychum*s Case, he remarked,
surely, the law on thTs sub ject ought 
now to be consTdered as fTnally set at 
rest; the decTsTons of thTs court were 
unTform, from the tTmes of Tts esta- 
blTshment untTl the publTcatTon of Mr.
W .M . Macnaghten*s book; and Tt can 
be a matter of no wonder, that we were 
for a short tTme - imTsled by hTs autho­
r ity . 3
It Ts apparent from the arguments put forward by the judges that theTr 
conclusTon was predetermTned, and they were motTvated by the urgency of seltlTng 
the law consTdering the wTde practTce of alTenatTons, TncIudTng ancestral Tmmov­
ables, by the father. In many cases, despTfe theTr dTscomfTture, the sons were 
probably shy to come forward to dTspute the actTons of theTr fathers. So Tn Bengal 
to a great extent, the judTcTary, for the sake of expedTency, led (so Tt seems) the 
Anglo-HTndu Law away from the sastra for the Supreme Court approved and relTed 
on the opTnTon of the judges of the Sadr DTvanT Adalat, whTch was as follows:-
1. He alluded to RussTck Lall Dutt*s Case, (1789), Strange, I, 263.
2. IDOS, V I, at 367.
3 . IDOS, V I, 367.
On mature consideration of the points 
referred to us, we are unanimously of 
opinion, that the only doctrine that 
can be held by the Sudder Dewanny 
Adawlut, consistently with the deci­
sions of the Court, and with the 
customs and usages of the people, Is 
that a Hindu, who has sons, can sell, 
give, or pledge, without their con­
sent, Immovable ancestral property 
situate In the province of Bengal . . .  1
The decision was (understandably) followed ten years later by a fu ll
2bench of the SDA In Kail Doss Neogee v . Chunder Nath Ral Chowdry, where
It was held that 'I t  has been established by precedents of the Court that a Hindu
3
father In Bengal can dispose of his property without the consent of his sons".
When a case came before the SDA from Bihar, the pandits had less 
d ifficu lty  In putting forward their opinions than In one from Bengal. The Hindus 
In Bihar were glvemed by the M lth lla  doctrine which recognised the son's right 
by b irth .
1. IDOS, I, at 367. But see the opinion of Wilson: 'that a man make what dis­
position he pleases of his property both ancestral and self-acquired and per­
sonal or real: a doctrine which Is wholly at variance with the letter and spirit 
of the whole Hindu law, whether as laid down by Manu, and ancient legislators, 
or as expounded by modem scholiasts'. H .H . Wilson, Works, ed.,  R. Rost, 
(London, 1865), III, 71. Earlier, In the context of ancestral Immovable pro­
perty, he said that this Is certainly contrary to the conclusions even of the Bengal 
lawyers, Ib id ., 70. A father's power to make an unequal distribution of ancestral 
Immovables was denied In Iktear Raee v . Rughonath Purshad, (1848), 4 SDAR 767 = 
IDOS, X , 544; this was a M lth lla case but the authorities and precedents cited 
were from Bengal. The case was recommended for tria l according to M lthlla law.
2. (1841) IDOS, V III, 112 = 7 Sel.Rep. 148.
3. (1841) , IDOS, V III, 113.
In Sham STngh v . Mussummaut Umaraotee,  ^ a HTndu father, a short
ttme before hTs death, made a gTft of a ll hTs ancestral estate to the eldest son
wTth the stTpulatTon of a pecunTary provTsTon for the younger son. The pandTts
of the DTstrTct Court declared the gTft TI legal, but the pandTts of  the ProvTncTal
Court at Moorshedabad upheld the gTft. The pandTts of the SDA agreed wTth the
DTstrTct Court and declared the gTft TIlegal. The deed of gTft dTd not contaTn the
word ‘dan* (gTft). But the SDA pandTts declared Tn clear terms that even as a
gTft (Man*) the donatTon of the father could not be valTd because *a father and a
2
son possess an equal rTght Tn ancestral Tmmovable property*.
3
In another Tnstance, from the same dTstrTct, a father made a gTft of 
hTs entTre ancestral property. The pandTts opTned that a gTft of ancestral Tmmov­
ables by a father to the second son wTthout consent of the predeceased eldest
son*s son was *null and voTd*. But they affTrmed that a father was entTtled to
4
gTve away ancestral movables wTthout the consent of hTs sons.
RegardTng self-acquTred Tmmovables of the father, the son*s rTght by
5
bTrth was upeheld Tn the case of Gobardhanlal v . Mohanlal and Gangaprasad.
1. A  case from the dTstrTct of Bhagulpore, BThar; (1813) IDOS, V I, 429 = 2 Sel. 
Rep. 92.
2
TbTd., at 95. The authorTtTes followed by the pandTts were Yajn.11.121; 
VT.Ra; SmrtT-samucaya; VT.Ca; VT.CT.
3. (1819), ZTlIah Bhagulpore, Macnaghten, II, 210.
4 . RelyTng on Yajn. 11.121; VT.Ra; MTta.
5. (1826), Vyavastha, N o .73, DVS, 202.
Macnaghten, J. of the Supreme Court put the question to the pandit that, I f  a
Hindu made a g ift of his whole self-acquired Immovables to one of his sons and
gave possession to him, would such a gift be valid In the presence of other sons
and, after the death of the father, would the other sons get their shares In that
property or n o t j  Pandit Valdyanatha Mlsra opined that without the consent
2
of a ll the sons, the g ift In question could not be va lid .
On this point, Valdyanatha Mlsra was consistent with his views. He
3
declared In Shyam Sundar Mahendra v. Krishna Chandra Bhramarabara Roy Papada
that In the presence of his son It was not lawful for a father to give away Immovable
4
property whether ancestral or self-acquired without the consent of the sons.
The same view was expressed by the pandits In respect of the fathers power of
5
alienation of self-acquired Immovables where the case had to be decided accord­
ing to the Benares School.
1. b id . ,  question N o . l,  at 204.
2. yada ca pltra tad danam sarva-putranumatya na krtam tada tad-dana-grahltur 
brhatrantaresu satsu tad-artham tad-danam slddham bhavltum na saknotl . . .  /  
relying on M lta; V I .M l. ;  V y . madhava; V y . kaustubha. The key text on 
which the pandit relied was: sthavare tu svarjlte pltradl prapte ca putradl para- 
tantryam eva, M lta . 1.1.27, DVS, 205.
3 . (1825), Vyavastha, No. 10, DVS, 32.
4 . (1825), Vyavastha, No. 10, DVS, at 35: satl putrady anvaye dhanadhlkarlnl 
vldyamane sarvasva danam tad ananumatya kramagata svarjlta sthavara danam 
caslddham/  Relying on M lta .1 .1.27, DVS, 36. Same view on Immovables, 
Bhlkshanaryan Slngha and Others, (1835), Vyavastha, N o .223, DVS, 677 at 679, 
relying on M lta , 1.1.29. Also Vyavastha, N o .226, DVS, 684, relying on M lta . 
1.1.29. But cp. P.C. on Rao Balwant Singh v . Rani Klshorl, (1898) 25 1A 54 
(PC), discussed and criticised Infra, t AA-  46,
5. Case N o .26, Macnaghten, II, 233.
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The Mttoksoravtew on the Incident's o f ancestral Immovable property 
was re-stated by Valdyanatha Mlsra In a case from the district of Sahabad. ^
In this case, a Hindu made a g ift of his ancestral Immovables to a Brahmin.
The donee was put Into possession and after his death, the property passed to 
his successors. During the lifetime of the donor, one of his sons challenged the 
va lid ity of the g ift. The question before the pandit was whether such a g ift was 
valid or not.
The pandit declared that because of co-ownership of ancestral Immov­
ables by father and son, a father had no power to make a g ift of such property
without the consent of his sons. But for religious purposes, a father could make
2
a g ift of a small portion of ancestral Immovables unilaterally.
A  father's power of alienation of ancestral Immovables without the con­
sent of his sons or grandsons was denied In M atlla l Kalyan Slngha v. Brajalal and 
3others according to the sastra followed In Bihar.
Vljnanesvara and Jlmutavahana differ In their definition and notion of
4partition. This difference of approach of the two commentators has been reflected
1. (1830) Gopalchandra v . Babu Kunwar Singh, Vyavastha N o .92, DVS, 257 =
5 SeI.Rep.29.
2. dharmartham klnclddane putranam anumatlm vlnapl paltrka-sthavare'pl pltur 
adhtkarah, Ib id ., DVS, 260; relied on Nafada, manl-mukta . . . ,  D h.K . 1219; 
Y a jn . l l . l2 l;  Vyasa, sthavaram . . .  , D h.K . 1587; Br . ,  ekopl sthavare . . . ,  
Dh.K.1588b; M lta .I, 1, 27; at DVS, 260-1.
3 . (1835) Vyavastha N o .204, DVS, 626: vehara-desa callta sastranusarena putrasya 
pautrasya va anumatlm vlna paltrka sthavarasya hastantara karane pltuh pltamahasya 
va svecchaya ksamata nastl, DVS, at ,628.
4 . M lta .I. 1, 4f  Da.bha., 1.8.
tn the vyavasthas o f the pandTts.
In Bengal a sale by one coparcener of hTs own undTvTded share was
declared va lid .  ^ But accordTng to the MTthTla school, a sale or gTft of one's
2
undTvTded share was held to be TnvalTd. ThTs shows that accordTng to the 
MTthTla and the MItaksara vTew the presence of an unseparated son w tll TnvalT- 
date the altenatton of jotnt property by the father.
The vyavasthas comptled by STr Thomas Strange are matnly from South
3
India. Indirectly a son's birthrightwasrecogntsed Tn a case from VTzagapatam,
Tn which the pandit opined that a ksatrlya having no son, grandson or nephew, 
could dispose of his estate as he thought proper.
Birthright also presupposes a son's right to demand a partition of the
4
family property from his father. In Turcapah v. Mullashlah, a father turned
one of his sons out of doors. The son demanded partition of the family property,
5
and the pandit declared that the father was bound to allow the son the share he
I .  Byjnath Bunhoojea v . Sambhuochand Bunhoojea, (1815), Sale Case No. 24, 
Macnaghten, II, . Also same view In a case from Z lllah Jungle Mehals, 
(1826), Macnaghten, II, 212.
2>t  (1823), Case N o. 17, Macnaghten, II, 224. D ull! Pande v . Kashi Pande, 
(1824), Vyavastha N o.2, DVS, 4 , answer to question no.2 at 6 . Mussummut 
Roopna v . Ray Reotee Rumeen, (1853), IDOS, X III, 260. The same view on a 
case from Cuttack, (1817), Macnaghten, II, 295-6 amd Tn a case from MTdnapore 
where Orissa law was followed, (1813), Macnaghten, II, 306.
3 . Strange, II, 428; opinion of Pandit Dusky Narraln, Sastraloo.
4 . (1807), Strange, II, 320.
5. Pandit Rangacharee. Colebrooke remarked on the vyavastha that the pandit's 
opinion was contrary to the law on the point, but he admitted that under particu­
lar circumstances, a son could demand partition, M lta, I, I I ,  7 . M r. EIlls
/Continued on next page:
demanded.
But- Tn Penauka-Paty v . Appauyangar ,  ^ a case from the dTstrTct of
Vendachellum, a son's claTm for a partTtTon of ancestral movables was denTed.
2
The pandTt opTned that a son could claTm a dTvTsTon of ancestral lands only 
from hTs lather.
3
STgnTfTcant was SarabTah v . MuIlTah, where a son's rTght to demand
partTtTon durTng the lTfetTme of the lather Tn any category of property was com-
- -  4pletely denTed. But the pandTt's relTance on a sTngle text of HarTta, asserting
Note 5 -  p .670 -  contTnued:
£ for F.W. EllTs, see RLS 1,26 #-§[ thought that a father's domTnTon over the famTly 
property was absolute. If he dTvTdes hTs estate at hTs own volTtTon, he Ts bound 
to gTve the son a share, otherwTse not. Sutherland's vTew was sTmTlar to that of 
M r. EllTs, TbTd., 321. But Tt Ts submTtted that Tn hTs exposTtTon of the MTtaksara 
law the pandTt was rTght, see Kane, HD, III, 570-1. The pandTt relTed on Yajn.
II.116a, Dh.K.1169a, (whTch he cTted as Narada's).
1. (1807), Strange, II, 319.
2. PandTt Sreenevasa Charloo. Strangely enough, he cTted as hTs authorTty,'Daya 
Bhagum of JTmuta Vahana and Agree Vateva Bhagum ("sTgnTfyTng dTvTsTon Tn the 
lTfetTme of the father” £ read i ajTvad eva bhagam, an untraced mTnor treatTse 
unless Tt Ts the JTvatpTtrka-vTbhaga-vyavastha-sara-sahgraha (see RLSI, 272, n5)J 
Tn Jagannatha turkapanchananam'. Colebrooke thought that the answer of the 
pandTt was expressed too broadly, and he cTted MTta.l.TT.7, accordTng to whTch 
a dTvTsTon may be exacted by sons under partTcuIar cTrcumstances. Mr. EllTs on 
the questTon of a son's demandTng partTtTon from hTs father remarked: '"They can­
not" -  certaTnly not; the property, barrTng waste, Ts absolute Tn the lather durTng 
hTs lTfetTme'. Both the pandTt and M r. EllTs were Tnfluenced by JTmutavahana 
and Jagannatha even as early as 1807.
3 . (1808), ZTlla BellarT, Strange, II, 322.
4 . PandTt Rungachary relTed on HarTta: jTvatT pTtarT putranam arthadana-vTsargak- 
sepesv asvatantryam, D h.K . 1146a. Colebrooke dTsagreed and expressed the 
same vTew as at n . 2 above.
a son's lack of tndependence (asvatantrya) durTng the lTfetTme of the father, 
arouses suspTcTon as to the authorlatatTve value of thTs opTnTon.
In a case from the dTstrTct of Gan|am,^ on the Tssue of a son's rTght,
among the Wodday BrahmTns, to enforce a dTvTsTon of the famTly property, the
pandTt made a dTstTnctTon between ancestral and self-acquTred property of the
father. The son could demand and enforce a dTvTsTon only of the ancestral pro-
2
perty Tn the hands of the father. The prTncTple behTnd such rTght of a son Tn
3
ancestral property was gTven by a pandTt Tn a case from the dTstrTct of ChTttore. 
He dTd not rely on the son's co-ownershTp wTth the father Tn ancestral property, 
but proffered the vTew that as a man offered pTnda to ancestors as far back as 
four degrees, he had therefore to that extent, a rTght to demand a share of hTs 
ancestral property.
4The vyavasthas, (a ll except one), from South IndTa discussed above, 
agree on one poTnt, namely, that Tn ancestral Tmmovable property, the son's
rTght by bTrth Ts unquestTonable and the majorTty of the opTnTons uphold such a 
rTght Tn a ll categorTes of ancestral property Tn the hands of the father. There
1. ZTlla Ganjam, Strange, II, 323.
2. Sutherland dTd not accept son's rTght to enforce a dTvTsTon of ancestral pro­
perty as a general rule. He overlooked MTta.I, v, 11, and relTed on 
MTta. I .TT, 7, and thought that only Tn partTcuIar cTrcumstances could a son 
demand such a partTtTon, Strange, II, 323.
3. (1810), Strange, II, 327.
4 . SarabTah v . MuIlTah, (1808), Strange, II, 322, cited at supra, 671.
are opTnTons, as Tn SarabTah v . MuIlTah  ^ where The son's bTrthrTght has been 
completely denTed, but such vTews only expose the iTmTted learnTng of the pan^ ITt 
on the poTnt.
The pandTts attached to the Sadr DTvanT Adalat of the North Western
ProvTnces recognTsed a son's co-ownershTp wTth the father Tn a house constructed
2 3by the great-grandfather of the objector Tn the case. But Tn a prevTous case,
a son had to share equally wTth hTs mother, the real property left by hTs father.
The pandTts declared that accordTng to *YagyabuIk, Byas and BTshnoo', the son
and the wTdow had a rTght to TnherTt equally the property left by the deceased.
4
In another case, a son's special posTtTon Tn the famTly was upheld partly and 
TndTrectly by the pandTts, who expressed the vTew that to gTve anythTng from a 
father's se If-acquTsTtTons over and above maTntenance to a wTfe havTng no chTld- 
ren was not valTd wTthout the consent of the sons, but a husband was free to make
a gTft of hTs self-acquTred property to a wTfe by whom he had chTldren. In N .W .P .,
-  5the MTtaksara vTew of joTntness before partTtTon was recognTsed by the ^pandTts,
when they declared TnvalTd the alTenatTon by co-sharer of hTs own share Tn the
joTnt ancestral property wTthout the consent of other co-sharers.
1. SarabTah v . MuIlTah (1808), Strange, II, 322.
2. (1860), Bywustha, No. 13, Bywusthas, from July to December, 1860; revTsed 
and publTshed by the authorTty of the SDA, N .W .P ., (Agra, 1861), 1,1,7.
3 . (1860), Bywystha, N o.5, TbTd., 3.
4 . Bywustha, N o .40, TbTd., 28.
5. (1860), Bywustha, N o .39, TbTd., 26-7.
Raymond West and Johann Georg BOhler's comptlatton  ^ of the 
replies of the pandTts Tn the several courts, throws some Itght on a son's rTght 
by btrth among the HTndus of Bombay PresTdency.
2
The pandTts Tn the court of Dharwur, upheld the claTm for the share of 
a predeceased son's son Tn the ancestral property durTng the lTfetTme of the grand­
father. But Tn the self-acquTsTtTons of the grandfather, the pandTts explaTned that 
such a claTm by the grandson mbs TnadmTssTble. The vTew that sons cannot demand 
a partTtTon of the father's self-acquTsTtTons was reTterated Tn another case from 
Dharwur.'*
But the opTnTons were not everywhere unTform. The rTght of sons to
dTvTde an ancestral house agaTnst the wTlI of the father was denTed Tn a case from 
4Khandesh, where out of four sons of a yogT, two had a quarrel wTth the father and 
dTvTded the ancestral house agaTnst hTs wTlI and durTng hTs absence. The pandTt 
opTned that the dTvTsTon under dTscussTon must be cancelled. Though the pandTt 
referred to 'brothers shall dTvTde the estate after theTr father's death (whTch Ts ob­
served by West and Btyhler, was not precTsely apposTte) hTs judgment was almost 
certaTnly based on the 'force or fraud' prTncTple to whTch we have adverted above
(p.S3>» ) .
1. DTgest of HTndu Law Cases, (Bombay, 1869), V o l. I I .
2 . (1846), BOhler, TbTd., 7; sTmTlar vTew Tn Surat, 1846.
3 . (1850), Btihler, TbTd., 11.
4 . (1852), West and BOhler, A  DTgest of the HTndu Law, (Bombay, 1884), II, 798.
In Tanna  ^ the pandTts took the opposite vTew and upheld a son's rTght 
to dTvTde ancestral property agaTnst the wTlI of hTs father. The pandTts added 
that Tf such property passed from the family and was subsequently regained by 
the father, Tt should be considered as self-acquired and could not be divided 
by the sons wTthout the consent of their father.
A  similar view In respect of ancestral property was expressed by the
2
pandits In Surat Tn 1847 and In 1860, but the views of the pandit of the same
3
court were different In 1859, for they qualified a son's general right to demand
partition agaTnst the wishes of the father. The pandits added that a son had no
right to demand a share of the ancestral and undivided property from his father
agaTnst his wish, unless there were good reasons for the demand, such as (I)
the father has relinquished his claim to his property, or (ll) he was dissipating
his property, or ( III)  he was In a state of unsound mind, or (Iv) he was very old*
4
or (v) he was afflicted with an Incurable disease. This Is a rather archaic recon­
c ilia tion of textewe have already studied.
1. (1854), West & BUhler, (Bombay, 1884), II, 796.
2. BUhler, A  DTgest of Hindu Law Cases, (Bombay, 1869), II, 3; also at 
Ahmednuggur, 1850; Poona, 1854; Dharwar, 1858; West & BUhler, 
(Bombay, 1884), 797.
3 . West & BUhler, (Bombay, 1884), II, 795.
4 . The pandit cited as his authority: YajrT. I I . 121^  at M lta .I .v .3 ; they relied 
on and explained M lta .I . I t  .7 and the text of Sankha: akame pltarl rfktha- 
vlbhago vrddhe vlparlta-cetasl roglnl ca, which Is cited as Harlta's Tn
V y. Mayukha, IV, lv .6 , Dh.K.1148a.
674b.
In Sholapoor,  ^ the pandTt approved the equal share of father and 
son Tn the property left by the grandfather, but opTned that Tn self-acqutred 
property of the father, the father as the acquirer was entitled to a double 
share Tn a partition with his son.
2
In Ahmadnagar, the pandTt affirmed the Inherent right of a son In 
family property when a partition was Initiated by a father. In this case, 
a Hindu having two sons divided his property equally between them.
Th e yoiTnger son being abroad, his share was given to the grandson.
When the younger son contested the action of the father, the sastrl 
opined that the father could not give his son's share to his grandson 
unless the son was Incompetent to receive Tt.
1. (1855) BUhler, Ib id ., 803.
2. (1855), ib id ., 801.
With regard to a father's power of alienation of his self-acqulsltlons, 
the pandits from Ahmednagar  ^ affirmed that the original acquirer was at liberty 
to dispose of his property In any way he liked.
2
But In 1857, the pandits of the same court opined that a father had no 
right to dispose of Immovable property, though acquired by himself, wTthout the 
consent of his sons.
In the majority of the opinions from different districts, It appears that 
the sastra as understood and followed during the period under discussion, In the 
Presidency of Bombay, gave a son a right by birth In ancestral property In the 
hands of the father. Regarding the father's seJf-acqulsltlons, the paqdlts leaned 
towards a father's superiority as the acquirer, but did not give him the liberty to 
dispose of self-acquired Immovables without the consent of his sons.
I l l . Gastric vyavasthas versus the caste customs
3
There are some evidences of empirical study In the Presidency of Bombay, 
the findings of which to some extent run counter to the opinions reflected In the 
vyavasthas regarding a son's right by birth In property In the hands of the father.
The study arouses doubt as to the universal acceptance of the sastrlc law among the 
different castes and sub-castes of the HTndu community, and one can find some
1. (1847Q, Bflhler, Digest (Bombay, 1869), 19.
2. (1857), Ahmednagar, Ib id ., 19.
3 . Such a study was generally neglected by the Government, RLSI, 307-8.
676.
value Tn Maine's hasty remark on the sastrlc works: ' it does not, as a whole, 
represent a set of rules ever actually admtnTstered Tn HTndostan. It Ts, Tn great 
part, an Tdeal picture of that which, Tn the view of the Brahmins, ought to be 
the Ia w 'J
2
Arthur Steele made a study of 101 castes and sub-castes Tn Poona.
On the question of community of property, Tt was found that out of those 101
castes, Tn 24 the manager could sell or mortgage family property, whether Tmmov-
3
ables or movables, wTthout the consent of other members. But among 24 castes,
at the time of alienation of family property, the consent of the rest of the family 
4
was necessary. In another 41 castes, Tn one form or other, the manager had to 
take the consent of the other members of the family before alienating family pro­
perty. Among the 101 castes, the practices of 12 castes are not known from that 
5
fie Idwork.
The enquiry Into the caste customs on partition between father and son
1. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 15. Sir Gariganatha Jha does not agree
with the first sentence of Maine. Jha says that we cannot conclude one way or
the other. But he agrees with the second .sentence, Hindu Law In Its Sources, 
(Allahabad, 1930), I, Tntrod., 14-15. Professor Derrett has repeatedly found 
Maine's words Inadequate and misleading, see Juridical Review, (1959), 1, 40ff.
2. A . Steele, The Law and Customs of Hindoo Castes, (London, 1868), preface, XV . 
But he warns about the limitations of such study due to the backwardness of the 
people, and lack of Intelligence, Ib id ., x v l.
3 . Ib id ., 398.
4 . Ib id ., 398.
5. Ib id .,  398-9.
revealed that amongst 82 of the 101 castes tn Poona, a son could not enforce a
partttton agaTnst hTs father unless the father conducted himself Improperly as the
manager.^ Among 17 out of those 101, a father, even when dividing family
property at his own volition, could divide arbitrarily among his sons. But this
finding In no way denies the son any say In the family property. In fact, a
2
'separation might take place' I f  the father acted extravagantly, or, even durTng
the lifetime of the father, among 72 castes, a son could act as the manager In his
father's name when the father was Incapable of managing the property for any 
3
reason. In Steele's study, the majority of the castes were non-Brahmlns and 
mainly respectable sudras.
In Borradalle's collection of the caste customs of Gujarat,lt Is found
that among 42 castes of the non-Brahmlns of Surat and Broach, (Including 1 from
Ahmedabad and 1 from Gour), there was, In no Instance, an admission of an un-
4
qualified right o f a son to enforce a partition against the w ill of the father.
5
Borradalle's study also reveals that among some Brahmins of Surat and Broach, 
a son could not demand a partition against the w ill of the father.
1. Ib id ., 216; 405-8 .
2. Ib id ., 216.
3. Ib id ., 216.
4 . cited by Btihler, A  Digest of Hindu Law, (Bombay, 1884), II, 662.
5 . The Bhargova Visa Brahmans, the Srlmall Brahmans, the Chowralsl Brahmans
and the Walra Oonewal Brahmans of Surat; the Tulubda Brahmans and the 
Sachoura Brahmans of Surat; the Motola, Desaee Turn Brahamans of OOlpur, 
Ib id ., 660.
The Investigations Into caste customs do not weaken the authority of 
the sastrlc precepts as such, but they reveal %the great chasm between custom and 
law*  ^ and show that a good many members of the Hindu community were following 
a system which did not coincide with the rules as expressed In the treatises 
which were supposed to be the correct Interpretation of sastra regarding that 
particular region.
IV. Juridical vyavastha literature
2
We havd discussed the vyavasthas of the court pandits o f Bengal, and
have also noted that, so far as Bengal was concerned, a fathers absolute right
3
over family property was jud ic ia lly  settled In 1831. Perhaps It Is not unin­
teresting that, parallel to this growth of judicial opinion, a vyavastha literature 
of juridical value was flourishing In Bengal, which has so far been burled under 
neglect. Despite their unnoticed existence, the raison d'etre of these works, and 
the recognised scholarships of the pandits who put forward their opinions through 
them, do not allow any excuse for Ignoring this literature when studying the Bengal 
view of the sastrlns on son's right by birth.
_ # 4
The earliest available of this literature Is the Vyavastha-sangraha
1. RLSI, 305.
2. Supra, 6484P-
3 . Juggomohan Roy v . Sreemutty Neemoo Dossee, (1831), IDC6, I, 358.
4 . Ramajaya Tarkalankara Bhattacarya, Vyavastha-sangraha, (Calcutta, 1827), 
Bengali script.
of Ramajaya Tarkalankara, who clearly states that a father can deal wTth his
self-acquired property In whatever way he wishes, but any distribution of such
2
property made In anger Is wholly Invalid. As far as ancestral property Is
concerned, except for sthavara (Immovables), nlbandha (corrodles, pensions),
dvlpada (slaves)^ the father has complete Independence of action. An unequal
division or g ift e tc ., of ancestral Immovables by the father Is declared to be 
3
'never valid*.
-  -  4Then TarkalaAkara explains the clrcumstances under which a father
could alienate family property:
1. On whom see RLSI, 254, 270.
2. Vyavastha-sangraha, 307. On Invalid transfers, see above,3 5 -6 -£ 4 .
3 . Ib id ., 308.
r \
4 . klntu kutumba vartana^vlrodhl k lnclt dana karlle slddha haya /  evam posya- 
vargatmaposana avasyaka-sraddhadl rna sodhanarthe a l tlnera pltr-krta dana 
vlkrayadl slddha haya /  kramagata athava svoparjlta dhanete pita yadl bhak- 
tatva vahu-posyatvadl karana nyunadhlka vlbhaga dana karena, tave taha 
slddha haya /  paltrka svoparjlta dhane krodhadl nlmlttaka pltr krta vlbhagadl 
sakala-t aslddha h a y a / evam yadl paltrka asthavaramatra dhana thake, tahate 
paltrka sthavarera nyaya vyavastha janlva /  putra pautra prapautra sambhavana- 
rahlta vyaktl-krta paltrka sthavarasthavara vlkraya slddha haya /  I t l  p llr p lta- 
maha dhana vlsayaka vyavastha sanksepa /  Vyavastha-sangraha, 308.
But the giftof a small portTon, wTthout 
jeopardtstng the support of the famTly,
Ts valTd. And an alTenatTon (gTft or 
sale) by the father, for maTntenance 
of the dependents, for performance of 
the sraddha e tc ., and for the payment 
of debts, Ts valTd. An unequal dTstrT- 
butTon of ancestral or self-acquTred 
property, based on consTderatTons such 
as fTlTal love or a son's responstbTlTty 
to support too many dependents, Ts valTd.
A dTvTsTon of self-acquTred property Tn 
anger Ts voTd. And Tf there are (T.e.
Tf the estate consTsts of) only ancestral 
movables, then the vyavastha should 
be as Tn the case of ancestral Tmmovables.
An alTenatTon of ancestral Tmmovables 
and movables, by a person who has no 
posstbTlTty of procreatTng a son, son's 
son or son's son's son, Ts valTd. ThTs 
Ts the end of the vyavastha regardTng 
paternal and ancestral property. 1
_ _ 2 -  -
In the Vyavastha-sara-sangraha, the opTnTon leaned towards JTmuta-
3
vahana Tn the defTnTtTon of daya, and Tt re-stated that a son's svatva arose after
4
the extTnctTon of the svatva of hTs father. The compTler contTnues by sayTng 
that a father can dTvTde self-acquTred property unequally accordTng to hTs dTs- 
cretTon, *but Tn ancestral property, as because there Ts equal ownershTp between
1. Tr. mTne.
2 . CompTled by Gokula CandraGosvamT, (Calcutta, 1870), BengalT scrTpt.
3 . Da.bha.1.5.
4 . Vyavastha-sara-sangraha, 237.
father and son, the father cannot do iTkewTse' J  He adds, *but Tn movable
2
property, the father has ownershTp*. ThTs wTlI probably Tnclude ancestral 
movables as w e ll. But the TncTdence of ancestral property Tn general becomes 
clear when the compTler says that ancestral property losfand recovered should 
be treated as self-acquTred. By these statements one should not be deceTved 
Tnto thTnkTng that the compTler was acceptTng co-ownershTp of son wTth the 
father Tn the ancestral Tmmovables. He came back to the Dayabhaga vTew 
and poTnted out that the lTmTtatTons on father's power regardTng ancestral Tmmov­
ables should be taken as applTcable only Tn the case of a dTsqualTfTed (or faulty) 
father.'*
It Ts evTdent Tn the compTlatTon that a son can dTvTde the property of
the grandfather durTng the lTfetTme of hTs father, but for such a dTvTsTon he must
4
seek the permTssTon of hTs father. As, on thTs rule, the paqdTts relTed on 
5
BrhaspatT, Tt should be understood as referrTng to a partTtTon durTng the survTval
1. pTtara svoparjTta dhane yatheccha purvaka vlbhaga karTya putradTgake dana
karTvara adhTkara achekTntu paTtrka sampattTte putravarger pTtara sahTta tolya 
svamTtisra thakaya aTrupa karTte parena na /  TbTd., 238; relyTng on VTsnu,
XVI1.2, and Katyayana, jTvad vTbhage tu pTta . . .  , D h.K . 1173b.
2 . TbTd., 239.
3 . purve ye pTtamahagata sthavara sampattTte pTtara aJathacdrTtva iTkhTta haTyache 
taha patTtyadT dosayukta pTtr-para yanTte haTve/ TbTd., 239; relyTng on Devala, 
asvamyam hT . . .  , D h.K . 1156a.
4 . Vyavastha-sara-sangraha, 240.
5 . Br. XXVI .9: pTtror abhave . . .  , D h.K . 1155a. TbTd., 240.
of the father after the mother's childbearing capacity has ceased.
On altenatton of jotnt Immovable property, the Dayabhaga vtew has 
been followed. It has been admttted that one co-parcener has no power to 
gtve or sell without the permtsston of other coparceners, but Tf any unilateral 
alienation of such property Ts done, Tt Ts only a moral offence.*
2In the preface to the Vyavastha-kalpadruma, the compTler justifies
the need for the compilation of the opinions of the sastrlns by saying that the
Hindus were getting Interested Tn foreign learning and pandTts were becoming
rare; Indeed, Tn rural areas they were not available at a ll.  That Ts why he
3
had to compile the opinions of the famous pandTts on topics which were Import­
ant to the dally life of the Hindus.
1. Vyavastha-saraisarigraha, 240, relyTng on Da.bha. 11.27 and 11.28, although 
discussed the Implication ofVyasa, D h .K .1587 and Br. eko'pl sthavare . . .  , 
Dh.K.1588b.
2. Vyavastha-kalpadruma, compiled by Candra Kumara Bhattacarya, Is te d ., 
(Calcutta, 1873); 4th ed ., 1885. The 4th ed. Ts followed here, preface,
1. Bengali script.
3 . The pandTts whose opinions were compiled Tn the work were a ll Bengalis and 
came from different famous centres of Sanskrit learning, signed by: Srl^ 
Durgadasa Sarnian and Amblkacarana Sarman of Trlvenl, Sri Ramadeva Sarman 
of Vasvardla, SrlSrlnatha Sarman, 5*1 Haramohana Sarman, SrT Vrajanatha 
Vldyaratna and Sri Mathuranatha Sarman of Navadvlpa, Sri Syamacarana 
Sarman of Vardlsa, Sri Bharata Candra Sromanl and Sri Tlturama Sarman of 
Calcutta, Sri Durgaprasanna Sarman of Vlllapuskarlnl, Sri Kallkanta Slromanl 
and Sri Saradacaran Tarkapancanana of VTkramapura, SrT Ramadhana Sarman 
of Krokadl and SrT Umacarana Sarman of Kotallpara.
On respective proprietary rights o f father and son In fa intly property,
the vyavastha, compiled and approved by 15 pandits  ^ tn this work, was that tn
self-acquired property the father had power to make an unequal distribution among 
2
his sons. But In grandparenta! property, the ownership of father and son being
equal, a father could not make an unequal distribution of such property among his 
3sons.
-  4
On the definition of  daya, the compiler has followed the Dayabhaga
5
view and has supported this definition with a (spurious?) text. The compiler 
has again reaffirmed the Dayabhaga ^ view on the alienation of Immovable pro­
perty by the father.
1 . S u p ra ,682., n .3 .
2. svoparjtta dhane pita svecchaya nyunadhlkam vlbhagam kartum sakyate I t l
vldam m atam / relied on Harlta, jlvanneva va . . .  D h.K . 1163a; the text 
has been Interpreted In the vyavastha as applicable to the self-acquired pro­
perty of the father, Ib id ., 5 .
3 . The vyavastha signed by the 15 pandits Is as follows: svoparjlta-dhane pita 
svecchaya nyunadhlkam vlbhagam kartum sakyate, na tu pltamaha dhane / 
pltamaha dhane pita putrayos tulyam svamltvam I t l  /  Idam matam /  The pandits 
relied on the literal purport of the text o f Vlsnu 17.1 and 2 and on Katyayana, 
jlvad vlbhage tu pita . . . ,  Dh.K.1173b. Vlsnu 17.2 Is explained In Bengali: 
klntu pltamaha-dhane pita evam putrera tulya svamltva, arthat sekhane pita 
putre samamsa halve / ,  ‘but In grandparenta I property the svamltva of  father 
and son Is equal, that means there (In that property) the share of father and son 
w ill be equal*, (tr. mine), Ib id ., 3 .
4 . Da.bha,, 1.5.
5 . pltradtnam svatvanase yad dhanam syat sutadlkam/ sva svatvadlka sambandhat 
tad dayah parlklrtltalj / f  cited as from the smrtl but anonymous, Ib id ., 1.
6. klntu dana o vlkraya slddha halve, pita papl halve /  relied on D a.bha .ll.28 . 
The view on father's alienation was not In the vyavastha but was added by the 
compiler, Ib id ., 13.
684.
Nanda Kumara KavTratna Bhattdcarya*s justification for the complla-
tTon of hTs Vyavastha-sarvasva was more or less the same as that put forward by
Candra Kumara Bhattacarya for hTs Vyavastha-kaIpadruma.^ Nanda Kumara
2
poTnts out Tn hTs preface, that the old pandTts out of greed for money were edu-
catTng theTr ownsons and grandsons Tn foreTgn leamTng. In the tradTtTonal SanskrTt
schools (catuspathT) the smrtT Ts neglected. ThTs crTsTs Tn the knowledge of the
dharmasastras Tnduced hTm to compTle the compendTum on smrtT for the benefTt
of the householders and especTally for those who iTve Tn the vTllages. The re-
3
peated publTcatTons of the work rule out any possible suspTcTon of commercTal 
undertone Tn the compiler's plea and show Tts acceptabTlTty and popuIarTty among 
the HTndus Tn Bengal.
On the defTnTtTon of daya thTs work has also followed the defTnTtTon of 
  4
JTmutavahana. The vyavastha put forward Tn Vyavastha-sarvasva on the TncTd-
ents of self-acquTred and ancestral property Ts very sTmTlar to that expressed Tn the
5Vyavastha-kalpadruma . The pandTts who gave theTr opTnTons Tn the present work
1. Supra, €$2.
2 . Vyavastha-sarvasva, compTled by Nanda Kumara KavTratna Bhattacarya, 
(Calcutta, 1916), preface, 5 . Bengali script.
3 . ls te d .,  1859; 2nd e d ., 1867; 3rd e d ,, 1878; 4th e d ., 1916. Also re­
peated publication of Vyavahara-kalpadruma, o p .c lt., 682. n . 2 .
4 .  D a.bha.1 .5 .
5 . Supra, 6‘83.
685.
1 2 -  -  3also relTed on HarTta, VTsnu and Katyayana, and affirmed that *a father
could make an unequal division of hTs self-acquired property but not of grand-
4
parental property. ThTs Ts the vTew of the learned*. On the TncTdents of 
Tmmovable property, especTally of land, NancbKumara* s compflatTon has 
followed the iTteral purport of Narada‘s dTctum, whTch enjoTns that for the 
movables the father Ts the prabhu, but for a ll Tmmovables, neTther the father 
nor the grandfather alone Ts the owner. But at the same tTme, on the rules of 
alTenatTon, the vyavastha reaffTrms the Dayabhaga doctrTne by statTng that the 
alTenatTon of Tmmovables by a father wTthout the consent o f hTs son Ts valTd, 
even though the father Tncurs sTn by such a c t.^
The works whTch we have just discussed above,^ are neTther projected
1. Dh.K.1163a.
2 . VTsnu, X V II. 1-2.
•  •  *
3 . Dh.K.1173b.
4 . svoparjTta dhanam pTta nyunadhlkam vlbhagam kartum sakyate na tu pltamaha 
dhane TtT vTdam matam/  TbTd., 126. The vTew on ancestral property has be­
come clear Tn the vyavastha on ancestral property lost and recovered, yada 
pltamaha dhanam anyaTr hrtam pascat pTtroddhrtam tada pTtur akamato vlbhagam 
kartum na sakyate TtT vTdam matam, relTed on Manu, IX .209, TbTd., 127. The 
same vTew Tn Dayabhaga-vyavastha, author unknown, Bengali script,(Calcutta, 
1871), published by lndranarayaija Ghosa.
5 . man! mukta . . .  , D h .K .l2 l9 b , TbTd., 121.
6 . tathaca dana vlkraya slddha haya, klntu pita pratyavayl haya, TbTd., 128-9.
7 . Supra, e rg -S S .
w ith  the masterly sk ill of the commentators or digest writers nor have they any 
judicial authority as have the vyavasthas of the Hindu Law Officers attached to 
the courts In different parts of the country. Despite these limitations, their 
significance lies In the fact that even being opinions of eminent sastrlns from 
Bengal they admitted, at least theoretically, the co-ownership of father and 
son,^ In the ancestral property. For their opinions, the pandits did not explore 
so much the commentaries but relied more on the texts of the sastra. It seems that 
Vlsnu, Katyayana and Harlta were more popular with them than Yajnavalkya. 
Despite their omission of many relevant texts -  the purport of Vlsnu, XVII .2 
was overwhelming -  the pandits superimposed on Vlsnu the maxim of factum valet 
which was jlmutavahana*s Innovation. Notwithstanding their correct under­
standing of the smrtl, the pandits were fettered by Jlmutavahana*s maxim and In
2
effect, the compilers, as their pious duty, took the task of popularising the 
Dayabhaga doctrine among the Bengali Hindus In their own tongue.
V . Conclusion
Coming back to the judicial vyavasthas, we are to note that the posts 
of the Hindu Law Officers of the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras
1. Rejected by Jlmutavahana, D a .b ha .II.18.
2. See preface to Vyavastha-sarvasva and Vyavastha-kalpadruma, o p .c lt.
were abolished tn 1864,^ but the pandits From a ll comers of the country left a
sub-Itterature whTch was as varted as tt was enormous. But the qualtty of the
optntons was not as great as theTr varTe ty and there was a lack of coherence
among the optntons of  pandTts even on the same jurTdTcal problem. The
scholarshtp of pandTts ranged from TlI-dTgested sastrTc leamTng of a vtllage
priest to the encyclopaedic expertise like that of Jagannatha. But for the dls-
2
harmony among the opinions on Identical Issues, the pandits' deficiencies can-
3not be entirely blamed. The sub-literature of Court pandits' vyavasthas . . .
was coloured strongly by the Anglo-Indian Courts* predetermined fancies as to
4
which texts should be relied upon and In which way*.
But the genre of this sub-literature as an exploration of the sastra 
has Its Interest to students of Hindu legal history; the vyavasthas, as experts' 
opinions on the sastra, might not have reached the standard of perfection ex­
pected by jurists, but at the formative period of Anglo-Hlndu Law, these opi­
nions gave an administrative satisfaction to the judiciary, and a subjective
satisfaction to the litigants, being regarded as the responsa prudenturn available 
5 (In their days, and set thepattem of many legal rules which are governing the
)
Hindus even today.
1. Derrett, DJL, 8.
2 . Acharyya, TLL, 1912, o p .c lt . ,  79. RLSI, 234.
3 . RLSI, 243.
4 . Derrett, DJL, 62.
5. Cp. the rabbinical opinions In Jewish law, the responsa ( 'replies', or juridical 
'opinions'), Z .W . Falk, 'Jewish Law', In Derrett, ed ., An .Introduction to 
Legal Systems, (London, 1968), 32. Also on responsum In Roman law, see
supra, 6 3 3  n . l-
CHAPTER 17.
FATHER'S POWER OF DISPOSITION AND THE BIRTHRIGHT OF SON
I • A son's Right by birth and the concept of Pre-emption
a. Introduction
A study of the‘Sastra reveals that In the same property there may well 
be a coincidence of different rights on the part of people who are reciprocally 
related to each other. ^  It Is an Instance of the Hindu concept of svatva that 
numerous people can have different facets of right In dhanam concurrently.
For example, where several sons own property jo in tly after the demise of their 
father, their concurrent rights happen to be Identical; but, In the case of pro­
perty ownership between lather and son, their respective rights, even though 
'equal', may be non-Identical. As the senior male member, a father has the 
superior right to manage the property Including that of his unseparated son, but
he lacks the right of alienation of certain types of property without the consent 
2
of his son. Therefore, as a corollary of the birthright, one o f the rights said 
to be possessed by the son Is to Impugn or prevent an alienation by the father.
1. Yajft.11.121, Dh.K.1175b. Vlsnu, XVI 1 .2 ,B h .K . 1175a. Br .X X V I. 10, 
D h.K . 1180b. Br. XXVI. 14, D h.K . 1179b. KSty. 839, Dh.K.1173b.
2 . Vyasa, Dh.K.1587ab, sthavaram dvlpadam . . .  Br. X V .7, Dh.K.803b.
Our present enquiry Ts confTned to whether there are any other Tnstances Tn 
HTndu Law by whTch persons, TncludTng sons or others than sons, are entTtled 
to Interfere wTth the Tndependent actTon of an owner. If such a rTght exTsts, 
the questTon arTses as to whether Tt Ts a substantTve rTght over that dhanam under 
dTscussTon, or whether Tt Ts merely a rTght pertaTnTng to the procedural formalTtTes 
of the transactTon. ^
b . Nature of the rTght of pre-emptTon
2
The Tdea of pre-emptTon has been expIaTned Tn general terms by
TyabjT as, ‘where a person has the rTght to have any property transferred to hlm-
self on hTs payTng the consTderatTon for whTch the owner of the saTd property has
agreed (or purported) to sell or barter Tt to another, such rTght Ts called the’VTght 
3
of pre-emption". * Thus, pre-emption Ts a rTght Tn the nature of property Tn
the land of another whTch may be actTvated provTded the pre-emptor Ts ready to
4
pay the sale prTce agreed upon between the vendor and the vendee. In
1. As emphasTsed by VTjnanesvara at MTta.I. i .31. The dTchotomy Ts analogous
to that between the mTmamsa categorTes of  kratvartha and purusartha upon whTch 
we cannot now dwefTT
2. Partly retaTned Tn the HTndu SuccessTon Act, 1956, S.22(1), the so-called pre- 
emptTon section. On thTs section, Ganesh Chandra ft adhan v . RukmanT Mohanty, 
AIR 1971 O r.65. Also M.S. VaTdya, *SectTon 22 of the HTndu SuccessTon Act:
A  Plea for Its Amendment*, 73 Bom.L.R. Journal, (1971), 41-9.
3 . F.B. TyabjT, Principles of Muhammadan Law, (Calcutta, 1919), 648, The right 
of pre-emption has fallen foul of the Constitution, JagdTsh Saran v . BrTj Raj,
AIR 1972 A ll 313.
4 . Derrett, (1962), K .L .T .J ., 59.
essence, Tt Ts a rTght to Tnfluence an alTenatTon, substTtutTng the pre-emptor
for the vendee Tn order to become the actual purchaser on the ground, e .g .
of vTcTnage or blood tTe. The rTght of a pre-emptor remaTns dormant and
does not arTse untTl a sale Ts Tn process. Pre-emptTon Ts not a restrTctTon on 
the general rTght of alTenatTon as suchj- Tt Ts more a restrTctTon
on the freedom of the sellor to sell to the vendee of hTs choTce and also on 
the buyer's freedom to buy Tn the market. In a sense, Tt Ts a rTght o f pre­
ference to buy certaTn property by the pre-emptor. The compIetTon of a sale 
to the orTgTna! vendee depends on the consent of the possible pre-emptors.
So pre-emptTon as a concept runs counter to natural rTght  ^ of volun­
tary transfer of property by the owner and from Tts nature, Tt betrays an ancTent
orTgTn because Tt Ts belTeved that at the dawn of human cTvTlTzatTon, ownershTp
2
was 'corporate not sole*. Many ancTent legal systems reveal that the valTdTty
3
of a transfer depended on the consent of the members of the famTly or the trTbe
or the ruler, and the modern concept of TndTvTdual rTght of free alTenatTon of
4
property has grown through a gradual and chequered process.
1. On natural rTght and legal rTght of transfer, see N . MTcklem, Law and the 
Laws, (London, 1952), 84.
2 . MaTne, AncTent Law, (London, 1930), 258 , 289. Markby, Elements of Law, 
(Oxford, 1885), 247. Mayne, ATreatTse on HTndu Law and Usage, (Madras/ 
London, 1892), 4210.
3 . STmTlar custom found regarding transfer of land among the Mundas and Oraons, 
the two aboriginal tribes of Chota Nagpur, E.S. Hart land, Primitive Law, 
(London, 1924), 95.
4 . Markby, lo c .c lt . ,  247-8. R. Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 
(New Haven/London, 1954), 115.
c . The rTght of pre-emptTon Tn different legal systems
In early Roman Law, excepttng the requirement of five witnesses for
the va lid ity of the manclpatlo  ^ form of transfer, we do not exactly come across
the Idea of pre-emption, and there Is nothing to suggest that, apart from contrl-
2
butlng to the notoriety of the transaction, these witnesses had any right analo­
gous to that of a pre-emptor. But Holloway, J . suggested that the Institution 
of pre-emption was known to Roman Law: *lt sanctioned an obligatory relation 
between the vendor and a person determined, binding the vendor to sell to that
person I f  he offered as good conditions as the Intended vendee. It arose from
3
contract and also from provisions of positive law*.
In the Germany system, the Individual ownership of land Is an evolu­
tion from the ownership of the community. The consent of the blood relatives 
was a prerequisite to the transfer of landed property by the owner (Belspruchs- 
recht). If land was sold without such consent, the relatives had the right to 
claim the property within a year and a day by the fiction that Inheritance had 
followed the death of the propositus -  Vetractus gentlllclus slve ex jure consan- 
gulnltatls*. Besides this analogous right to pre-emption, they had a distinct
1. G a l.1 .119, *a sort o f symbolic sale*, (Imaglnarla vendltlo .), Institute of 
Roman Law by Galus, ed ,# E .A . Whlttuck, tr . Poste, (Oxford, 1904), 74-5. 
W.W . Buckland, A  Manual of Roman Private Law, (London, 1925), 121.
W . Markby, Elements of Law, (Oxford, 1905), 249.
2. H .F . Jolowlcz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, (London,
1932), 145.
3 . Ibrahim Salb v . Muni M ir, (1870) 6 M ad.H .C . 26 at 30.
rTght o f pre-emption, of  Retraktrecht (Naherrecht), T.e. ‘ the power to require 
the reltnqutshment from the transferee or any subsequent grantee of land trans­
ferred upon payment of the ortgTnal purchase price*. ^
The rTght o f pre-emptTon of some sort o f devTce to keep away the
stranger from the vTcTnTty of famTly or vTlIage lands was a feature of the old
agrarTan communTtTes. In the old Dutch law, iTke the old German system, the
2
rTght of pre-emptTon was prevalent.
STnce olden tTmes thTs rTght has been recognTsed Tn almost a ll the
3
legal systems of the MTddle East. In AssyrTan Law, the members of the famTly
4
or neighbours had the ‘rTght of pre-emptTon or redemption*. A  stranger as a
5
purchaser was unwelcome among the Hebrews, and pre-emption as a practTce 
was well-establTshed Tn the MosaTc law .^ The rabbTnTcal law on the subject 
Ts eloquent.^ In that system, joTnt owners, ITke undivided brothers, and
1. K . GareTs, IntroductTon to the ScTence of Law, tr . A . Kocourek, (Boston, 
1911), 145^ The modem judtcTal transfer of land (gerTchtlTche Auflassung)
Tn which the consent o f the state Ts required may be a development from the 
ancTent requirement of the consent of the family and the tribe, Markby, Ele­
ments, of Law, o p .c lt., 250, 256.
2 . Derrett, (1962), K .L .T .J ., 59-60.
3 . c.1450 to 1250 B .C ., Driver and Miles, AncTent Codes and Laws of the Near 
East, The AssyrTan Laws, (Oxford, 1935), 4 .
4 . Driver and Miles, Ib id ., 315.
5 . Abraham's purchase of land for the burial of his w ife, Genesis, X X III.3 -8 .
6. Leviticus, XXV. 24-34.
7. MaTmonTdes, Code, XII (Acquisition), tr. I .  Klein, (New Haven, Yale 
JudaTca Ser. 5, 1051) 3
adjacent neighbours are pre-emptors•
Ruth Illustrates the right of the pre-emptor In the story o f the purchase
of land by Boaz.^ Naomi, the widow of Ellmelech, after the death of her
two sons, came back from the land of the Maobltes with her daughter-in-law,
Ruth. Naomi offered to sell a parcel of her husband%s land to Boaz, who
was one of his kinsmen. E lime lech had a nearer kinsman than Boaz. When
the offer of sale was made to Boaz, he asked the nearer kinsman to buy the land
or to renounce his right of pre-emption In the presence of other kinsmen. Boaz
could buy the land only after the nearer kinsman renounced his right. This
practice among the Jews Is again attested In the purchase of his uncle*s fie ld 
2
by Jeremiah.
3
Among the Arabs, the right of pre-emption was well-established and 
In Islamic Law, besides kinsmen, the right extends to the co-sharers, and neigh­
bours.^
1. Ruth, IV . 1-9. Horowitz, The Spirit of Jewish Law, (New York, 1953), 
" W -4 0 .
2 . Jeremiah, X X X II. 6-15. Driver and Miles, The Assyrian Laws, o p .c lt., 
315-6.
3 . Amir A ll,  Mahommedan Law, TLL, 1884 (Calcutta, 1904), I, 596.
4 . Tyabjl, Muslim Law, (Bombay, 1968), 608-10.
d. Pre-emption In Hindu jurisprudence
In Hindu jurisprudence, the right of the Individual was subordinated 
to the Interest of the group Dr the family to a great extent. The Hindus attached
great Importance to land and the sages went so far as to declare that land was In -
1 2 alienable. Though transfer of land was eventually allowed, yet joint owner-
3 4ship of land by father and son, a nd the discouragement o f unilateral alienation
have been repeatedly emphasised. Under such a system, a separated kinsman, 
especially, a separated son, considering the sentimental value attached to ances­
tral land or family land, would definite ly prefer to redeem the land when sold by 
a father. Any positive evidence of the existence of the separated son's right of 
pre-emption would reinforce the right of the unseparated son to Impugn an aliena­
tion by the father which Is a coefficient of a son's right by b irth .
For our enquiry Into the presence of the Institution of pre-emption among
the Hindus, the major commentators and nlbandhakaras do not proffer anything but
5 -  -silence. Apart from the smrtT texts cited by Varadaraja and Prataparudra-deva,
1. sthavare vlkrayo nastl . . . ,  M lta .I.1 .32 . On the juridical Implication of the 
text, see above, 3 4 5 , t i.3 ,
2 . B r., M lta .l.1 .28  , Dh.K.1588b.
3 . Y a jn .II.1 2 l, Narada, manl-mukta . . .  , D h.K . 1219b.
4 . Br. X V .7, Dh.K.803b; avlbhakta vlbhakta . . .
5. No recognisable trace In the Mltaksara, Smrtl-candrlka, Vyavahara-mayukha, 
Madanaratna-pracffpa, Vlramltrodaya, Vlvdda-ratnakara,~Vlvada-clntamanl~
Vlvada-bhahgarnava. But at the late mediaeval period, texts were discovered
RLSI, 161.
the only ancTent work whTch Tllustrated the practTce o f pre-emptTon was the
Afthasastra  ^ of KautTlya. Though there could be hesTfatTon Tn acceptTng
2Art ha sastra as a source of HTndu law, yet the rules IaTd down Tn the work are
of unquestToned value as evTdences of actual usage amongst the HTndus at that
3 ✓- 4remote epoch. The passage Tn the Arthasastra runs as follows:
1. KTnsmen, neTghbours and credTtors,
Tn thTs order, shall have the rTght to pur­
chase landed property (on sale).
2 . After that, others who are outsTders 
(may bTd for purchase).
1. c . 300 B.C . to 100 A .D ., Kane, HD, 1, 99.
2 . Kane, HD , I, 86. LTngat, CLI, 146, n .3 .
3 . Derrett, ‘PreemptTon Tn TesawalamaT: a Problem Tn ChoTce of ResTdual Law1', 
UnTversTty of Ceylon RevTew, V o l. 19, No.2 (1961), 105-16 at 111.
4 . Arthasastra, 3 .9 .1 -9 . The KautTlya Arthasastra, ed. ,  Kangle, (Bombay, I960),
I, 109. tT-samanta-dhanTkah kramena bhumT-parTgrahan kretum abhyabhaveyuh /
1 /  tato*nye bahyah /2 / samanta -catvarTmsat-kuIyesu grha-pratTmukhe vesma 
sravayeyuh, samanta-grama-vrddhe$u ksetram aramam setu-bandham tajakam 
adharam va maryadasu yatha setubhogam ‘anenarddhena kah kreta* T tT /3 / trT- 
radhusTtam avyahatam kreta kretum Iabhe ta /4 / spardhaya va mulya-vardhane 
mul^a-vrddhTh sasulka kosam gacchet/5/vTkraya pratTkosta sulkam d a d ya t/6 / 
asvamT pratT-krose catur vTmsatT pano dandah / 7 /  sapta-ratrad urddhvam anabhTsa- 
ratah pratTkrusto vTkrTnfta / 8 /  pratTkrusiatTkrame vastunT dvTsato dandah, anyatra 
catur vTmsatT pano dandah / 9 /  TtT vastu-vTkrayah / /
3. (Owners) shall proclaim a dwelling 
(as for sale) Tn front of the house, Tn the 
presence of members of forty neighbour­
ing families, and a fie ld , a park, an 
embankment, a tank or reservoir (as for 
sale) at the boundaries, Tn the presence 
of village elders who are neighbours, 
according to the extent of the boundary, 
saying, ‘a t this price who Ts w illing  to 
purchase?1 1
4 . What has been thrice proclaimed and 
not objected to, the purchaser shall be 
entitled to purchase.
5 . Or, Tn case of Increase Tn price be­
cause of competition, the Increase Tn 
price together with the tax shall go to 
the treasury. The (successful)
bidder at the sale shall pay the tax.
6. In case of a bid by one who Ts not 
an owner, the fine shall be forty-four 
panas.
7. If the (bidder) does not come (to 
take possession), the owner whose pro­
perty was auctioned may sell (again) 
after seven days.
8. In case of transgression by one whose 
property was auctioned, the fine Is two 
hundred panas In the case of Immovable 
property, a fine of twenty-four panas Tn 
other cases.
9. Thus ends (the topic of) sale of Tmmov 
able property. 2
1. Cp .In Assyrian law, the Intending purchaser had to cause proclamation by 
the herald three times within one month, Driver and MTles^ o p .c lt . ,  315.
2. Tr. Karigle, The KautTlya Arthasastra, (Bombay, 1963), II, 252. The word 
abhyabhu at 3 .9 .1  denotes a right, Kahgle, II, 189, n .26. The passage 3 .9 .1 -9
Ts also paraphrased by Derrett, University of Ceylon Review, 19 (1961) , 115, n.28.
The passage ts highly technical but In clarity rivals the provisions In 
many statutes drafted In modern times. j| t describes the procedure for sale of 
Immovables In cfetall, and could be mistakenly considered to be only describing 
that, but In the first two sentences the pre-emptors* rights are we II-pronounced,^ 
and the order of preference of buyers In a proposed sa le Is expressed by the word 
kramena (In order).
-  -  2Varadaraja Tn his Vyavahara-nlrnaya has discussed some smftl texts,
which declare the rights of some classes of people to buy Tn preference to others
3In a proposed sale. Thus, Vyasa ordains,
Relations, neighbours, creditors are In 
order "possessed of causes of purchase".
Amongst them the nearer are matah ( ‘to 
be respected”) In the sale, and fore- 
most are the saplndas ("agnates within 
seven Inclusive degrees” ) . Where 
neighbours on four sides compete, he 
on the East Is preferred, then he on
1. U .C . Sarkar, Epochs In Hindu Legal History, (Hoshlarpur, 1958), 87, 206. 
Also Derrett, University of Ceylon Review, 19, N o .2 (1961), 111.
2 . Some o f those referred by Kane In passing, HD, 111, 496.
3. Vyavahara-nlrnaya, ed ., Alyangar, K .V .R ., (Madras, 1942), 355. 
jnatl samanta dhanlkah kramena kraya-hetavah /  tatrasannatarah purva 
saplndas"ca kraye matah f f  (Also attributed to Katyayana, Dh.K.898b). 
catus samanta sannldhye pracl dig balavattara /  udlcl ca pratfcl ca sarvab- 
have tu dakslna/ /  (Analogous text of Katyayana, Dh.K.898b).
samana salllah pascat samsaktai"ca Tatah param / tato 'p l bandhavah pascat 
tat samsaktas tatah param / /  na cet tad vayavadhlyeta nadl srotah patha- 
dlbhlh / /
the West, the North, and Tn the absence 
of a ll others, the South. Those who 
share water come next, then those who 
are (merely) contiguous. Then come 
bandhavah (? remoter relations, or 
partners, connections) and after them 
their contiguous neighbours. And this 
Is not broken by streams, springs, paths 
and the like . 1
Another text of Vyasa which ordains the period of limitation within 
which a pre-emptor could redeem land has been cited by Varadaraijaand runs 
as follows:^
The period of resiling In the case of 
land Is ten days both for purchaser 
and seller. It Is twelve days In the 
case of saplndas. A fter that, the 
sale Is absolute (avlcalyam). Neigh­
bours have the same period (of grace) 
and we learn that the creditors have 
the same period, are understood to 
be motcty In purchase. 3
4
{ Varadaraja has cited three texts of Brhaspatl In the same context:
1. Tr. Derrett, Univ. Ceylon Review, 19 (1961), 114.
2. V y .N l. ,  357; Dh.K.899a. bhumer dasahoViusayah kretur vlkretun eva c c / 
dvadasahas saplndanam avlcalyam atah-param / /  tat kallkas tu samantah ta­
ka la dhanlkah smrtah /  tat kallkah saplndas''ca vedanlyah kraye matah / /
3 . Tr. Derrett, Ib id ., 114.
4 . Br. X V I11.14, Alyangar, ed ., 157; D h .K .896. inatyadl-pratyayenalva 
sthavara-kraya Tsyate /  anyatha cet krayo na syat dandas cap! tayor bhavet / /  
(Also attributed to Katyayana, Dh.K.898b).
(T) “A  purchase of Tmmovables Ts valTd only wTth The consent1 o f the relatTons, 
e tc ., otherwTse there Ts no purchase at a ll,  and the partTes may even be iTable 
to a penalty.1^
Varadaraja comments that thTs rule wTH apply only to the relatTons
2
e tc ., who are present Tn the vTcTnTty at the tTme of the sale.
3
Then BrhaspatT declares the rTght of those who are absent from the
vTllage at the tTme of the sale: (TT) “Where relatTons, neTghbours, and credTtors
are absent from the vTllage at the tTme of the purchase, they have no rTght of
4
protest when three fortnTghts have elapsed sTnce the purchase“ .
5
BrhaspatT contTnues to enumerate the classes of people who generally 
have the rTght of pre-emptTon Tn a proposed sale: (TTT) *1 Full brothers, sapTndas, 
sharers of water (T.e. samanodakas), members of the same gotra (“agnatTc iTneage1), 
neTghbours, credTtors, fellow vTllagers: these seven are matah Tn a sale of land1.^
1. Tr. Derrett, TbTd., 114. Renou Tn hTs translatTon of the sloka has rendered 
pratyayenaTva as “par la conftance* (“through the trust*), “’Notes sur la 
“BrhaspatT-smrtT*” , Indo-IranTan Journal, (The Hague, 1962-3), V I, I, 97.
2. V y .N T ., 357. jnatyadTnam sannTdhane vacanam/
3. Br. X V III.20, ATyangar ed ., 158; V y .N T ., 358; Dh.K .896. jnatT samanta 
dhanTkah kraye gramad bahTr gatah /  narhantT te pratTkrostum krantam paksa- 
traye krayat / /
4 . Tr. Derrett, lbTd., 114.
5. Br. S .V ., 323; D h.K . 896; V y .N T ., 356-7. sodaras'ca sapTnda^ca sodakas" 
ca sagotrTnafo /  samanta dhanTka gramyah saptaTte yanayo matah / /  varTant Ts 
bhukraye matah, V y.N T ., 357.
6 . T r. Derrett, TbTd., 114.
Renou points out that ‘ these seven types are the "foundations” (yonT)
of purchase*,  ^ and brTngs out the correct Implication of the text by saytng that
*the potnt of the question would have been the right of pre-emption that these
2
people would have possessed, In the given order*.
-  3Bharadvaja also declares, *ReIatlons, neighbours, creditors In order
are "takers of land” . Thereafter members of the same kula ("agnatic lineage"),
and In the absence of a ll,  members of another family ( I.e . "cognates” , says 
4
Varadaraja) .*
5 iVaradaraja cites a text from Hie Pancadhyayl with the same purport:
1. " II s*aglt des sept classes de gens qul sont less *bases* (yonl) de l*achat” , Repou 
IIJ, V I, I, 97.
2 . " II saglralt d*un droit de preemption que possederalent ces gens, dans l*ordre 
Indlque” , Renou, Ib id. The passage was translated for me by Dr. Kanltkar.
3 . V y .N t. ,  356; Dh.K.900b. jnatl samanta dhanlkah bhuml parlgrahah/
tatah sakulyab sarvesam abhave tv-nyajatayah / /  Varadraja explains: 
anyajatayah bandhavah /  There Is another text of Bharadvaja to the same 
purport, V y .N l. ,  358.
4 . Tr. Derrett, Ib id ., 114.
5. The work Is not well known. No light has been thrown on the work either by 
Kape or Alyangar In his Introduction to V y .N l.
6. V y .N l. ,  357; D h .K .901 a. jnatl samanta dhanlkalj jnate (kraye) ta t kallkah
smrtah /  dasahadyas tu te sarve kretur vlkretur eva ca / /  jnatyadtgaml tat 
ksetram vlkretur mulya-karpanat / /  The third line Is omitted In two manuscripts,
V y .N l. ,  357. The meaning of the line 1s vague but It might be Indicating a
restriction on the freedom of the seller In the sense that a seller had to sell land 
at a proper market price. It Is better not to conjecture because of our lack of 
knowledge of the method of price-fixing In ancient times, see Derrett, Ib id ., 
114, n .27.
Re latlonsf  . neTghbours, credTtors are 
learnt to have the same perTod (of 
grace) when Tt (the Tntended sale)
Ts known. For a ll of them have a 
ten-day period, e tc ., and so have 
the purchaser and seller themselves.
That fTeld wTlI go to the relatTves, 
e tc ., where the prTce accepted by 
the seller Ts Tnadequate.
There are two texts of Katyayana,  ^ whTch undoubtedly convey the 
Tdea of pre-emptTon Tn sale of land.
(T) The law says that there Ts no rule 
enablTng purchase or sale of lan<^,unless 
notTce has been gTven to relatTves (of 
the seller) and others (entTtled to pre­
empt), provTded they are readTly avaTl- 
able (iTterally sTtuated Tn the nelgh- 
bourhood) and of unblemTshed charac­
ter (T.e. credTt-worthy). 2
(TT) .In the same vTllage a perTod of 
ten nTghts (for vetoTng by kTnsmen the 
sale made by one of the kTnsmen) Ts 
prescribed; when (land sold Ts) Tn an­
other vTllage, the period Ts three fort­
nights, when Tn another country six 
months, when the language (of the ^ 
kTnsmen vetoTng) Ts different, a year.
1. Katy#702-3; D h .K .898; V y.N T ., 358. jnatyadln ananujftapya samlpasthana
(ta ndrl) nlndltan /  kraya vlkraya dharmo^T bhumer nastltl nlmayah (nlicayah) / /  
sva grame daia ratram syad anya grame trl-pa ksakarn / /  rasfrantaresu sanmasam 
bhasa-bhede tu vatsaram f f
2. Translated for me by Derrett.
3 . Tr. Kane, KatyayanasmrtTsaroddhara, 262.
The Tdea of the ftrst verse of Kdyayana ts thts: no seller of land can 
altenate wtthout proof o f nottce to possible pre-emptors. In Kane's translatton 
of Katyayana (702) the meaning of the verse ts somewhat blurred.^ He ts not 
Inclined to find any element of pre-emptton tn thts text and opines that the text
2 ./v•must be Interpreted tn the same sense* as the anonymous text ctted by Vtjna_
3 _nesvara at M lta .I.1 .31 , which, according to Vljnanesvara, ts a rule Intended
for mere publicity of the transaction In order to avoid future dispute. Kane
does not put forward any convincing reason for Interpreting Kayayana 702 In
„  4
the same sense as theanaiymous text cited by Vljnanesvara. In the next text 
of Katyayana, It Is apparent from Kane's explanations within parenthesis In his 
translation of the verse, that he admits the vetoing power of kinsmen when a 
sale Is purported to be made by another kinsman, which attests the view that 
Kayayana 702 Is a text on the right of pre-emption.
1. Derrett's ‘notice has been given* for anujnapyals better than Kane*s'securing 
the approval*, Kane, Ib id ., 262.
2 . Kane, Katyayanasrnrtl, 262, n. on 703. Jolly found In It the trace of a right 
of pre-emption but he thought that the text was divested of Its meaning by the 
commentators, History of'the Hindu Law, TLL, 1883, (Calcutta, 1885), 89.
This view was wrongty/Sccepted by Mahmood J. In Goblnd Payal v . Inaya- 
tullah, 7 A l l .  775 at 777. Long before Macnaghten Identified the text as con­
taining the Idea of pre-emption, see his comment on the sale Case N o .7,
Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1828), II, 297, note thereto.
3 . sva-grama jnatl-samanta . . .  , M lta.1.1.31.
4 . Karje also missed the texts attributed to Kayayana, which clearly state the 
rules of pre-emption, texts of Katyayana at Dh.K.898b.
A ll the texts cited above converge on one point, that In sale of 
Immovables the owner's decision to sell to the buyer of his choice Is not fina l. 
Certain categories of people had to be notified when there was a proposed sale 
of land, since they had the right to buy In order of preference.
As we have stated before,^ none of the major commentators has 
dealt with these texts In the context of pre-emption, but that does not a lto­
gether negate their knowledge of the concept. There Is a passage In Apararka 
which suggests the right of pre-emption of kinsmen. While stating the rule o f 
alienation of Immovable property, Apararka says that a seller must have the 
consent of kinsmen before a sale, and the object of requiring such consent Is
to Indicate that where they are not unfit or Indifferent, an alienation should be
2
made In their favour and not In favour of strangers. ,
Kalhana records an Incident of the fraudulent sale of a house In the
-  3 4Rajataranglnl, which comes very near to an Illustration of pre-emption.
1. Supra,634, 'n "5 *
2 . Apararka on Yajn. II . 175: Yajnavalkyasmrtl, Anandasrama edn., 380. 
danadl-yogyesu vlbhaktesu dayadesu satsu tebhya eva sthayaram arpanlyam 
ayogyesu nlrapeksesu va'nyebhya I t l / Y a jn .  II .175 Is a text on what could
be given as a g ift. But Apararka's comment could be taken as rule applicable 
to alienation of land In general. He was explaining the rights o f the separated 
dayadas on ancestral Immovables.
3. A  12th century work, chronicling the . reigns of the kings o f Kashmir from
c.2448 B.C. to 1148 A .D .
4 . Rajataranglnf, V I. 14-41, (Hoshlarpur, 1963), 245-8.
According to the law of the country, the sale of land had to be concluded tn 
the presence of the offTctal recorder (adhtkarana-lekhaka). It was hTs duty to 
measure the land and draw up the deed. In thts case, the seller bribed the 
recorder presumably to evade the rtghts of the pre-emptors. However, the 
pre-emptor lodged a complatnt wtth the ktng and *at the request of the coun­
c ilo rs , the ktng granted to the clatmant the house of the merchant, together
wtth hts property, and extied the defendant(s) from the landO  Kalhana com-
2
posed hts work between c. 1148 and 1149 A .D . The story of the fraudulent
merchant may be a narrative but, jurid ica lly , Tt ts the record of a usage prac­
tised among the people of Kashmir around the time when the author was compos­
ing hts work.
Even among the people of Bengal, where there ts supposed to be more 
freedom of alienation because of jlmutavahana*s approach to the smrtls, the prac­
tice of asking for the consent of kinsmen e tc ., before a sale of land, was not com­
pletely unknown. It has been pointed out by N .R . Roy that TnscrtptTonal materials 
of the time of the Pal dynasty reveal that while making a g ift of land, the king 
used to address the kinsmen (kutumba), neighbours (pratlvasT) and the elements
by saying, *1 am making a g ift of this land, let Tt be consented to by a ll o f you*
3(matam astu bhavatam).
1. R .T ., V I. 41. sab hair abhyarcamanena rajna sartham vantg-grham/ vtttrnam 
arthtne desat pratyartht ca pravasttah / /  tr . M .A . Stein, Rajataranglnl, 
(London, 1900), I, 239.
2 . Stein, Ib id ., 15.
3 . N.R. Roy, Bangallr ltthas, a historical work In Bengali language, (Calcutta,) 
ls te d .,  252-3.
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The later Inscriptions belongtng to the Sen dynasty show that the 
‘matam astu bhavatam‘ was changed Tnto ‘vldltam astu bhavatam* (Met Tt be 
known to you*). Roy does not thtnk that there was any baste difference be­
tween the two expressions. According to him, ‘matam astu1 was more courteous 
than ‘vldltam astu*. He also opines that the village community was not the 
collective owner of land during the reign of these two dynasties, but he was 
not so sure of his contention and qualified Tt by suggesting that to some extent,
It could be correct to say that these utterances were carrying the Idea of a re­
mote past when the concept of ownership was collective.^ In our present 
context, one can suggest that I f  some sort of consent of kTnsmen etc. was re­
quired while making a g ift, It  would not be altogether unnecessary while making 
a sale. In South Indian Inscriptions, especially those of the tenth to the four­
teenth centuries In Kannada orTelegu, sales with the consent of sons, relatives,
and neighbours are repeated! rehearsed and there are examples where the con-
to ' 2
sent turned out no/be sufficiently specific.
-  3There are a few texts In the Mahanlrvana-Tantra which mirror
4
the Idea of pre-emption as revealed In the smrtt texts cited above.
1. N .R . Roy, Bangafir ltthas, o p .c lt . ,  252.
2 . SeeEp, Carn. V , Chann. 242 (A .D . 1252), Ib id ., V III, Sorab 237 (A .D . 
1221).
3. A  sacred work composed between 1775 and 1785 A .D .,  RLSI, 267.
4 . Ante, 6 5 7 -7 0 1*
The texts tn Mahanlr vana-Tantra run as follows:^
If there be a competent buyer for Tmmov- 
able property, who Ts a near neighbour, 
then tt ts not competent for the owner of 
the tmmovable property to sell the same 
to another. Among buyers who are near,
$4ie agnate and one of the same caste are 
specifically qualified, and In their ab­
sence, friends, but the desire of the 
seller should prevail I. 2
Macnaghten cited these texts as Implying the recognition of the con-
3
cept of pre-emption among the Hindus. But he was sceptical about their
4
acceptability as precepts of practical law. He added a few words of caution
by saying that ‘ the Interminable and troubled ocean of Hindu Jurisprudence Is
sure to present something for the support of any opinion which It may be desirous
5
to keep afloat for the purpose of temporary convenience1.
1. MKT, ed., Sir John Woodroffe, (Madras, 1929), 390-1. X II. 107-8. Also 
cited by Shyama Charan Sarkar, Vyavastha Chandrtka, (Calcutta, 1880), II, 
627, note thereto. X II. 109-12 are Illustrations of the same rule, 
sthavaram dhanam anyasmal sthlte sannldhya-vartlnl/yogye kretarl vlkretum 
na saktah sthavaradhlpah / / 1 0 7 / /  sannldhya-vartlnam jnatlh savarno va 
v ls lsya te / tayor abhave suhrdo vlkretrlccha garlyasT/ / \ 0 8 / /  
vlkretrlccha garlyasT means that I f  there are several buyers belonging to any of 
these classes, the person to whom the seller wishes to sell the property w ill 
have the preference to buy, Harlharananda Bharatl on MNT, X II. 108. 
Woodroffe, MNT, (Madras, 1953), 374-5.
2 . Tr. Woodroffe, The Great Liberation (Mahantrvana Tantra), (Madras, 1953), 
374-5.
3 . W .H , Macnaghten, Principles and Precedents o f Moohummudan Law,
(Calcutta, 1825), xv ttt-x tx .
4 . Ib id ., x lx .
5 . Ib id ., note at x lx . The Supreme Court In Shrl Audh Beharl Singh. v . Gajadhar, 
AIR 1954 SC 417 at 420, treated the work as one on mythology and not on law, 
and did not attach any value to the texts of MNT on pre-emption.
Macnaghten did not seem to have any knowledge of similar texts tn
the Vyavahard-ntmaya or tn the Sarasvatt-vtllasa and havtng nothtng tn the
other commentartes avatlable to htm regardtng pre-emptton, hts scepttctsm was
legtttmate. But havtng before us the texts from the two above-men ttoned
treaties, there ts not much reason to suspect that tbe Mahan trvana-Tantra
texts were metrtca! verstons of Islamtc Jurisprudence.  ^ Moreover, the rules
contatned tn the Mahantrvana -Tantra texts are far from betng tdenttcal wtth
2
the Musltm law of pre-emptton.
The absence of a mentton of the rules of pre-emptton tn the major 
legal treattes, and thetr presence tn the Vyavahara-ntrnaya and Sarasvatt-
vtlasa may be due to the tntruston of customs (lauktka-dharma) or (vyavahartka-
✓- 3vtdht) tn the dharmasastra Itterature at a relattvely late stage. We mtght ftnd
some support for thts observatton t f  we attempt to explore the customary law of
the Htndus avatlable to us tn the dtfferent parts of the sub-conttnent.
The Dutch comptled the Thesavalamat, the Code tn Jaffna at the be­
ginning of the etghteenth century. The Code was prepared, as the name 
Thesavalamat* suggests, from customary matertals as presented by the Mudaltars.
1. On the supposed ortgtn of the work, see RLSI, 267, also on tts psychological 
background, Derrett, *A jurtdtcal fabrtcatton of early Brtttsh Indta : the 
Mahanlrvana-tantra*, Z . f .  vergl. Rechtsw., 69, pt.2 (1968), 13B*—81.
2. Derrett, The Htndu Law Relating to Pre-emptton*, Adyar Library Bulletin, 
V o l.25, p t.1 -4 , 25.
3 . Derrett, Ib id ., 25; also (1962) K er.L .T .J . 64.
4 . Tambtah, W .H ., Laws and Customs of the Tamils of Jaffna, (Colombo, 1950),
43f. Tamil Culture*, V o l.7, No.4 (1958), 9. Also hts Principles of Ceylon Law,. 
(Colombo, 1972), 200.
In the Code we can see that the right of pre-emption of heirs, partners and 
neighbours was recognised In the customary law of the Tamils of Jaffna, who 
migrated to Ceylon and carried the customs with them from their previous abode. 
Tamblah emphasises that the law of pre-emption known to the Thesawalamal Is 
a survival of the original Marumakattayam law brought by early colonists.^
According to Hindu customary law In Goa, ‘no transfer of land
was valid without the consent of the gankarsand other watandars, l.e  . ,  the
2
principal tenants of the village*. The knowledge that pre-emption existed
3
by custom among the Hindus In Bihar goes back as far as 1792. A  right or
custom of pre-emption was recognised as prevailing among the Hindus In
4 5G uiarat. Pre-emption also exists among the Khasas. A  fu ll bench of the
High Court ^ of North-West Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) determined that
1. Customs of the Tamils of Ceylon, Tamil Cultural Society, (Ceylon, 1954), 49.
2 . Derrett, The Hindu Law Relating to Pre-emption*, Adyar Library Bulletin,
V o !.25, 1-4, 24, n .2 .
3 . Ramruttan Singh v . Chunder Naraen Ral, (1792), 1 Sel. Rep., S .D .A ., (C al.),
1, disapproved at 7 Al l .  7 /5 . But pre-emption as part of Hindu usage In Tlrhoot 
was upheld In Omed Roy v . Nakched Ral, I .D . ,  O .S ., V II, 396= 5 Se!.Rep.82; 
at 85. There Is a valuable note which ends with the remark of Colebrooke at 86 , 
who states that a right of pre-emption *may be found supported by local custom* 
among the Hindus.
4. R .K . Wilson, A  Digest of Anglo-Muhammadan Law, (London, 1895), 351.
The same view with regard to the Hindus In Bihar, Ib id .
5 . Pre-Vedlc Immigrant belonging to the Aryan fold who occupied a large part of 
the Himalayas from Kashmir to Nepal, L .D . Joshl, The Khasa Family Law, 
(Allahabad, 1929), 192.
6 . Chowdhree Brlj La 1 v . Raja Goor Sahal, (1867) Agra (F.B.) (N .W .P ., F.B. Rul. 
July-Dec.1867), 95 cited by F.B. Tyabjl, Muslim Law, (Bombay, 1968), 631,n . 16,
also at 633, n .8 ; 637, n.30. Also cited by Tamblah, Tamil Culture, V o l.8 , NO.2
/Continued next page!
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pre-emption was a feature of the customary law of the HTndus and was not an
TmportatTon from Islamic jurisprudence. Despite this judicial pronouncement,
Sir John Edge In delivering the judgment of the Privy Council In Dlgambar Singh
v . Ahmad Said Khan  ^ held that pre-emption In village communities In British
India had Its origin In the Mohammedan law . . . *  The decision was somewhat
careless In the sense that the Judicial Committee did not even make any mention
of BrljlaPs case. The only text-book on the subject, they relied on was Amir
All*s Mahommedan Law and Macnaghten*s work went unnoticed. Even before
2Brljlal's case In Fakir Rawot v . Sheikh Emam Bukhsh, Sir Barnes Peacock C .J . 
left some doubts as to the certainty of Islamic origin of the Hindu law of pre­
emption by saying tha t,
we, therefore, think the established law 
upon this subject Is clear enough; that a 
right or custom of pre-emption Is recog­
nised as prevailing among the Hindoos In 
Behar and some other provinces of West­
ern India; that, In districts where Its 
existence has not been jud ic ia lly  noticed, 
the custom w ill be matter to be proved; 
that such custom, where It  exists, must 
be presumed to be founded on and co­
extensive with the Mahommedan Law 
upon that subject, unless the contrary 
be shown . . .  3
Note 6 -  p .708 -  Continued:
(1959) 32. Derrett, Adyar Library Bulletin, v o l.25, P t.1 -4 ,16, n .3 . 
1 apologise that I could not see the case from the law report Itself.
1 . (1914) 42 1A 10 at 18.
2. (1863) W.R. (Sp.No.) 143.
3 . Ib id ., at 145.
By these last fTve words he left the possibility open to show that the Hindus could 
have pre-emption In their customary law Independent of Muslim Influenceon the 
subject.
Despite the ava ilability  of Varadarajlyam and the Saras vatl-vllasa,
the Supreme Court aired Its Ignorance In emphatic terms that pre-emption was
not a feature of Hindu jurisprudence. Observing on pre-emption, the Supreme
Court remarked, ‘ there Is no Indication of any such conception In the Hindu Law
and the subject has not been noticed, or discussed either In the writings o f the
smrtl writers or In those of later commentators*. ^  But In Radhaklshan Laxmlnarayan 
2
v . Shrldhar, the Supreme Court observed that so far as Berar was concerned, the 
theory of the Islamic origin of the Hindu law of pre-emption did not seem to be 
well-founded.
3
It has also been :■ pointed out by the Supreme Court that pre-emption,
being a limitation of one*s freedom of enjoyment of property, Is against the provt- 
4
slons of the constitution. Be that as It may, In our present context, we refrain
5
from Indulging In constitutional quibbles regarding enjoyment of property.
Freedom of enjoyment of property Is desirable, but one should not miss the point 
that pre-emption Is also a notion of natural justice which upholds the preference
1. Shrl Audh Beharl Singh v . Gajadhar, AIR 1954 SC 417 at 420 •
2 . AIR 1960 SC 1368 at 1369, para,5.
3. Bhau Ram v . Balj Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1476 at 1481.
4 . A r t .15; A r t . 19( 1) ( f) .
5 . For the paradox and hollowness of decisions of the Bhau-Ram type, see Derrett, 
‘Iviinrftmfl Court onrl Pre-omntton*. 1963. Rom.! .R I I -4 .
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of certain persons having specific relations of person or property to the vendor.^ 
From the point of view of modernity, there Is no doubt that pre-emption Is a 
limitation on the owner's power of alienation and on a buyer's power to pur­
chase: these limitations and their nature and extent are relevant to our present 
enquiry Into the son's right by birth, which also Implies a limitation on the 
father's power of alienation. The nature of the two concepts, namely pre­
emption and birthright, may be different but they are manifestations of the same 
archaic tendency towards the Interaction of multiple rights over the same pro­
perty. But the existence of the one In any legal system doesnot necessarily 
prove the existence of the other; nevertheless, the discussion w ill help us 
In the sense that the existence of the right of a separated son as the pre-emptor 
In the case of a proposed alienation by his father would strongly Imply a right 
of Interdiction of a father#s alienation by an unseparated son, which In­
directly proves the existence of an unseparated son's co-ownership with the 
father.
In almost a ll the texts to which we have referred above jnatl (a person 
within the same gotra) Is recognised as the pre-emptor. In Vyasa and Brhaspatl 
sa plnda s (agnates within seven Inclusive degrees) are foremost In order o f prefer­
ence as pre-emptors. A son Is the nearest |natl as well as the nearest saplnda. 
Th^rrfeanlng of the word plnda In the law of Inheritance has Important bearing on 
our present purpose. As used In the Veda, plnda means particles of body and
1. Per Holloway, C .J . ,  Ibrahim Salb v . Muni M ir, (1870) 6 Mad. H .C .26 at 31.
not the funeral cake.^ VTjnanesvamalso opined that the word saplnda, either
2
dtrectly or Indirectly denoted parttcles of one's body. By being particles of
3
one's body Ts meant blood-relatlonshlp wtth one's ancestor. The son Ts the 
nearest blood relative of the father, and tn that sense, he Ts the nearest saplnda 
and according to the texts, would have the right to pre-empt before any other 
pre-emptor In the case of a proposed alienation by the lather. S im ilarly, Tn 
a proposed sale by a separated son, the father w ill also have the right to pre­
empt before any other pre-emptor.
e . Conclusion
Thus, In a legal system where the separated son has the right to pre­
empt, the unseparated son's right to Impugn or prevent an alienation by the 
father Ts unquestionable. We must say that our present discussion Is neither 
an attempt to prove the existence of son's blrthrlghf on the strength of the exist­
ence of pre-emption In the Hindu system, nor Is It a w ilfu l digression from our
1. Yaju.XXV. 42. The White Yajurveda, e d ., Webber, (Berlin, 1849), I, 769. 
ekas tvastur asasya vlsasta dva yantara bhavatas tathartul? /  ya te gatraiiam 
rtutha kmoml ta ta plndanam prajuhomy agnau / /  Mahtdhara explains gaticnam 
plndanam as, gatra-sambandhlnam mamsa-plndanam ta ta tan! = tany anganl 
agnau prajuhoml/  Ib id ., 769. Uvatacarya also explains plndanam as mamsa- 
plndanam, Suklayajurveda-Sarphlta, e d ., W .L.S . Panslkar, Nlrnaya Sagar 
Press, (Bombay, 19]2), 471a.
2 . Vl|hanesvara on Yajn.1.52, Kane, HD, I, 290.
3. Kane, Ib id ., 290. The Idea Is also In Baudhayana dh.su. 2 .2.15.16 ; D h.K . 
1268b; SBE, I I .2.14; angad angat sambhavasl, 'From my several limbs (of my 
body) art thou produced', SBE, X IV , 226.
central theme. On the contrary, since the sasfra has precepts on son*s right 
1 ~  
by birth, the texts on pre-emption may be Identified as complementary to those
precepts Intending to emphasise the co-ownership of father and son.
II. Son's birthright and testamentary power of a father
a. Introduction
The coming Into existence of a son's right by birth restricts the father's
power of dealing with family property and reduces him to a co-owner with his son.
The existence of testamentary disposition In any legal system envisages the power
of a father (testator) to Interfere with the expectancy of natural heirs by regulat-
2
Ing the devolution of property after his death. A  son's birthright Is a lim ita­
tion on his father's ownership In the form of curtailing his power of arbitrary 
division or unilateral alienation of family property. The Idea of co-ownership 
between father and son would not only Imply restrictions on father's power In
dealing with property during his lifetime, but also would prevent the father from
3
determining the devolution of property after his death. Thus, according to 
the MTtaksara view of property, the recognition of a son's co-ownership with his 
father In the patrimony should negate a father's power of testamentary disposition.
1. Y a |n . | | . l2 l .
2 . Jolowlcz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, (London, 1952), ]25 .
3 . West and BOhler, A Digest of the Hindu Law, (Bombay, 1884), 213.
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Under the MTtaksara system, a father before a partTtton with hTs son 
should have no power to w tll away hTs son*s share, the ownershTp of whTch was 
acquTred by the son at hTs b irth . There could be a posstbTlTty of testamentary 
dTsposTtTon by a father o f hTs own share Tn the famTly property, but property be- 
Tng joTnt, the shares of the co-owners remaTn undefined  ^ until a partTtTon takes 
place between the father and the son.
Even Tn the Dayabhaga system where a father, for a ll practical pur­
poses, Ts considered as the absolute owner of the family property, exclusion of 
a son from Inheritance took place only Tn rare circumstances, namely when the
son has proved himself an enemy of the father, or w ilfu lly  omits the performance 
2
of obsequies.
In both systems, the chances of testamentary disposition are minimal ;
3
because In both, In the absence of a son Including an adopted son, there Is an
absolute and far-reaching scheme of Intestate succession after the death of the 
4
propositus. But this cannot be the last word on testamentary disposition In 
the Hindu system uni Jess we explore the dharmasastras, which were the basic In­
spirations behind these two schools.
1. Appovler v . Rama Subba Alyan, 11 MIA 75 at 89.
2 . Colebrooke, D ig ., (Calcutta, 1801), III, 300-1; 303-4.
3 . Kane, HD, III, 474, 816.
4 . Cp. In Roman Law when a man died Intestate, leaving no suus heres, his
nearest agnate used to get his estate: si Intestato morltur, cul suus heres nec
esclt, adgnatu s proxlmus famlllam habeto, UlpIanT Fragmentct ex llbro Singu­
lar! Reg u la rum; on the discovery and authenticity of this work, see J#MuIrhead, 
Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome, (London, 1899), 310-11.
b . A  comparative .appraisal
Before we pass on to the dharmasastras, we should have a survey of 
other ancient legal systems which might provide a guideline to our present en­
quiry. A testament Is an Instrument to override the natural claims and rights 
of the kindred In blood of the propositus.^ In primitive society where mutual 
dependence and ties were closer, bequest would be a rare phenomenon. The
Institution of the disposition of one*s property after one*s death, as stated by
2Maine, Is a feature of the developed form of society.
D
The omans may be considered pre-eminently the Inventors of the
3
w ill,  but It took a long time for them to evolve the Idea of a proper Instru­
ment by which a testator could disinherit his legal heir. In the early Roman
system, there were two types of Instruments which were made either In the
4
comltla (testamentum calatls comltlls), or by a soldier when the army was
5
drawn up In battle array (testamentum In proclnctu). Around c.200 B.C.
testamentum calatls comltHs became obsolete and the more frequent
form of a sort of testament was testamentum per aes et llbram, which was a
1. There Is a general absence of testation In kln-organlsed societies, J. Stone, 
Human Law and Human Justice, (Bombay, 1965), 98.
2. Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 174.
3 i  Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1905), 172. But see supra, 33.
4 . Institute of Roman Law by Galus, tr . E. Poste, (Oxford, 1904), II , 101; 176
Ancient Law, 176. On this also supra, 33-4.
5. *ln proclnctu, Id est cum b e lli causa arma sumebant*: ‘In martial array, that Is 
to say, In the fie ld before the enemy*, Galus, Ib id . A . Watson, Roman Private 
Law around 200 B .C ., (Edinburgh, 1971), 100. See supra, 34.
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pecultar adaptation of manclpatlo, Tn the sense that bestdes the person to whom 
the transfer was made (famtltae emptor), Tt requtred ftve witnesses and the trans­
fer was not secret.^ For the first time, a general testamentary power was
2 3
granted In the Twelve Tables, but the Idea was In every way discountenanced,
and nothing short of express disherison (exheredatlo) could deprive a son (suus
4
heres) o f his ‘birthright*.
Even after the Twelve Tables, the potency of the right of the suus heres
was such that a testator had to provide, either by Institution or disherison, not
only for sul heredes In life at the date of his w il l ,  but also for any that might be
born subsequently. If this point was neglected, the birth of another child would
Invalidate the testament because even a newly-born child had an Interest which
5
could not be defeated except by his Institution or dlshered- Itlon . To protect 
the natural hetfr from being completely disinherited, various laws were made from
1 . Watson, Ib id ., 101-2.
2 . ‘u tl legasstt suae re l, Tta jus esto- ‘ * as a man shall settle In reference to his 
estate (res = res, famlllarls), so shall be law*, Mulrhead, Historical Introduction 
to the Private Law of Rome, (London, 1899), 46. On this text see s u p ra ,3 5 -6 *
3 . Discussed by Poste, G a l. Institute, II, 101-3, at 179. Also, Mulrhead, Ibid, 
46.
4 . Mulrhead, Ib id ., 46, 162. Also Sanders, The Institutes of Justinian, (London, 
1956), Introd., Itv . It Is submitted that by the phrase ^birthright*, Mulrhead 
and Sanders did not mean co-ownership of father and son In the Mltaksara sense. 
They emphasised the heirship o f son In preference to other heirs.
5 . Mulrhead, Ib id ., 163. Cp. Vyasa, D h ,K . 1587: ye feta ye*pyajatas^ca . . .
time to time. The most Important was the lex Falcldla, by whTch no one was 
allowed to gTve tn legactes more than three-fourths of hTs goods after maktng de
2ducttons for debts and funeral expenses. Thus, at least a fourth part was se-
io . 3
cured which was known as the Falctdta or portto legtttma. If children were
completely disinherited, they could prefer a complaint called querela Inofflclosl 
testament!, which was eventually abolished by Justinian. Under similar circum­
stances, the children could bring another action called de Inofflctoso testamento 
on the supposition that their parents were not of sane mind. A ll these rules show 
that In Ancient Rome the protection of the rights of natural heirs was given great 
Importance, and the testamentary power only gradually made Inroads Into the 
right o f Inheritance of the suus heres.
Testamentary succession In the strict sense did not exist Tn Babylonia. 
In the Code of Hammu-rabl ** there was no such Instrument as a w ll l .^  To
1. Passed In c . 40 B.C. In the reign of Augustus, Sanders, The Institutes of 
Justinian, (London, 1956), ln trod., llv  and 549-50.
2. Cp* by the authority o f the sunna of the Prophet, a Mahomedan cannot make a 
bequest of more than one-third of his estate, Hedaya, (London, 1870), 671.
MuIIa, Principles of Mahomedan Law, (Bombay, 1968), 127. N .J . Coulson, 
Succession In the Muslim Family, (Cambridge, 1971), 213-4.
3 . G a l.I I ,  227. G .S . Henderson, The Laws Relating to W ills In India, TLL, 1887, 
(Calcutta, 1889), 4 . On the different phases of the Roman Law of W ill,  see 
JolowTcz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, (London, 1952),248-56.
4 . Sanders, Inst. Justn., LIB, II, TIT. X V III; 209.
5 . c . 2270 B.C.
6 . G ,R. Driver and J .C . Miles, Ancient Codes and Laws o f the Near East, The 
Babylonian Laws, (Oxford, 1952), I, 343.
ar\  o note  th a t  l ex F a lc id ia  p ro te c te d  
any in s t i tu te d  h e ir  so f a r  as the le g is la t io n
dtstnhertt a son,qfather had to go before a court and announce hTs TntentTon of 
disherison. The judge would examtne Tnto the reasons, and Tf the son had no 
grave offence, he would not be dtstnhertted ('thrust out*).^
2
The Law Code of Gortyn dtd not provtde any freedom of testamentary
dtsposTtton to the father. ThTs may be due to the fact that the Code provides a
semblance ofson's btrthrTght Tn the sense that when a son was condemned to pay
a fine,the father had to give hTm hTs due portion from the family property.
Otherwise, normally a division would take place after the death of the father,
3
and a daughter would get half as much as a son.
4
A testament was unknown In Sparta. O rig ina lly, In Athens, *a man 
could Tn no circumstances determine the ownership of things belonging to his
5
patrimony after he should d ie1. The Athenian w ill Introduced by the Laws
of Solon was an Inchoate testament and could never prejudice the Inheritance
, 6 of a son.
1. Ib id ., 348-9. Rev. A .H . Sayce, The Code of Hammurabi, tr . Evolution of 
Law, (Boston, 1915), 1, 422; Code, $168. For grave offence like cursing 
a father, a son could be put to death, Code, ^195. For our discussion on the 
Code, see supra, 172.
2. c . 480-460 B .C . See our discussion, supra, 87.
3 . A .C . Merrlan, Law Code ofGortyna In Krete, (Baltimore, 1886), 15.
R.F. W illetts, The Law Code of Gortyn, (Berlin, 1967), 20. W ille tt's 
edition Is better than Merrlan's. On daughter's share, cp. Islamic law, a 
double share to the son.
4 . J . Mulrhead, Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome, (London, 
1899), 46. See supra, 82.
5. A .R .W . Harrison, The Law of Athens, (4th century B .C .), (Oxford, 1968), 
149-50. See supra, 81.
6 . Maine, Ancient Law, 174-5. Also supra, 81.
719.
In JewTsh law, there were tzewa'ah (*a g tft of one l/Tng sick*, matenat 
shektv mera1), a sort of donatto mortis causa but ‘shetar tzewa*ahk, a wrTtten w ill 
was of later development and appears to have been a product of the Influence of 
Roman or Hellenistic jurisprudence.^
In ancient German law, as In the Mltaksaragystem, a male child was 
2
a co-proprietor with the father, and a w ill was unknown to them until they
came In contact with the Romans and Roman Influence could be attributed to
3
the growth of testamentary disposition among a ll Teutonic nations of Europe.
In a ll these systems, the absence of or discouragement from making a 
bequest proves the fact that the natural heir had a vested right In the family 
property, though that might materialise only In the form of Inheritance after 
the death of the fatter. The ancient German system and the Mltaksara system 
In a striking resemblance manifest co-ownership of son with the father. In the 
Mltaksara system, a sonks power of demanding a partition from hts father makes 
a fathers testamentary power nugatory. The Roman patrla potestas resembles 
the powers of a father under the Dayabhaga system. The obstructions against 
testamentary disherison of natural heirs In ancient Roman law explain that even 
among the Hindus, following the Dayabhaga school, testamentary disposition by
1. Maine, Ib id ., 174. G . Horowitz, The Spirit of Jewish Law, (New York, 
1953), 402-4. Explained, supra, 2 I'd'.
2 . Maine, Ib id ., 175-6. AIsoR. Huebner, t r . ,  Phllbrlck, A History o f Ger­
manic Private Law, (London, 1918), 666. Supra, 128-9.
3 . See supra, 137-9.
a father may not be an easTly accepted phenomenon.
c . Testaments tn Classical HTndu Law
The above discussion explains Thomas Strangers claims  ^ as to why 
there Is no word In the Indian languages which accurately conveys the concept­
ion of a w il l .  Strange's view was also shared by Sir Henry Maine, who stated
2
that 'In Hindu Law there Is no such thing as a true w ill* . In this context, 
Montrlou brought out the underlying Idea behind the rules of Hindu succession. 
He explains,
an Inofficious W ill by a Hindu, I .e .  one substan­
tia lly  In contravention of the rules laid down for 
his guidance In the Sastras, as to the obligations 
and uses of property, Is a rare, It may be said, 
an almost Impossible occurrence. The ortho­
dox Hindu contemplates the claims of his children 
and dependants as Indeafeaslb le . . .  3 
Chandra
Golap/Sarkar Sastrl emphatically denied the existence of w ills among the Hindus.
He said, 'w ills were unknown to the Hindus, and In fact, they appear to be opposed
4
to the spirit of Hindu Law.*
Among the early authors on Hindu Law, almost a ll cherished the Idea 
that w ills were unknown to classical Hindu jurisprudence. But J .D . Mayne
1. T. Strange, Hindu Law, (Madras, 1859), I, 255. There Is a Tamil word, 
maranasadanam, analogous to w ill;  pointed out In Valllnayagam P llla l v . Pachche, 
(1863) 1 Madras H .C .R . 326 at 330, n . j .
2 . Maine, Ancient Law, o p .c lt., 171-2. Same view of Mulrhead, Historical Intro- 
ductlon to the Private Law of Rome, o p .c lt., 46.
3 . W .A . Montrlou, Hindu W ill of Bengal, (Calcutta, 1870), In trod., x llx .
4 . Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrl, Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1910), 569.
struck a different note and, as we shall see presently, ctted texts which he claimed 
to have contained the germs of testamentary disposition.
Modern researches on the topic have partially supported Mayne‘s c la im , 
but before going Into the controversy let us analyse the sastrlc position on the sub­
ject.
The earliest Idea of a g ift to be possessed after the death of the donor 
Is found In the Nabhanedlstjtalegend. ^  Manu divided his property among his 
sons. He omitted Nabhanedlstha^but Manu afterwards taught him how to ap­
pease the Anglras and to procure the cows. While going to heaven the Anglras 
promised Nabhanedlsthathat he should take a ll the property left by them. After
the Anglras left for heaven, Nabhanedlstbaproceeded to take possession of the
2 3property left by the donors, but someone (Rudra) opposed the whole claim.
4
The legend shows more evidences of a sonks Innate right In his father*s property 
than of testamentary disposition.
The smrtls vaguely betray some elements of w ills In the form of post obit
-  -  5gifts. Katyayana ordains,
1. R.V. X.61 and 62.
2 . In A I. Br. V . 14, ‘a man with ’’blackish dress"1; In Tal. Sam., I I I.  .1 .9 .4 .
Is mentioned as Rudra.
3 . The story Is given In each with slight variation: Tal. Sam., I l l . 1 .9 .4 . A I .Br. 
V .14 , Ja l.B r., I I I .  156. The significance of the story In the context of a w ill 
has been pointed out by Radhablnod Pal, The History of Hindu Law, TLL, 1930, 
(Calcutta, 1958), 329, 353-5.
4 . Kane, HD, III, 565. Discussed In this con text, above, 3 7 1-5 •
5. Katy, 71, Dh.K.806b. svasthenartena va deyam bhavltam dharmakaranat/ 
adattva tu mrte dapyas tat suto natra samsaya// Alternate reading In place of 
bhavltam Is sravltam.
722.
Tf a g ift was promtsed by a man for a re li­
gious purpose wheifier when Tn good health 
or when afflicted with disease, the son 
should be made to pay It , Tf the father 
(the promisor) dies without (actually) glv-j 
Ing It  over; there Is no doubt on this.
2Harlta has a similar text where It Is declared, *What has been pro­
mised In word, but not fu lfilled  In action, constitutes a moral debt, In this world 
and tn the nex t'.3
4
P .N . Sen opined that such voluntary promise made by a Hindu for
the performance of some religious or pious act would be legally enforceable as 
5
a debt, and a son would be obliged to pay such debt of his father. But Tn 
these texts he finds more an element o f pious obligation that, anything of a w ill
1. Tr. Kane, Katyayanasmrtlsaroddhara, (Bombay; 1933), 234. -
2 . Harlta, Dh.K.794b. va ca yacca pratljnatam karmana nopapadltam f  rnam 
tad dharma samytktam lha loke paratra ca / /
3 . Tr. Jha, Vlvadachlntamanl, (Baroda, 1942), 62.
4 . P .N . Sen, The General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, TLL, 1909 (Cal­
cutta, 1918), 91. Sen's view goes against a text of Brhaspatl which declares 
that a promise or direction to take effect afteir the death of the promisor was 
not ordinarily enforceable: Br . X IV . 14. Alyangar, ed ., (Baroda, 1941), 139. 
madurdhvam I t l  yad dattarp na tat svattavaham b h a ve t/ tenedanlmadattatvcn 
mrte rlkthlnamapatet / /  This text Is cited In the Vyavahara-nlmaya, 298-9, 
Derrett, IMHL, 443.
5 . Though not exactly on the point, yet for the Idea, see Derrett, Testamentary 
Contracts and an Opportunity for Indian Law1, (1974), Bom .L.R.J., 76, N o.1,6,
6. P .N . Sen, lo c .c lt . ,  92.
Mayne thought that these rules of ptous gtfts contained the germs of 
w ill,   ^ and went as far as to say that these could be extended even to disposi­
tions of undivided shares by a co-helr or ancestral property by a father without
2
the consent of the sons, Mayne*s overstatement and his Identification of
rules of testamentary disposition In these texts were vehemently criticised by
Arthur Phillips and Sir Ernest John Trevelyan. They say that the texts referred
3
to by Mayne do ‘not contemplate any testamentary disposition*. They find In
these texts merely an element of donatio mortis causa and according to their
opinion, ‘ the Hindu family system, which was Inconsistent with Independent
dominion over property, would necessarily not recognise any testamentary dls- 
4
position*.
Trevelyan*s restricted Interpretation of the texts had Its own merit.
But the texts of Katyayana and Harlta certainly declare that the promise by a
father before his death, was a debt In conscience to the donee which, at least
5
the customary law, would oblige the son to execute. Moreover, the smrtl 
rules have been reinforced by the rules of mlmamsa which envisage that ‘g ift 
promised, payments undertaken, and merit anticipated from Instituting sacrifices, 
would a ll continue and operate for the benefit of the sacrlflcer even though he
1. Also Kane, HD, III, 817.
2. Mayne, A Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, (Madras, 1906), 539.
3. Phillips and Trevelyan, The Law 'Relating to Hindu W ills, (London, 1914), 3.
4 . Trevelyan, Ib id ., 3 .
5 . Derrett, 1MHL, 443, ( 9 700).
should dte before the sacrtftce could be completed.*^
2
The fact that the law of wtlls has emerged from the law of gifts,
does not entirely conflict with the mlmamsa doctrine. The mlmamsa approves
the transference of detaTls (a tig as) prescribed for one sacrifice (yajna) Into an- 
3other sacrifice. | n a  very general way, It could be said that In Hindu law,
] .  Derrett, Ib id ., Jalmlnl, X .2 .58 . The purvapaksa view Is that ‘when the 
sacrlflcer has died, the "sarvasvara" should not be completed; as every act 
Is related to a living person*, J a l.X .2 .57. Jha, Shabara-bhasya, karmas- 
thlyajnavat, *on death the sacrifice Is like asthlyajna, The MTmamsa Sutras 
of Jalmlml, ed ., B.D. Basu, (Allahabad, 1923), 648-9] The sutra means 
*ln rea lity, there must be (completion) because both have been directly en­
joined*, Jha, Ib id ., 1721-2.
2. Tagore v . Tagore, (1872), 1 I .A . Sup., 47. Montrlou, Hindu W ill of Bengal, 
(Calcutta, 1870), 5.
3. The principle Is called atldesa (transference). The principle has been treated 
by Jalmlnl In Chapters VII and V II I .  The crucial sutra Is V III • 1.2: yasya 
Ilrigam artha-samyogad abhldhanavat, The Sacred Book of the Hindus, ed .,
B.D. Basu, (Allahabad, 1923^, X V II/I , 456: ‘that should be transferred of 
which there Is some Indicative;(and that which Is to be transferred); as In the 
case of names*, Jha, Shabara-bhasya, (Baroda, 1934), II, 1321-2. The model 
and principal sacrifice In the Vedas Is the Darsa-purnamasa. The rules and pro­
cedure of this standard sacrifice (prakrtl yajna) could be applied Into another 
modified sacrifice (v lk rfl yajna) whlcfi Is lacking In details of ritualistic pro­
cedure f K .L , Sarkar, MR1, 4 l l .  Jha, The Prabhakara Schools of Purva 
Mlmamsa, (Allahabad, 1911), 25. Natara|a Ayyar, Mlmamsd Jurisprudence, 
(Allahabad, 1952), 4 . Kane, History of Dharmasastra, (Poona, 1962), V . I I ,  
1321-4. Cp. In Jewish law, Middot (exegetlcal rules of Interpretation) In­
clude Gezerah Shawah ( ‘ Inference by Analogy*1',  lite ra lly : similar Injunction 
or regulation. When In two pentateuchal passages words occur which are simi­
lar or have Identical connotation, both laws, however different they may be In 
themselves, are subject to the same regulations and applications. Also Middot 
Include Blnyan‘ab mlkkathub*el?ad, lite ra lly , ‘constructing a family*, that Is, 
extension o f a rule to a number of connected provisions though It Is found In 
relation to one only of them. Thus, the principal passage Imparts to a ll the 
remaining passages, a common character which unites them In one family,. 
Hermann L. Strack, Introduction to the Talmud and Mldrash (Philadelphia, 1931) 
94; for examples, 285-6, n.5; 286, n .7 . Also, Z .W . Falk, ‘ Jewish Law*, In 
Derrett, ed ., An Introduction to Legal Systems, (London, 1968), 37, n.10. Also 
cp. qlyas (analogy) In Islamic juristic Interpretation.
* because there Is connection between that Indicative
gTft stands to w tll as the archetype or the ortgtnal sacrtftce (prakrtt-yaga) to 
the ectype or the modtfted sacrtftce (vtkrtt-yaga) tn mtmamsa solutton of Vedtc 
sacrtftces. But the mtmamsa has set a Itmtt to the prtnctple of transference, tn 
the sense that the extenston of the detatls of one sacrtftce to another ts permttted 
so long as there ts no tncongrutty tn such extenston J
The sastras forbtd maktng a g tft of oneks enttre property when there ts
2
a son. Moreover, the rules of  smrtts ordatntng co-ownershtp of son wtth the
3
father tn certatn categortes of property are well-known. If at a ll,  one wants 
to apply the mtmamsa prtnctple of transference (attdesa) to the laws of w tll from 
the laws of g tft, one must do that wtthtn the Itmtted sttuattons permttted by the
sastra for maktng a g t f t O t h e r w t s e ,  the extenston of the prtnctple should be
-  _ -  5
suspended as prescribed tn the mtmamsa rule of badha (annulment or suspenston).
1. Jha, The Prabhakara School of Purva Mtmamsa, (Allahabad, 1911), 25.
2 . Br.XV.3; also Yajn. ctted by Vacaspatt Mtsra , V t.C t . ,  Jha, $ 244.
For a dtscusston, supra, 3 4 9 -  51 •
3 . Y a jn .11.121.
4 . M tta . l. t.2 7 . Explatned supra, 347-64.
5 . By the general rule of the prtnctple o f attdesa, the detatls of the model sacrt­
ftce should be taken over to the modtfted sacrtftce. But tn some cases, the
model sacrtftce cannot be extended to the modtfted one. In a sttuatton where
there ts an express text agatnst appltcatton of detatls of the model sacrtftce to 
the modtfted, the prtnctple of badha w tll apply, Sabara on Jatmtnt, X .1 .1 . and 
X . l  .2 , Jha, 111. 1635-37. One can get over badha by restorttng to abhyuccaya 
or samuccaya (oppostte of badha), nevertheless one would requtre tn the modtfted 
sacrtftce, some rules enjotned of tts own, Sabara on Ja t., X .4 .6 . ,  Jha, III, 
1807-8. Kane, HD, V . I I ,  1327-8. Abhyuccaya applted by Vtjnanesvara on 
Y a jn .III . 243, on penance for Brahmtctde, Gharpure, Yajnavalkya Smrttt, The 
Collectton of Htndu Law Texts, (Bombay, 1940), 11 .V •, 1724-5. While apply- 
tng the prtnctple of attdeia, certatn alterattons and adaptattons become necessary 
and mtmamsa has taken care of these eventualtttes*. Sabara on Jatmtnt, IX . 1.1. 
Jha, III, 1417-20. The acara-kandas of  dharmasastras have made use of uha
(adaptatton) as tn M tta, Ya jn .1 .254 applted Vtsnu dh.su.75.7, SBE, V II, 240.
/Continued on next page:
Indeed, thetr Lordshtps  ^ would ftnd comfort tn ftndtng out an tndt-
genous prtnctple as justtftcatton behtnd maktng a w tll,  but the emphasts on the
2
stngular source of emergence of w tll from the laws of gtft and the eventual 
tdenttfTcatton of one wtth the other, were probably the result of confustng the
prtnctple of attdesa, whtch ts only transference or an extenston of detatls to a
3 -  _Itmtt, wtth the prtnctple of upamana (analogy). In the acara and prayascttta
secttons, commentators have used mtmamsa and the Vedanta as atds to sastrtc 
tnterpretattons, but tn applytng to vyavahara these could be mazes where many 
a master mtght lose hts way.
Apart from the sastras and the mtmamsa tnterpretattons, the medtaeval
htstory of the Htndus shows the extstence of the tdea of testamentary dtsposttton.
Note 5 -  p .725 -  conttnued;
Kane, HD, V . I I .  1326; HD, IV, 513, n . 1142a. Applytng these mlmamsa 
prtnctples to vyavahara, the questton would rematn as to whether a person 
would be able to w tll away property whtch ts declared as adeya or adatta, as 
g tft.
1. Tagore v . Tagore, (1872) 1 IA Sup., 47, Kalgavada Tavanappa v . Somappa,
1909, ILR. 33 Bombay 669 at 680, Justice Chandravarkar preferring the appjjt- 
catton of analogy tn similar cases. But Sir Robert Phtlltmore warned against 
application of 'strained analogies', Bhyah Ram v . Bhyah Ugar, 13 MIA 373 at 
390.
2 . As stated tn the Tagore case, tb td ., at 68.
3 . As tn Tagore v ,  Tagore, (1872) 1 IA Sup. 47; Kalgavada Tavanappa v . Somappa, 
(1909) ILR 33 Bom. 669 at 680. Probably thetr Lordshtps meant transference, but 
used a wrong rendering for attdesa. On upamana, see Sabara on Ja t., I .v .5 .  Jha, 
1.15-16. Natajaja , lAyyar knew the difference, but failed to point tt out, 
Mtmamsa Jurisprudence, (Allahabad, 1952), 71-81.
In the first half of the 8th century we come across a poltttcal testament of KTng
Lalttadttya of Kashmir.^ A document whtch appears to be Very much like
2
a w tll1 has survtved from the Maratha pertod tn the Deccan, and about 1730-40
3
testamentary dtsposttton was not unknown to the Htndus around Negapatam.
4
In customary law of the Vella lar Chetttyars, testamentary dtsposttton was ac­
knowledged though complete dtstnhertson dtd not exist between parents and
5
chtldren. It ts not clear how much this ts owed to Dutch tnfluence.
Though tt may not be conclustvely proved, yet tt would not be out of 
place to potnt out that the French found some customary practtces of testamentary 
dispositions among the Malabarts ( I.e . Tamils), whtch were ulttmately gtven 
legal force by the French.^
M . G tbeltn, the Procureur General, at Pondtchery, tn 1843 stated tn
1. Rq|atarahgtnt, ' IV ., 341-59, ed. Vtshva Bandhu, (Hoshtarpur, 1963), 151-2.
2 . Derrett, IMHL, 443. One letter o f Naro Babajt (dated 1775 A .D .) dtspostng 
property to be effective after hts death ts ctted by Kane, HD, 111, 817, n«1603.
3 . Derrett, IMHL, 443.
4 . A prosperous sudra, merchant community of the Coromandel coast.
5. Ludo Rocher, ‘Jacob MossePs Treatise on the Customary Laws of the Vellalar 
Chetttyars*, J .A .O .S . 89 (1969), 27-50 at 45. The title  of the treatise ts 
Het Chormandelsh Hetjdens Regt Van de Geslagten Wellale & C httttjt, undated. 
RLSI, 228, n.3 thereto.
6. Montrtou, The Hindu W ill of Bengal, (Calcutta, 1870), Introd., Iv.
a published discourse:^
Hindu law does not refer to this way of dispos­
ing of one*s goods In the case of death. It 
has been considered as a creation of practical 
law; I t  has been thought that the right to make 
a w ill did not exist for Indians. However, 
this right has been recognised among the people 
of Bengal and they enjoy It without hindrance 
up to the present day. In French territory, the 
same right has been recognised among Malabarls, 
Christians or heathens, without distinction.
They have possessed It since the establishment 
of French rule. The judicial decrees of the 
Chief Council of Pondlchery, (of 18 November 
1769, article 10; 22 April 1775, article 5; 
and 2 September o f the same year, article 16) 
sanction this right and draw up the rules to be 
followed In the exercise of I t .  In this respect, 
then, there Is an achieved right. It cannot 
be removed from the French natives. It Is 
only proper to maintain It within the limits 
that custom and law have assigned to It; 
name!yr  no one who has a child or other 
descendant may be allowed to make a w ill;  
or, I f  living a communal life* only he who 
has particular goods recognised as his own by 
Malabar! law may make a w ill and, In that 
case, It may relate only to the said goods.
1. Montrlou, Ib id. "Les lols hlndoues ne parlent pas de ce mode de disposer de 
ses blens, 6 cause de mort. On l*a consldere comme une creation de la lol 
positive, et on a cru que le droit de tester nVxlstatt pas pour les Indlens.
Ce droit cependant Ieur a ete reconnu dans Ie Bengale, et lls en joulssent 
jusqu*a ce jour sans d lfflcu lte . Sur le terrltolre franqals, le meme dro it a 
ete reconnu aux Malabors, chretlens ou gentlls, Indlstlnctement. lls en 
sont en possession depuls Petabllssement de la domination frangalse. Les 
arrets de reglement du Consetl Superleur de Pondlchery, (des 18 Novembre 
1769, article 10; 22 A vrll 1775, article 5; et 2 Septembre meme annexe, 
article 16) consacrent ce droit et tracent les regies b sulvre pour son exercise.
II yadonc, a cet egard, droit acquis. One ne peut I*enlever aux Indigenes 
fran9als. II est convenable seulement de le malntenlr dans les Umltes que la 
coutume et la jurisprudence lu l ont assignees, en ne permettant de tester q u ^  
celul qu! n*a pas d ‘enfant ou de descendant, ou, s*ll est en communaute, qul 
possede des blens partlcullers reconnus propres par la lo l malabare, et, dans ce
/Continued on next page:
This has been the constant practice, and these 
hallowed usages return again to the spirit of 
our French laws, under which a man may 
freely dispose of his goods only I f  he has no 
descendants or forebears. 1
These positive evidences help to show that the Idea of w ills among the
Hindus was not tota lly wanting, though It was quite far from* a full-fledged law
2 -of Testamentary succession1. It Is also fallacious to say that the Mltaksara
birthright or the vested right of the son to Inherit his fathers property as the 
3
nearest saplnda, and a system of testamentary disposition being an extension
of a fathers power of g if t, cannot co-exlst. Even under the Mltaksara system,
there are a lot of flex ib ilities by which a father can make reasonable gifts for
4
religious and other considerations. Mrtyu -patras were quite a common feature
5
among the Hindus, and In the majority of cases, there was always a direction or
Note 1 -  p .728 -  continued:
dernier cas , relatlvement aux dlts blens. C*est alnsl qu'on I ‘a constamment 
pratique", et ces usages consacres rentrent encore dans I‘esprit de nos lols 
francaIses, sous lesquelles c n‘est qu*a defaut de descendants et d ‘ascendants 
qu ''on peut llbrement disposer de ses blens” .
1. Translated for me by Dr. H . Kan ltkar, Department o f Anthropology, S .O .A .S .
2 . Kane,HD, III, 474.
3 . dadyat plndam hared dhanam/ Manu, IX . 136. The Idea may not be followed 
jud ic ia lly  but s till plays a part In rural Hinduism, H. Chatterjee, The Laws of 
Debt In Ancient India, (Calcutta, 1971), 90 #
4 . M lta .l.1 ,27 .
5 . West and BOhler, A  DTgest of the Hindu Law, (London, 1919), 1,216.
- j l  am inform ed by Pfcofessor D e r re t t  th a t re c e n tly  documents have been 
I brought to  l ig h t  by scholars which prove th a t w i l l f sanka lpa) were 
jknown' t o ' the Hindus from the seventeenth cen tu ry . These sankalDas
I h ig h lig h t  the testam antary  power o f  a Hindu fa th e r .  The p resen t w r i te r  
[ apologises th a t  he could not examine the re a l n a tu re  o f  these  
I documents p e rs o n a lly .
lecture to hts sons (or to the uttaradhtkarl) by a dying father as regards hts 
wtshes towards the actual dtsposttton of hts property, and a son would norm­
a lly  never tgnore the last wtshes of hts ancestor.^
We have shown that wtlls as post obtt gtfts or as donattones mortts 
causamtght have extsted among the Htndus tn the pre-Brtttsh pertod, but both
I
tn sptrtt and form they were dtfferent from modern wtlls and probably never 
tntended to be an tnstrument to dtstnhertt the son from hts tnnate rtght tn the 
property of hts ancestors.
d . Anglo-Htndu Law
In Anglo-Htndu Law, one of the earltest wtlls that we come across
2 3was that of Umtchand who dted tn 1758. In Bengal, the legtslature recog-
ntsed the power of a Htndu to w tll away, prtor or subsequent to 1st July, 1794,
hts enttre landed property to any of hts sons or even to strangers. Then several 
4
statutes were passed, but s ttll the law regardtng wtlls by a Htndu was not at
, 5 rest.
1. Montrtou, The Htndu W tll of Bengal, o p .c tt., x ltx .
2. For an Engltsh translation of the w tll,  see Montrtou, tb td ., 9 ff.
3 . Bengal Regulatton XI of 1793, ss.5 and 6 . Bengal Regulatton XXXVI of 1793.
4 . Regulatton XLV of 1795, s.6 applted to the provtnce of Benares. Regulatton V 
of 1799, s. 11 applted to Bengal, Bthar, Ortssa and Benares.
5 . Regulatton V of 1829 (Madras) stated that w tlls had no force except so far as 
they mtght be tn conformtty wtth general prtnctples of Htndu Law. Regulatton 
V III o f 1827 (Bombay) provided formal recognttton of executor, but was stlent 
as to race or creed to whose estate tt  would be applicable.
In Bengal, w tlls came before the judges o f the Company*s courts and
to know the sastrtc posttton, as tn other branches of Htndu law, they had to de-
-  1 2pend on the vyavasthas of the pandtts. In 1781, Juggulktsson Addtc, havtng
a wtfe and a son, disposed of hts whole property, partly ancestral and partly self- 
acqutred, tn equal shares between them. Upon reference to the pandtts of the 
Supreme Court, Calcutta, they certified tn favour of the w tll.
3
In 1789 tn Rush tk la I Dutta*s case, a father disinherited two elder sons 
tn favour of two younger, tn a w il l .  The pandtts of the then Supreme Court at 
Calcutta, affirmed the va lid ity of the w tll.  The decision attracted sharp c rttt-  
ctsm from Sir Wtlltam Macnaghten. He remarked,
to thts tt can only be answered, that the 
motives whtch actuated the pandtts tn thetr 
exposition of the law, and the judges tn 
thetr decision, are avowedly stated on con­
jecture only; and that t f  such motives are 
allowed to operate, there must be an end 
to a ll law, the maxim factum valet super­
seding every doctrine and legalising every 
act. 4
1. On vyavasthas, see supra, 633^ 6-46.
2 . Strange, Htndu Law, (London, 1830), II, 3 .
3. Rushtklall Dutt and another v . Choytun Chum Dutt, Strange, Htndu Law, 
I, 263.
4 . Macnaghten, Htndu Law, I, 6 -7 .
Strange also complained that Tn thts case, the maxTm, factum valet, 
was stretched to an unlimited length. He satd,
the grounds wtth the pandtts probably was 
(the Bengal maxtm) that, however Incon­
sistent the act with the ordinary rules of 
Inheritance, and the legal pretensions of 
the parties, yet, being done, Its va lid ity 
was unquestionable. 1
2
But again In 1792 In the Nuddea case, the SDA held that a g ift In
the nature of a w ill to the eldest son, depriving the other three, was va lid .
The majority of the pandits, Including Jagannatha Tarkapancanana, the com- 
3
pller of the Digest, upheld the valid ity of the w ill mainly by relying on
Jtmutavahana, who stated that although a father be forbidden to give away lands,
4
yet I f  he nevertheless do so, he merely sins and the g ift holds good. The other 
point (6th point) which the pandits made, that a principality might lawfully and 
and properly be given to an eldest son, was not based on the facts of the case. 
There was no evidence that the raj descended according to primogeniture because, 
as stated In the w il l ,  the king settled the property Tn order to prevent quarrels 
among his sons after his death, which settlement would not have been neces­
sary I f  the estate would have normally devolved on the eldest.
1. Strange, J4lndu Law, I, 163.
2. Eshanchand Ral v . Eshorchund Ral, ID OS, V I, 2 . Strange, I, 263-4. 
Macnaghten, I, 7.
3. See Strange, I, 265.
4 . Da.bha.11.29-30; 11.77. For a criticism of Jlmutavahana and particularly of, 
Jagannatha on this point, see H .H . Wilson, Works, V , e d ., R. Rost, (London, 
1865), 72.
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The decision In the Nuddea case was too muddled to establish any 
general rule of HTndu law, but I t  was received as a precedent and without con­
sulting the pandits, ' the Supreme Court followed the Nuddea case In 1807.^
2
But In Ramkoomar v . Klshenklnker, a note of dissent was heard from 
pandits. They opined that In Bengal a father, whose eldest son was a live , 
could make a g ift to the younger son of a ll his self-acquired movables and Im­
movables, and of only ancestral movables. But with regard to ancestral Immov­
ables, such g ift though valid Is Immoral. Even this categorisation of property 
regarding power of a father to make a w ill did not take the law very much further 
from the rules In the Nuddea case.
The wisdom of the pandits In the Nuddea case and In Ramkoomar's case,
was questioned by the judges In Bhowannychurn Bunhoojea v . The heirs of Ramkaunt 
3Bunhoojea. According to the facts of this case, a Hindu father of the district 
of 24 Parganas, Bengal by a Hlssanameh or deed of partition, made an unequal 
distribution among his sons of his estate, comprised of movables and Immovables, 
both ancestral and self-acquired. The disposition was not carried Into effect 
during his life tim e. Because the parties were not put Into possession during the 
lifetime of Ramkaunt, the effect of the disposition was that o f a testament. In
1. Ramtanu Mai Ilk and others v . Ram Gopal M frlllk and Ram Ratan M u lllk , 
Strange7~T7~253]!
2 . Ramkoomar Neaee Bachesputtee v . Klshenkunker Turk Bhoosun (1812) IDOS,
V I, 398.
3 . (IS I6 ) ,  IDOS, V I,  556.
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consequence of the difference of opinion among the pandits of the SDA, the 
quest Ton regarding a father's power of making a g ift was put to the pandtts of 
the Supreme Court, Tarapershad and MrTtyunjee; to Nurahuree, pandit of the 
Calcutta Provincial Court, and Ramajya, a pandit attached to the College of 
Fort W illiam . This board of pandits unanimously passed the opinion that I f  a 
father during the lifetime of his eldest son, made a g ift to his younger son of a ll 
his self-acquired and of his ancestral movables, such g ift was valid but the 
donour acted sinfu lly. Their opinion In respect of ancestral Immovables Is 
very significant with regard to the birthright o f a son In such property. They 
unanimously declared on the point that I f  a father, during the lifetime of his 
eldest son, makes a g ift to his younger son of a ll the ancestral Immovables, the 
g ift was not valid . 'Hence, I f  It  had been made, It must be set aside*.^
The opinion of the pandits In this case reveals a practice In Bengal, 
namely that a father lacked the power of depriving his son from his Innate right 
In the ancestral Immovables. The vyavastha shows that the pandits were not 
Interpreting the birthright of a son according to the Mltaksara. The authori­
ties cited by the pandits were mainly Jlmutavahana's Dayabhaga and once 
Dvalta Nlrnaya. So we can say that the pandits' opinion was based on the 
Bengali authorities, though they reached a conclusion different from that sup­
ported by Jlmutavahana In his Dayabhaga.
In self-acquired and movable property, a father's w ill has been upheld
1. A t  571 .
and when there were justiciable grounds, a father's power coutd hardly be 
questioned. Thus, a w ill of one Darpanarayan Sharma  ^ was upheld, which 
appeared to be more an excommunication than a testament. The wordings of 
the w ill are very Interesting:
as my eldest son Sri Radhamohan Babu 
and third son Sri Krlshnamohan Babu 
have discarded their Guru (spiritual 
teacher) and drink splrltous liquors, 
and have threatened to murder me,
I have discarded them and debar 
them from performing the ceremonies 
of burning my body and shraddha.
He gave the first and third son each Rs.l0,000 and bequeathed to his youngest; 
son, who was deaf and dumb, Rs.20,000. It should be taken Into considera­
tion that the property In this case, was self-acquired by Darpanarayana.
In Bengal, the law seemed to have been settled over a father's power 
of making a w ill of a ll his self-acqulsltlons and ancestral movables. But despite 
the decision In Bhowa nee churn's case, the controversey went on over a father's 
power of disposing by w ill of his ancestral Immovables. To resolve this contro­
versy and to put the law on the topic 'as fina lly  at rest*, (per Shakespear J .) ,
the then Supreme Court consulted the judges of the SDA who, after much consider
2
atlon, declared In Juggomohun Roy v . Sreemutty Neemoo Dossee that a Hindu,
1. Cited by Shamachurn Sircar, Vyavastha Darpana, 559.
2 . (1831) IDOS, I, 358.
having sons, may alienate hts ancestral land in Bengal wtthout thetr assent, and 
he can by w tll,  prevent, a lter, or affect their successton to such property.
Ryan J. declared that %the doubts, which they (judges) did entertain in conse­
quence of M r. W .H . Macnaghten's work, no longer exist*.
Thus, a father's power to make a w tll of hts self-acquired and ancestral 
property, was judlclaIly settled, but the juridical writings on the topic reveal 
that neither the pandits nor the judges were free from the fault of Inventing a 
rule which was hardly the ordination of the sastra.^
Colebrooke unambiguously wrote to Strange, *a Hindoo In Bengal may
leave by w ill a ll his own acqulstlons: but would be restricted, I f  he have sons,
from distributing ancestral property according to his mere pleasure'. But he modl-
3
fled his view In subsequent correspondence, not because of his re-dlscovery of 
the sastra, but because It was too late to stem the tide of w ills which were wrongly 
upheId by the courts. He wrote,
upon references to adjudged cases, and upon 
consideration of the Inferences to be drawn 
from them, and the principles held to have 
been settled by these judgments, I find occa­
sion to correct that part of my letter on the 
subject of w ills by Hindoos, In which I said 
that a Hindoo In Bengal may leave by w ill 
a ll his own acquisitions; but Is restricted 
from distributing ancestral property among
1. H .H . Wilson, Works, ed ., R. Rost, (London, 1865), V , 77-85.
2 . May 25, 1812; Strange, II, 435-6,
3 . July 22, 1812; Strange, II, 437.
hts children/ according to his mere 
pleasure. 1
He concluded,
a Hindu In Bengal may leave by w il l ,  or 
bestow by deed of g ift, his possessions, 
whether Inherited or acquired; and the 
g ift or the legacy, whether to a son or 
to a stranger, w ill hold however repre­
hensible It  may be, as a breach of an 
Injunction and precept. 2
Shamachum Sircar accepted the previous opinion of Colebrooke as 
the correct Interpretation of the sastra. He remarked on the opinion of Cole­
brooke,
these are true expositions of the law 
and ought to have been acted upon; 
but It was too late. Numbers of wills 
and deeds of g ift relative to the trans­
fer of entire estate, movable and Immov­
able, acquired and ancestral, had a l­
ready been admitted and affirmed; and 
thereby the doctrine of ‘factum valet* ^ 
was too deeply rooted to be shaken.
4
Shamachum‘s admission of Colebrooke‘s previous opinion as the true exposition 
of the law cannot exonerate him from his own attempt to Interpret wrongly the 
text of Narada ^ In his Vyavastha Darpana, ^ probably to give a Gastric
1. Strange, 11, 437.
2. Ib id ., 438.
3. Shamachum Sircar, Vyavastha-darpana, (Calcutta, 1867), 564.
4 . Letter of May 25, 1812, to Strange.
5. D a .b h a .II.3 ]. For the text, In fra ,7 3 8 •
6. Shanachurn Sircar, Vyavastha-darpana, lo c .c lt . ,  564.
sanction to the testamentary power of a HTndu Tn Bengal. Shamachum ctted 
part of the text, ‘should they gtve or sell thetr own shares, they do a ll that as 
they please, for they are masters of thetr own wealth*. Shamachum seems to 
thtnk that thts text contained the sastrtc ordtnatton for maktng a w tll,  but we 
shall see presently that thts ts not the case. Ftrstly, Shamachum has parttally 
quoted the text to hts own advantage. The whole text runs Itke thts:
When there are many persons sprung from 
one man, who have duttes apart, and 
transacttons apart, and are separate tn 
bustness, and character, t f  they be not 
accordant tn affatrs, should they gtve 
or sell thetr own shares, they do a ll 
that as they please, for they are masters 
of thetr own wealth. 2
Though Jtmutavahana has ctted the text as gtvtng power to dtspose of undtvtded 
property to one coparcener without the consent o f other coparceners, commen­
tators of the Mttaksara school do not agree wtth hts tnterpretatton, and they take
the text as declartng the separate and tndependent rtght o f co-hetrs who have
3 ✓
made a partttton amongst themselves. Srtkrsna Tarkalarikara also seems to
have thought that the natural constructton of Narada‘s text would bear out the
4 ^competency only of a dtvtded parcener to altenate hts share. SrTkrsrja trted
1. It ts more clear from hts vtew on coparceners power on altenatton, tb td ., 592-3.
2. Colebrooke, D a.bha .II.31.
3 . Stokes, -Hindu Law Book s, (Madras, 1865), 207, n.31.
4 . K .K . Bhattacharyya, The Law Relating to the Jotnt Htndu Famtly, TLL, 1884-5j 
(Calcutta, 1885), 484.
to explain away the first part o f the text o f Narada. He explained,^
By "duties" Ts meant the observance of 
the days of Impurity, such as ten days 
or twelve days. By 11 transactions11 Ts 
meant the practice of austerities, or 
the performance of valorous deeds.
By "character" Is meant mildness or 
flereceness. By "buslnes"" Is meant 
the performance of priestly duties and 
so forth. By "affairs" Is meant the 
making of gifts e tc . by each apart 
from the others. 2
y _ 3
Then Srlkrsna tries to bring out the legal precept behind the text,
I f  the owner makes a g ift or any other 
alienation of undivided Immovable pro­
perty, It Is valid , like that o f the d i­
vided, since afterwards the share may 
beldentlfled by the process of drawing ^ 
lots and so forth. This Is the purport.
Here Srlkrsna tries to explain that the religious duty of the members 
of an undivided family Is divided, and undivided brothers are to observe the 
rules separately, each one for himself. This Ts what Is meant by ‘duties apart*
1. dharmo ‘saucam dvadasa-ratradl/ karma tapal) sauryyadl /  guno mrdutva
candatvadlh /  krlya yajana palanadlh /  karyyesu ekalka-krlyamana-danadlsu/
Srlkrsna on Da. bha .11.31.• • *
2. Tr. K .K . Bhattacharyya, lo c .c lt . ,  484-5.
3.vTbhaktasyeva ablbhakta-sthavarasyapl svaml-krta-danadl sldhyatyeva/ 
aksapatadlna pascadamse parlcaya-sambhavadltl bhavah / /  Srlkrsna on 
D a.bha.II. 31.
4 . Tr. K .K . Bhattacharyya, The Law Relating to the Joint Hindu Family, o p .c lt., 
485.
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Tn Narada's text. Each of the brothers makes a gtft separately from one another. 
From thts, Srlkrsna draws the concluston that Narada has permitted alienation of 
undivided property by an undivided coparcener to the extent of his share. ^  Even 
this laboured Interpretation of the text of Narada does not clear up the fact that, 
so long as there Is co-ownership of son and father In ancestral Immovables, a 
father lacks the power of w illing  away such property by his unilateral act.
2Secondly, the text was cited as an authority by the pandits In Vyavastha N o .352, 
which was essentially an opinion on the co-parcener's power of disposing his own 
Interest In the joint property. The case has no relevance to the power of a father 
to dispose by w ill of ancestral Immovables while having sons.
Shamachum probably was not confident of his cogency of argument
based on the text of Narada. That Is why he searched for some commentatorlal
support for a father's power of making a w ill from the writings of Jlmutavahana
and Srlkrsna. Jlmutavahana envisaged two times of partition: 'One, when the
father's property ceases; the other by his choice, while his right of property en- 
3dures'. Srlkrsna explains the second time of partition by saying,
Butwhen the father, for the sake of ob­
viating disputes among his sons, deter­
mines their respective allotments, con­
tinuing however the exercise of power
1 • This view Is Illustrated In his Daya-karma-sangraha, X I .7-8, Setlur, II, 155.
2 . Vyavastha-darpana, o p .c lt., 594-5. Case N o. 13, Macnaghten, II, 220.
3. Da .bha. 1.38.
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over them, that Ts not partTtton: for hts 
property s ttll subsists, stnce there has been 
no reltnquTshment of Tt on hts part. There­
fore, the use of the term partTtton Tn such 
an Tnstance, Ts lax and TndetermTnate. 1
Shamachum argues that as the father has power to dTstrTbute the property durTng 
hTs iTfetTme wTthout the consent of hTs sons, so he should be allowed to dTspose 
of hTs property by a wTlI whTch wTll take effect after hTs death. But thTs could 
be answered Tn Srlkrsna‘s language that durTng hTs ITfetTme, a fathers property 
subsTsts and at hTs death, hTs property would cease and Hie law would not en- 
vTsage a continuance of a power of dlsposTtTon whTch ceased at hts death.
So Shamachum's attempt to find a sastrTc sanction behind testamentary
2
power of a Hindu Tn Bengal was not a success. The judges granted this power 
to a Bengali Hindu more for expediency than for having any definite sastrTc autho­
rity  for I t .
It appears that as early as the first quarter of the nineteenth century,
the principles of the different schools of Hindu law began to be well entrenched
In the judicial system through the opinion of the pandits. In Sham Sing v .
3Mussummaut Umraotee, a Hindu (governed by the M lthlla School) from Tlrhoot, 
a short time before his death, made a g ift of the whole of the estate to his eldest 
son. The word Ings were, 'he w ill become sole proprietor on my death, and my
1. Srlkrsna on Da .bha. 1.38, Stokes, o p .c lt . ,  195, n.38, Vyavastha-darpana, 570.
2. Similar attempt by K .L . Sarkar who tried to find out sastrTc precept for making 
a w ill In texts which ordained co-ownership of father and son and a dependant's 
right to be maintained, MRI, 412-3.
3 . (1813), IDOS, V I, 429.
younger son w tll be provided by him, with a suitable maintenance'. The 
pandits of the SDA opined that the g ift could not be considered as valid be­
cause of co-equal ownership of father and son In ancestral property.
Before that, In 1812, the pandits of  the Recorder's Court of Bombay, 
emphasised on the MTtaksara concept of co-ownership between father and son, 
and opined, '  there Is no mention of w ills In our Shaster, therefore they ought 
not to be madeO
In Madras It took a long time to recognise any sort of testamentary 
power by a Hindu. A w ill by a Hindu to dispose of only his self-acquired pro­
perty was recognised In Madras as lately as 1859 In the case of P. Narratnsvamt
2
Chettl v . P. Arunachella Chettl. But this power though settled, was some-
3
what restricted In Valllnayagam PIIlal v . Pachche, where It  was held that the 
testamentary power of a Hindu In respect of property, whether ancestral or self- 
acquired, was co-extenslve with his authorised power of alienation during his 
lifetim e.
1. Strange, II, 449; but see Strange, II, 419.
2. (1860) II Madras S .D ., 115. When there was no male Issue, a Hindu In Madras 
could make a w ill of his ancestral as well as acquired, estate, Nagalutchmee 
Ummal v . Gopoo Nadaraja Chetty, (1856) 6 M . I .A . ,  309.
3 . (1863) I MadrasH.C.R., 326.
About the same time, the right of a Hindu In the North Western 
Provinces to make a w ill of his self-acquired property was recognised by the 
Judicial Committee of tbe Privy Council.^ The Privy Council In 1880 upheld
the Mltaksara birthright of the son In ancestral property In Laksman Dada Nalk v .
2 -  Ramchandra Dada Nalk!. and held that under the Mltaksara law as received In
Bombay, a father could not by w ill make an unequal distribution of ancestral
property, whether movable or Immovable, between his sons.
3
The law was settled In Baboo Beer Pertap v . Rajender that a Hindu 
belonging to any school could dispose by w ill of his separate or self-acquired 
property of any description.
III. Fathers power of alienating self-acquired Immovables
In Hindu law, the testamentary power Is Interrelated with a father's 
power of alienation, the presence or absence of which Is one of the touch-stones 
for the existence of son's right by b irth . Since In the Dayabhaga doctrine as 
enunciated by Jlmutavahana, a son does not acquire any Interest by birth, either
Tn the ancestral property or In the self-acqulsltlons of the father, a father has
4 -  -enough Independence to dispose of them by w il l .  But In the Mltaksara system,
1. Rewan Persad v . Radha Beeby, 4 M IA, 137. Nana Nuraln Rao v . Huree Punth Bhao, 
(1862) MlA 96. The power of a Hindu to make a w ill of his divided property was 
recognised by the pandits of the S .D .A ., N .W .P . (1860), *Bywustha', N o. 16, 
Bywusthas (from July to December, I860), (Agra, 1861), I, 1, 10.
2 . LR 7 IA 181.
3 . (1867) 12 MIA 38.
4 . Debendra v . Brojendra, (1890) 17 Cal.886.
the Implication of the judicial opinions, as stated tn the preceding section, appears
to be this: that according to the Mltaksara law, as understood by the judiciary, son's
birthright was recognised only In the ancestral property In the hands of the father.
The rule that a father can alienate his self-acquired Immovables Is based on an
- 2erroneous Interpretation of the Mltaksara by the Judicial Committee In Rao Balwant
3Singh v . Rani Ktshorl. The view of the Judicial Committee has been accepted by
4
the Supreme Court In Arunachala v . Muruganatha , and despite the pointer by aca­
demic jurists the law Is jud icia lly settled on the point.
Vljnanesvara stated that ownership In the father's or grandfather**
5
estate Is by b irth . He also stated that the father Is subject to the control of 
his sons and the rest, In regard to the Immovable estate, whether acquired by him­
self or Inherited from his father or other predecessors.^ Then he explains:
1. Rewan Persad v . IRadha Beeby, 4 M IA, 137; Nana Nuraln Rao v . Huree Punth 
Bhao, (1862) M lA 96; Laksman Dada Nalk v . ifeamchandra Dada Nalk, LR 7 lA 
181; Baboo Beer Pertap v . Rajender, (1867) 12 MIA 38.
2 . M lta .l.1 .27 ; I . v .9-10.
3 . (1898)25 IA 54 (P .C .).
4 . AIR 1953 SC 495 at 498.
5 . M lta .l.1 .2 7 . For discussion, see above, p .518.
6 . M lta .I.1 .27 . See above, p .520.
So likewise, Tf the unseparated father ts 
making a donation, or sale, of effects 
Inherited from the grandfather, the grand­
son has even the right of prohibition.
But I f  the effects were acquired by the 
father, he has no right of prohibition, 
as he ts dependent on him • On the con­
trary, he must give his consent.
Consequently, the difference Is this: 
although he has a right by birth In his 
father*s and In his grandfathers property, 
s t il l,  since In regard to the father's pro­
perty^ he Is dependent on his father and 
since the father has a predominant Inter­
est as It  wasacqulred by himself, the son 
must give his consent to the father's dis­
posal of his own acquired property. 1
2 -  We have earlier pointed out In our discussion on the Mltaksara
3 4that the word 'dravya* should have been rendered as 'movable'. In Rao
5
Balwant Singh's case, the Judicial Committee was misguided by Colebrooke's 
Inexact rendering of the word 'dravya* as 'e ffec t'.^  Lord Hobhouse observed 
In the course of his Judgment that In the textbook and commentaries on Hindu law, 
religious and moral considerations were often mingled with legal commands.^
1. M lta .I.v .9 -1 0 ; For the text, see above, p .521, n . l .
2 . Supra, pp.521-2.
3 . At M lta .I.v .9 . Also see supra, p .521.
4 . SeeR.C. M ltra , The Law of Joint Property and Partition In British India,
TLL, 1895-6, (Calcutta, 1897), 105.
5 . (1898) 25 IA 54 (PC).
6 . On religious command and legal command, see RLSI,Ch.3>
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HTs Lordship opined that the passage tn the Mltaksara -  1.1.27, contained only 
moral or religious precept, while those In I .v .9  and 10 embodied rules of posi­
tive law, but his Lordship could not put forward any basic criterion by which 
one passage of Vljnanesvara should be taken as a religious command and another 
as a legal command.
In Arunachala's case, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
rectify the mistake of the Judicial Committee and to restore the correct Impli­
cation of the three above-mentioned passages of the Mltaksara by going directly
] 2 
to the Sanskrit texts of Vljnanesvara. But the Supreme Court re-examined
the relevant passages In Colebrooke's rendering and arrived at the same conclu­
sion as the Judicial Committee. One thing should be said In defence of the 
Supreme Court that It was too late to set the law right because many transactions 
of property had been made since 1898 on the basis of the rule laid down In Rao 
Balwant Singh's case.
1. Jolly was right In his opinion that the father did not have absolute power to 
alienate self-acquired Immovables without the consent of his sons, Outlines 
of an History of the Hindu Law of Partition, Inheritance and Adoption, TLL,
1883, (Calcutta, 1885), 111-113. Derrett, RLSI, 417, n .3 . Mu I la, Hindu Law, 
13th ed ., f  222. The Para sara-madhavlya clearly supports our Interpretation of 
the Mltaksara texts (1.1.27, I . v .9-10) and highlights the mistake of the Judicial 
Committee In Rao Balwant Singh's case, P .M .322, tr* Setlur, 320; P.M . 332, 
tr . Setlur, 320; see supra, 578-80. For the correct view on this point, also see 
The Madanaratna-pradlpa, 210, cited supra, 588, n .5 ; also The Vlramltrodaya,
11.1.23, discussed supra, 603-4. These major works of the Mltaksara school could 
certainly be available to the Counsel arguing the case before the S .C . bench.
2. AIR 1953 SC 495 at 498.
The decision of the Supreme Court In Arunachala's case has been 
hailed as a progressive piece of judicial opinion reflecting the radical reorien­
tation of the society towards Individualisation of ownership In property and dis­
integration of jo int family.^ But we are yet to see what In the Incipient social 
revolution among the Hindus Is ephemeral and what destined to endure.
IV. Son's birthright and blending or merger of self-acquired property with joint 
family property by the father
The effect of a judicial opinion whether right or wrong does not stop
2
with the particular decision. The decision In Rao Balwant Singh v . Rani Klshorl
3
and Its approval by the Supreme Court In Arunachala's case, Influenced the In­
cidents of self-acquired property In many respects.
Under the Mltaksara system, self-acquired property of a father when
Inherited by a son changes Into the category of ancestral In the hands of the son
vls-a-vls his own male Issue. But the controversy arises as to what would be the
nature of the property and what kind of Interest would pass to the male Issue of a
4
son when he gets the self-acquired property of his father by a g ift or w il l .  On
1. Vyavahara Ntmaya, a journal of the Law Faculty of Delhi University (1954),
111.I, 203-6 at 206.
2. (1898)25 1A 54 (PC).
3 . AIR 1953 SC 495.
4 . Kane puts such property In Its list of separate property, but does not fa ll to 
mention the differences of judicial opinions on the point, HD, III, 555, n.1087.
thts question of law there was divergence of judicial opinions among the different 
High Courts.
In 1863 the Calcutta High Court held  ^ such self-acquired property
as Ipso facto ancestral. The Madras High Court le ft It to the father to determine
whether the self-acquired property which he had bequeathed should be enjoyed by
2
his son as ancestral or self-acquired, but tn the absence of the father*s declara-
3
tlon of any Intention , It should be presumed to be enjoyed as ancestral. The
Bombay High Court partly agreed with the Madras decision as to the father*s power
of determining the nature of the property under discussion, but differed on the point
of presumption that In Hie absence of any clear Intention by the donor or testator,
4
It should be presumed to be self-acquired. The Bombay view was followed by
5
the Allahabad High Court, and a fu ll bench of the Patna High Court leaned to­
wards Madras.^ The Punjab High Court In several cases consistently held that a
1 • Muddan Gopal v . Ram Baksh, 6 WR 71. Also Hazarl Mai v . Abanlnath, 17 CWN 
280. But see Muktl Prokash v . Iswarl Devi, AIR 1920 Cal.746 which leaned towards 
Madras •
2 . cuius est dare elus est dlsponere
3. Tara Chand v . Reeb Ram, 3 Mad HC 50; Nagallngam Ptlla l v . Ramchandra, 24 
Mady 429; Velayyuddham v . Commr. of Income Tax, l.L .R . (1945) Mad. 549; 
Seeyall Acharl v . DoralswamT^ AIR 1948 Mad. 46; Kavuru Venkatappaya v .
Kavuru Raghavayya, AIR 1951 Mad. 318.
4 . Jugmohan Dass v . Manga Idas Nathubhoy, 10 Bom. 528.
5. Parsotam v . Jankl Bal, 29 A l l .  354; Jal Parkash v . Bhagwan, AIR 1937 A ll .453. 
Oudh followed Allahabad, M st. Brlj Kunwar v . Sankata Prasad, AIR 1930 Oudh 39.
6. Bhagwat v . Mst. Kapoml, AIR 1944 Pat. 298.
fathers separate property acquired by a son through a bequest would become self- 
acquired property In his hands vts-a-vis his sonsj
These conflicting decisions of the different High Courts were brought
2
to the notice of the Privy Council, but the Judicial Committee left the question 
unresolved. When the problem came before the Supreme Court, their Lordships
based their decision mainly on that given by the Judicial Committee In Rao Balwant
3
Singh*s case regarding a father*s power over his self-acqulsltlons. The Supreme 
Court held that since It was settled law that a Mltaksara father had absolute power 
of disposition over his self-acquired property, It would not be possible to hold that 
property bequeathed or gifted by him to a son must necessarily, and under a ll c ir­
cumstances, rank as ancestral property In the hands of the son. *The Interest which
4
the son takes In such property must depend upon the w ill of the grantor*.
The Supreme Court put forward two further arguments as to why the pro­
perty In question should not be considered to be presumed as ancestral. Firstly, the 
property which a son gets from his father by succession or partition Is ancestral In his
1. Amar Nclh v . Guran Pitta M ai, P.R. (1918) 53.2, N o .14, 75. Ram Singh v.
Ram Nath, AIR 1932 Lah. 533; Klshan Chand v . Punjab Sindh Bank L td ., AIR 
1934 Lah. 534; Jagtar Singh v . Raghblr Singh, AIR 1932 Lah. 85, a case on 
customary law where Tek Chand J . wrongly observed obiter that there was a 
cons^isus of opinion that under Hindu law the property under discussion was not 
ancestral.
2. Lalram v . Deputy Commissioner of Partapgarh, AIR 1923 PC 160 = 50 IA 266.
3 . (1898) 25 IA 54 (PC).
4 . Arunachala v . Muruganatha, AIR 1953 SC 495 at 499. Muddan Gopal v . Rambaksh
6 WR 71 overruled. CP. Valllammal Achl v . Nagappa CHettlar, AlR 1967 SC 1153,
where the property bequeathed was ancestral.
hands vis-a-vis hts male Issue, because he gets It as a ‘son*. Secondly, In the 
case of a g ift or bequest, the son receives the property not because he Is a son 
but because his father chose to bestow a favour on him which he could have be- 
stowecjiven on a stranger. In both these arguments, the Supreme Court gave 
Importance to the mode of transmission of the property to the son. But I t  Is 
perhaps not without significance that the Supreme Court did not say that on the 
basis of those arguments the presumption should be that the property under dis­
cussion would be self-acquired In the hands of the son. The Supreme Court ruled 
out any presumption one way or the other and gave paramount Importance to the 
Intention of the donor to determine the nature of the property In the hands of the 
son (donee or legatee).^ The Supreme Court's decision on this point could have
further support from the judgment of the Judicial Committee In Muhammad Husain
2
Khan v . Babu Klshva Nandan Sahal. This case confined the scope of the defi­
nition of ancestral property within the narrow lim it o f property ‘descending1 from 
any of the three paternal ancestors. From this judicial opinion, one can draw a 
conclusion that no property obtained other than by Inheritance from any of the three
paternal ancestors should be considered as ancestral property; hence, property ob-
3
talned by g ift or devise could be presumed to be separate property. But we can
1. Followed In Ram Parkash v . !Radhe Shyam, AIR 1963 Punjab 338.
2 . AIR 1937 PC 233 = 64 1A 205. The P.C. said that Colebrooke at M lta . l.v .5 , 
rendered pltamaha as ‘paternal grandfather*. Sim ilarly, at M lta .l.1 .2 7 , also 
he Intended *belonging to the paternal grandfather*, even though he rendered 
‘paltamahe* as ‘ancestral*. Followed In Godavari Lakshmlnarasamma v . Rama, 
ILJR (1950) Mad, 1084, which pointed out the mistake In Vekayyamma Garu v . 
Venkatarammanayyamma, (1902) 25 Mad. 678 (P.C .); For a discussion of these
cases, Infra
3 . Raghavacharlar, Hindu Law,)(Madras, 1970), 280.
recall that- the Supreme Court tn Arunachala*s case dtd not go tn favour of any 
presumptton and the questton tn each case, therefore, would depend on the in­
tention of the father.^
The dectston has two Implications. Firstly, due to the levy of death
2
duttes, more and more gtfts by the father of hts separate property may be expected 
to take place and tn most cases, a father would Itke to treat such property to be en­
joyed by hts son as ancestral, and then would proceed to a llo t the same to hts sons 
as tn a partttton. Secondly, a grandson could be deprived of hts btrthright tn 
the self-acqutred property of hts paternal grandfather t f  he devtsed that property 
wtth a declaratton of tntentton or by tmpltcatton that such property should be en­
joyed by hts son as self-acqutred, whtch by natural law of successton would have 
been ancestral tn hts hands vts-a-vts the grandson. Thus, the rule tn Laksman
Dada Natk v . Ramchandra has been tndtrectly shaken.
When a coparcener voluntarily throws hts separate property tnto the
4
common stock wtth the unequtvocal tntentton of abandontng a ll separate clatms
1. Srtntvasan, Htndu Law, (Allahabad, 1970), III, 2343. On the method of ascer-
tatntng the tntentton of the father, see S. Parthasaratht v . Commr. of Income Tax,
AIR 1967 Mad. 227 at 228. A  clear tntentton to watve separate rights must be 
established, Lakktreddt v . Lakktreddt, AIR 1963 SC 1601, followed tn Selvaraj
v . Radhakrtshna, AlR 1976 Mad 156.
2 . But see the present posttton, Infra, “75 3, n . i.
3 . 7 IA 1 8 1 .
4 . Mallesappa v . Desat Mallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1268; Gajendragadkar J . pointed
out that the doctrine of blending had been jud icia lly evolved and dtd not have
any textual authority behtnd tt ,  as wrongly thought by the P.C. that the doctrine 
evolved from M tta .l.4 .3 0  and 31, Shtba Prasad Stngh v . Prayag Kumart Devt,
59 IA 331 ~ AIR 1932 PC.216. But Kane accepted the P.C. view that Mtta on 
Yajn.11.120 contained the doctrine of merger, (printing mistake tn Kane, Instead
/Continued on next page:
upon I t  such property acquires a ll the Incidents of jo in t fam ily property.^ A  father
like any other coparcener can merge his self-acqulsltlons with the joint family
2
property and may waive either by mere declaration or conduct a ll his rights 
over It as separate property. The effect of such a merger Is this, that the sepa­
rate property of the coparcener loses Its separate character and becomes part of 
the common stock
Note 4 -  p .751 -  Continued;
1.120, It should be 11.120), HD, 111, 576, On unequivocal Intention, Cp.
Lakkl Reddy v . Lakkl Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 1268 at 1271.
1. Derrett, IMHL, 336. Raghavacharlar, Hindu Law, 6th edn., 275-8.
Srtnlvasan, Hindu Law, 4th edn., I l l ,  2364. Mu I la, Hindu Law, 13th edn.,253.
2 . Subramanla v . Commr. o f l .T . ,  AIR 1955 Mad. 623 at 624; Sadaslva v . Rattln, 
AIR 1958 A .P . 145; C . Narayana Raju v . Chamaraju, AIR 1968 SC 1276 at 1280.
3. Mallesappa v . Mallappa, AIR 1961 SC I268at 1271. The Estate Duty Act, 
1953, (Act N o .34 of 1953) As Amended up to 30th A p ril, 1974, was drawn In 
such a way as to prevent a member of a Mltaksara joint family from exercising his 
right of merging his self-acquired properties In the joint family estate shortly be­
fore his death, with the effect that at his death he owned absolutely nothing what­
soever, so that nothing passed by reason of his death, and no estate duty would be 
exigible out of his estate In the hands of his heirs. The statute took care to block 
this way of escape by the following provisions: (1) The coparcenary Interest Tn the 
joint family property of a Hindu family goaemed by the Mltaksara law Is assessable 
to duty, section 7(1); unless the coparcener was under 18, but his father or other 
male ascendant was a coparcener of the same family at the time of his death, 
section 7(2). (2) Property In which the deceased had an Interest ceasing on the 
death of the deceased shall be deemed to pass on the deceased*s death to the ex­
tent to which a benefit accrues or arises by the cesser of such Interest, section 
7(1); and the value of the benefit accruing or arising from the cesser of a copar­
cenary Interest In any joint family property governed by the Mltaksara school of 
Hindu law which ceases on the death of a member thereof shall be the principal 
value of the share In the joint family property which would have been allotted to 
the deceased had there been a partition Immediately before his death, Section 
39(1). For a discussion and comment, see Derrett, *Estate Duty and the Nature 
of a Mltakshara Coparceners Interest1, (1958) 60 Bom.L.R.J., 161-712.
753.
Once the unequivocal Tntentton Ts deduced from the conduct o f the 
party or the declaratton of bfendTng Ts established, the problem would arise to 
determine whether such a merger Ts a ‘gift* (transfer) or not under the relevant 
statutes  ^ for the assessment of specified taxes. If such a blending Is not a ‘gift* 
or ‘ transfer*, why Ts It  not?
The question and Its answer are very much Integrated with the son*s
birthright In the sense that, being the separate property o f the father, why should
It not be a *glft* or ‘ transfer* I f  the son has no birthright In the separate property
2of the father according to Rao Balwant Singh‘s case.
1. Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) Chapter V II . When It  was applicable, 
Income Tax A c t, 1922, S. 16(3)(a)(Tv). G ift  Tax A c t, 1958, S.2 (x ll):.‘ "g ift” 
means the transfer by one person to another of any existing movable or Immovable 
property made voluntarily and without consideration In money or money*s worth t 
and (Includes the transfer o f any property deemed to be a g ift under section 4 ") . 
The bracketed portion has been substituted by the Finance (No .2) A c t, 1971, 
with effect from 1.4.1972 as follows: ‘Includes the transfer or conversion of any 
property referred to In section 4p deemed to be a g ift under that section*.
G ift Tax A ct, 1958, S.2(xxlv) defines "transfer of property": "Transfer of pro­
perty" means any disposition, conveyance, assignment, settlement, delivery, pay­
ment or other alienation of property and, without lim iting the generality of the 
foregoing Includes:- (a) the creation of a trust In property; (b) the grant of crea­
tion of any lease, mortgage, charge, easement, licence, power, partnership or 
Interest In property; (c) the exercise of a power of appointment o f property vested 
In any person, not the owner of the property, to determine Its disposition In favour 
of any person other than the donee of the power; and (d) any transaction entered 
Into by any person with Intent thereby to diminish directly or Indirectly the value 
of his own property and to Increase the value of the property of any other person."
2 . 25 IA 54.
The problem came for dectston before the different High Courts, but
there was a sharp cleavage of judicial opinion. Madras High Court consistently
held that a father*s blending of his separate property with the common stock did
1
not amount to a transfer. The view of a division bench of the Kerala High 
2
Court conforms to the Madras opinion. On the other hand, In G .V . Krishna
3Rao v . First Addltlonal G 1ft Tax'. O fficer, Gunfur, the Andhra Pradesh High 
Court took a contrary view. Seshachalapatl J . dissented from the judgment 
In Stremann*s case, and opined: ”We are of opinion that, In the process of con­
verting the self-acquired property Into joint family property, there Is an element 
of transfer of rights to property. It also Involves the diminution of the father's 
right and the conferment and enlargement of rlghtsto others” .
The controversy has been ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court
4In G o ll Easwarlah v . Commr. o f G ift Tax, Andhra Pradesh. The Supreme Court
held that *the declaration by which the assessee has Impressed the character of joint
Hljidu family property on the self-acquired properties owned by him did not amount
5
to a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Act*.
1 • M .K . Stremann v . Commr. of I .T ., Madras, AIR 1962 Madras 26, contrary
view In Kesha via I v . Commr. o f I .T . ,  AIR 1962 G u j. 6, both these cases went 
to the Supreme Court, but the S .C . did not settle the point. Also G if t  Tax 
Commr. v . P. Rangasaml, AIR 1970 Mad.441 (FB). Same view In Bombay,
Klsan v . Vishnu, AIR 1951 Bom 4.
2. P .K . Subramanta Iyer v . Commr. o f G ift Tax, AIR 1968 Ker. 190.
3 . G .V . Krishna Rao v . First AddltlonaI G ift  Tax O fficer, Guntur, AIR 1970 A .P . 126; 
reaffirmed an earlier decision, Commr. of G ift Tax, A.P . v . Satyanarayana Murthl^; 
AIR 1965 A .P . 95.
4 . (1970) 1 SCWR 841 = AIR 1970 SC 1722.
5 . Ibid. at 847. For the provisions of the relevant Acts, see supra, p .763,fi* i.
The decision of the Supreme Court  ^ Indirectly throws light on the
point that even In self-acquired property of the father, the birthright as a concept
2
Is very much a live . The credit goes to the fu ll bench of the Madras High Court 
to point out the real reason as to why the merger by a father of his self-acqulsl-
tlons Into the common stock would not amount to a ‘ transfer*. Natesan J .
3
remarked on the obseraatlon of the Supreme Court on the point:
the reference to special right and waiver 
of the same with reference to property 
acquired by an Individual and held by 
him as his separate property, has to be 
related to the vestige of Interest which 
the son has In the property acquired by 
his father, the birthright of the son which 
Hindu taw recognised even In the separate 
property of the father. 4
5
We have pointed out that the Judicial Committee and the Supreme 
Court ^ held that the father had absolute power to alienate his self-acquisitions 
unilaterally. Despite this decision, the Supreme Court was aware that once 
a father decided even at his own volition to make a partition of his self-
1. G o ll Easwarlah v . Commr. of G ift Tax, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1722.
2 . Commr. o f G if t  Tax, Madras v . Rangasaml, AIR 1970 Mad. 441 (F .B .).
3 . Narayandraju v . Chdmara|u, AIR 1968 SC 1276 at 1280.
4 . Commr. o f G if t  Tax., Madras v . P. Rangasaml, AIR 1970 Mad. 441 (F.B.) at 
450. The point that a son has birthright In every kind of property was also made 
In Godavari Lakshminarasammd v . Rama, AIR 1950 Mad. 680 at 687 = ILR (1950) 
Mad. 1084.
5 . Rao Balwant Singh v . Rani KIshorl (1898) 25 1A 54 (PC).
6 . Arunachala v . Muruganatha, AIR 1953 SC 495.
acquisitions, the birthright of a son would Immediately become fu lly  effective.^
Juridically, a son's birthright In his father's self-acquired property has been pre-
2ferred to be accepted as a 'dormant1 rlght^ nevertheless It  Is real, and 'certainly 
3
not notional*. This birthright, even though we accept It as tformant*, enables
a father at his pleasure without formalities to deny himself his Independent power
4
or predominant Interest and look upon the property as the property of the fam ily.
5In G oll's case, the Supreme Court put emphasis on the law of Contract and held 
that since blending was a unilateral act, there was no question of a 'transfer*.
A t the same time, the Supreme Court did not fa ll to point out that blending was 
a doctrine peculiar to the Mltdksara school of Hindu law.^
It Is apparent that by blending there Is a change In the mode of enjoy­
ment of property and since the son's birthright Is existent In the separate property
of the father, there Is no change of ownership.^ Blending Is the manifestation
1. AIR 1953 SC 495 at 499.
2 . Mayne, Hindu Law, 11th edn., 336.
3 . Per Rajamannar C . J . In Godavari Lakshmlnarasamma v . Rama, AIR 1950 Mad• 
680 at 687*
4 . G .T . Commr. v . Rahgdsdml, AIR 1970 Mad. 441 at 451 •
5 . AIR 1970 SC 1722 »(1970) 1 SCWR 841. Pushpa Devi v . Commr. of I J . , 
New Delhi, (1977), 4 SCC 184 throws iTght and to be distinguished.
6 . (1970) 1 SCWR 841 at 844. Also pointed out by Derrett, *Estate Duty
and the Nature of a Mltakshara Coparcener's Interest*, (1958) Bom.L.R.J., 
161-172 at 161.
7 . Vallabhdas Mohta, 'Does Throwing Separate Property Into Common Hotchpot of
H .U .F , amount to "Transfer1'*, AIR 1969 J . 27-8.
of a subjective phenomenon, a particular state of mind on the reverse way of
1 2 severance of status as before an actual partttton.
Bypasstng the judtctal opinions on the point, Seturaman optnes 
that stnce a father has not absolute power over hts self-acqutred Immovables, 
there ts no need to tnvoke any doctrtne of blendtng tn such property. Secondly, 
he trtes to make a potnt that tn self-acqutred movables, there ts no need of blend­
tng, because the father can deal wtth such property at hts pleasure. Seturaman 
ts techntcally rtght wtth regard to hts optnton on the Incidents o f a father's 
self-acqutred tmmovables, but he fatls to comprehend that a son's btrthrtght ts 
all-pervadtng tn every category of property tn the hands of the father, though 
tts mode of enjoyment may dtffer accordtng to the ctrcumstances and legal capa- 
ctttes of the co-owners. It can be satd that a son's btrthrtght tn the self-
1. Rajantkanta v . Jagamohan, AIR 1923 PC 57; Putfrangamma v . Ranganna, AIR 
1968 SC 1018 at 1021.
2 . Cp. reunton, see Derrett, 'Reunton tn the Htpdu Famtly and an Unexpected 
dtctum from Ortssa', (1973) 75 Bom. L .R .J ., 15-16.
3. V . Seturaman, Theory of Blendtng and an Empty H .U .F . Hotchpot*, AIR 1971 
J .,  68-73 at 71. It ts submttted that the author's exploratton of the texts ts 
amateurtsh and the legends of the Vedtc pertod (Tat.Sam .lll• 1.9.4 and A tt.B r.
33.5) could be tnterpreted etther way as tndtcattng a father's absolute power or 
not; dtscussed ante,pp.372-$ • Hts,contentton that Vtjnanesvara was the tnven- 
tor of the dtvtston of daya tnto apratlbandha and saprattbandha ts also not correct. 
Asahaya's deftnttton of  daya was stmtlar to that of Vtjnanesvara*s; see Sarasvatt- 
vtlasa, ed ., FouIkes( London, 1881), 5, also Derrett, JIH, Vol30 (1952), 46,n.35. 
On the dtvtston of daya tnto two types, Vtjnanesvara mtght have tmproved on 
Bharuct's, see Sarasvatt-vtlasa, 403; on thts also see, I .S. Pawate, Daya-Vtbhaga, 
(Dharwar, 1975), 69. But Seturaman arrtved at the correct conclusion on the tnctd- 
ent of self-acqutred Immovable property (tb td ., at 71) of a father because he dtrectly 
went to the smrtt (e .g . Narada, D h .K .l2 l9 b ), although he could ftnd the same 
Implication at M tta . l. t.2 7 .
acquisitions of his father Ts subordinate to his spectal power of Independence and 
manifests Ttself tn real perspective, and a right which was seemingly dormant 
springs to life, at the volition of the father when he determines to merge his self- 
acqulsltlons with the common stock*
The undoubted right of a father to merge his self-acquired properties 
In the joint family estate and, because of a son*s birthright In his fathers self- 
acqulsltlons, the courts1 decision to hold such mergers or blendings as no ‘g ift1 
or •transfer*  ^ were matters of great concern from the point of view of revenue.
In this respect, the shield of the Mltaksara blrthrlght;to prevent the State from 
realising taxes, Indeed, showed an Imbalance between the tax laws and the 
family law of the Hindus. This Imbalance provoked legislative Intervention 
and, appropriately, the Parliament Incorporated a new provision In the G ift  
Tax Act: ^
Where, In the case of an Individual be­
ing a member of a Hindu undivided 
family, any property having been the 
separate property of the Individual has 
been converted by the Individual Into 
property belonging to the family through 
the act of Impressing such separate pro­
perty with the character of property be­
longing to the family or throwing It Into 
the common stock of the family (such
1. G ift Tax A ct, 1958, S .2 (x ll), (xxlv).
2 . G ift Tax Act, 1958, S.4(2), Inserted by the Finance (N o .2) Act, 1971, with 
effect from 1.4.1972.
property betng hereafter In thts sub­
section referred to as the converted 
property), then, notwithstanding any­
thing contained In any other provision 
o f this Act or any other law for the 
time being In force, for the purpose 
of computation of the taxable gifts 
made by the Individual, the Indivi­
dual shall be deemed to have made 
a g ift of so much of the converted 
property as the members of the Hindu 
undivided family other than such Indi­
vidual would be entitled to, I f  a par­
tition of the converted property had 
taken place Immediately after such 
conversion •
Since the Insertion of this sub-section s.4(2) the Revenue autho­
rities may feel safe but, for our purpose, the relevant cases discussed In this 
section jud ic ia lly  establish that a son has birthright In the separate property 
of his father.^
1 • See our view on the texts of the Mltaksara, 1.1.27; I . v .9-10, supra, 5 l'7-‘2,8 *
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CHAPTER 1 8 .
DIFFERENT KINDS OF SONS AND THE BIRTHRIGHT
I. Introduction
In our study of a son's right by birth we have mainly concentrated on
the rights of the legitimate (aurasa)  ^ son In respect of family property In the hands
2
of the father. But the dharmasastras generally mention twelve kinds of son.
3
Out of these twelve, six are kinsmen and heirs, and the rest are kinsmen but not 
heirs
1. aurasa lite ra lly  Issue of the breast, (uras), M tta . l.x l.2  Is a son procreated 
by a man himself from his married w ife , Kape, HD, III, 655. By mediaeval 
times, the aurasa was defined as the son procreated on a wife of the same caste 
as the father: Derrett, 'Inheritance, by, from and through Illegitimates at Hindu 
Law', Bom. L .R .J ., V o l.57 (1955), 6 . An Illegitimate son has no birthright, 
Hanmanta v . Dhondawabal, (1976), 78 Bom* L .R .675.
2 . Gautama dh .sG.XXVIII, 31-33, Dh.K.1263. Baudh.II.2.3.31-33, SBE, X IV , 
228-9; D h.K . 1270; Vaslstha, V II, 25, 38; D h .K .1272. Manu, IX . 158, D h.K . 
1319; Devala, D h .K .1350; Y a jn . ll.  129-33, M lta . l . x l . l ;  Br. XXV, 33, SBE, 
XXXIII, 375. Forenumeration, see Kane, HD, III, 645-62. Derrett, Ib id ., 
6 -7 .
3 . Manu, IX . 158-9.
4 . Manu, IX, 158, 160.
11 • Btrthrtght and the Illegitim ate ton
a. Rights of an illegitimate son
The Sastra meant those twelve types to be recognised In the case of
twice bom (dvtja) castes, but In the case of sudras an additional kind, namely
the daslputra,  ^ had been acknowledged by the sages. The daslputra Is a son
2
procreated by a sudra through a female (dasl) of the sudra caste, purchased or
obtained otherwise and kept continuously and exclusive I y by the procreator.
1. Manu, IX . 179; D h .K .1310. Y a jn . ll.  133, 134; D h.K . 1338. Judicially 
observed, Rathlnasabapathl v . Gopala, AIR 1929 Mad. 544 at 546. Con­
cept recognizable In the Brahmana literature, A l.B r. 8 .1 . Sari.Br.XII.3 ,
Kane, HD, III, 600, n.1133.
2. The word dasl Is not to be taken In the literal sense of a ‘female slave*,
Rajanl v . N lta l, (1921), 48 C a!.643.
3 . Raghavacharlar, Hindu Law, 6th ed ., 433. A son of a sudra through a twice 
born woman could not Inherit, Ramachandra v . Hanamnalk, (1936), 37 Bom.L.R. 
920, followed In Mahablr Prasad v . Raj Bahadur Singh, (1942) 18 Lucknow 585.
For a discussion, see Derrett, The rights o f an Illegitimate son of a Sudra by a 
woman of a twice bom caste*, M .L .J . ,  June, 1959, II, 19-21 at 21. Recently, 
the Calcutta High Court dissented from the Bombay decision In Ramachandra v , 
Hanamnalk, 37 Bom.L.R. 920, and held, relying on Amlreddl v . Amlreddl, AIR 
1965 SC 1970, that an Illegitimate son of a Sudra by a brahmin concubine has the 
status of a son and, according to Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law, Is entitled to a 
half of the share of a legitimate son, Mongol Chandra v . Dhlrendra Nath, AIR 
1976 Cal.129. The Calcutta decision shows judicial progressiveness. The I lle ­
gitimate son through a Sudra female of a twice bom man could not Inherit from his 
putative father, but see the wrong decisions In Natha v. Mehta, (1931) 55 Bom.l , 
following Bal Gulab v . Jlwanlal, (1921) 46 Bom 871, Ignoring the contrary view 
In Bal Kashi v . Jamnadas, (1912), 14 Bom.L.R. 547, where Chandavarkar J. 
held that a marriage between a te lce bom female and a Sudra male was Invalid,
at 552.
From the mention of these different categories o f sons In the scistra,
a question naturally arises concerning their rights In the property of the fam ily. ^
2 __ 3
As we have already noticed In the texts of Manu, only dayadas could Inherit
4 5
from their father; the others were merely gotrabhajab. These rules ex­
clude six kinds of sons from Inheritance, but Manu also ordains ^ that the leg iti­
mate son of the body ‘Is alone the owner of the paternal estate; but In order to
7 8avoid unkindness, he shall provide subsistence for the rest*. But this text
1. On classifications of sons and their rights conferred by different smrtls, see 
Kane, HD, III, 650-2.
2. Manu, IX . 158, 159, 160, supra, 7 <=>0, n .^ 4 .
3 . In Pataft|all*s Bhasya (600 B.C .) on Paqlnl, I I .111.9, It Is stated that the word 
dayada (heir) Is a synonym of the word svaml (owner). That Panin! (800 B.C .) 
regarded these two words as synonymous Is very significant from the Mltaksara 
point of view of acquisition of ownership. On this, see I.S . Pawate, Daya- 
Vlbhoga, (Dharwar, 1975), 342, n.45. Nandapandlta clearly explains that a ll 
the dayadas get property by birth: dayadanarp janmanalva svatvabhy upagamat, 
Valjayantl on Vlsnu, V . 179.151; also see Pawate, Ib id ., 208, m n .5 .
4 . Gautama calls them rlkthabhafafr, Gautama, XXVIII, 30-31; D h.K .]263 .
5. Baudh. dh.su.11.2.36-7; D h .K .1270-1 • Medhatlthl explains Manu, IX . 158; 
gotra hara daya haras'ca sat, Itare vlparltah /  Jha, Manu-smrtl, (Calcutta), 
1939), II. 291.
6 . Manu, IX . 163. eka evaurasah putrah pltrasya vasunah prabhuh/ se§anam 
anrsarpsyartham pradadyattu prajlvanam / /  Also Br.XXV.35, SBE, X X X III, 375.
7. In place of *ln order to avoid unkindness1, Colebrooke renders: ‘for the sake of 
Innocence*, M lta . I.x t.2 8 . BOhler renders: *ln order to avoid harshness*, SBE, 
XXV, 360. anrsamsam Is the highest dharma, tells the Mahabharata, I I I.  297.55, 
on this see Derrett, Critique, 51. Medhatlthl took I t  In the sense of dharma when 
he said, ‘avoidance of unkindness* meant ‘avoidance of sin*, Jha, Manu-smrtl, V , 
148; similar was the view of Kulluka, SBE, XXV, 360, n.163.
8 . Tr. Jha.Manu-smftl, (Calcutta, 1928), V , 147-8.
should not be taken to be denoting a rigid rule,^ In order to exclude a ll other
kinds of sons from Inheritance excepting the legitimates, because the rule seems
2
to be modified by subsequent texts.
It Is established that among the twice born castes, only the aurasa
3
and the dattaka sons are entitled to Inheritance, but exactly at what period of
Hindu legal history these two types excluded the others Is an ‘extremely d ifficu lt
4 5matter* to substantiate.
Apararka*s comment ^ on Yajnavalkya, (11.132) on the strength of
7
Saunaka‘s text, Indicates that In the kallyuga (lite ra lly  Iron age, I .e . the
1. M lta .l.x l.2 8 .
2 . Manu, IX, 164, ordained one-fifth or one-sixth of the father*s estate to the 
ksetraja (soil born) son and In IX.165 , put the aurasa and the ksetraja on equal 
fo<ptlng. Medhatlthl explained that the text should not be taken litera lly  and 
upheld the superiority of the aurasa, Jha, Manu-smrtl, V , 148-9.
3 . Kane, HD , III, 599. Derrett, Bom. L .R .J . 57 (1955), 8.
4 . Derrett, Ib id ., 7.
5 . As for example, the ksetraja (soil bom, I .e .  a son begotten on a man*s wife (or 
widow) by an agnatic kinsman s till survives In popular usage, see A .C . Mayer, 
Caste and Kinship In Central India, (London, I960), 25. But the better view Is 
that the ksetraja, too, was obsolete In the current age (kall-varjya), Derrett, 
‘ Illegitimates: A  Test for Modern Hindu Family Law*, jAOS 81 (1961) 3: 251-61 
at 259. On ksetraja, also see Kane, HD, III, 647, 659.
6. putra pratlnldhlnam madhye dattaka eva kalau yuge grahyah/ ata eva kalau 
nlvartanta Ity anuvrttau saunakenoktarn, Yajnavalkya-smrtl, Anandasrama 
Sanskrit Series, 46,‘ P t. ll,  (1904), II, 739; D h .K .1371.
7. dattaurasetaresam tu putratvena parlgrahah /  Saunaka, Ibid, 739; D h .K .1371. 
C f. Parasara : aurasah ksetrajas calva dattah krtrlmakah su ta h / which In the ka il 
age recognlsesksetraja, dattaka and krtrlma, besides the aurasa, D h.K . 1352.
present age o f mankind) only two kinds o f sons, namely the aurasas and the dattakas,
are admissible J  The retention of sonshlp only of these two types was probably
2 ^  
well-established by the 14th century. So, since the dbPolescence of the other
types of son In the kallyuga besides the aurasa and the dattaka (adopted son; whose 
rights we shall examine later), a ll other kinds o f sons, for the purposes of Inheri­
tance, are considered as Illegitimates.
b . Rights of a Sudra *s daslputra
In Anglo-Hlndu Law, the Illegitimate sons of three regenerate classes
i
are not entitled to Inheritance or to any share In a partition between the father and
3 4his aurasa sons; such Illegitimates are only entitled to maintenance. As a general
1 • Derrett, Bom. L .R .J . 57 (1955), 7 . In this respect, we should note the text of
Brhaspatl, X X V I.69, Alyangar, ed ., 207. anekadha krtah putra rslbhls'ca pura- 
tanalh /  na sakyante*dhuna kartum saktl hlnals^clrantanalh / /  ‘sons of many des­
criptions who were made by ancient saints cannot now be adopted by men, by 
reason of their deficiency of power*, tr . Jogendra Smarta Slromaijl, Commentary 
on the Hindu Law, (Calcutta, 1885), 112. Llngat observes that the obsolescence 
of secondary sons was due to a refinement o f the moral sense, rather than to a 
gradual worsening o f the Ages, CLI, 194.
2. Derrett, Ib id ., 7 .
3 . K . Thlrumalalyappa v . K.Sanmuganatha, (1969) 3 Mad.296.
4 . Chuoturya Run v . Sahub Purhulad, (1857) 7 MIA 18; Muttuswamy v . Vencataswara, 
(1868) 12 MIA 203; Rahl v . Gobind, (1875) 1 Bom.97; ttuppa v . Slngaravelu, 
(1885) 8 Mad.325; Hdrtstngjl v . A jlts lng jl, (1949) 51 Bom.L.R.770. See Medha- 
t lth l on Manu, IX .145, Jha, Manu-smrtl, (Calcutta, 1926), V , 128-9. The HAMA 
1956, s .20(1) and (2) guarantee the right of maintenance of Illegitimates and this 
right of a Hindu Illegitimate minor cannot be defeated even though the putative 
father Is not a Hindu, K .M . Adam v . Gopalakrlshnan, AIR 1974 Mad.232.
rule, this Ts also applicable to the Sudras but an iexceptlon has been made In the 
case of Sudras * daslputras, whose rights are the subject-matter o f our present dis­
cussion •
The Sudra*s daslputra^ rights are not Innovations o f Anglo-Hlndu Law.
i _ ^ 2
His rights have been ordained by Manu, and Yajnavalkya, and the commentators
3
have given fu ll force to the texts of the sages. O f a ll the commentators, 
Kamalakara Bhatta*s treatment of the rights of the Illegitimates In general Is the 
most exhaustive. His comments on the texts concerning the rights of the daslputra 
run as follows:^
1. Manu, IX . 179, D h.K . 1310.
2. Yajn.11. 133-4, D h .K .1338.
3 . Medhatlthl on Manu, IX . 179, Jha, II, 297; tr . V , 158. M lta . l .x l l .2 .  
Da.bha. IX . 29-31.
4 . The text Is quoted by Derrett, Bom. L .R .J ., 58 (1956), 179 from Vlvada-
tandava, (Baroda, 1901), 379: sudrasyanuda sudraputre sa eva /  dasyam vd
dasa dasyam va yah svdrasya suto bhavet /  so*nujnato hared amsam I t l  dharmo 
vyavasthltah / /  Manu, IX . 179, pltur abhaveVdha harah /  jato*pl dasyam 
sudrena kamatomsa-haro bhavet /  mrte pltarl kuryus tarn bhrataras tv ardha 
bhaglnam / /  Yajn .11. 133. anuda-jo bhratr dauhltrabhave sarvam grfinTyat 
dauhltre saty ardham / abhratrko haret sarvam duhltanam sutad-rte I t l  yajna- 
valkyokteh /  fY a jn .  I I .  134.]
7 6 6 .
The same author  ^ deals with the situation 
of the son of an unmarrted Sudra woman by 
a Sudra father: That son of a Sudra father 
who Ts begotten on a female slave or the fe­
male slave of hTs male slave may take a 
share as permitted by hts father; thus the 
religious law Ts settled1. 2 . But Tn the 
absence of hts father he may^take a ha lf.
*Bom of a female slave to a Sudra father 
he may take a share as beftts a slave; 
after hts father*s death the brothers must 
make htm a sharer to the extent of a ha lf- 
share*. 3 He who Ts bom of an un­
married woman may take the entTre estate 
Tn the absence of brothers and daughters* 
sons, but Tf a daughters son exTsts, he 
may take only a ha lf. For Yajnavalkya 
says, *lf he has no brothers he may take 
a ll,  save for the sons of daughters*. 4
The texts envTsage two sTtuatTons when property could possTbly pass 
to the daslputra: (T) before the decease of the father and, (TT) after the decease 
of the father.
A Sudra, by a father*s rTght to brTng about a dTvTsTon o f famTly pro-
5
perty between hTmself and hTs sons, may gTve the dasTputra a share of hts self- 
acquTred property and of hts dTvTded share of hts joTnt famTly property.^ There 
are more liberal judicial opinions which empower a sudra father to give away,
1. Referring to Manu •
2. Manu, IX . 179.
3 . Yajn.II .133.
4 . Y a jn . I I .134. Tr. Derrett, Bom. L .R .J . 58 (1956), 182.
5 . Sir Richard Couch Tn Raja Jogendra v . NTtyanund, (1890) 17 IA 128 at 132.
6 . ParvathT v . ThTrumalaT, (1887) 10 Mad. 334 at 344. See Derrett, Bom. L.R. J. 
$7 (1955), jIK
i f  he may so choose, hts entire self-acqutred property to the daslputra.  ^ The
same court held that a sudra had power to give a share of the undtvtded jotnt 
2famtly property to the dasTputra before the property has been actually dtvtded
wtth hts legitimate sons by metes and bounds even though a legitimate son had
3
earlier conveyed the Intention of severance of jo int status. On the purport 
of the smrtl texts, Srlntvasan J . observed, 'the text cannot, therefore, be con­
strued as referring to self-acquired property. It applies, tn our opinion, to joint 
4
family property1. In this respect, I t  cannot be denied that the texts and the 
5
commentaries do not restrict the father's power to any particular category of
t
property and the correctness of the decision In Karuppannan js case has never 
been disputed. It Is true that a liberal Interpretation of the father's power 
might cause atrltlon of the birthright of aurasa sons, but at the same time,
1. K. Thlrumalalyappa v . K . Sanmuganatha, (1969) 3 Mad.296 at 318, based on 
the wrong Interpretation of the Mltaksara In Rao Balwant Singh v . Rani Klshorl 
(1898) 25 IA 54, notwithstanding the admission by the Court that according to 
strict Mltaksara law, the right by birth Is recognised both In self-acquired pro­
perty as well as joint family property, at 318.
2. Following Karupannan Chettl v . Bhulokam Chettl, (1899) 23 M ad.16 at 18. 
Contrary opinion In Parvathl v . Thlrumalal, (1887) 10 Mad. 334 at 344, was 
Ignored In Karupannan's case, though referred to In the judgment of the District 
Munslff.
3 . Same view expressed In Delvanal Achl v . Chidambaram, (1955) 1 MLJ 120 -  
AIR 1954 Mad. 657, criticised by Derrett, Critique, % 215.
4 . K . Thlrumalalyappa v . K . Sanmuganatha, (1969) 3 Mad. 296, 318.
5. Medhatlthl on Manu, IX . 179. M lta . I .x l l .2 .
liberal judicial opinion would serve as a vehicle for social justice where the 
father's act Is not vltated by any motive other than making reasonable provision 
for the Illegitimate son.
If the father during his lifetime, does not give any share to the
daslputra, after the decease of the father he becomes a coparcener w l th his
aurasa brothers and can enjoy the privilege of survivorship with them.^ The
2daslputra has the right to demand a partition from his aurasa brothers, and can
3
oblige them to give him a share equal to a half of a legitimate son's share.
When no aurasa son exists and the dasTputra competes with his father's widow
4
or daughter or daughter's son, his entitlement Is half of the estate.
1 • Sadu v . Balza, (1879) 4 Bom 37 F .B ., relied upfcn In Jogendra v . Nltyanund, 
(1885) 11 Cal.72, affirmed by P.C. In Jogendra v . Nltyanund, (189l) 17 IA 
128; Doral Babu v . Gopalakrlshna, AIR i960 Mad. 501, 503; Slnghal A j i t  
Kumar v . Ujayar Singh, AIR 1^61 SC 1334, 1337.
2 . Raju Tamblran v . Arunaglrl, AIR 1933 Mad. 397; Shamrao v . M t. Munnabal,
AIR 1949 Nag. 43T
3. The Privy Council, In this respect, held that a dasTputra's share would be half 
the share 'that which he would have taken had he been legitimate*, Kamulammal 
v . Vlsvanathaswaml, (1923) 50 IA 32. The most natural Interpretation of ardha 
bhaglka, (Yajn. II . 133) should be half a share of aurasa, see I .S. Pawate, Daya- 
Vlbhaga, (Dharwar, 1975), 155. But the Privy Council, not understanding the 
Indian background, held that the dasTputra's ha lf Is the ha lf of what he would have 
have had as a legitimate son. The Supreme Court might have overruled this, but 
the S.C. Incautiously followed the P.C. In Gur Naraln Das v . GurTahal (1952), 
SCR 869 at 875. Note that Derrett's statement at IMHL, f  526 as correct: so
S.C. In Gur Naraln and Derrett, at Critique, f j  311-2 wrong.
4 . Kamulammal v . Vlsvanathaswaml, (1923), 50 IA 32; Bhagwantrao v . Punjaram, 
AIR 1938 Nag.1; also Slnghal A j lt  Kumar v . Ujayar Singh, AIR 1961 SC 1334, 
1337. ~
From commentatorTal and judTcTal authority, Tt Ts settled that the 
share whTch a dasTputra gets eTther from hTs father or from others after hTs puta-
tTve father*s decease has nothTng to do wTth the concept o f bTrthrTght.  ^ He Ts
  2
not an aprattbandha dayada wTth hTs father or father*s collaterals. Regarding
the nature of rTghts of a dasTputrd, STr RTchard Couch observed, *Tt cannot be
saTd that at hTs bTrth he acquTres any rTght to share Tn the estate Tn the same way
3as a legTtTmate son would d o .1 Consequently, a dasTputra, unlTke hTs aurasa
4
brothers, could not demand a partTtTon from hTs putatTve father. In other words, 
the smrtT texts conveyTng Sudra *s dasTputra^ rTghts are exceptTons and are to be 
construed as such and not en larged •
JudTctal opTnTons have repeatedly emphasTsed that there Ts a funda­
mental dTfference between the rTght of an aurasa and that o f a dasTputra. In
5KrTshnayyan v . MuttuswamT the dasTputras were denTed the rTght to take the
1. RaghavacharTar, HTndu Law, 6th e d ., 349. Gur NaraTn Das v . GurTahal,
AIR 1952 SC 2257
2. KrTshnayyan v . MuttuswamT, (1884) 7 A/Tad. 407; RanojT v . Kando|T, (1885)
8 Mad 557. These two decTsTon were attacked by Venkatarama SastrT who 
Tncorrectly contended Tn RathTnasabapathT v . Gopala, AIR 1929 Mad .545 at 
546, that dasTputras were apratTbandha dayadas, but Devadoss J . rTghtly re­
jected the contentTon, at 549.
3 . Jogendra v . NTtyanund, (1890) 17 IA 128 at 132; same vTew Tn RathTnasaba- 
pathT v . Gopala, AIR 1929 Mad. 545; R. DoraT Babu ChettT v . T . Gopala" 
krTshna Chetty, AIR 1960 Mad. 501 at 503; ThTrumalaTyappa v . Shanmuganatha, 
(1969) 3 Mad. 296 at 297.
4 . DoraT Babu, AIR 1960 Mad. 501; Gur NaraTn v . Gur Tahal, AIR 1952 SC 225. 
STnghaT AjTt Kumar v . Ujayar, AIR 1961 SC 1334.
5. (1884) 7 Mad. 407
interest of their father's brtther Tn competTtTon wTth the wtdows of the latter^!
whTch TndTcated that because of the non-extstence of hts bTrthrtght, a dasTputra 
would never form a coparcenary wTth hTs putatTve father's collaterals. The bTrth- 
rTght of an aurasa and the specTal rTghts of a dasTputra have been clearly dTstTn- 
guTshed Tn ParvathT v . ThTrumalaT,  ^ where CollTns, C .J .,  and MuttusamT Ayyar, 
J. remarked:
the kTnshTp of an "Aurasa” extends to the 
entTre joTnt HTndu family, whereas that 
of an TlIegTtTmate son Ts confTned to hTs 
father and mother and theTr branch of a 
joTnt famTly; the former has a concurrent 
and co-ordTnate rTght Tn ancestral pro­
perty from the tTme of hTs bTrth wTth hTs 
father and father's coparceners, where­
as the latter can only take a share at 
hTs father's pleasure, and the father 
cannot (sTc), before partTtTon, gTve co­
parcenary property of hTs own authorTty 
and otherwTse than wTth the consent of 
hTs coparceners. 2
c . ConclusTon
Therefore, Tt can be saTd that the rTght of a dasTputra as ordaTned by 
the sages Ts truly a concessTon of a personal nature, and despTte the Tncorrect
1 • (1887) 10 Mad. 334 at 344: the dasTputra was Tn com petTtTon wTth hTs father's
coparceners and wTdow. Also GopalasamT ChettT v . Arunachalam ChettT, 
(1904) 27 Mad. 32, where the putatTve lather of a dasTputra left no separate 
property and hTs claTm Tn competTtTon wTth hTs putatTve father's father and 
uncle was denTed.
2. (1887) 10 Mad. 334 at 344. Cp. K . ThTrumalaTayyappa v . K . Shanmuganatha,
(1969) 3 Mad. 296, supra,767 and n . I thereto.
decision tn Ramaltnga Muppan v . Pdvddal Goundan,^ where the Madras Htgh 
Court allowed the daslputrd to represent hts father Tn the successton to hts grand­
father, the sastras nowhere make any suggestion that the dasTputra Ts entitled to
Inherit from his fathers relations. Nevertheless, we cannot accept the rule
2
laid down by the Madras High Court In Dora! Bcfou v . Gopalakrlshaa, that
he has no right to demand at law any share In the family property unless his
3
legitimate brothers are already separate from ascendants and collaterals. On
this judicial conservatism and shortsightedness, Derrett rightly observes: This
Ts an Irrational handicap for one who Ts already handicapped through no fault
4of his own, and It  Is to be condemned under principle III .2(5).*
A Sudra *s daslputra has the status o f a son under the Hindu law, and
he Is a member of the fam ily. But his rights are limited as compared to those
5of a son born In wedlock. The shares which a dasTputra gets emerge more
1. (1901) 25 Mad. 519, criticised by Derrett, JAOS 81 (1961) 3: 255-6. Cp.
Govlndarajulu v . Balu Amrrial, AIR 1952 Mad. 1: (1951) 2 MLJ 209, where
under similar circumstances, the daslputra was denied to represent his putative 
father, but not for the special text but on Incorrect reasoning that a dasTputra 
could not provide spiritual benefit. See Medhatlthl on Manu, IX . 143, Jha, 
V , 128. Also Derrett, Bom. L .R .J ., 57 (1955), 19.
2 . AIR 1960 Mad. 501.
3 . AIR 1960 Mad. 501, 503.
4 . Derrett, Critique, ^ 215. Principle 111. 2(5): * . . .  exploitation and oppres­
sion must be restrained, rather than facilitated -  and It must be remembered 
that one can exploit a person by negative as well as by positive acts1, 
Critique, 44. .
5 . Slnghal A j lt  Kumar v . Ujayar, AIR 1961 SC 1334, 1337.
from his special connection with his father than from any Innate right In the pro 
petty of his male ancestors:
In fact, the special text of Yajna­
valkya dealing with the rights of 
the Illegitimate son of a Sudra 
clearly shows that such son does 
not acquire at his birth any right 
In his putative father*s property, 
as he can take a share only by his 
fathers choice. 1
1. Per Justice Patanjall Sastrl In Thangavelu v . Court o f Wards, (1947) Mad. 334,
339; DoraT Babu v . Gopalakrlshna, AIR I960 Mad. 501, 503; Slnghal A jlt  
Kumar v . Ujayar, AIR 1961 SC 1334, 1337. But the author o f the Ba Iambhattl 
went so far as to say that the grhajata slave of a Sudra ( I.e . a daslputra) got his 
rights as heir by b irth . Balambhatfa refers to the word haret In Y a jn .II. 134, 
and says: hared Tty anena janmana putravat tasyapl ( I.e.daslputrasyapl) janmana 
svatvam sucltam, Bdlambhdttl, Vyavahard Adhyaya, (Bombay, 1914), J.'R.
Gharpure, ed ., 182; Setlur, ed ., 5 l7 -8 ; modification by I.S . Pawate, Dcya- 
Vibhaga, (Dharwar, 1975), 156, n .10. On this point, Balambhatfa^ opinion 
does not seem to be based on any sastrlc or commentatorlal authority unless he 
relied on Vljnanesvara‘s general theory that a ll heirs get property by birth, see 
Pawate, Ib id ., 207. It needs to be mentioned that Balarpbhatta took a liberal 
view on slaveys heirship In general. He says that the right of a slave to be an 
he ir to his master Is based, as a ll heirship Is based on pratyctattl ( ‘Immediate 
proximity1 or ‘close contact*) between the slave and his master, and that this 
pratyasattl between the slave and the master Is of a higher and closer kind than 
the pratyasattl between the father and the son: klm ca putratvadl-pratyasattya- 
pek§aya dasatva-pratyasattlr uttamottama, Balarflbhattl, Vyavahara Adhyaya, 
Gharpure, ed ., 185. Cp. Manu, V III, 4 ]6 . But Balambhalfa does not mean 
to say that the slave becomes before the legitimate son to take the heritage.
However, he says that In the case of a Sudra father, the grhajata slave or 
daslputra Is only litt le  less than a legitimate son and higher than a dattaka son: *
adyadasasya aurasa-kalpatvam parlqayanabhlpt. anye§am dattaka-kalpatvarp, /  (XV 
tatra mantra-homayor abhavat, Balambhattl/Vyavahara Adhaya, Gharpure, 
ed ., 187; for a discussion, Pawate, Ib id ., iBF!
In Hits context, an additional comment, which Is not relevant to our 
present discussion, nevertheless not Inappropriate to the general design of our 
study, should be made on the plight of Illegitimates In the Hindu Succession A c t.
The HSA within the framework of a progressive legislation, has taken a  fretro-
1 1grade step by abolishing the special rights of the daslputra by equating him with
2
other Illegitimates. So far as succession Is concerned, the daslputra*s right
3
as Illegitimate has been abolished by HSA, but his right In Hindu joint family
1. It should be noted that the HMA, s .5, by abolishing the caste distinction of 
marriage partners, made legitimate the offspring of Inter-caste marriages who 
would have been Illegitimates In Anglo-Hlndu Law. But the HSA Is harsh on 
the Illegitimates In general. The tendency la enlightened society Is to re­
move the distinction between legitimates and Illegitimates, see Derrett, JAOS 
81 (1961) 3: 252 and n.4 thereto. In Britain, by S. 14 of Family Law Reform 
Act, 1969, the Illegitimate children and their parents are entitled to succeed
to each other; for details, see P .M . Bromley, Family Law, (London, 1971), 507.
In a comparative context, also see Herma H ill Kay, The Family and Kinship 
System of Illegitimate Children In California*, American Anthropologist, 67 
(1965) 6, Part 57-81 at 75-76. On Illegitimate children (they prefer the 
expression: ‘children bom to unmarried mothers*) In USSR, see I. Lapenna,
*The Illegitimate Child In Soviet Law*, I.C .L .Q . 25 (1976) 1: 156-80 at 169. 
‘Children born out of wedlock” -  this euphemism Is preferred In Sweden as w ell, 
J .W .F . Sundberg, *Recent Changes In Swedish Family Law: Experiment Repeated*, 
Am.J.Comp.L. 23 (1975) 1: 34-49 at 36. These terminological changes show
tT i J " fl ‘ ^ e r^«wn% fv iX  9C ^ ^  * J u * 19?l , P
2. HSA, S .3 (l)( j).
3 . Derrett, Critique, f  310.
774.
property s ttll subsists and Tn that respect, the texts o f Manu (IX . 179) and
Yajnavalkya (11.133) and the judTctal decisions upholding these texts are Tn
fu ll force.^ A  father can sttll give the dastputra a share and the existence
2
of that right adds nothing but anomaly to the many existing anomalies of the 
law regarding the Hindu joint famtly which could not be remedied by piece­
meal legislation such as the HSA.
II. The adopted son and the Mltaksara birthright
a . Introduction
_ g
Unlike a sudra*s daslputra, an adopted son (dattaka) was more or
1. It ts submitted that to uphold the equality clauses tn the Constitution, a ll I l le ­
gitimates should be treated a like . But tn an egalitarian society, thts cannot be 
achieved by taking away the existing rights (as has been done tn the HSA,
S •3(l)(jJr but by taking a more liberal and progressive attitude towards the 
Illegitimates, see Derrett, f t  215, 310.
2. In thts context, the hypothetical problems tn the law of HTnjdu jo in t famtly and 
succession have been Illustrated by Derrett, and there ts every possibility that 
these hypothetical situations would come for determination before the judiciary 
as real problems, Derrett, Critique, f f  311-13.
3 . The Institution of adoption was not encouraged tn the Rg-veda, see Kane, HD,
III, 641, 657, but the Brahmana literature has specific references of adoption, e .g . 
Sunahsepa‘s adoption by Vtsvamttra, A l.B r ., V II .  13-18. Also A trl gave hts only 
son tn adoption, for details, see Kane, Ib id ., 662-3. During the dharmasastra 
period, adoption was well-established, Manu, IX . 141, 142. Adoption was 
recognised tn almost a ll the major legal systems. Adoption was tn vogue tn 
Eshnunna (old Babylonia), R. Yaron, The Laws of Eshnunna, (Jerusalem, 1969), 
107-8. The Code of HamurabT/$85-6, also tells us that adoption was recognised 
In Babylonia, J .M .P . Smith, The Origin and History of Hebrew Law, (Chicago, 
1931, rept. 1960), 208f. Adoption was also known tn Assyria, The Assyrian Code, 
28, J .M .P . Smith, ib id ., 228-9. For adoption and sale adoption at Nuzt, see 
supra, pp. 181-94. There was nothing tn Jewish law corresponding to formal adopt­
ion proceedings, G . Horowitz, The Spirit of Jewish Law, (New York, 1953), 263. 
Normally the relationship of natural parent and child could not be duplicated, but 
a child could be adopted either (t) through a vow or promise, or (tt) de facto,
/Continued on next page:
n .3 . -  p .774 -  confirmed:
A . J . Sllversteln, 'Adoption Tn JewTsh Law*, Connecticut Bar. Journal, 48 
(1974) 1: 73-82 at 75. R. de Vaux says, ‘that the notion of adoption, In the 
juridical sense, was known In Old Testament times, but had lit t le  Influence 
on dally life  . Anci ent  Israel, (London, 1961), 52. However, the Mlshnah 
-  a son from any source frees the father's w lf^ from the obligation of levlrate 
marriage -  at Yevamot II , 5, Is significant, see Horowitz, Ib id ., 261 • The 
Greeks sought to perpetuate the family and the ancestral cu lt by adoption, see 
Driver and M iles, Assyrian Laws, o p .c lt . ,  249, n . ] .  The Roman maxim: 
adoptlo naturam Imltatur Is well-known. The desire that the son should carry 
on the sacra or religious cult o f the family was very strong In Rome; so the tie 
between father and son could be created a rtific ia lly  by adoption, Jolowlcz,
HISRL, (Cambridge, 1932), 118-9; Galus, ( tr . Poste), I. 97-107, (Oxford,
1904), 62-5; Buck land, Elementary Principles of the Roman Private Law, 
(Cambridge, 1912), 20, 21; also his A  Manual of Roman Private Law,
(Cambridge, 1925), f  28; T .C . Sanders, The Institutes of Justlnlon, (London, 
1956), 40-7, 186. The custom of adoption Is fa irly  common among Serbs and 
Croats, M .S . FlllpovTe ‘Symbolic Adoption among the Serbs*, Ethnology, 4 
(1965) 1: 66-71 at 70. In pre-Islamlc Arabia, the custom of adoption was 
well-known and the adopted child had the legal status of the adopter's own 
ch ild . This Is apparent from the verse (xxxlH. 37) In the Quran which 
abolishes this custom to settle the controversy which arose from the marriage 
of the Prophet to the divorced wife of his adopted son Zayd, N .J . Coulson,
A  History o f Islamic Law, (Edinburgh, 1971), 13. In Chinese law, fa lling 
legitimate sons, an heir used to be adopted for ancestor worship, and to attend 
the family sacra, G . Jamieson, Chinese Family and Commercial Law, (Sanghal, 
1921), 3 , 24; also D. Bodde and C . Morris, Law In Imperial China, Exemplified 
by 190 Ch'ng Dynasty Cases, (H .U .P ., Cambridge, Mass. ,  1967), Case: 42.1, 
1827, reported at 243. Adoption of an heir was also recognised by the people 
of Manchu China, Sybille Van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions In Manchu China, 
(The Athlone Press, University of London, 1966), 15-6. Adoption was known to 
the customary laws of Ceylon, F .A . Hayley, A  Treatise on the Laws and Customs 
of the Sinhalese, (Colombo, 1923), 166. Similar customs could be found In 
Malaya, M .B. Hooker, Readings In Malay Adat Laws, (Singapore, 1970), 134-5; 
also his Adat Laws In Modem Malaya, (Kuala Lumpur, 1972), 211. Adoption 
could be found also In the customary laws of N igeria, but It should not be confused 
with guardianship arrangements, E . l.  Nwogugu, Family Law In Nigeria ( Ibadan, 
1974), 251 • At the dawn of English law, parent's right over his child were In­
alienable and It  could recognise no change o f status comparable to adoptlo or 
adrogatlo of Roman law, but eventually statutory adoption was Introduced In the 
Adoption of Children Act, 1926, amended In the Adoption A c t, 1958, see T.E. 
James, Child Law, (London, 1962), 45-67; also P.M. B romley, Family Law,
(London, 1971), 246-7.
less on the same footTng as the aurasa son Tn respect of the concept of rTght by 
bTrth.
As compared wTth the adopted son, the 
TllegTtTmate son's posTtTon Ts certaTnly 
TnferTor. The adopted son has a co- 
ordTnate Tnterest wTth hTs father Tn 
ancestral property. He can claTm 
partTtTon from hTs father. He repre­
sents the father as agaTnst the father's 
coparceners. He excludes the wTdow, 
the daughters and the daughter's son.
b . Effects of Adoption
Though the actual bTrth of an adopted son takes place Tn hTs natural
2
famTly yet, after hTs adoptTon, he Ts deemed to be notTonally reborn Tn the
adoptTve famTly. HTs rTghts Tn the adoptTve father's property Tn the adoptTve
3
famTly emerge from thTs notTonal bTrth and, wTth certaTn exceptTons, he *ac-
4
quTres a ll the rTghts of an aurasa son*.
] .  PerCollTns, C .J . and MuttusamT, J.T n ParvathT v . ThTrumalaT, (1887) 10 
Mad. 334, 344, 345.
2. TewarT Raghuraj v . RanT Subhadra, AIR 1928 PC 87. Cp. the effect of an 
adoptTon under the Punjab Customary Law; there Ts no transplantatTon of the 
adopted son from hTs natural famTly Tnto the famTly of hTs adoptTve father.
Only a personal relatTonshTp Ts establTshed between the appoTnted heTr and 
the appoTnter, Gurnam STngh v . Smt. Ass Kaur, AIR 1977 P & H 103.
3 . He remaTns subject to prohibited relatTonshTp Tn marrTage Tn the natural famTly 
and takes 1/4 Tn competTtTon wTth subsequently born aurasa son. For the contro- 
versTes among the dTfferent schools on the rTghts o f an adopted son Tn competTtTon 
wTth an after-born aurasa son, see Derrett, IMHL, t l8 6 .  Also RaghavacharTar, 
HTndu Law, 6th e d ., f !5 3 .
4 . KrTshnamurthT v . KrTshnamurthT, (1927) 54 IA 248, 262; Anant v . Shankar, 
(1943) 70 IA 232; PunTthavallT v . RamalTngam, AIR 1970 5C 1730 at 1731a, 
pr.3 .
In cases of adoptTon by a male HTndu during his lifetim e, Tn Anglo-
HTndu law the adopted son from the date of hTs adoptTon becomes a co-owner
wTth hTs adoptTve father just as Tf he were an aurasa son.^ The adoptTve father
2
cannot dTspose of hTs ancestral property wTthout the adopted son's consent and
the adopted son can demand partTtTon of the ancestra I property from hts adoptTve
3  _
father. These judTcTa! opinions undoubtedly establish that, Tn the Mltaksara
family, on his adoptTon an adopted son acquires a fictitious birthright with real
effects In the property of his adoptive fam ily.
c . Status of an adopted son In his natural family
In a sense, an adopted son has two lives, one In the natural family 
and the other In the adoptive fam ily. Here a question would Indeed arise re­
garding his ante-adoptlon birthright and acquisition of property Tn the natural
family prior to his adoption. The answer to this question Is couched In the Inter
4
pretatlon of the text of Manu, which runs as follows: The “given11 son shall 
not take the family and estate of his progenitor: the plnda follows the family
1. Da .m l., V I .8. The textual authority for the adopted son's right In the adopt­
ive family Ts Manu, IX . 141. Rambhat v . Laksman, (1881) ILR 5 Bombay 630.
2. Rungama v . Atchama, 1 PCR 197.
3 . Parvathl v . Thlrumalal, (1887) 10 Mad 334, 344-5; Rambhat v . Laksman 
(1881) 5 Bom .630.
4 . Manu, IX . 142, gotra-rlkthe janayltur na hared dattrlmah sutah /  gotra- 
rlkthanugah plndo vyapaltl dadatah svadha / /
and the estate: the giver's funeral rttes pass away.1 ^
The Itteral meantng of the verse does not help us Tn gauging the
effects of adoptTon on the adopted son's ante-adoptlon Interests Tn property.
It Ts agreed by general consent that after hTs adoptTon the proprietary Interests
of the adopted son cease Tn the natural family, but with regard to his pre-
adoption Interest Tn the natural fam ily, the judges and jurists are sharply
2 3divided Into two camps. The High Courts o f Madras and Calcutta have
taken the view that adoption does not divest the adopted son of any property
4
which has been vested In him prior to his adoption. But the Bombay
5
High Court held that the adoption of the boy was tantamount to death In the
1. Tr. Derrett, Bharuct, II, 247-8. Sir William Jones renders: *na hared' as 
'must never claim*, the Ordinances of Manu, ed ., S .G . Grady, (London,
1869), 208, followed by Colebrooke, M lta, I, x l.3 2 . BOhler renders as 
'shall, never take*, SBE, XXV, Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrl: 'as not to 
take away', Hindu Law, 6th edn., 244. Kane renders as: 'should not take*,
HD, III, 690. Variant reading: na hared dattrlma kvaclt does not make any 
difference In meaning.
2. Venkata Naraslmha v . Rangayya, (1906) 29 Mad. 437, following Beharl Lai v . 
Kallas Chunder, (1896) 1 CWN 121.
3. Shyama charan v . Sri Charan, (1929) 56 Cal 1135; Rakhalraj v . Debendra,
AIR 1948 Cal .356, ihe Implications of Manu, IX . 142, Dattaka MTmarnsa,
V I. 6-8, and Dattaka Candrlka, II . 18-19 discussed at 359, 361.
4 . This view Is supported by J .C . Ghose, The Principles of Hindu Law, 3rd ed ., 
(Calcutta, 1917), I, 715-6; Kane, HD , III, 694; Gharpure, Hindu Law, 4th 
ed ., 154; Raghavacharlar, Hindu Law, 6th e d ., $148; Derrett, IMHL, 4 174.
5. Dattatrava v . Govlnd, AIR 1916 Bom.210 -40 Bom 429, followed In Bal Kesarbal 
v . Shlvasangjl, (1932) Bom .654 = 34 Bom LR. 1332 56 Bom .619, the view approved 
by Golapchandra Sarkar SastrT, Hindu Law, 6th e d ., 243, revising his appa­
rently correct opinion In The Hindu Law of AdoptTon, TLL, 1888 (Calcutta, 1891), 
390. Same view of Mayne, Hindu Law, 10th ed. ,  $194. Different view In 
Mahableswar v . Subramanya, (1923) 47 Bom 542, but this case and Dattatraya v . 
Govlnd are surprisingly approved In Manlkbal v . Gokuldas, AIR 1925 Bom 363 =
49 Bom 520, 525.
natural famtly and properties vested In him either as heir to his natural father 
or as the sole surviving coparcener would be lost to him.
The mtmamsa rules support the fact that the Calcutta and Madras view ^
2
on Manu, IX . 142, was correct and the Bombay view was vitiated with the fault 
3of vakyabheda and the text should be only applicable to rlktha harana In the
natural family after adoption. The commentatosalso do not seem to subscribe
to the Idea that property vested tn the son In the natural family Is divested by his 
5adoption •
This controversy has been resolved by the Hindu Adoptions and Main­
tenance A c t,^  wwhlch clearly states: *any property which vested In the adopted 
child before the adoption shall continue to vest In such person . .  .* ^  In the
1. Supra, p. 7 7 $  , n . x /3 *
2. Supra, p. 7 7 # , n. 5 .
3 . vakyabheda Is the fault of splitting up of a sentence so as to yield two distinct
vtdhts (rules), see Sabara on Jalmlnl, II, 2 . 26, Jha, Shabara-bhasya, (Baroda,
1933), 257-9, K .L . Sarkar, MRIHL, 87-8. J.R. Gharpurejdlndu Law, 4th ed ., 
(Bombay, 1931), 154. Derrett, 'Hindu Law* In his An Introduction to Legal 
Systems, (London, 1968), 91.
4 . Kane, HD, III, 695.
5 . Medhatlthl on Manu, IX . 142: Itas" ca bhaga-harafvam datrlmasya tuktam /  
yato janayltuh sakasad gotram dhanam ca na haratl, vamsad a p e ta tva t/ Jha, 
Manu-smrtl, (Calcutta, 1939), 285. But Medhatlthl has also mentioned the 
opinion of someone who held a contrary view, see SBE, XXV, 355, n.142. 
Nllakantha In conformity with mlmamsa rules interpreted the verse to convey 
only one rule, V y .m a ., ed ., Kane, 115; tr . Kane and Patwardhan, 1st ed ., 123.
6. Act 78 of 1956 (21 December, 1956),
7 . HAMA, s .l2 (b ). Cp. the contrary provision to the effect tn English law,
Adoption A ct, 1958, ss,16and 17; see James, Child Law, o p .c lt . ,  51.
light of this provision, the preceding discussion may appear to be otiose, never­
theless It helped to clear up the juridical position of the property which the 
adopted son might have acquired In the natural family by virtue of his birthright 
therein •
d . Effects of adoption In the adoptive family
Now we turn to the rights of the adopted son In his adoptive fam ily.
We have already stated,^ and we must re-emphaslse that an adopted son acquires
a flctltous birthright with real effects In the adoptive fam ily. It has also been 
2
pointed out that an adoption during the lifetime of the adoptive father does not 
create any problems excepting those which could emerge from the co-ownership 
of father and son.
3
But after the death of a male Hindu, his widow may adopt on behalf 
of her husband and, In Anglo-Hlndu law, the adopted son's rights would not accrue
1. Supra,777.
2. Supra, 7 7 7 .
3 . The sastrlc rule Is this that the widow cannot adopt without being authorised by 
her husband, Vaslstha, XV, 5; SBE, 14, 75. But the text has been Interpreted 
differently by different High Courts. In M lth lla , excepting In the krtrlma form 
the widow Is Incapable to adopt, Chandra Choor v . Blbhutl Bhusan, (1945) 23 
Pat 763. In Bengal and Benares (Northern and Central India), the consent of 
the husband was required, Pudurn v . Koer, (1869) 12 MIA 350, 356; Bhupendra 
v . Puma, AIR 1939 PC 2227 In Southern India the widow required the authority 
either o f her husband or of his saplridas after his death, Collector of Madura v . 
Mootoo Ramallnga, (1868) 12 MIA 397; Sri Balusu v . Sri Balusu, (1899) 22 Mad. 
398 (PC). For details, see Derrett, IMHlT ^ 144-49. Raghavacharlar, Hindu 
Law, 6th e d ., $$ 101-29.
from the date o f adoption, but would relate back to the date o f the adoptive
father's death, as I f  the adopted son was In existence at that time. Thus the
adopted son's birthright, however long after the death of the adoptive father
he might be adopted, would travel back to the lifetime of the adoptive father
on the wings of the fiction of relation back  ^ and manifest Itself with a ll Its 
2
correlative Instances.
e . Relation back: Anglo-Hlndu law stage
Since the enactment of the HAMA, the Implication of the fiction 
of relation back should be studied In two stages: firstly, the Anglo-Hlndu law 
stage, and secondly, the modem Hindu Law stage.
3
As stated above, a widow may adopt long after the death of her 
husband, so between the death of her husband and the date of adoption, pro­
perty may have passed to heirs, survivors or alienees. In such situations, since
1. *ReIatlon back*: 'where two different times or other things are accounted as 
one, and by some act done the thing subsequent Is said to take effect ”by 
relation” from the time preceding. Thus letters of administration relate back 
to Intestate's death, and not to the time when they were granted', Wharton's 
Law Lexicon, 14th ed ., 858.
2 . Pratapslng v . Agarslngjl, (1918) 46 IA 97 =43 Bom. 778, 792; Anant v . Shankar, 
AIR 1943 PC 196; approved by the SC on the point In Shrtnlvas v . Narayan, AIR 
1954 SC 379.
3 . As Illustrations we can point out that the adoption was made 71 years after the 
death of the adoptive father In Raje V .A . . Nlmbalkar v . Jayavantrav M . 
Ranadlve, (1867) 4 BHC 191; In Shrlnlvas v . Narayan, AIR 1954 SC 379, 
the widow adopted 41 years after the death of her husband; a widow may 
adopt after haIf-a-century or more, see the remark of Hegde, J . ,  In Govlnd
v. Nagappa, AIR 1972 SC 1401; similar remark In the last century by M ltte r ,J ., 
Kally v . Gocool, (1877) ILRCal. 295, 303-4.
Hie adoptTon Ts related back to the date of hts adoptTve father's decease, the 
adopted son, by vTrtue of hTs notTonal bTrth rTght, would be entTtled to (T) reopen 
partTtTon, and (TT) question1 Improper' alTenatTons whTch mTght have taken place 
between hTs adoptTve father's death and hTs adoptTon. In other words, he would 
dTvest property whTch had been vested Tn the wTdow or Tn someone else, such as 
a coparcener or anybody claTmTng as reversToner or helr.^
The rules of relatTon back and dTvestTng have developed by analogy
2from the sastrTc rTghts of the posthumous son, because the posTtTon of the adopted
son Ts analogous to that of a son who was Tn hTs mother's womb at the tTme of hTs
3
adoptTve father's death but bom thereafter.
1. Anant v . Shankar, (1946) 70 IA 232.
2 . Yajn. II. 123. M T ta .l.v .8 -9 . Also see the text of BrhaspatT regarddTng the 
rTghts of absent coparcener, Br . XXV. 24, 25; SBE, XXX III, 373. The texts 
are dTscussed by Gajendragadkar, J . Tn Ramchandra v . RamkrTshna , (1952),
54 Bom LR 636, 643-4.
3 . The pandits of  the SDA pretended that the adoptee was, Tn fact, en ventre sa mere 
and fTctTtTously the mother had been pregnant up to the tTme of adoptTon, see
Ranee KTshenmunee v . Raja Oddwunt STngh, (1824) 3 Beng.Sel.Rep., 304. 
KuIkamT refuses to accept the analogy between a posthumous son and an adopted 
son, and trTes to show that durtng the unlTmTted and fTctTtTous gestatTon period^, the 
adopted son cannot acquTre any rTght Tn the property of the adoptTve father, S.R. 
KuIkamT, The doctrTne of relatTon back Tn adoptTon and Tts valTdTty*, (1963) 65 
Bom. L .R .J ., 4-13 at 12. But KilkamT mTsses the poTnt that upamana (analogy)
and atTdela (transference) were accepted mTmamsa rules and were applTed by the
Anglo-HTndu judges Tn relevant sTtuatTons. On atTdesa, see supra,“7,24 n .3 .
StrTctly speakTng, there Ts no mentTon of dattaka at Yajn. 11.123, or a t MTta, I.vT.
8, see Derrett, 'An Important development Tn the law of adoption*, 57 Bom.L.R. J. 
(1955), 73-88 at 82. The analogy was doubted by the PrTvy Council Tn Bamundoss 
Mookerjee v . Mussamut TarTnee, (1858) 7 MIA 169, 190, but Tt was accepted by 
MelvTll, J . ,  Tn Rupchand v . takhmabaT (1871) 8 BHC (ACJ), 114, 117; also by 
the SC Tn ShrTnTvas v . Narayan, AIR 1954 SC 379, 380a. The non-acceptance of 
the analogy leads to the danger of making the adopted son Tllegitimate and such a 
son, though fTctTtTously Illegitimate, could not be adopted, see Derrett, IMHL,
162; RaghavacharTar, Hindu Law, 6th e d ., f  141. So relatTon back Ts a fiction
/Continued on next page:
F. "Relation back and dlverstlng o f property
The detached student, however, cannot avoid the observation that 
Invention of a legal fic tion ,^ and Its application to law and life  are not one 
and the same thing. These two processes chime HI with each other and that 
Is why the Indian judicial and juristic scene Is agitated by controversies surround­
ing the extent o f divesting by an adopted son.
The general rule of succession Is that an Inheritance might never be
2 3In abeyance, and that an estate once vested cannot be divested. The Interplay
n.3 -  p.782 -  continued:
o f legitimacy as w ell, and that Is why ‘whenever the adoption may be made 
there Is no hiatus In the continuity of the line of the adoptive father*,
Pratqpstng v . Agarstngjl, AIR 1918 PC 192; 46 IA 97; approved and restated 
In Shrlnlvas v . Narayan, AIR 1954 SC 379, 385a, pr.17,
1. Bentham condemned ‘fiction (as) an assumed fact notoriously false, upon which 
one reasons as I f  It  were true*, Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, ed ., 
C .K . Ogden, (London, 1931), 71. Fiction Is a ‘noble lie* which prevents law 
from coming Into grips with rea lity , M . Barkun, Law Without Sanctions; Order 
In Primitive Societies and the World Community, (New Haven/London, 1968), 
124. But there are non-lnvldlous uses of legal fiction as a device to adapt the 
law to new conditions and ‘at a .particular stage of social progress they are 
Invaluable expedients for overcoming the rig id ity  of law* and the Tlctlon of 
adoption Is one such device, Maine, Ancient Law, (London, 1891), 27. Maine 
Is supported by Hans Valhlnger, tr . C .K . Ogden, T he Philosophy of 11 As I f " , 
(New York, 1925), 19-20, 33, 143. Same view by Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions, 
(Stanford, 1967), passim and Anatomy of the Law, (Pelican Books. U .K ., 1971), 
76. Also C.S. SSstrT, Fictions In the Development of Hindu Law Texts, (Adyar, 
1926), 203-4. But jud ic ia lly  ‘fiction compels further fictions because of their 
fundamental conflict with natural laws . .  .*, per Bose, J .,  Udhao Samb v. 
Bhaskar Jalkrlshna, AIR 1946 Nag. 203, 205.
2. See Sutherland, J .C .C .‘s remark In Lakhl Prlya v . Bhalrab,Chandra, 5 S .D .A . 
Rep.315. Also Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrf,The Hindu Law of Adoption, TLL, 
1888, (Calcutta, 1891), 408.
3 . Deo Klshen v . Budh Prakash, (1883) ILR 5 A l l . 509; Derrett, (1955), 57 Bom. 
L .R .J ., 75.
between this general rule and the retro-operatTve birthright of the adopted son 
has engaged the attentton of the judiciary to a considerable extent, and Tn order 
to avoid the uncertainty In the enjoyment of property, the dectstons betray a 
growing tendency to hamstring divesting of property by an adopted son.
Before the decision In the case of Amarendra v . Sanatan }  there
was considerable doubt as to whether adoption could be carried out at a ll I f  the
2
effect would be to divest property from any one other than the adopting widow.
But this decision established that the va lid ity of an adoption was not affected by
the question as to whom It might divest of property.
Sir George Lowndes explained the significance of Hindu adoption In
these words:
In their Lordships* opinion, I t  Is clear that 
the foundation of the Brahmlnlca! doctrine 
of adoption Is the duty which every Hindu 
owes to his ancestors to provide for the 
continuance of the line and the solemniza­
tion of the necessary rites . . .  It can,they 
think, hardly be doubted that In this doc­
trine the devolution of property, though 
recognised as the Inherent right of the ^ 
son, Is altogether a secondary consldatlon
and
1. (1933) 60 IA 242 = B 35 Bom .L.R. 859.
2. G .K . Dabke, (1939), 41 Bom. L .R .J ., 41-8 at 41. Derrett, (1956) 58 
Bom.L.R. J .,  1-16 at 5 .
3 . Amarendra v . Sanatan, (1933) 60 IA 242, 248.
the vesting of the property on the death 
of the latt holder In some one other than 
the adopting widow, . . .  cannot be In I t ­
self the test of the continuance or extinc­
tion of the power of adoption. 1
Thus, a new avenue for birthright opened and that concept up to a certain point,
ensnared the decisions Into giving It the widest possible effect. This becomes
apparent when Meredith, J . ,  speaks on the effects of adoption by a widow In
2Chandrachoor v . Blbhutlbushan:
Having dated back by fiction for the 
purpose of continuing the line and con­
ferring the spiritual benefit, the son 
takes In return the property of which 
his father was possessed at the time of 
his death, and I f  that property has In 
the meanwhile passed to someone else 
by Inheritance, he w ill necessarily 
divest that person of I t .  If the pro­
perty has In the meanwhile passed to 
someone who has In turn been succeed­
ed by someone else, that third person 
w ill also be divested, because any one 
who takes the property of the lather 
takes It provisionally and subject to the 
risk of defeasance should adoption 
take place. 3
1. Ib id ., 255.
2. (1940) 23 Pat 763.
3 . Ib id ., at 853. From practical motives, though on Incorrect understanding
of the concept of birthright, contrary view of Chagla, C. J . ,  In Ramchandra 
Hanmant v . Balajl Dattu, AIR 1955 Bom 291 where It  was held that although 
the adoptee could divest a sole surviving coparcener^ heir, he could not 
divest property In the hands of an helr*s heir. Criticised by Derrett,*Dlvest-
Ing an Important fu ll bench decision on adoption*, (1956) 58 Bom.L.R. J .l-1 6
at 3 , 7 -8 . Overruled by SC In Krlshnamurthl v . Dhruwaraj, (1961)2. SCJ 582 
(SC).
If Hits correct Interpretation of the ftctton of relation back Is 
followed out, adoption would undoubtedly put on Its ubiquitous garb of divest­
ing and would k many titles to property so long as there Is any ‘potential
1 2 mother In the joint fam ily1, and this was precisely the line of Privy Council
decisions which acknowledged that the key to the adopted son‘s right to divest
property was his birthright In the jo int family estate, Into whosoever hands It
might come.^
But this all-pervading birthright o f the adopted son has not remained 
Intact, and gradually It has been eroded by judicial activism.
It seems to be acknowledged on a ll sides, though sometimes grud-
4 -glngly, that adoption creates b irthright. The Mltaksara birthright Is not
merely a right In the property of the father, but I t  extends to the whole of the
5
jo int family property. Following this principle, the adopted son can recover
1. Gajendragadkar and Vyas J J ., In Ramchandra v . Ramkrlshaa, (1951) 54 Bom. 
LR636.
2 . Anant v . Shankar, AIR 1943 PC 196; followed In Neelangonda v . Ujjangauda,
AIR 1948 PC 165 = 50 Bom LR 628 PC.
3 . Derrett, (1956) 58 Bom L.R. J .,  1-16 at 7.
4 . See Ku!kaml*s strict but somewhat Incorrect Interprdatlon of M lta , 1.1.23, at 
(1963) 65 Bom L.R. J ., 4-13 at 10. On the literal strength of the text, he 
denies the relationship of the adopted son to his adoptive father, but he failed 
to understand that the dattaka was ‘certainly a bandhu-dayada*, (Manu, IX .
159, 160), Derrett, (1953) 55 Bom .L.R . J . ,  1-8 a t. Vljnanesvara himself took 
note of Manu‘s texts and explained the rights of the adopted son at M lta . I .x l.30-1.
5. Derrett, ‘Estate duty and the nature of a Mltakshara coparcener'Viterest*, (1958) 
60 Bom.L.R. J .,  161-72 at 166.
hts Interest Tn the joTnt family property by partttton or otherwise from ancestors 
and collaterals within the prescribed four degrees of the Mltaksara coparcenary.
Thus, the effect of the coerslve fiction of relation back can be far-reaching and 
I f  applied without any qualification, could be a menace to the devolution of 
estates and their secured enjoyment.
The sandhill of precedents which were bu ilt by giving fu ll effect to 
the fiction was partly demolished by the Supreme Court In Shrlnlvas v . Naryan,
which narrowed the lim it of the adopted son's birthright and laid down the rule 
that the adopted son was entitled only to the property of his male lineal ancestors 
but not of his collaterals:
the relation back of the right of an adopted 
son Is only quoad the estate of the adoptive 
father. 4 In explaining the Inconven­
iences of the Anant v . Shankar rule, the 
Supreme Court went on: *The claim o f the 
appellant to divest a vested estate rests on 
a legal fic tion , and legal fiction should 
not be extended so as to lead to unjust re­
sults. We are of opinion that the deci­
sions In AIR 1943 PC 196 Insofar as I t  re­
lates to properties Inherited from collate­
rals Is not sound and that In respect of 
such properties the adopted son can lay ^ 
no claim on the ground of relation back.
1. Derrett, 'Adoption by a daughter-in-law and divesting*, (1964) 1 MLJ, 3-8 at 7.
2. AIR 1954 SC 379 = 1954 SCJ 408 = 57 Bom LR 678 = (1954) 1 MLJ 630 (SC) 
approving J lva jl v . Hanmant, (1950) Bom 510 = 52 Bom LR 527.
3 . Derrett, (1964) 1 MLJ 3-8 at 7 .
4 . AIR 1954 SC 379, 387b, pr.25.
5 . Ib id ., 387b-388a, pr.25.
Nevertheless, wtthTn thTs narrow lim it of the rule tn Shrtntvas v . Narayan, the 
birthright of the adopted son w tll follow the property of the adoptive father tn 
whosoever hands Tt may be, whether tt had passed to others by survivorship, 
succession, partition or alienation.^
2
The judicial activism In Shrtntvas v . Narayan, and jurid ica l opt-
3
ntons exposing the Inconveniences of the fic tion of relation back served as a
prelude to legislation, and one may wonder why there should be a discussion on
the law of adoption In Anglo-Htndu Law after the enactment of the HAMA.
But It Is Interesting to note that the effect o f adoptions made before the HAMA
Is fe lt even to-day. Indeed, I t  w ill be fe lt for some time to come and the
4
doctrine of relation back seems to be s till w ell and alive notwithstanding the
1 • Krlshnamurthl v . Dhruwaraj,(1961) 2 SCJ 582, 584; discussed by Derrett, 
•Adoption, succession, and the present state of Hindu Law*, (1966) 68 Bom.
L.R. J .,  41-48 at 43. Also S. Valdyanathan, ‘Adoption by a daughter-in-law 
and divesting*, AIR 1967 J .,  135-9 at 139.
2. AIR 1954 SC 379.
3 . Fora long time jurists were urging for legislative Intervention. G .K . Dabke, 
•Divesting of estate on adoption*, (1939) 41 Bom. L .R .J ., 41-8 at 48.
Ga jendragadkar, ‘Hindu wtdow*s power to adopt and Its effect upon vesting of 
property*, (1944) 45 Bom .L.R . J. 17-24 at 23, also from the bench, Ramchandra 
v . Ramkrlshna, (1952) 54 Bom.L.R. 636, 641. Derrett, *Some troublesome cases 
In adoption*, (1953) 55 Bom .L.R . J . ,  1-8 at 8 .
4 . See ’Sawan Ram v . Kalawantl, AIR 1967 SC 1761;: Slta Bal v . Ramchandra, 
AIR 1970 SC 343. Derrett, ‘Adoption and relation back: the position In 1971 ‘ , 
(1971) 73 Bom.L.R. J . ,  31-5, also ‘Adoption*: the whole hog*, (1972) 74 Bom. 
L.R. J . ,  123-5. Very much alive In a recent case: Motl Lai v . Sardar M ai, 
AIR 1976 Raj 40, 55.
statute. But even Tn the Anglo-HTndu Law context, the fTctTon of relation back 
and the extent of divesting are passing through transformation and If we reconnoitre 
the recent sequence of decisions of the Supreme Court, the transformation may be 
seen In its true perspective.
But before we survey the Supreme Court decisions, let us look back to 
a case at the turn of the last century In which the facts were not very dissimilar 
from those dealt with by the Supreme Court In the recent past. The case we are
referring to Is Surendra Nandan v. Sallaja.^ According to the facts of the case
1 2  - 1 we find that B and B were living In a Mltaksara joint family. B died leaving
authority to his widow, W , to adopt a son. On B *^s death, his undivided half-
2
share Tn the coparcenary property passed to B by survivorship. During the Ilfe - 
2
time of B , W adopted AS. The adoption related back to the date of the death
of B1 and by virtue of ASks birthright, a coparcenary Interest was created Tn the
joint property co-extenslve with that which B^  had In the property, and, because
of the adoption, It vested In AS. Norris and Beverley, J J ., rightly held that
on his adoption AS became entitled to the share of his father B^, notwithstanding
2 2that such share had already been vested In B . The High Court awarded one-
half of the joint family estate to AS.
, 3
In Govlnd v . Nagappa, the facts were slightly different from those
1. (1891) HR 18 Cal 385.
2 . Surendra Nandan v . Sallaja, (1891) ILR 18 C a l. 385 at 386, following 
Vlradhl Pratapa v . Brozo Klshoro (1876) ILR 1 Mad 69 = 3 IA 154.
3 . AIR 1972 SC 1401 = (1972) 3 SCR 200.
referred above, but the Supreme Court had to deal wtth the same problem of
compytlng the share of the adopted son. In the present case, the facts were
1 2  3 2as follows: F had three sons, S , S and S . S went out of the family by 
adoption. died In 1912 leaving a widow, W. After death, F and
3 1S made a division of the property between them In 1933. F bequeathed
his properties to some of his relations In 1934 and died In the same year. W
adopted AS In 1955. AS sued for his share In the property^!
Even though AS was adopted In 1955, his birthright would relate
back to 1912, the date of his adoptive father's death, and he would be deemed
3
to be a coparcener with F and S . He would be able to re-open the partition 
of 1933 and would be entitled to one-third of the joint family property. But 
AS In his contention, Ignored the fact of partition and argued that I f  S  ^ had re­
mained alive when F died (1934), S  ^ would have got one-half of the property 
and this one-half was claimed by AS.
But the Supreme Court In Govlnd's case allowed AS one-third, the
share which his adoptive father would have got had he been alive at the time
of partition In 1933. Nevertheless,the SC admitted the effect of adoption In
Anglo-Hlndu Law and remarked that 'I t  Is true that because he (v iz . the adopted
son) was not a party to the partition, he Is entitled to ask for reopening of the
2
partition and have his share worked out without reference to the partition*, but
1. It Is apparent that In the light of the subsequent adoption by W, F alienated 
his share beyond his legal power to do so.
2. Govlnd v . Nagappa, AIR 1972 SC 1401 at 1403a.
at the same time, t t  was potnted out that 'the doctrtne of relatton back ts only a 
legal ftctton. There Ts no justification to logically extend that fic tton . In 
fact, the p la in tiff had nothing to do with his adoptive father's family when F 
dled.*^ Supplementary to this line o f argument, It could be pointed out that 
In cases of adoption by a widow, no adopted son In fact, would have anything 
to do with the supervening events, between his adoptive father's death and his 
adoption, which occurred In his adoptive family but so long as the fiction of 
relation back Is not entirely abrogated In Anglo-Hlndu Law, there could be no 
denial that In fiction the adopted son would notlonally exist right from the date
of his adoptive father's death. The denial of this fic tional existence Is ‘social
2 3
utilitarianism ' but the SC simply adumbrated the social factor, and justified
Its taking Into consideration the fact of partition In 1933 more on logical grounds
than relying on any particular theory of jurisprudence. The Court stated, and
rightly so from the factual point o f view, that the fact o f partition could not be 
4 ]
Ignored, and even I f  S had been alive Tn 1933 he could not prevent the parti­
tion because division of status need not be effected by bilateral agreement• It 
can be effected by unilateral declaration by a coparcener I f  the same Is properly
1. Ib id ., at 1403, pr.8 .
2. On social utllatarlanlsm, see W. Friedmann, Legal Theory, (London, 1967), 
325-44. Also P.B. Mukharjl, The New Jurisprudence, TLL, i960, (Calcutta, 
1970), 37.
3. AIR 1972 SC 1401 at 1404b.
4 . Ramchandra v . Ramkrlshna, AIR 1952 Bom 463 overruled on the point and 
B a jlraov. Ramkrlshna, A|R 1942 Nag. 19 distinguished.
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communicated.  ^ But the observations of the SC complicate and enliven the 
problem when It subsequently remarks that AS ‘can no doubt Ignore the actual 
partition by metes and bounds effected by [  F 1 and [  S*J and ask for a re­
partition of the properties, but his adoption by Itself does not and cannot reunite 
2
the divided family*. Now the question arises, I f  AS can ‘Ignore the actual
partition by metes and bounds* and ‘ask for a repartition of the properties*, why
cannot he realise ha lf of the remaining jo in t estate which his adoptive father
would have got had he been alive after F*s death In 1934? Though the SC
3
was ‘concerned with the quantum of share* to which AS was entitled, we do 
not get the answer to this question In this judgment.
The Inconveniences of the doctrine of relation back and ‘ the Interest 
4
of the society* prevented the fu ll effect of the birthright of the adopted son;
and hindered his enjoyment of his admitted right to reopen the partition, though 
5Indirectly admitted by the SC. Yet the point of severance of status was u lt i­
mately emphasised In these words:
1. Correct Interpretation of Raghavamma v . Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136; 
also Puttrangamma v . ’Rangamma, AIR 1968 SC 1018.
2 . AIR 1972 SC 1401, 1403b.
3. Ib id ., 1404b.
4 . Ib id ., 1404b.
5 . Ib id ., 1403b.
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The rights of an adopted son cannot be 
more than that of his adoptive father.
If the plaintiff's adoptive father was 
alive In 1933 when the partition took 
place, he could not have obtained 
anything more than l/3 rd  share In 
the family properties. 1
The decision curtailed the effect of relation back by acknowledging the fact of 
partition, and thereby the actual happenings of life prevailed over the fictions 
or notlona I birthright of the adopted son •
To have an answer to the sort o f question raised above, we had to 
wait about two years and In 1974, V.'R. Krishna Iyer, J . ,  with some references
of Govlnd's case, elaborated the juristic basis of such decisions In Shrlpad v .
2
Dattaram. Before we analyse the rationale of the judgment In Shrlpad *s case, 
let us summarise the facts for a better understanding of the problem Involved In 
the decision.
A Hindu jo int family was comprised of F, S^, SS (son of S^) and
2 2 1 S W, the widow of S who died In 1921. In 1944, F and S made a partition
of the estate, and each took a half-share after leaving some properties for the 
2
maintenance of S W . F made a g ift of his entire half-share In favour of SS.
F died In 1946. S^W adopted AS on 16.2.1956. On 20.4.1956, AS brought 
a suit for reopening the partition and claimed a half-share In the properties, 
challenging the va lid ity  of the g ift made by F to SS. The facts of this case 
are Identical with those of Govlnd's case, and the nature of the claims of the
1. AIR 1972 SC 1401, 1405a.
2. AIR 1974 SC 878.
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adopted sons ts also respectively the same. But, as we shall see presently, the 
facts and rationale being the same, It Is Interesting and significant to note that 
the conclusions arrived at In the two cases are dissimilar.
If the fiction o f relation back Is given fu ll effect, AS*s adoption 
w ill date back to 1921 when his adoptive father expired , and by virtue of his 
notional birth AS would be deemed to be present In 1944 when the partition took 
place, and I f  the partition Is Ignored and the g ift Is nu llified , AS should get half 
of the properties as he claimed. Even though the fact of the partition might be 
given effect on the basis of the rationale of Govlnd*s case,^ AS should get one- 
third of the properties •
On AS*s claim for half a share of the estate, Iyer, J . ,  observed,
To undo the divided status and continue the coparcenary t i l l  the date of the
suit so as to award a half-share to the p la in tiff as representing one of the two
surviving branches would be legal fiction run rio t. Immediately before this,
his Lordship explained the entitlement of AS by saying, *by parity of reasoning
we have to give the p la in tiff a one-third share, which alone even In an aurasa
son of late £ S^ ]  would have got stlrp lta lly .*^ Then his Lordship asked the
crucial question: *Where Is this share to come from?11, and the answer was Mrom
4
the coparcenary property less what has been legitimately gone out of I t .*
1. AIR 1972 SC 1401.
2. AIR 1974 SC 878, 883b.
3 . Ib id ., at 883b.
4 . Ib id ., at 883b.
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In the complex formula which springs from thTs answer, much of that one-thtrd 
has evaporated and tn fact, AS got Itttle  more than 1/4 Tnstead of 1 /3 .
To arrive at thTs coneluston, hts Lordshtp had to uphold two ‘pro­
prietary events*,^ whtch would have been tneffectual Tf the doctrine of relatton 
back was gtven fu ll effect.
g. Lawful altenatton and divesting
Ftrstly, the partttton of 1944, he justified on the rationale of GovtncPs
2
case; and secondly, the altenatton by F he Justified by upholding and relying
3
on a catena of decisions, which stood mainly on ‘equitable considerations*, 
and not on the correct Interpreatlon of Hindu law. Thus, the Supreme Court 
opened a new vista on the Hindu law of alienation vls-a-vls the rights of the 
adopted son, and the essence of the judgment on this point Is this: t f  the a lien­
ation Is ‘ lawful*, as defined by this Judgment, I t  Is binding on the adopted son.
4
In Shrtntvas v . Naryan, we get a definition of lawful alienation tn the following 
words:
1. Ib id ., at 887a.
2 . AIR 1972 SC 1401.
3 . Bhlmajl Krishna Rao v . Hanumantrao, AIR 1950 Bom 271 = 52 Bom LR 290; 
Krlshnamurthl v . Krlshnamurthl, AIR 1927 PC 139 = 54 IA 248; N .R . Bljoor v . 
Padmanabha, AIR 1950 Bom 319 = ILR (1950) Bom 480; Somasekharappa v^ 
Basappa Channabasappa, AIR 1961 Mys 141 = (i960) 38 Mys LJ 687. The 
reasoning behind these decisions has been acbtely criticised by Derrett, (1953)
55 Bom.L.R. J .,  1-6, For a fu ller discussion of these cases, see In fra ,793-8C Z.
4 . AIR 1954 SC 379.
When an adoption Is made by a widow of 
either a coparcener or a separated member, 
then the right of the adopted son to claim 
properties as on the date of the death of 
the adoptive father by reason of the theory 
of relation back Ts subject to the lim ita­
tion that alienations made prior to the 
date of adoption are binding on him, I f  
they were for purposes binding on the""" 
estate. 1
This Is nothing but a restatement of the rules of binding alienation under joint
family law, as being for the benefit of the fam ily, according to the Interpreta-
-  2 3tlon of the Mttaksara In Hunooman Persaud v . Mussumat Babooee. But In
Shrlpad‘s case, the whole concept of Mawful alienation* has been looked at from
a different angle:
Any disposition testamentary or Inter 
vivos, lawfully made antecendent to 
the adoption Is Immune to challenge 
by the adopted son; . . .  lawful a lien­
ation In this context, means not neces­
sarily for a family necessity but alien­
ation, made competently In accord­
ance with law 4
and, I t  appears to be, the test Is that *the alienation must be lawful, not In 
relation to the rights o f the adopted son, but I t  must be lawful at the date when
1. Ibid. at 387. Emphasis supplied.
2 . M lta .1.1.27-9.
3 . (1856) 6 MIA 393; also SankaraIlngam v . Veluchaml P llla l, (1942) 2 MLJ 678 = 
(1943) Mad.309 (FB). Derrett (1956) 58 Bom. L .R .J ., 9 . Srlnlvasan, Principles 
of Hindu Law, (Allahabad, 1969), I, 291.
4 . Shrlpad v . Dattaram, AIR 1974 SC 878, 886b. A  case not cited In the present 
judgment, Vishnu Pandu v . Mahadu Baburao, (1950) 52 Bom LR 599 = AIR 1951 
Bom 170, where the adopted son was entitled to recoverall ‘such properties*
‘subject, ftowever, to such alienations as had been lawfully effected*, Ibid .at 604-5,
the altenatton was made* J  In Bhtmajt Krtshna Rao%s case, Chagla, C .J . ,
and Gajendragadkar, J . ,  relted on the observatton of Vtscount Dunedtn tn
2Krtshnamurtht v . Krtshnamurtht, whtch runs as follows:
When a dtsposttton ts made tntra vtvos 
by one who has fu ll power over property 
under whtch a portton of that property 
ts carrted away, tt ts clear that no rtght 
of a son who ts subsequently adopted 
can affect the portton whtch ts dtsposed 
o f. The same ts true when the dtspost­
tton ts by a w tll and the adoptton ts sub­
sequently made by a wtdow who has been 
gtven fu ll power to adopt. For the w tll 
speaks as at the death of the testator, 
and the property ts carrted away before 
the adoptton takes place. 3
1. Per Chagla, C .J . and Gajendragadkar, J .,  tn Bhtmajt Krtshna Rao v . 
Hanumantrao, AIR 1950 Bom 271; approved tn ShrtpacPs case, tb td ., at 885a.
2. AIR 1927 PC 139 = 54 IA 248 = 29 Bom. L.R. 969.
3 . 54 IA 248, 262. But see Nagalutchmee v . Gopoo, (1856) 6 MIA 309: tn 
that case tt was found as a fact that authortty to adopt had not been gtven, 
but had tt  been gtven, and had the adoptton been made tn pursuance of t t ,
t t  ts clear that the w tll would have been tnvaltd. Also recently the Rajasthan 
High Court correctly held that a w tll by a sole survtvtng coparcener, so far as 
t t  related to the coparcenary property, was tnoperattve because a coparcenary 
subsequently came tnto extstence by a legal ftctton of relatton back after the 
death of the S.S.C. on account of a son betng valtdly adopted to htm by 
hts wtdow after hts death. Consequently, the properttes tn the hands of the 
S.S.C. passed to the adopted son by survtvorshtp and they could not pass to 
the legatee under a w tll of the S .S .C ., Mott Lai v . Sardar M ai, AIR 1976 
Raj 43; Udhao Sambha v . Bhaskar Jatkrtshna, AIR 1946 Mag 203 dtsttngutshed; 
Shrtntvas v . Narayan, AIR 1954 SC 379 relted on (on logtc).
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The observation of the learned Viscount shows that the rule which he 
laid down In those words was applicable to alienation made by the adoptive father
i
during his lifetim e, which was precisely the Issue In Krlshnamurthl‘s case, and 
his observation obiter on the rights of the legatee vis^a-vis the son adopted by 
a widow Is a manifestation of somewhat mistaken understanding of the doctrine 
of relation back. It Is a cardinal principle of the law of testamentary success­
ion that a w ill Is ‘ambulatory1, which means that until the death of the testator 
a w ill has no effect at a II.^  It can be reminded that an adopted son notion­
al ly exists before the death of the adoptive father, thus restricting his power of
2
testamentary disposition.
h. Alienation by a sole surviving coparcener; the Bombay view
The emergence of a convenient but mistaken notion from Krlshna- 
3
murth1*s case, that a sole surviving coparcener had complete power of aliena­
tion without having to justify I t  as a family necessity, served as a breakthrough
1. Re Thompson (1906) 2 Ch. 199 at 205.
2 . Alienations by w ill were held binding on the adopted son, Veeranna v . 
Sayamma, (1928) 56 MLJ 401 = ILR 52 Mad 398; followed In Sankarallngam 
v. Veluchaml, (1942) 1 MLJ 119, the decision confirmed by the F .B ., (1942) 
2 M lJ  678 = ILR (1943) Mad 309 FB; followed and approved In Udhao v . 
Bhaskar, AIR 1946 Nag 203, 206; also Narayan v . Padmanabh, (1949) 52 
Bom LR 313; Vlthalbhal v . Shlvabhal, (1949) 52 BomLR301; also see Sasht 
Kanta v . Pramode, AlR 1932 C a l.600; w ill also took effect In Rani Lalltha- 
kumarl v . Rajah o f Vlzlanagaram, AIR 1954 Mad. 19 at 40. For a criticism 
of this line of decisions, see Derrett, ‘Some Troublesome Cases In Adoption1, 
(1953) 55 Bom .L.R. J . ,  1-8; also *Dlvest1ng by an Adopted Son: A  Pressing 
Problem for the Supreme Court1, (1960) 23 SCJ, 43-57. For judicia l support 
o f Derrett's view and correct, though harsh, Interpretation of the law, see 
Motl Lai v . Sardar M ai, AIR 1976 Raj 40, 55.
3 . AIR 1927 PC 139.
and some judges happtly used J t as an authority to safeguard titles which were
otherwise on shaky foundations. An artic le by Derrett,^ unmentloned or un-
2noticed In Shrlpad *s case, but one of undoubted merit, points out the misunder­
standing of the doctrine of relation back by Viscount Dunedin and the right Impli­
cation of his observation. Different High Courts from time to time were applying 
the Dunedin rule In cases of alienations when the sole surviving coparcener was
the adoptive father, and the Bombay High Court pointed out the limitation of
3the doctrine of relation back In Narayan v . Padmanabha, In these words:
fane of the Important limitations and exceptions Is that the adopted son Is bound
by a ll the lawful alienations made by his adoptive father I f  he was the sole sur-
4
vlvlng coparcener of a joint fam ily.*
1. Derrett, ‘Divesting: An Important Full Bench Decision on Adoption*, (1956)
58 Bom.L.R.J., 1-16 at 10; also see the articles cited at n above.
Derrett*s emphasis on relation back as laid down by the Privy Council In deci­
sions like Anant v . Shankar AIR 1943 PC 196, Is logically and technically sound.
2. See Iyer, J . ,  on Krlshnamurthl*s case, at AIR 1974 SC 878, 885b, para. 15.
3 . AIR 1950 Bom. 319 = HR (1950) Bom.480.
4 . Ib id ., at 319b. Also see the same view of Lokur, J . ,  In Ramchandra Balajl v . 
Shankar Apparao, AIR 1945 Bom. 229, followed by Chagla, C .J . ,  In Bhlmajl v . 
Hanumantha Rao, AIR 1950 Bom.271 • Same view was also expressed at Nagpurr ' 
Prahlad v . M o tlla l, AIR 1948 Nag.351. In Mysore, I t  was held that an adopted 
son could not divest the vendee of an heir of sole surviving coparcener (here­
after as S .S .C .), Somasekharappa v . Basappa, AIR 1961 M ys.141, but over­
ruled , and the rules of alienations of jo in t family law re-established In Paramanna 
v . Shldgouda Nlngappa, AIR 1964 Mys 217 at 219, pr.12, followed In Mahade- 
vappa v . Chanabasappa, AIR 1966 Mys 15, which also followed the obiter In 
Guramma v . Mai lappa, AIR 1964 SC 510. But contrary opinion In Ramchandra 
v . Anasuyabl, AIR 1969 Mys 64. Bombay, however, consistently followed 
the view that the alienations under discussion could not be challenged by the 
adopted son, Mahadeo v . Rameshwar, (1967) 70 Bom LR 89; Babgonda v . Anna, 
AIR 1968 BomlT! In S. Pedda Subbaya v . Soletl Ademma, (1967^ 2 A n.W .R .3 l4 , 
the Andhra Pradesh H .C . admitted that an adopted son could challenge the alien­
ation made by a limited owner prior to his adoption (main question In this case 
was of lim ita tion).
The judicial optnton that the sole survtvtng coparceners altenatton 
cannot be challenged by a son adopted by hts wtdow ts somewhat adrtft from the 
correctton notton of Htndu jotnt famtly property.
It ts true that we have been accustomed to hear the sole survtvtng
coparcener called a *full owner1 of the estate,  ^ subject, o f course, to the matn-
tenance rtghts of other members of the jotnt fam tly. But t t  cannot be dented
that there rematns a jotnt famtly even though there may be only one coparcener,
and, at least for Income-tax purposes, there may be a jotnt famtly wtth no male 
2
member altve at a ll .  And, although a sole survtvtng coparcener looks on the
3
surface Itke a fu ll owner, there ts s ttll a potential jotnt famtly so long as a 
wtdow (a potential mother) has the right to adopt* a male ch ild . The point 
has been correctly explained by Lord Stmonds:
I . Srt Rajah Venkata Narastmha Appa Row v . Srt Rajah Rangayya Appa Row 
(1905) 29 Mad. 437, 447; Veeranna v . Sayamma, (1928) 56 MLJ401; 
Parashram v . Shrtram, (1929) AIR Nag. 3 2 l; Krtshtappa Venkappa v . 
Gopal Shtvajt, (1956) 59 Bom. L.R. 176 F.B.
2 . Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay v . Laxmtnarayan, (1935) 59 Bom.618,
S.C. (1935) AIR Bom .412; reversed tn (1937) AIR PC 239; but see Bajtrao 
Tukaram v . Ramakrtshna, (1942) AIR Nag 19, SC (1941) Nag .707. Income- 
Tax Commissioner v . Sarwankumar, (1945) A IR A II.286, 288-9; Commissioner 
of Income-Tax, Central and United Provinces v . Musammat Bhagwatt, (1947) 
74 IA 142, SC (1947) AIR PC 143; Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras v . 
Veerappa Chetttar, (1970) 1 SCWR 31.
3 . Umayal Acht v . Lakshmt Acht, (1945) AIR f . c .  25: (1945) 1 MLJ. 108.
But though tt may be correct to speak 
of htm S .S .C . as th e ‘owner*, yet 
tt  ts s ttll correct to describe that whtch 
he owns as the jotnt famtly property.
For hts ownership ts such that upon 
the adoptton of a son t t  assumes a 
different quality . . .  1
Thts peculiarity of Hindu jotnt famtly property was consciously 
ignored by the Bombay High Court tn order to Introduce a rule that the adopted 
son was bound by a ll the ‘ lawful1 alienations made by his adoptive father I f  he 
was the surviving coparcener of a joint famtly.
I .  Extension of a misconception
However, the rule applicable to alienations made Intra vivas by a 
sole surviving coparcener was extended by Chagla, C . J . ,  to alienations made 
by other members of ftie coparcenary after a partition thereof. The learned 
Chief Justice observed:
It Is possible to take the view that the 
position of the members of the divided 
family Is In law the same as that of a 
sole surviving coparcener. Just as 
a sole surviving coparcener has every 
right and authority to dispose of the 
property as I f  I t  was of his absolute 
ownership, so also after partition 
the members of the erstwhile copar­
cenary have equally the right o f dls' 
posing of the share which came to 
them on partition as I f  It  was their 
property. 2
1. Attorney-General o f Ceylon v . A r. Arunachalam Chettlar, (1957) A .C .513, 
542; a judgment of great persuasive authority In India. Juridical approval by 
Derrett, (1958) 60 Bom. L .R .J ., 161-72; (I960) 23 S .C .J ., 43-57at 52.
2. Krlshtappa v . Gopal, AIR 1957 Bom. 214, 215 (FB); similar view In Narayan 
Bhagwantrao v . Namdeo Balobarao, AIR 1955 Nag 208, 210a, p a ra . il .
Supposing there ts a wtdow of one of the coparceners ( I.e . a potential mother), 
thts observation ts not jud ic ia lly  sound and manifests more an eagerness to pro* 
tect the rights of the alienees than a correct following of the then established 
Angl-Hlndu Law on the point.
j .  Approval of the misconception by the Supreme Court
Notwithstanding this novel approach towards establishing a rule 
regarding ‘ lawful alienation* vls-a-vls relation back, the learned judges could 
not find the exact solution to the problem they were dealing with from prece­
dents, and eventually they had to decide the cases on the equities of the situa­
tion.^ The rationale of this decision has been approved by the Supreme Court 
2
In Shrlpad*s case, and since the Supreme Court decisions are binding on a ll
3
‘High Courts as well as on a ll tria l courts*, that stands as the law.
Nevertheless, the line of decisions which has been relied on and 
approved In Shrlpad*s case has long before been emphatically pointed out by
1. Chagla, C .J . at Krlshtappa v . Gopal, AIR ]957Bom 214, 215a, para.3.
Also Bavdekar, J . ,  Gurupadappa v . Karlshlddappa, AIR 1954 Bom 318, 32lb; 
however In this case, Bavdekar, J . evinced strong sympathy with the correct 
view ( I.e . giving fu ll effect to the doctrine of relation back and birthright) 
notwithstanding the dictum of Lord Dunedin, and I f  he had not fe lt that, like 
a ll Privy Council d icta, I t  was prlma facie binding upon him, he would cer­
ta in ly have Ignored I t ,  see at 319b, 320, 32 lb ; Yajn". II . 122 examined at 320.
2. AIR 1974 SC 87b.
3. G .H .G adbo ls , J r ., ‘Selection, Background Characteristics and Voting Be­
haviour of Indian Supreme Court Judges, 1950-1959*, In G . Schubert and 
D . Danelsklm, ed ., Comparative Judicial Behaviour, (New York, 1969),
221-56 at 221.
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Derrett to be based on an erroneous conception of the law. He suggested that
*the Bombay dectstons allowing unauthorTsed attentions to btnd an adopted son
(except where made by hts adoptive father as the sole survtvtng coparcener) ^
2
are unreliable and ought to be disapproved by the Supreme Court*. The
Supreme Court, tn fact, supported the view, though obiter, tn Guramma v.
3
Mallappa, where Subba Rao, J. whtle considering relation back In the con­
text of the rights of a posthumously-born son, said,
The sole surviving member of a copar­
cenary has an absolute power to alien­
ate the family property, as at the time 
of alienation there Is no other member 
who has Joint Interest In the family . . .
If another member was conceived In the 
family or Inducted therein by adoption, 
his right to avoid the alienation w ill 
not be affected. * 4
This was supported again by obiter of Hegde, J . ,  In Punlthayalll v . Ramallngam 
In these words:
1. This Is to be understood as during the lifetime of the S.S.C.
2 . (1956) 58 Bom L .R .J ., 1-13 at 11; also the same view expressed previously 
at (1953), 55 Bom L.R. J .,  1-8 at 4 -5 .
3 . AIR 1964 SC 510.
4. Ibid. at 516a, pr.13, relying on Avadesh Kumar v . Zakaul Hasnaln, AIR 
1944 A l l . 243; Chandramanl v . Jambeswara, AIR 193] Mad 550; Bhagwat 
Prashad v . Devi Chand, AIR 1942 Pat 99. Relied on by Mahadevappa v . 
Chanabssappa, AIR 1966 Mys 15 at 16-7. Although obiter dicta of the SC Is 
binding on the HCsj( see Derrett, (1971) 73 Bom .L.R .J., 31-5 at 34), the Bom 
Bay HC did not follow the said dicta In Mahadeo v . Rameswar (1967) 70 Bom. 
LR 89; also Babgonda v . Namgonda, AIR 1968 Bom.8.
5. AIR 1970 SC. 1730.
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In fact, under the Benaras School of 
MTtakshara rule . . .  the altenatton 
effected by a sole survtvtng male co­
parcener can be successfully challeng­
ed by a person adopted subsequent to 
the altenatton. The ftctton of re la- 
tton back has to be gtven fu ll effect 
by Courts and consequences spelled 
out as t f  the ftctton ts a fac t. 1
But as we can see from the judgment tn Shrtpad*s case, exactly the oppostte has
been done by the Supreme Court. Iyer, J . constdered the dectstons he relted
2on as forward-looktng judgments to curtatl the anttqutttes of the doctrtne of 
relatton back. Referrtng to the rattonale of these dectstons, hts Lordshtp 
explatned:
Two prtnctples compete tn thts jurts- 
dtctton and judges have struck a fatr 
balance between the two, antmated 
by a sense of realtsm, tmpel led by a 
destre to do equtty and to avotd un- 
settltng vested rtghts and concluded 
transacttons, lest a legal ftctton 
should be tnvadtng actual facts of 
Itfe become an tnstrumentaltty of 
tnstabtltty. 3
However, desptte the equttable constderatton of the judges and the 
justification of the dectstons from the potnt o f vtew of realtsm, the techntcal
1. AIR 1970 SC 1730 at 1731, p r.3 . In Shrtpad*s case, thts obtter dtcta has 
been held to be too wtde, AIR 1974 SC 878, 879b. The controversy between 
the dtcta and tts oppostte Bombay vtews has been dtscussed succtnctly by 
Derrett at (1971) 73 Bom. L .R .J ., 31-5 at 34-5.
2 . See D .C . Srtvastava, *Legal Change and the Functton of the Judtctary*,
(1963) 65 Bom. L .R .J ., 81-91 at 87-8.
3 . AIR 1974 SC 878, 882a, para .11.
correctness of the optnton of Derrett  ^ ts beyond any dtspute. But thts seemtng
dtscordance between the judge and the jurtst, tn fact, *ts a war of tdeas not of 
2
men1; tt  ts not a question of who ts rtght and who ts wrong, but of two con-
fltcttng optntons, strangely enough trytng to reach the same goal, namely
the abolttton of the doctrtne of relatton back, through dtfferent means. Whtle
3
the judges were tndulgtng tn *judtctal unorthodoxy1, though unwarranted, to
mtttgate the rtgour of a ftctton, Derrett, Itke many others, was stresstng the
potnt that ‘the undoubted fact that the correct rule ts tnconventent ts one whtch
4
concerns the legtslature prtnctpally, and not the courts*.
The Anglo-Htndu Law adopttons have over-reached the HAMA and
tt becomes exceedtngly d tfftcu lt for a judge to swallow a rule whtch has been 
5
seemtngly aboltshed by the Parltament even though judtctal rettcence has pre­
vented tt from productng the destred result.^ The fact ts that stnce 1956, the
1. Supra, g03.
2 . Roscoe Pound, *Justtce Accordtng to Law*, tn Essays on Jurtsprudence from the 
Columbta Law Revtew, (C o l.U .P ., New York/London, 1963), 217-79 at 278,
3 . R. Dhavan, Jurtsttc Techntques tn the Supreme Court of Indta (1950-1971) tn 
some selected areas of Publtc and Personal Law, Ph.D. thests tn Law, Untver-
stty of London, 1972, 506.
4 . Derrett (1956) 58 Bom .L.R.J., 1-13 at 13; prevtously (1953) 55 Bom .L.R.J., 8; 
also (1960) 23 SCJ, 43-57 at 57. Dabke was also agatnst judtctal law-maktng 
on equttable constderatton, (1939) 41 Bom L.R. J . ,  41-8, 48.
5 . Iyer, J . ,  obtter tn AIR 1974 SC 878, 881a, I p r.7 .
6. Infra, cases dtscussed, g ] § —SIS'.
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poltcy of Parliament to do away with divesting (see HAMA, S.12.C) has
affected the judtctal outlook and so gtves an advantage to the successtve
TI logical trend of dectstons tn Mahardstra. Thus, tn Shrlpad *s case, Iyer, J . ,
whtle dealtng wtth a problem, statutortly anachrontsttc (as he thought),  ^ yet
2
jurtdtcally a ltve, found the rattonale of the Bombay dectstons judtctally 
conventent. But he mtght have been consctous of thetr jurtdtcal unsound­
ness and that ts why he strengthened the Itne of those dectstons by explatntng
the relevancy of a parttcular jurtsprudenttal theory Tn modern Indta, namely
3
soctologtcal jurtsprudence, the school of thought they represent, 
k . Soctal engtneertng versus dtvesttng
Stnce, tn Shrlpad *s case, the learned judge wanted to make socto-
4
logical jurtsprudence the handmatden of justtce, somewhat parenthettcally to
K  AIR 1$74 SC 878, 881.
2 . Supra, 798-9.
3 . The development of thts school of jurtsprudence tn the Untted States was matnly 
due to the efforts of O .W . Holmes, R. Pound, Benjamtn Cardozo. But the 
movement owes Tts ortgtn to the wrtttngs of Arts to tie , Hobbes, Sptnoza and 
Montesquteu, see H . Catms, Law and the Soctal Sctences, (London, 1935), 
127, 168. Fora comprehensive survey of thts school o f jurtsprudenttal theory, 
seeG . Gurvttch, Sociology of Law, (London, 1953), 53-155. A IsoW . 
Frtedmann, Legal Theory, o p .c tt., 321 -42.
4 . AIR 1974 SC 878 at 882.
our present purpose we may be allowed to offer observations on the relevancy of 
that particular theory o f jurtsprudence. With the zeal of a champion of 
•social Interest*, Iyer, J . ,  remarked, *Nor Is law Inhuman or Inequitable or 
abstract, Its essence being social engineering*.^
Iyer, J.*s penchant for this beguiling phrase -  ‘social engineering*,
2
coined and popularised by Roscoe Pound, Is revealed and elaborated else­
where In his characteristic dlthyramblc praise for the sociological definition of
law In the following words: ‘ law Is a species of social engineering and not an
3
Immutable set of ’’revealed” rules as some people absurdly Imagine*. Iyer. J*s
abhorrence for fiction and ‘revealed* rules befogged hts awareness of the fact
that the Idea ;behtnd the phrase, ‘social engineering*, since Its coining by
Dean Pound, appears to-day as somewhat wizened and Insufficient as a
4
panacea for every jural problem. Sociological jurisprudence had Its lim ita­
tions and Mike any other outcropping of human thought, was a creature of a time 
5
and place*, and *Pound*s ’’social engineer” , like the traffic engineer of a modem
1. Ib id ., 882a, para.11.
2. R. Pound, Justice According to Law, (New Haven, 1952), 30; also his An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, (New Haven, 1954), 47. On the Impli­
cation of this phrase and for a short summary of Pound*s views, see W . Friedmann, 
Legal Theory, (London, 1967), 336-42. For the exposition of the theory, see 
Pound, *The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence*, (1911) 24 Harv. 
L.Rev., 591-619 and (1912) 25 Harv.L.Rev., 140-68; 489-516.
3 . V .R . Krishna,Iyer, Law and the People, (New Delhi, 1972), 31.
4 . Especially In a transitional society like India, social engineering Is not a fyMI— 
proof doctrine, J . Stone, Human Law and Human Justice, (Bombay, 1965), 
279-80; 284-85.
5. J. Stone, *Roscoe Pound and Sociological Jurisprudence*, (1965) 78 Harv.L. 
Rev., 1578-84 at 1581.
c ity , was bound to be a busy man, far behind Tn hTs work, however many and 
mighty the projects already completed.* ^
2
Pound*s *te!eological* goal o f jurisprudence Is well ahead of the
de facto aspirations of the people In a transitional and cfeveloplng country like
3 4India, where ‘ judicious .friending of theory with empirical research* Is yet
to emerge and even In the developed countries, remains as ‘everlasting enigmas*.
1. J . Stone, (1965) 78 Harv. L . Rev., 1581. Also In a slightly different
language In his Law and the Social Sciences In the Second Half Century,
(U. o f Minnesota P ., Minneapolis, 1966), 27. But Dean Pound anticipated 
such criticism and warned that *the apparatus of administering justice , . .  
call for more than a simple apparatus o f policing the Main Street*, Pound, 
*Synthetlc Jurisprudence*, In M .J . Sethna, ed ., Contributions to Synthetic 
Jurisprudence, (Bombay, 1962), 4 .
2 . G . Gurvltch, Sociology of Law, o p .c lt . ,  124-30, 129.
3 . J. Stone, Human Law and Human Justice, (Bombay, 1965), 279-80; 284-5. 
But Pound was not dogmatic about his view and recognised that *ln the house 
of jurisprudence there are many mansions . . . *  (1930-1) 44 Harv.L.Rev., 711; 
and pointed out that India was to ‘develop a regime of justice to the measures 
of Its own needs*, Sethna, ed ,, Contributions to Synthetic Jurisprudence, 
lo c .c lt . ,  5 ,
4 . Remarked In context of American legal system where the author claims that
In the U .S .A . some research has been done, J . H all, ‘Methods of Sociological
Research In Comparative Law*,  In J .W . Hazard and W .J . Wagner, e d ., Legal 
Thoughts In the United States of America under Contemporary Pressures,
(Brussels, 1970), 149-69 at 152.
5. C .K . A llen , Aspects of Justice, (London, 1958) 103. Also M .S . Amos, 
‘Roscoe Poundk, In W .I.  Jennings, ed ., Modern Theories of Law, (London, 
1933), 86-104 at 104. The same view Is expressed by G .W . Paton, A  
Textbook of Jurisprudence, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1972), 122.
These enigmas only emphasise the d ifficu lty  of having an exact corre­
lation between the rules of law and the views of the average man, and justify the 
method resorted to by Iyer, J . In Shrlpad's case because ‘there are no precise 
methods o f discovering what the community really thinks, so we must trust the 
judge to be a typical representative of his day and generation1  ^ who Is mostly 
1 to depend on subjective judicial experience, study and reflection, In brief from 
life Itself*. ^
It cannot be denied that at a certain point o f administering justice, 
sociological jurisprudence Is stretched to Its lim it and
sometimes he (the judge) Is Influenced 
by the philosophy o f law, sometimes he 
looks at the mores of the society . . .  
sometimes at the state of law as t i l l  
then fixed by the legislature or deter­
mined by other judges, and having 
weighed the matter from one or more 
of those angles, he approaches the 
facts and decides what the solution 
of the controversy before him should 
be. 3
1. Paton, Ib id ., 122.
2. C .K . A llen , Aspects of Justice, o p .c lt . ,  103. Also W. Friedmann, 
*LegaI Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking*, In Essays on Jurisprudence from
the Columbia Law Review, o p .c lt., 101-25 at 125.
3. M . HldayatuIIah, ‘Judicial Method*, A  Judge's Miscellany, (Bombay, 1972),
65-81 at 67.
In other words, we are to allow the judge Independence of 'equitable a pp I Teat Ton 
of law O
When a judge devTates, for the sake of soctal Tnterest and economic
2progress, from the doctrine of stare decisis, and resorts to ‘equity*, a zealous 
conservator of well-established legal fictions might Compi™* but whenever the
1. R. Pourtf, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence*, (1912) 25 
Harv.L. Rev., 515. That judges are engaged In the task of social engineer­
ing Is one of the limitations of Pund*s theory, M .R. Cohen, Law and the Social 
Order, (Archon Books, U .S .A ., 1967), 337. On Pound's conception of jud l- 
clal empiricism that to arrive at a decision the judges may resort to a source 
outside the legal system In whole or In part, see Pound's Jurisprudence, (St.
Paul, M inn. West Pub.Co., 1959), III, 473-4; 557-8. E,W . Patterson 
wonders as to whether such judicial empiricism Is 'unwarranted lawmaking', 
'Roscoe Pound on Jurisprudence*, 60 Columbia L. Rev., 1124-32, at 1127.
G . Sawer Is also of the opinion that Pound's five volumes, Jurisprudence, 
give very little  practical advice to counsel or judge, Law In Society, (Oxford, 
1965), 23. The sasirlc authority for equitable application o f law Is declared 
In the text, Bfhaspatl, II .  12: kevalam sastram asrltya na kartavyo vlnlmayah, 
yultft-h lne vlcare tu dharma-hanlh prajayate. On this text see, Llngat, CLI, 
250.
2. It Is submitted that Iyer, J. In Shrlpad's case had precedents (rather communis 
errorl) behind him. For a discussion on the doctrine of stare decisis, see R.A. 
Sprecher, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Extent to 
which It should be Applied*, (1945) 31 American Bar Association Journal, 501-9. 
C .K . A llen, Law In the Making, 7th edn., (Oxford, 1964), C h .III- IV , 161-366. 
W infield, 'History of Judicial Precedent*, (1931) 46 L .Q .R ., 207. On Indian 
contribution on the subject, Seerval, JLaw and Precedent^ (1964), 66
Bom.L.R., J . ,  65-73. Also for the Indian point o f view, see Derrett, (1960)
23 S.C. J . ,  57, n.56. There Is a good chapter In R. Dhavan In a different 
context, Juristic Techniques . . .  , o p .c lt . ,  67-92. On the nature of stare 
decisis, see Max Rad In, 'Case Law and Stare Decisis*, In Essays on Jurisprudence 
from Columbia Law Review, (Col. U .P ., New York/London, 1963), 3-16 at 3-5; 
for a balanced view and on Interplay of stare decisis and social forces, In the 
same volume, W .O . Douglas, 'Stare Decisis*, 18-38 at 18.
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need Is Imperative ‘ the highest court of the country . • • must have freedom to
depart from Its older decisions so as to give free play to new public policies*.^
2
Indeed, In administering justice there Is no ‘slot-machine theory*, and antique
3
corners of a legal system require an ‘occasional spfrlng-cleaning*. This spirit
of moulding the doctrine of relation back to the fact< s of contemporary social
4
and economic change Instigated Iyer, J . and his colleagues In the Supreme 
Court bench to take a positive judicial action In the case under discussion —  
the sort of judicial *behavlour which to judges was once anathema becomes not
5
only tolerable but laudable*. This goes a long way to support the judicial 
creativity of Iyer, J . In a situation where the Bombay High Court for a long 
time was openly avoiding the rationale of the superior court‘s decisions, and 
the Supreme Court's stray obiter d ic ta ,^  Instead of straightening out the law, 
were confusing the whole scene.
1. Shrlvastava, (1963) 65 Bom. L.K. J . ,  81-91 at 91.
2 . H .J . Abraham, The Judicial Process, (New York, 1968), 325.
3 . Viscount Kllmulr, the then Lord Chancellor o f Britain, Speech on the occa 
slon of the dedication ceremony of the University o f Chicago Law centre, 
April 30, I960, quoted by Abraham, Ib id ., 331.
4 . Cp. Iyer, J.*s decision on the point of polygamy In Muslim law In 
Shahulameedu v . Subalda Beevl, 1970 KLT 4 .
5. Said In the context of tenant's rights and prisoner's rights In the American 
system, E.W . Tucker, Two Aspects of Judicial Innovation and Evolving 
Social Change*, Connecticut Bar Journal, 48 (1974) 3: 199-240 at 200.
6. Supra, 8 0 3 - 4 .
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I. Actual computation o f shares In Shrlpad*s case
Once the jurisprudential doctrine Is explained, I t  remain* to be seen
how the learned judge tackles the complexities of the situation which sprung from
giving effect to the alienation by F. Validation of F*s alienation means that
half of the estate Is out o f the reach of the adopted son. The remaining half
(less half of the property set aside for W*s maintenance) was In the hands of .
If one-third of the entire joint family estate, as awarded,^ Is given to AS from
the property In S^*s hands, S  ^ w ill be left only with approximately l/6 th . If
he had alienated the property, as F d id, and used the proceeds, there would
have been nothing left for AS except the property set aside for the maintenance
of W . But we cannot embark on hypothetical situations. As the facts then
stood, keeping S^ks predicament In mind, the learned judge had to make an eqult-
2
able adjustment, not rig id ly but *justly* of the properties. He explained the 
just method In these words:
3
The p la in tiff has to be given his one- 
third share as In 1944, when the parti­
tion took place. Assuming that the 
entire estate was then worth 3 lakhs, 
the adopted son would have got a lakh 
of rupees, say. But £ F*sJ share 
has been entirely gifted away and must 
be Ignored which means that the plain­
t i f f ^  one-third share valued at one
1. AIR 1974 SC 878 at 887a, para . 19.
2 . AIR 1974 SC 878 at 887a, following Chagla, C . J . ,  In Krtshtappa v . Gopal, 
AIR 1957 Bom. 214 (FB).
3 . We know him as AS.
8 1 3 .
lakh w tll have to come out of S *s pro­
perties which, on our arithmetical 
assumption, would be one-half of three 
lakhs, l.e ,  l i  lakhs. It would be un­
fa ir to deprive £s^ ^ of a llonks share 
out of his allotment merely because, be­
fore adoption, he had not parted with 
his properties. It would be eminently 
just to make the first defendant bear 
only one-half the burden cast by the 
notional re-entry of the p la in tiff Into 
the coparcenary and we direct a d iv i­
sion Into two equal shares of such of 
the properties which fe ll to the first 
defendants share In the 1944 parti­
tion as were with the first defendant 
at the date of adoption . . .  1 Includ­
ing among the Items to be divided the 
Item set apart for the maintenance of 
[  S2 W .] 2
We must add that since the burden of maintaining the widow fe ll on 
the whole coparcenary, and I f  the lands allotted for the purpose to are re­
called to provide on ancestral share for AS, AS himself must share the responst- 
2
b ltlty  for S W and his own receipts from the family must be diminished propor­
tionately. This Is not *equltyk, I t  Is law.
Suppose the estate was worth *3 lakhs* (excluding the Item set apart 
for the maintenance of S^W)at the time of partition In 1944; for a clear under­
standing, we put forward the following comparative results by computing ASks 
share according to judgments, previous and present.
1. AIR 1974 SC 878 at 887a. My emphasis.
2. Ib id ., at 887b.
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1) Following Anant v . Shankar; AS w ill get: Rupees
Surendra v . SaTlaja; J
Shrlnlvas v . Narayan; i  = Rs. l i  lakhs = 150,000
2) Following 2 AS w ill get:
Govlnd v . Nagappa; J~ R s . 1 lakh = 100,000
3
3) In Shrlpad v . Dattaram ; AS Is awarded:
4= R s. 1 lakh = 100,000
In the light o f the rationale In Shrlpad^ case, AS‘s share should have 
been calculated as follows:-
I) Suppose the whole estate at the time of partition In 1944 Is 1 and 
certain Items of property set apart for S^W‘s maintenance Is n. So the pro­
perties available for partition Is 1-n.
1 1-n
II) Out of that 1-n, F and S got —^ — each, In the partition of 1944.
1  — n  1  — n
III) AS Is entitled to J o f 1-n = -g — . But allotted In the parti­
tion to F has been ‘ lawfully* alienated and (according to the rule In Shrlpad^ case) 
should be Ignored.
Iv) So AS should get 5 of the property In the hands of S^, that means i  of
■^■n- ■ present case Rs. 75,000.
But In fact, AS‘s share In Shrlpad*s case Is computed as follows:
1. AIR 1943 PC 196; (1891) ILR 18 C al. 385; AIR 1954 SC 379.
2 . AIR 1972 SC 1401.
3 . AIR 1974 SC 878.
1 1—n 1-nAS got i  of the property In the hands of S , that means - j — x i  ,
say rupees 75,000 + £  (ha If of what was set apart for S^W*s maintenance) = say, 
Rupees 100,000.
Here recalling ( I .e . i  of the property set apart for the mainten­
ance of S^W) to make up the share of AS (Rs. 100,000), the Supreme Court went 
wrong. AS, as we have stated aarller, like other coparceners, must bear In law 
the responsibility for S^W and his own receipts from the family property should have 
been diminished and calculated accordingly.
From the above allotment In Shrlpad's case, there need be little  hesi­
tation In accepting that S  ^ Is also the loser. He got Rs. 150,000 In a partition 
between him and his father. Under the Govlnd principle, nobody can dispute
his getting Rs. 100,000. Despute a ll the judge's good Intentions, he Is left with 
n 1only Rs. 75,000 . S may lament over this Inequitable result of equitable
allotment, but this Is a result of the conflict between fiction and fact, a nagging 
problem which has beset the judiciary for a long time.
m. Relation back and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956
It needs hardly any more elaboration to show how the doctrine of rela­
tion back and the resulting divesting, In the Anglo-Hlpdu Law context, disrupted 
the ‘comfort and expectations of the members of the family who had In no way 
assented to or been parties to the adoption*.^ It Is also Indubitably agreed to
1 • Derrett, Critique, ^ 157. In many cases the motivation behind a widow's 
adoption was to cause distress to the heir or collaterals of her deceased husband, 
Derrett, (i960) 23 5CJ, 43-57 at 57.
be just that the far-reaching effect o f the Anant v . Shankar rule  ^ regarding
divesting of property deserved abolition. There need be little  hesitation In
2
accepting the jud ic ia l Intervention as In Shrlnlvas v . Narayan was only a partial 
3
solution to the problem and that Is why Parliament, as In other branches of Hinduj
law, had to step In and the HAMA was passed.
n. Relevant provisions of the HAMA
The three sections of the Act which are primarily relevant to our pre­
sent purpose are set out below:
s.4 . Overriding effect o f the Act
Save as otherwise expressly provided In 
this A c t, . . .
(a) any text, rule or Interpretation of 
Hindu Law, or any custom or usage as 
part of that law In force Immediately be­
fore the commencement of this Act shall 
cease to have any effect with respect to 
any matter for which provision Is made
In ibis A c t.
(b) any other law In force Immediately 
before the commencement of this Act 
shall cease to apply to Hindus Insofar 
as It Is Inconsistent with any of the 
provisions contained In this A c t.
1. Gajendragadkar, (1944) 46 Bom. L .R .J ., 17-24 ar 23. Derrett, Ib id ., at 57.
2. AIR 1954 SC 379.
3 . The decision In Shrlnlvas v . Narayan was orthodox and, although I t  manifests 
judicial actlvtslm In a limited sense It  was not*soctal engineering*. However, 
judicial legislation can hardly cope with the orthodox effect of the fiction of 
relation back In Hindu law of Adoption.
s.5 . Adoption to be regulated by this Chapter
(1) No adoption shall be made after 
the commencement of this A c t by or to a 
Hindu except In accordance with the pro­
visions contained In this Chapter, and any 
adoption made In contravention of the 
said provisions shall be void.
s .12. Effects of adoption
An adopted child shall be deemed to be 
the child of his or her adopted father or 
mother for a ll purposes wlfh effect from 
the date of the adoption and from such 
date a ll the ties In the family of his or 
her birth shall be deemed to be severed 
and replaced by those created by the 
adoption In the adaptive family:
Provided th a t----
. . .  ( c ) the adopted child shall not 
divest any person of any estated which 
vested In him or her before the adopt­
ion.
o . Interpretation of the provisions
Taking Into account the above provisions of the A ct, especially, 
ss.5(l) and 12(c), the juridical community may suppose that the Act abolished 
the Inconvenient doctrine of relation back, effecting the fictitious birth of the 
adopted child not from the date of the adoptive father*s death, but from the 
date of adoption, thus rendering divesting of Interim titles Impossible.
There Is no gainsaying the fact that the operation of a statute does 
not depend on the jurists* understanding o f the presumed or Imputed Intention of
the legislature to be derived from the wording of Its provisions, but sometimes It 
depends entirely on the judicial Interpretation of the rules contained In those
provisions; and this Is exactly what has happened In the case of the HAMA.
The rule was well-established In Anglo-Hlndu Law that when a 
widow adopted, she adopted for and on behalf o f her husband. The Intention 
of the Legislature ‘seemingly behind1  ^ section 12, proviso (c) Is that when a
2
widow adopts, she adopts to herself, -  a proviso Indicating women‘s liberation,
3
as well as the abolition of the ugliness of the doctrine of relation back. The
judicial Interpretation of the proviso opened up with Hanumantha Rao v .
4
Hanumayya, which was a case Involving adoption after the enactment of the
HAMA. The facts of the case run as follows: a jo in t family consisted of F,
S1 and S^. died In 1924, leaving his widow, W . F died In 1936. On
2
June 17, 1957, W adopted AS. AS sued S and his sons for partition and possess 
Ion of a half-share In the family properties. The Andlwa Pradesh High Court
held, and quite rightly, that since the enactment o f the HAMA, a ll adoptions
5 ]
would take effect from the date of adoption, and the property o f S which
passed by survivorship to S^ long before the adoption should be deemed to be
1. Derrett^ Critique, f l7 9 ,
2 . But In fact, It has not happened, see Infra, 219-2$  • Also C ritique , f  170.
also Derrett at (1974) 76 Bom. LRJ, 16-17.
3 . This has also not been abolished, see Derrett (1972) 74 Bom.LRJ. 97-9. Also
the cases discussed, In fra ,8 19  — 2.8.
4 . (1964) 1 An. W.R. 156.
5. See HAMA, s .12, supra, 817.
1 2vested In S , and on the strength of the proviso (c) of S. 12, It could not be 
divested by AS.
But the lambent optimism that relation back Is abolished by the
 2
statute, kindled In Hanumarithd Rap'S case was anaesthetized by the Bombay
3
High Court In Ankush Narayan v . Janabal, which was also a case Involving 
the problem of post-statute adoption. A  summarisation of the facts o f the case 
may be useful. F died In 1917 leaving two widows, and and a daughter, 
D by W^# died In 1948. adopted AS In December, 1957. On 
December 31, 1957, AS sued W^, his adoptive mother and D, his step-sister, 
for possession of the estate. It was rightly contended on behalf of that 
when an adoption was made under the HAMA by a widow, It  would not divest 
her from her own property , but she would merely obtain a son for herself. But 
the Bombay High Court rejected this contention and held that essentially the 
consequences of the Act's provisions were that the widow's adoption provided 
an heir for her husband. The Court explains that when either of the two spouses
1. Amarendra v . Sanatan, (1933) 60 IA 242. Derrett rightly points out In this 
respect that property passing by survivorship does not vest, (1966) 68 Bom. 
L .R .J ., 4-48 at 45. This view was anticipated by Golap Chandra Sarkar 
Sastrl, The Hindu Law of Adoption, TLL, 1888 (Calcutta, 1891), 410. 
Supported by B. N . Sampath, (1970) 2 SCJ, 1-10 at 10.
2. (1964) 1 An. W.R. 156.
3 . (1965) 67 Bom. L.R. 864. Criticised by H . G ujrathl, AIR 1966 J . ,  19-20. 
Derrett, (1966) 68 Bom. L.R. J .,  44-48 at 44-5. P. Dlwan, at (1966) 
Annual Survey of Indian Law, (1969), 361-3. Ankush Narayan approved by 
SC In Slta BaTyRamchandra, AIR 1970 SC 343.
adopts, both get a chtld and the chtld stands as a new member of the famtly
exactly as I f  he had been born In It , and the proviso (c) o f s. 12 of the Act
does not iTmtt  ^ the genera! proposition tn the matn body of the sectton.
Thus, the adoption creates a relationship with the collaterals and the adopted
2
child becomes a coparcener. The High Court did not give any Importance 
to the proviso (c) of s. 12, and opined that the most Important part o f the sec­
tion was the last phrase before the proviso commenced. From the judgment, 
we are le ft with the Impression that the proviso was visualised as a mere 
caprice of the Legislature rather than a rule of law to be given Its relevant 
effect. The Court held that AS was entitled to divest his adoptive mother,
notwithstanding the fact that she was an absolute owner under s. 14(1) of the
3
Hindu Succession A c t. The Bombay view on s. 12(c) was In direct conflict
with the opinion put forward by the Andhra Pradesh High Court In Hanumantha^
4case.
Nothing could cause greater dismay among the protagonists of re­
form than this Bombay decision, which revived the doctrine of relation back
supposedly entombed by Parliament. Some respite was provided by the Madras
5
High Court Tn Arumugha Udayar v . Valltammal, where Ramamurthl, J . Tnter-
1. Ankush Narayan v . Janabal, (1965) 67 Bom. L.R. 864, 866.
2. (1965) 67 Bom. L .R ., 864, 868.
3 . Act 30 of 1956 (17 June 1957).
4 . (1964) 1 An. W.R. 156.
5 . AIR 1969 Mad .72; decided on 20 June, 1967, despite contrary decision by SC
In Sawan Ram v . Kalawantl, AIR 1967 SC 1761, decided on 19 A p ril, 1967*
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preted s .5 (l) and s.12(c) and observed that stnce the enactment of the HAMA, 
an adoptton by a wtdow was an adoption to herself and would such an adoption 
In no way affect the devolution or enjoyment o f property by others. Despite 
favourable reception of the judgment by jurists, jud ic ia lly  It was In a limbo, 
because a couple of months before this decision, the Supreme Court's view In 
Sawan Ram v . Kola wan t l ^  In effect, overruled the present opinion of the 
Madras High Court by anticipation.
In Sawan Ram (which has aroused a ll jurists* antagonism), F died 
before 1948 leaving a widow, W . W Inherited her husband's property under 
the Anglo-Hlndu Law of Intestate succession and, thus, she had only a limited 
ownership In the property. She mortgaged lands of F's estate to M In 1948.
In 1949 she purported to make a g ift of the suit land to her grandnlece, N .
R, the collateral of F, was the presumptive reversioner. He sued for a decla­
ration that the alienations were without legal necessity and not binding upon 
him as reversioner. R was successful In the tria l court. W appealed to the 
High Court and, during the pendancy of the appeal, W adopted N's son, AS,
In 1949. W died later In the same year. A fter W's death, the litigation 
commenced again, and Rsued for possession of the lands on the ground that 
since the adoption was governed by the HAMA, AS could not succeed to the 
property of F and could not oust him (R) as the nearest reversioner. The Supreme 
Court rejected the contention of R and held that F^ the deceased husband of W,
1. AIR 1967 SC 1761.
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would be deemed to be the adoptive father of AS and by the application of the 
doctrine of relation back, AS would defeat the Interest of R as the nearest re­
versioner.^
The Importance of Sawan Ram*s case lies In the fact that I t  Is the
first decision of the Supreme Court on the effect of adoption by a widow after
the enactment of the HAMA. On the effect o f widow's adoption, Bhargava,J. 
explained In the course of the judgment:
The most common Instance w ill natur­
a lly  be that of adoption by a female 
Hindu who Is married and whose hus­
band Is dead, or has completely and 
fina lly  renounced the world . . .  In 
such a case, the actual adoption 
would be by the female Hindu while 
the adoption w ill be not only to her­
self, but also to her husband • 2
On adoption by a widow, therefore, 
the adopted son Is to be deemed to 
be a member of the family o f the de­
ceased husband of the widow . . .
The right, which the child had, to 
succeed to property by virtue of be­
ing the son of his natural father, In 
the family of his birth Is, then, 
clearly to be replaced by similar 
rights In the adoptive family and, 
consequently, he would certainly 
obtain those rights In the capacity 
of a member of that family as an 
adopted son of the deceased husband 
o f the widow . . .  taking him In adopt­
ion. 3
1. Cp. the P.C. decision on adopted son and reversionary heir, Bhubaneswarl v . 
N llkomul, (1885) 12 IA 137 at 140.
2 . Emphasis supplied.
3 . AIR 1967 SC 1761 at 1764, para.7 to 1765, para.8 .
For a better understanding of the Implication of the above obser­
vation, we need to go back to Hanumantha's case, In which the Andhra Pradesh 
High Court Interpreted s. 12 of the HAMA In these words:
On a fa ir Interpretation of the provi­
sions of sec .12 of the Act we are of 
the opinion that the section has the 
effect of abrogating the ordinary 
rule of Mltakshara law that as a re­
sult of the adoption made, by the 
widow, the adoptee acquires rights 
to the share of his deceased adoptive 
father which has passed by survivor­
ship to the father's brother. 1
This observation of the High Court was expressly disapproved by the Supreme
2
Court, though obiter, In Sawan Ram's case. The Supreme Court, however,
noticed the objective presence of s. 12(c) In the statute by admitted that the
proviso prevented the actual divesting of property already vested In any one,
but neutralised It by adding that In no way did It prevent the adoptee being
3
the adopted son of the widow's deceased husband. We shall see presently
4
that their Lordships* leaning towards 'cultural continuity* of the Hindu 
society embedded In the relationship between father and son brought back 
the doctrine of relation back with Its corollary of divesting despite Its seeming 
abrogation In the HAMA.
1. (1964) 1 An. W.R. 156.
2 . AIR 1967 SC 1761, para.7.
3 . Ib id ., para.9 .
4 . Derrett, (1971) 73 Bom. L .R .J ., 31-5 at 32.
The Supreme Courts dicta tn Sawan Ram were beyond a ll progno­
stications and we have already noticed that the Supreme Court allowed AS to 
dislodge R from his position as reversioner. The jurists reacted to the decision, 
and particularly to the dicta In their own characteristic ways.
Derrett, In order to prevent the revival of divesting by an adopted 
son, tried to save the Act from the onslaught of the dicta In Sawan Ram on a 
subtle and technical point. This Is apparent from his comment on the dislodg­
ing of R by AS, where he tried to explain I t  away by saying that:
In loose terms, this could appear to most 
readers as a "divesting” • But because 
revers.tdnershlp Is a mere spec success -  
Ion Is 1 and the right of reversion rests 
In the reversionary body (up to the 
Government o f India) as a whole, the 
adoption did not work a divesting. 2
Paras Dlwan's reaction was vigorous and he opined that Sawan Ram*s
case should be overruled, or that the unnecessary obiter dicta should be disavowed
3 4at least. In the same vein, G .K . Dabke attacked the Interpretation of the
1 • The view that reverslonershlp Is a spec successlonls was taken by the FB In 
Krlshnajl v . Rajaram, (1938) Bom 679 at 690; a wrong decision on the point 
of determining the rights of the adopted son, Dabke , (1939) 41 Bom.L.R.J., 
41-8 at 44, 48.
2 . Critique,fr180. Also Sampath, (1970) 2 SCJ, J, 1-10, at 10.
3 . P. Dlwan, ‘Adoption by a Hindu widow: adopted son's relationship with the 
deceased husband1, (April, 1969), 21 Law. Rev. (University of Punjab), 1- 
x v l l l .
4 . Dabke, *Dlvestlng on adoption', (1968) 70 Bom. L .R .J . , 143-8.
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Supreme Court o f s .5(1) o f HAMA Tn Sawan Ram‘s case as wrong and poTnted
out that ss. 7, 8 and 14(3), 14(4) of the A ct clearly TndTcated that neTther
spouce could adopt so as to thrust a chtld on the other.^ He sharpened hts
2
weapons and attacked agatn Tn another artTcle wTth rTdTcule, by showTng 
that a Itteral TnterpretatTon of the dectston Tn Sawan Ram w tll brTng back a ll 
the evTls of dTvestTng.
However, neTther Derrettks subtlety nor the bellTcosTty o f Dabke
and others Tn the iTght of the dTcta Tn Sawan Ram*s case had much effect on the
revTval of the old law. In the context of post 156 adoptTon, Derrett poTnted
out the legal posTtTon Tn hTs remark that ‘ that adoptTon relates back as the old
3
phrase goes Ts stTjl the basTc prTncTpIe*, and admTttTng the semantTc fertTlTty
of the legal language, he concluded the artTcle wTth banter: ‘Hence relatTon
4
back Ts saved under the Act by that iTttle word "to ” *.
5
Dabke crttTcTsed Derrett and asked for reconsTderatTon on a mTs- 
understandTng of thTs utterance.^ What Dabke consTdered Derrett‘s jurTdTcal
1. IbTd.,  at 144.
2. Dabke, That ITttle word "to " Tn s.5(1) of the HTndu AdoptTon and MaTnten- 
ance A ct, 1956‘ , (1969) 71 Bom. L .R .J ., 13-4. ThTs poTnt has been elabor­
ated by Derrett wTth concrete examples, CrTtTque, 169-73.
3 . Derrett, (1968) 70 Bom. L.R. J . ,  51-5 at 54.
4 . IbTd* at 55.
5 . Dabke, (1968) 70 Bom. L.R. J . ,  143-48 at 147-8.
6 . Supra, n .4 .
resignation was, tn fact^ a reluctant- compromise with judicial tnterpretatton, 
and this ts qutte clear from the sentence whtch follows: ‘Had tt  been up to 
the Supreme Court to determine what thtit word meant, the present wrtter 
would have advised, cautiously, against giving that sense , . . *  ^
The apprehension that the old law remained securely hinged on
this litt le  word , *to*, has been proved to be true by subsequent ded stons,
and before the din of Sawan Ram has receded, the Supreme Court In Slta Bat v .
2
Ramchandra gave Its blessing to divesting In the context of post *56 adoption. 
The facts of the case reveal that a joint fam ily consisted of two brothers, and 
B^. In 1930 B^ died, leaving his widow, W (Slta Bat). B^  had an Ille g it i­
mate son IS (Ramchandra). On 4 March, 1956, W adopted AS. On 13 March, 
1958, B  ^ died. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, AS became a member of 
the coparcenary with effect from his adoption, and on the death of B  ^ he took
by survivorship from him. It might appear to be surprising that the Supreme
3
Court In Slta Ba1*s case did not cite Sawan Ram. We are Informed that their
1. Derrett, lo c .c lt . ,  at 55. Derrett made his view abundantly clear at (1966)
68 Bom. L .R .J ., 41 at 45, which Dabke, of course, did not fa ll to note, loc. 
c lt .  at 147, Subsequently, Derrett has made his view clear by saying that 
•relation back1 should be confined to social and religious spheres, Critique,
*1 8 3 .
2. AIR 1970 SC 343; decided on 20 August, 1969. Criticised by B .N . Sampath, 
The Doctrine of relation back: an unfortunate revival*, (1970) 2 SCJ, J . ,  
1—10 at 1. Also Critique, ^185.
3. Bal Chanchal v . Manlshankar (1971) 12 Guj LR 576. For a discussion on this 
case, see Derrett, ^Adoption: the whole hog*, (1972) 74 Bom. L.R. J .,  97-9.
Lordships In Slta Ba1*s case might have marked some looseness In an obiter at 
the end of the judgment, which suggests that property In the hands of the sole 
surviving coparcener becomes his own. This opinion, though obiter, certainly 
conflicts with the view taken In Slta Bat's case, and may explain why the Supreme 
Court tn the latter does not cite the former. In Slta Bat's case, the Supreme 
Court's specific approval of the disturbing decision of the Bombay High Court 
In Ankush Narayan v . Janabal  ^ gives the Impression that the old law of divest­
ing Is again brought Into play. In Ankush Narayan *s case^ the Bombay High 
Court (as we have seen) wrongly allowed the adopted son to divest his adoptive 
mother's Inheritance which had vested In her absolutely under s. 14(1) of the HSA,
and the decision In effect, has been overruled on the point by the Supreme Court
2
In Punlthavalll v . Ramallngam. In this case, Hegde, J . clearly set out the 
law as follows: The fu ll ownership conferred on a Hindu female under section
14(1) Is not defeasable by the adoption made by her to her deceased husband
3
after the Act came Into fo rce .' PunIthavaIll's case cuts only one wing of
the ugly reappearance of the old law of divesting for, otherwise, the ghost of
4
relation back remains *at large* and this Is apparent from the tendencies In
5
the courts as manifested In Bal Chanchal v . Manlshankar, where the facts are
1. (1965) 6 7 Bom.LR.864.
2. AIR 1970 SC 1730.
3 . Ibid. at 1731.
4 . See the article of Derrett of the same title  In a different context, (1974) 
76 Bom. L .R .J ., 16-17.
5. (1971) 12 Guj LR. 576.
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more or less TdentTcal to those Tn Slta Bate case. F dTed Tn 1918 leavTng two 
1 2 1sons, S and S . S dTes Tn 1923, leavTng hTs wTdow, W. W adopted AS
Tn 1958. j AS through hTs adoptTve mother, sued S^ for partTtTon. He was
2allowed one-half of the joTnt family property, notwithstanding S remaining 
the sole surviving coparcener for th irty -five  years. The Gujarat High Court 
followed Slta Ba| v . Ramchandra,^ and made It a reality that even under the 
new law, so long as there Is a potential mother Tn the fam ily, there Is a 
possibility of divesting the seemingly vested property In the hands of the sole 
surviving coparcener by the adopted son by virtue of his birthright.
p. Conclusion
Accordingly, In the end, we are back to where we started regard­
ing the main point, namely, the material problem of the effect of the Mltaksara
birthright manifested Tn the case of the adopted son In the form of divesting and
2
thus, *we have gone the whole hog. Relation back Is a reality Indeed* -  and 
so Ts the birthright of the adopted son, because the statutory glue of HAMA on 
this textual right, though It Is based on a fic tion , has come unstuck.
Despite the judicial revival o f the doctrine of relation back, with
utmost respect to the Supreme Court, I t  Ts submitted that the Andhra Pradesh
3
High Court In Hanumantha's case caught the right spirit of the statute where 
Ramamurthl, J . opined that at least so far as It was related to the doctrine of
1. AIR 1970 SC 343.
2 . Derrett, (1972) 74 Bom. L .R .J ., 99.
3 . (1964) 1 An. W.R. 156.
relation back, the MtfcTksara blrth^rlght o f the adopted son was abrogated by 
the HAMA. But the backlash to the observatton has come due to the Inadver­
tence of the LegTslature which, without categorically abolishing the Mltaksara 
birthright, tried to abolish Its fictional offshoot o f relation back and divesting.
In the case of Shrlpad v . Dattaram^ which we have discussed at some length,
2 3In the context of pre-*56 adoption, there Is a flimsy hope that previous Inter­
pretations of the Supreme Court o f s. 12, so far as It Is related to relation back, 
w ill receive a rethinking; but, at this stage, any patchworth, however b rillian t, 
would rip apart at some of the seams.
In a sacramental sense, relation back Is a spiritual link and In the
social sense, a healing balm, but In the secular sense It Is a ‘confounded nuls- 
4
ance*, and  short of cautious and overall statutory reform, either by the Instl-
5
tutlon of a uniform Adoption Act for a ll communities, or by making the law
1. AIR 1974 SC 878.
2 . Supra,-793-SIS’ . But see M otl Lai v . Sardar M ai, AIR 1976 Raj 40;
The fiction of relation back Is given effect In the context of Mltakscora birth­
right and SC decision ( ‘social engineering*) has very little  Influence to 
abolish or even to erode the fic tio n .
3 . AIR 1974 SC 878, obiter at 881a, para.7 .
4 . Derrett, (1971) 73 Bom. L.R. J . ,  31-5 a t 31.
5. The Indian Conference of Social Work and other welfare organisations urged 
the enactment of a uniform adoption law for a ll the communities and submitted 
to the Parliament a Draft Adoption B ill*  1972. The peculiar features of the 
B ill are stated by H.S. Ursekar, ‘Adoption Laws*, In Narmada Khodle, ed ., 
Readings In Uniform C iv il Code, (Bombay, 1975), 70-6 at 74-6. This has
not become law.
of adoption contain a part of the Code of Family Law or the C iv il Code,  ^
the seemingly jejune and moribund provisions o f the HAMA are Incapable of 
coping with the problem of divesting.
1. Derrett, (1968) 70 Bom. L .R .J .^ 5 5 .
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CHAPTER 19.
TYPES OF PROPERTY AND THE CONCEPT OF 
RIGHT BY BIRTH
I.  Introduction
In the preceding Chapter we dealt with the rights o f the different types
of sons and saw that apart from the special rights of a sudra's daslputra  ^ and the
2
derivative birthright of the dattaka In the form of relation back, no other second­
ary son had any Inherent right In the property of the father. So, hereafter, our 
study w ill be concentrated only on the mutual rights In family property of an 
aurasa son and hts father.
While studying the Mltaksara we have seen that Vljnanesvara envisaged
3
son's right by birth In a ll types of properties of the father and the grandfather.
We also noted that Vtjnanesvara, from the practical point of view, Imposed some
4
limitations on birthright In respect of the movables In the hands of the father.
We may recall that the British authorities decided tn favour of administering the 
personal law of the Hindus according to theiriestras. So, during the A ng lo -
1. Supra, 764-70.
2. Supra, 774 ff .
3 . M lta .I. t.2 7 . Discussed supra, 520-5.
4 . Supra, 527-8,
5. Supra, 6 ?2 .
Hindu Law period the smrtl texts and commentaries went through the process of 
judicial Interpretation and as a result, not unexpectedly, many sastrlc rules, 
Including the rules on separate property, took a meaning quite different from 
that which they originally conveyed.
II . Nature of family property In classical Hindu Law
From the sastrlc texts we come to know that there could be two types of
properties In the hands of the father.^ First, a father would manage the property
which passed to him from his father on behalf of himself and his sons. Secondly,
a father could have self-acquired property In which, though the sons acquired a
right by birth, yet, the sons had no right to partition the same before the death,
2retirement or disqualification of the father. The sastra confers on the father
a right to make a partition during his lifetime and, I f  he so wishes, he can retain
3
a double share for himself.
But we should not be deluded by this categorisation of property Into
ancestral and separate. So long as the coparceners were, jo in t, a ll their
4
acquisitions used to go ‘Into the common pool*. That means a ll property however
1. The texts dealt at supra, 331-46.
2. M lta . 1.11.7.
3 . Narada, D h.K . 1171a. Br : jlvad vlbhage tv pita grhqltarpsa dvayarp svayam, 
D h.K . 1172b, these texts cited by Jlmutavahana In D a .b h a .ll.35, are not con -  
troverted In the M lta ., see Derrett, (1956) 19 SCJ (Jour.), 103-11 at 105, n .6 .
4 . Mayne, A  Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 5th ed ., (London/Madras, 1892),
^215. Derrett, ib id ., 106. RLSI, 114.
acquired by any member belonged *to the whole family* J
Though there are sastrlc texts which throw light on the concept of self-
acqulsttlon yet, to the ancient and mediaeval Hindus the concept had Importance
2 3only In the context of partition. The text of Manu, which by Its literal
meaning seemingly denies any property to the sons and w ife, has been Interpreted
as conferring ownership to the acquirer without having any power of disposal.
These Interpretations of the text strengthen our statement that any acquisition
5
by members used to go to the ‘common pool* and the texts of Manu,
1. Kane, HD, III, 578. This explains Haradatta*s comment on Gautama, 28.29 
that while the father Is alive whatever Is earned by a member, whether learned 
or not (vldusavldusa) belongs to the father, Kane, Ib id ., n.1088. Also 
Derrett, (1958) 60 Bom. L .R .J ., 161-72 at 164.
2. GoldstOcker, On the Deficiencies In the Present Administration of Hindu Law, 
(London, 1871), 18 and n. thereof.
3 . Manu, V I I I . 416.
4 . Sabara, on Jalmlnl, V I .1.12 and V I .1.14. Medhatlthl on Manu, V IM .416. 
Jha, Manu-smrtI, (Calcutta, 1939), II, 239. Da.bha. 1.16-17. Kane, Ib id . 
(555-6; 578.L.Rocher, ‘ Janmasvatvavada and uparamasvatvavada: the 
first chapters on Inheritance In the Mltaksara and Dayabhaga*, Our Heritage, 
19/1 (1971), 3-13 at 8 also approves the same view but his citation of Manu, 
V II I .  416 Is Inaccurate, Instead of 8.146 I t  should be 8.416. Bharucl, how­
ever, Is prepared to allow a better title  to the acquirer. He comments on 
Manu, V II I .416: ‘their goods may be utilised only with their consent . .  .* 
their ” propertyless-nessM must be understood to be propounded In a secondary 
(or figurative) sense*, Bharucl*s Commentary on Manusmrtl, tr . Derrett,
(Wlesbader) 1975), II, 2 l0 .
5. Manu, IX .205-6; IX .208.
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- . /v  1 -  -  2Yajnavalkya and Katyayana whtch deal with self-aaqulsltlons,only htgh- 
Itght the potnt that the importance of this category of property Ites only Tn case 
of a dtvTsTon.
In the Mltaksara there are clear TndTcattons that there were no separate 
pools for separate property of the tndtvtdual members of a jotnt fam ily. This 
explains why VIjnanesvara did not lay down any rule for the devolution of pro­
perty which was *ln part the common property of a united fam ily, and In part
3 .~-the separate acquisition of the deceased • . .* In this connection, Vljnanes-
4
vara has dealt ‘only with cases In which the property In question has been 
either wholly the common property of a united fam ily, or wholly the separate
5
property of the deceased husband*. To the Privy Council, this appeared to 
be confusing, but to VIJnanesvara this was crystal-clear. Since there was no 
status of separate property apart from the status of the Individual, Vljnanesvara 
was not obliged to lay down a rule for a third situation. This Is also apparent 
from Vljnanesvara*s answer to the purvapaksln who alleges that without one*s 
own separate property, religious duties preserved by the Vedas could not be
1. Yajn. II . 118-9.
2. Katy. Kane, ed ., 851; D a.Bha.ll. 65-73; Kane, HD, II I, 578,
3 . Katama Natchlar v . The Rajah of Shlvagunga, (1863) 9 MIA 539, 6QT-8.
4 . M f ta . l l . l .
5 . 9 M IA 5 39at 607.
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performed.^ To this, VTjnanesvara*s answer was that ‘suffic ient power for
such purposes Is Inferred from the cogency of the precept (which enjoins their 
2
performance)*. This shows that self-acqulsltlons used to go to the common
stock and Vtjfianesvara showed that the practice did not conflict with the 
a caras of  Htndu l ife .
Small wonder, therefore, that for the purposes of succession, property
as such, whether joint or separate, had no status Independent of the status of 
3
the Individual. On the death of a propositus, the devolution of property
depended on the sole question of whether he and his dayadas were joint or 
separate.
Thus, when a father and his male Issue were joint the ancestral pro­
perty as well as a ll their acquisitions, formed a common pool and at the death 
of the father, the property as a whole passed to the sons as survivors.
When a male Hindu died without leaving any sons, and I f  he was joint
with his brother, the whole property regardless of whether It were ancestral or
4
self-acquired, used to pass to the brother and not to the widow of the propositus.
1. M lta .I.1 .18 . Bharucl also advocated this view, see Bharucl on Manu, V II I .
416, Derrett, Bharucl, II, 210. Also for a discussion, see RLSI, 132-4.
2 . M lta .l.1 .26 .
3 . Derrett, (1956), 19SCJ Jrn l. 107.
4 . M lta .ll.1 .3 0 ; 11.1.39. Smrtl Candrlkff, X I .1.23-6, Setlur, I, 278.
Vyayahara-mayukha, 71, Setlur, I, 337. Madana-parljata, Setlur, 11,534,
p a ra .l. The Sarasvatl-vllasa, £480, explains that I f  the husband Is jo in t,
he has no nlyata, "special” , "several" or "distinct" proprty: "N o t so: the
wife and daughter rule applies to the wives of a divided man, only where
special property belongs solely to their husband. It Is to be borne In mind
that the wife and daughter rule applies In the case of a divided man; because
there Is no possibility for the wives of an undivided man to take their husband's
/Contlnuned on next paae;
ThTs explains why on the determInatlon of thTs point tn the eighteenth century ^
2
and Tn the nineteenth century, up to the decision In Katama Natchlar v .
3
Srlmut Rajah Mootoo V ljaya, the courts concentrated on the status of the co­
parceners rather than on the nature of acquisition of the property. The First 
Shlvagunga case strongly supports our view on this point.
If we project the complex facts of the First Shlvagunga case Tn a simple
1 2 2 way, It appears that B and B were two undivided brothers. B was granted
an estate by the Government which should be considered as his self-acqulsltlon.
1 2 1 2  3 2B died before B , leaving three sons, S , S and S . B died without any
2 l
male Issue. On B *s death, S took possession of the estate, and after his death,
2
he was succeeded by his son, SS. Out of seven wives of B , three were alive
2
at the time of his death. B also left a few daughters and their descendants, 
both male and female.
n . l  -  p .835 -  continued:
share In the joint property, seeing that no special property belongs to their 
husband.”  The relevant words^of the original Sanskrit are: avlbhakta- 
patnTnam  ^patyur nTyata-dravy5J dhavat samudlta-dravye patyamso-grahltvasya- 
sakyatvat.
1. Infra, £ 3 8 - 40.
2 . See Srlmat Mootoo Vljaya v . Rany Anga Mobtoo (1844) 3 MIA 278 (here- 
after as the First Shlvagunga case); Varadlperumal v . Ardanarl Udalyan, 
(1863) 1 MHCR 412; restated Tn Godavari Lakshmlnarasamma v« Godavari 
Rama Brahman, (1950) ILR Mad. 1084 at 1089-90.
3 . (1863) 9 M IA 539; (hereafter as the Second Shlvagunga case).
837.
For our present purpose, the relevant question decided by the Privy
Council was to whom ought the estate to have descended according to Hindu
2 2 1 ]
law after the death of B -  to the widow of B or to S , the son of B ?
The pandits a t every stage of the litigation,  ^ gave sole Importance to
2
In their answers to the status of jointness at the time of B *s death, and opined 
that 'the succession to the separate self-acquired property of a member of an
undivided family who died leaving no son, son's son or son's grandson Ts governed
2 . 3by the same rules as the succession to the joint property of such fam ily1.
1 4That means, according to their view, the property should go to S . So far
✓- 5as they were following the traditional sastrlc rule, the pap^lts were correct. 
This also goes to support our previous statement that acquisition of any joint 
coparcener used to go to the joint pool.
Leon Sorg also tells us that In French India (Pondlchery), I f  two Hindu 
brothers were joint and one of them died without male Issue, the self-acquired 
property left by the deceased, used to go to the surviving brother and the widow
1 • Answer to the Sudder Court on 28 October, 1833, 9 M IA 539- 547-%;
answer of the pandits on 16 January, 1837, Ib id ., at 550.
2 . Emphasis supplied.
3 . 9 M IA 539, 550.
4 . For the rules of devolution of jo in t property on this point see, Sadabart
Prasad Sahu v . Fool bash Koer, (1869) 3 Beng.LR 31; Rajah Ram Naraln 
Singh v . "Perturn Singh, (1873) 20 WR 189; Phoolbas Koonwurv . Latla~ 
Jogeshur Sahoy, (1876) ILR 1 C al. 226 (PC); Debl Parshad v . Thakur D ia l, 
(1875), ILR 1 AM 105, the Second Shlvagunga case explained at 110.
5 . Supra, 53d", n .2 .
of the propositus was only entitled to maintenance.
But we have a thought-provoking report of an arbitration from Pondtchery
2
Tn The Private Dtary of Ananda Ranga PtllaT/ which might shed more conclusive
Information on the matter. The parties Involved In this litigation werwChrlstlan
3
converts, but the case was decided *Tn consonance with the custom and usages1
4 1 2of the caste and the *£astras*. The facts of the case reveal that B and B were
two brothers living jo in tly . B^  died on 12 February, 1746, leaving a widow, .
1 2 B had a son who predeceased his father. S left a widow, SW. B had a w ife,
W^. B^*s estate consisted both of ancestral and self-acquired properties.
1 2  1Both W and B were respectively claiming the estate as the rightful heir of B ,
and to resolve this dispute, Duplelx had to appoint twenty arbitrators who were
5 1‘ leading members of the different castes*. On behalf of W her two brothers
1. Avis N o .57, 18 May, 1837, Leon Sorg, Avis du Comlte" consultatlf de 
Jurisprudence Indlenne, (Pondlchery), 1897), 160. Sorg later admits that 
the rule was abandoned but he remarks at p .2 l that the distinction between 
joint and separate property Is a recent development and even as lat as the 
period of publication of his work, he found that In certain families there were 
no distinctions between the two categories of property, see G .D . Sonthelmer, 
The Joint Hindu Family; Its evolution as a legal Institution, (London Unlver-
slty, Ph.D. thesis, unpublished, 1965), 379.
2. Translated from Tamil by order of the Government of Madras, e d ., J.F.Price,
(Madras, 1904), The Kanakaraya Muda11*s case Is reported In V o l.I ,  314-30.
On this case, also see D . Annoussamy, 15 JILI (1973), 594-9,
3 . A .R .P. Diary, I, 322.
4 . Ib id ., 322.
5 . Ibid. On the method of solution of disputes between parties In the French
territories, see Derrett, RLSI, 282-3.
] 2 1contended that there was a partition between B and B and hence W was en-
2
tttled to Inherit the estate of her deceased husband to the excluston of B .
2
B , on the other hand, established that there was no such partition as alleged
1 2 on behalf of W , and the arbitrators being satisfied with B *s contention, de-
2 1 elded that the estate shouldafeevolve upon B as the survivor,
2
Keeping In mind the opinion of the pandits In the First Shlvagunga
3
case, one can realise that In this arbitration also, the parties and the arbltra-
4 ]
tors were concentrating on the sole question of jointness or separation of B
2
and B and to a ll concerned the nature of the property, whether ancestral or
5
self-acquired (though most of the property In this case was self-acquired), 
was Irrelevant to the resolution of the substantive Issue. So far so good; but 
the disquieting factor In the report Is the answer of the arbitrators to the ques­
tion of Duplelx who Interposed: ‘Supposing that the partition had been made; 
how would this affect his [  B^*s J position?1 The arbitrators replied: *Even 
then, as Kanakaraya Mudall had no son, and as Chlnna Mudall was his brother, 
the latter had a right to the estate of the deceased. Even I f  there had been no 
brother, and I f  he had had only a cousin, this cousin could claim the property.1 ^
1. Ib id ., 321.
2 . Supra, g37.
3 . (1844) 3 M IA 278.
4 . A.RP. D iary, I, 319, also 323-4.
5. Annoussamy, 15 JILI (1973), 594-9 at 598.
6 . A  JR. P. Diary, 1, 322. It Is not Impossible that either the question or the 
answer was misunderstood. In a case of partition, concerning ‘ limited 
estate*, the Inheritance would go to the brother on the widow's death I f  he 
survives her.
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ThTs answer removes the case completely from the rattonale of the Ftrst Shiva -  
gunga case and ts the anttthests of what the sastra propounds.
B ut this curiously oblique opinion of the arbitrators does not falsify
our observation because, apart from this answer to the hypothetical question,
In fact, the case was decided on the point of absence of partition between 
2
and B . Moreover, I f  the question of partition was altogether Immaterial,
It remained unexplained as to why the arbitrators were probing Into I t .  In
deducing the rationale of this case, one should bear In mind that none of the
arbitrators were acknowledged Gastrins; they were a ll ‘ leading castemen1 ^
and out of these twenty caste leaders,ten were Chettls who were respectable 
2sudras. So It Ts not unlikely that the oplnloo represents an Irritating blend­
ing of an Inscrutable custom with the sastra because the opinion strongly suggests
3
that even a separated coparceners widow had only the right of maintenance. 
Therefore, for our purpose, the answer of the arbitrators to the second question 
of Duplelx should not be given much weight.
1. A .R .P. D iary, I, 315.
2. See L. Rocher, ‘Jacob Mosse!‘s Treatise on the Customary Laws of the 
Vella lar Chettlyars*, JAOS 89 (1969) 1: 27-50 at 28-9.
3 . A .R .P. Diary, I, 322,
111. Emergence of self-acquired property: Anglo-Htndu Law
During the Anglo-HTndu law period a new dimension has been given 
to self-acquired property. We have seen that by 1867 a father's testamentary 
power over his self-acquired property was well-established.^ Besides this 
recognition of testamentary disposition, the whole concept of self-acquired 
property passed through a revolutionary change and In this respect, the nine­
teenth century witnessed a transition from the MTtaksara multiple agnatic 
ownership to Individual ownership; and Its devolution to jo int collaterals, 
depriving the widow of the propositus, was abolished.
2
The decision In the Second Shlvagunga case was a turning point In
the history of the Hindu law of property. It may be recalled that In the First 
3
Shlvagunga case, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee made It known
'that the question of division or non-dlvlslon appeared to be the only point on
4
which the main question of title  to the property would ultimately depend.1 
But In the Second Shlvagunga case, the Judicial Committee looked at separate 
property from a different angle, and Lord Justice Turner In the course of 
delivering judgment, rejected the above observation of their Lordships In the
1. See Baboo Beer Pertap v . Rajender, (1867) 12 MIA 38; earlier recognised 
In Madras, P. Narrafnsvaml Chettl v . P. Arunachella C hettl, (1860) 11 
Madras S .D ., 115.
2. (1863) 9 M IA 539.
3 . (1844) 3 MIA 278.
4 . (1863) 9 MIA 539 at 594
First Shlvagunga case and laid down the rule that:
even If  the late Zemindar (B ) continued 
to be generally undivided In estate with 
his brother's fam ily, this Zemlndary was 
his self-acquired and separate property, 
and as such was descendible, like sepa­
rate estate, to his widows and daughters 
and their Issue preferably to his nephews 
•  •  •
Upon this view of the law, the question 
whether the family were undivided or 
dHded becomes Immaterial. The 
material question of fact would be 
whether the Zemlndary was to be treated 
sep ara te / as seIf-acqulred/property, or as part of 
the common family stock. 1
With this remark, the Privy Council emancipated a male Hindu's self-acqulsl- 
tlons from the archaic and mediaeval conception of communal ownership of 
agnates and established the rule that self-acqulslttons were Ipso facto separate. 
In the light of what we have said hitherto, the calm disposal of the Issue In the 
words chosen above Is surprising but It should be remembered that In England In 
1$63 a person could own property by various titles concurrently, e .g . as owner 
In fee simple, as beneficiary under a trust, as cotenant under a tenancy In 
common, as tenant In ta ll, or as joint tenant with benefit of survivorship, and 
by 1863 It was by no means clear how many analogies of English law had taken 
root In India. Although the decision could be hailed as a paradigm of modern­
ity , a liberalising judgment, there was something Ironic In the fact that their 
Lordships whilst professing to apply the correct Mltaksara position, departed
1. (1863) 9 M IA  539, 5$9.
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from Its concept that the devolution of property dtd not depend on the nature of 
the property but on the status of the proposttus. Thts revolutionary swing to 
Individualism, namely, that self-acquired property of an undivided coparcener 
should belong exclusively to the acquirer and passed on his death to his heirs, 
Instead of passing by survivorship to other coparceners, had necessarily fa r- 
reaching effects on the Mttaksara coparcenary concept, and especially on the 
birthright of sons In the self-acquired property of their father.
The virtual abolition of son's birthright In the self-acquired property 
of the father was achieved by successive jud icia l leaps. Ten years after the 
decision In the Second Shlvagunga case, I t  was held by the Calcutta High 
Court In Lochun Singh v . Nemdharee Singh  ^ that a son had no right to demand
partition of his fathers self-acquired properties. In Rao Balwant Singh v . Rani
2 -  3Klshorl, the Judicial Committee, misunderstanding the texts of the Mttaksara,
confirmed that a father had absolute right to dispose of his self-acquired Immov­
ables. Although these judicial developments deprived the son of his birthright 
In his father's separate property yet, because of the Ipso facto separate nature 
of such property, the decisions reinforced, somewhat unexpectedly, the b irth­
right o f a separated son In the self-acqutslttons of his father.
1. (1873) 20 WR 170.
2. (1898) 25 IA 54; texts analysed supra, 517-29; cases discussed, supra,r4 '3-6.
3 . M lta .l.1 .27 ; I . v .9-10.
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We have repeatedly pofnted out that according to the Mttaksara, ^
a son acqutres a right by btrth tn accestral property as well as tn the self-
acquired property of the father, and unttl a partttton, both father and son
lived on a ll the property wtthout maktng any dtsttnctton between the two 
2
classes. From th tj obvtously the natural and logtcal rule emerges, and
-  3the sastrakaras accordtngly ordained, that tn the case of the father maktng a
partttton, the share of each of the sons would come from the enttre common 
stock comprtsed of the ancestral property as well as self-acqutstttons. The 
'sastra also took care of an after-born son and tf  and when a son was born 
after a partttton, as menttoned above, a ll the separated sons were obliged to
4contribute fracttons to make up the share of the after-born son. Thts sastrtc 
posttton has changed stnce the Second Shtvagunga case,** and other cases ^ 
whtch tntoned the dtrge of btrthrtght tn the father's separate property; and a 
partttton by a father ts valtd even though no ttem of the father's self-acquVed 
property ts given to the son. In other words, when a son ts separated from hts 
father, he may not take wtth htm, unless the father so wishes, any part of the
1. M tta . l. t.2 7 .
2. See Sayana on Tat.Sam.II, v t.1 ,6 ; Dh.K.1161 a n d o n A t.A r . il,  t ,  8; 
Dh.K.1163. Derrett, (1956) 19S C J(Jn l.), 107. For Sayana*s texts, 
see supra, 5% 1 -82 ,
3 . M tta . I . t t .  generally does not make any dtsttnctton between ancestral and 
self-acqutred property.
A» M tta .|.v t.8 -1 0 .
5 .  (1863) 9 M IA 539.
t f .  See supra, #43.
separate property of hts father, and -  however unjustly -  the sons who remained 
united wtth the father also would not have any svamyam tn such property. Thus, 
so far as father's separate property ts concerned, the separated (vlbhakta) and 
united (avtbhakta) sons have no preference over each other. So, regarding 
separate property, t f  during the lifetime of the father one class of sons has no 
preference over the other, why, after the death of the father, following the old 
rule which ts valtd tn the context of separate property before the Second Shtva- 
gunga case, should the united sons exclude the separated sons from the Inheri­
tance of the separate property of the father? After the Second Shtvagunga case, 
the exclusion of the separated sons tn thts context would be a wrong Interpreta­
tion of the law.^
Though our observation ts the logical outcome of the judicial develop­
ment tn respect of self-acqutred property, yet the casespn the potnt do not speak
wtth one voice and the majority of the decisions show a nostalgia for a rule
2
which Is no longer logically sound. In Faktrappa v . Yellappa, a grandson 
enforced a partttton against the wishes of hts paternal uncles and the grand­
father. After the death of the grandfather, the separated grandson and uncles 
who were untted wtth thetr father, became contestants tn respect of their shares 
tn the property which was acquired by the grandfather htmself before the parti­
tion wtth hts grandson. Ranade and Jardtne, J .J . held that, as between the
1. See K.S. Atyer, AIR 1949 J n l., 39-42. Derrett, (1956) 19SCJ (Jn l.), 
103-11.
2 . (1896) 22 Bom 101.
united sons and a separated grandson, on the grandfather's death the property
left by him, both ancestral and self-acqutred, would go In preference to the
united son J  Jardlne, J . thought that the claim of the grandson was contrary
to the spirit and presumptions of Hindu law, but both Jardlne and Ranade, J . J.
significantly added that to hold otherwise would stimulate many unpleasant
2
litigations. In Nana Tawker v . Ramchandra Tawker, the Madras High Court 
theoretically accepted that the sons had an Interest by birth In their father's 
self-acqulsltlons, but Munro and Plnhey, J .J . qualified their observation 
by saying that since a father could dispose of his separate property at his 
pleasure, i f  was not coparcenary property In the ordinary sense.
On the same point, the Allahabad High Court In Kunwar Bahadur v .
3
Mad ho Prasad held that 'the mere fact that some of these sons continued to 
live In his (father's) house joint In food with him would not deprive the sons
1. Relied on a text In West & BOhler, Hindu Law, 3rd edn., 68, 366.
Brhaspat! has a similar text: putralh saha vtbhaktena pltra yat svayam 
arjltam /  vlbhaktajasya tat sarvam anlsah purvajah smrtah f f  Br.XXV.19, 
SBE, 33 , 372-3; Dh.K.1568. It Is submitted that the text Is not appli­
cable In post-Second Shlvagunga case situations. For a critica l comment 
on the text, kee Derrett, (1956) 19 SCJ (Jn l.), 106.
2 . (19CB) 32 Mad .377; reaffirmed In C. Naraslmha v. C . Naraslmham, 1932 
Mad.361, which following Vlravan~Chettlar v . Srlnlvasacharlar, A1!R 1921 
Mad. 168, 171-2, pointed out that the view taken In Nana Tawker's case 
that succession to separate property was by survivorship and not by Inhert- 
tance was wrong. Blind following of Madras In Ragubardayal v . Ramdular?, 
(1928) 6 Rangoon 367, 371 •
3. (1918) 49 1C 620.
who were ltvtng away from hTm of their share Tn hts estate1,  ^ consisting of
ancestral as well as self-acquired properties. But the decision fudged the
Issue by pointing out that although descendants 'ceased to reside1 In their
father's house and lived separately, 'there was no finding . . .  that there was
2
a partition between them'.
3
But the point was made clear In Badrlnath v . Hardeo, where Stuart
CJ. and Srlvastava, J . ,  concurring, rejected the Bombay view In Faklrappa's
case and opined that In the absence of any sastrlc text to the contrary, self-
acquired property was not subject to the rights of survivorship but should be
governed by the rules of Inheritance and a ll the sons of the propositus, whether
they remained separate or united with him, would share equally and there should
be no difference In this respect whether the father acquired the property before
4
or after the division with the son who was separated. To this line of
rational argument we can add the dissenting opinion of Hamilton, J . In Ganesh
5
Prasad v . La la Hazarl Lai, where he observed on the point In these words:
'My answer to the reference Is that undivided sons do not exclude the divided
1. (1918) 49 1C 620b.
2. (1918) 49 1C 620, also the headnote at 620a.
2 . AI!R 1930 Oudh.77. There Ts a strong suggestion that this case would have
been followed had the property been self-acquired In Khushaldas v . Shrtmall, 
AIR 1936 S ind.199.
4 . AIR 1930 Oudh.77 at 79.
5. AIR 1942 A l l . 201; the majority opinion of this bench and 22 Bom 101 were
followed In Vasudeo v . Vlshvanath, AIR 1948 Bom.313, criticised by K.S. 
A lyer, at AIR 1949 J n l., 39-47.
son1 But the majority of the bench held the opposite vTew and toed the
2line of the decision In Faklrdppa V case. In Gafaesh Prasad v . La la Hazarl
3
Lai, the fu ll bench re-emphasised the point that a father had an absolute power 
of disposal over his self-acquired property and sons would succeed to such pro­
perty by Inheritance and not by survivorship. Although, as we have pointed
4
out, the rule that a father has absolute power of disposition over his self-
acquired property, and especially over his Immovables, emerged from an tn -
-  -  5 6correct understanding of the Mltaksara by the Judicial Committee, and
7 8since In this respect we know the opinion and attitude of the Supreme Court,
we are not disputing the rule at this stage. It Is also logical that I f  a son has
no birthright In his fathers separate property, It should pass by Inheritance and 
9
not by survivorship, but I t  should not remain unmentloned that according to
1. AIR 1942 A l l .201 at 217a.
2 . (1896) 22 Bom 101.
3 . AIR 1942 A l l .201.
4 . Supra, 7 4 4 - 4 “7.
5 . M lta .L I.2 7 ; I . v .9-10.
6. (1898) 25 IA 54.
7 . Arunachala Mudallar v . Muruganatha, (1954) SCR 243.
8. A rule which Is In vogue for three-quarters of a century, becomes part of
the law, Gurunath v . K a m aM ^, AIR 1955SC 206.
9. Contrary opinion In Ramappa v . Slthammal, (1879) ILR 2 Mad 182 (F .B .). 
Golap Chandra Sarkar SastrT tells us that the rule laid down In this case 
would be applicable to self-acquired property of the father, Hindu Law, 4th 
ed ., 285, but from the judgment Itself the nature of the property cannot be 
ascertained.
1
sasfrtc texts , sons have a special posttton as first hetrs even Tn their father's
 2
self-acqulsltlons whtch pass to them as gpratTbandha dayadas. In fact, there
are views that partition with the father does not Interfere wtth the right of Inherl-
3
tance of the divided sons. Thus, It was held In Ramappa v . Stthammal that 
'under the Mltakshara law a divided son (no undivided sons surviving) Ts entitled 
to succeed to his father's share In preference to his father's widow*. Jagan- 
natha's remark to this effect Is very significant:
If a father, having made a partition with 
his sons, die after reuniting himself with 
any parcener whomsoever, I t  would fo llow , 
that his property could not be Inherited by 
the divided sons: but no other persons 
ought to take the succession while sons 
live , since none can like them have a 
present right 4 to his property. 5
Our objection Ts concentrated on the mistakes of the judges Tn the line 
of decisions Tn and based on Faklrappa's case;^ those failed to comprehend the 
significance of the decision In the Second Shlvagunga case on the rights of the 
sons, and especially of the separated sons, Tn the self-acquired property of the
1. Baudhayana's text: satsvangajesu; Da.bha. IV .2 and 21, 'Male Issue of 
the body being Tn existence,lfie wealth goes to them*. Manu, IX. 104. 
See Derrett, (1956) 19SCJ (Jn l.), 105, n .3 .
2 . In this respect Ntlakagtha made no distinction between *reunlted* sons and 
'not reunited* sons, Vyo vahara-mayukha, IV .9.16.
3 . (1879) ILR 2 Mad 182.
4 . E mphasls supp lied .
5. Colebrooke, Digest of Hindu Law, (London, 1801), III, 522.
6 . (1896) 22 Bom 101.
father. In e ffect, a son*s b irthrigh t Tn the separate property of hts father was
aboltshed Tn thts case,^ and Tt was establTshed that Tn a ll circumstances such
2
property would pass by Inheritance. The decision also made It possible that
when a father separated a son, he would not be obliged to give any portion of
his separate property to the son. The great Inconveniences of such restatement
3
of the law were masked by the law of Vnerger*; whereby the father could
render his self-acqulsltlons jolnt-fam lly property by Intention alone. Thus,
the Inconveniences relate only to famtlles where the father omitted to do this.
4
Now we repeat our question whether when the ownership of self-acquired pro­
perty has undergone such transformation, Tt Is logical or substantially correct to 
rely on the texts which exclude the separated son from a share In such property
In competition with the united sons? The answer, as we have found In Badrlnath 
5
v . Hardeo should certainly be In the negative; but I t  Is submitted that the learned 
judges Tn the decisions which ran counter to that Tn the present case made their 
mistakes by applying texts which were relevant to a situation when, except In
1. (1863) 9 MIA 5J9.
2. See Srlmut Rajah Mootoo Vljaya v . Katama Natchlar, (1866) 11 MIA 50, 71.
3 . On ‘merger*, supra, “7 4 7 - 5 9 ,
4 . Supra,$4$ •
5. AIR 1930 Oudh 77. The judges Tn Satruhan Prasad v . Sudlp Narayan, AIR 
1955 Pat 408 and in Vlshweshwarlal v . Bhuramal, AIR 1968 Raj 277 at 278b, 
thought that Oudh case was overruled In M t. Ram Del v . M t. GyarsI, AIR 
1949 A ll 545 (P6J. But In fact, there Ts no mention of the latter In the former.
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the context of partttton, there was no dtsttnctton between jotnt and separate
property tn the famtly. And, tn fact, the vtew of the Oudh case  ^ has got a
place tn the statute book. For the purposes of devolutton by tnherttance of
2
separate property of a Htndu male, The Hindu Successton Act does not make
‘any dtsttnctton between a son who was dtvtded and a son who was undtvtded 
3
wtth the father1.
It ts stated tn the Act that *The property of an tntestate shall be dtvtded
i
among the hetrs tn Class I of the Schedule tn accordance wtth the followtng rules:-
Rule 2 . ~  The survtvtng sons and
daughters and the mother 
of the tntestate shall ^ 
each take one share.
Here tn the phrase ‘survtvtng sons‘ , the Act does not make any dtsttnc­
tton between separated and untted sons. Thus, the Act reflects the vtew of the 
Oudh case and gtves statutory recognttton to separate property as a dtsttnct cate -  
gory tn whtch a son has no rtght by btrth.
1. AIR 1930 Oudh 77.
2. Act 30 of 1956 (17 June, 1956).
3 . S .8, H .S .A ., explained tn clause 7 of the Htndu Successton B ill, B tll No. 
X III of 1954, see Derrett, (1956) 19 SCJ, J n l., 103. Raghavachartar, 
Htndu Law, 4th edn., 776. The dtsttnctton on thts point between dtvtded 
and undtvtded sons has been retained tn respect of coparcenary property,
H .SA ., s.6, Explanation, 2; Raghavacharartar, 4th ed ., 794-5.
4 . H .S .A ., s .10.
5. H .S .A ., s. 10, Rule 2.
IV . Property TnherTted from the maternal grandfather
It remains to examtne the rights of sons In another category of property
w h ic h  Is n e i t h e r  ‘ a n c e s t r a l *  In  th e  t e c h n ic a l  s e n s e ,  ^ n o r  s e l f - a c q u i r e d  b y  th e
father. The property we are concerned with Is that property which Is Inherited
by the grandsons from their maternal grandfather, through the mother. Under
the Mttaksara scheme, the question would arise regarding the nature of rights
In  s u c h  p r o p e r t y  In h e r i t e d  b y  g ra n d s o n s , In t e r  se as w e l l  as  b e t w e e n  th e m  a n d
their male Issues. In fact, the question came for determination before several
High Courts and ultimately to the Privy Council In Raja Cheltkant Venkayyamma
2
Garu v . Raja Cheltkant Venkataramanayyamma, where the facts were as follows:
MF, a Hindu governed by the Mttaksara law, died tn 1869 leaving his w ife, W
who died In 1875, and a daughter, D . D died In 1884 leaving two sons, DS^
and DS^. DS  ^ died In 1892 and DS^ died In 1901. The property left by MF
1 2was his separate property and descended on DS and DS after the death of D .
1 2The point for decision was whether DS and DS would Inherit the property
jo in tly  with benefit of survivorship or jo in tly  or In common without benefit of
3
survivorship. The Judicial Committee accepting Mayne*s contention, held 
*that under Mltakshara law the two sons of a Hindu's only daughter succeed on 
their mother's death to his estate jo in tly  with benefit of survivorship as being
1. As envisaged by Vljnanesvara, see Colbrooke, M lta .I.1 .27 .
2. (1902) 29 IA 156 (hereafter as the Jagampet case).
3 . (1902) 29 IA 156 at 159.
jo in t ancestral estate*. ^
We have noticed Tn the Second Shtvagunga case, that the Judtctal 
CommTttee abolished survivorship Tn separate property and explained the In­
stances of jo int property and separate property In this well-known passage:
According to the principles of Hindu 
law, there Ts co-parcenaryshlp be­
tween the different members of a 
united fam ily, and survivorship 
following upon Tt. There Is commu­
nity of Interest and unity of posess- 
lon between a ll the members of the 
fam ily, and upon the death of any 
one of then the others may well 
take by survivorship that In which 
they had during the deceased *s 
lifetime a common Interest and a 
common possession. But the law 
of partition shows that as to the 
separately acquired property of 
one member of a united family, 
the other members of that family 
have neither community of Inter­
est nor unity of possession. The 
foundation, therefore, of a right 
to take such property by survivor­
ship falls; . . .  3
1. (1902) 29 IA 156 . Samlnadha P llla l v . Thangathannl, (1895) 19 Mad 70, 
Jasoda Koer v . Sheo Pershad Singh, (1889) 17 Cal 33 overruled.
2 . (1863) 9 M IA 533.
3 . (1863) 9 MIA 543, 615. GoldstOcker Tn his criticism o f the judgment pointed
out that the Judicial CommTttee applied a rule applicable *to a divided family 
to an undivided one*, On the Deficiencies Tn the Present Administration of 
Hindu Law, (London, 1871), 20. K .V . Venkatasubrahmanya A lyar, resented 
the Importation from English law by Colebrooke, terms, such as ‘coparcener* 
and ‘survivorship*, (1942) MLJ J n l., 63-82 at 63-4. Jt Ts true that from a
very technical point o f view, Alyar*s complaint deserves attention, but con­
sidering the d ifficu lty  In translating a legal work from one language Into an­
other, the Judicial Committee was justified In following the renderings of 
Colebrooke. Moreover, the ‘original texts do not treat much of the law
/Continued on next page:
1 1 2In the Jagampet case, DS and DS were allowed to hold the property
as jotnt tenants wtth the right of s u r v iv o r s h ip .  In the context of the Mttaksara
law, It means that the two brothers were holding the property as Tf. they had
right by b tf th In It and their male Issues also w ill have their b irthright. But
we shall see presently that this approach of the Judicial Committee was wrong.
But before we point out the exact mistake, we are to look Into another case
which dealt with the same problem. The case.we are alluding to Ts Muhammad
2
Husain Khan v . Babu Ktshva Nandan Sahal where the Judicial Committee took
Note 3 -  p .853 -  continued:
relating to undivided families1, and this Ts also true of the Commentaries, 
see Krishna Kama I Bhattacharya, The Law Relating to the Joint Hindu Family, 
TLL, 1884-5, (Calcutta, 1885), 55^ Despite their difference Tn origin, 
there are striking resemblances between aprattbandha daya and joint tenancy 
In Common law; on this, see L ittle ton, 288. Coke on Little ton, 186a#(
For elaboration, see James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, ed .,
C .M . Barnes, 13th edn., (Boston, 1884), 360-1. AlsoMegarry and Wade, 
The Law of Real Property, (London, 1966), 403-8. On the differences be- 
tween the two concepts, see the view of Sir Barnes Peacock In Sadabarat 
Pershad Sahoo v . Fool bash Koer, (1869) 12 WR (FB) 1. Also Go lap Chandra 
Sarkar SQstrT, Hindu Law, 4th edn., (Calcutta, 1910), 250. In Common law, 
coparcenary there Is no jus accrescendl (survivorship), see Richard Preston, 
Essay on Abstracts of T itle , 2nd edn., (1823-24), 11, 70. Sir W illiam Black- 
stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 15th edn., e d ., E. Christian, 
(1809) 11, 188. Also see Megarry and Wade, o p .c lt . ,  442. For the Hindu 
law position, see M lta .II .1.30; 11.1.35, elucidated by MTtra Mlsra, V lra - 
mltrodaya, III, 1.10. Also M lta .II . Tx .4 . Madana Parljata, rights of re-  
united male Tn preference to the wife In samsrsta property, Setlur, II, 535; 
alsoR. Sarvadhlkarl, The Hindu Law of Inheritance, TLL, 1880 (Calcutta, 
1882), 775.
1. (1902) 29 IA 156.
2 . (1937) 64 IA 250.
a contrary vtew on the point. When the facts of the matter are projected, 
we get the following Information. F Inherited a village from his maternal 
grandfather. He died leaving a w ill whereby he gave his son S on ly a life 
Interest In the estate, and gave his daughter-in-law, SW, an absolute estate 
Tn the remainder. For our present purpose, F*s power of disposition In respect 
of the property In question was at Issue.
The Judicial Committee held that :
under Hindu law a son does not ac­
quire by birth an Interest jo in tly  with 
his father which the latter Inherits 
from his maternal grandfather . . .
The expression "ancestral estate" 
must be confined to the property 
descending to the father from his  ^
male ancestor Tn the male line.
The Judicial CommTttee observed that the property which F Inherited from his
2
maternal grandfather should be treated as his self-acquired property, and he 
had fu ll power of disposal over that estate. That means S had no birthright Tn 
that property. This observation of their Lordships of the Judicial CommTttee 
runs counter to the observation of their Lordships Tn the Jagampet case. In 
this divergence of opinion on the point, a reappraisal of the Mltaksara would 
not be Inappropriate •
1. Ibid. at 250; following Atar Singh v . Thakar Singh, (1908) 35 IA 206, 
a case on Punjab customary law.
2. (1937) 64 IA 250, 267.
VTjnanesvara states that *lt Ts a settled potnt that property Tn the 
paternal and ancestral (grandparental) estate Ts by birth*. ^  This does not 
leave any scope for Imagining that this would also Include property Inherited 
through the maternal line. In the Jagampet case, the Judicial Committee 
was misled by Its blind following of the Inaccurate rendering by Colebrooke
2of the word paltamaha as ‘ancestral*. In Muhammad Hussain Khan*s case,
the Judicial CommTttee pointed out that ‘Colebrooke apparently used the word
"ancestral1 to denote grand-paternal and did not Intend to mean that Tn the
estate which devolves upon a person from his male ancestor Tn the maternal
3
line his son acquires an Interest by birth*. This Is certainIy the correct
Interpretation of the text, and In fact, has been relied on by the Madras High
4
Court In Godavari Lakshmlnarasamma v . Godavari Rama Brahman. After
much consideration of the Jagampet case and Muhammad Hussain Khan*s case,
5 6Rajamannar, C. J . approved the view of Mayne and Mulla that ‘after the 
later decision, the Jagampet case must be confined to Its own facts.* ^
1. M lta .l.1 .27 .
2. (1937) 64 IA 250.
3. Ibid. at 266.
4. (1950) ILR Mad 1084 = AIR 1950 Mad 680.
5. Hindu Law, 10th ed ., 664.
6. Hindu Law, 10th ed ., 246.
7. (1950) ILR Mad 1084 at 1103.
But a postscript must be addled to our conclusion on the Jagampet case. 
A t a ll material times, the two brothers tn this case treated the property as their
joint property. The decision of the Judicial Committee was based on ‘the
mode* rather than on ‘ the nature of the ownership1.^ This potnt has been 
on phaslsed In the judgment In these words:
There Is certainly nothing In the 
evidence which supports the view 
that the grandsons held the pro­
perty tn common rather than jointly; 
there ts no separate dealtngs wtth 
any share. It ts not suggested that 
t f  they succeeded jo in tly  they ever 
ceased to hold It In the same way.
The property was treated and dealt 
with as a whole, and so far joint 
ownership rather than ownership 2 
tn common ts the more probable.
3
This strongly suggests an element of blending and from the mode of enjoyment
of the property, I t  could be suggested that the two brothers wanted the property
4
In questton to be treated as joint property. Had the Judicial Committee ex­
pressed their observation more categorically on the potnt of blendtng, the dect- 
ston could have stood on tts own facts.
In the Jagampet case, Lord Ltndley observed that “members of a joint
family who succeed to self-acquired property take It jo in tly . . .  but It may be
5
that where sons succeed, the Inheritance as to them Is unobstructed. 1 Now,
1 . (1902) 29 IA 156 at 167.
2 . (1902) 29 IA 156, 166.
3. For a discussion on blendtng, see supra, 7 4 7 - 59 .
4 . Thts potnt has been emphasised tn Muhammad Husain Khan v . Babu Ktshva
Nandan Sahat, (1937) 64 IA 250 at 265. 5  ^ (]9Q2) 29 IA 156, 165.
we find an explanation of unobstructed heritage In the observation of Rajamannar, 
C .J . In Godavari Lakshmlnarasamma's case,  ^ where he remarks: The only In­
stance of apratlbandha daya known to Hindu law Is the rights of a son, son's son 
and son's son's son In the property, of the father, father's father and father's 
father's father. This Is the jenmanalva swatwa of Vlgnaneswara. The obser­
vation of the learned Chief Justice, though obiter, Is most Interesting. It w ill 
be borne In mind that the court were Instructed at great length by K .V . Venkata- 
subrahmanya A lye r, one of the celebrated teachers of Hindu law at Madras, and 
an advocate on the appellate side of the High Court. The Chief Justice goes on:
According to the Mltakshara, the son has 
a right by birth In every kind of property.
This must always be borne In mind . . .
The misconceptions prevailing In this 
branch of the Hindu law are mostly due 
to the mistake of equating the right by 
birth (jenmanalva swatwa) with equal 
ownership (sadrlsam swamyam). Though 
It  Is true that the son has a right by 
birth In a ll kinds of property belonging 
to the father, the amplitude of his owner­
ship differs accordingly to the nature of 
the property. 3
The learned Chief Justice Is trying to establish that a son has 'equal ownership*
( sadrsam. svamyam) In ancestral property, but In self-acquired property of the
4
father, a son has merely 'right by b irth ' (janmanalva svatva). Here, by trying
1. (1950) ILR Mad 1084.
2. Ib id ., 1104-5.
3 . (1950) ILR Mad 1084 at 1105.
4 . The bench was obviously Influenced by the persuasion of K .V . Venkata-
subrahmanya A lyer, who was the counsel for the appellant. See his Identi­
cal views at (1942) MLJ, J n l., 70.
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to expose the mtstake of others, the learned ChTef Just tee ts equally exposing 
hts own mtsunderstandtng. Although the modem posttton Ts tru ly thts, that
the son has no svamyam, Vljnanesvara htmself had envtsaged that the sons had
_ .  ] 2
svamyam but not svatantryam tn the self-acquisitions of the father. The
learned ChTef Justice betrays his knowledge that even Tn self-acquired property 
of the father, a son had birthright, but he was trying to explain away the 
Mltak^ara position by saying that equal ownership (sadr Sam svamyam) exists 
only Tn ancestral property. It Ts an example of that ubiquitous phenomenon, 
the desire to read traditional, authoritative texts as congruent with the facts 
of one's own time.
Rajamannar, C .J . observes that 'In property described as swarjlta or
swayamopath ffc] a, the son's ownership Is dormant and subordinate to the 
3
father's.* A t the same time, he tends to contradict himself by saying,
4
*But It Ts certainly not notional. It ts . . .  real.* We have already pointed
5
out the observation of the learned Chief Justice that the only Instance of 
apratlbandha daya known to Hindu law Is the rights of a son, e tc ., Tn the pro­
perty of the father. Now his Lordship adds to this by saying that:
1. On these concepts, see s u p r a ,  4 3 ^~ 3 3  .
2. Derrett, (1956) 19SCJ, J n l., 109, n . l .
3 . (1950) ILR Mad 1084, 1105.
4 . Ib id ., 1105.
5 . Supra, $5&'
accordtng to the Mttakshara school 
of Htndu law no property or Interest 
Tn property of one person Ts taken by 
another by survTvorshTp un less the 
latter had already an Tnterest Tn the 
property by reason of hTs relatton- 
shTp. ThTs can only be Tn apratl- 
bandhd daya, Tn which there Ts a l­
ways the right by b trth . 1
ThTs Is true, but Rajamannar, C .J . knew that since the Second Shlvagunga case,
a son had not even svamyam In the self-acquired property of the father. He was
Indulging Tn a patchwork and was frying to justify the modern position by saying
that Tn self-acquired property ‘son^ ownership Ts dormant and subordinate to the 
2
father^ . 1 In addition to this, he was frying to prove that because the father
had absolute power of disposal and a son had no right of partition, he had no
3 4right by birth tn his fathers self-acquisitions. But we have already shown
that the fathers absolute power of disposition over his self-acquired Immovables
emerged from a misunderstanding of the Mltaksara; and *the right of partition1,
5
the absence of which presupposes the absence of the right by birth Ts, Tn fact,
1. (1950) ILR Mad 1084, 1106.
2. Ib id ., at 1105.
3 . Ib id ., at 1105.
4 . Supra, 744
5. This view was wrongly taken Tn SarJaj KuarT v . Deoraj KuarT, 15 IA 51 at
64. But the decision should be confined to Its own facts, see Shiva Prasad
v . Rani Prayag Kumar!, 59 IA331, 345; see also M f. Ram Del v . M t. 
GyarsT, AIR 1949 A l l .  545 at 549a.
to put tt more accurately, a remedy  ^ which follows the rtght tnherent wtth
btrth. Rajamannar, C .J . put the cart before the horse by saytng that sTnce
the son had no power to demand a partition of self-acqutred property from hts
2
father, he had no btrthrtght tn Tt. That thts observation of the learned 
Chtef Justice was wrong could be proved from the rights of a disqualified co­
parcener to which we now turn.
V . Disqualified coparcener
3It was held fn  Tlrbenl v . Muhammad that birthright could not be
4affected by supervenient Insanity. In Amrlthammal v . Valllm ayll Ammal, 
a congenital Idiot was admittedly precluded from claiming a partition of the 
joint family estate from his father. Nevertheless, he was held to be a co­
parcener with his father and the latter's beque5 t In favour of his wife was held 
to be Inoperative. Again the Madras High Court In Muthuswaml Gurukkal v .
1 . Obiter, Commr. of IT Punjab v . Dewan Bahadur Dewan Krishna Klshore, 
(1941) 68 1A 155 at 176.
2 . Though this may, historically, be the true explanation here, between about 
1830 and 1860 the Hindu IQW tn, e .g . Madras, came to deny that birthright -  
first of a ll partition was denied, as the Mltaksara a 1 lows.
3 . (1905) 28 A ll 247.
4 . (1942) 2 MLJ 292 (F.B.); Krishna v . Sami, (1885) 9 Mad 64 followed;
severely criticised by K .V .V . A lyer, ‘Coparcenershlp of Disqualified son 
under the Mltakshara*, (1942) MLJ J n l., 63-81 at 65-7.
Meenamma 1  ^ held fia t supervenient tnsantty as a disqualification could be a 
bar to demanding partition but It could not prevent the disqualified coparcener
2
from taking the benefit of survivorship and becoming the sole surviving coparcener.
3
In spite of some doubts, tt appears that a disqualified coparcener Is entitled to 
enjoy fu ll coparcenary rights, Including the right to alienate undivided property
4
and he Is ‘disqualified from nothing except the right to demand partition . '
Here, a questton may arise whether a man who could not demand partition him­
self can create In the alienee an equity to demand at maximum that share which,
If  he were undlsqualifted, he could have obtained at the date of suit. The 
question should be tackled from the point of view of the family and to consider
the matter simply from the point of view of the legal d ifficu lty  of a man glvtng
5
what he apparently does not possess, would be jurid ica lly Impracticable.
1. (1918) 38 MLJ 291 = ILR 43 Mad 464; followed In D llra j Kuar v . Rlkheswar,
(1934) 13 Pat 712; Vlthaldas v . Vadlla l, (1935) 38 Bom LR 257; Mool Chand
v. Chahta Devi, ILR (1937) A ll 825 (F.B.); Bhagawatl v . Parameswarl, AlR 
1942 A! 1267“  ---------------  ------------------
2 . This view has been wrongly criticised by K .V .V . Atyer, lo c .c lt . ,  82, but 
the learned writer's view has been proved to be erroneous by the decision of 
the Supreme Court, Kamalammal v . Venkatalakshml Ammal, AIR 1965 SC 1349.
3 . Derrett, IMHL * 409.
4 . Derrett, Critique, t  148. IMHL, £ 409. See Kesava v . Govlndan,
(1946) Mad ' ' 452 = AIR 1946 Mad 287; Inadequately distinguished In 
VenkatalakshmammaI v . Balakrlshnacharl, AIR I960 Mad 270, 273.
5. Derrett, Critique, f  148.
8 6 3 .
!f the fam ily Ts Tn South IndTa and a coparcener (precisely a disqualified co­
parcener) has an Individual need which the family (rather, the manager) can­
not satisfy and I f  unilateral severance of status  ^ Is out of the question, there
Ts no reason why money should not be obtained and the equity created merely
2
because actual partition at the alienor's option Is not available to him.
Indeed, *hls disqualification Is personal, It cannot affect the alienee, and
the notional partition for the purposes of calculating the value of the equity
3
Ts nowhere treated as a severance of status. 1
4
Now the Supreme Court In Kamalammal v . Venkatalakshml Ammal, 
has reaffirmed the point that Tn Madras, prior to the Hindu Inheritance (Re­
moval of Disabilities) A c t, 1928, a disqualified coparcener (a congenital 
deaf-mute) became by birth a coparcener with the father and could be the 
sole surviving coparcener.
1. A  demand for unilateral severance of status, Tn the circumstances, would
amount to renunciation for, by defin ition, no share Is available at his
demand, Derrett, C ritique, ?148.
i
2. Derrett, Ib id . ,  5 148.
3. Derrett, Ib id ., f  408. Contrary view In Deonath iSahay v . Lekha
Singh, AIR 1946 Pat 419, which, I t  Ts submitted, was wrongly decided, 
see IMHL, ^ 409; Critique, 117, n .5 . Surprisingly the court also Ig­
nored the Hindu Inheritance (Removal of Disabilities) Act, 1928.
4 . AIR 1965 SC 1349.
V I .  Conclusion
The above dtscusston on disqualified coparceners shows the mistake 
Tn the observation of Rajamannar, C .J . ,  who opined that sons had no birth­
right In the separate property of their father because they could not claim a 
partition of such property. ^
But whatever we might point out as the correct view on father's self-
acquired property vis-a-vis son's right by b irth , Tt Ts too late to restore this 
2
birthright; and hereafter our discussion on this concept should be confined 
mainly to the Instances of joint family property.
1. (1950) ILR Mad 1084 at 1105.
2 . Affirmation In Detvdnal Acht v . Chidambaram Chettlar, AIR 1954 Mad 
657 at 671. But we must not overlook those revenue cases which are 
bu ilt on the proposition that the son has birthright In his father's self- 
acquired property and the cases on 'g if t ' or 'transfer* of property dealing 
with father's making his self-acquired property ancestral property between 
himself and his sons, for a discussion, see supra, “747-59 .
CHAPTER 20.
BIRTHRIGHT AND PARTITION
I .  Introductory remarks
We have already nottced  ^ Vljnanesvara's broad prtnctple that Tn
2
the property of the father and the grandfather ownershtp Ts by btrth; and
have noted also that the judiciary, somettmes by mTstnterpretatton and some-
3
times out of expediency, has whittled down that rule to a great extent.
We have pointed out that the Judicial Committee In the case of 
4
Rao Balwant v . Rani Klshorl Tn effect abolished a son's right by birth Tn 
the self-acquired Immovable property of the father by pronouncing that a 
father could dispose of self-acquired Immovables without the consent of his 
sons, though this was not the correct Interpretation o f Vljnanesvara's view.
Consequently, only ancestral property remained as the subject of a 
son's birthright, and therefore, he could question or Impugn only Its Improper 
alienation by his father.
1. Supra, 520-5.
2 . M lta .l.1 .2 7 .
3. Supra,7 4 5 -4 7 :, 8 4 1- 4 ^ j S59-
4 . (1898) 25 IA 54.
Apart from a son's rtght to questton or prevent altenatton of ancestral 
property by the father, btrthrtght also entails a son's right to demand partition 
of such property against the wishes of his father.
II .  The notion o f partition
At one time jurists thought that among the Hindus the character of 
property was only centripetal as opposed to centrifugal. Maine was mainly 
responsible  ^ for popularising such an Interpretation of the sastra which, a l­
though partly tenable, was apparently not the whole truth. Maine observed:
The mature Roman law, and modem 
jurisprudence following In Its wake, 
look upon co-ownership as an ex­
ceptional and momentary condition 
of the rights o f property. This view 
Is clearly Indicated In the maxim 
which obtains universally In Western 
Europe, Nemo In communlone potest 
TnvTtus detlnerl (“ No one can be kept 
In co-proprietorship against his w il l” ) .
But In India this order of Ideas Is re­
versed, and It may be said that sepa­
rate proprietorship Is always on Its 
way to become proprietorship In 
common . . .  As soon as a son Is bom, 
he acquires a vested Interest In his 
father*s substance, and on attaining 
years of discretion he Is even, In cer­
tain contingencies, permitted by the 
letter of the law to call for a parti­
tion of the family estate. As a fact,
1. Also Mayne, Hindu Law, 10th ed ., (Madras, 1938), 254. Jo lly , TLL, 
1883, 97; but he accepted a son's right to partition at 125.
however, a dfvtston rarely takes 
place (1) even at the death of the 
father, and the property constantly 
rematns undTvtded for several gener­
ations though every member of every 
generation has a legal right to an 
undivided share In I t .  (2)
Indeed It Is Tn everyone‘s Interest that the members of a Hindu joint
3
family ‘should remain "jo in t Tn food worship and estate” as long as possible1,
4
but the rsls never Intended family property to be absolutely Indivisible.
And, despite his In itia l denial, Maine himself had to admit the textual autho-
5rlty  of the sastra allowing the son to demand division of the family estate.
Gautama and Manu ordained that ‘Dharma Increases I f  they are separate,
hence separate performance of rituals Ts consistent with dharma. ‘ ^ From
1. Emphasis mine. Only 20 years after the publication of Maine's Ancient
LaW, a leading journal recorded that ‘the archaic principle of jo int family
Is fast decaying1, anonymous, Calcutta Review, (1881) V o l.1, X X III, 14.
In 1883 a writer observed: ‘Separation Ts the only means that promises to 
afford re lie f from the social Incubus, and to separation many families have 
now resorted1, L.S .S. O 'M alley, Modern India and the West, (London, 1941), 
325, quoting Shiv Chunder Bose, The Hindoos as They Are.
2 . Maine, Ancient Law, N ew edn., (London, 1930), 283.
3 . Derrett, Critique, f  186.
4 . The texts Tn the dharmasastras Imply to this effect, supra, 3 4  $ t \  5 .
5. See the paragraph quoted s u p r a , n .2. , especially the last part.
6 . Gautama, XXVI11.4 . Manu, IX . I l l ;  Derrett, BharucT, II, 238. For
discussion of similar texts, I.S , Pawate, Daya-VTbhaga, (Dharwar, 1975), 
104-5.
the potnt of vtew of partition between father and son, BharucT's comment on 
Manu, IX.111, Is very significant. BharucT says:
Now when partition Ts consistent with 
dharma, a state of Indlvlslon Is not 
right when grounds for a separation 
have been taught. And this In 
effect, Ts what has been stated.
This Is how a partjjfxi between father 
and sons Is to be explained, for the 
cause of such separation Is similar.
Nor should one doubt the existence 
of such a partition because the text 
says partition may take place "after 
the death of the father . . . "  1
This shows that as early as the sixth or seventh century,*- partition
between father and son was not altogether an unknown phenomenon among the
Hindus. It Ts also well known that Gautama had knowledge of sons who were
dividing the family property against the wishes of their father, although the
3
practice was considered by the sage as socially outrageous. Thus, It Ts 
small wonder that Tn the 12th century we find In the Mltaksara, sophisticated 
and comprehensive rules concerning the law of partition between father and son.
Vlinanefvara consolidated the concept of a son's co-ownership with 
his father, and there cannot be two minds on the question that co-ownership
f t 1
1 • BharucT, II, 238. MedhatlthT takes a neutral stand on the spiritual aspect 
of partition: •neither separation by Itself nor non-separation by Itself Is 
either meritorious or sinful*, Medh. on Manu, IX.111; Jha. V , 91.
2. On the date of BharucT, see Derrett, BharucT, I, Tntrod., 9-10.
3 . Gautama, X V . 15 and 19; Kane, HD, III, 566-7, 571.
connotes a right to demand partition of the property concerned.^ The 
crucial text In the MTtakgara on this point Tn respect of ancestral property 
runs as follows:
And thus though the mother Ts having 
her menstrual courses (has not lost the 
capacity to bear children) and the 
father has attachment and does not 
desire a partition, yet by the w ill 
(or desire) of the son a partition of 
the grandfather's wealth does take 
place. 2
Mltra MIsra restated the Mltaksara doctrine and explained the jural 
basis of a son's right to demand partition from the father: 'Here again, parti­
tion at the desire of the sons, whether In the lifetime of the father or after his
demise, may take place by the choice of a single coparcener, since ijiere Is 
3
no distinction. * This right o f partition emerges from the birthright of a son.
Thus, the author of BalambhattI made It crystal-clear that 'the meaning Ts that
4
that (v iz ., division) follows from ownership by birth alone.*
1 . Where there was joint ownership there was also the right to partition, 
jud ic ia lly  accepted per Lord Watson, Madho Prashad v . Mehrban Singh, 
(1890) ILR 18CaI.157, 161. Also Shankar Baksh v . Hardeo Baksh ,
(1888) 16 IA 71, 75-6; Sundar v . Parfeatl, (1889) 16 IA 186.
2 . M lta . I .v .8 . The text Ts correctly Interpreted by S.C . In Puttarangamma 
v. Ranganna, AIR 1968 SC 1018 at 1020. Earlier S.C. In Raghavamma v . 
Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136.
3 . Tr. Golap Chandra Sarkar SastrT , The Law of Inheritance astn the V lra - 
mltrodaya of Mltra MIsra, 11.1.23, (Calcutta, 1879), 89.
4 . BalambhattI on M lta . I . v . l .
t  I f , ,
Since father and son are co-owners of ancestral property, before a 
partition their rights extend over the whole property* In Appovler
v . Rama Subba Alyan, Lord Westbury Illustrated the situation In
these words:
According to the true notion of an 
undivided fam ily, no Individual 
member of that fam ily, whilst It 
remains undivided can predicate 
of the joint undivided property 
that he that particular member 
has certain definite share and 
rights of the coparcener In an 
undivided Hindu family governed 
by the law of the Mltaksharg, 
whtch consists of a father and 
his sons, do not d iffer from those 
of the coparceners In a like family j 
which consists of undivided brethren.
II I. Ancestra I movab les
A little  ramification on these old cases may not be Irrelevant, when 
we see that the Bombay High Court was reluctant to accept a son's birthright 
In ancestral movables by disallowing him the right to demand partition from 
his father, thus contradicting the clear texts affirming such a right In the
1. (1886) 11 MIA 75, 89; also Suraj Bunsl Koer v . Sheo Proshad Singh,
(1878) 6 IA 88 , 100. Earlier In K. Natchlar v .T .R .M . Raganadha 
B .G . Taver, (1863) 9 MIA 559, 611, Turner, L .J . had referred to the 
property as "the common property of a united fam ily". "There Is", he 
said, "community of Interest and unity of possession between a ll the ('co­
parceners1), members of the fam ily, and upon the death of any one of them 
the others may well take by survivorship that In which they had during the 
deceased's lifetime a common Interest and a common possession."
Mltaksara, ^
In itia lly , the judtctary wanted to confTne the textual authority only
2
to the ancestral Immovables. We may recall that for practical purposes,
Vljnanesvara allowed some Independence to the father In dealing with ancestral
movables. The Bombay High Court Interpreted this Independence as a bar to
the right of a son to demand partition from his father. In Ramchandra Dada
3
Nalk v . Dada Mahadev Nalk, Sausse C .J . and Arnould J . held that 'on this 
side of India a son (Hindu) has no right to enforce partition of ancestral mov­
able property In the hands of his father1. Now, neither the Mltaksara nor
4
the Mayukha (IV . 1.5) (which Is of paramount a u th o rity ' In Bombay) restricts 
only to Immovables a son's right to demand partition of ancestral property.
However, the mistaken view of this bench, although doubted, was not d irectly
5 6overruled by M e lv lll, J . In Lakshman Dada Nalk v . Ramchandra Dada Nalk,
1. M tta .l.1 .27 .
2. Supra, 527  -2 £ .
3. (1861) 1 Bom HC Rep. Appx.76.
4 . The special authority of the Mayukha In Gujarat and Bombay, when In con­
f l ic t  with the Mltaksara, has been considered and recognised In Lallubhal v . 
Mankuvarbal, (1876) 2 Bom 388, 416; Sakharam v . Sltabal, (1879) 3 Bom. 
353, 365; Bhaglrathlbal v . Kahnujlrao, (1886) 11 Bom 285, 294; Mu l j l  v . 
Cursandas, (1900) 24 Bom 563 = 2 Bom LR 721.
5 . In Lakshman v . Ramchandra, (1880) 7 IA 181, the P.C. while confirming the 
decision of M e lv lll, J . abstained from pronouncing a decided opinion against 
the older judgment, but certainly they did not speak In Its favour.
6 . (1876) ILR 1 Bom. 561.
but Tn Jugmohandas v . Manga Idas,  ^ the Bombay Htgh Court decided that 
‘there Ts no dTstTnctTon between movable and Tmmovable property as regards
the rTght of a son Tn an undTvTded famTly governed by the MTtakshara law to
2 3partTtTon Tn the iTfetTme of the father.* The Madras HTgh Court and the
4
Calcutta HTgh Court rTghtly made no dTstTnctTon between movables and Tm- 
movables and laTd down the broad rule that sons could compel a dTvTsTon of 
ancestral property of any category at the hands of theTr father and the grandson 
may maTntaTn a suTt agaTnst hTs grandfather for compulsory dTvTston of ancestral 
famTly property.
However, although ultTmately the judTcTary recognised a son*s rTght 
to demand partTtTon Tn a ll categorTes of ancestral property at the hands of hTs 
father, the matter dTd not rest there.
r
IV . Ap ajT v . Ramachandra
An TnterestTng poTnt arose out of a sTtuatTon where the grandfather was 
stTlI alTve and the father was iTvTng joTntly wTth hTm; or where, even though the 
grandfather was deceased, the father was ITvTng wTth hTs brothers (collaterals).
1. (1886) ILR 10 Bom. 529.
2 . (1886) ILR 10 Bom.529.
3 . NagalTnga MudalT v . SubbTramanTya MudalT, (1862) 1 Mad HC Rep.77 at 80.
4 . Laljeet STngh v . Rajcoomar STngh, (1873) ]2Beng.L.R . 373. Also Allahabad,
Jogul KTshore v . $Ktb SahaT, (1883) ILR 5 A ll 430 (FB.).
A fathers ItvTng with his brother and hTs nephews Ts a very common
phenomenon among the Hindus, but to deny a son the rTght to separate from
respect
hTs father and hTs uncles Ts to deny hTm such rTght Tn ^ancestral pro-
tui envi’ScL^ exA- b j V • j s v a . - r c * .
perty^. WhTle no one of the MTtaksara school has denTed a son hTs birthright, 
the Bombay HTgh Court was reluctant to extend Tt to a situation iTke that just 
mentToned.
The classTc case on thTs poTnt was Ap ojT v . Ramchandra,^ Tn whTch
Tt was held that under the MTtaksara law, a son could not sue hTs father and
uncles for a partTtTon of the joTnt famTly propertTes anchor possession of hTs
2
share therein when hTs father was not assenting thereto. The majority decl-
3slon of the fu ll bench Tn Ap <ajt‘s case held sway Tn some areas for a long time,
but ihetase deserves our attention not so much for Its ratio decidendi, but espe-
I
d a ily  for Its remarkable dissenting judgment of Telang, J .,  which contained
- 4tfie correct Interpretation of the MTtaksara.
1 MQOON II D IX  D OO -t-riyufctv 0 p  U w * CASH b e  S ock A f \ f 2 f
• E i  v Air I m  H
2. Criticised by Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrl as: ‘a misapprehension on • . .  
o f the Mltakshara*, A  Treatise on Hindu Law, 7th ed. (Calcutta, 1936),
502-3. J .C . Ghose, the decision ‘was never contemplated by Vljnanes- 
vara‘ , The Principles of Hindu Law, 3rd ed. (Calcutta, 1917), 563. Com- 
mented upon unfavourably by Kane, HD, II I, 570-1. Derrett, the rule ‘ Is 
admittedly bad Mltakshara Iaw‘ , C ritique, £ 204. R.C. Mltra Is uncritical,
Xhe Law o f Joint Property and Partition In British India, TLL, 1895-96,
(Calcutta, 1897), 50, 333. Srlnlvasan‘s projection of the case Is unreliable, 
Hindu Law, III, 1811.
3 . Jlvabhal Vadllal v . Vadlla l, (1905) 7 Bom.LR 232; Bhupal v . Tavanappa,
AIR 1922 Bom .292.
4 . Derrett, Critique, ^204.
The situation Tn Apajt‘s case may be better understood by means of 
the following Illustration:
(FF)
•i
i
S
1 2The joint family consisted of B , B , F and S. S, the p la in tiff sued 
1 2the defendants, B , B and F for apartltlon o f the ancestral property. F did 
not consent to this partition. The Subordinate Judge passed a decree for S 
which was confirmed by the D istrict Judge. On appeal to the Bombay Htgh 
Court, the case was referred to the Full Bench.
The point for decision was:
Under Hindu law applicable to this 
Presidency, (the Satara District In 
this case), can a son In the lifetime 
of his father sue his father and uncles 
for a partition o f the Immovable ancestral 
family property and For possession of his j
share therein the father not assenting thereto?
In the present case, the specific question before tbe Full Bench was whether
such right of the son to parti tTon also exists where the ancestral property Is
2
held In coparcenary by the father In union with his brothers and nephews.
Sergant, C . J. observed that, while It was well-settled In a ll the 
Presidencies that, under the Mltaksara law, a son could claim partition of
1. (1892) ILR 16 Bom 29 at 30, 32.
2. (1892) ILR 16 Bom 29 at 33.
the ancestral properties Inherited by the father whether he assented to I t  or not,
such a right was not available without the consent of the father during the
fathers lifetime In the case of ancestral property held In coparcenary, when
the father was joint with his father or brothers or nephews. ^  The Chief
2
Justice referred to a decision of the Privy Council, In whfch I t  was observed: 
•according to Mltakshara,(Chap.|, Sec.5 , Verse 3), there can be no partition 
directly between grandfather and grandson while the father was a live*. While 
Sargent, C . J. admitted that the observation of the Privy Council was obiter, 
he scrupulously clung to It  as the correct (judicial) meaning of the placltum.
But It seems from his subsequent remarks that hjs Lordship was swayed from the 
Mltaksara on a consideration of public policy.
It Is a familiar situation In India that the ascendants, descendants and
collaterals live together holding property In common. But familiar also Is the
break -up of jo int families, and new families are set up when one or more of the
coparceners realise their shares In a partition. This fusion and fission are ever-
3
changing phenomena of the Htndy way of life . But Sargent, C .J . missed 
this point and observed:
1. (1892) ILR 16 Bom 29, 33.
2. Ral Blshenchand v . M t. Asmalda Koer, (1884) ILR 6 A ll 560 (P .C .), 574 = 
11 IA 164, 179.
3. Subba Ayyar v . Ganasa Ayyar, (1895) ILR 18 Mad 179, 182.
It Ts, moreover, to be remarked that 
Jlequal rtght of ownership of father 
and son Tn property acquired from 
the grandfather” does not necessa­
r ily  Imply a separate and Independ­
ent right by one of the coparceners 
to have that property segregated from 
the joint family estate Tn the hands 
of several lines of coparceners -  and
Indeed, tt Is plain that I f  the son
could assert such right against the 
w ill of the father, the segregation 
might lead to grave practical d lf f l-  
cu Itles • 1
But what the Chief Justice thought o f as a matter of public policy or •practice
2
of the Hindu community*, In fact, emanated from his misunderstanding of the
Mltaksara. This Is apparent when his Lordship remarked that they should not
go beyond the express texts of the Mltaksara considering the ‘feeling* or*prac-
3
tlce*of the Hindu community*. The Chief Justice, like others of his colleagues,
-  -  4analysed the texts In the Mltaksara on partition. The controversial text Tn this
respect runs as follows:
1. (1892) ILR 16 Bom 29 at 36.
2. ILR 16 Bom 29 at 36.
3 . Bayley, J . ,  Candy, J . ,  concurred; Telang, J . dissenting.
4 . adhuna vlbhakte pltaryaw dyamanabhratrke va pautrasya paltamahe dravye
vlbha^o n a s tl/  adhrlyamane pltarl Ityukta tva t/bhavatu  va svarjltavat pltur 
Icchayalvetyasahklta aha -  bhur ya pltamahopatta nlbandho dravyam eva va /  
tatra syat sadrsam svamyam pltuh putrasya calva h i / /  Yajnavalkyasmrtl, 5th 
ed. (Nlmaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1949), 227.
* ‘pltrto bhagakalpana* (Vy.120)
If the father be altve and separate 
from the grandfather, or t f  he have 
no brothers, a partttton of the grand­
father's estate wTth the grandson 
should not take place (1) stnce tt 
has been directed that the shares 
shall be allotted Tn right of the 
father, I f  he be deceased or, ad­
mitting partition to take place, It 
would be made according to the 
pleasure of the father, like a d istri­
bution of his own acquisitions : to 
obviate this doubt the author says —
It Is well known that the ownership 
of father and son Is the same In land 
which was acquired by the grand­
father, or In a corrody or In chattels 
(which belonged to him). (2)
Although Telang, J . could not agree with Colebrooke's rendering of
3
the placltum and favoured Jolly's translation, the fault of misinterpretation
1. Gharpure renders: pautrasya paltamahe dravye vlbhago nastl, as 'the 
grandson would not have a (rlght)to) partition In the grandfather's estate*, 
otherwise he follows Colebrooke closely, Yajnavalkya Smrtl, The Collect­
ion of Hindu Law Texts, II, IV': /Bombay, 1939), 1019.
2 . Tr. Colebrooke, M tta . l.v .3 .
3 . 'Supposing the father to be divided (from his coparceners) or to have no
brothers, shall the estate, which has been Inherited from the grandfather, 
not be divided at a ll with the grandson In that case, because It has been 
directed that shares shall be allotted In right of the father I f  he Is deceased 
(and not otherwise); or admitting partitions to take place (In that case), 
shall It  be Instituted by the choice of the father alone: In order to remove 
the two doubts, which might thus be entertained, the author says.* Julius 
Jo lly, Outlines of an History o f the Hindu Law of Partition, Inheritance and
Adbpltlon, AsContalned In the Original Sanskrit Treatises,TLL, 1883,
(Calcutta, 1885), 125, n . l .
of the text does not Ite with Colebrooke. There ts always a danger tn read- 
Tng a placttum of the Mttaksara tn Isolation. Every text should be seen In 
the light of Vljnanesvara's cardinal principle of birthright and his exiguous 
style of projection. V I j nan es vara, the jurist par excellence, always kept
In mind the opposing view, and never missed a chance to voice It  through 
the lips of the purvapaksln, his Imaginary opponent, with the Intention of 
carrying home to hts readers the final point; and this text also Is an example 
of his Interpretative technique and juridical style which, I f  read Incautiously 
or Tn Isolation, can be a trap to an Inalert reader.
The text Ts a continuation of his comment on the text of Yajnavalkya:
*But among grandsons by different fathers, the allotment of shares Ts according
to the father.*  ^ Vljnanesvara says that the Implication of the text Is this,
that distribution of ancestral property among the grandsons should be per stirpes 
2
and not per capita. To dissipate any possible misunderstanding of this, he
expanded this Interpretation Tn a further paragraph, and posed the possible
doubts which could be raised from his earlier statement. These doubts may
seemingly take the shape of a rule, namely, that there can be no partition at
the Instance of the grandson when the father Is a live , has brothers, and does
not desire partition and, consequently, a son's right of partition Is taken away
3
as tn the case of a fartier's self-acqulslttons. The doubts which may emerge
1. M t ta . I .v . l .
2 . M tta . l.v .2 .
3 . Succinctly explained In Subba Ayyar v . Ganasa Ayyar, (1895) ILR 18 
Mad 179, 181.
from the placttum,  ^ have been explatned by Vtsvesvara Bhatta tn hts Subodhtnt
by contemplattng two sttuattons: (la) when the father ts altve and separated
from hts own father, the grandson ts not entttled to partttton the grandfather's
property. The father, betng separated from the grandfather, cannot get the
grandfather's wealth and, because the father ts survtvtng, the grandson cannot
demand a partttton of hts grandfather's property because the father's presence
2
ts obstructtng the tttle  of the son. (lb ) Agatn, where the grandfather ts 
altve and jotnt wtth hts only son, the father, and although the latter by reason 
of hts betng unseparated obtatns the property, the grandson cannot demand a 
partttton untlaterally from the grandfather because hts own father obstructs hts 
tttle . Therefore, tn etther of these two sttuattons, a grandson whose father ts 
Itvtng does not get a share tn the property of the grandfather wtthout the consent 
of hts father. The father's presence, whether separated or unseparated from 
th e  grandfather, ts constdered as an obstructton to the rtght of hts son tn the 
grandfather's property.
Analogous wtth these two sttuattons ts a thtrd state of affatrs 
wheretn the father ts Itvtng jotn tly wtth hts brothers and nephews. Heiealso 
the presence of the father obstructs the son's tttle  and consequently, he ts not
1. M tta . l.v .3 .
2 . dvarasya ntrudhvatvat: 'as the door ts blocked*, text, J.R. Gharpure, 
ed. The Subodhtnt, The Collectton of Htndu Law Texts, N o.3 , (Bombay, 
1914), 52; It . tb td ., N o .4 , (Bombay, 1930), 132. Cp. Balambhattt, 
151, II. 13-14: tasya satvacca dvara ntrodhena pautrasya pattamaha 
dravya prapty abhavah /
considered entitled to sue hts father and uncle for partttton of the ancestral 
property agatnst the w tll of hts father.
Here, parenthetically, we may mention that Jtmutavahana, to reach 
the same end, took a different stand. He dtd not say that the father, when 
altve, obstructs the rtght of the son, but he satd: *The grandsons and great- 
grandsons whose fathers are altve cannot offer oblattons tn the parva occasions, 
they are not therefore entitled to the estate of thetr grandfather and great­
grandfather respectively.* ^
The rtght answer to these doubts and also to jtmutavahana*s view 
may be found tn the Vtramttrodaya, Mttra Mtsra expressly refutes Jtmutavahana 
by saytng:
Thts, however, ts not acceptable; 
because, tt has been established 
that tn the grandfather's property 
the grandsons also acquire owner­
ship by birth; hence the equality 
of the grandsons* share (wtth a 
son's share) tn the grandfather's 
property ts based upon the autho­
r ity  of the texts, (2) and not found­
ed upon any equitable prtnctple.
For the capacity for presenting 
funeral oblattons ts not alone the 
criterion of the rtght to heritage, 
stnce the younger brothers are 
entitled to heritage, although
1. See Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrt, e d ., V? ramttrodaya, II*t.23a.
2. vacanena ntvartate, Vtramttrodaya, ll. t .2 3 a , Golap Chandra Sarkar
Sastrt, ed ., 35. Cp. loka-prastddham tn the Mttaksara, n . € below, P.S81.
they are not competent to offer obla­
ttons whTle there ts the eldest brother.
And the fttness for presenttng obla­
ttons, (whtch the younger brothers 
have) ts not wanttng tn grandsons too 
(whtle thetr father ts a ltve). 1
2The placttum has two parts , namely, (t) the doubts or objections, 
and (tt) the answer. Vtjnanesvara anticipated these objections, and that ts 
why he put an end to them by ctttng the well-known rule from Yajnavalkya
that tn the property of the grandfather, the ownership of father and son ts
3  _
equal. The key to the paragraph Ites tn the phrase: bhavatu va svarjttavat
pttur tcchayatvetyasahktta aha: whtch he puts tmmedtatel y before quoting
the substantive rule of Yajnavalkya (11.121).
We notice that Vtjnanes'vara never Intended, as Telang, J . rtghtly 
4
observed, to tmpose a restriction on what was considered to be the unquali­
fied and Inherent rtght of a son (coparcener) to demand a partition of ancestral
property. Vtjnanesvara was conscious that, although a son*s co-ownership
5
with father was well-known ( loka-praslddham) and a coparcener^ right to 
demand a partition unassailable, In his own days, as tn our time, the question
1 • Tr. Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrt, The Law o f Inheritance as In the V tra - 
mttrodaya of Mltra Mtsra, (Calcutta, 1879), 91.
2 . M tta . l.v .3 .
3 . Yajn. 11.121.
4 . (1892) ILR 16 Bom. 29, 40.
5 . The Mltaksara, Nlmaya Sagar Press, edn., 227.
882.
of partttton by the son was probably a matter of frequent dtsputes. That ts
why Vtjnanesvara allowed more space for thts and made tt  absolutely clear
that *In such property, whtch was acqutred by the paternal grandfather through
acceptance of gtfts, or by conquest or other means (as commerce, agrtculture,
or servtce), the ownershtp of father and son ts well-known: and therefore,
« 1partttton does take place (vtbhago stt) .* Then he comes back to the text
on computatton of shares, and says that allotment w tll be per sttrpes; but
that does not mean that tn respect of hts rtght a son ts tn any way unequal to 
2
hts father. And, fina lly , he adds that the rtght to demand partttton ts tn
the son and tt ts by hts w tll,  and not by the father*s destre, that the partttton 
3
takes place. So, even though the father ts jotnt wtth hts brothers, a son*s 
general rtght to demand partttton does not a lter. Thts ts borne out by Kane*s 
observatton:
When the son*s rtght of ownershtp by 
btrth tn ancestral property came to 
be recogntsed by such smrtts as that 
of Ya jn .,  tt followed as a logtcaI 
consequence that any person who 
acqutres a rtght by btrth can demand 
partttton and separate possesston of 
hts share at any ttme. 4
Thts was prectsely the vtew of Telang, J . tn hts dtssenttng judgment 
tn ApajtV case but, although Sargent, C. J. acknowledged Telang, J.*s
1. M tta. Ntmaya Sagar Press, ed ., 227; Colebrooke, I .v .5 .
2 . M tta . I .v .6.
3 . M tta . |.v .8.
4 . Kcne, HD, III, 571.
accurate knowledge of Sanskrit,^ he dtd not pay proper heed to hts textual
2
Interpretation the reasons for whTch we have already mentioned.
The erroneous decision of the Bombay Full Bench was followed In
3 4 5 6Bombay, but the High Courts o f Calcutta, Allahabad, Madras, and
7
Patna did not commit the same error and held to the general point that a
Hindu governed by the Mlfaksara law was competent to maintain a suit for
partition of ancestral properties even when his father and grandfather were
both a live . These are old cases and one may wonder why we should devote
space to them In our present study. But as recently as the ‘sixties and
‘seventies, we find that the problem has not diminished In Its vigour.
o
In 1964, the Gujarat High Court followed the majority decision of Apajl*s
1. (1892) ILR 16 Bom 29 at 35.
2 . Supra,
3 . Jlvabhal Vadllal v . V ad lla l, (1905) 7 Bom LR 232; Bhupal v . Tavanappa, 
AIR 1922 Bom 292.
4 . Laljeet Singh v . Rajcoorner Singh, (1874) 12 Beng LR 373; Rameshwar v . 
Lachml (1903) ILR 31 Cal 111; Mussamut Deo Bunsee v . Dwarkanath, 
(1868) 10 WR273.
5 . Jogul Klshore v . Shtb Sahal (1883) ILR 5 A ll 430.
6. Subba Ayydr v . Gandsa Ayyar (1895) ILR 18 Mad 179, 183.
7. Dlgambar Mahto v . Shtb Sahal (1922) ILR 1 Patna 361 obiter at 362.
8. Jaswantlal v . Nlchhabhal, AIR 1964 Guj 283, 287.
case on the point wtth the comment that the rule does not apply to a suit for 
partition by metes and bounds once the father had admitted the son*s right to 
severance of status. *But the problem remains where the father altogether 
denies the right to sever.* ^
Again In 1973, the same matter as In Apajl*s case came for decision 
2
before the Mysore High Court. After a discussion o f the case laws and rele­
vant texts on the problem, the Bench rightly adopted the dissenting opinion 
of Telang, J . The Court observed that ‘ the right o f partltton Is considered
as a necessary Tnctdent of the co-ownership of property by members of a Hindu 
3
jo int famtly*, and hence, as In the present case, *a son during the lifetime of 
the father Is competent to maintain a suit against him and his uncles for parti­
tion of the jo int family properties when the father was not assenting thereto and
4
continued to remain joint wtth his brothers.*
Before the Mysore decision, the question of the rtght of partition of
a coparcener came before the Supreme Court In the case of Puftarangamma v .
5Raganna. The Supreme Court held that *lt Is now a settled doctrine of Hindu 
law  that a member of a joint Hindu family can bring about his separation In 
status by a definite, unequivocal and unilateral declaration of his Intention to
1 • Derrett, Critique, f  204;
2. Devagya Tuldya v . Shtvgya Igya, AIR 1973 Mys 4 .
3. AIR 1973 Mys 4 at 10.
4 . AIR 1973 Mys 4 at 4 .
5. AIR 1968 SC 1018 = (1968) 3 SCR 119.
885 .
separate htmself from the family and enjoy hts share In severalty.1^  The
2
Supreme Court did not examtne the text whtch became a point of debate
3
In Apajl's case, but gave pride of place to the text which confers right of 
partition generally on the son against his father's w il l .
V . Conclusion
Although the observation of the Supreme Court In Puttarangamma's
case generally upholds the right of a son to seek partition from his father, the
4
the tnconrect rule, to the effect that a son may not demand partition against
his father's w ill when the father Is joint w ith an ascendant and collateral,
5passed sub sllentlo and 'nothing less than the overruling of the Bombay case 
by the Supreme Court w ill serve to set us free from this anomaly.* ^
1. AIR 1968 SC 1018 at 1020.
2. M T ta .l.v .3 .
3 . M tta . l.v .8 . The SC also relied on Vtramttrodaya, 11.23; SarasvatT- 
vllasa, 28; Vyavahara-mayukha, IV . ll l .1  • Also earlier SC In Ragha- 
vamma v . Chencamma, AIR 1964 SC 136.
4 . ApajI v . Ramchandra (1892) 16 Bom 29.
5. The assumption of the Mysore Bench, AIR 1973 Mys 4, that the majority 
view In ApdjT's case has by Implication been overruled by the SC In 
Puttarangamma's case Is a misunderstanding of the SC decision.
6. Derrett, Critique, 204.
But, nevertheless, the Supreme Court decision tn Puttarangammc^s
case  ^ has placed the birthright of a son on a firm foundation, and because of
their birthright the coparceners of joint family property have the right to parti- 
2
tlon, the right to restrain alienation by the head of the family exeept for
3 4 5necessity, the right to maintenance and the right of survivorship. A ll
these rights of the coparceners Imply plurality of ownership over the same pro­
perty as opposed to absolute Individual ownership. To examine the valid ity 
of continuation of the joint family property In modern India Is the theme of 
our next chapter.
1. AIR 1968 SC 1018.
2. Derrett, IMHL, ^404. Narayana Prabhu v . Janardhana Malian, AIR
1974 Ker 108.
3. Derrett, IMHL, f  404.
4 . Ib id ., 400-1.
5. Ib id ., f  408. Chhotey Lai v . Jhandey Lai, AIR 1972 A ll 424.
CHAPTER 21
BIRTHRIGHT IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING
1. Character and Incidents of Coparcenary (Juridical Joint Family)
A t the concluding stage of our study, by way of recapitulation, 
but certainly not for the sake of repetition, we should apprise ourselves 
of the character and Incidents of coparcenary (joint famlly/ancestra!) 
property.
The Hindu joint family Is a social, economic and religious unit, 
consisting of a ll males lineally descended from a common male ancestor, 
their wives, unmarried daughters and other dependants. It Is generally 
accepted that, within this wider social unit, the male  ^ descendants from
1. A  female cannot be a coparcener, Jagarnath v. Deputy Director of Con­
solidation, AIR 1977 A ll 176. But statutory extension of coparcenary In­
terest, Hindu Women's Rights to Property A ct, 1937, S .7(2). The S.C. 
opines that the Act ‘clothed her wtth a ll the rights and concomitants of a 
coparcener's Interest' and 'I t  Is fu tile  to contend that the widow couldnot 
be treated . . .  as a member of the Hindu coparcenary . . . ' ,  even though 
'acquisition of Interest by birth , Is wholly wanting In her case*, Controller 
of Estate Duty, Madras v . A llad l Kuppuswamy, AIR 1977 S.C. 2069, f l l . 
But the strict Mltaksara view Is stated by the S .C .: 'A  Hindu female . .  • 
Is not a coparcener because a coparcenary 'Includes only those persons who 
acquire by birth an Interest of the . . .  coparcenary property', Pushpa Devi 
v . Commr. of I .T . ,  New Delhi, (1977) 4 SCC 184, 185. In the light of 
these contradictory opinions of the S .C ., one should also see the earlier 
decisions Satrughan v . Sabujparl, AIR 1967 SC 272; State Bank of India v . 
Ghamandl Ram, AIR 1969 SC 1330, 1333-4.
the common ancestor Tn the male Itne, form the economtc consorttum of
co-owners of the jotnt famtly property, which Is known as the coparcenary.^
To be precise, a Hindu coparcenary comprises only those males who take by
2
birth an Interest In the jo in t, ancestral, or coparcenary property. The 
coparcenary extends up to four degrees of relationship, Including the 
common ancestor for the time being, I .e .  a person himself,
1. On the distinction between Hindu joint family and coparcenary, State 
Bank of India v . Ghamandl Ram, AIR 1969 SC 1330, 1333-4; Babu Lai 
v . Chandrlka Prasad, AIR 1977 NOC 229 (A ll); Pushpa Devi v . Commr. 
of ITT., N ew D elh i; (1977) 4 SCC 184, 185.
2. Surjlt Lai Chhabda v . Commr. of Income-tax, Bombay, AIR 1976 SC 109. 
On Owners of coparcenary Interest other than coparceners, see IM H L,f 9 
412-8.
hts sons, son*s sons and sonfcs grandson.
T he Important feature of the coparcenary ts that every coparcener has 
got an Interest In every parcel of the jo in t family property,^ and since every co­
parcener^ right Is Integrated wtth similar rights of other coparceners, no copar­
cener can claim that he Is the owner of a particular portion o f the property.
This Mttaksara doctrine of samudaylka svatvavada leads to two things. First,
no coparcener can claim a definite or specified share In the property until he
2
exercises hts right to claim a partition. Secondly, a coparcener cannot 
voluntarily transfer any specific portion of the joint family property until and 
unless It ts allotted to him at a partition. Thus, although a coparcener's sub­
stantive right to claim a partition sounds Individualistic, the nature of joint 
family property Is essentially corporate. And this economic consortium Is also 
supposed to be the lifeblood of the social unit of the jo int family as an Institu­
tion.
Thus, a study of the relevancy of birthright or coparcenary property In 
contemporary India, apart from Its juridical aspect Is, o f course, Integrated, 
like many other variables, with an examination of the structural trends of the 
Institution of family among the Hindus.
1. State Bank of India v . Ghamandl Rami, AIR 1969 SC 1330; followed In
Mst. Kashmlra v . The Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1975 A ll 458.
2 . G lrljanandlnl v . Brljendra, AIR 1967 SC 1124, 1127; Commr. o f G ift  Tax, 
Madras v . N .S . G etty Chettlar, AIR 1971 SC 410.
II . Famtly Tn IndTa
a* Traditional pattern of famTly
We need have no hesitation In saying that over the centuries, the
family has been the most Important social unit In India.^ However, despite
2
the existence of sporadic examples of the nuclear family system, the tradi­
tional pattern of living among the Hindus was that of the joint family whose 
members were bound together by ties of common ancestry, common property 
and common worship.3
b. Impact of modernIsdl on
4
Since the nineteenth century, India had significant cultural contact
1. A . Betellle, ‘Family and Social Change In India and Other South Aslan 
Countries*, Economic Weekly Annual, 16 (1964), 237-44.
2 . In this respect, I.P . Desal points out that In India In the past/iuclear 
group did exist *but nuclearlty was not the prevalent pattern of fam ily1,
Some Aspects of Family In Mahuva, (New York, 1964), 40. Also 
Y . Singh, Modernization of Indian Tradition, (Delhi, 1973), 175-6.
3 . Alleen D. Ross, The Hindu Family In Its Urban Setting, (Bombay, 1961), 8 . 
Judicial observation In Appovler v . Rama Subba Alyan, (1886) 11 MIA 75.
4 . The sociological consequences of fifteenth and sixteenth century contact 
with the Portuguese were only marginal, L.S.S. 0*M alley, The Impact of 
European C ivilization*, In L.S .S . O 'M alley, e d ., Modem India and the 
West: A  Study of the Interaction o f their C ivilizations, (London, 1941), 45. 
The Portuguese were followed by the Dutch and the French In the 17th and 
18th century. The British contact with India started In the early 17th cen­
tury but the consolidation of British power was complete only towards the 
end of the 19th century, Y . Singh, o p .c lt . ,  85-6.
with the West. Nineteenth century Western culture was fundamentally d iffer­
ent In Its ethos from the traditional cultural pattern of Hinduism. The pre­
va iling Indian values based on status and hierarchy experienced a confrontation 
with the theoretical equality and Individualistic doctrines of the West. The 
then legal rationalism of the West, recognising a contractual-individualistic 
relationship between man and society, pervaded the Intellectual atmosphere 
o f the Indian elites who found their own legal values Immersed In communal 
and famlllstlc status allocation. Hand In hand with philosophy;and legal 
learning, the Impact of the Industrial revolution began to be fe lt In India 
and the process of urbanisation and Industrialisation commenced. Thusy a I-  J )  
thoughAvlth Independence, India committed herself to modernisation, the / )  
shifting of values In Indian society had already begun with British rule.^
c . Programme of Industrialisation
A programme of Industrialisation, modernisation and development
2 3tsually Involves changes In social organisation and some social scientists
1. M .N . Srlnlvas, Social Change In Modern India, (Berkeley, 1966), 53. 
Gunnar Myrdal, Aslan Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, 
(Pelican, 1968), 1,54. But British attempt of modernisation failed 
to revolutionise Indian society because Government action could attack 
traditional values only on a broad front, J .C . Heesterman, ‘Political 
Modernization In India*, In A .R . Davis, ed ., Traditional Attitudes and 
Modem Styles In Political Leadership, Papers Presented to the 28 Inter­
national Congress of Orientalists, Canberra, January 1971, (Sydney, 1973), 
29-56 at 48-9.
2 . H . Nagpaul, The Study of Indian Society, (New Delhi, 1972), 91,
S .K . Kuthlala, From trad ition to Modernity, (New Delhi, 1973), 20.
3 . W .J . Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns, (Glencoe, 1963), 239. 
Parsons also Relieves that Increasing economic rationality shows an Increase 
In percentage of nuclear families, T . Parsons, The Social System, (Glencoe, 
1951), 182-91.
postulate the general view that Increase In Industrialisation connotes a corre
spondlng Increase In nuclearisation of the familial system. But It Is not axio­
matic that Industrialisation In a ll societies leads to a transition from a joint or 
extended to a nucleated structure of fam ily. In this respect, Peter Laslett puts 
forward a broad observation:
The evidence seems to suggest In fact, 
that the size of the household has tend­
ed to grow rather than shrink with the 
coming of Industrialisation, though Its 
size has fluctuated since. The m ultl- 
generatlonal family of kin living under 
the same roof or In close geographical 
proximity may even be somewhat 
commoner In the contemporary Industrial 
c ity  than It was amongst the peasantry.
Urbanisation, mechanical communica­
tions, the growth of wealth and the In­
crease In the expectation of life may 
actually have strengthened the fami­
lia l tie In some ways and widened the 
network of kinship. 1
1. P. Laslett, The History o f Population and Social Structure1, International 
Social Science Journal, Paris, UNESCO 17 (1965) 4 : 582-93 , 588-9.
Goode also observed: ‘Just how Industrialisation or urbanisation effects 
the family system, or how the family system facilitates or hinders these pro­
cesses, Is not c lear', W .J . Goode, World Revolution and Family Patterns, 
o p .c lt., 1-2. In Japan, the traditional stem family has survived urbantsa- 
tlon. In Turkey also, the factory organisation Is patterned on the traditional 
extended family, Bryce Ryan, Traditional Societies Can Change', In Carle
C. Zimmerman and Richard E. DuWorSp ed. ,  Sociology o f Underdevelopment, 
(Vancouver, 1970), 35-46 at 38-9; Traditional Groups In the Developmental 
Process*, In D. Naraln, ed ., Explorations In the Family and Other Essays, 
Professor K .M . Kapadla Commemoration Volume, (Bombay, 1975), 544-62 at 
551. Traditional social patterns have been well-preserved or even reinforced 
among some migrant groups In the Middle East, V .F . Costello, Urbanization In 
the Middle East, (Cambridge University Press, London, 1977), 106. In Indian 
context, see Ross, o p .c lt., 49-50.
Thus, Tn the Itght of the preceding observation, It cannot be said 
with certainty that Industrialisation Is Incompatible with the joint fam ily.
A t the same time, there Is no denying the fact that the economic pattern of 
India Is changing and, In some spheres, very fast; but India's transformation 
from rural agrarian to urban Industrial economy Is not to ta l. The emphasis 
on agriculture Is no less than on Industry and demographlcally 80% of India 
s till remains mainly rural and agrarian. Thus, In the rural setting there Is no 
visible shift as such of economic balance In favour of a nucleated household.^
d . Change of values
Not Infrequently, social scientists try to explain the perspective of
family In India In terms of abstract and esoteric value considerations. The
2
educated younger generation steeped In modern thought often complains of
the suffocating atmosphere of the joint fam ily. Although a joint family k1s
3
always an exciting group to live In ', one must admit that In the last two decades 
the younger generation, throughout the world, Is absorbing new values. The 
reasons for this development do not appear to be exclusively economic, but are 
largely of a psychological nature. The Vorld-w lde trends of juvenile unrest,
1. But see Infra,9I4-1&*
2 . K .M . Kapadla, Marriage and Family In India, (Bombay, 1966), 291-2. 
Also Cora Vreede-de Stuers, 'Attitude of Jaipur G ir l Students towards 
Family L ife1, In D. Naraln, lo c .c lt . ,  151-62.
3. Irawatl Karve, Kinship Organization In India, (Poona, 1953), 14.
student revolutions and 19th century anarchist revivalism  ^ Illustrate these
trends In Industrial societies, as well as In the ^ -ca lle d  underdeveloped
countries of Asia, A frica , and Latin America. They have a psychological
2
rather than an economic-mechanical physlogonomy*. Indeed, Indian
3
youths have their fair share of this global trend; but the sub-culture of the
younger generation Is not a reliable variable from which to visualise a total
social situation for the simple reason *that those who behave as non-conformists
at their younger age and break away from joint family organisation conform to
the same structural arrangement In the society when they become parents,
4
parents-ln-law, and grandparents.1
1. For an analysts, see Henry Blenen, Violence and Social Change, (Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, Chicago/London, 1968), 66ff.
2. U.R. Ehrenfels, ‘Matrt lineal Joint Family Patterns In India* In G . Kurlan, 
e d ., The Family In India: A  Regional V iew , (Mouton, The Hague, 1974), 
91-106 at 102-3.
3 . S .C . Dube, Contemporary India and Its Modernization, (Delhi, 1974),
112-24.
4 . Ramakrlshna Mukherjee, ‘Family in India*, In D . Naraln, ed ., Explorations 
In the Family and Other Essays,(Bombay, 1975), 1-64 at 51. Also Derrett, 
Critique, pr.19. One should also note that *!f the role-structures grow w ith­
out a concomittant response from values, modernisation may become an Instru­
ment In the hands of the traditionally established power groups to maintain the 
status quo*, Yogendra Singh, ‘H istoricity of Modernisation (A Comparative 
Analysis o f India, (blna and Japan)* in D. Naraln, ed ., Ib id ., 647-62 at 
660. Thus, Irving Louis Horowitz observes that modernity might also rein­
force tradition, Three Worlds of Development, (OUP, New York, 1966), 308.
e. EmpTrTca 1 data
On Contemporary trends Tn famtly structure Tn India, there ts dts-
harmony  ^ among soctal scientists, and thts ts well expressed tn Pauline
Kolenda*s statement concemtng two of the best known Indian soctal anthro-
pologtsts: * . . .  Irawatt Karve suggests that t t  ts the larger or smaller jotnt
famtly that ts the typtcal of India. S .C . Dube, on the other hand, suggests
2
that nuclear famtly or small jotnt famtly ts typtcal.* In consideration of 
tlese disagreements, Atleen D . Ross pertinently observes that *before a defi­
nite trend can be established or predtcted, there ts the necesstty of analysing
3
the many vartables tn the total sttuatton tn whtch each famtly ts found*.
Stnce at thts stage we cannot come to a deftntte conclusion regardtng 
trends tn famtly structure tn Indta, let us see t f  emptrtcal data can be of any 
help. Ftndtngs from some of the soctologtcal and anthropological studies from 
different parts of Indta are gtven overleaf:
1. R. Mukherjee, tb td ., 2.
2 . Paultne M . Kolenda, *Reltgton, Caste, and Famtly Structure: A  Compara­
tive Study of the Indian Jotnt Famtly*, tn M .B. Stnger and B.S. Cohn, ed ., 
Structure and Change tn Indtan Soctety, (Chtcago, 1968), 339-96 at 342.
3 . Atleen D . Ross, The Hindu Famtly tn Its Urban Setttng, (Toronto, 1961), 23. 
Also D .A . Chekkt^ 'Modernization and Soctal Change: The Famtly and Ktn 
Network tn Urban Indta*, tn G . Kurtan, ed ., The Famtly tn Indta: A 
Regtonal Vtew, (Mouton, The Hague, 1974), 205-31 at 206.
(1) (2) (3) W (5)
Province Locatton Proprtton 
of Jotnt 
Families
Proportton 
of Nuclear 
Families
Year
West Bengal Kanchanpur, 
Dtstrtct, Burdwan
39% 61% 1962
n  i t 4 villages, 
Burdwan Dtstrtct
36%,44% 
46%,46%
64%, 56% 
54%, 54%
1959
1964
1965
n  ii Shyambazar 
area, Calcutta
58% 42% 1964
H i i Lake area, 
Calcutta
66% 34% 1964
Uttar Pradesh Thakurs of Sena- 
pur, Jaunpur 
Dtstrtct
74.5% 22.5% 1962
1. T .K . Basu, The Bengal Peasants from Time to Ttme, (New York/Calcutta, 
1962), 89-92"!
2 . Jyottrmoyee Sarma, The NuclearTzatton of Jotnt Famtly Households tn 
West Bengal*, Man tn Indta, 44 (1964), 193-206. L .K . Sen, *Famt!y 
tn Four Indtan Villages’, Man tn Indta, 45 (1965), 1-16. Sen found 
56% nuclear, 38% extended, Tbtd., 5.
3 . J . Sarma, o p .c lt., 193-206.
4 . Ibtd.
5. R.D. Stngh, Famtly Organization tn a North Indtan V illage: A  Study tn 
Change, Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell Untverstty, 1962, cited by P.M. 
Kolenda, *Regtonal Differences tn Indtan Famtly Structure*, tn R .I. Crane, 
ed ., Regtons and Regtonaltsm tn South Astan Studtes: An Exploratory Study,
(Duke Untverstty, Program tn Comparative Studies tn Southern Asta, 1967), 
147-226 at 151, 225.
Province Location Proportion Proportion Year
of Joint of Nuclear
Families Families
Uttar Pradesh Untouchable 34% 66% 1061
Chamars of Sena- 
pur, Jaunpur 
District
”  " Rajputs of Khlala- 51% 49% 1956
pur, Shaharanpur 
District
" ”  Untouchable 44% 56% n .d . ^
Chuhras of 
Khalapur
" ” Sherapur, 56% 44% 1959^
Fyzabad D istrict
u n Slrkanda, Dehra 39% 61% 1963 ^
Dun District 
(In the sub- 
FI Ima Iayas)
1 • B.S. Cohn, *Chamar Family In a North Indian V illage: A  Structural 
Contingent*, Economic Weekly, 12 (1961), 1051-55.
2 . J.T . Hitchcock, The Rajputs of Khalapur: A Study of Kinship, Social 
Stratification and Politics, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell Uni­
versity, 1956, cited by Kolenda, o p .c lt . ,  151, 221.
3 . Kolenda, o p .c lt., undated, 151.
4 . H .A . Gould, Family and Kinship In a North Indian V illage, Unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis, cited by Kolenda, 
o p .c lt . ,  151, 221.
5. G .D . Berreman, Hindus of the . Himalayas, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1963); also ‘ Unpublished field census of 
V illage Slrkanda*, 1963, cited by Kolenda, 151, 218.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Province Location Proportion 
o f Jotnt 
Families
Proportion 
of Nuclear 
Families
Year
Delhi Ram pur 54% 46% 1958 1
u Khatrls of Delhi 
C ity
More than 
28%
Less than 
72%
1965 2
Rajasthan Koma, Jodhpur 
District
57% 43% 1963 3
it Barmer D istrict 
(4 Panchayatl 
Samltl areas)
48% 52%
4
1964
ii Jalore District 47% 53% 1964, 1965,5
Kashmir Pandits (Brahmins) 
Utrassu-Umanagarl, 
Anantanag District
60% 40% 1965 6
1. O . Lewts/ Vtflage Life Tn Northern Indta (Urbana, 11 ItnoTs, 1958), cited 
by Kolenda, o p .c lt., l5 l ,  223.
2 . Kapoor, cited by Kolenda, o p .c tt., 151.
3 . A .B . Bose, S.P. MaIhotra and L.P. Bharara, ‘Socto-Economtc Difference
In Dispersed Dwelling and Compact Settlement Types In Arid Regions*,
Man In India, 43 (1963), 119-30.
4 . S.P. Malhotra and M .L .A . Sen, *A Comparative Study of the Socio- 
Economic Characteristics of Nuclear and Joint Households (II)*, Journal 
of Family Welfare, 11 (1964) 2 :21 -32 .
5. A .B . Bose and P.C. Saxena, *Composltlon of Rural Households In Rajasthan
(Studies In Households III)*, Indian Journal of Social Research, (1964), 299-
308; ‘Composition and Size of Rural Joint Households (Studies In Households 
IV)*, Indian Journal of Social Research, (1965), 30-40; ‘Some Character­
istics ^ FT^ucleain-iousehold^ 45 (1965), 195-200.
6 . T .N . Madan, Family and Kinship: A Study of the Pandits of Rural Kashmir, 
(London, 1965), 72.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Provtnce Location Proportion 
of Jotnt 
Families
Propdrtton 
o f Nuclear 
Families
Year
Madhya,
Pradesh
Ramkhert,
Malwa
41% 59% 1960 1
Gujarat Two htgh school 
classes tn Baroda: 
(I) Homes of Brah­
mtn students 
(tt) Homes of Banta 
students 
(ttt) Homes of 
Pattdar students
42%
37%
62%
58%
63%
38%
1961 2
Maharashtra 
Andhra Pradesh
Badlapur, Thana 
Dtstrtct
Nagpur Dtstrtct
Shamtrpet,
Telangana
*
Tj- 
00 
00 
— 
00
86%
62%
81.5%
1959 3
1963*
1955°
Ortssa Brahmins of Btra- 53% 47% 1956 6
Narastnghapur, 
Purt Dtstrtct
1. Adrian C . Mayer, Caste and Ktnshtp tn Centra! Indta, (London, 1960),
177-83.
2. Savttrt Sahant, The Jotnt Famtly: A  Case Study*, Economtc Weekly,
13 (1961), 1823-28.
3 . W .A . Morrison, ‘Famtly Types tn Badlapur: An Analysts of a Changtng 
Instttutton tn a Maharashtrian V illage*, Sociological Bulletin, 8 (1959), 45-67.
4 . E.D . Driver, ‘Famtly Structure and Socto-Economtc Status tn Central India*, 
Sociological Bulletin, 11 (1962), 112-20.
5. S.C. Dube, Indian V illage , (London, 1955), ctted by Kolenda, o p .c tt.,
152.
6. A . Ray, *A Brahmtn V I Ilage of the Sasana Type tn the Dtstrtct of Purl*,
Ortssa, Man tn India, 36 (1956), 7-15.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Province Location Proportion 
of Joint 
Families
Proportion 
of Nuclear 
Famtltes
Year
Madras Brahmins of Kumba- 
pettal, Tanjore 
District
42% 58% 1956,
ii Paramalal Kallar, 
a sub-llneage of 
Tenalapattl hamlet, 
Madras District
00 92% 1957 2
Mysore Four zones of 
Gokak taluka 
Belgaum District
5 9 %  55% 
66%, 62%,
41%, 45% 
34%,38%
I9 603
ii Untouchable 
Paralhs of Bangalore
24%, 76% 1959 4
Kerala Two census tracts 55%,61% 45%, 39% 1962 5
of AngadT village, 
Ernad taluq, largely 
Nayar Tn caste
1. E. Kathleen Gough, ‘Brahmin Kinship In a Tamil V illage*, American 
Anthropologist, 58 (1956), 826-53; *Caste Tn a Tanjore V illage*, Tn
E.R. Leach, ed ., Apects of Caste In South India, Ceylon and North-west 
Pakistan, (Cambridge, i960), 11-60.
2. Louis Dumont, Une sous-caste de l*lnde du sud, (Mouton, Paris, 1957), 
cited by Kolenda, o p .c lt., 152, 219.
3 . M .G . Kulkarnl, ‘Family Pattern Tn Gokak Taluka*, Sociological Bulletin, 
9(1960), 60-81.
4 . Gertrude Marvin Woodruff, An Adldravlda Settlement In Bangalore, India, 
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Radcllffe College, 1^59, cited by Kolenda, 
o p .c lt . ,  153 , 226.
5 . Joan P. Mencher, ‘Changing Familial Roles among South Malabar Nayars*, 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 18 (1962), 230-45.
From these 34 studtes of the differential TncTdence of joint or nuclear
family types, Pauline Kolenda observes that the rural areas of the Gangetlc
plains have a higher proportion of jo int families than those In Central India,
Maharashtra, Andhra and Madras. It Is also noticeable that In the Gangetlc
plain Itself, joint families are more common among the Rajputs and nuclear
families predominate among the lower castes J  Among the Brahmins of rural
Kashmir, 60% of families are jo in t, and the same Is true for the Brahmins of 
2 3
Orissa, Nayars of Kerala and upper caste Pattldars of Gujarat.
In analysing the factors which could possibly be associated with the
variation In types of families In one region or In one group, Kolenda concludes
that an economic explanation (that the joint family Is a convenient labour pool), 
4
classical Hindu law, caste Identity, ownership of land, or the dominant or
1. Kolenda, o p .c lt., 154.
2. Bailey argues, In his study of an Orlya v /'lage , that expanding non-agrt- 
cultura! employment opportunities caused the partition of joint famlltes,
F .G . Bailey, Caste and the Economic Frontier, (Manchester University 
Press, 1957), 92. However, In the light of recent research on the joint 
fam ily, the opinion does not hold In India as a whole.
3 . But see Kathleen Gough, ‘Changing Household In Kerala*, In D . Naraln, 
e d ., Explorations In Family and Other Essays, o p .c lt . ,  218-67.
4 . Kolenda, o p .c lt., 165. The Thakurs of Senapure and Ramkherl follow the 
Benares School of the Mltaksara law, A .C . Mayer, Caste and Kinship In 
Central India, o p .c lt., 242. But Thakur brothers never demand a partition 
of family land during thelrfather's lifetime, and even after the father*s death 
they seldom divide, R .D . olng, Family Organisation In a North India 
V illage, o p .c lt., cited by Kolenda, o p .c lt . ,  165. In Ramkherl, however, 
some break-up seems to occur during the father's lifetime, Mayer, o p .c lt . ,  
179-81; 241.
subservient status of castes have no causal assoctatton wtth a preponderance of 
jotnt family types.
Subsequent to KoIenda*s compilation, a few more studies throw some
light In this direction. Gore, tn his study of 494 Agarwal families of the
Haryana area, found that his sample as a whole conformed to the joint family
pattern.^ In this respect, Jogtnder Kumar‘s study of rural Mltaksara Is also
Interesting. The data from 50 villages In Madras, Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and
Rajasthan,showed that both jo int and nuclear families existed In equal propor-
2
tlons In these rural areas. The study Indicates that In the Southern state of
Madras about 60% families are nuclear; the developed region of the Delhi
3 *n
area has 57% nuclear families, w h ll^U tta r Pradesh 42% of the families are
of this type. Jurisprudentially, I t  may be of some significance that, In North
India, the nuclear families emerge from the break-up of existing joint families;
but In the Southern part of India the tradition appears to be the establishment
4
of a separate nuclear home shortly after marriage.
1. M .S. Gore, Urbanisation and Family Change, (Bombay, 1968), 232,
2. J . Kumar, ‘Family Structure In the Hindu Society of Rural India1, In 
G . Kurlan, e d ., The Family In India: A  Regional V iew, (Mouton, The 
Hague/Paris, 1974), 43-74.
3 . Ghosh In his study of Naralna, a village 14 miles from Delhi, found 0% 
to 60.9% Increase In nuclearisation, although until today only a minority 
o f the families In the village are nuclear. However, the village being 
surrounded by the c ity  of Delhi, the study cannot be considered as sympto­
matic of a general trend In rural areas, B.R. Ghosh, ‘Changes In the Size 
and Composition of the Household brought about byUrbanlzatlon In Delht 
Area*, In G . Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, Io c .c lt . ,  249-61, 250, 260-1.
4 . J . Kumar, Io c .c lt. , 70.
Dan Chekkt, Tn hts study of 230 urban famtltes of Kalyan and Gokul
Tn the dTstrTct of Dharwar, Mysore, found that the frequency of nuclear famt-
iTes and extended famTlTes was almost the same.^ But Tt would be fallacTous
to argue from thts study that urbanTsatTon Ts leadTng to stereotyped nucleartsa-
tTon. ChekkT concludes that ‘the nuclear famTly far from beTng Tsolated and
atomTzed,Ts organTcally fused wTth the extended kTn network. Both nuclear
and non-nuclear famTlTes Tn the cTty maTntaTn close tTes wTth a wTde range of
2
blood and affTnTal relatTves, 1 Among a ll the ethnTc groups Tn Palakkara,
Central Kerala, Kathleen Gough also notTced only a partTal transTtTon to 
3
nuclear households.
As a study of the Tnfluence of TndustrTalTsm on the typology o f the 
famTly, MTlton Stnger*s research on a group of successful TndustrTalTsts Tn 
Madras cTty Ts worth nottng. He found from hTs sample that whTle there were 
strTkTng changes wTthTn three generatTons Tn resTdentTal, occupatTonal, and edu- 
catTonal factors, as well as socTal mobTlTty, and rTtual observances, these changes 
had not transformed the tradTtTonal joTnt famTly structure Tnto atomTsed nuclear 
unTts. STnger notTced that urban and TndustrTal members of a famTly were matn- 
taTnTng numerous tTes and oblTgatTons wTth extended kTn, geographTcally dtstrT-
1. D .A . Chekkt, *ModernTzatTon and SocTal Change: The FamTly and KTn Net­
work Tn Urban IndTa1 Tn G . KurTan, e d ., FamTly Tn Indta, o p .c tt., 205-31
at 216.
2. Ib td ., 226.
3. K. Gough, *ChangTng Households Tn Kerala*, Tn D . NaraTn, e d ., o p .c tt., 
218-67 at 264, 267.
903.
buted.^ HTs sample stgntftcantly shows a structural congruence between jotnt
famtly organtsatton and the organTsatton of tndusfrtal ftrms, tndtcattng symptoms
of the emergence of a modtfted jotnt famtly wtthtn the urban and tndustrtal 
2setttng.
But Singer's ftndtngs from the Madras sample are no safe gutde to 
postulate a general proposttton that bustness ftrms can be smoothly run as jotnt 
famtly concerns.
In a more dffused study, A llan Cohen found that tn seven out of etght
bustness and tntergenerattonal famtltes, there was sharp tnter-role confltct be-
3
tween famtly roles and bustness roles of the members. The author concludes
that the charactertsttcs of the tradtttonal Indtan famtly are tn many ways dtffer-
4
ent from the charactertsttcs expressly destred for bustness enterprtses and the 
prescrtbed famtly roles of the members are htndrances to a coordtnated poltcy
1. Mtlton Stnger, *The Indtan Jotnt Famtly tn Industry*, tn M .B . Stnger and 
B.S. Cohn, ed ., Structure and Change tn Indtan Soctety, (Chtcago, 1968), 
423-52 , 443-7. Also Mtlton Stnger, Mnbroductton : The Moderntzatton o f 
Occupational Cultures tn South Asia*, tn M . Stnger, ed ., Entrepreneurship 
and Moderntzatton of Occupational Cultures tn South Asta, (buke Untverstty 
Program tn Comparative Studies on Southern Asta, 1973), 1-15 at 11.
2 . The adapttve restltency of the jotnt famtly has also been shown by earlter 
research, K .M . Kapadta, Marrtage and Famtly tn Indta, 2nd ed ., (Bombay, 
1958), c h .12.
3 . A .R . Cohen, Tradttton, Change and Confltct tn Indtan Famtly Business, 
(Mouton, The Hague/Parts, 1974), 297-99.
4 . Ib td ., 4 .
904.
and growth o f the business organisation.
2
Contrary to the observations of Kumar, Chekkl and Singer, Kaldate's 
3
and DriverX studies Indicate that urbanisation Is associated with a high Incid­
ence of nuclear families. But, again Kaldate's and DriverX findings are not
4 5supported by those of Desal and Kapadla.
There Is fa irly  general agreement that among the land-owning classes 
there Is a relatively high proportion of jo in t families,^ but s till there Is no
1. Ib id ., 297-99. Mortis criticises Singer's thesis and states that 'as the 
scale of private enterprise grows In South Asia, the business firm w ill 
cease looking, as It does now, like a legal fiction behind which the joint 
family operates. The great new enterprises w ill take on more of the Im­
personal character that we know In the West.' He adds: This Is not to 
Imply "convergence11 In any declstve way. The modem corporate form 
w ill take on a more Important role, but joint families w ill s till continue to 
be a major device through which new firms w ill appear. The very wealthy 
great entrepreneurial families w ill continue to play Important roles In the 
activities of the Impersonal corporations, as wealthy families s till do In 
North Atlantic enterprises', M .D . Morris, *Economlc Change and Occupa­
tional Cultures In South Asia: Comments on Ames, Owens and Singer', In 
M . Singer, e d ., Entrepreneurship and Modernization . . .  , o p .c lt . ,  287-301 
at 296.
2. S.S. Kaldate, 'Urbanisation and Disintegration of Rural Joint Family',
Sociological Bulletin, 9 (1961), 108-10.
3 . E. Driver, Differential Fertility  In Central India, (Princeton, 1963), 43-44.
4 . I.P . Desal. , Some Aspects of Family In Mahuva, (New York, 1964), 40.
5. K .M . Kapadla, 'Rural Family Pattern: A  Study In Urban-Rural Relationship*, 
Sociological Bulletin, 9 (1956) 2: 119.
6 . This Is also evidenced In Gujarat, Hemalatha Acharya, *Some Possible Vari­
ations In Family Types In Gujarat*, In G . Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, 
o p .c lt., 179-90. Epstein, In her study of two Mysore villages, suggests that 
the development of a cash economy, necessarily leads to the break-up of joint 
families, Scarlett Epstein, Economic Development and Social Change In South 
India, (Manchester University Press, 1962), 178.
dearth of contrary evidence. The Paramalat Kaliars of Tengalapattl, tn Madras,
own land and are dominant caste In the v illage, yet they have only 8%  jo int
families.^ The Rajputs of Slrkanda, who also own lands, have jo in t families 
2
only In 39% cases.
Irawatl Karve generalised In the 1 sixties that the conjugal, or nuclear,
family was becoming the normal pattern even though sentiment and moral values
continue to play a role In the fam ilia l Institutions of the Hindus. She observed
that: * . . .  there Is no doubt that even In rural areas the jo int fam ily as depicted
3
In Indian scriptures and law books Is disappearing.* In the Seventies In the 
same vein, social scientists are saying:
But one must not lose sight of the fact 
that even though nuclear families are 
on the Increase, . . .  these nuclear 
families cannot live In Isolation w ith­
out active co-operation and contacts 
with extended k in . . . .  It may be
stated as a general conclusion that In 
India the traditional extended famtly 
s till exists as a functional unit In most 
ways except resldentlally. 4
1. Kolenda, o p .c lt., 152. It should be noted that among the Pramalal
Ka liars, the sons Inherit after the death of their father, Kolenda, o p .c lt., 
165.
2. Kolenda, o p .c lt., 151.
3. I. Karve, *The Family In India* In B .N . Varma, ed ., Contemporary India, 
(London, 1964), 47-58 at 57.
4 . K. Ishwaran, *The Interdependence of Elementary and Extended Family*, In
G . Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, o p .c lt., 163-77at 176-7.
ThTs leaves us wtth Dube's observatton that:
the traditional typology of simple, com­
pound and extended famtly does not accu­
rately f t t  the norms of famtly organtzatton 
met wtth tn Indta. A t one potnt of ttme , 
the stze and actual composttton of a 
famtly often denotes only a parttcular 
stage tn tts development cycle. Stmple 
famtltes grow tnto extended famtltes and 
then break up tnto stmple famtltes agatn 
. . .  Perfect three genera tton extended 
famtltes are rare, and not many stmple 
famtltes can rematn techntcally stmple 
for a long pertod. 1
f .  Evaluatton of emptrtcal survey
2 3Desat and Mukherjee are among those who are of the vtew that the
jotnt famtly tn Indta ts as tmportant today as ever. Desat exposes the fallacy
of tnferrtng that there ts a rtstng tnctdence of nucleartsatton but, additionally,
concedes that the co-restdent and commensal ktn groups rr^ be nuclear but
* jotnt famtly'-wtse tntegratton ts matntatned among those untts whtch are tdentt
4
fted as components of a jotnt structure. Ramakrtshna Mukherjee also, has
1. S .C . Dube, 'Men and Women's Roles tn Indta: A  soctologtcal Revtew*, 
tn Barbara E. Ward, ed ., Women tn New Asta, (UNESCO, 1963), 177.
2 . I,P . Desat, 'Syjnpostum on Caste and Jotnt Famtly: An Analysts', Socto- 
logtcal Bulletin, 4 (1955) 2: 97-117.
3 . R. Mukherjee, 'Indian Tradttton and Soctal Change*, tn T .K .N . Unntthan, 
e ta l .  e d ., Towards a Soctology o f Culture tn Indta, (New Delht, 1965), 200.
4 . I.P . Desat Some Aspects of Famtly tn Mahuva, o p .c tt . ,  25-7, 40 f f .  
However, Desat admtts that the whole Issue needs re-thtnktng and further 
research, 'A  Note on the Famtly Research tn D. Naratn, ed ., Explorations 
tn Famtly and Other Essays, o p .c tt., 65-8. The S.C. rightly dissented 
from the rule tn McIntyre v. Harcastle (1848) 1 A ll E.R.696 on the ground 
that the structure of soctal Itfe tn Indta *ts not based on pure tndtvtdualtsm', 
Srt Ram Pasrtcha v . Jagannath, (1976), 4 SCC 184, 188.
modified his views la te ly . He observes:
The data available on variations In 
family structure In India are sparse 
and sporadic. They cannot give a 
precise estimate of the relative Incid­
ence of the nuclear and joint families 
In India as a wholle. Nevertheless, 
they suggest that an appreciable num­
ber of nuclear families, as co-resident 
and commensal kin groups, Is to be 
found almost anywhere In India. 1
However, although a considerable number of nuclear families are noticed
In the foregoing surveys, this need not necessarily lead us to believe that there
2Is a definite trend from jointness to nuclearisation, or that, In a certain year 
In future, a ll families w ill turn Into nuclear families. First, In most cases, we 
do not have sufficient empirical data regarding the situation prior to these 
studies. Secondly, It Is fallacious to assume that there was no existence of 
nuclear families In classical and medleaval India. Indeed, variations In
3family structure must have existed In those days. Although sastrlc literature
points to a multlgeneratlonal joint family, there existed a number of ‘non Aryan
4
groups, subject to different laws, among whom the faml I y was not joint*.
1. R. Mukherjee, ‘Family In India', In D . Naraln, ed ., Explorations In Family 
and Other Essays, o p .c lt., 46.
2 . The Code of C iv il Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act. 104) envisages and 
recognises both nuclear and joint family and does not Interfere with the con­
cept of ’’family" In any personal law for the time being In force, a new Order 
XXXI1A, rule 6, a-e. A Hindu undivided family Is a juristic person, rule 10.
3 . R. Mukherjee, ‘Family In India*, In D. Naraln, o p .c lt., 52.
4 . Derrett, *The History of the Juridical Framework of the Joint Hindu Family*, 
Contributions to Indian Sociology, VI (1962), 20-21, 24.
A comparison of the dimensions of the household In pre-Brltlsh India
with that of modem India, also does not Indicate that the trend Is towards
definite nuclearisation.^ Henry Orensteln noticed that there had been a
slight Increase In the average size of the household from 1867 census to that 
2
of 1951. The preceding observations show that playing the numbers game 
of counting the structural character o f families In a particular region or 
regions tn India Is no safe guide to lead to the conclusion that the trend of 
family organisation Is proceeding one way or the other.
The Joint family Is a way of life ; It Is also a concept -  a constella­
tion of values; and so long as our value system does not change, the joint 
famtly as a norm w ill retain Its Identity; and so I t  has done until today.
To discern the overall societal values of the Hindus, Isolated demographic 
study Is Inadequate. In addition to demographic studies, one must study 
the subjective expectations Hindus have of family life , and In this respect, 
Orensteln and M lcklln  observe that for the last 2,000 years, Joint family
3
life  was not merely an Ideal but a cogent actuality of the Hindu way of life 
and this, even today, Is bome out by the attitude of the Hindus towards family
1 • A .M . Shah, ^Changes tn the Indian Family: An Examination of Some 
Assumptions*, Economic and Political Weekly, Annual Number, January 
1968, 12 7 -3 4 ^1 3 7 :
2. H# Orensteln, *The Recent History of the Extended Family In India1, 
Social Problems, 8 (1961) 4: 41-50.
3 . H . Orensteln and M . M lck lln , *The Hindu Joint Family: The Norms and 
the Numbers*, Pacific Affairs, 39 (1966-67), 314-25 at 315, 325.
structure and relationships.^
However, Itfe tn Indta ts becoming tncreastngly secularised and 
materialistic and due to social mobility, Interpersonal relationships are be­
coming more and more functionally specific and In large cities In particular,
traditional social Institutions for maintaining cultural patterns are changing
2
rapidly, and new modes of living and working are emerging. It remains 
questionable whether the joint family w ill be able to absorb modernity within 
Itself, or whether these new forces w ill pave the way for the development of 
a quasl-joint family or an elementary family beybetter suited for the day.
I l l , Change In Family Structure and Birthright
Birthright Is the genesis of coparcenary property, on which the econo­
mic structure of the jo int family rests. The concept also Ideally suits m ultl- 
generatlonal jo int families. At this point, one may argue that I f  there Is a 
visible trend towards nuclearisation, birthright Is an anathema In the social 
context. But we cannot afford to forget that In Its legal context the definition
1. Attitude study reveals that joint family Is s till the cultural Ideal, I.P . 
Desal, Some Aspects of Family tn Mahuva, o p .c lt . ,  167. Kapadla, 
Marriage and Family In India, (O .U .P ., 1959), 261. R. Owens, 
‘ Industrialization and the Indian Joint Family*, Ethnology, 10 (1971) 2: 
223-50 at 243. K. Ishwaran, The Interdependence of Elementary and 
Extended Family1, In G . Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, o p .c lt . ,  
163-77 at 168-9.
2 . H . Nagpaul, The Study of Indian Society, o p .c lt., 106.
of joint family Is specialised. Birthright may operate even within the
2
nuclear ‘household* of sociological conception. For example, a father
and an unmarried son, or a widow and her unmarried son are sufficient to
constitute a juridical, joint fam ily. Despite the popular legal definition
o f joint fam ily, namely, that It should be *jotnt In food, worship and 
3
estate*, It does not necessarily Imply that In practice the jurid ical joint
4
family should always conform to this defin ition . Thus, a son with his
own conjugal unit or part of his conjugal unit, may live separately from his
5father, nevertheless they can continue to be members of the coparcenary.
1. A .M . Shah, ‘Changes In the Indian Family: An Examination of Some 
Assumptions*, o p .c lt . ,  131; also The Household Dimension of the Family
In India: A  Field Study In a Gujarat V illage and a Review of Other Studies, 
(Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1973), 119. Also Bhlm Singh v . Ratnakar, 
AIR 1971 O rl. 198, 200.
2 . Shah, Ib id ., 131. G ow ll Buddamma v . Commr. of I .T . ,  Mysore, AIR 
1966 SC 1523; N .V . Narendranath v . Commr. Wealth Tax, (1969) 1 
SCWR 1182 = (1969) 2 SCJ 727; Slta Bal v . Ramchandra, AIR 1970 SC 
343. Derrett, Critique, £80.
3 . Nee Ik Ts to v . [feerchunder, (1869) 12 MIA 523.
4 . Even Christians could be members of a Hindu coparcenary, see Srldharan v. 
Commr. of Wealth Tax, AIR 1970 Mad 249, for a study of the case, Derrett,
at 1970 2 MLJ, 1-8.
5. *Even I f  the members live apart and never correspond they may s till be joint 
. . . * ,  Derrett, IMHL, f  397. In Gujarat Hemalatha Acharya observes that 
the jo in t family type that Is currently In vogue Is the type where property Is 
jo int but residence separate, *Some Possible Variations In Family Types In 
Gujarat*, In G .  Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, o p .c lt . ,  179-90, at 181. 
Also see Kathaperuma! v . Rajendra, AIR 1959 Mad 409.
A ll these factors Indicate that we cannot say with certainty that birthright Is 
to ta lly Incompatible with nuclearisation; at the same time, we cannot say 
either that blrthrlghtls the life  blood essential to the survival of the socio­
logical joint fam ily. Joint families have survived In Assam and Bengal w ith­
out the Incidence of b irthright. Thus trends In the structural modification of 
the sociological family are not the only criteria for continuation or abolition 
of the concept of birthright; the justification for either should also be sought 
elsewhere, preferably In the national mood, the economic situation and the 
policy of the government toward property vts-a-vls the family and the Ind iv i­
dual.
However, It must be reiterated that birthright Is congruous only with 
collateral and three or four generational jo int families where the proprietary 
Interactions operate between the adult male members only. In a nuclear 
family of a father and his minor sons, birthright may technically exist but that 
does not substantially warrant Its continuation. In nuclear families, the reten­
tion of birthright as a fetter to the power of the father In dealing with property 
Is simply recognition of one of the disadvantages of joint families. It Is better,
I submit, for the minor sons to be left to the care of the father for their w e ll­
being than to their legal co-ownership In the family property.
IV . Economic realities
According to its legal deftnttton a joint family implies jo in t holding 
of estates; but legal scientists sometimes overemphasis®this fact of jo int holding^ 
which is not always warranted by economic facts. A  jo int family may not 
have any property worth mentioning and *in a considerable number of cases 
there is nothing to share except debts.*  ^ Aileen Ross points out that ‘eco­
nomic factors have probably been the main determinant o f the increasing num­
ber of family separations, for the inab ility  of the land to support the growing
population has forced many sons to leave home to seek their livelihood in the 
2
growing c itie s .1
Today, the exalted notion of joint family as a unit of production and 
consumption is valid only in respect of a minority. The vast mass of people 
who live below the poverty Itne may not have been of concern to the lawyers 
and the courts, but certainly, while engaging in law reform, this is a matter 
for the legislature to take note o f.
Empirical data show that in 1955-56, 86% of the population had 
per capita annual income of less than Rs. 360 (approximately £24-00) and 69%
1 • B. Shivaramayya, Towards a Secular Concept of Family*, in T . Mahmood, 
ed ., Family Law and Social Change, (Bombay, 1975), 145-67 at 162.
2 . Aileen D . Ross, The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting, o p .c it . ,  41.
1 2 less than Rs. 240. According to Ojha, the poor constituted 51.8% of
the rural population and In 1967-68 this rose to 70%. In Pranab Bardhan‘s
study the rural poor figure as: 38% In 1960-61, 44.6% In 1964-65, 53%
In 1967-68. While Bardhan, like Ojha, has observed an upward trend In
4
rural poverty, Mtnhas noted some decline: 52.4% In 1956-57, 46% In
1960-61, 39.3% In 1964-65, 37.1% In 1967-68. Midway between these
two trends, Dandekar and Rath observed that poverty In the rural and urban
areas has been constant over the years with 40% of the population remaining
5
below the poverty line. On the total economic situation of the population 
Dube remarks:‘Between the affluent (less than 5 per cent) and those below the 
poverty line (approximately 40 per cent), there Is the nebulous middle class. 
This deceptive label hides more than It reveals. A  sizeable part of It Is
1. Report of the Committee on Distribution of Income and Levels of Living, 
(1964), Part 1, 10-12, 22-24; rpt. L .M . Sanghvl, ed ., Law and Poverty: 
Cases and Materials, (Bombay, 1973), 10-14 at 12.
2 . P.D. Ohja, *A Configuration of Indian poverty: Inequality and Levels of 
L iving1, Reserve Bank o f India Bulletin, 24 (1970) 1: 16-27; rp t., Sanghvl, 
lo c .c lt . ,  4-8 at 7.
3. P.K. Bardhan, ‘On the Minimum Levels of Living and the Rural Poor1,
Indian Economic Review, 1 (1970), 129-36.
4 . B.S. Mlnhas, ‘Rural Poverty, Land Distribution and Development Strategy1, 
Indian Economic Review, 1 (1970), 97-128.
5. V .M . Dandekar and N . Rath, Poverty In India, (Economic and Political 
Weekly, Bombay, 1971). A ll these studies defined ‘poverty line* In terms 
of either a minimum monthly per capita expenditure of Rs.15 to 20 (approxi­
mately, £1-00) at 1960-61 prices or of a minimum calory requirement of 
2,250 units.
margtnally above the poverty line, but Tts security Ts extremely precartous.1 ^
According to o ffic ia l estimates as these stood In 1972, 40% o f the people In
2
India were living below the poverty line.
The general economic condition certainly has Influence on the compo­
sition of the household. The National Sample Survey defined •household1 as 
a group of persons usually living together and taking their principal meals from 
a common kitchen, and the observations of the Survey on such households and
their sizes are Instructive In the context of the reform of family law. The
Survey reveals:
In the rural area a little  more than 
68 per cent of the households did 
not possess more than two rooms, 
and In the urban area thts percent­
age was a little  more than 69.
Households possessing from three 
to six rooms account for 29 per 
cent In the rural sector and about 
27 per cent In the urban sector 
where the majority of the house­
holds, 58.45 per cent In the rural 
area and 51.51 per cent In the 
urban area, had three to six mem­
bers. Among the six Population 
Zones It was observed that In the
1. S.C. Dube, Contemporary India and Its Modernization, (Vikas Publish­
ing House, Delhi, 1974), 6.
2 . Indian Express, Delhi, 17 August 1972, p .5; quoting Mohan Dharla, the 
then Minister of State for Planning. The recent trend Is also not encourag 
Ing, The Measurement of Indian Poverty, 1950-1980, Indian Institute of 
Public Opinion Quarterly Report, October 1968, 15, 36, rp t., Sanghvl, 
o p .c lt., 8-10.
three rural zones, namely, South 
• . .  West . . .  and Central India . . .  
the percentage of households posses­
sing one room was higher than Ine 
the other three zones, namely,
North . . .  East . . .  and North-West 
India . . .  In the first three zones, 
this percentage was of the order of 
42 and In the other three zones It 
varies from 25 to 34. The crowding 
In one room accommodation In big 
clfles like Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi 
and Madras, was s till worse than In 
either small or big towns. In these 
cosmopolitan cities, about 65 per 
cent of the households lived In one 
room whereas about 36 to 38 per 
cent of the households In small and 
big towns possessed the same type 
of accommodation • 1
Let some sociologists say what they may; what joint family can sur­
vive or flourish In such households?
By way of furnishing these statistics, It Is not our Intention to highlight
the poverty of India, nor do we suggest that during the classical, Islamic or
British periods the masses were better off than they are today. What we do
2
suggest Is this, that law, or the Visible symbol1 of the Invtstble fact of
1. The National Sample Survey, Eleventh Round, August 1956 -  January
1957, No.51 (The Cabinet Secretariat: Government of India), 6 . Urban 
factors such as restricted housing space considerably affect family size,
S .K . Kuthlala, From Tradition to Modernity, (New Delhi, 1973), 83.
2. Emile Durkhelm, The Division of Labor In Society, (Illino is, Free Press, 
1947), 64.
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soctal soltdartty Tn a society^ must reflect the actual way of Itfe of the masses; 
and, Tn thTs respect, economTc realTtTes should be taken Tnto consTderatTon Tn 
any prospectTve reform of the law of property.
V . Government PolTcy
a. FamTly plannTng
The socTal objectTve of the government Ts the control of the popuIatTon; 
explosTon and *the ultTmate object Ts to see that the Tdea of a small famTly be­
comes a way o f iTfe for the people.*  ^ In hTs fTeld research, KuthTala sTgnT-
fTcantly found that 69.9% of the TndustrTal workers, and 66% of the agrTcultural
2
w o r k e rs  a p p r o v e d  th e  g o v e r n m e n t  p ro g r a m m e  a d v o c a tT n g  s m a l le r  fa m T lT e s .
Also, Tn the same study, 67% of the agrTcultural workers and 70.3% of the
TndustrTal workers showed a strong desTre to have a famTly of only 3-4 chTldren.
However, the success of bTrth control devTces Ts more vTsTble among the educated
3
and economTcally w e ll-o ff TndTvTduals than among other vTlIagers. Moreover, 
those that practTce bTrth control often only postpone theTr famTlTes by thTs means.
b . Land reform
BTrthrTght envTsages collectTvTty of property wTthTn the famTlTal organT- 
satTon, but the land reform legTsIatTon Tn IndTa shows a trend towards dTvTsTon of
1. Report of the Small FamTly Norm Committee, (1968), Para ,432.
2 . S .K . KuthTala, op.cTt., 84.
3 . Ib id ., 85.
jo in t famTly holdings and co-operative farming on non-tradltlonal lines. ^
Land reform policies, like the land celling laws, are providing a powerful
legal force for the disintegration of the joint fam ily. The land reform laws
2
enacted In the states have fixed ceilings In agrTcultural holdings. O rlg l-
l
nally, the ceilings were Imposed on the holdings of Individuals, but lately 
they are Imposed on family holdings. To make the provisions of this legis­
lation equitable the need for a definition of •family* arose which, Tn fact,
1. U.R. von Ehrenfels, ‘Matrlllneal Joint Family Patterns In India*, In G . 
Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, o p .c lt., 91-106 at 91. On land 
distribution and land celling legislation, see G . Myrdal, Aslan Drama, 
(Pelican, 1968), II, 1316-18. On co-operative farming Tn India, see
D.R. G adgll, ed ., Report of the Committee on Direction of Cooperative 
Farming, Ministry of Community Development and Cooperation, Govern­
ment o f India, (New Delhi, 1965). 5 .K . Goyal, Some Aspects o f Co- 
operatTve Farming In India, (London, 1966). H . Laxmlnarayanan and 
K. Kanungo, Glimpses of Cooperative Farming In India, (London, 1967).
2 . Madhya Pradesh Celling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960; The Madras 
Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceilings on Land) Act, 1961; The Gujarat Agri­
cultural Land Ceilings A ct, 1960. Some of these Acts were struck down 
by the SC on the ground that *celllng* was offending the equality clause 
of the Constitution, Karlmbll Kunhlkoman v . State of Kerala (1962) SCJ, 
510; A .P . Krlshnaswaml Naldu v . State of Madras, (1965) 1 SCJ 239.
The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, furnished a blanket 
protection to the legislation relating to celling on agricultural holdings. 
Also see, t f .C .L .  M erllla t, ‘Abstract of Law and Land Reform Tn India*, 
Law and Society Review, 3 (1968) 2 and 3: 295-300.
envtsages a nucleated unTt as opposed to the tradtttonal joint fam ily. The 
Congress Working Committee proposed that a family unit for purposes of the 
land celling should be husband, wife and three minor children, and In 1972, 
the then Minister for Planning, defending this proposal, pointed out that under 
Hindu law a person was entitled to a share Tn the ancestral property and that 
the definition of family was changed In order to eliminate the possibility o f a 
Hindu joint famTly unit getting greater privileges Tn the matter of land celling 
as compared to other communities.^
By way of Illustration, we may consider the definition of a famTly unit 
Tn the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceilings on Agricultural Holding) A c t, 
1972. Section 3(f) o f the Act defines a ‘ family unit* as follows:
(1) In the case of an Individual who 
has a spouse or spouses, such Ind iv i­
dual, the spouse or spouses and their 
minor sons and their minor unmarried 
daughters, I f  any; (11) Tn the case of 
an Individual who has no spouse, such 
Individual and his or her minor sons 
and unmarried minor daughters; ( ill)
Tn the case of an Individual who Is a 
divorced husband and who has not re­
married, such Individual and his minor 
sons and unmarried minor daughters, 
whether Tn his custody or not; and 
(Tv) where an Individual and his or 
her spouse or both are dead, their 
minor sons and unmarried minor 
daughters.
1. Sunday Standard, Delhi, 9 July 1972, p .7.
Explanation: Where a minor son Is 
married, his wife and their offspring 
I f  any, shall also be deemed to be 
members of the family unit of which 
the minor son Ts a member. 1
The celling area, as provided In the Act Is, Tn the case of a family
unit, consisting of not more than five members, one standard holding. If
there are more than five members, an additional extent of one-fifth o f a
standard holding for each member Ts allowed, but under no circumstances can
2
a family unit hold more than two standard holdings.
Apart from the definition of ‘family un it1, which Ts equated with the
nuclear fam ily, the provisions o f the land ceilings legislation Tn general have
Influenced the Joint family system. For example, to safeguard against the
3
possible evasion of the law, partitions, like transfers, have been Invalidated,
1. Cp. the definition of ‘family* In the Finance Act, 1975, s.3 , Amendment 
to s. 10 of the Income Taxt A ct, 1961: *” famlIyM Tn relation to an Ind iv i­
dual, means -  (1) the spouse and children of the Individual; and (11) the 
parents, brothers and ststers of the Individual or any of them,wholly or 
mainly dependent on the Individual.*
2 . In the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, as amended, celling area of any 
family could never exceed more than twenty acres Tn extent, C h . ll l,
s .82(c) and explanation 2 .
3. See the Kerala Land Reforms Act of 1963, as amended, s.84. U.P. 
Zamlndarl Abolition and Land Reforms Act (1 of 1951), s. 18: the ordinary 
rule of Hindu law that the manager of the family can transfer family pro­
perty for legal necessity does not apply. There Is no provision In the Act 
that one of the co-Bhumldars can transfer more than his own share, Bhawanl 
Prasad v . Ram Deo, AIR 1975 A ll 87.
Tf made after specified dates mentioned Tn the various Acts. This, at least 
Indirectly and Impliedly, restricts the power of a father to make partition among 
the sons and, conversely, takes away the sons1 birthright to demand a partition 
from their father. However, married sons,who have reached their majority 
seem to be entitled to a standard holding o f their own. But these laws pro 
tanto derecognise birthright In the sense that, Irrespective of the number of 
minor sons, the maximum family holding cannot exceed two standard holdings.
In this respect, the government policy seems to encourage nuclear families 
among the agrTcultural and land-owning classes who normally conform to the 
joint family norm.
c . Taxation Laws: the undivided Hindu family
Joint family property as an appendage to the Mltaksara birthright was 
also a problem Tn revenue matters. We notice that particular Indulgence was 
shown to the joint family In the laws relating to Income tax.^ The provisions 
Tn the Income Tax laws for a larger In itia l margin* of Income exempt from taxa­
tion gave to the Hindu undivided family a distinct advantage over other tax payers. 
On the surface, considering the joint family as a unit of consumption and product­
ion and maintenance of a group, the tax advantages seem to be fa ir. But Tn 
actual practice, these advantages became Instruments of evading the tax laws 
and while, sociologically, joint families were breaking up, more and more tax-
1. See I.S . G ula tl and K.S. G u la tl, The Undivided Hindu Family: A  Study 
of Its Tax Privileges, (Bombay, 1962)^
Induced jo in t families werd coming Into being J
A Hindu undivided family Is a distinct unit for the assessment of
Income tax and an Individual member Is not liable to be taxed In respect of
2 3his Income from the family property. Moreover, according to section 66
of the income Tax Act, 1961, the Income from the joint family Is not to be
Included In the Individual's Income for the purposes of determining the rate
of tax on his total taxable Income. In order to take advantage of this provl-
4
slon a member could convert his separate property Into jo int family property.
The birthright of a coparcener to partition the joint family property
5
could also be used as a convenient device to evade Income tax. A  joint 
family with Income slightly over the exemptions lim it could avoid the tax 
lia b ility  altogether by one of Its members resorting to partial partition. Some­
1. B. Slvaramayya, Towards a Secular Concept of Family1, In T . Mahmood,
ed ., Family Law and Social Change, o p .c lt., 145-67 at 164.
2. Income Tax Act, 1961, s .10: 'In computing the total Income of a previous
year of any person, any Income falling within the following clauses shall 
not be Included -  (2) '(subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of
section 64, substituted by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) A c t, 1970, with 
effect from 1.4.1971) any sum received by an Individual as a member of a 
Hindu undivided family, where such sum has been paid out of the Income 
of the fam ily, . . . '
3 . To be read with s .86(v).
4 . For a discussion on merger, see supra,7 4 "7- 59*
5. Udayyan Chlnubhal v . Commr. o f I .T .,  Gujarat, AIR 1967 SC 762; 
I.T . O fficer v . Bachu Lai, (1967), 1 SCWR 14 at 20.
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times, tn the case of a family with Income considerably higher than the Initial 
exemption lim it, a partition would be the convenient device to place the sepa­
rated members or units Into lower Income brackets subject to exemption or a 
lower rate of taxation.
The devices commonly used to defeat the tax laws through the con­
cessions given to the Hindu undivided family have been summed up tn the Report 
of the Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee:
The normal modes by which Hindu undi­
vided family has been utilized by tax­
payers for purposes of tax avoidance may 
be stated as under:-
(a) create as many smaller Hindu undivi­
ded families within the main family as 
possible, so that each one of the sub- 
branches In the main family becomes a 
separate unit of assessment and thereby 
has Its Income and wealth subjected to 
lower rate of tax;
(b) where the Hindu undivided family has 
enormous properties, have partial parti­
tion of family assets, as many times as 
possible, so that neither the family nor 
the Individual faces higher tax liability;
(c) whether there Is ancestral property 
or not, have the self-acquired property 
thrown Into the family hotchpot so that 
Individuals Income liable to higher tax 
rate Is reduced and also liability arising 
due to clubbing of Income under section 
64 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961, Ts 
avoided; and
(d) retain the ancestral property as the 
property of joint family as otherwise the 
property as well as the Income from such 
property w ill be assessed In the hands of 
the members along with their Individual 
Incomes and wealth at a much higher 
rate.
The Committee also observed that *the Hindu undivided family as a 
unit of assessment Is retained In most cases only when It enables the persons to 
reduce their tax lia b ility  and that In other cases It Is promptly partitioned w ith­
out considerations of sentiment coming In the way.* ^
It would not be to our purpose to explore each one of these alleged 
grievances. Once the decision was taken to tax the Hindu undivided family 
as a distinct entity, the latter became the kv llla ln  whether any Individual 
family was w ell-to -do, rich or very rich . Various requisites are reserved 
In relation with a fam ily^ particular circumstances and a ll are resisted by 
other assessees on some hypothetical Vnoral* basis which It Is not our task to 
Investigate.
The Committee somewhat dramatically, commented that the old 
notions of compassion and altruism were fast fading away In the Hindu undivided 
families and therefore, the Institution did not deserve special concessions and,
Tn the context of large scale avoidance of taxes, fiscal benefit to the state should 
be taken Into consideration. The Committee recommended that Hindu undivided 
families should be taxed at rates which are substantially higher for the lower slabs 
of Income than the rates applicable to Individuals.
1. Direst Taxes Enquiry Committee, Final Report, Government of India, (197]), 
73-75, quoted In Report of the Committee on Taxation of Agricultural Wealth 
and Income, Government of India, Ministry o f Finance, (1972), 96-7.
However, the higher rates of tax suggested by the Direct Taxes En­
quiry Committee would be effecttve only If  the Income and wealth of the Hindu 
joint families are large enough and I f  there are no ways open to It for splitting 
them. Thus, commenting on this, the K .N . !Raj Committee on Taxation of 
Agricultural Wealth and Income observes:
Since an HUF can be divided and sub- 
dtvded Into smaller units of HUFs -  
each such unit comprising a separate 
taxable entity In addttton to the matn 
HUF -  the Tncldence of the higher 
rates proposed can, Tn fact, be 
avoided qutte easily, particularly I f  
the main HUF had not been dttded 
earlier Into the maximum permissible 
number of HUFs. We have, there­
fore, grave doubts about the adqquacy 
of the measures taken already or pro­
posed to be taken for dealing with 
such evasions. The HUF Ts an Import­
ant entity among those belongtng to 
the higher ranges of Income and wealth, 
and conttnued recognition of It as a 
separate tax unit Ts therefore like ly 
to affect seriously the effectiveness 
of a ll dtrect taxes Including those on 
agriculture. We are of the view that 
the recognition given to HUFs should 
be tota lly withdrawn for tax purposes, 
and the Income and wealth of each 
HUF considered divisible among the 
nuclear families constituting It  and 
treated as part of the Income and 
wealth of each such family while 
assessing the taxes on them • It Is 
somettmes mentioned that there are 
practtcal d ifficulties Tn Implementing 
such a course on the ground that In­
terest of coparceners In the family 
keeps on fluctuating with birth and 
deaths of members. We do not see 
why a notional apportionment of the
famTly Income and assets cannot be made 
at a fixed point of time every year. 1
d . Present position
Thus, manipulation of the rules of jo int family law, such as the right 
of partition, merger, and abuse of recognition by revenue authorities of the a l­
truistic sentiments behind joint family life  as machineries for tax evasion became, 
Indeed disturbing to the revenue authorities and Parliament had to step In with 
sultab le reforms of the Finance laws.
As to the abuses of the ruler of merger of separate property Into the 
joint family pool, the Income Tax law relating to the Hindu undivided family 
has been amended, and such converted property of the Individual, for the pur­
poses of Income tax, shall be considered as the property of the Individual and 
not o f the fam ily.
Sub-section 2 of s.64 of the Income Tax Act, 196], Inserted by the 
Taxation Laws (Amendment) A ct, 1970, runs as follows:
Where In the case of an Individual 
being a member of a Hindu undivided 
family, any property having been the 
separate property of the Individual 
has, at any time after the 31st day of 
December, 1969, been converted by 
the Individual Into property belonging 
to the family through the act of Im­
pressing such separate property with 
the character of property belonging 
to the family or throwtng It  Into the 
common stock of the family (such
1. Report of the Committee on Taxation of Agricultural Wealth and Income, 
Government of India, Ministry of Finance, (1972), 97-8.
property being hereinafter referred to 
as the converted property), then, not­
withstanding anything contained In any 
other provision of this Act or In any 
other law for the time being In force, 
for the purpose of computation of the 
total Income of the Individual under 
this Act for any assessment year com­
mencing on or after the 1st of A p ril,
1971, -
(a) the Individual shall be deemed to 
have transferred the converted property, 
through the family, to the members of 
the family for being held by them jo in tly;
(b) the Income derived from the converted 
property or any part thereof, (Insofar as
It Is attributable to the Interest of the 
Individual In the property of the family), 
shall be deemed to arise to the Individual 
and not to the fam ily.
The larger In itia l margin of Income exempt from taxation for a Hindu 
undivided family, which was leading sometimes to fictitious partition or merger, 
has also been reduced; and, at the present moment, In respect o f Income tax, 
there Is no perceptible distinction between an Individual and a Hindu undivided 
family.^ However, now members w ill benefit more by partition than by 
living jo in tly .
1. The total Income exempted from Income tax for every Individual In the 
Finance Act, 1973 (The First Schedule Part I), was Rs. 5,000. For the 
Hindu undivided family I t  was Rs. 7,000. In the Finance A c t, 1974, 
(The First Schedule Part 1), In both cases the exempted lim it Is Rs.5,000. 
From Income exceeding Rs. 5,000 the rate of Income tax Is higher for 
Hindu undivided family than Individuals, FlnancfeAct, 1974, The First 
Schedule, Part I, A , II .
The corporate Image of a Hindu undivided famTly has been further
eroded by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) A c t, 1975, Tn Tts penal clauses tn 
respect of offences by the karta or any member of Htndu undivided families.
S.278C: *(1) Where an offence under 
this Act has been committed by a Hindu 
undivided family, the Karta thereof shall 
be deemed to be gutlty of the offence 
and shall be liable to be proceeded agatnst 
and punished accordingly • . . .
(2) Notwithstanding anything con­
tained In sub-section (1) where an offence 
under this Act has been committed by a 
Htndu undivided famTly and tt Ts proved 
that the offence has been committed wtth 
the consent or connivance of, or Is a ttr i­
butable to any neglect on the part of, 
any member of the Hindu undivided family, 
such member shall also be deemed to be 
gutlty of that offence and shall be liable 
to be proceeded agatnst and punished 
accordingly.
The present section keeps the notion of representation of the family 
by a karta , but at the same time, authorises the state to punish fhe Individual 
who commits any fiscal offence.
The present development In the Tax laws has Tts own Indirect reflect­
ion on the Institution of birthright and the mood of Parliament Indicates that the 
legislature does not view the concept with favour. However, the reforms of 
the Tax laws In respect of the Hindu undivided famTly are signposts In the direct­
ion of reform Tn the sphere of family law.
V I.  Negation o f Individualism
a. Past and present
The joint Hindu family Is a social, economic and religious Institution 
and the economic co llectiv ity of the group Is contained In the coparcenary.
It may be re-emphaslsed that the coparceners are the co-owners of the joint 
property In the famTly. The joint famTly system was the natural outcome of an 
agrarian society. In the static economy of the pre-Industrial era the family 
was the unit of both production and consumption.^ Lack of scope for chang­
ing one‘s vocation, absence of social mobility and the bonds of kinship tied 
down the Individual to the position and setting to which he belonged. The
juristic basis of birthright was consistent with the Hindu phenomenology of
2
human nature and ‘holism*. It was suited to the economic order of a group-  
oriented and non-egalltarlan society and became anathema to an Individual- 
oriented and unlversallstlc state of affairs. In Its pure form, the joint family 
system leaves litt le  room for the gifted Individual to exercise any leadership, 
enterprise and In itia tive .
! •  A .A . D‘Souza, ‘ Introduction*, The Indian Family In the Change and
Challenge of the Seventies, (Indian Social Institute, Sterling Publishers,
1972), 2 .
2 . The term used by Louis Dumont, tr. Mary and James Douglas, ‘Preface by
Louis Dumont to the French edition of the Nuer*, In J .H .M . Beattie and 
IR.G. Llenhardt, ed .f  Studies In Social Anthropology, (Oxford, 1975), 
329-42 at 338. For an analysis of Dumont‘s emphasis on holism and hier­
archy Tn traditional Indian society, see Y . Singh, Modernization of Indian 
Tradition, (Delhi, 1973), 34-9.
At present, although most of India Is rural and agrarian, egalitarian 
Ideas of Individualism have penetrated the rural frontier due to social mobility, 
spread of education, mechanised transport, politica l consciousness and the In­
fluence of the mass media. ^  We must not Ignore the fact, too, that only
2
about one-fifth of Indiaks population resides In an urban setting.
b . Legislative Intervention
The need for Individualising property was beginning to be fe lt during
the Anglo-HTndu law period. With the establishment of British rule, and as a
result of contact with the West, social changes started to take place and the
3
urban, educated elite  fe lt the need to free self-acquired property from the
fetters of famTly collectivism. The English-educated class, who were earning
substantially Tn newly-established professions, like the c iv il service, medicine
and law, reacted sharply against he regime of joint property. According to
the then Hindu law, Incomes earned by an Individual member as a result of
special training financed by the famTly were presumed to be earnings for the 
4
fam ily. The rule contemplates that such earnings were considered as co­
parcenary property and the birthright of the coparcenersLperated In fu ll force.
I
This was unfair to the Individual and his Immediate fam ily, because during his
1. B. Kuppuswamy, Communication and Social Development Tn India, (New 
Delhi, 1976), chTft^
2 . H . Nagpaul, The Study of Indian Society, (New Delhi, 1972).
3 . Also see our discussion on the famous Shlvagunga cases, supra,$ ”32" 44.
4 . Gokul Chand v . Hukam Chand Nath Mai (Firm), AIR 192] P.C. 35.
lifetime he was subject to a ll the restrictions o f dealing w ith jo in t property,
and at his death, the property would go to the coparceners by survivorship
to the exclusion of his widow and daughters. To remedy this state of affairs,
the legislature had to step In,  ^ and the result was the enactment of the Hindu
2
Gains of Learning A c t, 1930. Section 3 of the Act provided that Indivi­
dual family members acquired a separate and exclusive right to the property 
earned by means of learning financed out of the family fund. The enactment 
shows that the westernised and enterprising Hindus were no longer prepared to 
be guided by the dictates of their traditional laws and the legislature had to 
step In to help them to fu lf il their aspirations.
c . Judicial Intervention
The judiciary had to play Its part In straightening up this part of 
Hindu law. We have stated earlier that the Mltalqara view represents the 
samudaylka svatvavada which means that every coparcener has got an Interest 
In every parcel of jo int family property. Moreover, every coparcener^ right 
Is qualified by the existence of the similar rights of other coparceners, and 
therefore, no coparcener can assert that he Is the owner of a particular portion 
of the property; quite legitimately this leads to the rule that no coparcener can 
voluntarily transfer any specific portion before It Ts allotted to him at a partition.
1. Derrett, Critique, f  89.
2 . The Madras Act of 1890 to this effect never reached the statute book.
The sastrlc authority for this enactment could vaguely be found Tn Gatftama, 
28.28: * t he learned man need not give his self-aaqtflred property to his 
unlearned coparceners.*, also Gautama, 28.31.
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d. Involuntary (execution) sale
The monolithic character of joint family property stood In the way of 
the creditworthiness of an Individual Hindu. To protect the creditor, the Privy 
Council In Deen Dayal v . Jugdeep Naraln,  ^ laid down the rule that the pur­
chaser of an undivided share of the family property In execution sale for a sepa­
rate debt acquired a share In such property and also the right to ascertain and 
realise It by partttlon. Thus, the Judicial Committee by Introducing Into Hindu 
law the equitable principle of the bonaflde purchaser, seemingly opened a new
Individualistic trend In family property. The trend was clarified In Muddun
2Thakoor v . Kan too La ll, In which the Privy Council observed that joint family 
property could be sold In execution of a money decree against the father. It 
shows that the birthright of sons could no longer stand In the way of execution 
sales.
From these decisions, however, one should not assume that the jud i­
ciary was out to disintegrate the jotnt family property. The judiciary had to
accommodate contingencies of c iv il law through the application of the English
3
principle of justice, equity and good conscience, and the resulting recognition 
of a sort of Individualism was only expedlental and Incidental.
1. (1877) 4 1A 247; also Mahabeer Pershad v . Ramyad (1874) 12 Beng. L’R 90;
Suraj Banst v . Sheo Prasad, (1880) 5 Cal 148 « 6 1A 88,
2. (1874) LR 1 IA 321; also NanomI Babuasln v . Modun Mohan, (1885) LR 13
IA 1.
3. Derrett, RLSI, 311-12.
e . Voluntary alienation
In respect of voluntary alienation, the Mltaksara notion that no co­
parcener can Individually alienate his share In the jo in t family property Is s till 
the general ru le. However, there Is a difference of opinion among different 
High Courts on this point. The Calcutta High Court upheld the general rule
that the alienation of his coparcenary Interest by an Individual coparcener was
1 2 Invalid . The Allahabad High Court was also of the same opinion; but
3
the High Courts of Bombay and Madras, that means South India generally, 
deviated from the Mltaksara rule and, relying on equity, validated the aliena­
tion of coparcenary Interest for valuable consideration (mortgage or sale, but
4 -not gift) by a coparcener. In conformity with strict Mltak§ara law, the
1. Nandaram v . Hashee Pandee (1823) S.RP. 23 L; Sheo Shurrun v . Sheo Sahal 
(1826) 4 S.RP. 138; Jlvan v . Ramgovlnd (1832) 5 S.R. 163.
2 . Balgovlnddas v . Naraln LaII (1893) 20 1A 166 » 15 A ll 339; Lachman
Prasad v . Sarman Singh (1^17) 44 IA 163 » 39 A ll 500. Also recently:
under the Benares school of Mltaksara, a coparcener cannot, without the 
consent of other coparcener, sell his undivided share In the jo int family 
estate for his own benefit, Babu Lai v . Chandrlka Prasad, AIR 1977 NOC 
229 (A ll) , relied on Sukh Ram v . Gaurl Shankar, AlR 1968 SC 365.
3 . The view of the Madras school on this point Is stated In Raghunathv.
Radhakrlshna, AIR 1975 O rl. 214.
4 . In South India Improper gifts of joint family property are void; else­
where a ll Improper alienations are voidable. Critique, f l2 9 .  The whole 
question of Improper g ift was reviewed by the Andhra Pradesh HC In Rattamma
v . Venkata Subbamma, AIR 1973 AP 226. It was pointed out that the legis­
lature would probably soon abolish a ll curbs on a coparcenerks alienation of 
his Interest. The court allowed a coparcener to give his Interest to his 
brother and nephews to the disadvantage of his own w ife . But cp. Kan- 
dammal v . Kandlsh Thevar, AIR 1977 NUC 220 (Mad): a g ift of ancestral 
Immovable property by the father In favour of his wife Is void.
views of the High Courts of Calcutta and Allahabad were right, but Bombay and 
Madras viewed the situation through the prism of equity and laid down that by 
alienating his coparcenary Interest, a coparcener Incurs an obligation and a l­
though this Is ultra vires, equity should not allow him to evade the performance 
of the obligation and thus the mortgagee or vendee was allowed to pursue his
i 2
rights by a suit for general partition against the joint family as a whole.
This allowed tndlvildaaltsttc members to anticipate their shares or use them for 
temporary purposes, but this South Indian solution did not solve the problems 
of coparceners In North India. Earlier jurists were not happy with the equit­
able solution on this point and, Indeed, Prlyanath Sen remarked that the High
Courts have ‘ lent a helping hand to the diverse Influences at work In under-
3
mining the Integrity of a joint family under the Mltakshara law.* The jurists 
of that period were more Interested In keeping the purity of the respective doc­
trines of the Mltaksara and the Dayabhaga than In the aspirations of the Ind iv i­
dual coparceners. However, while Sen*s juridical Interpretation of the Mltaksara 
doctrine Is understandable, It cannot be denied that the Inconveniences of the 
rigorous rules In respect of alienation of jo in t family property was fe lt even In 
his days, but nobody was bold enough to say that the Institution should be 
abolished. Today, In the throes of Individualism, we can say Hiatfils medleaval 
Institution has outlived Its purpose.
1. Venkatammal v . Slnna, AIR 1975 Mad 316.
2 . Derrett, Critique, f  140.
3 . P .N . Sen, The General Principles of Hindu Jurisprudence, TLL, 1909,
(The University of Calcutta, 1918), 154.
V II .  Equality o f the sexes and b irthrigh t
We may recall that under the Mltaksara law, a Hindu coparcenary Is 
comprised only of the male members who take by birth an Interest In the joint; 
family property.^ This shows that birthright envisages a family property com­
plex from which females are excluded as owners.
There Is no doubt that the Constitution contemplates a social revo­
lution brought about through the use of law as a mechanism of social englneer-
2
Ing, and equality of the sexes Is guaranteed by the Constitution.
The aim of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as we shall presently see,
was to rationalise the law of succession, to Improve the position of women and
to effect social justice In the domain of family property; but the conservative 
3
resistance against abolishing male birthright defeated the most Important
1. Kane, HD, 111, 591. Jagamath v . Deputy Director of Consolidation,
AIR 1977 A ll 176.
2. A rt. 15.
3 . On the opinions In favour and against abolition of birthright, see Report
of the Hindu Law Committee, (Delhi, 1947), 14-17. H .L . Levy, ^Lawyer- 
scholars, Lawyer-polltlclans and the Hindu Code B ill, 1921-1956*, Law 
and Society Review, 3 (1968-69) 2 and 3: 303-16. Lotlka Sarkar, 
*Jawaharlal Nehru and the Hindu Code B ill*, In B.R. Nanda, e d ., Indian 
Women: From Purdah to Modernity, (New Delhi, 1976), 87-98. On typ t- 
cal orthodox argument against reform, see Why Hindu Code Is Detestable, 
published by the Shastra Dharma Prachar Sabha, (Allahabad/Calcutta, un- 
dated), 105. The same orthodox view was expressed by N .C . Chatterjee 
In Parliament. He was opposed to any change In the traditional Hindu law 
but, Ironically, challenged the government to enact a uniform C iv il Code 
for a ll citizens. D.E. Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change In the 
Third World: A Source Book, (New York, 1V71), 84-6,
purpose of the legTslatton. The HSA seemingly provided women with an equal 
right of Inheritance with men, but the Inequality of the sexes stayed In the 
retention of the Mltaksara coparcen ary. Since It often tips the scales against 
women In the matter of succession., the concept of ancestral property Is against 
public policy.^
Section 6 of the HSA provides that the female heirs of a male Hindu
get a share of his property (his share In the coparcenary property plus his self-
2
acquired property which Is calculated by a partition; but the sons get a share 
of their father's property In addition to their own Interest as coparceners. Thus, 
the Inequality of the sexes s till continues. There Is no bar In the Constitution
against females holding the highest office of the state, but I t  Is Indeed Ironic
-  3that women cannot be members of the Mltaksara coparcenary.
V II I. The Hindu Succession A c t, 1956
a . General tenor of the Act
In the context of the traditional Hindu view of family law, the Hindu 
Succession Act made radical changes In the law of succession • Despite Its
1. Mst. Sham Kaur v . Harl Singh, AIR 1973 P & H 71, 74-5.
2 . Sushtlabal v . Narayanrao, AIR 1975 Bom 257.
3 . The National Committee on the Status of Women (1971-74) attacked
birthright as an Institution of sex discrimination. The Committee re­
commended Its abrogation, J .P . N alk, Status o f Women In India; A  
Synopsis of the Report of the National Committee on the Status of Women 
(1971-74), (New Delhi, 1975), 53-4:
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weakness and resulting anomalies, It Is Indeed to be conceded that the A c t, 
for the first time, represents a major attempt by the legislature to demytholo- 
glse the Hindu law of property. As we have stressed earlier, It seems that 
one of the significant Intentions of Parliament was to confer on women equal 
rights of Inheritance with men. The proposed Hindu Code B ill of 1948 (as 
amended by the Select Committee) had one chapter on joint fam ily and from 
the point of view of male birthright, sectton 86 of the Code was really revo­
lutionary. The section provides:
On and after commencement of this Code 
no right to claim any Interest In any pro­
perty of an ancestor during his lifetime 
which Is founded on the mere fact that 
the claimant was bom In the family of 
the ancestor, shall be recognised In 
any court.
This proposed abrogation of birthright was undoubtedly a step toward Ind iv i­
dualism and equality of the sexes In the law of family property. However, It 
Is well known that the statute of 1956 did not abolish the Institution of birth­
right. The legislature sought reform through a compromise and allowed the 
continuation of the doctrine of survivorship In an attenuated form •
The Hindu Succession Act Introduced several close relatives, Includ­
ing women, as simultaneous heirs for a man%s separate property and made It 
Imperative that the same law should apply to his Interest In coparcenary property 
at Mltaksara law.^ Section 6 of the Act provides:
1. RLS1, 4 2 0 .
When a male HTndu dies after the 
commencement of this A c t, havtng 
at the time of hts death an Interest 
Tn a Mttakshara coparcenary pro­
perty, hts Interest Tn the property 
shall devolve by survivorship upon 
the surviving members of the copar­
cenary and not In accordance with 
this Act:
Provided that, I f  the deceased had 
left him surviving a female relative 
specified In class I of the Schedule 
or a male relative specified In that 
class who claims through such female 
relative, the Interest of the deceased 
In the Mttakshara coparcenary property 
shall devolve by testamentary or Intest­
ate succession, as the case may be, 
under this Act and not by survivorship.
Explanation 1: For the purposes of 
this section, the Interest of a Hindu 
Mttakshara coparcener shall be deem­
ed to be the share In the property that 
would have been allotted to him I f  a 
partition of the property had taken 
place Immediately before his death,
Irrespective of whether he was en­
titled to claim partition or not.
It appears from this section that the occasion for the application of the 
rule of survivorship w ill appear tn comparatively few cases, nevertheless the 
operation of birthright within the scheme of Inheritance, In appropriate cases, 
frustrates the social goal. For calculating the deceasedfes Interest, It ts pro­
vided by section 6 (Expl.l) that It should be thelnterest which the deceased 
would have realised had there been an actual partition  ^ of the property Imme­
diately prior to his death.
1. Rangubal La ljl v . Laxman, AIR 1966 Bom 169 = (1966) 68 Bom LR 74. 
Substantially based on Munnalal v . Rajkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493, ably 
criticised by S.R. Gokhale, AIR 1965 J. 85-7.
b. Anomalies and uncertainties
This half-hearted attempt to abolish an archaic Institution, In fact, 
created anomalies and uncertainties In the law of succession and, I f  certainty ^
Is one of the purposes of codification, then Hindu Succession A ct falls far 
short of I t .  A  few illustrations are furnished to throw light on the anomalies 
emerging from the Hindu Succession A c t.
(1) When F dies after 1956 leaving S and SS, there Is no clear
directive In the Act as to whether SS has a birthright In the share which Is un-
^  3
doubtedly grandparental propertyso far as SS Is concerned. Dabke took
great pains to emphasise the view that, In such cases, after the Hindu Success­
ion A ct, the birthright of SS no longer survives. The Assam and Nagaland
4
High Court also decided that In the given situation, SS had no birthright. 
However, It Is submitted that neither the juridical opinion of Dabke nor the
decision of the Assam and Nagaland High Court Is the correct Interpretation
5 -  -of the existing law and, despite the Hindu Succession A ct, the Mltaksara
1. On the purposes of codification, see A .T . Von Mehren, The C iv il Law 
System: Cases and Materials for the Comparative Study of Law, (Prentice
Hall In c ., 1957), 31-3.
2. Derrett, !RLSI, 338: *BTrth Control and the Intended Abolition of the 
Hindu Joint Family*, Lawasla, 4 (1973), 2: 155-68 at 166.
3 . G .K . Dabke, (1966) 68 Bom L .R .J ., 113-5.
4 . Ghaslram v . Commr. of G ift  Tax, AIR 1967 A & N 48. The point was
not correctly argued before the bench, hence the decision Is per tncurlam.
5. Derrett, Lawasla, 4 (1973) 2 : 166.
939.
f
blrthrlghf survtves.
(11) In another situation, suppose a jo int famTly consists of FM, F,
1 2  1 2  S and S y  At the death of F after 1956, S and S w ill be treated as joint
In respect of 2/3 of the estate; and the remaining 1/3, that belonged to F by
legal fic tion , w ill pass to the sons as heirs, each holding 1/6 absolutely;
thus, the same property w ill pass to them by different tenures.^
(Ilia) (F) -  W (lllb ) (F) ~_W
J i l  '  ”J2
We shall presently see that even In situations within the proviso of 
s.6, the birthright s till operates, although according to this proviso the pro­
perty Is supposed to devolve by Intestate succession. The ‘deemed* partition 
to compute the shares of the heirs pushes back the Hindu Succession Act to the 
pre-Hindu Succession Act situation and unconsciously Invigorates the law of 
partition and coparcenary In an Incongruous setting.
In these Illustrations, suppose F dies after 1956. The shares passing 
In Illustration (Hla) are 1/3 and In Illustration (tttb) 1/4.
The shares In the notional partition before F*s supposed death would be:
1. For ju d ic ia l  support o f  our view see a recen t case: Commr. o f I . T . 
G u jara t - I  v .  D r. Babubhai Mannsukhbhai (deceased), (1977) 108 ITR 
417. I t  was h e ld  in  th is  case th a t  in  the  case o f Hindus governed 
by the M ita k s^ara where a son in h e r i ts  the s e l f  acqu ired  p ro p erty  
o f h is  father", the son takes i t  as the jo in t  fa m ily  p ro p erty  o f  
h im s e lf and h is  son and not as h is  separate p ro p e rty . The court 
re fused  to  accept th© co n tra ry  op in ion  o f the A llah abad  HC in  
Gommr. o f I . T . v . Ram R akshpal, (j.968) 67 ITR 164 as the c o rrec t 
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  law .
2, D e r r e t t ,  Law asia, 4 (1 97 3 )2 : 166.
F, 1/3; W, 1/3; S 1/3. W gets 1/3 absolutely  ^ as a share, and S being 
the coparcener with his father gets 1/3 as his b irthright. The remaining 1/3, 
being the share of F, Is divided between W and S, and each gets 1/6 as heir­
ess and heir respectively. Finally, they get: W (1/3 + 1/6) = J;
S (1/3 + 1/6) = i .
1. RangubaT L a ljl v . Laxman, AIR 1966 Bom 169; logical following of 
Munnalal v . Rajkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493. The female heirs were 
wrongly Ignored by Patel, J . In Shlramabal v . Kalgavda, (1963) 66 
Bom LR 351; F died leaving W and S. The estate was divided: .
F, i ;  S, i .  F*s i  again divided between S and W, each getting i .
Finally, S ( i  + i )  = 3 /4 . For defence of the case, B. Shlvaramayya, 
•Ascertainment of a Deceased Coparcener's Share*, (1965) 67 Bom LRJ,
65-7. But see Derrett, *The Ascertainment of a Deceased Coparcener*s 
Share*, (1964) 66 Bom LRJ, 169-73; ‘Adoption, Succession and the Pre­
sent State of Hindu Law*, (1966) 68 Bom LRJ, 41-8, 45f; Critique, f  271.
Also Paras Dlwan, Modern Hindu Law: Codified and Uncodlfted, 2nd ed ., 
(Allahabad, 1974), 371. Patel, J . revised his opinion In Rangubal's case, 
approved In Sushllabal v . Narayan Rao, AIR 1975 Bom 257 (F ,B .). In 
Rangubal*s case, Patel, J . Interpreted the ‘deemed* partition as an ‘actual* 
partition but, subsequently, the Allahabad High Court by Interpreting It as 
only ‘notional* partition brings back the controversy on HSA, s.6, E x p l. l,  
Controller of Estate Duty v . Anarl Devi, AIR 1972 A ll 179. According to 
the fact of this case F died leaving behind two widows, one son and three 
daughters. On notional partition, F*s share came to^r. T h ls i devolved 
by succession, each widow taking 1/40 and son and each daughter taking 
1/20. Fora defence of the case, Paras Dlwan, lo c .c tt. ,  371. The 
Allahabad decision was anticipated by Derrett, (1966) 68 Bom LRJ, 41-8,. 
and M ulla , Hindu Law, 13th ed ., 780-1. While the ratio of  Rangubal case 
Is well-established, the Allahabad decision Is better where women reap 
large rewards under the HSA at the cost of a son's birthright. However, 
the two decisions together show the confusion which exists In the Interpre­
tation of s.6 of the HSA. This law can be settled only by the Supreme
1 Court. It is interesting to note that in Vidyaben v . Jagadishchandra 
AIR 1974 Guj. 23 the Gujarat HC followed Rangubai bnt recently 
ithe same HC in Commr. of I.T. Gujarat - I v . Shantikumar. 1976 105
JITR 795 Guj disagreed with Rangubai. For a critical discussion 
| and support for Rangubai. see Derrett, 'Hindi Succession Act^XXX 
of 1956) , Section 6: A Re-appraisal of Rangubai v . Laxman 
Supreme Court Journal. 15th May '78, 64-66.
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1 2In the second TllustratTon (ttlb ), W would take i  + i ,  S and S
i  +  i  each, i  betng their b irthright. Now the questton artses as to whether
1 2the coparcenary between S and S ts broken at this stage? Are they sepa­
rated from each other Involuntarily  ^ and, Tf so, can we Impose a partition on
2
them although they did not declare an •unequivocal* Intention to that effect?
These are the questions emerging from their birthright and without being conser-
-  1 2  vatlve, we can say that so long as the Mltaksara birthright survives, S and S
are not separate and enjoyOi = i  In coparcenary tenure.
Again It deserves to be mentioned that In Madras and Andhra, W
3
would take nothing, but provision for maintenance In a partition, hence F*s 
share would be i  (F, i ;  S, i )  and 1/3 (F, 1/3; S^, 1/3; S^, 1/3) respectively. 
In final computation, the property w ill be divided as follows: In Illustration 
(Ula): S, i  +  i ;  W, i ;  In Illustration (mb): S^, 1/3 +  1/9; S^, 1/3 +  1/9;
W, 1/9. These regional variations show the Intolerable diversities within the 
Mltaksara system. This Is not a happy situation and I f  uniformity and
1. Mrs. Sujata Manohar has correctly opined that sons w ill not be divided by
any such deemed partition, •Rangubai La ljl v . Laxman La ijt and Section 6, 
Hindu Succession A c t, 1956*, (1966) 68 Bom LRJ, 60-2 at 62. This view 
is rightly supported by Derrett, Critique, 217, n .9 . But for the trend In 
judicial opinion, see Fathlmunnlsa Begum v. Tamlrasa,  AIR 1977 AP 24: 
*Only when the proviso to s .6 applies, there Is a change In the character 
of holding the property from joint ownership to that of tenants-ln-common. 
If there are only male heirs left by a Hindu, even I f  he died after the HSA
came Into force, the joint family continues until there Is a disruption by 
partition or otherwise. *
2 . Raghavamma v. Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136.
3 . Critique, f  271. In North India she takes a share under similar situation, 
Vlshwa Nath v . Prem Nath, AIR 1975 J & K 92.
certainty are our prime objectives, birthright needs to be abolished and the 
trauma o f ‘deemed1  ^ (notional or actual) partition should be replaced by a 
simple division of the deceased's estate In equal shares among the entitled 
heirs.
c . Pious obligation and Hindu Succession Act
Apart from creating anomalies In the suecessortal scheme under the 
Hindu Succession Act, birthright causes serious problems In the Hindu law of
2
debt. A  natural correlative to birthright Is the sons* (and sons* sons*) liab ility
3 4to pay their father's (and grandfathers') private, antecedent, untainted debts.
The supposedly spiritual justification of the rule that a father's soul
5
w ill remain In Hell unless his debts are paid has no logical or juridical 
support,^ since It did not prevent the rules being abolished so far as the separate
1. HSA, s.6, Expl.1, Critique, ? f2 ]5 - l9 .
2. By virtue of pious obligation, the Interest of sons In joint family property
Is answerable: Nan Bachchan v . Slta Ram, AIR 1977 A ll 126; debts aris­
ing out of a surety bond executed by the father: Smt. Chhablranl Bal v. 
G lrdharlla l, AIR 1976 MP 69; debts Incurred by the father In the course 
of a business, Paramanand Jain v . Firm Babulal Rajenda Kumar Jain, AIR 
1976 MP 187; but no pious obligation of sons where the business Is not the 
kulacara of  the fam ily, Sankaranarayanan v . The O ffic ia l Receiver, 
Tlrunelvell, AIR 1977 Mad 17]; sons liable for pre-partltlon debts of the 
father, Keshav Nandan Sahay v . The Bank of Behar, AIR 1977 Pat 185, 
followed Pannalal v . M t. Naralnl, AIR 1952 SC l!70.
3 . On antecedency, see Derretj; Critique, 131-33.
4 . Critique, f  127.
5. Narada, 1.9. Katyayna quoted In Vyavahara-mayukha, V . l v . l l .
Also Derrett, Critique, f  49.
6. Derrett, Critique, f4 9 .
property of the son was concerned. Because of b irth righ t, the birth of a son
diminishes his father‘s credit, and therefore, It Is equitable that sons must act
as legal sureties to the extent of their Interest In joint family property,^ to
2
guarantee payments of their father's debts. This Is the rationale behind the
3
so-called doctrine of pious obligation In Its temporal context.
The courts take a very strict view of a son*s liab ility  Tn this respect,
and unless the debts are proved to be Incurred through w ilfu l dishonesty or crime,
the sons are compelled to pay even though the debts were Incurred or contracted
by the father Imprudently, Inadvertently, or unconsciously. Thus, birthright
with Its corollary of pious obligation makes a mockery of Itself by allowing a
father to pile up unlimited debts. Because of this archaic rule, on the one
hand, there Is no restltutory compensation for the creditor when the debts are 
__ 5
tainted (avyavaharlka) and, on the otherr  there Is no protection for the son 
against an unrighteous father. This unbridled * J Individual Ism of the father
1. Nan Bachchan v . Slta Ram, AIR 1977 A ll 126.
2 . Sampath, o p .c lt., 60. Derrett, Lawasla, 4 (1973) 2: 165.
3 . On Its origin, Kane, HD, 111, 442ff. Derrett, ‘ India Pletas: A  
Current Rule Derived from Remote Antiquity1, Zeltschrlft der Savlgny- 
Sttftung fuer Rechtsgeschlchte, Rm. Abt. 86 (1969), 37-66.
4 . Perumal v . Devarajan, AIR 1974 Mad 14.
5. In a recent case the Andhra Pradesh HC rightly held debts as avyavaharlka 
In which a father purported to borrow for expenses of c iv il and criminal 
litigation against his own son, the object of the litigation being to deny 
the son‘s legitimate rights to property and to assert his own exclusive right 
to It ,  M . Veera Raghavlah v . M . China Veerlah, AIR 1975 AP 350.
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at the expense of birthright certainly needs curtailing even In the context of 
jo int family law. It Is of Interest that no one has taken the In itia tive to 
propose this.
Indeed, I t  Is good that Immorality should be discouraged, whereupon
sons should not be forced to pay their fathers Immoral (and Illegal) debts; but
that does not deter collusion between father and son, and a son has been known
to put his father In the witness box to aver that a particular debt was tainted,^
2 3The judiciary sometimes Intervened, rightly or wrongly, to protect the
creditor from the abuses of the avyavaharlka rule, but the anomdlles s till
4
remain unresolved, except Tn Kerala.
After the Hindu Succession Act, the pious obligation provokes another 
problem. There Is no denying the fact that to a certain extent, the birthright 
has been eroded by the Hindu Succession A c t. In a situation where the de­
ceased leaves sons as well as daughters as heirs, the daughters along with the 
sons take their shares Tn the fathers separate property and Tn his Interest In the
1. Glrdharee Lai v . Kan too Lai, (1874) 1 IA 321 (PC); discussed In 
Luhar Amrlt Lai v . DoshI, AIR 1960 SC 964 at 967.
2. As In Glrdharee Lai v . Kantoo Lai, 1 IA 321 (PC).
   — r -------------------------
3 . In Luhar Amrlt Lal*s case, the SC said that sons cannot effectively allege
that the proved debt Is tainted unless they also allege and prove that I t  was 
tainted to the knowledge of the creditor. The decision Is most unfortu­
nate and for the correct law and viable suggestions, see Critique, ^ 139. 
However, the SC Is followed Tn Thoga v . Suresh, AIR 1975 J & K 16.
4 . In fra ,9 7 2 .
coparcenary properly. Under the present circumstances, It seems that 
following the principles of pious obligation, the creditor should proceed only 
against the property In hands of the son. Should the daughter be exempted 
from sharing the liab ility  of her father's debts even though she Is sharing the 
Interest of the father In Joint family property like the son? We know that 
because of a son's birthright, a daughter's entitlement w ill be less than that 
of a son but equality of the sexes demands equity and we suggest that a ll the 
heirs should have equal shares and equal liab ilities for the debts of the deceased.
d . Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act
It Is Indeed expedient for some to argue that by virtue of s.6, 
collateral Joint families w ill eventually die out; and the legislature also took 
care to ensure that lineal Joint families w ill also wither away I f  fathers take 
advantage of testamentary disposition conferred by s .30 of the Hindu Success­
ion A ct.
S.30 provides:
Any Hindu may dispose of by w ill or 
other testamentary disposition any pro­
perty, which Is capable of being so dis­
posed of by him, In accordance with 
the provisions of the $  ndlan Success­
ion Act, 1925, or any other law for 
the time being In force and applicable 
to Hindus.
Explanation. The Interest of a male 
Hindu In a Mltakshara coparcenary 
property or the Interest of a member 
of a tarwad, tavazhl, Tllom, kutumba 
or kavaru Tn tne property o f the tarw ad , 
tavazhf, Tllom, kutumba or kavaru shat I ,
notwTthstandTng anythTng contaTned Tn 
thTs A c t or any other
law for the time be mg Tn force, be 
deemed to be property capable of 
betng disposed of by htm or by her 
wtthtn the meantng o f this sub­
section .
It may appear from the opentng part of the section that Parliament
was giving a Hindu a general power of testamentary disposition. But, Tn
fact, that Is not the case, and the key phrase of the section (*whlch Is capable
of being so disposed of by him1) has been elaborated In the Explanation to that
section. Birthright and coparcenary property s till remain  ^ and the father
has no power to w ill away property beyond his self-acquisitions and his Inter-
2
est In the coparcenary property. It Is logical that a father cannot w ill 
away the Interest of his sons Tn the joint fam ily property of which they are 
owners from their b irth .
Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act generates a contradiction
In the Mltaksara law. The general rule of Mltaksara law does not allow
a coparcener to dispose of his property Inter vivos, but the Act allows him,
In most cases, to do so by w i l l . To be precise, I
cener can transfer his Interest for valuable consideration. Mltaksara law In
3
general forbids a coparcener to make a g ift of his Interest Tn the jo int family 
property. Now throughout India a Mltaksara Hindu can usually w ill away
1. Where a male HTndu dies leaving widow e tc ., birthright Is eroded, 
otherwise the main rule of s.6, HSA, must apply, Ramaprasada v . 
IRatnavel, AIR 1976 Mad 393 at 396.
2 , See Motl Lai v . Sardar M ai, AIR 1976 Raj 40 at 55.
nSouth IndTa only a copar-
3 . Derrett, IMHL, ^ 463.
hts coparcenary Interest • The section appears to be a step towards freedom 
of the Individual and strikes a modern note within the archaic symphony of 
the joint family system but, In fact, apart from arousing discrepancies within 
the law of transfer, the National Committee on the Status of Women complain 
that the section has become an Instrument of perpetuating discrimination 
against women because, In many cases, to deprive the females, properties 
are being disposed of by Hindus In favour of their sons J
While the sentiment of the members of the National Committee on 
the Status of Women Is understandable, It does not explain or pinpoint the 
soclo-jurldlclal problem, In this respect Involved with the actions of a Hindu 
father. Nor does It detect the shortsightedness of the 1956 reformers who, 
for the sake of removing the dependence of women, In fact, and Indeed, In 
many cases, conferred disproportionate benefits on the daughters.
The reasons for the seeming discrimination against women by avoiding 
the provisions of s.6, Hindu Succession A c t, should not be sought In these avoid 
ances as such, but In the extent to which these provisions are relevant within 
the context of the wider spectrum of Hindu society.
In the West, since the last quarter of the last century, equality of 
women has been steadily recognised and the post-war years have accelarated 
the emancipation of women. In India too, the need for emancipation of 
women was fe lt by a section of the society and *the self-respect of the males
of Influential communities could not bear the contrast between the status and
expectations of Western women and the status of their own wives and sisters.*^
But the social development which coincided with the emancipation of women
In the West did not occur In India. Unlike the West, and despite The Dowry
2
Prohibition Act 1961, arranged marriages and the dowry system s till remain, 
and the majortty of men and women In India believe that the true place for 
women Is the kitchen. Thus, the emancipation of women Tn India, based on 
Imitation of the West, Is merely on paper.
I  n a sociological context, the framers of the Hindu Code saw It as 
part and parcel of a scheme whereby by the mere stroke of a pen the Indian 
public would rid Itself of antiquated values and would build up a modern 
nation. The economic benefit to women Tn the Hindu Succession Act Is part 
of that scheme, but It did not go hand In hand with their social emancipation. 
Nor does It seem that the reformers were Interested Tn the equality o f women 
with men; a ll they were Interested In was the removal of the dependent posi­
tion of women and this, they thought, would be achieved I f  they could accord 
better rights to them than to their male relatives.
This jurisprudential device to emancipate women produced serious 
social and juridical consequences. Despite equal rights of daughters with
1. Derrett, ‘Adoption, Succession and the Present State of Hindu Law*,
(1966 ) 68 Bom . LRJ, 41-8 at 45.
2 . PadmlnT Sengupta, The Story of Women of India, (New Delhi, 1974), 236.
sons Tn the successortal scheme of the HTndu SuccessTon Act, the sons sttll 
remained custodians of the prestige and responsibility of the family Tn the 
true HTndu tradition. A  daughter who has gone away from the family a fter 
her marriage w ith, say, her g ift of affection from the father,^ her dowry and 
her share of the family estate under the Hindu Succession A c t, should be 
treated nevertheless as a guest by her brother whenever she comes herself 
or with her children to her brothers house, and Indian tradition demands 
that her visits and expenses Incurred for her should not be grudged by her 
brothers fam ily. But these Indian folk-ways show that the Hindu Suc­
cessTon Act awarded women rights upon a footing which had no rational 
background. And that Is why, to create a social and economic balance 
and to do justice to the sons, many a HTndu father mtght have to take advan­
tage of s.30 of the HTndu Succession Act by devising property Tn favour of 
his sons.
However, having said that, we cannot afford to overlook the fact 
tha t s.30 of the Hindu SuccessTon Act alone neither satisfied the women nor 
provides satisfactory means to a father who wants to regulate the devolution 
of family property after his death; thus, the Hindu law of jo int family pro­
perty and succession needs overall legislative review.
1. Guramma v . Mai lappa, AIR 1964 SC 510. For a critica l discussion,
Derrett, Critique, ? 124. Guramma's case confirmed by SC In Amma- 
thayee v . Kumaresam, AIR 1967 SC 569. G if t  Tn favour of mother held 
void: Tlrupurasundarl v . Kalyanaraman, AIR 1973 Mad 99; g ift of an- 
cestraI Immovable property In favour of wife held void: Kandammal v . 
Kandlsh Thevar, AIR 1977 NOC 220 (Mad); cp. Rattamma v . Venkata 
Subbamma, AIR 1973 AP 226.
IX . Posstble advantages o f the jotnt fam ily system
When a ll Is said In favour of abrogation of birthright and joint 
fam ily, we should not fa ll to analyse the advantages which are normally 
put forward In support of the joint family system.
a. Moral and spiritual factors
Considering the advantages and disadvantages of the system, 
Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrl said: *Thls Institution like every other, has 
Its advantages and disadvantages, but Its advantages are both spiritual and 
secular, whilst Its disadvantages are merely secular Tn character.*  ^ It 
Is true that the HTndu rellglo-phllosophlcal doctrines exert considerable 
Influence on that society; and moral and spiritual elements are merged 
with the secular aspects of joint family life , but the survival o f moral and 
spiritual factors does not necessarily depend on the existence of b irthright. 
And birthright Itself Is a secular concept.
b . Miniature welfare state
It Is assumed that the Hindu joint family In the Ideal sense Is a 
2
mlntature *welfare state*, and In the absence of adequate social security 
measures, the Institution takes the major responsibilities of looking after
1. Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastrl, Hindu Law, 4th ed ., 193.
2 . Derrett, Lawasla, 4 (1973) 2: 155-68 at 162.
the aged, the tnftrm widows, orphans, the sick and the unemployed.^ The
truth of thts contention Is undeniable, but at the same time, Individualism
must be recognised by abolishing the Mltaksara birthright, and It can be done
more securely because Hindu piety and solidarity,characteristics for which the 
2
nation Is famed, can be left to those same Individuals to manifest, what­
ever the legal title  to their assets.
c . Mental health
The psychoanalysts argue that the joint family Is an emotional nexus
and that the warmth and togetherness that exist among the members make life
meaningful and stable. It Is believed that the jotnt family system minimises
anxiety, tension, conflict and frustration and does not lead to mental health 
3
problems. In a recent survey, Dr. Sethi concludes that unitary families 
living In strange and unfamiliar environments are more prone to psychiatric
1. W .J . Goode, World Revolution and Family Pattern, (New York, 1963), 
245. D .A . Chekkl, 'Modernisation and Social Change: The Family and 
Kin Network In Urban India*, In G . Kurtan, ed ., The Family In India, 
o p .c tt., 205-31 at 227. In the same volume, *K. Ishwaran, The Inter- 
dependence of Elementary and Extended Family*, 163-77 at 177.
2 . In spite of Derrett*s massive principles In his Critique, C h.2.
3 . W.S. Taylor, •Behaviour Disorders land the Breakdown of Hindu Family*, 
Indian Journal of Social Work, June, (1943), 164-5. Morris Opler, 
•Family, Anxiety and Religion In a North Indian Locality*, In Marvin 
Opler, ed ., Culture and Mental Health, (New York, 1960), 273.
disorders such as depression than are joint families.^ Although there Is
some weight In these arguments, no one can assume with certainty that
jo in t families are free from psychosomatic problems* In jo int families
2there Is abundant room for clasb of w ills and It should be noted especially
that the junior male members do not receive the kind of socialisation which
3
would permit them to act Independently. Such an atmosphere Is hardly 
conducive to mental s tab ility . Moreover, the alleged psychic advantages 
appertaining to jo int living or the large household do not apply to legal 
jo in t families which we have been discussing.
1 • B.B. Seibl, paper read at International Congress of Psychotherapists
In Paris, The Statesmen Weekly, July 17, 1976, p .3 .
2 . Hemalatha Acharya observes that In Gujarat fam ilial tensions, especi­
a lly  between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law, have In­
creased the Incidence of suicide among daughters-ln-Iaw, *Some Pos­
sible Variations In Family Types In Gujarat*, In G . Kurlan, ed ., Family 
In India, o p .c lt . ,  179-90 at 180. There are few suicides In Burma, 
where the joint family Is confined to a handful of Immigrant Hindus. 
Muslim jo int fam 1 lies are very rare In most regions of India; Information 
supplied by Derrett on the margin of my first draft.
3 . T .G .P . Spear, Modem India, (Ann Arbor, U .S.A. , 1961), 65-7.
H . Nagpaul, The Study of Indian Society, (New Delhi, 1972), 79.
The general rule Is this, that the senior member acts as the manager of 
a jo in t fam ily. A  senior member may give up his right as manager 
with consent of a ll the members, Narendrakumar v . Commr. of Income 
Tax, AIR 1976 SC 1953.
CHAPTER 22 •
JOINT FAMILY LAW IN  KERALA
I .  StgntfTcance of Kerala
O f the 20 mtllton people tn Kerala, ^61%  are Htndus, 21%
Chrtsttans and 18% Muslims. The Htndu community tn Kerala conststs of
the Brahmins, the Nayars, the Kshatrlyas and other upper Castes, the
Ezhavas, and other backward and polluting Castes. The traditional per-
2
sonal laws of these various groups o f Hindus were not homogeneous and to 
discuss them tn detatl would be beyond the scope of our present study. How­
ever, a short survey of the Kerala systems of famtly law Is worthwhile for three
reasons: first, the Hindu society of Kerala stands merged In the general stream
3
of social life  In India; secondly, the jotnt families In Kerala, whetfier
1. Before the re-organisation of States In 1956, following Indian Independence, 
Kerala consisted of three separate and more or less autonomous administrative 
units, namely, Travancore and , Cochin; states administered by the Indian 
rulers; and the Malabar district which constituted part of the then Madras 
Province. The State of Kerala was fomied In 1957; I t  comprised Malabar 
District plus the Malaya lam-speaking taluks o f South Kanara, and Travancore- 
Cochln, minus the Tamil-speaking taluks of the extreme south.
2. IMHL, f  571.
3 . T .K .N . Unnlthan, Contemporary Nayar Family In Kerala1, In G . Kurlan, 
ed ., The Family In India, o p .c lt . ,  191-203 at 202.
matrlllneal or patrilineal, have the basic organisational characteristics of a
Mltalqara joint family; and a number of patrilineal Hindus were governed by the
Mltaksara law as custom, although variations from It had judicial recognition; ^
2
and thirdly, Kerala has gained special significance by Its pioneering legislation
on abolition of birthright which Is our central theme.
II • TYpes of Families
Among the Hindus In Kerala we come across both matrlllneal and
patrilineal families. The matrlllneal system Is followed by the Nayars,
3
Khatrlyas, certain temple Castes, and some Ezhavas. Brahmins and other
4
Htndus follow the patrilineal system. The Kqnlkkars and Uralts of Travan-
5
core are matrlllneal but patrllocal. However, their Marumakkattayam
1 • Also Mltaksara law Is applicable to lllam , makkattayam and marumakkatpyam 
as residua I law, IMHL, ^574.
2 . The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) A c t, 1975, 30 of 1976.
3 . It Is significant to note that there are five extant matrlllneal Nambudlrl 
lllam In the extreme north, Joan P. Mencher and Helen Goldberg, 'Kinship 
and Marriage Regulations among the Namboodlrl Brahmans of Kerala', In G . 
Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, o p .c lt., 291-316 at 294. Also Mayne's 
Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 10th ed ., Appx. I l l ,  967.
4 . Unnlthan, o p .c lt., 197.
5. The word marumakkattayam Is from marumakan = 'sister's son* and tayam = 
'share', 'Inheritance*. The patrilineal descent system Is referred to by the 
word makkattayam, makan = 'son*, C .J . Fuller, The Nayars Today, (Camb- 
brldge University Press, London, 1976), 54. Also Mayne, 967.
system of succession and Inheritance by the stster*s son has eventually been re­
placed by the Makkattayam system of succession by sons.^ It deserves men­
tioning that the joint family system Is not confined within ihe frontiers of a 
particular community, and In Kerala some Christians, too, live In joint families 
which conform to a regime analogous to the Mltaksara jo in t family with birth­
right. Again, the *Map£>tIlas were orig inally governed by marumakkattayam
2law, which embraced a ll aspects of jo lnt-fam tly and succession.”
111. Tarwad
In the marumakkattayam system, the traditional family unit Is called
3 4a tarwad. In the allyasantana system, It  Is called a kutumba. A  tarwad
was a segment of a matrlllneage, some three to six generations deep, containing
5
both Its male and female members. Jurid ica lly, It was a property group con­
sisting of a ll the descendants of a common ancestress ^ In the female line.
1. B. Mukherjee, The Structural Features o f the Tribal Fantltes of India*, In 
G . Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, o p .c lt.fr 75-90 at 86.
2 . Derrett, RL51, 525. See the Mapllla Succession A c t, 1918; the Mapllla 
Marumakkatayam Act, 1928. Also onMappllIas, Kathleen Gough,
*Mapp!l!a: North Kerala*, tn D .M . Schneider and K. Gough, ed ., 
Matrlllneal Kinship, (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angele^
1961), 415-42.
3 . The Madras Marumakkatayam Act (22 o f 1933), section 3(1) defines tarwad as 
a ‘group of persons forming a joint fam ily with community o f property governed 
by the Marumakkattayam law of Inheritance*.
4 . IMHL, £572.
5. Kathleen Gough, ‘Changing Households In Kerala*, In D . Naratn, ed ., 
Explorations In the Family and Other Essays, o p .c lt , ,  218-67 at 225.
Mayne, 10th ed ., 968.
However, the tarwad has got a legal personality apart from Its members for 
certain purposes and for other purposes, I t  Is a group of persons. It Is a
right and duty-bearing unit and, In that sense, has greater a ffin ity  with a
1 2 corporation. Traditionally, tarwad property was Impartible. Every
member of a tarwad has equal rights In the property by reason of his or her 
3
birth Tn the tarwad. The memb rs took by survivorship a ll the property
4
left by a member dying Intestate •
IV . Karnavan
The tarwad property was administered by the eldest male member,
5
called the karnavan. The karnavan was the mother*s brother who was a co-
1. Gopala Menon v . KalyanI Amma, 1964, KLT 166. Cp. joint Hindu family
Is not a corporate entity, Mahavlrprasad v . M .S. Yagnlk, AIR I960 Bom. 191; 
N .V . Subrahmanyam v . Additional Wealth Tax O fficer, Eluru, AIR 1961 AP 
75; Chhotey Lai v . Jhandey La i, AIR 1972 A ll 424 FB.
2 . Mayne, 10th ed ., 969. Derrett, IMHL^ $576.
3 . Kalllanl Amma v . Govlnda Menon, (1912) 35 Mad 648; Kabakandl Koma v .
Siva Sankaran (1^10) 20 MLJ 134.
4 . IMHL, f  576. The same rules apply to the members of a kutumba under the 
Allyasantana customary law, Jalaja ShedthI v . Lakshml Shedthl, AIR 1973 
SC 2658, 2659.
5. Mayne, 10th ed ., 969. In the absence of any adult male member, the senior-
most female could act as the managing member (kamavathl), ib id ., 969. In
the Allyasantana system, they are known as ejaman or ejamanthl, Ib id ., 969.
In the Allyasantana system, the eldest member of the kutumba, whether male 
or female, was entitled to be the manager, Raghavacharlar, Hindu Law, 6th 
ed ., 715.
parcener and had an economtc Interest In the tarwad . ^  He Is In a fiduciary 
position relative to the junior members and he has no larger right of ownership 
than any such members. He had absolute powers of decision so far as manage­
ment of the family property was concerned, but he could not alienate any portion
2
of the Immovable property without unanimous consent of the junior members.
3
However, he had a larger power of disposal In respect of movables.
The karnavan had a dual role to play. As the head of his sister's 
family, he had to protect the Interest of the members of that matrlllneal seg­
ment, and as a father and husband to his own conjugal unit, he may experience 
a degree of role conflict arising from external social Influences and expectations.
1. Cp. the mother's brother (U Knl) In the matrlllneal Pnar Khasl families (Kur 
or Its smaller lineage ling) of Assam Is not a coparcener. TFTe youngest 
daughter Is the heiress of the fam ily, B. Mukherjee, The Structural Features 
of the Tribal Families of India*, In G . Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, 
o p .c lt . ,  75-90 at 85. For a comparison between a karnavan and U Knl, 
see U.R. Von Ehrenfels, 'Matrlllneal Joint Family Patterns In India* In 
Kurlan, e d ., Ib id ., 91-106 at 94-5.
2. The Madras Marumakkattayam A ct, 1933, s.33(1). Mayne, 10th ed ., 980. 
'Raghavacharlar, 6th ed ., p r.6 4 l, 648.
3 . Raghavacharlar, pr.641. The Kerala HC observed that the karnavan Is the 
representative of the tarwad. He Is not the agent of the members of the tarwad 
as such, but only the legal entity called 'tarwad*, Gopala v . Kalyanl, 1964 
KLT 166.
4 . Theoretically, 'matrlllneal descent groups do not require the statuses of father 
and husband', D .M . Schneider, 'Introduction: The Distinctive Features of 
Matrlllneal Descent Groups', In D .M . Schneider and K. Gough, ed ., M atrl­
llneal Kinship, o p .c lt., 1-29 at 14. But 'there Is always potential conflict 
between the bonds of marriage and the bonds of descent*, Ib id ., 17. Schneider 
explains: * . . .  where stable marriage Is a normative element such that there Is 
strong and consistent pressure on a ll husbands and wives to be firm ly bound to 
each other, this w ill constitute a' source of strain on the matrlllneal descent 
group*, Ib id ., 17. For a discussion on ro le -confllc t, see Ib id ., 17-25. Rao 
also observes: The central point In the change of the matrlllneal kinship system
/C o n t'd . on next page:
Unnlthan  ^ points out that often hts role as a father and husband conflicted with 
his juridically-perceived role as a karnavan and as a result, strife and ten­
sion over the ro le-confllct of karnavan became the normal scene In the marumak-
kattayam families In Kerala and, particularly during the nineteenth century, the
2
authority of the karnavans came to be Increasingly challenged. These divergent 
roles of a karnavan may contain the seeds of degeneration of the joint family 
system among the matrlllneal groups In Kerala.
V . Individuation of tarwad property
3
From ancient times, tarwads split Into tavazhls, which are sub-
4
tarwads or miniature tarwads within the tarwad proper. However, It was during 
the nineteenth century that tarwad property In Central and North Kerala came to
Note 4 -  p .957 -  continued:
Is the changing basic behaviour patterns. The assimilation of the concept 
o f paternity strikes the keynote of the changing tarawad organization. This 
has resulted In the establishment of close bond of affection with one*s chl^l- 
ren and the corresponding dwindling of the tie that existed with one*s sister« 
children1, M .A .S . Rao, Social Change In Malabar, (Bombay, 1957), 203.
1. T .K .N . Unnlthan, *Contemporary Nayar Family In Kerala*, In G . Kurlan,
ed ., o p .c lt . ,  191-203 at 196.
2. C .J . Fuller, The Nayars Today, o p .c lt . ,  128.
3 . Narayana v . Sankara, (1947) Trav LR 625.
4 . IMHL, <§573.
959.
be ever more frequently divided Tnto tavazhts.  ^ It was a settled law that one 
or more members of a tarwad could not claTm partition and separate possession 
of their share of the tarwad property without the consent of a ll the members 
thereof.^
In 1908, the Marumakkathayam Committee set up by the Travancore 
Government, realised that It would be best I f  an Individual were allowed to 
realise his Interest In the tarwad through a partition, but recommended that
3
‘ Individual partition Is at present opposed to the sentiments of the community1,
and, Instead, partition could only be demanded by tavazhl. But Individuation
or conjugallztitlon was In the a ir, and a man‘s conjugal family gained Importance
at the expense of the greater extended unit. In this respect, the formation of a
tavazhl by a section of the family was the first step, and gradually a custom 
4
developed whereby property might be donated or bequeathed to a woman and
1. K.E. Gough, *Changlng Kinship Usages In the Setting of Political and Econo­
mic Change among the Nayars of Malabar1, JRAI, 82 (1952), 71-87 at 79. 
J.P . Mencher, Changing Familial Roles among South Malabar Nayars*, 
Southwest Journal of Anthropology, 18 (1962), 230-45 at 231. Fuller 
Isolates three basic factors which contributed towards the Increase In the fre­
quency of  tarwad partition: (1) growth of population; (II) young men*s ambi­
tion to become a karnavan; (111) frequency In transfer of self-acquired pro­
perty by men to their wives (sambandham partners), promoMng dispute between 
men and their matrlllneal relatives, C .J . Fuller, The Nayars Today, o p .c lt., 
126-7.
2 . Mayne, 10th ed ., 969-70.
3 . Report of the Marumakkathayam Committee, Travancore, (Trivandrum, G ovt. 
Press, 1^08) , 69.
4 . IMHL, pr. 578.
her children.^ During the nineteenth century, advantpge of this customary
practtce was Increasingly taken by Nayar men who began to use their Inde­
pendent cash earnings to build private houses, which they gave to their wives
2
and to their wives* uterine descendants In jo int ownership. However, I f
3
they failed to donate or bequeath their self-acqulsltlons, a ll such property
4
reverted to their matrlllneal property group. The custom achieved legis­
lative recognition In The Malabar Marriage Act of 1896 (N A ct N o .6 of 1896) 
which provided In section 23:
Where a man following the Marumakkat- 
tayam or the Allasantantana Law of In­
heritance dies Intestate tn respect of his 
self-acquired or separate property or any 
portion thereof, one-ha If of such pro­
perty or In the even of no member of 
his Tarwad surviving him, the whole of 
such property shall devolve on his widow 
I f  he leaves no children, or on his 
children Tn equal shares Tf he leaves 
no wtdow or on hts
1. L. Moore, Malabar Law and Custom, 3 rd e d ., (Madras, 1905), 174.
2 . K . Gough, *Changlng Households In Kerala*, In D . Naraln, ed ., Explora­
tions In the Family . . .  , o p .c lt., 225. Fuller, o p .c lt., 127.
3 . Every person governed by the Marumakkattayam or Allyasantana law of Inheri­
tance, I f  of sound mind and not a minor, could dispose of his self-acquired or 
separate property by w ill under the provisions of Malabar W ills Act 1898, 
Raghavacharlar, 6th ed ., 732.
4 . Kallatt Kunju Menon v . Palat Erracha Menon, (1864) 2 MHCR 162; affirmed 
by the majority of the FB In Govlndan Nalr v . Sankaran N alr, (1909) 32 Mad. 
351 FB. It was fe lt that the FB decision was opposed to the consciousness of 
the people, Vishnu v . Akka~mma, (1911) 34 Mad.496; Chakka v . Kunnl, 
(1916) 39 Mad.317 FB; Abdureheman v . Hyssetn, (1919) 42 Mad.761 •
widow and children In equal shares I f  he 
leaves both widow and children. 1
Similar legislation to this effect reached the statute book In Travan­
core In 1899, although It fe ll short of the Individualistic aspirations of the 
Nayars
The Travancore and Cochin legislatures passed statutes concerning
marumakkattayees, not on a general basis applicable to a ll marumakkattayees,
but on a caste basis. Consequently, there remained many marumakkattayees
In the Travancore area who did not come under any statutes and followed their
customary law unttl modified by the enactment of the Hindu Succession A ct,
3
1956. In 1913, the first Travancore Nayar Act allowed the wife and child­
ren! of a Nayar dying Intestate to Inherit one-half o f his self-acquired pro­
perty, while the other half merged with the feietrlllneal joint property.
The provision -  obviously a compromise -  fe ll short of the Marumakkathayam 
Committee*s recommendations and of the demands of the Nayar reform leaders.
1 • Section 24: ‘Where a woman following the Marumakkattayam or the 
Allyasantana Law of Inheritance died Intestate In respect of her separate 
or self-acquired property or any portion thereof, one-half of such property 
shall devolve In equal shares upon her children, In the event of no member 
of the Tarwad surviving her, the whole of such property shall devolve on 
her husband.1 The Act was a dead letter, but served as a precedent for 
similar legislation In Cochin and Travancore about twenty to thirty 
years later.
2 . Fuller, o p .c lt., 134.
3 . Moothath, *The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System Abolition B ill, 1973 -  
A  Study1, KLT (1973) J .,  91 f .
The Nayar Service Society which was founded In 1914, demanded radical reform 
and In 1925, the second Nayar Act  ^ came tnto force, allowing almost unre­
stricted partition of joint family property.
Among the Nayars of Cochin, the first legislative breakthrough was 
the Cochin Nayar Act of 1920. In respect of devolution of self-acquired
property, the provision In the Act was the same as In the Travancore Nayar Act 
of 1913. The Cochin Nayar Act (29 of 1113 M .E.) 1938, allowed further Indi­
vidualisation of property. Until 1938, men were not entitled to take Ind iv i­
dual shares of their ancestral property, but under the Act of 1938, they got 
this right. In matters of Inheritance, a man's Immediate family gained priority 
over the matrlllneal segment, and the Act provided that a man's personal Intest­
ate property, whether self-acquired or acquired by a partition from his tarwad,
2
would pass In equal shares to his mother, widow, sons and daughters. Before 
this legislation, a woman could legally claim the shares In the ancestral pro­
perty pertaining to herself and her uterine descendants separately from the rest 
of the tarwad only after the decdase of her mother, mother's brothers and own 
brothers, or of any more distant linear ascendants. The A ct allowed women to 
clatm their own Individual shares as well as those of their minor uterine descend­
ants. It also provided that, at her death, a woman's self-acquired property and 
her share from the tarwad property would pass In equal shares to her sons and 
daughters.3
1. Travancore Nayar A c t,  (2 o f 1100 M .E .), 1925.
2 . Cp. Ss. 19-24, The Madras Marumakkattayam A ct, 1933.
3 . Cp. Ss. 25-28, The Madras Marumakkattayam A c t, 1933.
The Madras Marumakkathayam Act (Act No.22), 1933, s.38,^ which
granted tavdzhy partition, was applicable to a ll marumakkattayees tn Madras
State. The Act was amended by the Madras Marumakkathayam (Amendment)
A ct, 26 of 1956 (Kerala), s .9, whereby tndtvtdual rtght of partition was con-
were
ferred on a ll persons who/Sjovemed by I t .  The Kerala Nayar Act, J958, dtd
contribute to loosening the rigid character of Nayar family structure. The
Madras Allyasantana (Mysore Amendment) A ct, 1961, by s .5, Introduced a new
2
section (s.37A) Into the Madras Allyasantana A c t, 1949, and granted the
members of a kutumba or kavaru an unrestricted right to claim partition and
3
an absolute Interest In the per capita share from the date of such claim.
1. S.38(1): *Any tavazhl represented by the majority of Its major members may 
claim to take Its share of a ll the properties of the tarwad over which It  has 
power of disposal and separate from the tarwad:
Provided that no tavazhl shall claim to be divided from the tarwad 
during the lifetime of an ancestoress common to such tavazhl and to any o th er tavaz 
- i  ortavazhls of the tarwad, except with the consent of such ancestress,
I f  she Is a member of the tarwad.
(2): The share obtained by the tavazhl shall be taken by It with the Incidents 
of tarwad property.
Explanation -  For the purposes of this Chapter, a male member of a tarwad 
or a female member thereof without any living child or descendant In the 
female line, shall be deemed to be a tavazhl I f  he or she has no living fe­
male ascendant who Is a member of the tarwad.*
2 . The Act conferred a right to partition properties on a ll the members of the 
kutumba, but the basic matrlllneal concept of Allyasantana customary law 
was not disturbed by the Act, Jalaja v . Lakshml, AIR 1973 SC 2658, 2659.
3. IMHL, 360, n .7 .
The effect of this legislation was that gradually the tarwads became 
shallower and narrower with lesser generational depth and Included fewer dis­
tantly related k in . But It was not predominantly a case of social change 
through legal change; In fact, social change and legal change went hand In 
hand. In some Instances, It seems that the legislation was giving legal 
va lid ity  to emerging social norms. For example, In much of Travancore, 
tarwad division was occurring on a large scale even before the passing of 
the 1925 Act* Although much land was theoretically Impartible and In­
alienable, It was being sold or mortgaged.^ § n South Malabar and Cochin, 
the great majority of tarwads were divided between Individuals or between
tavazhls soon after the Acts In the 1930s. In most tarwads which had not
2
divided their property, ‘ .partition suits* were pending In the courts. Joan 
Mencher Informs us that many of the larger tarwads began to divide their pro­
perty Immediately after the 1933 A ct, and by i960 a ll the large tarwads In
3
Malabar either had been partitioned or had cases pending In courts. In
1. T .C . Varghese, Agrarian Change and Economic Consequences: Land Tenures 
In Kerala, 1850-1960, (Calcutta, A llied Pubis., 1970), 99-100.
2 . K. Gough, *Nayar: Central Kerala*; ‘Nayar, North Kerala*; T lyyar:
North Kerala*; ‘Mappllla: North Kerala*; The Modem Disintegration of 
M atrlllneal Descent Groups* In D .M . Schneider and K. Gough, e d ., M atrl­
llneal Kinship, o p .c lt . ,  298-442; 631-52 at 646. Also the same observation 
In her study of the Nayars of Palakkara, (1949-1964), Central Kerala,
*Changlng Household In Kerala*, In D. Naraln, e d ., o p .c lt . ,  218-67 at 226.
3 . J.P . Mencher, *Changlng Familial Roles among South Malabar Nayars*, 
Southwest Journal of Anthropology, 18 (1962), 230-45 at 237.
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the Cochtn tarwad studied by ChTe Nakane, the first division was made In 1898 
and the final partition of the property by Individual members was In 1944. ^
These anthropological data justify the legislative measures, and also prove that 
joint living or joint ownership of property was Increasingly dying out and being 
replaced by an Individualistic norm.
V/. Nambudlrl joint family (lllam)
A traditional Nambudlrl household Is a patrilineal stem fam ily.
2
It Is suited to long-term ownership of Impartible manorial estates. The
lllam property concept Is Integrated with the marriage customs of the Nambu-
dlrls. In order to maintain the lllam property Intact, only the eldest son was
3
allowed to marry a Nambudlrl woman and beget Brahmin children. The 
younger sons of a Nambudlrl lllam remained members of the aatal household 
with rights of maintenance In the lllam p’ operty. The non-Brahmln wives of 
the younger sons and their children had no right In the property of the Nambudlrl
1. Chle Nakane, *The Nayar Family In a Disintegrating Matrlllneal System*, 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 3 (1962), 19-28 at 21.
2. Gough, “Changing Household In Kerala*, In D. Naraln, ed ., o p .c lt . ,  
230. Derrett, IMHL, ^574 .
3 . Joan P. Mencher and Helen Goldberg, *Klnsh!p and Marriage Regulations 
among the Namboodlrl Brahmans of Kerala*, In G . Kurlan, e d ., The 
Family In India, o p .c lt., 291-316 at 294.
/
family.^ These marriage rules restricted the number of legitimate heirs and
2
minimised the pressure to partition the family estate; I f  only the eldest son 
could produce an heir to the family estate It would never have to be divided. 
This extreme emphasis on primogeniture and complete denial of any rights to 
the non-Brahmin wives (sambandham partners) and their children might con­
form to the values of a medleavel landed aristocracy and religious e lite , but 
In the modern context, they are nothing but discriminations on the ground of 
caste and sex and causes of feckfessnes and frustrations among the younger sons 
of the fam ily.
From the beginning of the 20th century, pressures arose among the 
Brahmans, as among other Castes, for Individual control of private earnings, 
and for Individual claims to property. This social aspiration found ex­
pression In the Cochin Nambudlrl Act of 1939, by which a ll Nambudlrl men 
were permitted to marry within their Caste and to claim on behalf of their 
conjugal families separate shares In the estate. The non-Brahmtn wives and 
children of Nambudrlrls were also permitted to claim maintenance and the 
right to Inherit the property of their husbands and fathers.
1. O f course these women and children had their rights In their own tarwad. 
That Is why Nambudlrl system of property ownership should not be studied 
In Isolation. In kin terminology, marriage patterns and In property owner­
ship, the Nambudlrls form a part society within the larger social context 
of Kerala, Mencher and Goldberg, o p .c lt., 294.
2. C .J . Fuller, The Nayars Today, o p .c lt., 3 .
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V I I .  Ezhavas
Among Ezhavas It was a traditional custom that a ll brothers married 
a single wife In fraternal polyandry. Such an arrangement yielded only one 
set of children In each generation to Inherit the property of the joint fam ily.^
Although they were roughly patrilineal, their joint families neither f i t  Into the
-  2Mltaksara type nor Into the typical matrlllneal category. The Ezhavas had
no birthright or pious obligation.
By the 1920s, the custom of fraternal polyandry had fallen Into dis­
approval, and under the Cochin Makkathayam Thlyya Act of 1940, a ll members 
of the patrilineal joint family were permitted to claim separate shares of the 
ancestral property. The Act also permitted daughters, and the widows of the 
deceased male members, to claim such shares.
VIIf. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 and the Kerala Joint Families
The tarwads and tavazhls, kutumbas and kavarus, and IIlams were 
severely shaken by the Hindu Succession A c t. Section 7 of the Act provides
1 • Commenting on the fraternal polyandry among the Khasas, R .N . Saksena 
says: ‘Fraternal polyandry also leads to the setting up of an Intense form 
of jo int fam ily. Due to the absence of ” male jealousy”  and the high 
status given to the eldest brothers, a ll other possible causes of dispute 
among the brothers that may split the family are eliminated1, ‘Marriage 
and Family In the Polyandrous Khasa Tribe of Jaunsar-Bawar*, In G . 
Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, o p .c It,, 107-17 at 113.
2 .  IM H L , f  5 70 .
that when a Hindu to whom the Marumakkattayam, Allyasantana or Nambudtrt 
law applies dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession A ct, the un­
divided Interest of such a Hindu shall devolve by testamentary or Intestate suc­
cession ander the provision of the HTndu Succession Act and not according to 
Marumakkattayam or Allyasantana or Nambudlrl law. It does not need re- 
empha&lng that the Mltaksara coparcenary with Its survivorship rule outlived 
the Hindu Succession Act under certain statedcondlttons, but In the matter of 
succession to the Interest of the member of a tarwad, tavazhl, kutumba, kavaru 
or lllam , survivorship was abrogated. However, succession Is a matter that 
opens after the death of the propositus and until such ttme, a ll the rights of 
the members of a joint fam ily, e .g . right to a partition, the right to Impugn 
alienation e tc ., remain operative.^ Both patrilineal and matrlllneal fami­
lies needed the abolition of birthright to put an end to the joint fam ily system, 
and this was precisely what was not done In the Hindu Succession A c t. Thus, 
as Tn the Mltaksara system, and In Nambudlrl and Marumakkattayam systems as 
w e ll, the jo int family with a ll Its rules survived the Hindu Succession A c t.
1. For example, s .7(1) of the HSA says nothing whatsoever as to the nature of 
the Interest held by a marumakkattayee In the property of his tarwad during 
his lifetim e. Despite the enactment of the HSA, It remains an undefined 
and undivided Interest, Dhanalakshm! Bank Ltd ., Trlchur v . Neelakantan 
NambudTrlpad, 1964 KLT 219.
IX . Post-Independence Social Revolution and Kerala
The local legislation Tn Kerala and the Hindu Succession Act were 
legislative measures Intended to bring about an egalitarian society, but the 
most fundamental causes for change should be sought In the po litica l and con­
stitutional reforms that have taken place In India In the past three decades. 
However, significantly, Kerala experienced the post-Ind!ependence social 
revolution Tn a special way. High literacy and high unemployment, com­
bined with the coming Into power of the Communist and Socialist Parties, 
heightened the process of po litica l socialisation which ran counter to the 
tradlttonal status quo of the familial Institutions. The Governments, led by
or In partnership with the left-wing parties,  ^ Introduced various social and
2
economic measures, such as, land reforms.
Apart from these external factors, the matrlllneal jo int family as an 
Institution was disintegrating from w ith in . If we take the case of the Nayars, 
we realise that the tarwad regime was relevant only for a few. One does not 
fa ll to notice that Nayar society Is polarised between Nayar aristocracy and
1. The Communists came to power In the first election but since 1959, Kerala 
has mostly been ruled by unstable Congress-led coalitions, alternating with 
periods of direct rule from New D elh i.
2 . The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, which came Into force In January 1970, 
fixes a celling (approximately 15 acres on average) on a households land -  
owning. A similar reform was first proposed by the Communist Government 
of 1957, but the Nayar Service Society and the Christian churches opposed 
the government's proposal.
the Nayar masses, and the majority o f these Nayar masses are poor peasants 
and agricultural labourers who were continuously In process of establishing
nuclear families. Again, the suppression of the In itia tive and aspirations 
of the enterprising members of the matrlllneal complex by the autocratic 
karnavans led to conflict and tension w ithin the family organisation and gradu­
a lly  the tarwad failed to function as a viable social and economic un it. This 
was yet another reason for the division of joint family property and the establish­
ment of smaller households by separated members.^
The socially oppressed members of the Nayar aristocracy and the
economically Impoverished Nayar masses found common ground with the
socially disadvantaged Ezhavas, Pulayas, Parlahas, and other polluting
Castes, and gave a new but dynamic momentum to the socio-economic changes 
2
In Kerala. They realised that their survival depended on the transformation 
of the established economic Institutions, and particularly on a change In the 
pattern of land ownership by family units. Thus, the politica l situation Influ­
enced the social scene and the fam ilia l and social factors were crying for 
po litica l decisions. In Kerala the time was ripe for a legislative In itia tive
for legal change Tn fam ilial organisation, which Indeed found expression In
3
The Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) B ill, 1973. The B ill was passed
1. A .C . Mayer, Land and Society In Malabar, (O .U .P ., 1952), 131-7.
2 . T .K .N , Unnlthan, ‘Contemporary Nayar Family In Kerala*, Tn G . Kurlan, 
ed ., The Family In India, o p .c lt . ,  191-203 at 200.
3 . On this, see P. Parameswaran Moothath, *The Kerala Joint Hindu Family 
System (Abolition) B ill, 1973 -  A  Study*, KLT (1973) J . ,  91-5; 99-101. 
Derrett, *Law Reform In Kerala*, KLT (1974) J . ,  2 -6 .
Tn the Kerala State Legislature and The Kerala Joint Hindu Family System 
(Abolition) Act 1975, 30 of 1976, received the assent of the President on 
10th August, 1976.
X . Summary of the relevant provisions of the Act
Section 2 ofthe Act defines the jo in t Hindu fam ily. For the pur­
poses of this A ct, a joint Hindu family means any Hindu family with community 
o f property. This Includes the tarwad, or tavazhl of the Marumakkattayees,
Kutumba or kavaru of the Allyasantanas, llloms of  the Nambudlrls and undivided 
Hindu families of the Mltaksara law.
In Section 3 ,  the Act abolishes birthright, which provides that, 
after the commencement of this A c t, birth In the family of the ancestor w ill 
not confer any right to property •
Section 4(1) puts an end to jolnt-tenancy In the Mltaksara joint 
family and converts It Into a tenancy-In-common, each member thereof holding 
his or her share separately as fu ll owner, as I f  a partition had taken place among 
a ll the members. However, having regard to the spirit of Hindu jo int family 
life , the proviso to the sub-section safeguards the right to maintenance, to 
marriage and funeral expenses, or to residence, out of the coparcenary property.
Section 4(2) deals with Hindu joint famlltes other than Mltaksara 
families, and provides that on the day this A ct comes Into force a ll members of
1. The provisions of the A ct (ss.3,4^7) are crltlcsed by P.B. Menon for their ambiguity 
and, particularly s.3 leaves some extra*-judicial loopholes, ‘Some Stray Thoughts 
on the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolltlon)Act, 1975, Act 30 of 1976*, 
KLT (1977) P t.17-18, J .,  37-38.
such families w ill hold the family property as tenants-In-comm on, as If  a parti­
tion of such property per capita had taken place among a ll the members; and 
each one of them would hold his or her share separately as fu ll owner.
Section 5 abrogates pious obligation of a Hindu son, son's son or 
son's son's son In respect of untainted debts of their father, father's father 
or father's father's father. However, section 5(2) guarantees the rights 
of the creditors and alienees Tn respect of debts and alienations contracted 
before the commencement of this Act.
X I . Comment on the Act
The main provisions of the Act (ss. 3 , 4 , 5, and 6), In fact, contain 
the provisions (ss.86-89) In Part V  of the Hindu Code B ill (L .A . B ill 42 of 
1947), as amended by the Select Committee; which provisions were abandoned 
In favour of the provisions In the Hindu Succession A c t.
Both from the sociological and jurid ical angles, the present Kerala 
statute Is revolutionary and, speaking on the B ill,  the Law Mlntster of Kerala 
rightly said that It was Intended to end the 'p rlm lttve ' jo int family system.^
In the jurisprudential context, the legislation Is epoch-making In the sense 
that for the first time, an Indian legislature Is expressly abrogating an 850
1. Indian Express, Delhi, 12 July, 1973, 5 .
1 2 years* old concept of birthright, which had been the corner-stone of
Vljnanesvara^ theory. Jurid ically, I f  the Hindu Succession Act epitomises
a legislative compromise with anomalous consequences, the Kerala statute,
being a legislative expression of social consciousness and economic realities,
3
Is a fine piece of legislation with Its clarity and boldness.
However, the oj»jx>rtunltf' could have been utilised to abolish the
4
Christian and Muslim jo int families as w e ll, but probably the legislature did 
not take the risk o f provoking these communities In a matter of personal law(?), 
although^ excepting In custom, In none of these communities had joint family 
law any religious foundation.
X I I . Effect of the Legislation on Joint Family System
The Act puts an end to two main substantive disadvantages of the 
joint family system.
(l) Restriction on alienation
As In the case of the manager (karta) of a Mltaksara Hindu undivided 
family, the power of alienation of joint family by a karnavan was also restricted. 
In this respect (except now In Kerala), the action of a manager Is s till determined
1. The textual authority goes back to Gautama and even earlter^to the Vedas, 
Kat)e, HD, 111, 553 , 543.
2 . Excepting the anomalous provision In s .6, HSA, and puerile device In s.30, 
HSA.
3. But see P.B. Menon, KLT (1977) J ., 37-38.
4 • As rightly hoped by Derrett, KLT (1974) J . ,  2 -6 .
by a 12] years1 old dictum laid down by the Judlctal Committee In Hunooman 
Persaud*s Case.  ^ According to this rule, the manager of a jo int Hindu family 
has no power to alienate for consideration jo in t family property so as to bind
the Interests of adult or minor coparceners unless the alienation Is made for
2 3legal necessity, or for the benefit of the estate.
The restriction on the power of the manager, which Is an Incident 
of birthright, Is repugnant to the modern concept of ownership; and an Ind iv i­
duals right of free disposition, which the seventeenth century English Levellers 
4
called *blrthrlght*, Is Indeed Inseparable from the ownership of property.
1. Hunnooman Persaud v . Massumat Babooee (1856) 9 MIA 393. One may say 
that the rule goes back to Brhaspatl,
2. Father*s alienation for legal necessity Is binding on sons, Faklrappa v . 
Venkatesh, AIR 1977 Knt. 65.
3 . The persons entitled to question an alienation of joint family property are:
(l) any coparceners, (11) any widows who took under the 1937 Act; (111) 
any mortgagee of the jo int family property; (Iv) any purchaser of an Interest 
In It ,  Critique, f  128.
4 . John Lllburne, *England*s Birthright Justified* (October, 1645), In Haller, 
Tracts on Liberty In the Puritan Revolution, III, 261, cited by C .B. Mac- 
pherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, (O .U .P ., London,
1962), 137, n .2 . Lllburne listed In 1646 the basic rights of man: *Llberty 
of conscience In matters of Faith, and Divine worship; Liberty of the Person, 
and Liberty of Estate: which consists properly In the propriety of their goods, 
and a disposing power of their possessions*, Macpherson, ib id ., 137. Overton 
also understood the right to property to be a ‘propriety . . .  people have In their 
goods to doe with them as they list*, quoted by Macpherson, Ib id ., 138. 
AIsoW , Markby, Elements of Law, (Oxford, 1885), 247,
975.
The restrictions were also hindrances to business In itia tive  ^ and 
commerce, and a manager had no power tpjbllenate family property for the
purposes of starting any trade or Industry, however lucrative It might be,
-  -  2 unless the proposed trade or Industry was the kulacara of the family; and It
Is needless to point out that In a technologically Innovative age, many In­
dustries would fa ll outside the kulacara of traditional business families.
Indeed, as Derrett has rightly obsdrved, the Privy Council rule In Hunnoman
3
Persaud*s Case ‘ turned out to be an Iron cage*, for managers, but the re­
strictions on the power of alienation could be used by an unscrupulous manager
1. Critique, 9 122.
2. Sanyas! Chdran Mandal v . Krlsnadhan BanerjT, AIR 1922 PC 237; Benares 
Bank v . Harl Naraln, AIR 1932 PC 182; followed Tn context of lllam and 
tarwad In K .M . Narayanan Namboodlrlpad and Others v . Vadakkedath 
Manakal Sankaran Namboodlrlpad and Others, AIR T947 Mad 76. F.B.
In an Interesting |udgment, the Madras High Court recently observed that 
when a father ‘sells ancestral property In order to discharge an antecedent 
debt, It would be binding (on the son) even though the antecedent debt had 
been contracted for starting a new business*. The family was agricultural 
but starting a new business, like the bus In this case and raising loan for 
purchasing the bus, cannot be called avayavaharlka, Rajan v . Kanlkonda,
AIR 1975 Mad 117 at 118. Cp. Sankarananarayanan v . the  O ffic ia l Re­
ceiver, Tlrunelvell, AIR 1977 Mad. 171; Tn this case, the debt contracted 
by the manager was not avayavaharlka as such ‘s till Tn view of the fact that 
they started a business which Is not the kulachara of the family and have In­
curred obligations therein, the minor coparceners In the family cannot be held 
to be bound by any such obligation.”
3 . Critique, £122.
as a fraudulent device against a vendee of the joint family |Droj>erty. No one 
needs reminding of dishonest law suits by erstwhile minors who have been put up 
by the managers of joint families to set aside alienations after having enjoyed 
the consideration paid by the alienee, or where the alienation had not turned 
out according to expectations.^ The abolition of birthright In Kerala has 
put an end to this state of affairs.
(II) Right to partition \
In relevant cases, a member‘s right to sue for partition against father
or other paternal ancestors In Mltaksara and Nambudlrl laws, and against mother /. ■ - *—
2
and maternal uncle In marumakkattayam law, has led to a large volume of l i t i ­
gations, putting fxessure on the judiciary which Is overburdened with cases.
It Is well known that partition suits are causes, as well as results, of animosity 
within the family organisation and, In rural areas, sometimes the whole village 
Is polarised Into feuding groups behind the disputing jxirtles and a substantial 
amount Is spent. These social evils are remedied In Kerala by the statute.
From the preceding discussion, It Is apparent that the abolition of 
birthright Is not an Issue only applicable to Kerala; It needs abrogation In the 
rest of India as w e ll.
1. Derrett, KLT (1974) J ., 2-6 at 3 .
2 . Robin Jeffrety, The Decline of Nayar Dominance: Society and Politics In 
Travancore, 1847-1908, (New York, 1976), 183-4.
CHAPTER 23.
CONCLUSION
I. The Problem
We have seen that btrthrtght runs counter to the prevailing Ind lv l- 
dualtsttc trend Tn the society; Tt ts also a fetter against economic Independ­
ence of the Individual.^ Also, we have sufficient reasons to say that within 
the existing successorlal scheme the birthright creates anomalies. Thus, while 
the sociological, economic and juristic arguments are against birthright, Its 
continuation Is not justified only because a few agricultural and business fami­
lies find It  a machinery of professional convenience. Business families, I f  
they want to pursue their trade as a family guild, are free to take advantage 
of the Company law and the law of Partnership. The agricultural famlltes,
I f  they survive the onslaught of land reform, can also carry on jo in tly without
2
birthright like the joint families Tn Bengal and Assam.
1. J.P . N alk, o p .c lt., 54. Also Peter Rowe, ‘ Indian Lawyers and Political 
Modernization*, Law and Society Review, 3 (1968-69) 2 and 3: 219-50 at 
237.
2. For distinction between Mltaksara and Dayabhaga jolnt-fam llles, see Batal 
Bala DasI v . Chabllal Sen, AIR 1974 Patna 147, 149. On the applicability 
of Dayabhaga law, Rohan Kumar v . Lachhuman Pathak, AIR 1976 Patna 287.
For a vivid picture of Dayabhaga joint family in Bengal see 
a novel by Romen Basu, A House Full of People, (Calcutta, 19 ),
II . Methodology
Now, the queitlon arises, what form would the reform take? There 
are three possibilities: (I), the Implementation of the article 44 of the Consti­
tution; (II) to have a Uniform Code of Family Law for the whole of India as a 
step toward the C iv il Code; (ITT) to abolish birthright and consequently, the 
juridical joint family In order to tidy up Hindu family law of property. The 
third, again, Is a step toward the first two,
i 2
The Constitution has a provision for a C iv il Code In article 44,
which states: *The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform
C iv il Code throughout the territory of Ind ia .1
Despite constitutional projection and juridical support for a Uniform
C iv il Code for a ll Indians, debates between protagonists of pro-reform and no-
3
reform groups s till continue.
The pioneering thought of a ‘Codlcls Indlcae*, for the ‘worshippers of 
Christ, followers of Mahomet, children of Brama1, was of Jeremy Bentham 
as far back as 1782, see S .G . Vesey-Fltzgerald, ‘Bentham and the Indian 
Codes‘ , In  G .W . Keeton and G . Schwarzenberger, ed ., Jeremy Bentham
and the Law, (London, 1948), 222. A .S . Nataraja Ayyar goes so far as to 
say that Art .44 was anticipated by Kumarlla, Mlmamsa Jurisprudence, 
(Allahabad, 1952), 31.
2 . On the Directive Principles In  general, and particularly on the debates 
over Incorporating A rt.44, see K .C . Markandan, Directive Principles In 
the Indian Constitution, (New Delhi, 1966), 106-^1
3. See Tahir Mahmood, ‘On Securing a Uniform C iv il Code*, tn Narmada 
Khodte, ed ., Readings In Uniform C iv il Code, (Bombay, 1975), 173-90 
at 173-8.
While a considerable number of jurists,^ social scientists and political
2 3Ideologues are advocating Implementation of the artic le , fundamentalists and
1. For juridical opinions Tn favour ofa C iv il Code Tn India, see K. Venkoba Rao, 
‘Revision of Indian Statutes or a Bharat C iv il Code1, (1953), 55 Bom L.R. J ., 
47-50. Derrett, Hindu Law Past and Present, (Calcutta, 1957), Preface, v;
The Indian C iv il Code or Code of Family Law*, Law Quarterly, (Calcutta,)
3/3 (1966), 137-44 at 140; RLSI, 546 ff; C ritique, 1; *Blrth Control and
the Intended Abolition of the Hindu Joint Family1, LawasTa, 4 (1973) 2: 155- 
168; The Indian C iv il Code or Code of Family Law: Practical Propositions*,
In Narmada Khodle, ed ., Readings In Uniform C lv tl Code, o p .c lt . ,  21-38,
M .C . Jain Kagzl, ‘Advisability o f Legislating a Uniform C iv il Code*, Jaipur 
Law Journal, 5 (1965), 199, R.C.S. Sarkar, ‘ Uniform C iv il Code*, Journal 
of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 3 (1969) 3 : 76-89 at 85. D. 
H lnchcllffe, The Islamic Law of MarrTage and Divorce In India and Pakistan 
since Partition, Ph.D. thesis, London University, unpublished, 1971, 424.
J .M . Shelat, Secularism; Principles and Applications, (Bombay, 1972), 126. 
P.B. Gajendragadkar, The Indian Parliaments and the Fundamental Rights,
TLL , 1972 (Calcutta , 1972), 64. K.S. Hegde, 'Welcome Address*, Tn Tahir 
Mahmood, ed ., Islamic Law In Modem India, ( I . L . I . ,  1972), 3 -4 . Paras 
Dlwan, The Uniform C iv il Code: A  Projection of Equality*, In M . Imam, ed ., 
Minorities and the Law, ILI, New Delht, (Bombay, 1972), 418-25; In the same 
volume, Ram Singh, ^Yonder Polemics of a Uniform C iv il Code*, 426-39; 
Mohammed Imam, ‘Muslim Law Reform In India and Uniform C iv il Code*, 385- 
417 at 388; M .H . Beg, *Democracy, M inority and National Integration*, 75; 
S.C. Thanvl, ‘ Indian Minorities -  Legal and Social Factors of National Inte­
gration*, 95; K.B. Agarwal, *AdvIsab!lIty of Legislating a Uniform Indian 
Marriage Code*, 440-59 at 441. P.B. Mukharjl, ‘Uniform C iv il Code*, In 
Narmada Khodle, ed ., leadings In Uniform C iv il Code, lo c .c lt . ,  3-9; also
Tn the same volume, A .B . Shah, *Why Uniform C iv il Code?1, 10-20; U.C. 
Sarkar, ‘Uniform C iv il Code for India*, 217-21.
2. But see the statement of the then Prime Minister on defence of personal laws 
of the Muslim community. She said that the guarantees provided In the Con­
stitution for the minorities would be honoured and *we w ill not tolerate any 
Injustice done to the minorities at any level*, The Overseas Hlndusthan Times,
11 January, 1973. Mohamed ShafI Qureshl, the then Deputy Railway Minister 
emphasised that any change In the existing Muslim personal law can be brought 
about only by Muslims themselves, Hlndusthan Standard, 1 January, 1973.
3 . A .A .A . Fyzee thought that a C iv il Code would hurt the feelings of a vast 
majority of Muslims In India, The Reform of Muslim Personal Law In lndla*#
Hunman 1st Review, 8 (1970), 389. Views expressed Tn the Constituent Assembly 
by Ismail Saheb, Nazlruddln Ahmed and Hussain Imam, V II Constituent Assembly 
Debates, (1949), 447-9. Also Bashir Ahmed Sayeed, 9former judge of the 
Madras High Court), *Why This Anxiety to A lter Islamic Personal Law*, Radiance,
weekly, Delhi, 30 January, 1972. On reforms of Muslim law In other parts of
/Cont*d. on next page;
sceptics are consistently opposing a C iv il Code or a Uniform Code of Family law. 
As one of these sceptics , Rajkumarl Agarwala remarks:
And shall It  not be better, more rational 
and realistic to try the other approach, 
v iz . attempt at "universality In diversity”, 
permit respective personal laws to remain 
as preserves of "ethnic and cultural Iden­
tity , ego satisfaction and the rest” w t h 
appropriate changes brought Into cure 
unsatisfactory spots In each system Indi­
vidually? 1
However, despite her opposition to a Uniform C iv il Code, she Is concerned 
about the •unsatisfactory spots1 In the respective family laws of the various 
communities which, she concedes, undoubtedly warrant reform; and It Is 
desirable that reformist zeal should be expressed In a positive tone.
Note 3 -  p .979 -  continued:
the world, see J .N .D . Anderson, ‘Codification In the Muslim World: 
Some Reflections*, Rebels Zeltschrlft (Berlln-TOblngen), 30 (1966), 247.
N .J . Coulson, Succession In Muslim Family, (Cambridge, 1971), 135-64. 
J .N .D . Anderson and N .J . Coulson, ‘ Islamic Law In Contemporary Cultural 
Change*, Saeculum, 18 (1967), 13-92. RLSI, 515. T . Mahmood, Family 
Law Reform In the Muslim World, (1972). For Hindu fundamentalists, see 
Guru Golwalker of the R .S .S ., The Motherland, New Delh i, 21 August, 1972; 
also Swam! KrIpatrI|T, al-JamI*at, dally, Delhi, 28 September, 1972.
1. R. Agarwala, ‘Uniform C iv il Code: A  Formula Not a Solution*, In T .
Mahmood, ed ., Family Law and Social Change, (Bombay, 1975), 110-44 at 
144. But cp. J . Mlnattur, *The longer a secular state applies divergent laws, 
the stronger w ill be the hurdles In the way of national Integration . ,.*,*Law 
and Religion In a Secular State*, (1976) K .L .T . J . ,  Pt.6 & 7, 14-16. Also 
same view expressed by K.S. Hegde, *A society which Is compartmentalized 
by Its laws can hardly become a homogeneous unit . .  .*, “Welcome Address*,
In Tahir Mahmood, ed ., Islamic Law In Modem India, o p .c lt . ,  3 -4 . Kamila 
TyabjT rejected reform altogether; she thought that a C iv il Code would ‘serve 
no purpose except to d ivide us*, 'Muslims, Reform and Integration*, Times 
of India, 7 December, 1969.
Between these two extremes of positivism and negativism, jurists are 
trying to find a solution In gradualism, and the prevailing mood among many 
of them is symptomatic of the Idea of Implementation of the C iv il (ode through 
gradual reform of the respective personal laws of Hindus and Muslims.^ This 
gradualism Is expressed by Derrett who states: *The logical way to proceed Is 
not, I submit, to wait until Art .44 Is put Into effect before Improving the pre­
sent statutory element In Hindu law, but to amend the Hindu law first, see It
In action, and then bring the other personal laws Into comparison and confront- 
2
atlon with I t . 1 With the same objective In mind, but In the context of
Muslim personal law, Upendra Baxl, rather vaguely demurs: *The Issue of the
reform of Muslim personal law must be severed from the Issue of the Implement-
3
atlon of the article 44 Directive*. The views of the gradualists In general
4
and Derrett*s view, as quoted above, In particular, represent a synthesis 
between the Benthamite doctrine of law as a determined agent for creating
1. See J .N .D . Anderson, ‘Muslim Personal Law In India1, In Narmada Khodle, 
ed ., Readings tn Uniform C tv ll Code, o p .c lt . ,  41 —61 at 43.
2 . Critique, f  1.
3. U. Baxl, ‘Muslim Law Reform, Uniform C iv il Code and the Crisis of Common-  
sense*, In T. Mahmood, e d ., Family Law and Social Change, o p .c lt . ,  24-46 
at 42.
4 . This Is better expressed by C .K . A llen: ‘A t least In Democratic Countries,
It Is not a process solely of command and obedience, but of the action and 
reaction between constitutionally authorised In itia tive on the one hand and 
social forces on the other*, Law In the Making, (Oxford, 1964), 427. Also, 
V.R . Krishna Iyer, Law and the People, (New~Delhl, 1972), 33.
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1 2 new norms, Inaugurated by the Napoleonic Codes , and the historical
approach of Savlgny who believed that Reform should be done slowly In re­
sponse to clearly formulated social sentiments, and ‘not by arbitrary w ill of
3
the law-glver*. In this respect, the historical school Is In company with
4
the sociologists who assert that through Instant radical reform of the law
1. W . Friedman, Law In a Changing Society, (London, 1959), 3 .
2. See the appreciative comments of A .T . Von Mehren that ‘the greatest 
achievement* of the French C iv il Code was to give France a national 
unified and coherent body of law‘ , The C iv il Law System, (Prentlce- 
Hall Inc ., 1957), 12.
I
t
3. F.C. v . Savlgny, Ueber den Beruf unserer ZeltfOr Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtswlssenschaft^ (1814), hr. A . Hayward, su b .tit., On the Vocation 
of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, (London, 1831), 30.
On Savlgny's theory, see J .E .G . de Montmorency, ‘Savlgny‘ , In 
J. Macdonell and E. Manson, ed ., Great Jurists of the World, Conti­
nental Legal History Series, V o l.2, (London, 1967), 209-11. J. Stone,
Law and Social Sciences In the Second Half Century, (University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966), 4 . K.W . Ryan, An Introduction 
to C iv il Law, (Sydney, 1962), 31. On criticism of the historical school , 
J .H . Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology with Particular 
Reference to German Politico-Legal Thought, (London, 1946), 63-65.
For a criticism of the v iab ility  of Savlgny's theory, see Hermann Kantoro- 
w lcz, ‘Savlgny and the Historical School of Law‘ , Law Quarterly Review,
53 (1937) 209: 326-43.
4 . Savlgny regarded law essentially as Volksrecht -  I .e . law Is ‘peculiar to the 
people, like their language, manners and constitution*, On the Vocation . . .  
o p .c lt., 24. Thus, law Is always organically connected with the develop- 
ment of social life 1, Kantorowlcz, o p .c lt . ,  332. The social anthro­
pologists say that law Is social life Itself, G . Cochrane, ‘Legal Decisions 
and Precessual Models of Law‘ , Man, 7 (1972) 1: 55.
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society gets a shock and hardly gets any time to adjust Itself.^ Again, 
where a legal concept creates anomalies, as birthright does, Instead of re­
flecting the social structure, *lt would serve not to contribute to the contln-
0
ulng Integration of the social system but to disrupt I t .  Thus, considering
3
the juridical and sociological factors, Hindu law needs a gradual but deter­
mined process of reform, and abolition of birthright Is justified as a step In the 
right direction.
II I. Comparative Experience
a. Towards Individualism and uniformity
We have noticed In the course of our comparative survey that, a l­
though not exactly Identical with the Mltaksara b irthright, the ancient G er-
4 5 6manic, Greek and South Slavonic legal systems showed some positive
1. I.R. Jenkins, The Ontology of Law and the Validation of Social Change1, 
Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, BNF. N r.5 , Wles- 
baden, (l968), 62. However, law can bring social change under certain 
circumstances, J .H . Beckstrom, ‘Handicaps of Legal-Social Engineering In 
a Developing Nation*, 22 Am .J. Comp.L., (1974), 697-712 at 697.
2 . E.E. Dais, *Law, Value and Validation In Basic Social Change: Some Re­
flections on the Underdevelopment Problem*, Archives for Philosophy of Law 
and Social Philosophy, BNF N r. 5 , (1968), 94~.
3 . Hasty codification has Its weaknesses. The French Code was drafted In 4 
months. Despite Its merits the haste led to many lacunae, K .W . Ryan,
An Introduction to the C iv il Law, o p .c lt . ,  29. The draft of the German 
C iv il Code took 22 years. Its systematic structure and conceptualism 
justify the time factor, Ryan, Ib id ., 32.
4 . Supra, 160-
5. S u p r a , 90. 6 . Supra,io i .
signs of corporate family ownership of property. But eventually, through the 
reception of developed Roman law, renaissance and liberalism, the Individual­
istic^Weltanschauung ^ predominant In legal science as In every field of
thought. This politico-legal philosophy went hand-ln-hand with modernistic 
trends, and In the law of property, group ownership had to give way to Increas­
ing Individualism which was also obviously suited to changing economic condi­
tions. Thus, In the c iv il law countries, starting with France,^ the liberation
2
of property from the kin group found legislative expression In the Codes.
Even In the late ‘seventies, one does not fa ll to notice the co-exlst- 
ence and conflict between mediaeval and modern values In Indian society and, 
set between tradltton and modernity, family law In India Is at a crossroads. 
Indeed, In the throes of modernisation, the experiences of the c iv il law system
1. The Code Napoleon, 1804.
2. A few examples of Codes: The German *B(Jrgerllches Gesetzbuch* of 1896;
The Austrian C iv il Code, 1811. The Swiss C iv il Code, 1907. The Greek 
C iv il Code, 1941. The Italian C iv il Code, 1942. The Ethlopean C iv il 
Code, I960. The C iv il Code of Portugal, 1967, enacted on the centenary 
of Its predecessor. The Communist countries have recodified their e lv ll laws, 
like U.S.S.R. (1964), Czechoslovakia (1964), Hungary (1959), and Poland 
(1964). For a short summary of these Codes, see K.W . Ryan, An Introduction 
to C iv il Law, (Sydney, 1962), 26ff. A .A . Ehrenzwelg, PsychoanalytlcaT 
Jurisprudence, (Lelder\/New York, 1971), 117-9. J .N . Hazard, Communist 
and Their Law, (Chicago, 1969).
3 . Derrett, The Indian C iv il Code or Code of Family Law*, Law Quarterly,
(Calcutta) 3 (1966) 3: 137-44; also, The Indian C iv il Code or Code of 
Family Law: Practical Propositions*, In Narmada Khodle, ed ., Readings In 
Uniform C iv il Code, o p .c lt . ,  21-38 at 23.
are valuable for the reformers of IndTan law. Even concerning our limited 
venture of abolishing birthright, the c iv il law system offers a stimulating 
parallel as regards unifying the law of succession. For example, a problem 
similar to the unification of the Hindu plural systems of Inheritance arose to 
confront the dfafters of the French C iv il Code.
b . The French C iv il Code
At that time, more or less like the Mltaksara and the Dayabhaga 
among the Hindus, two systems o f property ownership were prevalent In France. 
Throughout the anclen regime In France, a family concept of property prevailed. 
In the pays de droit coutumTers,  ^ that Is, the coutumes of the northern region In 
particular, an owner of property did not have the freedom of altenatlon, either 
Inter vivos or mortts causa, but he was bound to preserve the property for the 
benefit of his heirs. Also, particularly, the Institution of reserve coutumlere 
considerably restricted the power of a testator to dispose freely of his property 
upon death. Thus, Irjicustomary law, the normal mode of transmission was 
Intestate succession, which In fact, guaranteed the vested Interest of the 
natural heirs.
In the pays de droit dcrlt (regions of written law), where customary 
tradition was not followed, the Roman law of testate succession had been the 
rule and the family received much less protection from these rules as to the 
legltlma portlo than under customary law. Significantly, In the southern
! •  J .H . Merryman, The C iv il Law Tradition, (Stanford, 1969), 13.
part of France, the whole estate formed a stngte mass, distributable upon 
Intestacy In accordance wTth Justinian *s Novels; but In the north, as In 
the case of Hindu coparcenary and separate property, Intestate succession 
varied with the origin and character of property. ^
2The object of the Code was to unify the private law of France and, 
In the sphere of property, the codlflers realised that reconciliation between 
the customary and Roman principles was Impossible and the result was a victory 
for the 'Roman system • The object of the codlflers was to secure the maximum 
possible division of property and to treat the heirs, theoretically, according to 
the principles of egalltef even though It Involved curtailment of the testator's 
liberte". However, the Code gave a ll Frenchmen a large measure of freedom 
In dealing with property. The French experience of modernisation and the 
rationale behind the reform may serve as a parallel Inspiration towards the 
abolition of birthright, the concept behind the group ownership of family 
property.
1. K.W . Ryan, An Introduction to the C iv il Law, (Sydney, 1962), 27-8.
2. J .H . Merryman, The C iv il Law Tradition, o p .c lt., 29,
3 . Cp, the proposals for codifying a C iv il Code In Indonesia In 1962. Some 
were In favour of retaining the customary law, others In favour of written 
law to be borrowed from abroad to suit the modem conditions, S .L . Daniel, 
The Lady and the Banyon Tree: C iv il Law Change In Indonesia1, In An 
Introduction to the Study of Comparative Law, ILI, (New Delhi, 1975), 
o p .c lt , ,  97-, ‘ }00.
c . Franco-Htndu law
By the French arrete of 6th January, 1819, the C iv il Code of France
was extended to French India, but the arrete made It clear that Indians, whether
Christians, Muslims or Hindus, should be judged, as In the past, In pursuance of
the laws, usages and customs of their Caste ✓and community.^ But French
jurists like Sanner were disturbed by the ‘miserable* subtlety and ‘unjust dlscrtmt-
2
nation between sexes1 of the Hindu law-glvers and they conveniently over­
looked this arrete and advocated that, In French India, the rights of the Hindus 
In relation to property should be like the rights of Frenchmen In France. In 
their anxiety to Ignore the Hindu law principles and Import French notions, 
Justice Maharajan remarks: that
the Hindu law notion that a son acquires 
Interest In the joint family property by 
birth has been done away w ith . Accord­
ing to French jurisprudence so long as a 
Hindu father Is a live, he can sell his 
properties for good consideration, be­
cause he Is the sole and exclusive owner 
of the properttesbf the fam ily. His 
sons would have  ^no power to tmpugn ^ 
his sales so long as the sales are genuine.
1. Justice Maharajan, ‘Administration of Franco-Indian Laws -  Some Glimpses*, 
JILI, . 15 (1973) 1: 122-37 at 131. Cp. Warren Hastings Plan of 1772 and 
Plan of March 28th, 1780, RLSI,232.
2. J . Sanner, Droit c iv il applicable aux Htndous dans les establlssements franqals 
de l*lnde (The C iv il Law Applicable to Hindus In French India), (Pondlchery,
1916-17), cited by Maharajan, Ib id ., 130.
3. Maharajan, Ib id ., 131. For bibliography on Franco-Hlndu law, see RLSI, 
283, n . l .
However, the French courts have trted to do equity by permitting 
sons to file  suits restraining fathers from wasting their properties.
The French authorities established a Comltd'Consultatlf (Consulta­
tive Committee) composed of representatives of different Castes of Hindus 
whose opinions on questions of the sastra were considered but not always 
accepted by the French judges.^ It Is Indeed Interesting to note that to­
wards the concept of a son's birthright vis-a-vis g ift and bequest by his father
the approach of the French judicial administration varied according to their
2
cultural and ‘psychological conditioning*. In respect o f a Hindu father's
power of making a g ift or a bequest, the French jurists like Sanner attempted
to apply the French concept of Veserve* from the C iv il Code; that means a
Hindu father could not dispose of by g ift or bequest more than half a share
I f  he had one child , more than one-third If  he had two children, and more
3
than a one-fourth share I f  he had three or more children. The Indian 
judges opined that Hindu law provided for a certain portion of property which 
a father could dispose of by way of g ift or bequest. They pointed out that a 
custom prevailed among the Pondtchery Hindus based upon a text of Brhaspatl, 
which provided that a father could donate whatever was In excess of what was
1. RLSI, 282-3.
2. Maharajan, o p .c lt., 131.
3 . Maharajan, o p .c lt., 131. Cp. Germanic law, supra, 130.
4 . Text cited by Leon Sorg, Avis du Comite Consultatlf de Jurisprudence Indlene, 
(Pondicherry, 1897), 322.
necessary for the ‘conservation* o f the fam ily. On the basis of this text, 
the Comltg'Consultatlf gave an opinion on 13 December, 1871, that a Hindu 
could not make a w ill or g ift of more than 1/8 share of his properties. The 
French jurists preferred, In the language of the C iv il Code, to ca ll this 1/8 
quotlte'dlsponlble and the balance as the *reserve‘ , but the Indian judges 
considered It to be a Hindu custom recognised from time Immemorial.
Whatever might be Its juristic basis, the whole argument hinges on 
son's birthright vls-a-vts father's power of dealtng with family property. A l­
though birthright as such was not recognisable In Franco-Hlndu law, the 
jiwfttcTal
French/idmlntstratlon could not completely do away with the wider Implica­
tions of the concept as It concerned family property. The courts had to admit 
that the father had no power to make a g ift or bequest beyond 1/8 of the family 
property.
But It Is to be admitted that, In French India, a son had no power to 
demand partition from his father and In an alienation of family property for 
consideration, a father was absolutely free. Due to the absence of b irth­
right, the Hindu notion of pious obligation had no part to play tn French
India.^ Thus, we notice that there the Mltaksara law was modernised ' *__
partly through the Influence of French juristic thinking and partly through 
the Influence of the French C iv il Code.
1. Maharajan, o p .c lt., 131.
d . Luso-Hindu law
W ell Into the modern pertod the Htndus of the Portuguese terrTtortes 
tn India were governed by Htndu law substantially as administered by the 16th 
century pre-Portuguese Muslim rulers.  ^ In matters of Inheritance, accord­
ing to customary law, sons excluded daughters. The Foral of Alfonoso MexTa 
2
of 1526 mentions that, according to the then rule, a daughter could not 
Inherit; and, In default o f a male heir, the property of a deceased passed to 
the Treasury. This shows that sastrlc law was not applted to these Hindus.
It was not palatable to the Hindus that, In default of male heirs, their pro­
perties should pass by escheat to the Treasury and they tried to persuade the 
Portuguese king to decree that the law of Portugal should apply to descent 
and distribution of Hindus* estates. A fter 1691, the Portuguese law dtd
apply to the Hindus but, Ironically, this gave the daughters equal rights of
3
Inheritance wtth the sons, a state of affairs again not liked by the Hindus. 
During the eighteenth century the Hindus repeatedly failed In their attempts 
to get the old customary rule that sons exclude daughters reinstated. They 
did not want their estates to pass to the Treasury In default of male heirs but, 
to prevent that, they did not like their property being Inherited by daughters 
either. The Portuguese could not satisfy this Hindu demand and Portuguese
1. RLSI, 282.
2. Cited by Derrett, RLSI, 282.
3 . Derrett, ‘Hindu Law In Goa: a Contact between Natural, Roman and Hindu 
Laws‘ *ZVR 67 (1965) 2; 203-36^; rept. Essays In Classical and Modem Hindu 
Law, (Leiden, E .J . B rill, 1977), II, 131-65 at 140.
law rematned Tn force; tndeed, tn 1880, HTndu law as such was aboltshed
In favour o f the Portuguese C iv il Code.^ O f course, the Htndus Tn some
cases by-passed the Portuguese law and the HTndu preference for male hetrs
tn thetr herttable system was achieved through a deed of transfer of their
2
shares by the sisters Tn favour of their brothers. However, the applica­
tion of the Portuguese C iv il Code to the Hindus proved the fact that even 
as early as the 1880s, Htndus could adjust to an alien Code of law,
IV . Recommendation
In the ultimate analysis, I t  appears that the advantages of birth­
right are outweighed by disadvantages. It Is time for Parliament to abrogate 
this antiquated concept and In the light of our preceding observations, we 
suggest a b i l l .
Proposed B ill :
THE JOINT HINDU FAMILY SYSTEM ABOLITION BILL
An Act to Abolish the Joint Family System Among the Hindus In India
Preamble:- WHEREAS It  Is expedient to abolish the joint family system 
among the Hindus In India;
BE It enacted In the . . . .  year of the Republic of India as 
follows:-
1. RLSI, 282.
2. Dereett, Hindu Law Past and Present, (Calcutta, 1957), 53.
Short t it le ,  extent and commencement:-
(1) This Act may be called the Jotnt HTndu Famtly Abolition Act . . .
(2) It extends to the whole of India.
(3) It shall come Into force on such date as the Government may,
by notification In the Gazette, appoint.
Definition:-
In this A ct, ‘Joint Hindu Family1 means any Hindu family with 
community of property and Includes -
(1) an undivided HTndu family governed by the MTtakshara 
law.
(2) any undivided Hindu family based on custom with the 
Incidents of coparcenary or ancestral property.
Birth to give rise to rights In property abolished:- On and after the 
commencement of this Act, no birthright shall be recognised Tn any 
property.
Explanation:- Birth In this section also means adoption and the doc­
trine of relation back In respect of property Is abrogated.
Joint tenancy to be replaced by tenancy In common:- On the day this 
Act comes Into force, a ll members of an undivided Hindu family governed 
by the MTtakshara law or by custom, holding any property as joint ten­
ants shall hold such property as tenants In common as If  a partition had 
taken place among a ll the coparceners and each one of them shall hold 
such property as fullowner thereof.
Provided that —
Nothing tn thts Section shall affect the right to maintenance 
or the right to marriage or funeral expenses out of the copar­
cenary property and such expenses shall be borne by the 
tenants In common proportionately to their shares In the co­
parcenary property which existed before the commencement of 
this A c t. This Act w ill also not affect the right of residence, 
I f  any, of members of an undivided Hindu fam ily, other than 
persons who have become entitled to hold their shares sepa­
rately.
Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act abrogated:-
(1) After the commencement of this A ct, Section 6 of the Hindu 
Succession Act w ill have no application In the matter of 
succession.
(2) The estate of a Hindu dying Intestate w ill pass at his death 
In equal shares to the hetrs as provided by Section 8 of the 
Hindu Succession A ct.
Section 30 of the Hindu Seccesslon Act abrogated:- On and after the
commencement of this Act any Hindu may dispose of his property by
w ill In accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession A ct,
1929. (39 of 1925).
Pious obligation of Hindu son abrogated:**
(1) On and after the commencement of this A c t, save as provided
In sub-section (2), the doctrine of pious obligation of son,
994.
grandson and great grandson for the debts of theTr male 
ancestors shall be deemed to be abolished.
(2) Sub-section (1) of this section shall not affect the rights 
of a creditor or any other person In respect of debts con­
tracted before the commencement of the Act and any such 
right can be enforced as I f  this Act had not been passed.
8 . L iab ility  for debts contracted before the Act not affected:- Where a
family debt has been contracted before the commencement of this Act 
by a manager of a Hindu joint family, nothing herein contained shall 
affect the lia b ility  of any member of the family to discharge any such 
debt and any such lia b ility  may be enforced by the creditor against 
a ll or any of the members liable therefor In the same manner and to 
the same extent as It would have been enforceable before this Act.
9. Repeal:- Save as otherwise expressly provided In this A ct, any text, 
rule or Interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of 
that law In force Immediately before the commencement of this Act 
shall cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provi­
sion Is made In this A ct.
o o o o
V . Epilogue
It seems that for the present we are to remain satisfied with the abo'
lltlon of birthright; however, It Is Imperative that In the near future India
w ill have to unify the family laws as a step toward the Implementation of
article 44 of the Constitution. The unification of family law Involves
taking Into consideration the personal laws of communities like Jews,^
2 3Armenians, Parsees, and the tribes, but of particular Importance are the 
laws of the two major communities , namely, Hindus and Muslims. In 
both these communities, there are orthodox fundamentalists, but at the same 
time, there are ample progressive elements on both sides who want moderni­
sation of their personal laws.
1. The general ischeme of Inheritance laid down In the Indian Succession 
A ct, 1925, Is applicable to Christians and Jews, Part V , ss.29-49.
2 . The Indian Succession A ct, 1925, furnishes a distinct scheme of Inheritance
for the Parst Community, ss.50-56. Mrs. Meher Rohlnton Master-Moos 
opines, In the context of the personal law of the Parsees, ‘ that personal and 
religious laws should not be merged In the miasma of general c iv il laws appli­
cable to a ll persons In India*, The Personal Law of the Parsees with Reference 
to a Proposed Family Law Code*, In Narmadla Khodle, ed ., Readings In Unl- 
form C iv il Code, o p .c lt., 116-69 at 169.
3 . For example, Nalk examined a ll the customary laws of the Important tribes 
of Madhya Pradesh and recommended to the Government that the provisions 
of the Hindu Code B ill should not be made applicable to the tribes at least 
for 20 years. T.B. N alk, ‘Applied Anthropology In India: A  Trend Report*,
In A Survey of Research In Sociology and Social Anthropology, V o l. I I I ,
Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi, (Popular Prakashan, 
Bombay, 1972), 240-81 at 258.
Although these arguments have become stale, Tt needs to be re­
emphasised that the Htndus have realised that sastrlc precepts cannot be
their only juridical guidance.^ There Is little  room for doubt that *the
2
dharmashastra Is a complete science, like any other shastra,* but In the
modern jurisprudential context, It Is seen *as some kind of mammoth dug from
the Siberian snows, Its thousand-year-flesh to be fed by bits and pieces to 
3the judges . Even In their contemporary setting, the dharmasastras,
as a literary law elaborated by an e lite , seem to have had an oblique Influe­
nce on most of the customs that governed the everyday life of the Hindus.
It Is Indeed conceivable that local customary practices have often Imitated 
Brahmintc standards, and conversely, the dharmasastras also gradually Incor­
porated norms that eventually acquired the authority of the sacred law; but
4
their origin lies more In customs than In Immutable texts. Thus, classical
1. A  comparable example Is the Hindu state of N epa l. For two centuries, a
Code of Hindu law (Mulukl A in), based on the ancient texts, was applied In 
the courts of Nepal. But In 1963, a new legal Code was promulgated which 
established equality before the law. The Code forbade certain forms of 
caste distinctions, legalised Intercaste marriages, prohibited polygamy, and 
guaranteed to women new rights relating to divorce and Inheritance, D.E. 
Smith, Religion and Political Development, (Boston, 1970), 101. Josh I and 
Rose, Democratic Innovation In Nepal, (Berkeley, 1966), 474-5.
£
2. Derrett, Hindu Law Past and Present, o p .c lt., 9.
3 . Derrett, Critique, 10.
4 . R. Llngat, tr . Derrett, The Classical Law of India, o p .c lt., 202-4. RLSI, 
157-64. R .M . Unger, Law In Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social 
Theory, (New York/London, 1976), 113. In this respect, Ludo Rocher*s ob- 
servatlon Is worth noting: *We are not among those who believe that the more 
recent dharmasastras were composed with the Intention to Innovate and depart 
from what had been said by the older ones. On the contrary, we are con­
vinced that the more recent authors tried their very best to maintain the
/C o n t'd . on next page:
Hindu law was not dtvorced from soctal realttTes. ^
Durtng the commentatortal epoch, there are ample examples of mani­
pulation of the texts. Vtjfiane^vara, like some other authors, often cites 
second-grade texts of doubtful authority and for some of his famous propositions, 
namely, those regarding the nature of property and the character of the Joint
family estate, he really relies not on the doctrines of the Sastra, but rather
2
upon popular usage, which for him was a good source. Thus, It has to be 
conceded that the Joint family law that we see today ‘has grown out of a few, 
exiguous, and not unambiguous Sanskrit texts, developed, expounded, and
3
meanwhile manipulated by doctrines from English common law and equity.*
Fundamentalist Hindus should accept the fact that the sages did not 
consider the sastra as the only source of law; they gave pride of place to
Note 4 , p .996 -  continued:
general scheme laid out by their predecessors. But In the meanwhile, 
the actual situation did change, and every now and then authors of more 
recent dharmasastras could not prevent themselves from reflecting some of 
these changes*,'’’Lawyers” In classical Hindu Law*, Law and Society Review, 
3 (1968-69), 2 and 3: 383-402 at 399.
1. See B.S. Cohn, ‘ Notes on the History of the Study of Indian Society and 
Culture*, In M . Singer and B.S. Cohn, ed ., Structure and Change tn 
Indian Society, 3-28, 7 -8 .
2. Derrett, Vljnanesvara and the Future of Hindu Law*, Allahabad University 
Law Journal, 2 (1967), 4-11 at 9.
3 . Derrett, *Btrth Control and the Intended Abolition of the Hindu Joint Family*, 
Lawasla, 4 (1973) 2: 155-68 at 160.
sadacara (good custom) as w ell.^  Nor did the rsts consider law as something
2 3static or Intangible , and Manu himself said: ‘Distinct are the dharmas of
the krta Age, distinct In the treta and the dvapara Age, distinct In the ka il
4
Age, because of the worsening of those Ages.1
Indeed, no one could put more effectively the principle of evolution
5
and orientation of laws In accordance with changing social conditions.
Considering the need for reform, H .V . Pataskar, the then Law M in i­
ster, told the Loksabha In 1955 that the time had come for man-made law,
responsive to changing social needs, to replace ‘Immutable* divine law. He
pointed out:
But this Is not the proper time to con­
sider what Manu said 2,000 years ago 
divorced from Its context with the pre­
sent time. . . .  What Is known as Hindu 
law at present Is entire ly different from 
what was laid down by Manu or Yagna- 
valkya or any of those other sages cen­
turies back.
1. Manu, 11.12, Llngat, C L I, 14-17. Derrett, RLSI, j.
2. Llngat, CLI, 184.
3 . Manu, 1.85: anye krta yuge dharmas tretayam dvapare y u g e / anye ka il 
yuge nrnam yugarupanusaratah f f  also Parasarasmrtt, 1.24.
4. Tr. Derrett, CLI, 184.
5 . S.S. Dhavan, ‘Secularism In Indian Jurisprudence1, In G .S . Sharma, ed ., 
Secularism: Its Implications for Law and Life Tn India, ILI, New Delhi, 
(Bombay, 1966), 102-38 at 106. Also CLI, 184-9.
He added: ‘Society ts never static and, sim ilarly, law also must not be so .‘ ^
Again, those Hindus who s till believe that the ultimate source of 
2
their law Is the Vedas, should look at a particular hymn of the Rg Veda 
where they may find that perhaps the fountain of Hindu law flows from 
ethnography as much as, as It Is thought, from the mouth of Brahma:
Who verily knows and who can here 
declare I t ,  whence It  was born and 
whence comes this creation?
The gods are later than this world's 
production. Who knows, then 
whence It first came Into being?
He, the first origin of this creation, 
whether he formed It  a ll or did 
not form It ,
Whose eye controls this world In 
highest heaven, he verily  knows 
I t ,  or perhaps he knows not. 3
Now we come back to Muhammadan law. Theologically, the tenets 
of the Qur 'an are Immutable to the Muslims, but teleologtcally Islam has no
1 • Quoted by D.E. Smith, Religion, Politics and Social Change In the Third 
World: A  Source Book, (New York, 1971), 81.
2. Vedo ‘k jillo  dharma-mulam /  In this respect, Medhatlth! on Manu, 11.6,
enumerates amongst the sources of dharma the practices of the sadhus:
Vedo ‘khllo dharma-mulam smrtl-sfle ca tad-vldam, acaras" calva sadhunam
atm an as tustlr eva ca. However, the acaras"of the sadhus coalesce with »• • _
customs, Llngat, CLI, 180.
3. R.V. X.129, 6-7, tr. R .T.H. G riff ith , The Hymns of the Rlgveda, (Benares, 
1897), II, 576.
conflict with progress. There are Muslims who are of the opinion that:
The Holy Qu ‘ran and the Sunnah de­
p ict events and certain answers to the 
questions as they took place and arose 
while the Book was being revealed.
As nobody can comprehend the In fi­
nite variety of human relations and 
situations for a ll occasions and for 
a ll epochs, the Prophet of Islam left 
a very large sphere free for legisla­
tive enactments and judicial deci­
sions even for his contemporaries who 
had the Holy QuVan and the Sunnah 
before their eyes. This Is that prin­
ciple of Ijthlhad or Interpretative 
Intelligence working within the 
broad framework of the QuVan and 
the Sunnah. 2
The fundamentalists hold the view that derivation of legal rules 
through reason (Iji' lhad) leading to consensus (Ijma) among the learned was
1. For a discussion, R.J. ZwT Werblowsky, ‘Progress and Stagnation: the 
Dllemas of Islam1, In his Beyond Tradition and Modernity, (University 
of London, 1976), 61 —82~ Also Asghar A ll Engineer, "Causes of Mis­
conception of Muslim Personal Law‘ , In Narmada Khodle, ed ., Readings 
In Uniform C iv il Code, o p .c lt . ,  191-216. Ahmad Zakl Yamanl,
Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues, (Jidda/Kara ch i, Rajab 1388 A .H .) .
2 . The Introduction of the Report of the Commission on Marriage and Family 
Law, Pakistan, 1955, quoted by D .E. Smith, Religion, Politics, and 
Social Change In the Third World: A Source Book, o p .c lt., 76. Cp. the 
orthodox reply to this by Maulana Ihtlsham-u-Haw: ‘ Perhaps our Intro­
duction-writer does not know that the QuVan Is the sacred Word of God 
and embodies his Divine Guidance, who has the fullest knowledge and 
embodfes prescience of every epoch from the beginning of time to Its end‘ , 
Smith, Tbtd., 76-7,
1 0 0 1 .
a ‘gate ‘ that was closed after the death of Ibn Hanbal (c . 855 A .D .) J  The
Pakistan Marriage and Family Law Reform Commission seems to rehabilitate
the doctrine of Ijtahad and the gate of Ijtahad was Indeed thrown wide open
by the High Court of West Pakistan In Rashida Begum v. Shabad Din and 
2
Others, In which Muhammad Shafl, J . observed:
There are some traditions which take 
away the human beings away from 
this world. It Is a good thing to be 
spiritual but Islam does not allow It  
to be taken to absurd extreme. . . .
In any case, the traditions require 
thorough research and minute exami­
nation on absolutely new basis.
I am further of the view that the exe­
gesis o f the bbly QuVan should be 
developed by the judges as well as 
by the chosen representatives of the 
people by a subtle method of reason­
ing and analogy In the light of the 
given fact. 3
The Indian Muslims too can take a lesson from this progressive and 
enlightened observation of the High Court of West Pakistan.
What Is needed at the present moment In India Is this: In order to 
modernise and unify personal laws, the communities should come together on
1. E. Adamson Hoebel, ‘Fundamental Cultural Postulates and Judicial Law­
making In Pakistan*, American Anthropologist, 67 (1965) 6, Pt.2, 43-56 
at 50.
2 . PLD (W.P.) 1960 Lahore 1142.
3 . PLD (W.P.) i960 Lahore 1142 at 1173-4.
a secular plane,  ^ and should try to find common grounds Tn thetr personal laws.
To achieve a common objective, the communities need a certain amount of
2
self-crltlcism, which Indeed every society needs to preserve Its humanity 
and to keep pace with changing situations. What w ill unite the Islamic 
MJlama and the Hindu dharmasastrln, Is not reliance on the orthodox Inter­
pretation of the QuVan or on mummified and quasl-sacrosanct texts of the 
sastra, but on the c iv ic  habits and human aspirations of the people In con­
junction with a programme of substantive justice Tn fam ilial relations.
This search for the latent and living law Includes the legal sense as 
well as the moral sense of a society. It Is fo lly  to enact as law any propo­
sition which does not have the backing of the moral sense of the majority of 
the population. The so-called Hindu Code had already drawn very exten­
sively, perhaps overdrawn, on the public's good sense Inclining them to resort 
to litigation only when no other means of accommodation can be found. The
Imbalance between the law In the statute book and people's way of life has
3
resulted In large-scale avoidance of the courts. Peter Rowe Informs us Tn
1. For a scholarly discussion on secularism, see R .J. Zw l Werblowsky,
Beyond Tradition and Modernity: Changing Religions In a Changing World, 
Jordan Lectures 1974, (University of London, 1976), Ch.I and II. Also 
G .S . Sharma, ed ., Secularism: Its Implications for Law and Life In India, 
ILI, (Bombay, 1966).
2. In a brief passage of his Republic, Plato evokes a society In which men, 
reduced to animal contentment, have lost the capacity of self-crltlcism .
He calls the society the C ity  of Pigs, Republic, 372D.
3 . P. Rowe, 'Indian Lawyers and Political Modernization', Law and Society 
Review, 3 (1968-69) 2 and 3: 219-50 at 237.
his study that there Is great hostility and resistance to the Hindu Code. In 
the majority of the cases, family and personal disputes are settled outside the 
court system,  ^ and the percentage of such settlements Is as high as 98% and 
never below 80%. Cases on maintenance, divorce, and suits by a daughter 
or sister for her share of property under the Hindu Succession Act^ mostly In­
volve townspeople. It seems that villagers are simply Ignoring the provi­
sions of the HTndu Succession Act; on the other hand, they may not be fu lly  
aware of them. Dan Chekkl also found that among the Llngayats In some 
areas of Mysore, In matters of marlage, succession to property, adoption and
maintenance, there Is a greater adherence to the customary law than to the 
2
modern statutes. Although some studies show that an overehelmlng majority
3
of people favour monogamy, polygamy continues to be unlawfully practised,
and, significantly, empirical data show that Its rate Is not lower among the
4
Hindus than among the Muslims whose personal law s till permits I t .
1. Rowe, Ib id.
2 . D .A . Chekkl, 'Modernization and Social Change -  The Family and Kin 
Network In Urban India', Tn G . Kurlan, ed ., The Family In India, 205- 
231 at 219.
3 . *A Study of Opinion Regarding Marriage and Divorce', study conducted by 
Mysore University under B. Kuppuswamy Tn 1957, see Jaipur Law Journal,
5 (1965), 117, n .24. Kantl Pakrasl and A jlt  Haidar, 'Polygynlsts of Urban 
India, 1960-61', Indian Journal of Social Work, 31 (1970) 1 :49-62.
4 . T. Mahmood, 'Family Law Reform: Perspective Tn Modern India', In T. 
Mahmood, ed ., Family Law and Social Change, (Bombay, 1975), P t.l, 
93-109 at 97; the author refers to a study made at the Indian Statistical 
Institute, The Hlndusthan Times, 12 December, 1969.
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On these problems of modernTsatton of the legal system, Gunnar 
Myrdal observes:
Thus the combination of radicalism In 
principle and conservatism In practice, 
the signs of which were already appa­
rent In the Congress before Independ­
ence, was quickly woven Into the 
fabric of Indian politics. Social legis­
lation pointed the direction In which 
society should travel, but le ft the pace 
Indeterminate. Many of these laws 
were Intentionally permissive. In 
banning dowries, child marriages, 
and untouchablllty, the government 
did not vigorously seek to enforce Its 
legislation. Laws that were compul­
sory were either not enforced at a ll or 
were not enforced according to their 
spirit and Intention. 1
Avoidance of new norms by a section of the community does not Imply 
a failure of the legislation, It only emphasises the fact that society needs time 
to adjust Itself to new juridical expectations. However, In the name of 
modernisation and uniformity, law reform does not warrant a complete break 
from a people's past. In context of a possible unification of African laws, 
A llo tt opines:
1. Gunnar Myrdal, Aslan Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, 
(Pelican, 1968), I, 276. *There Is a vast difference between putting the 
law on the Statute Book and seeing that I t  Is actually carHed out*, Social 
Legislation, Its Role In Social Welfare, The Planning Commlsslon,Govern-  
ment of India, (New Delhi, 1956), 348. In context of codification In 
developing countries, this Is also the observation of A .T . von Mehren, 
The Potentials and Limitations of Codification*, Journal of Ethiopian Law, 
8 (1972) 1: 195-7 at 195.
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• . .  t f  the untform legal system ts to 
evolve tn a satisfactory manner, one 
Which expresses the characteristic 
ethos and ways of life of the people,
It Is essential that Immediate atten­
tion should be paid to the present 
customary law, which reflects, par 
excellence, the peopled own choice 
of legal system. So far as possible, 
one wants to avoid revolution In the 
legal sphere, and abrupt discontinuity 
with the past and present. What one 
seeks Is a smooth evolution of legal 
Institutions, so that the new law Is 
based on and Is In harmony with the 
old. 1
In India, to squeeze the unruly multitude Into a narrow juridical
mould would be oppressive unless their past Is taken Into consideration.
2
This means that India needs uniformity In her personal laws In order to
3
achieve the Constitutional goal and to play her part In the global
1. A .N . A llo tt, The Study of African Law1, (1958), Sudan Law Journal 
and Reports, 257-65 at 258.
2 . We are not unaware of the fact that In a country like India, with multiple 
customs and diverse personal laws, I t  Is really d ifficu lt to achieve total uni­
formity but I f  our priorities are right It Is not altogether Impossible. The 
C iv il Code of Ethiopia, 1960, contemplates three forms of marriage, C iv il, 
Religious and Customary (A rt.578-580), but In a ll three types, the effects, 
as regards personal relationship between the husband and the wife and their 
property are the same, W. Buhaglar, Journal of Ethiopian Law, 1 (1964) 1: 
73-99 at 73. But keeping diversity within a Uniform Code may frustrate Its 
desired goal. For example, In Ethiopia the Sharia courts s till exist as they 
did before the promulgation of the C iv il Code. Norman Singer points out 
that Ethiopia Is caught In a situation of ‘ legal dualism* and I f  Ethiopia wants 
to have a modern legal system an unequivocal decision must be made In the 
near future to unify Its law In the real sense, N .J . Singer, The Status of 
Islamic Law In Ethiopia*, In John Glllssen, ed ., Le PluraltSmefurldlque, 
(University of Brussels, 1972), 207-41 at 235. India can gain something 
from the Ethiopian experience.
3. On this see Rend'Davld, The International Unification of Private Law1, In 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, II . ch .5 .
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unification of private laws, but she also needs a judicious transfiguration 
of what she has Inherited Into a new form without losing the best of the 
old. Indeed, the government of the day has the prerogative to take the 
lead; but those responsible for drawing up a Uniform Code of Family Law 
must achieve a balance between religion, law, society and the stated
1. For an assessment of the respective roles of religion, law, society and the 
state In India, one must see Derrettks magnum opus*, Religion Law and the 
State In India, (London, 1968)* For comparable experiences, Izhak 
Englard, The Problem of Jewish Law In a Jewish State1, In H .H . Cohn, ed ., 
Jewish Law In Ancient and Modem Israel, (Ktav Publishing House, 1971), 
143-67; The Relationship Between Religion and State In Israel*, In the same 
volume, 168-89; also In the same volume, Amnon Rubinstein, *Law and Re­
ligion In Israel*, 190-224. Max Rhelnsteln, The Family and the Law*, 
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, V o l.IV , 3-16. M .E. 
Marty, *Secularlzatlon In the American Public Order*, In D .A . G lannella, 
ed ., Religion and the Public Order, N o .5: An Annual Review of Church 
and State, and of Religion, Law and Society, (Cornell University Press, 
Ithacq/London, 1969), 3-26; In the same volume,B.J. Coughlin, S .J ., 
Values and the Constitution*, 89-114.
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APPENDIX I
A SIGNIFICANT INSCRIPTION THROWING LIGHT O N A FATHERS 
POWER OF ALIENATION: EpTgraphTca Camatlca, 15, Supplementary 
Inscriptions. New Inscriptions from Belur Taluk, No. 320.
Vlrodhlkrtu-samvatsarada pu sudha 15 Adlvarana svastl srlmatu pratapa- 
cakravarttl Hoylsana . . .
Vamnnanu Bhandarl Adlyannasana kayyalu tatukaloclta-krayava kottu 
konda nlvesanavanu tamma aradyata . . .  
nerasl kalla nadsl kottaru adan arlyade a-Devanna makkaju Naganna 
sovamnamgalu Narasinha-devararasara munde 1 . . .  
vara makkalu paraklvu nlmma tande mad! dharma-vldhlya agadendare 
hamgadu . . .  mdu prama . . .
Tr. Derrett: *ln the year Vlrodhakrt, the fifteenth of the bright 
half of the month Pusya, Sunday ( = A .D . 1252)*. Hall*. (While) the 
mighty emperor Hoysala (SomesVara (?) was ruling the earth Devanna paid 
cash Into the hands of Treasurer Adlyanna and bought at the appropriate 
time a dwelling house and gave It to their respected . . .  and erected a 
stone. The sons of Devanna, v iz . Naganna and Sovanna, who had been 
unaware of this, went before King Naraslmha (to dispute) this . .  • those
1. Reference kindly supplied and translated for me with commentary and 
notes by Derrett.
1156.
sons, 'Take care*. You are bound not to render void the dharma-dTsposTtTon 
(the v ldhl, or precept of or for dharma) which has been made by your father", 
he said: (therefore there Is) an authority (.) . . .  1
Commentary and Notes by Derrett,
*1. Sons, not consulted In this g ift, dispute the trans ctlon, apparently 
wanting the g ift set aside.
2. The point of law asserted by the King In person Is analogous to what we 
find In Katy. (ed. Kane)slokas 566 and 642 (see Kane's notes thereon).
3 . Dharma-vldhl Is the operative ward. It can mean the Injunction 
Implied In the father's action, which the sons must respect, or the 
performance by the father of the Injunction Inherent In precepts of 
dharmasastra: on the whole I think the latter more probable.
4 . The date Is settled by material at my Hoysalas (1957), 126, 128.
5. The stone contained a record of the g ift and was a private sasana 
Issued by the father, the donor. The donee must have been a 
mathadhlpatl or the like .
6. The word nerasl, which I have left untranslated, Implies completing 
and joining, and the erection of the stone was obviously the sign that 
the transaction was completed: but I am not sure, since It stands at 
the beginning of the line, and the ends of the lines are lost, that It
Is a complete word.
1157*
7. ‘Authority*, this Is taking prama to be the beginning of pramana, 
which Is Far more like ly than the alternative, pramada (‘fo lly*).
If I am right the present stone records the decision (there w ill be a 
substitute for the donee*s jayapatra In the following lines lost from 
the Inscription, and prama(na) refers to the ‘ground* upon which the 
donee‘s title  Is now based, Irrespective of the ‘stone* we heard about 
before.
8. There Is a ;polgnancy In the story for which a knowledge of Hoysala 
history Is required. Somesvara Hoysala had been chased out of the 
Tamil country In that very year. Our Inscription Is at Haleb Id, 
which Is actually the Hoysala capital Itself, Dorasamjlra. Somesvara 
had only recently returned there after a long absence. He brought 
with his his son Naraslmha, a lad of fourteen or so , which was signi­
ficant, since In a few years, after the father went away to Kannanur 
again, the boy was an under-klng representing his father In the Deccan, 
roughtly equivalent to the modern Mysore. The boy acted In a judicial 
capacity In our case while he was s till hardly more than a princeling. 
And of course he would take the view that one must uphold the dharma 
dispositions of one‘s father*. In fact, he proved a fa irly  good sub-king, 
and we have no evidence that he let his father down. See the appro­
priate chapters of my Hoysajas, and remember that I did not have this 
dated Inscription available to me when establishing the dates and 
movements of the royal family at that very critical period.*
